§ LORD BRASSEY rose to call attention to the protection of trade by auxiliary cruisers manned by British seamen. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the subject with which I propose briefly to deal especially calls for consideration in view of the recent discussions on the Declaration of London. Among the objections urged by the Chambers of Commerce to the Declaration none was more strongly insisted upon than the increased danger to British shipping from the conversion of foreign merchant steamers into cruisers. We have a vast shipping to protect. The steamers over 2,000 tons on Lloyd's Register number 2,600 under the British flag, as against Germany, 270; France, 97; the United States, 38. For the protection of our vast mercantile marine we look chiefly to the standing Navy. Behind the Navy we need a reserve of merchant cruisers.
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The policy I desire to commend to your Lordships is not new. It was advocated long ago by the first Lord Inverclyde in an article contributed by him to the Nautical Magazine, and in other very able papers. I cannot put the policy more effectively than by quoting a short passage from Lord Inverclyde's article. He wrote—
There never was a time in the history of this country when the subject of the efficiency of the Royal Navy occupied a position of greater importance than it does at present.
This was written many years ago, and it still continues to be the case. Our risks lie in the fact that the fleets of other nations are fast becoming more powerful, and whilst no navy can numerically approach that of this country, yet there are nations in Europe whose fleets combined would
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undoubtedly give us enough to cope with. How, then, can we strive ahead as the greatest maritime Power and hold our own against the fleets of the world? Not by being satisfied with increasing the strength of the Navy proper, which, owing to the prodigious cost of modern war vessels, can only be done to a comparatively small degree. Other means are ready to hand—namely, by utilising the vessels of the mercantile marine.
§ In former days when I had the honour of serving at the Admiralty the opinion of the naval Lords was strongly in favour of the policy of creating and maintaining a Reserve of mercantile auxiliaries. That policy was highly approved by Sir Frederick Grey, Sir Cooper Key, Sir Anthony Hoskins, and Sir Spencer Robinson; and among naval constructors by the late Sir Edward Reed, and by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby and Sir William White. It was approved by leading shipowners, including, as I have said, Lord Inverclyde. Sir Donald Currie was also prominent on the same side. In the United States the Civil War showed the injury which might be done by a few feeble vessels. As the best means of defence the Secretary of the United States Navy recommended the establishment of lines of ocean-going ships of high speed, capable of conversion into vessels of war. More recently, for the naval operations during the Spanish-American War, auxiliary cruisers were taken up and rendered excellent service.
§ I may refer to a personal experience. I was serving at the Admiralty at the time of the Penjdeh incident. In view of the possibility of an immediate declaration of War with Russia the Admiralty was compelled to take up vessels at home and abroad. We were severely criticised, but the expenditure was inevitable. The reasons were given by an eminent shipowner, the late Mr. Ismay, in evidence before a Royal Commission. He stated that at the commencement of the Russian scare great temptations were offered to the owners of the White Star steamers running between San Francisco and Japan. Our whole commerce in the Pacific, he added, would have been transferred to the flag of the United States if that offer had been accepted. The lessons of the Russian scare were not lost on our successors at the Admiralty. In 1887, when contracts for the mail service to New York were being 309 renewed, the Admiralty addressed a letter to the Treasury. They recalled the recent heavy expenditure in retaining fast vessels taken up to prevent their being available for any hostile Power, and they urged that the steamers subsidised to carry mails should be engaged for service as cruisers. In pursuance of the recommendations of the Admiralty a number of vessels were enrolled. When the Atlantic Combine was formed, we had no hold on the ships for which subsidies had been paid. It was resolved to discontinue subsidies and to rely on the power in emergency to take up vessels. The change of policy was ill-judged. Auxiliary cruisers are required, and care should be used in arranging the terms and conditions under which subsidies are granted.
§ The opportunity for supplementing our Navy cruisers with auxiliary vessels will generally offer in connection with contracts for ocean mail services. We have to secure that the subsidised vessels shall be at the disposal of the Government when required. Conditions should be insisted upon as to construction. The subject has on many occasions been discussed at the Institutes of Naval Architects and Civil Engineers. Our ablest constructors have taken part in those discussions, and have been unanimous in the view that auxiliary cruisers may have effective protection. As to cost, in 1903 a Committee was appointed, over which Lord Camperdown presided, to reconsider the principles on which subsidies should be given for mercantile cruisers. The ships were to have a speed of not less than twenty knots, and to be capable of carrying a light armament. For twenty-knot ships the Committee estimated the annual subsidy at £9,000. Cost progresses rapidly with increasing speed. For the defence of commerce extreme speeds are not required. Mail steamers over twenty knots number eight under foreign flags, as against six under the British flag. In steamships of speeds ranging from twenty to seventeen knots, we have an immense preponderance. In conclusion, we have increased the Estimates to an amount never approached in time of peace. Cruisers have absorbed a large proportion of the Shipbuilding Vote, and still they are few for the protection of a commerce which extends to every sea. Our policy should be not to rely on the Navy alone, but to organise a Reserve consisting of the vessels subsidised for swift communication with the States of the outer 310 Empire and for opening up new lines of trade.
§ LORD INVERCLYDEMy Lords, I take the opportunity of thanking Lord Brassey for his kindly reference to my father. With what Lord Brassey has said I agree almost entirely. But I think that one cause of the trouble is that the mercantile marine of this country is increasing at such a tremendous rate that His Majesty's Navy are not able to keep pace with it. It is our intention as shipowners, as long as we are able to do so, to maintain our mercantile supremacy. We are perfectly ready to have our ships fitted to meet the requirements of the Admiralty and to be paid for the services we render. But we do not ask to be subsidised. Personally I am not much in love with subsidising lines of steamers. His Majesty's Government already have a call on a number of fast ships, and if it is desired to extend that number I am quite sure that shipowners would endeavour to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government. I am glad that Lord Brassey has brought this subject forward, as I think it is one of considerable importance towards the maintenance of the commerce and trade of this country on the ocean.
LORD ELLENBOROUGHMy Lords, there is one point that has not been considered, I think, by the Admiralty. Where are the armaments of these ships to come from? Are the light guns necessary to repel torpedoes in existence or not It would be extremely wrong for vessels like the "Lusitania" or the "Mauretania" to be sent to sea utterly defenceless against torpedoes and at the mercy of any torpedo vessel which could get near. I think all shipowners who have large and valuable ships should have them so fitted that the guns could easily be put on board. I do not think it necessary for them perpetually in time of peace to carry a large quantity of war stores, but they ought to be originally built to mount guns up to 4in., or at any rate long 12-pounders, and be able to defend themselves from the attack of torpedoes. I doubt very much, however, whether these small guns are in existence, and I think it is a point which might well be considered.
§ LORD INVERCLYDEAs the noble Lord who has just sat down referred to the "Lusitania" and the "Mauretania," I may say that they are fully fitted, and that the guns are in store and could be put on board at very short notice.
§ THE EARL OF GRANARDMy Lords, the noble Lord who has introduced this subject is well qualified to speak upon it, for from his earliest days he has had the interests of both the Royal Navy and the mercantile marine at heart, and in addition he has held office at the Admiralty in days gone by. When this matter was first brought forward in 1887 the conditions were very different from what they are to-day. There were then on the Atlantic trade two ships, the "Etruria" and the "Umbria," which were known as ocean greyhounds. Their speed was nineteen knots, and there was no regular cruiser with a speed under natural draught of more than sixteen or seventeen knots. The "Etruria" and the "Umbria" had a very large coal capacity, and in addition were free from capture by any regular cruiser owing to their speed. To-day our regular cruisers and those of foreign Powers attain a speed approximating to twenty-five knots per hour, and the only ships in the mercantile marine which exceed that speed are the "Mauretania" and the "Lusitania," of the Cunard Company. It therefore follows as a natural sequence that any armed merchantman that did not exceed the speed of the fastest regular cruiser must, in the course of time, fall a victim to the cruisers.
The price paid as subsidies to the Cunard Company some years ago—I am speaking from memory but I think my figures are correct—exceeded £150,000 per annum, in addition to an advance of over £2,000,000 on advantageous terms. The whole question was gone into by Lord Camperdown's Committee in the year 1903, and that Committee made several suggestions with regard to subsidies; and Mr. Arnold-Forster, who then represented the Admiralty in the House of Commons, stated in reply to a question that the Admiralty would not consider the subsidy of any merchant vessel with a speed of less than twenty-two knots. That I may inform your Lordships is the policy of the Admiralty to-day. The question of paying large subsidies becomes a very expensive one, and if we are to subsidies vessels whose speeds would be comparable to that of cruisers to-day the 312 expense, I venture to think, would be out of all proportion to the results we should receive. If you ask a shipping company to build a ship whose speed is above that of commercial requirements, the Government must pay for it.
It may be said that armed mercantile cruisers would be of very great use in parts of the ocean where there are no hostile fast cruisers. I do not think that can be in any way denied; but the Admiralty contend that we have a sufficient number of these vessels at our disposal to-day. Under an agreement with the International Marine Company we have a right of pre-emption for the hire or purchase of British vessels owned by that company, and the Admiralty cannot see their way to enlarge their subsidies any further. As to the observation of Lord Ellenborough, I am glad to be able to inform him that the armaments are ready for all the ships controlled by the Board of Admiralty under the International Marine Agreement.