§ *THE DUKE OF BEDFORD rose to call attention—
- 1. To the deficiency of 600 Regular Infantry officers, excluding Staff, on the mobilisation of the Regular Infantry of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force, and to ask what would be the deficiency, including Staff.
- 2. To the statement of the Secretary of State for War (House of Lords, Official Report), 6th March, 1912—
- (a) "What you would do would be to draw upon the Regular o officers belonging to other establishments at home."
- (b) "In the Peninsular War we had to make up a deficiency of officers on mobilisation, and we promoted a large number of non-commissioned officers in those days."
- 3. To ask the Secretary of State for War whether, on the mobilisation of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force, Regular officers attached to the Infantry of the Territorial Army will be re-posted to their Regular battalions in order to complete the number of Regular officers required.
- 4. Whether it is the intention to promote from the non-commissioned rank to fill vacancies in the commissioned ranks before the embarkation of the Expeditionary Force, or subsequently during the progress of the campaign; and to move for Papers.
§ The noble Duke said: My Lords, on mobilisation the Expeditionary Force will be short of 600 Regular Infantry officers, not including those required for Staff duties. To meet this deficiency the noble Viscount told us on March 6 that he has "1,571 Regular Infantry officers available—namely, 780 Regular Infantry officers now doing duty in the Special Reserve and 791 belonging to the infantry of the Regular Reserve of Officers." I wish to test those figures. The first point is to discover the total shortage of Infantry officers in the Expeditionary Force when the requisite number are withdrawn for Staff duties. The requisite number is given in detail in "War Establishments, Part I, Expeditionary Force, 1912." "War Establishments" is a War Office manual published by authority. I find in that book that there are required for Brigade and Divisional Staff 48 officers; for transport, signalling, and machine gun, 3 officers per battalion—234 officers; a total of 282. I do not propose to give the details, which would mean the reading of a page and a-half from this manual, but if the noble Viscount challenges these figures I have the detail here and shall ask to be allowed to read it in the course of my reply. Then comes aviation. This is not yet allowed for in "War Establishments." For aviation work 182 officers from all branches of the Army are required by Memorandum on Naval and, Military Aviation [Cd. 6,067]. Say that the Infantry contribute 50. That makes a total of 332. If, therefore, for Staff work 332 more Infantry officers are required, then the total deficit of Regular officers for the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force is 932. If we say, in round numbers, 900 Regular Infantry officers, we shall be well under the mark. Because this estimate does not include every Staff appointment, and it does not make any allowance for unfitness for active service. How is this deficiency of 900 Regular Infantry officers to be met on mobilisation?
§
The noble Viscount told us, on March 6 last, that he had 780 Regular officers
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serving with the Infantry of the Special Reserve, and that he was going to draw upon them in the first place to make good the deficiencies in Regular officers with the Line. But the noble Viscount forgot., when he gave the figure of 780, that he had already withdrawn all Regular officers from the Fourth Battalions of the Special Reserve except the adjutants and quartermasters, and was left with 632 Regular officers in the Special Reserve Infantry. Now, out of this number field officers, quartermasters and adjutants are not available as company officers. There are available, by the Army List, in the 74 Third Battalions of the Special Reserve 358 Regular company officers, which is not quite the same as 780, being less than half. The noble Viscount wants 900; he has got 358, and is left with a shortage of 542. He then falls back upon the Reserve of Regular Officers. He told us, on March 6 last, that in the Reserve of Officers—
There were at present 791 Infantry officers after allowing 40 per cent. for officers who for various reasons may not be forthcoming. That figure by itself would wipe out his (the Duke of Bedford's) 575,
that being the deficit excluding Staff.
§ But what is the real state of the case here? There are available in the Regular Reserve of Officers, by the statement of the Under-Secretary of State for War on March 13, 129 Infantry captains and 38 Infantry subalterns who are resident in the United Kingdom, who do not belong to any other branch of our military forces, and who have left the Army less than three years—a total of 167 to meet a deficit of 542, leaving a shortage of 375. It is impossible for the sate of efficiency to allow more than three years of complete rustiness to accumulate upon an officer who is to command a company in action within three weeks of rejoining!Again, there is the point of age. It is useless to call back elderly captains to command Infantry companies on active service after they have "got slow." To sum up the noble Viscount's figures. He has told us that he had in the Special Reserve 780 Regular officers and in the Infantry of the Reserve of Officers, after allowing for all wastage, 791—a total of 1,571 Regular officers available to make good deficiencies in the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force. But when we come to go into detail by reference to the Army List we 1056 find that, instead of 1,571 officers being available, we have 525—that is, one-third of the number given by the noble Viscount. The deficit in the Expeditionary Force is 900; the number available for wiping out the deficit is not 1,571, it is 525, leaving a shortage of 375.
§ The question I ask is, How does the noble Viscount, having exhausted all available Regular officers in the Special Infantry Reserve and in the Regular Reserve of Officers, propose to make good this shortage of 375 Regular Infantry officers previous to embarkation? To bring back a lot of rusty and elderly captains from the Reserve and put them in command of companies over the heads of senior subalterns fully qualified for the promotion which is due to them will not add to the efficiency of battalions. There are 129 captains to come back from the Reserve, so that it seems that on mobilisation companies to the numerical equivalent of sixteen battalions—that is four Infantry Brigades—will be commanded by Reserve captains. That is not desirable, although perhaps the best that can be done in the circumstances. But what is very much worse as far as efficiency goes as well as still more unfair to the Line subalterns is to bring in several hundred non-Regular officers from the Special Reserve. Bringing in non-Regular officers over the heads of Line officers previous to embarkation ought at all costs to be avoided; anyhow, the less of it the better. The effect of posting some hundreds of non-Regular captains and subalterns from the Special Reserve and Supplementary List of the Special Reserve to Line battalions on mobilisation is this. In the case of the captains, captains who have served fewer months consecutively than Line subalterns have years, and who have passed for their promotion under much easier terms, will step in and deprive the latter of the promotion due to them, for which they are qualified and to which the officers who go over their heads have no sort or kind of claim.
§ In the case of lieutenants, first lieutenants from the Special Reserve will supersede second lieutenants in the Line. The Special Reserve first lieutenants on being posted to the Line on mobilisation, however much junior they may be, rank s[...] to all Regular second lieutenants however 1057 much service they may have had. A first lieutenant from the Supplementary List of the Special Reserve who happens at his own convenience to have completed four separate fortnights of service, two months in all, will go over the head of a junior Line subaltern with nearly four years of consecutive service to his credit, and who has passed for the rank of first lieutenant in the Army. Now, as a former company officer in the Army I say at once that there is nothing I should have resented more keenly than a man who has avoided all the drudgery and hard work of military life in time of peace coming into my battalion over my head. An individual of one's own age, or very likely younger, and very probably a known failure to get into the Army, is to supersede you the moment it is a question of active service. This supersession of Regular officers by non-Regular officers on mobilisation destroys the Army as a professional career. The noble Viscount told us on March 6 last, "You would make your Expeditionary Force as perfect in officers as possible," and he proceeds to supersede the fit by the less fit, and that on the eve of active service.
§
The noble Viscount, in dealing with the Army Estimates on March 14 of last year, said—
There is no difficulty at all in mobilising as far as officers of the Expeditionary Force are concerned. But, of course, you would deplete to a very considerable extent the depôts and home establishments.
I demur to the statement that there is no difficulty at all in mobilising as far as officers of the Expeditionary Force are concerned, but I entirely agree that the home establishments and the depôts must he depleted. But what does the noble Viscount mean exactly by the home establishments? On the departure of the Expeditionary Force we are left with four Regular battalions for the whole of Great Britain and Ireland and the Channel Islands. I presume that the noble Viscount does not propose to deplete these four borne battalions of their officers. But it would be satisfactory to have an assurance from him that he does not intend, to do so. Then as to the depôts. The noble Viscount cannot deplete the depôts because he has done that already. All Regular officers belonging to the depôts leave the depots of mobilisation with the Third Battalions of the Special Reserve, and we have already
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dealt with them. There is nothing left at the depôin the way of Regular officers on mobilisation, and you cannot deplete nothing. But there is still a body of Regular Infantry officers left in the country—namely, the adjutants of the Territorial battalions. There are 207 Regular infantry officers serving as adjutants of Territorial battalions. It is these officers, and not non-Regular officers, who should join the Expeditionary Force. Home Line battalions mobilising under great pressure for instant active service abroad are no place for non-Regular officers. With the best intentions in the world they will be more in the way than anything else, because they lack all knowledge and experience, in dealing with Regular non-commissioned officers and soldiers.
§ A battalion at home has been called by the noble Viscount a feeding battalion in the sense that it has to send drafts to its linked battalion abroad. If the feeding battalion is called upon to take the field within two or three months of having despatched all its drafts, then it is in the condition described by Lord Wolseley as that of a "squeezed lemon." When Lord Card well established the linked battalion system he most certainly never contemplated squeezed-lemon battalions being used within a fortnight of mobilisation for a great European campaign. He meant them for home defence. But His Majesty's Government, whether rightly or wrongly I do not know, are credited with having contemplated the possibility of using them last summer on the Continent of Europe. It is that which makes it especially interesting to consider in detail the composition of the battalions with which the Government were prepared to embark on a European campaign. In round numbers there will be available for each home battalion, after the departure of drafts abroad, 300 young soldiers with the Colours; consequently on mobilisation 600 Reservists will be required. First, as to the serving soldiers; most of these are boys of twenty years of age with little more than one year's training. They cannot be the equals of what are often referred to as Continental conscripts, who are men of not less than twenty-two years of age and none of whom will have done less than two years' training. Again, on the Continent the whole manhood of the nation is in the Army. You cannot say that Line recruits in this country 1059 represent the manhood of the nation. It is idle to suppose that the boys serving with the Colours in the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force will not be outclassed in every respect by the Continental soldiers whom they will have to meet.
§ Next we come to the Reserve. Now, we organise our Reserve on a different plan from that of Continental Powers. They train their Reserve officers and men annually with the units with which they did their Colour service and with which they will serve again on mobilisation. We do not. We do not train our Reserve, either officers or men, annually, and we post officers and men to units in time of war with which they have never served in time of peace. Our plan ensures our Reservists becoming more and more rusty with the lapse of each year spent in civilian life without any military training. Our Reserve is of varying quality—from excellent to the reverse. The men in Section "A" who have done seven years' Colour service and have not been more than a year in the Reserve are probably the best trained Infantry soldiers in the world, but their numbers are limited. Some Reservists, and you must take the best, are required by Mobilisation Regulations, 1912, for Mounted Infantry duties in place of the Divisional Cavalry, which is lacking from the Expeditionary Force. But few of the serving boy soldiers would have been through a Mounted Infantry course, or would be strong enough to ride. They could not control one cob, let alone holding two or three others all unbroken to Mounted Infantry work. A boy cannot do a man's work in the Army any more than in any other field of labour. In the present Army Reserve many men have been passed prematurely to the Reserve after two or three years' Colour service. The exact number is known only to the Adjutant-General in the War Office. But what is known to every one outside the War Office is this, that men who have had two years' training with the Colours and spent many more, in the Reserve without any training at all are of no immediate value as first-class soldiers. Thus in the Regular Reserve you pass by degrees from excellence in Section "A" to uselessness amongst the re-enlisted Reservists in the last years of their service in Section "D."
§
The evidence given by many General Officers before the South African War
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Commission shows that Sections "A" and "B" of the Reserve proved most satisfactory on service, provided always they had had time to regain military habits, discipline, and proficiency. Field-Marshal Lord Methuen states that he found the Reserve efficient with the exception of the men in Section "D," who could not march and many of whom he had to leave behind. We rely, by the way, on Section "D" men for the Expeditionary Force. Lord Methuen adds that—
The difficulty with the Reserve is that when you bring them, as I did, up the Orange River and launch them against the enemy at once, they have hardly got to know their officers and non commissioned officers. Therefore I should say that to give a battalion a full chance the Reservists ought to be with the battalion a few weeks in the field before they are used.
Now the first-class Army Reserve was called up on October 7, and the Battle of Magersfontein was fought on December 11—nine weeks after mobilisation. There had been mobilisation at home, the voyage out, the disembarkation, the march up the Orange River, but, even after that, the Reserve was not yet at its best. Now what chance is there of the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force having nine weeks previous to going into action on the Continent of Europe? The answer is none, absolutely none. The men will not have time to get used to their new boots much less their new rifles. The problem is how to attain the maximum of efficiency in a couple of weeks with a battalion composed of a collection of 300 young serving soldiers undoubtedly inferior to Continental soldiers, and 600 Reservists some of whom may be superior and others again inferior to the troops to whom they will be opposed. The degree of efficiency to which a battalion can attain under these circumstances within two or three weeks must depend entirely on the ability and experience of its officers and non-commissioned officers. Hence the necessity of employing none but Regular officers who know how to handle and deal with Regular soldiers.
§ The noble Viscount must summon the 207 Regular officers from the Territorial Army. We remember that in the early days of the Territorial Army the type of man to make an ideal Territorial adjutant was said to be a young solicitor. Could not the noble Viscount cause lists to be 1061 prepared of young solicitors who would be ready to act as adjutants on the mobilisation of the Territorial Force, and thus set free Regular officers urgently required for more important duties abroad? No one has ever yet been able to explain the use of the Territorial Army. We have had many debates in your Lordships' House on this subject, all of which have intensified the obscurity. But this is clear—if the Territorial Army is to endanger the initial success of the Regular Army in a Continental campaign by depriving it of Regular officers, then so surely the Territorial Army as an institution becomes at once a standing danger to the Empire. If the noble Viscount reports to the Army 207 adjutants from Territorial battalions, then there is still a deficit of 168 Regular officers to be made good from the Special Reserve and by promotion from the ranks. If the noble Viscount leaves the Regular officers with the Special Reserve battalions as he told us last Thursday, then it will be 168 plus 358—that is, 526. The noble Viscount can make good that shortage by taking every Special Reserve subaltern from the Third Battalions—there are at present 500 available—and making good the further shortage by promotions from the ranks. But I have included the 207 adjutants from the Territorial Army. If the noble Viscount does not repost these Regular officers to their Line battalions, then he must make good the 207 by promotion from the ranks. As regards the Special Reserve officers I would venture to make this suggestion to the noble Viscount. Send none but subalterns to the Line previous to embarkation, and make all Special Reserve subalterns, whether they be first lieutenants or not, join at the bottom of the list of Regular officers as recruit officers. Let them join as they do now on passing for the Army. Why should the fact of not passing for the Array allow them on account of mobilisation to join senior to Line subalterns? You will thus avoid interfering with promotion in the Line, anyhow previous to the commencement of the campaign, whatever may happen afterwards.
§
Then as to promotion front the ranks. On March 6 last the noble Viscount told us that—
In the Peninsular War we had to make up a deficiency of officers on mobilisation, and we promoted a large, number of non-commisioned officers in those days.
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Does the noble Viscount propose to promote from the non-commissioned ranks before the embarkation of the Expeditionary Force or during the progress of the campaign? I cannot find instances of noncommissioned officers promoted from the ranks previous to the commencement of the Peninsular War. Perhaps the noble Viscount would kindly inform me where the records can be found. During the campaign several non-commissioned officers were promoted for distinguished service in the field and were generally appointed adjutants in other regiments. The Under-Secretary of State for War stated, on March 12, that lists of non-commissioned officers qualified for commissioned rank had already beer prepared. It is impossible to tell if an officer, a non-commissioned officer, or a man will show distinguished ability on service. In the Peninsular War they tried non-commissioned officers in the field first and promoted them afterwards. The obvious disadvantage of promoting front the ranks on the eve of embarkation is that experienced noncommissioned officers are invaluable on mobilisation, and although the commissioned ranks may be strengthened the non-commissioned ranks must be weakened by being deprived of their best and most experienced members. It may be that promotion from the ranks on an extended scale at the moment of mobilisation may impair, and not add to, the total efficiency of battalions.
§ If the noble Viscount resorts to promotion from the ranks he must give those promoted a living wage. The pay of a second lieutenant is 5s. 3d. a day; that of a sergeant-major, 5s. But when a cadet joins from Sandhurst he is not as a rule a married man with a wife and six or eight children, which is generally the case with sergeant-majors and senior non-commissioned officers. The noncommissioned officer has his uniform, boots, and other articles of clothing provided, also his rations. Then he has free quarters for his wife and children, and when the battalion moves they travel at the public expense. The moment he is promoted to commissioned rank he loses all these allowances. I presume that this question of pay has been considered, and I hope the noble Viscount will give us some information upon the point. In conclusion, I hope that the noble Viscount will do as he told us he was going 1063 to do, namely, make the Expeditionary Force as perfect as possible in officers. But that entails depriving the Territorial Infantry of the Regular officers, and not superseding Regular officers by Special Reserve officers. I have avoided any reference to the wastage of war, as my remarks apply solely to the officers of the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force previous to embarkation.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEMy Lords, I confess that experience has now taught me to tremble when the noble Duke gives notice of a Question, because it branches out into a vast variety of topics. Much of what he said dealt with matters to which this Motion does not refer. For instance, the quality of the British Reservist as compared with the Continental Reservist. It is quite true that he is not trained during his Reserve period to the extent that some Continental soldiers are trained; but, on the other hand, the British Reservist has served seven years with the Colours and is a much better trained man initially than his Continental contemporary, and that is the reason why we lay less stress on training than is laid upon it on the Continent, where the Reserve period commences after two years' training. There were other topics to which the noble Duke referred, to even touch upon which I should be taking up a great deal of your Lordships' time. I will only refer to one. He said that aviation will require an increase in the establishment of officers. That is quite true. We shall have to recruit more officers to meet the demands which aviation is making, and we are proceeding to do so. Recruiting for that establishment will be added to the recruiting for the other establishments, and as aviation grows so we must get as many officers as we can for this work. It will be satisfactory to noble Lords opposite to know that the officers of the Flying Corps are on the whole well paid. We have seen to that. As regards non-commissioned officers who may be promoted, there, again, I can inform the noble Duke that we have anticipated what he said, and his observations have therefore not fallen upon deaf ears.
Then the noble Duke went into a string of further figures, of which again I had no notice. If there belonged to your Lordships' House a noble Lord with the gifts of one of those marvellous youths to be seen in the music-halls in the capitals of this 1064 country and the Continent, who can perform astounding feats in impromptu calculation and carry in their heads strings of figures, he might be in a position to cope with the noble Duke; but I am wholly deficient in those gifts, and therefore I can only deal with the figures of which he has given me some notice, except where by chance I happen to carry some others in my head, which I fear is but rarely. The noble Duke spoke first of the deficiency of 600 Regular Infantry officers, excluding Staff, on the mobilisation of the Regular Infantry of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force. He asked what would be the deficiency, including, Staff. My answer to that is that the actual shortage in the Infantry battalions of the Expeditionary Force on March 1 last, after deducting the officers required for Staff and extra-regimental appointments, was 666. The number varies from day to day, and can no more be considered constant than the number of subalterns to be taken from each Special Reserve battalion. This number must depend on the requirements of the Regular units and on the strength in officers of the Special Reserve battalions. The authorities do not propose necessarily to take four officers from each Special Reserve battalion. If a particular Special Reserve battalion is considerably below-its establishment of subalterns, its strength may be left undisturbed.
On Monday last I told the noble Duke that in all periods of history and in every country mobilisation must be a ragged business. The immense leap front peace to war establishment, in the case of officers in particular, is always trying, even in the most perfectly regulated armies. If the noble Duke found himself in Berlin he would probably hear complaints, almost as loud and long as his own, of the system which they have there, although it is a better system, owing to their circumstances, than we have here. The actual method of filling the deficiencies in the Expeditionary Force must be determined at the time and in the circumstances of the moment, having regard to what the number may be when the need arises. Then the noble Duke called attention to what I said on March 6. I then said that what we should do would be to draw upon the Regular officers belonging to other establishments at home. The noble Viscount opposite has also called attention to that sentence. But meantime—on Monday last 1065 —I explained what I meant. I said that we should draw on the Regular establishments at home, but that that was not to be taken as meaning that we should mop up all the officers, or the greater part of them. We have no intention of taking away the Regular officers with the Special Reserve units. We have no intention of depriving the Territorial Force of its Regular officers, of its adjutants and so on. I do not think the noble Duke displayed any love for the Territorial Force in the suggestion which he made to me on that point. But I can assure noble Lords that as regards the Territorial Force our virtue is proof, as it is in the case of the Special Reserve, so far as regards Regular officers. In the course of the development of mobilisation schemes it has been found that it is not desirable that we should draw Regular officers from any establishments at home except the Staff College and other establishments which would naturally be closed on mobilisation. As I explained on Monday, we do not propose to draw away the Regular officers with the Special Reserve battalions or the Regular officers with the Territorial Force.
Then I explained that it is our intention to promote a number of non-commissioned officers on mobilisation, and we have made provision for proper remuneration for them. It is intended to give commissions to a number of non-commissioned officers to fill vacancies in the Expeditionary Force prior to its embarkation, and this source of supply may subsequently be drawn upon also to meet the wastage of war. While non-commissioned officers are very valuable, this is not an aspect in which the Army is deficient. We have always been able to maintain great elasticity in the supply of non-commissioned officers, and the Reserve is sufficiently large to enable us to make up the slight depletion which the promotion of these non-commissioned officers would occasion. I have now answered all the points as to which the noble Duke interrogated me in his Questions. I am wholly unable to cope with the torrent of figures which he poured out in his speech and to which no reference is made in his Notice on the Paper; and. I can only say again that if he wants information about these figures, many of which go into great detail, the best plan would be for him to come and see us at the War Office and we will supply him with all the in- 1066 formation he desires. I can assure him he will always be welcome.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANERegular officers.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEI can conceive it possible that we might take a particular adjutant because he was suitable, but we would always replace him by a Regular officer.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEYou cannot have in the case of mobilisation a scheme so defined that you can say whether or not you will take a particular officer or an officer in a particular arm. We should avoid doing anything which would injure the efficiency of the Territorial Force.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEThe noble Lord ought to know that it is contrary to the practice of every country but our own to give even as much information as I have given regarding mobilisation. The noble Lord's experience must show him that it is not in the public interest to probe far into mobilisation details.
LORD LOVATI decline to accept the reference to other Continental Powers. The noble Viscount said that there was equal anxiety in Berlin. Germany has a reserve of officers under the rank of major numbering 28,000; and France, I believe, has a reserve of officers of about 17,000. Therefore we have in this country every right to be anxious and to desire to pin the noble Viscount down to every single thing we can get cut of him. Moreover, a good many of our officers appear in two places. They appear in the Army List both as officers of the Territorial Force and in the Reserve of Officers. I should like to ask whether any of these can be taken away to serve with the Expeditionary Force on mobilisation.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEDo you mean Regular officers?
LORD LOVATI mean officers who have been Regular officers and who are now serving in the Territorial Force.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEI should say certainly if the interests of the country required it. In those circumstances it would be right to take them. They are not Regular officers in the sense in which I have spoken. They are officers who have been Regular officers and who have become Territorial officers, but who are still under obligation.
LORD LOVATI do not dispute the noble Viscount's wisdom in saying that he might take these officers away, but I wish to press home this fact, that the Territorial Army is to be depleted at the time of the mobilisation of the Expeditionary Force of its most efficient men. Thus the training of the Territorial Force will be deprived of its backbone. The noble Viscount said that he did not tie himself to take any particular number of officers from any of the Special Reserve regiments. All the Special Reserve regiments are short, I think, with only three or four exceptions. The inference, therefore, is that they will be entirely denuded of subalterns.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEMost of these officers who have served long enough to get a pension and are now in the Territorial Force are senior officers and of captain's standing, at all events, and there is no deficiency in officers of that sort. The General Reserve of Officers contains officers liable to serve in that rank in abundance. The difficulty is in junior subalterns, and to supply these we have called into existence the Officers Training Corps, which, as I explained the other day, now consists of 25,000, and some 18,000 have passed through it having obtained either the "A" or "B" certificate. We believe that the Corps will give us a large supply. As regards the rest, the promotion of non-commissioned officers, which the noble Lord opposite seemed to think a bad system—
LORD LOVATNo. What I said was that it is a bad system at the moment of mobilisation; in fact, at the moment of mobilisation it is an infamous system.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEit is, at any rate, resorted to in France, and it is only not resorted to in Germany because of that large reserve of officers to which I referred last Monday. On mobilisation 1068 we have to do the best we can. It is only by making use of such means as the Universities and public schools afford that we can deal with the subject, and it is not made any better by probing too minutely into details.
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDI regret that the noble Viscount will not harden his heart and take the 500 or 600 Regular Infantry officers whom he proposes to leave at home with the Territorial Force. They would be valuable for the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force. The noble Viscount has not told me where I can find the record of commissions granted before the sailing of the Army for the Peninsular War.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEI will make inquiries among those who are learned in these things, and if I can get any light on the subject I will communicate with the noble Duke. As to the question of the desirability of taking away Regular officers from the Territorial Force, the noble Duke must fight that out with the noble Lord (Lord Lovat) who sits below him.