THE ARMY.

HL Deb 20 February 1912 vol 11 cc78-132

^*THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH rose to call attention to the Report of the Inspector-General of the Forces on the Territorial Force, and to ask the Secretary of State for War if any, and if so what, measures will be taken to secure more efficiency and training in the Force.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, in calling attention to the Report of the Inspector-General on the Territorial Force I am bound to say that I sympathise very much with the position in which that distinguished General, who is a friend of mine, was placed. Not only is he a great soldier, but he is a very considerate English gentleman, and reading this Report one is struck throughout with the great desire on his part to say nothing which can unnecessarily wound the susceptibilities of a considerable body of patriotic Englishmen who are acting to the best of their ability and performing work which certainly ought to be shared by a very much larger number of their fellow-countrymen. I do not know whether, when Sir John French was asked to write this Report, it was remembered by the noble Viscount—it surely must have been remembered by Sir John French himself—that he had before the Norfolk Commission already expressed very strong views upon the questions of training and efficiency. Sir John French was one of the principal witnesses before the Norfolk Commission, and, in reply to cross-examination on the part of the late Lord Derby, made this statement—that in his opinion a year's continuous training is the least which would give a man an ordinary insight into discipline. Those being his views, he must have found it extremely difficult to say anything as regards efficiency in reference to the Territorial Force. Indeed, it is the striking and prominent feature in this Report that not one single word is said about efficiency.

I cannot do better than go through the Report very shortly and quote to your Lordships the words of Sir John French himself. Speaking as an expert in regard to the several branches of the Force, Sir John French says, as regards the Yeomanry, in Paragraph 3— With so many types—crofters, city clerks, Highland gillies, miners, farmers—there is naturally between … even squadrons of the same regiment inequality in appearance and efficiency. That is to say, he complains of there being no cohesion. In the next paragraph he says— There is still, as was noticed last year, some tendency to engage in advanced schemes of manoeuvre when squadrons are quite deficient in elementary training. And following that, the Inspector-General recommends that the course should be entirely devoted to work of an instructional kind. He mentions fire tactics, fire discipline, rapid mounting and dismounting, mutual support, advances to and retirements from fire positions under cover, security, protection, scouting, and despatch riding. What comes into one's mind when one reads this recommendation of the Inspector-General is this—How much of this can possibly be taught within the limited time devoted to actual training? Because in the same Report Sir John French tells us that the fifteen days are further reduced by Sundays, coming and going, and other causes.

Now I come to Paragraph 6, and there Sir John French says as regards the Yeomanry— Squadrons are much hampered during their annual training by recruits who are without the elementary knowledge necessary to fit them for the ranks. I want to know what is the meaning of the phrase "elementary knowledge." I ask the noble Viscount why are untrained recruits taken to camp at all, and whether the regulations for the training of the Territorial Force are enforced which were laid down at the time when the Force was set up, because one of the most prominent features in those training regulations is—and this applies to all and every branch of the Force—that no pay or allowance will be issued to officers or men who do not perform the necessary drills before annual training in camp. Is it the case that these men have not had the necessary drills before they came to camp? I should like also to ask the noble Viscount whether it would be possible—I am informed that it would not be difficult—for him to give us a return of the average number of drills, exclusive of camp training, which is carried out by the Territorials in their several branches.

The next point is the Territorial Mounted Artillery. The Territorial Mounted Artillery is the arm, says Sir John French, which will be "the most difficult to bring to a high standard of fighting efficiency," and for this purpose he goes on to say that a longer period of continuous training after embodiment than in the case of the other arms will be necessary. That seems to me to be rather a strange recommendation. Already six months is considered to be a somewhat long time in which the enemy is to wait before you are to have your Force in a state of efficiency; but, if you make it even longer than that, is it not most probable that any European war would be well over before your Territorial Mounted Artillery would be efficient and be able to be brought into play at all? Then Sir John French goes on to speak of the Royal Garrison Artillery, and in Paragraph 9 he says— The officers are the weak points in the organisation. Some of the older officers are quite out of date … but are at present indispensable owing to their local influence. I have no doubt that is perfectly true. At the same time it is a very unfortunate feature. If I may be allowed to say so, it is not the fault of the noble Viscount, but is due to there being no means of compulsion. You are not able to deal with a free hand according to the exigencies demanded to secure efficiency. Then, as regards the Infantry, Sir John French says, in Paragraph 12— The training is still in many cases too advanced considering the limited knowledge of officers and men under instruction. And as regards the Royal Army Medical Corps, he goes on to say— In most of the general hospitals the noncommissioned officers and men have a very indifferent knowledge of the first principles of first-aid.

I have gone through the Report and given your Lordships the exact words of Sir John French. He does not say one word of efficiency as regards the Force as a whole or as regards any branch of the Force. On the other hand, he feels it his duty to criticise in very severe language each and every branch of the Force, and then he goes into the question of training, on which I should like to say a few words. He points out that the fifteen days' training is practically reduced to nine, and he makes certain specific recommendations as regards certain branches of the Force. He specifically recommends that the services of Territorial Artillerymen should not be accepted for less than fifteen days' training. I know there are a great many men who have the interests of the Territorial Force at heart who would not be sorry to see this particular branch of it—the Territorial Artillery—very much reduced, if not dispensed with, so that the men who would go into that particular branch might go into other branches of the Force. There is one very striking and remarkable thing about Sir John French's Report, and it is this, that the Report ends at December, 1910, and we have had no Report since this very belated Report. However, my Lords, we have had debates in this House and we have had information given us—I admit most freely given us—by the noble Viscount in this House and by Colonel Seely in another place, and we have been able to examine the reports and statements made by the noble Viscount in the country; and I am bound to say that the result of investigating the figures that have been extracted here and in another place and the statements made by the noble Viscount elsewhere does not give us any hope that things are better since Sir John French's Report.

I do not wish to trouble your Lordships with any great detail or mass of figures, but I think the figures are eloquent and speak a great deal more forcibly than any general loose observations on the subject. I find this very unsatisfactory state of things—that in January, 1910, the deficiency of the Territorial Force in officers was 1,533; that in January, 1912, that deficiency had risen to 1,848. Now how about the deficiency in other ranks? In January, 1910, the deficiency in noncommissioned officers and men was 41,161; in January, 1912, the deficiency was 47,429. Now let us look at this from the point of view of those who absented themselves from camp altogether—that is to say, who, while nominally belonging to the Force, did not submit to even fifteen days' annual training. In 1910—these are the figures which the noble Viscount gave me in November last—there were 1,426 officers and 24,569 non-commissioned officers and men who absented themselves from camp altogether; in 1911 the number of officers who absented themselves from camp altogether had not increased very much, but had increased from 1,426 to 1,491; but the number of non-commissioned officers and men who had absented themselves from camp altogether had risen from 24,569 to over 32,000. Let us look at it—exclusive, of course, of the Permanent Staff—from the point of view of the officers and men who attended camp for the full fifteen days or more, so that we may be able to get, in a sort of rough way, some estimate as to the number of men who, even upon the very low standard of training in point of time, may be said to have fulfilled the requirements of the Territorial Force as laid down. I am sorry to say that in regard to that there is a considerable deficiency. In 1910, exclusive of the Permanent Staff, 168,175 officers and men attended camp for the full fifteen days or more; but in 1911 that number had sunk to 155,293.

These figures are, I must confess, very disturbing and disheartening, but besides these general facts affecting the whole Force we have other facts dealing with particular aspects of the Force which are also very disquieting. I was told, in November last year by the. noble Viscount, that of the Territorial Force 40,000 were raw recruits under one year's service; that 32,500 men were under 19 years of age; and, as regards the mounted forces, that at the last training nearly 13,000 Yeomanry horses were hired and that less than 8,000 horses belonged to the officers and men of the Force—and, of course, even supposing you could hire horses at the last moment, they would be strange horses and, besides, would have to be ridden by men who were untrained. That is a serious matter. Then I was also told that the Territorial Force and Field Artillery batteries were not even marked for fire tactics at annual practice—and if they are not marked for fire tactics the men cannot be of any efficiency as Artillerymen—and more than this, that during the past season one battery out of four did not fire a shot. I know perfectly well that the noble Viscount and the War Office have encountered great difficulties as regards the provision of ranges, but I should be much obliged if it were possible for the noble Viscount to tell us how many batteries fired over land ranges, because, as the noble Viscount knows perfectly well, the question of Artillery efficiency is not merely a question of hitting a thing at sea, but getting the guns into practice and the selection of positions.

I have not said anything specially about the question of musketry. I am quite aware that it would be most unreasonable to ask the noble Viscount to give us figures upon musketry. But I should like to point out that I do not think in that respect that it is so much the fault of the War Office as it is the fault of the viciousness of our system. It is really impossible to carry out musketry systematically, effectively, or efficiently except under some system of compulsion, as is the case with the Regulars and the Special Reserve. Your musketry, if it is to be valuable and useful, must be carried out collectively, but it is very difficult to get the men to come together, and it amounts to this, that the only day on which they can be got together is a Saturday. I admit that those are great, and to a large extent insuperable, difficulties in our voluntary system, and I only refer to them for this reason, that they show the viciousness of our system. We have never been able to arrive at any satisfactory system as regards musketry, and I am afraid this is due to the inherent difficulty underlying the whole of our voluntary system.

When we talk in this House of changing our system we are always confronted by the fact that we are asking for enormous drafts upon public expenditure. This is an unsatisfactory feature also about the Territorial Force, that it is becoming an expensive Force. I take the figures of the old Yeomanry and Volunteers, which is a fair comparison. Their cost for the year ended March 31, 1906, was £2,215,000 odd. The Territorial Force for the year ended March 31, 1911, cost £3,165,000. I admit that the Territorial Force in organisation, in design, and in plan is infinitely superior to the old Volunteer Force, but, at the same time, when we see how signally the Territorial Force has failed from the point of view of efficiency, it is a serious element to find the cost a considerably increasing one. I was told in November by the noble Viscount that there was no money lost over the 33,500 who failed to attend camp training, because as they were absent from camp they received no pay. That may or may not be so, but that does not apply to the general principle, because it is not an unfair inference that if those men did not receive the pay, the pay which they did not get is added to the expense of the other men. The strength of the Territorial Force is 264,000 men. If you deduct from that number the 33,500 men who did not attend camp at all, you arrive at the figure of 230,500. That figure works out to an average of about £13 10s. per man, whereas the cost of the old Auxiliary Forces averaged between £7 and £8 per man. I think it is necessary to mention the question of cost, because if we are to spend much more money upon the Territorial Force we ought to insist that we secure our money's worth by getting a really efficient Force, whatever that. Force may be. I do not myself attach so much importance to whether the Force is a large or a small Force, but, whatever the Force is, it should be a really efficient Force.

It does seem to me that this question of the Home Defence Force strikes at the root of the whole of that scheme of the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for War, which, if I may say so, was in my humble opinion an excellent scheme—that is to say, that you should have an Expeditionary Force which you are able to send abroad to assert your rights, whether on the Continent or elsewhere, at once. The question of whether you can send the Expeditionary Force out of the country or not depends upon whether you have a Home Defence Force sufficient to confront an invasion of 70,000 men—they may be 80,000 or 100,000. The Territorial Force is now asked to perform a duty which originally, when the scheme was introduced, was not placed upon its shoulders. It has to resist an invasion of picked Continental troops. The noble Marquess the Leader of the House, and, I think, the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for War, when I asked in November last what would happen if we had to send our Expeditionary Force to the Continent, said that would depend on the opinion of the General Staff. It is, of course, perfectly true that the military movements of the time would have to depend upon the strategic mind and decision of the Staff. But do not let the country suppose that they have an Expeditionary Force of six Divisions of 166,000 men when, as was implied by Lord Crewe and by the noble Viscount, very possibly two of those Divisions, or one-third of the Expeditionary Force, would not be able to leave this country. What I feel is this, that unless the Home Defence Force is efficient and has the confidence of the country we may rest assured of this fact, that, if we are ever confronted by a serious European opponent, public opinion in this country will never allow the Expeditionary Force to go, and, more than that, that the freedom and utility of our Navy will be paralysed by its being tied to our shores.

It is implied that there is among a certain class of gentlemen who are interested in Home Defence some bias against the Territorial Army. I happen to live near Bulford, and I am constantly in touch not only with Regular soldiers but with the Territorials, and I can assure the noble Viscount that I have never discovered the slightest bias of any sort or kind against the Territorial Force. The dinners which used to take place in the old Volunteer days were considered to be a very good means of bringing together the various officers and men, and I resuscitated the custom by a large dinner at Andover in November last. That dinner was extremely pleasant and convivial, but I can assure the noble Viscount that, while the Hampshire Association is one of the best of the Territorial Associations, having at its head Sir Henry Crichton, there was not one single officer at that dinner who did not hold the opinion that if you are to make your Force a living Force you will have, in some shape or other, to introduce a system of compulsion. The only bias against the Force is on the part of certain political allies of the noble Viscount, who think that the Force tends to produce a feeling of what they are pleased to call militarism.

I ask your Lordships to consider how curiously like in many respects the condition of affairs in regard to public opinion upon this matter is to what happened in France. In 1868, when unfortunately the health of the Emperor of the French was so indifferent that politics drifted into the hands of legal and rhetorical wind-bags, the French Government was fully aware of the efficiency, capacity, and thoroughness of the Prussian Army. They had had the most admirable information from their military attaché, Stoffel, at Berlin; but the French Legislature refused to establish an efficient military system. It was even with the greatest difficulty that the French Legislature established the Garde Mobile, which bore some resemblance to our Territorial Force, because there, again, there was only demanded an annual calling up for fifteen days, and Marshal Le Bœuf said he hoped to make it clear to the French Emperor that the Garde Mobile in time of peace would only be an army on paper. Well, my Lords, the war and the national disaster came, and in 1872 the French nation had, under a Republic, to establish that which they refused to recognise only four years before under an Empire.

I cannot help thinking that the fault in these matters is not so much with the War Office as with the inherent vice of our present system. The noble Viscount, if I may say so, has surpassed himself in energy, in ubiquity, in resourcefulness; every conceivable device has been brought into play to attract men into the Territorial Army. But what have we seen since this question became one of interest to the country—that is to say, since the South African War, which showed us our difficulties and our failures? We have had a succession of Secretaries of State for War, able men, honourable men, men of the greatest industry—Lord Lansdowne, the late Mr. Arnold-Forster, Lord Midleton, and the noble Viscount opposite—all men of ability, all men who, to speak perfectly honestly, have devoted themselves to the interests of the Army. But, my Lords, has there been any continuity in War Office administration? What has been the state of things? We have seen each and every successive Secretary of State trying his hand at remedying the failures of his predecessor. I do think that in fairness it must be borne out that there is some inherent vice in our system. Bricks cannot be made without straw. You cannot build up an Army without adequate training, and it is more than abundantly clear that the patriotic few cannot and will not have thrown upon their shoulders a national obligation which ought to be shared by all alike. Cannot we raise this question above the level of political expediency, as a matter of national necessity? Cannot we substitute, if I may be allowed to say so, for the almost perilous display of swagger and the pageantry of Empire of which we hear and see so much, the quiet resolve to place the power and the safety of England on a basis where it will rest respected because it will rest secure?

THE EARL OF DUNMORE rose to call attention to recent statements with regard to the armament of our Land Forces, and to ask the Secretary of State for War whether he considers that the present armament is satisfactory.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, during the recent recess some controversy has arisen upon a question which is of the most serious importance to this country, the question as to whether the Land Forces of the United Kingdom are or are not adequately armed as compared with foreign armies. Speaking at the Albert Hall in January, Mr. Bonar Law called attention to this important subject and referred to the weapons of our Regular Forces as being inferior to those of the armies of other nations. That statement has been commented upon in an adverse sense by two Ministers. One reply we have had to Mr. Bonar Law's remark is to be found in the City speech made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on February 3. With your Lordships' permission I shall give his exact words. Mr. Lloyd George, criticising Mr. Bonar Law's statement, said— He charges us with being just as bad as our predecessors in office. Well, I cannot conceive a graver accusation than that. But is the statement true? If it were true the responsibility is not ours. These weapons, such as they are—and I am sure that what he says about their quality is absolutely incorrect—these weapons, with one exception, were chosen by the Unionist Government. Those words, my Lords, contain Mr. Lloyd George's answer to a very grave indictment. You will observe that Mr. Lloyd George first of all traverses Mr. Bonar Law's statement, and, secondly, by way of an alternative plea, he, if I may use legal phraseology, "confesses and avoids" the statement by putting the matter this way. "Let us assume," says Mr. Lloyd George, "that the statement is true. Even in that case the fault lies not with us but at the door of the last Unionist Government."

Let me first of all take the plea that Mr. Bonar Law's information in regard to the inferiority of our weapons is incorrect. My Lords, I venture to say that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is in no way justified in traversing that statement. There is no doubt that our rifle is inferior to some of the weapons in use on the Continent. The weapons on the Continent have certainly a very much flatter trajectory than ours. I notice that the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for War, speaking at Gateshead on the night following the Albert Hall speech, also referred to Mr. Bonar Law's words. What line did he take? If the noble Viscount was correctly reported, he by no means committed himself to the flat denial that the Chancellor gave to Mr. Bonar Law's indictment. The noble Viscount first of all threw the responsibility for the indictment on to Lord Roberts, and then carefully, very carefully, avoiding the pitfalls connected with the rifle, asserted that Lord Roberts's criticism was probably really directed to the cartridge and bullet. Lord Haldane said—I give the exact words of the report in the Scotsman— Lord Roberts's criticism was probably really directed to the cartridge and bullet. The bullet had been criticised because it was round ended instead of sharp pointed, and it was said that it was not so effective for certain purposes, although he personally thought it a very good bullet. Lord Roberts overlooked the fact that a month before he made his speech the War Office had begun the re-armament with a new bullet. We should, he continued, in time get a new rifle which he hoped would be the best in the world. I hope the noble Viscount opposite will correct me if I have misquoted him.

I am glad to see that the noble and gallant Field-Marshal to whom the noble Viscount referred is in his usual place on the Cross Benches. I hope therefore that he will answer presently for himself. But I venture meanwhile to doubt whether Lord Roberts's criticism was directed to the cartridge and bullet, except in so far as they form part of the whole weapon of offence. The noble Viscount opposite will, I think, admit that it is not every pattern of rifle which will admit of using every description of charge. I do not think that Lord Roberts overlooked the fact that a month before he made his speech the War Office had begun what the Secretary of State for War describes as the re-armament with a new bullet; for the reason, my Lords, that our disadvantage lies not so much in the bullet as in the amount and composition of the explosive which propels that bullet, and I understand that whatever makeshift is resorted to as regards our rifle, the breech will never be strong enough to stand the strain of a charge giving sufficient muzzle velocity to gain the same low trajectory as possessed by the latest Continental weapon.

If your Lordships will allow me, I will, very briefly, compare the German rifle with ours. The Germans adopted the pointed bullet in the year 1906. The muzzle velocity with this ammunition is given as 2,882 feet per second, and the extreme height of the trajectory over a distance of 800 yards is 6 ft. 10 ins. Now if we turn to our rifle with the Mark VI cartridge—that is to say, with the ammunition with which the bulk of our troops are armed to-day—we find that the muzzle velocity is only 2,060 ft. per second, while the extreme height of the trajectory over 800 yards is 13 ft. 4 ins.—a difference of over 6 ft. as compared with the German rifle. This would mean that Infantry advancing to the attack over that 800 yards would be untouched by the trajectory of the bullet for a space of 595 yards, as compared with 320 yards with the German rifle. The re-armament of our Forces with the new bullet, which we must remember has not yet taken place, will make, I admit, some difference. With the new Mark VII pointed bullet the height of the trajectory over a distance of 800 yards is brought down to 8 ft. 9 ins. But even with this your Lordships will observe that there is still a difference in favour of the German weapon of practically 2 ft. as regards the trajectory of the bullet over this distance, with the corresponding advantage of about 100 yards less dead ground. It is therefore quite clear that our Land Forces would fight to-day at a very grave disadvantage against troops armed with the weapon I have just described—a disadvantage which will be somewhat modified but by no means abolished if the whole of our Land Forces are re-armed with the new ammunition.

Now I come to Mr. Lloyd George's alternative plea—surely the most extraordinary justification ever attempted by a responsible Minister of the Crown. He states that our present rifle and our present field gun were both introduced by a Unionist Government, and that the only weapon for which the present Government is responsible is the howitzer, which is the best in the world. It is true that the last Unionist Government introduced the rifle which was the best weapon of its time, and the field gun which, if it was brought up to date in some respects, is probably the best even to-day, only that the French gun may be superior to ours in some respects. I might also point out that the conditions to be fulfilled for quick-firing howitzers were circulated in the War Office in July, 1904, and that the last Unionist Government therefore practically initiated the howitzer for which Mr. Lloyd George takes so much credit.

But, my Lords, that is not the point. The point is that there has not been a Unionist Government since 1905. Does Mr. Lloyd George, in using this argument, mean the country to understand that His Majesty's Ministers are to ignore the improvements and changes that take place in armaments as time goes on? Because a weapon is the best of its date, are subsequent Ministries justified in shutting their eyes to further developments in that particular weapon? If that is the case, they might argue with equal force that they are justified, especially with Mr. Lloyd George in the Government, in introducing into the Army the bow and arrow of the famous Welsh archers who did such gallant and deadly service at the battles of Crecy and Agincourt. No doubt the bow was the best weapon of its day, but it is one which subsequent Administrations certainly discarded as improved weapons were introduced. Such an argument as Mr. Lloyd George employed at the City Liberal Club may do fairly well to raise a laugh at a Saturday afternoon meeting, but I presume he scarcely intended it to be taken as a serious answer to what he described as a very serious charge. It is scarcely conceivable that a responsible Minister of the Crown who has held office for upwards of six years should think he was meeting criticism on the armament of our Land Forces by referring the matter back to those who held office before His Majesty's present Government attained to power. The argument is of itself, if seriously used, sufficient to condemn the Chancellor of the Exchequer as incapable of understanding the ever-changing problems connected with the defence of the Empire.

Now, my Lords, in bringing up this subject, I would assure the noble Viscount opposite that I wish in no way to belittle the good work that he has done. I wish in no way, at any rate at present, to criticise the vast changes that he has introduced into our military system. The noble Earl, Lord Portsmouth, gave us some vigorous, and, I think, well-informed criticism of Lord Haldane's policy. Well, I cannot at present join hands with the noble Earl, for the very reason he himself gave at the end of his speech "that he wished to put this matter above Party politics." Lord Haldane has put forward an experiment. As an experiment I feel we should give it ample time and perhaps plenty of rope to either prove itself in or hang itself with. I also recognise that the noble Viscount has been forced to work within certain limitations imposed on him by the general feeling in this country, and within these limitations he has no doubt worked very hard to perfect our organisation. Whether the organisation which he has set up fulfils our military requirements is a question on which I reserve my opinion. But in the meantime I think that the people of this country are entitled to know exactly where they stand in relation to other countries as regards armaments.

I do not propose to rake up controversies that are old and which I trust are now passed. But we have it on the authority of the Foreign Secretary that during the negotiations between France and Germany last year, to quote his own words used in the House of Commons— There was anxiety, diplomatic anxiety, not always, not constant, but intermittent, and at times considerable anxiety, as to how the negotiations between France and Germany were to find a solution. Putting the international situation in other words, my Lords, it is clear that the horizon was clouded if not stormy. If the international situation had, unhappily, led to an outbreak of hostilities in which this country had become involved, under what conditions would we have embarked on that struggle? Can the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for War say that our Expeditionary Force would not have been severely handicapped, armed with a rifle which even now with its latest alteration is, as I have shown, certainly inferior to that of one of the nations involved. The noble Viscount, in the speech to which I have already referred, said that the War Office had begun the re-armament with a new bullet. That, I notice, is after any crisis was over. I would remind the noble Viscount that the Germans adopted the new ammunition in the year 1906. Apparently it required five years and a crisis to bring us this much up to date. I think the country would prefer the armament of our Forces to keep pace with modern requirements without such stimulus. How far our rifle with the new ammunition can be said to meet modern requirements is another question. The noble Viscount in his speech finished up his remarks on the rifle by saying that— The present rifle and bullet were not bad, but the new armament would give us something which, if we were ever called upon to fight against Continental troops, would be practically the same bullet as that of our opponents. That is somewhat vague. The remark would be equally applicable to the situation were our soldiers armed with catapults instead of the present rifle. Either weapon is capable of discharging a bullet, but it does not follow that their trajectory is the same.

I read a very able article in The Times the other day in which the writer, in analysing Mr. Bonar Law's statement, attempted a general vindication of Lord Haldane's policy. I understand that the author of that article is an official in the War Office and is in receipt of pay on the Estimates. If that is the case, it seems to me that those of us who read his articles in The Times will be somewhat at a loss to know whether the views he expresses are his own, or whether they are not somewhat tinged—perhaps unintentionally—with the views of his official Chief. Perhaps the noble Viscount will be able to reassure us on this point.

My Lords, it is certain that we cannot always expect to be in the front of all other nations in our armament. With each re-armament a nation no doubt gains something on its rivals. The only law that can govern a nation's action is one of common sense. But one thing we should always remember is this—that the initiative in war lies with other nations, not with us. If war were ever to be brought about, it would be by our opponent's action, not by ours. They would choose the time, not us. Therefore, my Lords, it behoves us to see that our small Expeditionary Force, when it is called upon to fight the battles of this country, enters upon that struggle under no serious disadvantage in respect of the weapons with which it is armed. It is because I feel that the subject of the adequate armament of our Land Forces is of importance so great—I should hardly be exaggerating if I said of importance so vital—to this country that I have ventured to bring the matter before your Lordships' House to-day in the hope of eliciting some definite information from His Majesty's Government.

VISCOUNT HARDINGE

My Lords, the subject of armament which my noble friend Lord Dunmore has brought before the House is a very important one. Many varied statements upon it have been made of late, not only in the Press but also on public platforms, and I trust, therefore, that the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for War will enlighten us on many of these points and give us answers to some of the definite questions put to him. My noble friend Lord Dunmore has dealt very fully with the armament question, not only with respect to the rifle in the present use of the Infantry of His Majesty's Land Forces, but also with regard to the gun in use not only by the Artillery of the Line but by the Territorial Artillery. I do not intend to follow him with regard to gun armament, for I consider that in the presence of the noble and gallant Field-Marshal on the Cross Benches it would be presumptuous in me, an Infantryman, to attempt to do so.

I will, therefore, confine my remarks to the rifle question—a question in which, if I may say so, I have taken the keenest interest since I first joined the Army in 1877. I presume for that reason I was employed for many years not only as musketry instructor to my regiment, but also on the musketry staff of the Army. Therefore I trust that your Lordships will consider that I am in some way qualified to speak on the rifle question—at any rate as competent as the Military Correspondent of The Times, who, curiously enough, served in the same regiment as myself for many years. I can honestly say that in that regiment he was never regarded as an expert or an authority either on rifles or rifle-shooting, and from his letter in The Times of February 2 he does not appear to have gained much further knowledge on that question, for the only line of criticism that he attempted to take up was to throw the whole blame upon certain members of the last Unionist Government. In fact that was his only line of argument; whilst he concluded his remarks with respect to the rifle by the extraordinary statement that "the present rifle is well thought of by the men." I ask your Lordships, Was there ever a more feeble defence set up by a man who, ever since he left the Army, has endeavoured to pose as a fair military critic? To my mind the duty of a critic should be to criticise, not in the interests of one Party, but in the interests of the Army as a whole. In his letter to The Times I contend that his line of argument is based, not upon the true facts of the case with regard to the rifle, but purely upon motives of political partisanship, and for that reason I do not think it is worth paying any attention to.

As most of your Lordships are probably aware, the present short Lee-Enfield rifle was first issued in 1903. I believe that at that time it was regarded as the best military weapon of the day, not because it was a handier weapon or more suitable for rapid and quick firing, but because when the rifle was fired with a fixed sight the bullet travelled at such a low trajectory as to be able to hit a man 5 ft. 6 ins. anywhere within the danger zone up to 500 yards without any alteration of sight. Any one who has been on service in the field must appreciate the immense advantages of such a weapon—a weapon which prior to 1903 bad never been in the possession of the British Army. Military experience has taught us that whenever a new rifle is introduced it is always received by the soldiers with a certain amount of distrust and suspicion, but I know very well that when that rifle had been in their hands for twelve months the general opinion, both of officers and men, was that it was the best rifle they had ever had and that it was in no way inferior to the weapons of any Continental Army, whilst in many people's opinion it was far superior.

My noble friend Lord Dunmore has referred to the only weak point in or objection against the rifle. The only objection to it is the weakness of the breech, which I regret to think has never been altered or rectified during the last nine years, and which I consider affords good cause for criticism. In spite of the assertion contained in the letter of the Military Correspondent of The Times, I have no hesitation in saying that in July last, when there was every likelihood of the Expeditionary Force being called upon for active service on the Continent, it was the opinion of most Infantry officers that our rifle was inferior both to the French and to the German rifle, more especially the latter, and for this very good reason, that the German rifles fired with their fixed sight point-blank up to 730 yards. I maintain that what is the opinion of the officers is also the opinion of the men. At any rate, whether that opinion is of any moment or not, every one will agree that it is absolutely essential that when our Army goes into the field, at any rate in Continental warfare, it should be armed, not with an inferior weapon, but with a weapon, if possible, superior to that of any Continental Army.

I did not, however, gather from the speech of the Secretary of State for War at Gateshead that at that time our Army was in that state of superiority; for the noble Viscount then said— We should in time get a new rifle which he hoped would be the best in the world. With that hope I am sure we are all in cordial agreement. But that is not the point at issue. The point at issue is, What has been done in the last six months? I would like the noble Viscount to give me a definite answer to this question—If our Expeditionary Force had been ordered abroad last September, would the Infantry of that Force have been armed with a rifle and bullet as good as those of the German Army? I trust that he will be able to do so. If he fails to do so, I venture to think that the statements that have been made on public platforms by certain politicians have been proved to be absolutely justifiable.

THE EARL OF ERROLL

My Lords, I should like to say just one word on this question of the rifle and bullet. It seems to me that it is not so much a question of the rifle or who is to blame for the rifle we have, but as to what steps are being taken to rectify the position in which we find ourselves. Our rifle is admittedly inferior to the rifle of the Japanese, of the United States, of France, and of Germany, and would no doubt put our troops to very considerable disadvantage if we were at war with any of these Powers. What we want to know is whether the steps which the Government are taking are adequate to deal with this subject, or are we merely tinkering with it. There is no object in apportioning blame. What we want to know is, What is being done? The fact remains that our rifle at the present moment is the very worst in the world among civilised Powers. No doubt when introduced some years ago it was quite good enough, but since then the high-velocity cartridge has been introduced by other Powers and the breech block in our rifle is too weak to allow the full charge being taken. The ammunition with which we are experimenting at the present moment is merely a makeshift, and does not give the same results as are given in the foreign rifle.

What we want now is a new rifle with a powerful action, locking close up to the breech block and a much larger chamber. It is this large chamber capacity which gives the German rifle, I am told, a great advantage over ours. In spite of the new bullet and the ammunition the vertex of the trajectory only comes down to 8 ft. 4 ins. I quite admit that this is a great improvement over the old Mark VI which rose up to 13 ft. 4 ins., but we are still a long way behind the Germans, and it would put our troops at a very serious disadvantage if we were in collision with them. The late Lord Tweedmouth, who, I think, was accepted, especially by this House, as an expert in rifle shooting, said in a debate in 1904 that he put a low trajectory before everything for a practical service weapon. I believe the excuse for our not having a new rifle is that in time we shall get an automatic rifle, but I venture to think that that rifle is a very long way off, and there are some people who think it is of very doubtful advantage. While we are waiting for this new rifle we may find ourselves at war with an enemy who will have very much the same advantage over us as the Prussians had with their needle guns over the Austrians in 1866 with their muzzle loaders. The critical time or stage of a battle is during the last 800 yards. That is where the crisis generally exists. Troops with a rifle that fires point blank have very great advantage at that distance as the sights do not have to be altered and the bullet will hit the enemy all the way. With the flatter trajectory of 6 ft. which the foreigners have they have to a great extent attained this ideal. But we have not.

I conclude by saying that our men would be very severely handicapped by having to alter their sights, or they would be shooting over the heads of the enemy. I have seen the sympathetic treatment of this question in The Times, and I should like to know whether that article was in any way inspired. My reason is that I believe that Colonel Repington is employed at the War Office. The noble Viscount shakes his head. I have been informed—but I am open to correction—that he is editor of the Army Review, and that in such capacity he is obtaining a fee of £500 a year. It seems to me that in that capacity he must have access to documents which are denied to other members of the Press. I do not see how he can be taken as an impartial critic. He must be more or less prejudiced, and I think that his criticism of the noble Viscount's scheme must be absolutely valueless. The Times has very great weight on military matters in this country, and it seems to me that it is quite wrong that any official connected with the War Office should be allowed to write as correspondent in the newspapers. It is unfair to the other papers and unfair to the public. As I said before, I do not think any one who has this access and this means of gaining information should be allowed to take part in this controversy.

EARL ROBERTS

My Lords, I do not propose to make any great demand on your Lordships' time and patience this afternoon, but I wish to say a few words upon one or two matters connected with our military preparations, about which it seems to me essential that there should be further discussion and a clear understanding. Up to the present a large proportion of our fellow-countrymen appear to believe that the Territorial Force is practically all that is needed for our country's safety, and that if we only have patience and give it sufficient time in which to perfect itself we shall possess a Home Defence Army to which the security of these islands can safely be entrusted. This is, in fact, the answer that I have almost invariably received from its supporters whenever I have ventured to suggest that the Territorial Force is far from being what is required, and that even if it were double the strength laid down it could not be trusted to carry out the supremely important duty for which it has been brought into being, for the simple reason that it is impossible—no matter how long we wait—for the Force to be given the necessary amount of training as long as it is organised under the voluntary system.

How much longer, may I ask, my Lords, are we to wait for the promised perfecting of the Territorial Force? Ought it not to be considered what are the duties that would devolve upon that Force in time of war after the Expeditionary Force had gone abroad? Ought it not to be considered whether it could under existing circumstances ever be properly prepared for those duties with due consideration to the difficulty employers of labour have during peace in giving their employees oven 15 days' leave and only once in the year; and whether there is the slightest chance of their being able to dispense with their men's services for six months after war breaks out for training purposes? The Secretary of State for War once said that at such a time trade would be at a standstill and that the men would be only too glad of other kinds of employment. But, my Lords, will this argument bear examination? Some few trades might be slack, but, for the most part, business would be far more brisk in war time than in peace. The Territorial battalion of which I have the honour to be honorary colonel is to a great extent composed of printers and gas workers. Are printing and the demand for gas likely to be slack when a war is going on? And are the employers who have been patriotic enough to allow their men to join the Territorials to be compelled to give them up to be mobilised for six months' training, during which time the unpatriotic employers, who had refused to give their men leave to fit themselves to serve their country, would be revelling in a vast increase to their business? Surely, my Lords, this is a matter which should not be allowed to remain in doubt and upon which a definite answer should be given by the Secretary of State for War. For, if employers are not willing to let their men go, and are not to be forced to do so, the whole scheme falls to the ground, for the men would be unable to fulfil their enlistment engagement without losing their means of livelihood.

The goal that would appear to be aimed at—and to achieve which Lord Haldane and those serving under him are making such desperate efforts—is that the numerical strength of the Force, as laid down by the noble Viscount, should be reached. But, my Lords, it never seems to have been realised that the numbers laid down have nothing whatever to say to the demands that may be made upon the Force. These numbers were decided upon because experience had taught us that about 300,000 was the maximum number we could possibly hope to obtain under a voluntary system. Three hundred thousand might be sufficient to deal with a couple of insignificant raids, which were all that were contemplated as likely to take place at the time that the Territorial Force was established. And it was not until 1900—three years after the Territorial Force had come into existence—that it was decided by the authorities that 70,000 was the number for which we had to be prepared.

But, my Lords, for the idea that the strength of an invading force would be limited to only 70,000 there is absolutely no foundation. That number appears to have been fixed upon, as I explained to your Lordships last April, because it was the minimum number with which I myself stated, at a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1905, I believed that any commander would venture to attempt an invasion of this country. And also because the naval authorities asserted that the transports required for a larger number of men would be so numerous as to make it impossible for them to evade our warships. Considering, my Lords, that in all the larger Continental ports steamers each capable of carrying from 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers for a short voyage can always be made available, 70,000 multiplied by two, or even by three, would require quite a small number of vessels for their transport. But, my Lords, it is not so much the possible strength of the invading force to which I desire to draw your attention as to the fact that no steps have been taken to increase the strength of the Territorial Force, while the hostile numbers against which we are supposed to have to guard have admittedly risen from 10,000 to at least 70,000. This again, my Lords, is a matter requiring the closest inquiry.

There is still another matter of supreme importance which affects the Regular Army even more seriously than it does the Citizen Army, and that is the inferiority of the weapons with which our soldiers are armed. Lord Haldane has treated with airy levity the statement I made about these weapons in my letter to the papers last December, which he incorrectly alluded to as a "casual remark" made in a "speech." My Lords, it was no "casual remark," nor was it made in a speech, but a carefully-considered opinion arrived at after the fullest inquiry, and expressed, as I have said, in a public letter. Notwithstanding Lord Haldane's reply to Mr. Bonar Law's indictment, and in spite of the defence of the noble Viscount made in The Times of the 2nd inst. by its Military Correspondent—who, by the way, as a paid official of the War Office, can hardly be expected to take quite an unbiassed view of the Secretary of State's action—I still maintain that our soldiers are armed with inferior weapons, for, even with the improved sighting and the issue of a new kind of ammunition, our rifle is interior to the German and French rifles; and, owing to the artillery fuzes, fuze-setters, and sights not being up to date, our field guns are not automatic firing guns.

I purposely avoided in my public letter laying stress on the serious moral effect which the inferiority of armament would have on our soldiers when they discovered, as they certainly would in the very first action, that they were not only out-numbered, but that they were out-matched as regards their weapons. Assuredly the moral effect would be very disastrous. As regards the Territorials, even supposing their arms are all that the Secretary of State claims them to be, they will be of no military value unless the men are trained to use them in an effective manner. This is the crux of the whole question. Let us lay aside all other points of controversy connected with Lord Haldane's scheme, and endeavour to come to some satisfactory conclusion as to how both officers and men of the Territorial Force can be sufficiently trained to admit of their being a valuable asset to the defence of the country.

Nowadays the two essentials to success in war are discipline and skill in the use of military weapons. Not the old barrack-square discipline by which a man became part of a machine, but a discipline which gives him confidence in himself and an intelligent appreciation of unity of action. Neither of these essentials can be taught by any training that it is possible to give to Territorials under the existing conditions of their service. No amount of "organising public spirit"; no number of flattering panegyrics on the patriotism of the officers or assertions that their corps are composed of "a good fighting lot of men"; no appeals to "enthusiasm"; no additional expenditure, will have the slightest effect in making the Territorial Force anything but a make-believe, until some means are devised by which the required amount of training can be given and the Force can be filled with officers and men who have the military knowledge which would render them trustworthy on the field of battle.

In support of my views as to the difficulty in which employers are placed in regard to the question of the training of their employees let me read an extract from a letter from an important firm of manufacturing chemists, in reply to a request from the secretary of the National Service League to be allowed to speak to their men on the subject of universal military training— We regret that our manager at Hounslow is not in favour of your going there, for fear Territorial enlistment may be encouraged. Our business is of a peculiar nature, and is already quite seriously interfered with by the training of the appreciable number of Territorials in our employ. The difficulty is that ours is very skilled labour; in many cases we have no duplicate men, and outsiders cannot temporarily take up and discharge the duties of these men. And now mark what follows— When service is compulsory we shall be on equal terms with everybody else, and willing to bear an increased burden.

^*THE DUKE OF BEDFORD rose to call attention—

1. To the statement made by the Secretary of State for War when dealing with the Army Estimates on the 14th March last year "That "we have added a good deal to the "number of Regular officers in the "Army during the last five years. "I think, 2,600." (Official Report, page 2086.)

2. To the Return rendered on the 27th April, 1911, which gives the number of officers serving in the Regular Army, Home, India, and the Colonies as 10,851 on the 1st January, 1905, and as 10,720 on the 1st January, 1911, a reduction of 131.

To ask the Secretary of State for War why the addition of 2,600 Regular officers to the Army during the last five years results in a decrease during the same period of 131 as shown by the Return rendered the 27th April, 1911.

3. To the statement of the Secretary of State for War on 15th March, 1911, that "the real reduction" of the Regulars is "25,074, which is the "number of Regulars that have "been disbanded between 1905 and "now." (Official Report, page 2354.)

4. To the Return of the 27th April, 1911, in which the total reduction in the numbers of the non-commissioned officers and men of the Regular Army serving with the Colours in 1911, as compared with the numbers of non-commissioned officers and men serving with the Colours in 1905, is shown to be 32,706.

5. To the fact that by the Return of 27th April, 1911, the Regular establishment of the Special Reserve was included in the total number of the non-commissioned officers and men serving with the Colours, whereas in 1905 the Permanent Staff of the Militia numbering 4,242 non-commissioned officers and men belonging to the Regular Army was excluded.

To ask the Secretary of State for War whether the total reduction in the non-commissioned officers and men serving with the Colours since 1905 is as stated in the Return of the 27th April last, 32,706, to which must be added 4,242 non-commissioned officers and men of the Regular Army serving on Army attestations but then employed as the Militia Permanent Staff, making the total reduction 36,948; and to move for Papers.

The noble Duke said: My Lords, in dealing with the Army Estimates on March 14 last the noble Viscount made the following pronouncement— After five years of work we have passed out of the region of questions of principle and have got to the field of secondary problems—some of them of considerable difficulty, and nearly all of them of detail. I propose, therefore, to discuss questions not of principle, which, according to the noble Viscount, have been already decided for good or for ill, but of detail. The object of my Questions is to ascertain the actual reduction in the number of officers and men serving with the Colours when the Regular Army of 1905 is compared with that of 1911. There has been considerable discussion on this point, and it would be well to try and bring the controversy to a definite conclusion before the appearance of this year's Army Estimates. For my own part, I propose to confine my remarks to officers and men serving with the Colours and not to discuss any other part of our military forces.

I begin with the officers. The noble Viscount, dealing with the Army Estimates on March 14 last, said— We have added a good deal to the number of Regular officers in the Army during the last five years, I think 2,600. That is a very short statement and should be clear. The officers are Regular officers, and 2,600 have been added during the last five years. But that addition, according to the Return of April 27, 1911, which I quote on the Paper of the House, has resulted for some reason or another during the same period in a decrease of 131 officers. This result is so incomprehensible at first sight that I beg to ask the noble Viscount if he would kindly explain the matter.

As regards the non-commissioned officers and men, the noble Viscount, during the five years in which he has been establishing the principles now determined, has kept us informed of the increase and decrease of the Regular Army. The noble Viscount began by telling us on March 8, 1906, that— There was a rumour in the papers that I had decided to recommend the abolition of ten battalions of the Line, and I tried to describe that rumour correctly as a 'nidus equinus,' which is a polite and classic way of calling it a mare's nest. If I had decided to do anything of that kind it would have been, in military eyes, tantamount to insanity.

In the following month, however, the noble Viscount not only changed his own mind, but persuaded all the members of the Army Council that a course which in March seemed an act of insanity had in April become an inspired policy of Army reorganisation. The noble Viscount then, having decided in April, 1906, to adopt that policy which in the previous March he and his military advisers had considered tantamount to insanity, proceeded to assure us at Newcastle in the following September that— The first step towards doing something effective for developing the national basis of the Army is to cut something off superfluous Regular forces. It seemed that the noble Viscount had come to the conclusion that the superfluity in the Regular Army, from which as an essential preliminary in military reorganisation something must be cut off, resided principally in the Infantry, both Guards and Line. The noble Viscount therefore deleted nine Infantry battalions from the Army List, sent a tenth abroad pending disbandment, and reduced the establishment of all Line battalions on the Home and Colonial List.

We naturally assumed, with apparent good reason, when the nine battalions of infantry disappeared from the Army List in 1906 and 1907, when the establishment of Infantry battalions on the Colonial List had been reduced by 80 men per battalion and those on the Home List by 30 men per battalion, and when men were in process of disappearing from the Garrison and Mountain Artillery, that we must presently see a diminution of the numbers serving with the Colours in the Regular Army. But, on the contrary, after two years, the noble Viscount assured us in November, 1908, that— So far from the Regular Army having been cut down, we are to-day 90,000 stronger. Now, my Lords, I submit that the only conclusion which the country could come to from that statement was that not only had there been no reduction in the numbers of the Regular Army, but that on the other hand 90,000 Regular soldiers—that is to say, men serving with the Colours—had been added to its strength. Then, again, when speaking in the City of London in November, 1908, the noble Viscount is reported to have said that— There was no greater fallacy than to suppose that the Government Lad reduced the Regular Line. But the Army List told us that nine battalions of Regular Infantry had been disbanded, and Regimental Establishments for 1905 and 1911 showed us that the establishment of all Infantry Battalions on the Home and Colonial List had been reduced. How, then, can it be a fallacy to suppose that the Regular Line had not been reduced?

The noble Viscount, when be came to deal with the Army Estimates on March 15, 1911, stated that— The real reduction is 25,074, which is the number of Regulars which have been disbanded between 1905 and now. A year before—in 1910—in an article which I had published in the Press, I mentioned that the reductions in the Regular Army would amount, according to War Office figures, to more than 34,000 men as compared with 1905. When the noble Viscount quoted last year 25,074 as the correct number, I assumed that I had been guilty of misleading the public mind by exaggerating figures concerning our military weakness—a practice most mischievous in the eyes of the noble Viscount, and one against which he once gave me a most solemn warning in your Lordships' House. I can assure the noble Viscount that I most cordially agree with him as to the value of accuracy in our Army statistics, and deprecate most strongly the practice of exaggerating not only the weakness of our military forces but their strength. The latter is the more dangerous practice. I So it was a real relief to me when on April 27 last the noble Viscount published a Return, which is the one I quote in detail on the Paper of the House, comparing the number of men serving with the Colours in the various branches of the Regular Army on January 1, 1905, and on January 1, 1911. From this Return it appears that the difference is 32,706. But to this figure must be added 4,242, the number of the Permanent Staff of the Militia in 1905, all of whom were men serving on Army attestation and belonging to the Regular Army, making a total reduction of 36,948.

The noble Viscount's account of the increase and decrease of the Regular Army from 1906 to 1910 is interesting chiefly for its variation, but as it is already a matter of past history I shall not trouble the noble Viscount to go back beyond the Army Estimates of last year. Then the noble Viscount stated that the real reduction was 25,074 but accepted the responsibility for a reduction of only 20,000 men from the Colours—"no more and no less," I think was his expression. How or why an additional 16,948 more men have disappeared from the Colours of the Regular Army since 1905, apparently without any authority from the Secretary of State for War, I am not now concerned to inquire. All the country wants to know for certain is, How do we stand now, and how much weaker was the Army of 1911 than the Army of 1905? I ask the noble Viscount, therefore, to say if we may disregard all other statements concerning the increase and decrease of the men with the Colours of the Regular Army and accept the Return of April 27, 1911, as the basis of all future calculations and the numbers reduced at 36,984. I beg to ask the noble Viscount the Question standing in my name, and to move.

Moved, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to the strength of the Regular Army.—(The Duke of Bedford.)

EARL STANHOPE

My Lords, I venture to think that this House is under no inconsiderable debt of gratitude to my noble friend Lord Dunmore for having brought this question forward. It has brought to light some very strange opinions. The noble Earl quoted the remarks of two Ministers of the present Government, who simply stated, in reply to Mr. Bonar Law's very grave charge, that the Government were alone responsible for the howitzer, which is the best weapon of its kind, and that they had nothing whatever to do with the field gun or with the rifle which had been brought in by a Conservative Government. I never heard a more extraordinary argument. Let me apply it to the sister Service. Suppose that, shall we say, Russia had been the first Power to invent the type of ship called the "Dreadnought." Would it have been any excuse for the First Lord of the Admiralty to say, "My Government did not build the 'King Edward' class; therefore I am not responsible for that class being now out of date?" It seems to me, and I venture to think to a good many others, that the Army is not considered either by the Secretary of State for War or by any member of the Government as being actually for use. If I may be allowed to say so without offence, as far as I can see the Secretary of State for War has not realised that the Army is for use and not merely a peg on which to hang the beatitudes.

The mere fact that the Army is small is surely an adequate reason why it should be kept, not only abreast, but ahead of the developments in armaments and all other military preparations made by other Powers. I know nothing about the howitzer. It may be all that is claimed for it, or it may fall short of modern requirements. It is perfectly true that the field gun which we now possess is very far ahead of the gun which it displaced, but I venture to ask the noble Viscount whether the experience of the past few years has not brought out certain faults and failings in the new gun which certainly should be rectified. For instance, there is no doubt that it is certainly slower in its rate of fire than the French gun. It will not be denied that the gun is not as accurate as it might be, owing to the fact that the shock of the recoil is much more severe on the carriage of our gun than is the case with the French gun. The result is that the right gun of a battery may begin to drop a shell to the left and the left gun to the right, thus rendering observation and direction of fire by the battery commander infinitely more difficult. Then there is the further consideration of the ammunition. I believe it is still the case that we are not satisfied with our present fuze, and that the fuzes of several other Powers are ahead of ours. It is no excuse to say that it is a better fuze than it used to be. That is not the point. The point is, Is it the best fuze obtainable?

As to the rifle, I do not altogether agree with my noble friend that the rifle was the best of its day. I do not wish to weary your Lordships with technical formulæ. I do not believe the present rifle ever was the best of its day. Of course, these things are very much matters of opinion, but there is not the very least doubt about it that our rifle had certain advantages over the rifle of other Powers and those advantages it possesses to the present day. One, which perhaps I might mention, is the way in which the bayonet is fixed to the wood of the rifle and not to the barrel, therefore causing less effect on the shooting. But, as several members of your Lordships' House have already pointed out, the shock of discharge, instead of being taken at the front or muzzle end of the bolt was taken at the rear of the bolt, with the result that the shock of discharge through the enormous pressure occasioned by modern ammunition travelled along the whole length of the bolt in our rifles and the steel was compressed from end to end, and a high pressure in the chamber of the rifle was rendered impossible. The result of that has been that whereas Great Britain, until this new ammunition came in, was only able to have a pressure in our rifle of 15½ tons to the square inch, France had a pressure of 17¾, Germany 17½, and the United States 19¾ tons to the square inch. We have been able to get a certain advance with our new ammunition, but so long as the rifle has to take the shock of discharge at the rear end of the bolt it is impossible to get a rifle which will give us a trajectory as low as that of other Powers.

The height of the trajectory has been given by several speakers, and therefore I do not propose to go over that again. Perhaps I might bring out this point, that the space of ground over which a bullet is low enough to hit an Infantryman, or a man in a standing position, 1,000 yards' range, is, in the case of the German rifle, 83 yards, and, in the case of our rifle, 44 yards. Any member of your Lordships' House who has endeavoured to judge distance over a range of something approximating to 1,000 yards will know how much easier it is to get within 83 yards of the correct distance than it is to get within 44 yards. I do not know exactly the percentage, but no doubt there are experts at the War Office who will be able to inform the noble Viscount on that point. These are not my figures. They are figures taken from the Official Text Book of Small Arms published as long ago as 1909. But the position is a great deal worse than that. This was not realised by the War Office as late as 1909. The whole of these facts were known at the War Office no less than six years ago, and then, even if the facts with regard to the German rifle were not known, it was at any rate known by actual experiment what it was possible to do with the pointed bullet. In 1906 and 1907 various makers of ammunition in this country made experiments as to the shape of ballets, and in 1907 the Swift bullet, which I believe is approximately the same as the Mark VII bullet now being brought in, was invented. My Lords, I am by no means in favour of bull's-eye shooting being considered an adequate preparation for the shooting required in battle; but the greatest opponent of bull's-eye shooting has never denied that at long ranges with match rifles it is the only real test for getting at the best rifle and the best ammunition that can be found. What has the pointed bullet achieved? In 1907 it won the English Eight Club Competition; it set up a record for 800, 900, and 1,000 yards' range at the Scottish meeting; and it won with a considerable margin the Irish Eight meeting. It was used by the winner and half the competitors in the difficult Cambridge Cup, and was almost universally used for long ranges and match rifle competitions at Bisley that year. And yet in 1907, 1908, 1909, 1910 the War Office did nothing! I see that the Secretary of State denies that statement, but at any rate we are in this position, that the pointed bullet was not provided for even the Expeditionary Force of the Army and nobody apparently began to make it until last year and possibly even after the crisis of last year.

What is the position to-day? It appears to me that it was the situation during last summer that aroused the War Office to take any action at all in this matter. They are at last moving. They have adopted the pointed bullet. How do we stand at the present moment? I believe I am correct in saying that the Expeditionary Force is even now not altogether re-armed with the rifle fitted with the new sights made necessary by the pointed bullet. I believe that will very shortly be carried out, but at the present moment the Expeditionary Force is not in a position to take the field with the new sights as required for the pointed bullet. Anyhow, the Special Reserve has not got this new rifle. Were the Special Reserve required to supply the drafts for the Expeditionary Force, which would be required from them the moment the Expeditionary Force went abroad, there would be two sets of armaments in the field: the Special Reserve with the old rifle and the old ammunition, and the Regulars with the new rifle and the new ammunition. Anybody who has been into the question of the supply of ammunition in the field will know how endless will be the complication if you have two sets of ammunition to supply to the troops.

Then what about the Territorial Force? Apparently it has not been even considered that the Territorial Force should be re-armed with the new rifle at all—at any rate, the re-armament has not yet begun. Perhaps that is a very unimportant point seeing that the Report of the Inspector-General of the Forces on the Territorial Force, to which the noble Earl behind me referred, made no mention whatever of the shooting of the Territorial Force. Apparently it is considered such a trifle that it is not necessary to include it, but that it is of far more importance to put in tittle-tattle about the doings of the National Service League. I venture to think there is not one member of the National Service League who would be so misguided as to say that the shooting of the Territorial Force is not worth being dealt with in the Annual Report of the Inspector-General.

Now I come to the point as to how the new Mark VII bullet compares with the German bullet which was brought in in 1906, or possibly in 1905. At 800 yards the highest point of its trajectory, as has been stated by several noble Lords, is 8 ft. 6 ins. as compared to the German 6 ft. 10 ins. But that is not the whole of the story. Our bullet compares unfavourably with the German bullet in almost every single particular. Its time of flight is longer, and it has less striking energy and less velocity. That, I believe, is true at every range at which the two bullets have vet been tested. With fixed sights our rifle will hit a man standing up to 700, the German rifle up to 740 yards. With fixed sights a man lying down will be hit up to 400 yards with our rifle, with the German rifle up to 450. And so far as we have gone at present it has been found that the new bullet jams in our rifle when used in magazine firing. Thanks to the War Office having only brought in this bullet as lately as last month, or at any rate the end of last year, I do not believe one per cent. of the men of the Expeditionary Force have yet used the rifle with the new sights and the new ammunition. We are told that the new rifle is shortly to be issued. I can only hope that "shortly" in this case will not be seven years hence, but will mean, what it is usually understood in ordinary conversation, a question of months.

My Lords, I venture to hope that the new rifle will not be a compromise, as I believe the old rifle was, in order that the machinery which turned out the old rifle might be utilised as far as possible for the construction of the new one, and that a good deal that is now incorporated in our rifle will be dispensed with at the first available moment. It has been said constantly by manufacturers that it is not worth while endeavouring to bring forward any new inventions. They say that officials at the War Office take the best part of the invention of one manufacturer, another part from another, and a third part from the invention of somebody else, and that by putting all those parts together they get an excellent article, but the result is that the unfortunate manufacturer who has spent his brains, his energy, and, naturally, a considerable amount of money in endeavouring as far as possible to perfect an invention gets no reward whatever for the services he has actually rendered to his country. I do hope, therefore, that the Government will see their way to give some sort of subsidy to firms in order to endeavour to bring forward inventions such as are required. To give a case in point, I believe that most rifle experts are of opinion that an aperture sight would be a great advantage. The difficulty at present is that there is not an aperture sight on the market which can be set with rapidity and accuracy, and that if it does fulfil those conditions the aperture sight has projections and disadvantages when fitted to a rifle, which is not only a shooting weapon but is also used for drill and still more is actually the handle for the modern pike. If some inducement were offered to manufacturers to bring forward inventions dealing with these requirements we should get a good deal of competition, and British manufacturers would, I think, be able to meet the problem in a satisfactory manner.

There is yet another thing that the country will desire to know. Who is responsible for the fact that our Army has been equipped for six long years with a rifle and ammunition not up to modern requirements? Technically it is unquestionably the Secretary of State—actually it is nobody. By the Order in Council of August 10, 1904 the Secretary of State is responsible to Parliament, and I suppose to the country, for all the business of the Army Council. I believe that the military members of the Army Council have interpreted that literally, and have not held themselves responsible to the country for the condition of the Army as have the Sea Lords for the Fleet. The result has been that whereas the old War Office building has been a grave for the reputation of more than one Secretary of State, the new War Office, or the new policy, has been the grave for the reputations of the majority of those officers who have become military members of the Army Council. So long as the military members of the Army Council are not prepared to take the responsibility for the equipment and the details of an important matter such as this, so long must they incur any odium when it is discovered that matters are not so good as they might be.

Twenty years ago a Memorandum used to be laid on the Table of the House, signed by the Commander-in-Chief, stating that in his opinion the Army was in an efficient and satisfactory condition. The Secretary of State who abolished that Paper was responsible for his Government being thrown out of office on the Cordite Vote. I venture to think that this debate will have proved that it is impossible for any civilian Secretary of State to have at his fingers ends all the details of the technical requirements necessary to an Army in war. It is for the General Staff to say what is required; it is for the other military members of the Army Council to supply those requirements. If this debate has done nothing more, it will have done incalculable service if it has proved that, even with a Secretary of State as able and as energetic as the noble Viscount, the present position is impossible, and that the time has come when the military members of the Army Council should be required to sign a statement that their respective departments are in a condition to fulfil the policy put before them by the Secretary of State for War.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (VISCOUNT HALDANE)

My Lords, the debate has ranged over a variety of topics, and it will probably be convenient that I should deal with them in a somewhat different order from the order in which they have been taken. The noble Earl who has just sat down devoted a good deal of his interesting speech to the question of the rifle, and I think it will be convenient if I begin with the question of armaments. Reference has been made in the speeches of more than one noble Lord to an article which appeared in The Times by its Military Correspondent, Colonel Repington, and it has been suggested that Colonel Repington, somehow or other, was infringing some rule which should have prevented him from writing articles in The Times while he was in the service of the War Office. Let me say at once that the first I saw of that article was after it had appeared in The Times. I believe Colonel Repington's preparation of it was done entirely on his own initiative. I confess that I read the article with very great interest, because it is an article by one of the most brilliant writers on military subjects in this or any other country. At the same time the War Office has not the advantage of having him on its staff. He is not a War Office official, he has no allotted room or office at the War Office, but he is simply acting as the editor of the new Military Review. We asked him to undertake that post because, as I have said, we consider him one of the most brilliant military writers and one of the best informed minds on the subject of armies at home or abroad at the present time. I think we have been very fortunate in securing his services as editor of the Army Review, but in editing that review he is in no way in a position to control or to interfere with or to obtain access to any documents except those which the Chief of the General Staff chooses to entrust to him for the purposes of his researches. But to suggest that somehow or other he is a War Office official influenced by political partisanship in "backing me up," as one noble Lord said, in his writings is really very far from the mark. I have the honour of knowing Colonel Repington, and I frequently have had the advantage of asking his opinion on questions of difficulty, which he is always ready to give me. But to this hour I do not know what his politics are. I never talked to him about his politics, I know nothing of them, but I am informed that he is a very strong Unionist.

THE EARL OF DUNMORE

I think the noble Viscount is referring to me. I brought no accusation against the author of the article in question, but what I wanted to know was whether he was in receipt of public money. It seemed to me that if he were his articles might, unintentionally perhaps, appear to those of us who read them to be tinged with the views of what I might describe as his official chief.

VISCOUNT HALDANE

As I have said, Colonel Repington is editor of the Army Review, and as such he receives £500 a year, but he writes independently in The Times and elsewhere; and I have as frequently felt the weight of his criticism as I have been fortunate enough to obtain some praise from him. But as for having any power or influence with him, or having anything to do with inspiring his articles, nothing is more remote from the facts. I cannot say what effect the work he has undertaken for the Army Review may have on his mind, but I should say very little, because he is one of the most independent men I know.

Now I turn to the more serious question of the armaments of the Army—the rifle, the field gun, and the howitzer. The advice which I have received from those most competent to judge is that the British Army is to-day, on the average—that is, if you take all the qualities of all the weapons together—as well armed as any Army in the world. Our field gun is much superior to the field gun of the German Army. Whether it is as good in every respect as the French field gun is a matter in regard to which there is a great deal of difference of opinion. A good many people think that in some points, which were touched upon in the speech of the noble Earl, the French gun has advantages, but in other respects our gun has advantages also. It is a very powerful gun, and with the possible exception of the French gun it is better than the gun of any Continental countries where military organisation has reached a very high stage. Our howitzer is by far the best in the world. There is no other howitzer that can be contrasted with it. It has been perfected and brought up to date during the past few years, and, speaking from experience, a very difficult job it has been, and we are watching every improvement made in the field guns of other countries with a view to adapting them to our own gun if desirable.

Now I come to the rifle. The French rifle dates back, I think, to 1896, the German Mauser to 1898, and our own short rifle, which carried on the principle of the Lee-Enfield but was a new rifle, dates back to about 1903. I cannot help thinking that the noble Field-Marshal has been a little too critical of his own child. He took a great pride in the short rifle when it came out, and I really think his child is more worthy of him than he thinks. It is true that it is inferior with respect to trajectory to other rifles; but it has also some very great advantages. Because of its superior mechanical arrangements it is capable of being fired from the shoulder much more easily and much more frequently than the Continental rifle. It has this advantage, that you can fire nearly double the number of rounds out of it that you can with the German rifle, which has to be brought down from the shoulder so frequently. The noble Earl opposite referred to the jamming of the new cartridge. It is quite true that at an early stage, when we were experimenting with new ammunition, there were difficulties in extraction during rapid fire; it is hoped to overcome this difficulty. Another point is that the heavy bullet is more effective at a long range. It is an elementary proposition in mathematics that the lighter the bullet the greater the muzzle velocity, but the more quickly it comes to the ground with its momentum gone, for its energy is soon spent. I remember an eminent expert once telling me that he could make a shell of aluminium which would have the greatest muzzle velocity of any shell in the world, but it would fall into the sea about half a mile from the muzzle, and even although the German bullet has immense muzzle velocity and very fiat trajectory at a long range, it is not as useful a rifle as the noble Field-Marshal's.

It has been truly observed that science marches on, and it is true that ours is not so good a rifle as it was originally. Times have changed. I agree that at the time, in 1903, when the pattern of the new rifle was adopted after great study by the noble Viscount opposite and the noble Field-Marshal, it was a great pity that opportunity was not taken to enlarge the breech-chamber. If the breech-chamber had been enlarged we could have done what French and Germans have done—that is, put in a cartridge with a larger amount of powder. The difficulty of this rifle is that it is the most modern of the three rifles. It is young and new compared to what the French have, and even what the Germans have, and we did not like to throw it aside hurriedly, particularly as new improvements were coming, so we set ourselves to work to get more powder into it consistently with the chamber being a small breech-chamber. I have personally taken a deep interest in the question of powders. I had the good fortune to be appointed by the noble Marquess opposite a member of the Explosives Committee, and I came to know something about powder at that time. Since then I have been in close consultation with the experts about what we could do to get over the defect of the smallness of the breech-chamber of the present short rifle, and the conclusion we came to was that the great improvements which have taken place in cordite have helped us materially. To begin with, we now have modified cordite which is a better cordite than the cordite we used to have—the old Mark I cordite. In the second place, we have learnt how to make the cordite tubular. Instead of having it in flakes or cords, it is now in small hollow tubes with very small bore. The burning capacity also is very much improved, and you get out of the same quantity of cordite much more available energy. I say available because time of burning is a factor which enters largely into these things. We have been able by adopting tubular cordite to get a larger charge than we otherwise could of cordite, which burns its substance away into the gas which produces the ballistic force. The result is that we have got a considerable way on in improving the small rifle.

The noble Earl opposite gave very nearly accurately—I do not quarrel with him ill the main—the relative position of the rifle. I am speaking from memory, but I think I have the facts pretty accurately in my head as to the differences which the changes have made. The dangerous space at 800 yards, of course, is less if you have a high trajectory than if you have a flat trajectory. The high trajectory of the short rifle gave at the highest point of the curve 12 ft. 9 ins. That has been reduced by means of the improved cordite to 8 ft. 9 ins., which brings us within 2½ ft. of the German highest point. I agree that is a great difference in favour of the Germans, but still it is a very substantial improvement. It brings us within less than a foot of the French rifle. And when you take into account the advantages which the short rifle possesses—its handiness, its freedom from jamming, the fact that you can fire it from the shoulder almost continuously, resembling the action of an automatic rifle, and that our men are trained, to compensate for the high trajectory, to fire low, the sight being arranged accordingly—all I can say is that, though I am far from claiming that the present rifle is a perfect weapon or one we should remain with, our experts, so far as I can judge, would not be in the least afraid of our going into a war with a European Power with that rifle. Its advantages are set against its disadvantages, and although we should be deficient, I admit, in the flat trajectory which other rifles possess, we have enough, and our men are so trained in the use of it that the disadvantage arising from that would be by no means so great as it seems.

The noble Earl asked me a question about the Expeditionary Force. Four Divisions have already been armed with the new ammunition. The remaining Divisions of the Expeditionary Force and the Cavalry Division will be armed with it almost immediately. We shall then proceed to the Special Reserve, and so on through the Army. We are taking a large provision in the Estimates of this year for the supply of the new ammunition, which will gradually supersede the old ammunition, and it is not uninteresting to know that the re-sighted rifle can fire the old ammunition. I am not suggesting that it is going to, but in an emergency you would get quite fair shooting from it at ranges up to 500 yards even with the old ammunition. I do not wish the House to suppose for a moment that we are going to do it, but that statement may relieve the apprehensions of those who think that in changing from one ammunition to another we may have diminished stocks. We shall not have, because while we are taking very large supplies of the new ammunition we are not making our old ammunition useless.

I am not saying that we are satisfied even with that state of things. We feel that other Powers will progress, and we have been at work for long in devising a new rifle. It has been devised and the pattern has been approved. I have seen the rifle and examined it with such care as I am capable of, and I think I may say that if this rifle, on the enlarged tests we are going to put it to, turns out to be what it promises, it will be the finest rifle in the world, both in flatness of trajectory and in every other point. Immense pains have been spent upon it. The only point about it is that it is not automatic. I do not want to go into the details of its trajectory, because that is obviously inexpedient, at present. We have not got to the stage at which these details should become public. But it is not an automatic rifle, and that point may be made against it. But I would observe that General Staffs, not only in this country but in others, are by no means agreed on the advantage of an automatic rifle. The waste of ammunition and the inaccuracy in shooting which comes from it counterbalances, in the opinion of a great many competent to judge, the advantage in the number of bullets you can send out of the muzzle in a minute of time. Moreover, with this new rifle, with very improved mechanism, with the clips and the extreme rapidity of loading, you get very near to the maximum that you can make use of in war. And therefore we are by no means disposed to wait until the rifle can be put into the automatic form. We are proceeding to the manufacture of a considerable number of these rifles which we propose to issue to selected bodies of troops to practise with for a time. We shall then have a real test, and if that does come out satisfactorily we shall go at once to the new rifle and supersede even the child of the noble Field-Marshal. The rapidity with which we shall proceed with that depends upon the success of the tests. The rifle has been shot by the experts, and we are now proceeding to the large tests which we must be satisfied with before we can take the serious step of arming the Army with a new rifle. The important thing is the new ammunition. That we have pretty nearly determined finally, and it will be in a form which will be adapted to an automatic rifle, should that come on, and our new rifle will be of a kind which can readily have automatic ammunition fitted to it. The whole question of weapons is such a difficult one, whatever Government it may be, that I should never be disposed to make many criticisms upon those who have gone before me, or, for that matter, on those who came after me. We all know how extremely difficult it is. Just when you think you have got the best thing, somebody comes forward with an entirely new thin", or a new powder, which alters the whole character of the rifle, and I think everybody ought to exercise the maximum amount of charity towards his neighbour in this difficult problem of what is the best weapon to be got.

I pass now to the question put by the noble Duke, the Duke of Bedford. He reproached me, to begin with, for breaking a pledge in 1906. He quoted me as having said I should be almost in a lunatic condition if I reduced battalions, and said that, nevertheless, within a few weeks I proceeded to do it. What I did say, and what I was reported as having said in every newspaper, except one, and what I was certainly reported in the Official Report as having said—and I made it perfectly plain in answers in the House of Commons—was that I should be a lunatic if I reduced the home battalions. The home battalions were fewer in number than the battalions abroad, and what we wanted above everything was to restore the balance of the Cardwell system. I never reduced any home battalions; what I did was to reduce the battalions abroad.

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

Will the noble Viscount admit that the battalions disappeared from the "Army List." That was entirely my point.

* VISCOUNT HALDANE

No, that was not entirely the point. Of course they disappeared from the Army List. What the noble Duke charged me with was with violating a pledge. He spoke about the Army being 90,000 stronger than before. I never said it was. I said the number of men you could send abroad was 90,000 stronger than before, because the Militia were put under an obligation to serve abroad. The figures were available to anybody. I had occasion to complain a little last summer of some figures of the noble Duke, by which he made out that we had effected very great reductions in numbers, and I pointed out that his accountant, or whoever made out his figures for him, had made a mistake, and that the statement was some 30,000 out. That did not prevent the statement appearing under the signature of the noble Duke But I am sure it was made before I answered that question and made the correction, a he would have been the last person to allow an inaccurate statement to appear in an Army journal to the effect that of my own admissions the figures which he had given were right. The noble Duke had doubtless sent his letter to that journal before I gave my answer in the House but it did not appear until later.

I am put in this difficulty, that the noble Duke somehow or other almost always gets the figures wrong. He has given figures on the present occasion which he has got, if he will allow me to say so, quite wrong. He has dealt with the number of officers, and with the reductions. I will take first the point as to officers. He represents me as having stated in my Estimates speech in the House of Commons last year that we had added 2,600 to the absolute number of Regular officers in the Army during the last five years. I think I have a little reason to complain of the noble Duke's accountant. He has quoted that, not from the Hansard report which is on the shelves in the Library, not from the Official Report but from the rough Hansard which simply represents what the reporters very often at the moment cannot hear properly, and do their best to take down, and within a day or two the rough report comes to us and is corrected. On this occasion what I am reported as having said was taken from the rough report and not from the Official Report. When I said, "We have added a good deal to the establishment of Regular officers in the Army," I was referring to the extra officers added on the formation of the Special Reserve. And I went on to say— To day the position is that we have got, counting the Special Reserve, about 2,700 more officers at home who will be available for service abroad than we had five years ago. I did not use the words which the noble Duke has quoted from the rough uncorrected report. What I said appears in the corrected report, and it is absolutely accurate. I was dealing with the mobilisation of the six Divisions, and the figure 2,700 is the result of a comparison between the number of officers serving in the United Kingdom and liable for service abroad—that is the Regulars, Special Reserve and Reserve of Officers—in December, 1905, and the number so serving in December, 1910. The Return given in the House of Commons on April 27, 1911, showed the number of Regular officers serving at home, in India, and in the Colonies on January 1, 1905, and January 1, 1911. The reduction between these dates is 131; but there is nothing in this Return inconsistent with the statement that, for the purpose of the Expeditionary Force, there are now 2,700 more officers available than there were five years ago.

Now I come to the second point the noble Duke made. He said that the real reduction which I have made, or which the present Government have made, is 32,706 non-commissioned officers and men. That, again, is most extraordinary. It is quite clear that the noble Duke has taken the figures as from January 1, 1905, a period months before I came into office. He has got confused in that way. The figure 25,074, to which he refers, represents, as I made quite clear at the time, the difference between the establishments provided in Vote A of the Army Estimates of 1905–6 and those provided in the Army Estimates of 1910–11. Those establishments are for the Regular Army, exclusive of India; they include all ranks and the Permanent Staff are included in both years. If you look at the Estimates of 1905–6 and the Estimates for 1910–11, Vote A, you will find the figures as I have stated them now. The figure should be 25,950, not 25,074, and of those 25,950, 5,000 and more were marked for reduction by my predecessor in office in the year 1905. So far as I am concerned, and so far as the present Government are concerned, our reductions amount to about 20,000. And I need not remind the noble Duke that those include some 3,000 Chinese, Indian, and Colonial troops, and certain Garrison Artillery which had been marked for reduction by the Owen Committee, and virtually the reduction only amounted to the nine battalions of which I have spoken. As against that we can now mobilise the Artillery, which we could not do in those days, and so far as transport and other matters are concerned we are in a better position. The figure 32,706, which the noble Duke quotes, is the difference between the number of noncommissioned officers and men serving at home in India and the Colonies on January 1, 1905, and the number serving on January 1, 1911. Of this number 17,851 represents the loss of strength between January 1, 1905, and April 1, l906. I am not responsible for those. I am responsible for the reductions which I have made myself and of which I am not at all ashamed, because I think the re-shaping and re-organisation far more than compensate for the lopping off of these surplus battalions which we could not mobilise and could not use for the lack of Artillery and proper transport. What I have done at all events is represented by that figure—the exact figure being 19,097. I said about 20,000. Of course, these figures are perfectly consistent with what is in the Return and with what I said in my speech, and the mistake of the noble Duke has arisen from whoever supplied him with the figures having committed the blunder of not noticing that on the 1st of January, 1905, it was not I who was in office but the late Mr. Arnold-Forster.

Now I pass to the more general topic which has been discussed—I mean the Territorial Force. I agree that it is not possible with fifteen days' training, even with the extra training far in excess of regulations which the Territorials put in, to produce a first line Army; and the question I wish to put is—What is it you are aiming at More than a year's training is requisite if you want to produce a force which you can pit man for man against Continental troops. You must have at least two years for Infantry, and perhaps three for Artillery and possibly for Cavalry. The advice of my experts is clear as to that. They say that unless you have that training you will not get a first line Army—that is to say, an Army which is designed to bear the shock of an equal number of troops on even terms with itself. But we never proposed the Territorial Force as a first line Army. The fallacy which lies at the root of all the misrepresentations of the scheme of defence, which is now the scheme of defence of three Governments—the late Government, the Government of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and the Government of Mr. Asquith—is this. The first and second lines of the scheme of defence are naval. They rest upon command of the sea, and that is why command of the sea is vital and essential to this country. I quite admit that if we have not got command of the sea all my schemes fall to pieces. We depend absolutely upon a Fleet which can outmatch any Fleet that may be brought against it, and we depend also upon that second naval line of submarines and destroyers which is established round our coasts and against which any transports or warships which escaped the main Fleet would have an extremely difficult task. We hear speeches—I hear them from the noble Field-Marshal—which seem to me to ignore the naval considerations. The noble Field-Marshal spoke of the great transports which are in foreign ports not far off and their capacity for carrying troops. But it is not such an easy thing to transport troops even when you have the transports. To transport 25,000 troops took Italy three weeks, although the Italian General Staff had been making the most careful and secret preparations long before, and I should like to see the fleet of transports which would come out against the superior Fleet watching for it and against that second line of naval defence of which I have spoken. Anyhow, we have put our money upon these two naval lines.

I deprecate the scheme of the noble Field-Marshal and of the National Service League. I am strongly opposed to it for two reasons. It does not give a first line Army, but a four or six months' trained Army, which I am advised would be useless against Continental troops on the footing of a first line Army, But I combat the hypothesis of the noble Field-Marshal because it ignores what the naval experts have laid down for us, and it is by the naval experts that we must be guided in this matter. We deliberately adopted the policy of making our first line of defence naval, and if you are going to take a great deal of money for compulsory service I think you will find yourself going short on the money you spend on the command of the sea and also upon your Oversea Army, to which I attach very great importance. I will not enter into the controversial topic of whether recruiting for the Regular Army and its necessarily voluntary system would be imperilled by a system of compulsory training. My own belief is that it would be in great peril, but I will not go into that. It is enough for me to say that if you put £7,000,000 or £8,000,000 on to the Estimates it will inevitably come off the ships and the Regular Army, and it is because I believe in the Naval doctrine of keeping command of the sea and in putting that command beyond doubt as the foundation of our strategy of defence that I am wholly opposed to the policy of the noble Field-Marshal. I receive everything he says with respect, but I would receive it with more if he were not dealing with what is essentially a naval problem, and on which the authority of naval experts, and naval experts alone, ought to be taken.

This goes to the root of much of the criticism that was made by the noble Earl opposite. The noble Earl said, Let us take this away from the level of mere Party politics, and unite on compulsory service. In the first place, for the reasons I have just given, I think compulsory service utterly wrong from a strategical point of view; and, secondly, I want to know who, in this nation of seamen, is going to bring it forward. Will the noble Viscount or the noble Marquess opposite bring it forward? They have never said so. The noble Earl who opened this debate is a man of great courage and perhaps he will lead a Party in favour of compulsory service, but I am bound to say that if he did so I think he would find the water very cold, and that his endeavour would have very short shrift. And I rejoice that it should be so, because I believe the real seaman's instinct in this nation points to a very different solution of the problem of defence and of the Empire. These considerations have a very great bearing upon the Territorial Force. The Territorial Force was never designed to be a first line Army. It was designed to supply an Army of much superior numbers ready to envelope and destroy what might pass through the naval network, which is the true first and second line of our defence. It does not do to rest your defence solely I on ships. Raiding parties may slip through, the figure of 70,000 was an arbitrary one, and was adopted from the figure given by the noble Earl himself. But against small raiding parties slipping through we ought to provide, and the Territorial Force is designed to make it not worth the while of anybody to try to bring such a raiding force. The scheme of coast defence is now very elaborate, and, we think, amply sufficient to make it impossible for any very large force to come. Even if it did get through in considerable numbers, such a force, I believe, would very soon be swallowed up and worn out. I think I have said enough to answer many of the criticisms made in the speech of the noble Earl, which were really founded on this, that the Territorial Force ought to be a first line Army.

* THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH

I do not wish to interrupt the noble Viscount. I merely want to ask him this question—Am I to gather from what he has said that the view expressed in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister, acting on behalf of the Committee of Imperial Defence, that under all circumstances it was the duty of the War Office to provide against an invasion of 70,000 men, has been dropped? Is that theory now dropped?

VISCOUXT HALDANE

Not in the least. Even if the Expeditionary Force-had left this country we should still have 410,000 troops here, a number of them Regulars, a number Special Reserve, and more than half Territorials, who would be charged with the duty of giving the 70,000 men a bad time. The Prime Minister has never said, and I have never suggested, that the Navy admit that 70,000 men or anything like that number will ever be able to land in this country. The very foundation of our naval strategy and the number and disposition of the ships we keep in the home waters is to make it impossible for any force numbering anything like 70,000 to land. Now I think I have dealt with the bulk of the topics that have been brought forward. They are so numerous that I cannot be sure of having exhausted them all, but I do not think I have omitted anything.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

My Lords, I quite realise the difficulty under which the noble Viscount labours when he rises to reply to the different points brought out in speeches by men who have made a careful study of, and speak with great authority on, this subject. I cannot say that I think the effort of the noble Viscount to alleviate what is a genuine apprehension on the part of those who have spoken to-night was a very happy one, especially in the last ten or fifteen minutes of his speech. With what has the noble Viscount dealt? He has gone off at a tangent and denounced observations and opinions of the noble and gallant Field-Marshal, but he has not met the substratum of the case which he was asked to meet to-night—namely, whether he has been able to bring the forces of the country up to the point that is necessary for national safety. Really when the noble Viscount, who is quite capable of a very limpid atmosphere of thought, goes off into this murky atmo- sphere of discussion which is destined and entirely intended to enshroud and fog the real issues, I must ask permission to endeavour to bring him back again to the points that he has been asked to meet on the different subjects, none of them discursive, which we have had brought forward this evening.

The noble Viscount was first asked to remember that the numbers of the Regular Forces were by his own confession less than when he took office, and that the training of the Auxiliary Forces was less than the Inspector-General, whom he himself appoints, considers necessary for the performance of the duties placed upon them. If I may come straight to the point as time is short, I must say that I think the noble Viscount does not really realise what is behind these discussions. I myself deeply deprecate the necessity for these continual attacks and criticisms, but they have become necessary owing to the present condition of our Army and of the War Office. The reason which actuates them at this moment is that whatever has been said from the Front Bench up till last year has received u completely fresh perspective from what occurred last September. The whole basis on which the Territorial Army has been built up has been that they would get six months' training before they would be called upon to face a foreign foe. The noble Viscount knows better than any man that the whole of what has been told us from that Bench during the last five years was changed by the attitude which His Majesty's Government found it necessary to take up last September. Never under any circumstances have we been told in this House that all the six Divisions might be sent to the Continent within a very short time. We pressed the noble Marquess the Leader of the House, before the noble Viscount became a member of it, and three of his colleagues spoke from that Bench. The result of their observations was that unless these islands were absolutely free from any fear of invasion not more than four Divisions would ever be sent abroad. I do not wish to tread on delicate ground, but everybody knows that circumstances might arise which might cause the employment of 150,000 Regulars abroad, and which would absolutely preclude the amount of training necessary for the Territorial Force on which the whole edifice of the noble Viscount's scheme is built.

If I had time, I should like to make a slight excursion into some of the facts on which the noble Viscount has come to an issue with the noble Duke. The noble Duke is a greater master than I am of these figures. I will take two points merely to illustrate how unreliable are the noble Viscount's deductions as regards his own action. Take the case of the officers. He admits that the total number of officers is less than it was six years ago, and he then proceeds to explain that the number available to go abroad is greater than it was six years ago, and he expects us to rest content with that. We know perfectly well that the number of Regular officers must be genuinely greater in this country, and the number available to go abroad must be greater. The noble Viscount took exception to the noble Duke's assertion with regard to the number of Regulars which the noble Viscount had reduced, and he fell back, unconsciously no doubt, on a statement which I have always thought was one of the most unfair ever made with regard to a man who is not here to answer for himself—the late Mr. Arnold-Forster. The noble Viscount says— It is quite true that the number of Regular troops is less by 20,000 than it was when I took office, but 5,000 of those men were doomed to extinction by my predecessor. The fact is entirely left out that Mr. Arnold-Forster had based the possibility of reducing the number of Regulars with the Colours upon introducing a system of short service of two years with the Colours and ten with the Reserve, which would have produced a less number of Regulars with the Colours but a much greater number of Reserves. That attempt the noble Viscount found it necessary to knock on the head as soon as he came into office. So that, whereas by Mr. Arnold-Forster's scheme we should have had 5,000 men less with the Colours but a much greater Reserve, the noble Viscount has robbed us not only of the men with the Colours and a great many more besides, but of the additional number of Reserves which would have been created.

Realising how great and serious these issues are I was amazed to hear, if I may say so, such paltry rhetoric put before your Lordships. And we are asked to go away content with it. The same with regard to the training of the Territorial Army. Like others of your Lordships I am doing all I possibly can in my own neighbourhood to secure recruits for the Territorial Army. We do not wish to discourage them. But really we must be allowed to try their numbers and their training by some standard, and is it unfair for that purpose to take the figures which the noble Marquess opposite said it was necessary to deal with?—not with the force which the noble and gallant Field-Marshal thinks might land on these shores. The noble Marquess himself said that a force of 70,000 might have to be dealt with. That is the figure we took, and the training that we ask for is not the training which the noble and gallant Field-Marshal asks for, but the training which Sir John French asks for. When we find that the Territorial Army is 60,000 short of the figures of the noble Viscount; that it is dwindling to some extent or is hardly being maintained; and that, by a document not put before us until twelve months after it has been in the hands of the War Office, the training is denounced by the Inspector-General, I think we have a Tight to ask that the noble Viscount should keep to that point and not go off to statements about the Fleet being our first line of defence—statements from which we have never dissented. All we ask him to do is to provide against the number of troops who are likely to laud on these islands, which the noble and gallant Field-Marshal tells us we are not at present in a position to do.

I will say one word with regard to the rifle. The noble Viscount showed clearly that the question of the ammunition at this moment is most important. He explained why the rifle adopted in 1903 was not capable of firing the exact ammunition which would give it the lowest trajectory and the greatest velocity. I do not in the least quarrel with anything he said about the rifle, but I think we have some little cause to complain of the publicity given by his colleague, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to a charge that under the noble and gallant Field-Marshal and his predecessors a rifle was adopted which was quite unlit for the troops. The field gun has been vindicated, and in all these matters we come back to our old quarrel with the noble Viscount—a quarrel which was admirably phrased by my noble friend Lord Stanhope, when he said that the noble Viscount seemed to look upon the Army as "a peg on which to hang beatitudes." The remarks of four or five members of your Lordships' House who have spoken this evening in a handsome and appreciative mariner of the Military Critic of The Times must have proved to the noble Viscount that the bland and child-like innocence with which he tells the House that an officer chosen to fill a high post under the Chief of the General Staff at the War Office is likely to indulge in as pungent and pointed criticism of the Secretary of State as a man who has no connection either with the Secretary of State or the Department over which he presides, is one of those points which must go side by side with the noble Earl's epigram. Not only does the noble Viscount look upon the Army as a peg on which to hang beatitudes, but I fear he believes that the one duty that a Secretary of State has to carry out is to ply the public with sedatives, and in this House to ply your Lordships with generalities when he has been pinned down by some of the best experts to facts and figures.

That is my quarrel with the noble Viscount, and I would even now appeal to him that he will not leave us as he has done in this debate. We know that the number of our Regular Forces has been, unwisely in our opinion, decreased. We know that we have not got enough Regular Officers, and that the Auxiliary Forces are not fit to carry out the work which the noble Viscount himself has insisted should be entrusted to them. Yet we are asked to go away from here to-night, as we have been asked before, without the admission of a single defect by the Secretary of State, without the promise of looking into one point with regard to the personnel or of an endeavour to amend it in the direction advocated by every critic and by every noble Lord who has spoken on this side of the House. That cannot be satisfactory to us. It does not lead to conviction, and in the end will result in gradually turning into impatient critics all those who are earnestly anxious in the interests of the country to see success crown the efforts which the noble Viscount has made and the scheme for which he has laboured so hard.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (THE MARQUESS OF CREWE)

My Lords, I have no intention of endeavouring to cover anything like the wide field over which this debate has so far travelled. It is only because my name has been mentioned by the noble Viscount opposite that I rise to say a word upon the one I point of the often quoted figure of 70,000 men of a hostile force who are supposed to be able to land on these shores. I think it is necessary to make some caution I with regard to this figure, because the figure of 70,000 is now sometimes rather airily spoken of as though it were an agreed figure of a hostile force which at any time, not as a sequel to a sea fight, but at any time might make its appearance on these shores, and which would have to be met by the Territorial Force. I think the figure of 70,000 was originally mentioned by the then Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in another place, and the I way in which it came to be mentioned, so I far as I recollect, was this. When we were discussing the whole question of invasion in relation to the inquiries made by my noble and gallant friend on the Cross Benches, the conclusion arrived at was that, perfect though the means employed by the Admiralty might be of stopping an invasion, yet it could not be on any showing certain that some forces, of the type which it has been convenient to describe as "raids," might not slip through; and it was held, at any rate for the sake of argument, that two such forces might possibly, in such circumstances, avoid the Fleet. Then we had discussions as to the figure at which a raid might be possible. I think that in the original definition of a raid supplied by Mr. Balfour when these matters were first discussed the figure was put at 5,000 men, but it was afterwards held that, owing to the increase in the size of transports and for other reasons, that number ought to be increased, and it was then put at from 12,000 to 15,000, or even 17,000 men. It was assumed, as I say for the sake of argument, that two such raids might conceivably effect a landing on different parts of the United Kingdom, and in order to be thoroughly on the safe side the maximum number of men comprised in those two raids was doubled and so it reached the figure of 70,000, and that perfectly arbitrary figure was therefore taken as the force against which the Territorial Army ought in an extreme case to be able to provide. That, so far as I know, is the origin of what I may venture to call the quite arbitrary figure of 70,000, and although I do not protest at all against that figure being used, I do protest very strongly against its being taken as what I venture to call an agreed figure representing a force which a hostile European Power could at any time place in one body on our shores and which the Territorial Army would have to meet.

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

My Lords, I desire to say a very few words in reply to the noble Viscount. Would the noble Viscount kindly tell me whether the figures in the Return of April 27, 1911, are correct or not. The figures I have given are not my own figures; they are the figures in that Return, and they show a difference between 1905 and 1911 of 36,948 men.

VISCOUNT HALDANE

Yes, the Return is quite correct. But the whole point is that the noble Duke has taken the 1st of January, 1905, as the date from which I am responsible, and I was not in office at that time.

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

I am not concerned with who is responsible. My point is that the Regular Army has been reduced by 36,948 men. There were that number fewer serving in the Army in 1911 than in 1905, and if that is so I should like to point out some of the many consequences that will ensue. In the first place, if you reduce the Army by 37,000 men you want far fewer recruits. Your recruiting problem ought, therefore, to be much easier, and all your establishments in future ought easily to be kept up to full strength. Another thing that is absolutely inevitable if yon reduce the Army by 37,000 men is that your Reserves must be also reduced. You cannot have the one without the other. This also is certain, that if you reduce the Army by nearly 37,000 serving soldiers it is all nonsense to go on talking about the Army of the future being stronger than the Army of 1905. One of the very last utterances of the noble Viscount concerning Army reductions was made in December last, and it is a most important one. The noble Viscount was then commenting on a letter written by the noble and gallant Field-Marshal Lord Roberts on national defence, and the noble Viscount is reported to have said, in reference to the reductions of the Regular Army, that he had merely lopped off those useless branches which contributed nothing to the trunk. I doubt very much whether the audience who heard the noble Viscount, or even those of your Lordships who read the report of the noble Viscount's speech, realised what had happened, and what those branches really were. What the noble Viscount had really done was this. During his tenure of office 5,686 noncommissioned officers and men disappeared from the Garrison and Mountain Artillery. Nine Regular battalions disappeared from the Army List, and altogether 36,948 men disappeared from the Army. If the Government have been advised, as I suppose they have, by the Committee of Imperial Defence that the Regular Army is too big for the needs of Imperial Defence, and have accordingly reduced the numbers, that is a matter; of policy on which I offer no criticism. But what I do protest most emphatically against is this, that the Secretary of State for War should have said that all he had done in regard to reducing the Army was to lop off those branches which contributed nothing at all to the trunk, the fact being that during his term of office 36,948 men have disappeared from the Regular Army. As the noble Viscount has given me the information I wanted—namely, that this is the correct number of men who have disappeared from the Army—I beg to withdraw my Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.