HL Deb 27 June 1916 vol 22 cc404-14

THE EARL OF CROMER rose to ask—

  1. 1. Whether His Majesty's Government can give any further information as to the events which have recently taken place in the Arabian Peninsula.
  2. 2. Whether it is proposed to publish any Papers as regards the recent operations undertaken against the Sultan of Darfur.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, I should like to offer a few words of explanation with regard to the two Questions which stand in my name. The accounts which have appeared in the newspapers about events in Arabia, which have all the appearance of being authentic, are extremely important. They are also, I think, very satisfactory; and I may add that they are all the more welcome because they are rather unexpected. They are important, because anything which affects the political status of the Holy Places touches very nearly the interests of the whole Moslem population; and amongst the Moslem population I need hardly remind your Lordships that there are a great many million British subjects. They are satisfactory, because although we have no detailed information on the subject I hope and believe that the action taken by the Sherif of Mecca and those associated with him is an indication that they place the most implicit confidence in the declaration which was very wisely made by His Majesty's Government a year or so ago that they had no sort of intention of interfering with the independence of the people of the Hejaz. Not only are they satisfactory, but they are, as I have said, somewhat unexpected; because although the whole of Arabia has been more or less in a state of chronic revolt for many years past, if anybody acquainted with its affairs had been asked whether there was likely to be a revolt, he would have replied in the negative. It did certainly appear that the success unfortunately gained by the Turks at Kut-el-Amara was likely to nip in the bud any idea of revolution in Arabia. However, that has not been the case; and it is another object-lesson to be added to the hundreds that have gone before showing how utterly impossible it is for any European to foretell what is going to happen in the East. All we know is that we may invariably expect the unexpected.

Since I put on the Paper the Question relating to the Arabian Peninsula. I have seen in the newspapers that there have been revolts of the Arabs against the Turks at Kerbela. Kerbela is near Baghdad, and it contains the shrine of Hussein, son of the celebrated Khalif Ali; and the city is regarded with almost as great a degree of sanctity by the Shiahs as the rest of the Mahomedans and the Shiahs regard Medina and Mecca. I cannot complain if I get no information on this subject, as I did not mention it in my Question, but if the noble Marquess can give any information it would be very welcome to those interested in the affairs of the East.

My other Question is in connection with the affairs of the Sudan. We have had, unfortunately, during this war to deplore a good many failures and disappointments both in the field of diplomacy and in the field of military operations. It is therefore especially pleasing to be able to dwell on a success. In the Sudan a very remarkable success has been achieved, not merely the military success to which I have alluded in the Question but a success in the realm of the civil administration. Consider what the position of the Sudan was at the beginning of the war. It is an enormous country, as large as France and Germany put together, perhaps larger; the difficulties of communication are very great, the climate is extremely trying, and the population, as we know from the experience of the last few years, is very often turbulent. The whole of this country under all these conditions has been governed by a mere handful of civil and military employees, many of them young men who have only recently left the Universities or the military colleges. They have been aided by an altogether insignificant force of British soldiers; but in spite of all this, there has not been in the Egyptian Sudan proper the smallest disturbance of public tranquility since the war began. That, I think, is a very remarkable achievement, and I do not know that it has been as fully recognised in this country as it ought to have been. I am not by any means complaining that it should not have been noticed by the Press, because as far as my own experience is concerned it is always a sure indication in countries like Egypt and the Sudan that matters are going well when the Press never alludes to the officials concerned either by way of praise or blame. At the same time I think a little timely encouragement from His Majesty's Government would be welcome.

The state of affairs in the Sudan is one of the greatest indirect compliments that has ever been paid to the wisdom and beneficence of English administration. Moreover, it affords the most ample justification for the lines on which our general Imperial policy is conducted. I may say it also shows the very great wisdom which Lord Salisbury displayed when some few years ago he laid down the general lines on which the Sudan was to be governed. The arrangement then made was full of anomalies and might have been riddled with criticism by political theorists, but it was singularly calculated to meet the requirements of the case, and it has in fact proved a great success. The utmost credit for all this is due to Sir Reginald Wingate and to the officers under his command, and I think it is impossible to speak too highly of the services they have rendered. Let me in fairness also add that I think a great deal of credit is due to the Public Offices in London—not for what they have done but for what they have very wisely abstained from doing. I shudder to think what might have happened if any attempt had been made by Departmental officers to govern the Sudan from this country. It is very probable that we should have created under those circumstances as much confusion in Sudan affairs as appears, from what we have heard this afternoon, to have been created in the wool trade.

Recently Sir Reginald Wingate and his officers established another claim to our gratitude. The Sultan of Darfur, Sultan Ali Dinar, has always been a most unsatisfactory and uncomfortable individual. For a great many years he was kept pretty well in order, mainly through the influence exerted on him by Slatin Pasha. Slatin Pasha, being an Austrian, was obliged to leave the British service directly the war broke out, but that ought not to obscure the fact that during a great many years he gave most loyal and efficient service to the British Government. Whether it was his withdrawal or other reasons, I do not know; but the fact remains that recently the Sultan of Darfur adopted an extremely hostile attitude. Sir Reginald Wingate very wisely and courageously did not hesitate for a moment what to do. He undertook military operations against the Sultan. I see in his place my noble and gallant friend Lord Grenfell, who can speak with greater authority than I can on the difficulties of campaigning in the Sudan. They are unquestionably very great. The climate is very trying, and the difficulties of transport and supply are enormous. In this particular instance the railhead reached only to El Obeid in Kordofan, and Sir Reginald Wingate's force had to advance 300 to 400 miles to El Fasher, the capital of Dar-fur. All this was accomplished with success, and I must say that I think a more brilliant little military achievement has rarely been accomplished in these Eastern countries. I hope, therefore, that His Majesty's Government will see their way to publish Despatches in order to enable us to judge of the details better than we can with any information we have now in our possession.

LORD GRENFELL

My Lords, I am glad that the noble Earl has asked these two Questions, and as regards the latter I am very pleased to bear testimony to the extraordinary ability with which the Sirdar, Sir Reginald Wingate, conducted these operations. I do not think anybody knows the present Sirdar better than do Lord Cromer and myself. He served under me for a period of eight or ten years, and we both served under the œgis of the noble Earl (Lord Cromer). The difficulties of this expedition were very great indeed. I know something of these expeditions when I have commanded in the Sudan. On this occasion, as Lord Cromer has mentioned, the great difficulty was the long distance between the base at the railhead, which was about 350 miles away from the place of the operations. There was little water and nearly all the well-holes had to be re-dug; there were no roads, and at one part they had to pass through a dense forest. The sand was so deep that only camels could be used for transport. There is an idea that a camel will travel a great while without water. That is the greatest possible mistake; he requires a great deal more water than one would expect, and the difficulties of transport are therefore enlarged. To reach El Fasher the expedition had to pass through a part of the Sudan which is inhabited by Arabs whose loyalty was rather doubtful, and I think the diplomatic qualities of Sir Reginald Wingate were greatly displayed by his being able to get through this difficult and dangerous region without any hostilities whatever. There were no Europeans except the English officers who commanded in the Egyptian Army, and perhaps I might be allowed to pay a tribute to Colonel Kelly, who commanded under Sir Reginald Wingate. I do not wish to allude further to the question which Lord Cromer has raised, but I am very glad to have had the opportunity of saying what I have; and I am sure your Lordships will agree with Lord Cromer and myself as to the great success achieved and the wonderful foresight exercised by the Sirdar, Sir Reginald Wingate, in this very brilliant campaign.

VISCOUNT BRYCE

My Lords, I hope I may be permitted to add two or three supplementary questions to those which my noble friend Lord Cromer has addressed to His Majesty's Government with regard to the state of things in Arabia. In the first place, I should like to inquire whether any information can be given us with regard to the state of the Hejaz railway and the number of troops which the Turks at present dispose of in Palestine and Syria. As your Lordships are aware, the only means which the Turkish Government have, since they have been cut off from the sea, of communicating at all with Medina and Mecca and that part of Arabia is by the Hejaz railway; and no doubt one of the chief objects with which Abdul Hamid spent such an enormous amount of money on the construction of this railway was to have a means of communication with those parts apart from the sea. The railway was made largely by German engineers, and although it is only a single line railway it is very well laid, and it has the advantage of having very few bridges for the simple reason that there are no rivers. There are viaducts here and there, but except in one or two spots there is nothing above a brook; therefore in that respect the railway is easy to maintain. I should like to know whether there is any truth in the statement in to-day's newspapers that the forces of the Sherif of Mecca have torn up part of the railway line to the north of Medina, and therefore made it impossible for the Turks to get to Medina and relieve that city by means of the railroad.

Another point on which I would like to have information is the state of things in Syria. We hear very little about Syria, which seems to have been completely bottled up by the Turks; but what little we do hear goes to show that the country is suffering terribly from famine and disease, and from the cruelty exercised by the Turks upon any of the Arab population whom they suspect of disaffection. As your Lordships know, there has long been a smouldering disloyalty towards the Sultan among the Arab population, and although it is strongest in the wandering tribes it extends to some extent into Syria, and I believe it has given occasion to unparalleled severities by the Turks in that part of the country. Lebanon, which is the most prosperous as well as the most beautiful of the Turkish regions because it enjoys an almost complete autonomy and is therefore better governed than any other of the Turkish dominions, is said to be in a state of misery; and the last vestiges of the beautiful forests which grace its slopes are being destroyed to provide fuel because no coal is available for the service of the railway.

Then I should like to ask whether we can be told anything about another question which is of great importance but about which it may not perhaps be thought desirable to give any news at this moment—I refer to the attitude of the Arab tribes in Irak and along the upper portion of the Persian Gulf and near Basra. If we could have such information it would also be of considerable interest. It would be important to know whether the action taken at Mecca has had a sympathetic, effect on those Arab tribes and is inducing them to take up a more friendly attitude towards us than we have reason to believe has been the case during the recent Mesopotamian campaign. I need hardly say that my questions are put only in the hope that His Majesty's Government may feel it consistent with the public service to give us such information as they possess.

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE

My Lords, I fear that so far as the part of the noble Earl's Question which relates to Arabia is concerned, I cannot add very much to the information which has appeared in the Press and which your Lordships no doubt have read. We have not seen that information altogether with surprise. As my noble friend very truly stated, it has been OUT point of view all through that the Holy Places both in Arabia and in Mesopotamia must be secured under Moslem control, and as soon as it appeared that the Turkish Government, under foreign influence and under something like German control, was ceasing to represent the Moslem world in the truest sense, it became obvious that a rising such as has lately occurred was by no means impossible. The Turkish Government has been for some time past losing its real validity as the representative of Islam, and, that being so, nobody has the right to feel surprised at what has occurred among those who regard themselves as the true representatives of the Moslem faith. It is equally true that we can none of us refuse our sympathy with those who endeavour thus to throw off an alien yoke. And there is a further reason—I do not think it has been mentioned by any noble Lord—why we are sympathetically disposed towards the Arabian efforts to free themselves from Turkish domination. The pilgrimages have been of late greatly and of necessity interfered with. As noble Lords know, thousands upon thousands of His Majesty's subjects go from India and from further East on pilgrimage to the Holy Places, and its seems, I hope, likely that what has taken place in Arabia will render it far more easy to encourage the renewal of the Hadj, which had been interfered with to a great extent by the necessary blockade of the Turkish ports on the Arabian coast.

As regards the point raised by my noble friend below the gangway (Viscount Bryce) concerning the Hejaz railway, we have no reason to suppose that the report which is mentioned of a cutting of a portion of the railway is untrue, but we have no further information regarding it than what has appeared in the public newspapers.

As to Syria, we have, I am afraid, confirmation of the deplorable state of things in that country. Great severity has been exercised by the Turks under Djemil Pasha against a number of Syrian notables who became suspect to the Turkish Government. At least twenty persons of importance were condemned to death, and a number of others were imprisoned or exiled. But apart from that, there is the terrible condition of things which was indicated by my noble friend. The Turks appear to have formed a regular cordon round the Lebanon district and to be practically starving the population inside that cordon, depriving them of the necessaries of life. Representations, I believe, have been or are being made by the United States Government to the Turkish Government, pointing out what a departure from the ordinary proceedings of civilised Governments is involved in action of this kind, and it is difficult to see what other step it is possible to take for the relief of these unhappy people. Bearing in mind the fate of Armenia, it is impossible not to feel the gravest disquiet at the possible fate which may threaten the inhabitants of Syria. We, of course, and also the French, although greatly interested in the lot of the Syrian Christians, are also concerned for the fate of the Syrian Moslems, and the whole future of Syria is one which naturally causes us the deepest concern, and we can only hope that the successes which may be obtained in the different parts of the world in the military field may assist in settling this question.

As regards Kerbela, we have no very special information beyond that which has been mentioned by the noble Earl opposite. It appears to be the case that the Turks attacked Kerbela, actually firing shells at one of the famous shrines, and it may be assumed from this that a considerable part at any rate of the Arab population of that part of Mesopotamia are in hostility to Turkish rule—by no means an uncommon thing, as the noble Earl knows, as between some of the Shiah population and the Turks. But as regards the wider question which my noble friend puts with reference to the general attitude of the Arab tribes in Mesopotamia in their relation to our Expeditionary Force, I am afraid I am not in a position to give him any particular or special information.

I pass to the much more satisfactory subject of Darfur and the success which has been obtained there. The noble Earl, Lord Cromer, has told us in broad outline of the recent history of that Sultanate. Sultan Ali Dinar, a quite uneducated and fanatical type of Moslem, maintained for a considerable period rather distant but at any rate correct relations with the Government of the Sudan, but in 1915 he began to show signs of resenting our rule. He refused to pay the very small amount of tribute which he had been in the habit of paying to the Sudanese Government, and he started intrigues with the tribe of the Senussi and with other Moslem elements in Africa which he thought might prove to be hostile to us in Egypt and in the Sudan. Consequently, early this year Sir Reginald Wingate concentrated a small force—he had not, indeed, a very large force at his disposal—to protect the border of Kordofan, which it seemed might not improbably be attacked from Darfur. It is well to note that the French Government, whose colony of Wadai is on the western side of Darfur, were naturally deeply interested and became somewhat concerned at the unrest shown by the Sultan of Darfur, and also at the possible consequence upon their colony of energetic action on our part. It was clearly important that we should not in any way disturb or imperil their frontier. But the real necessity of inflicting a lesson upon the Sultan of Darfur became more and more evident, and it is quite clear now that by far the best course was taken in the interests of the French as well as of ourselves. Sir Reginald Wingate accordingly determined that an advance should be made on El Fasher, and friendly communications with the French authorities resulted in an agreement that they should render on their side any help that they could. All offers of help were naturally welcome, because—as the noble Earl and the noble and gallant Field-Marshal with so much personal experience of that part of the world have described—the expedition to be taken to El Fasher was one of no ordinary difficulty. The capital of Darfur lies just about 400 miles from the railhead at El Obeid.

In the meantime the Sultan had become more and more truculent. He addressed some very violent letters to the Governor of Kordofan and the Inspector at Nahud, which is on the border. The second of these, couched in the most lurid terms and with a sort of grim humour, was addressed to the "Governor of Hell" in Kordofan and the "Inspector of Flames" at Nahud—a letter, in fact, full of the Jehad idea and calling down and announcing his determination to inflict upon all the infidels those combined punishments in this world and the next which the Moslem is in the fortunate position of being able to distribute. It was quite evident that this fanatical Arab had been misled by that propaganda completely misrepresenting the true thought and belief of Islam which has been spread all over the Mahomedan world through German agency, and of which we have had evidence not merely in Africa but also freely in Asia.

On March 16 the advance of the British force began in circumstances which, as the noble and gallant Field-Marshal has explained, were made harder through the scarcity of water. It might perhaps be asked, "Why advance at a time when water is so difficult to get; why not have waited until the rains, when movement becomes easy?" The answer to that not unnatural question is that when movement is easy for you it is easy also for your enemies; and on a line of communication of that length it is worth the risk and the discomfort to avoid the chance of that line being cut at a time when raiding parties can move freely about; the country. In the dry season they, too, are tied to short travel, and I have no doubt therefore that the General, in acting as he did, showed the truest possible sense of the needs of the situation. It was also likely that if further delay for a more favourable travelling season were incurred some of the Turkish and German emissaries, whose presence with the Senussi tribe we have already had occasion to recognise, might have found their way to Darfur and added to the difficulty of the General's task. At the same time the French made a demonstration in force on their side—that was, I think, towards the end of April; and co-operation between the forces was arranged. The advance from a place about halfway from the Kordofan border took place about the 15th, and the capital, El Fasher, was occupied on the 23rd, after some sharp fighting. Heavy loss was inflicted on the force of Ali Dinar, and he himself fled with a small following. That is, briefly, the history of what occurred. I hope that when Sir Reginald Wingate's complete report of the operations is received we shall be able to lay it before Parliament at the first possible opportunity.

Before sitting down, I desire to add the warmest possible tribute, on behalf of the Government, to what has been already said of the services rendered by Sir Reginald Win-gate and the Sudan officials, both for the very sound judgment which was shown throughout and for the careful weighing of risks without refusal to take a certain amount of hazard, which undoubtedly existed in making this move forward at the time when it was undertaken. The plan was most carefully drawn, and the execution was rapid and prompt. This is indeed just what we should have expected from Sir Reginald Wingate, who is one of the most brilliant representatives of that type of soldier-administrator of which the history of our government in India and also in Africa has given so many examples. He was admirably supported by his headquarters staff; and I should like also to add a word of commendation to those who were referred to by Lord Cromer—namely, the young officials, many of them of quite short service, who have carried on the Sudan administration with such success under the Sirdar. It is also right to remember the name of Colonel Kelly (who was mentioned by my noble and gallant friend), who made the actual march to El Fasher, and who evidently carried out the military part of the expedition with the utmost care and with the success which we are all so happy to recognise