HL Deb 04 March 1909 vol 1 cc315-34
Bedford, D. Westmeath, E. Lawrence, L.
Wellington, D. Wicklow, E. Leith of Fyvie, L.
MacDonnell, L. [Teller.]
Ailesbury, M.
Bath, M. Falkland, V. Monk Bretton, L.
Bristol, M. Falmouth, V. Oriel, L. (V. Massereene.)
Lansdowne, M. Goschen, V. Saltoun, L.
Hood, V. Sanderson, L.
Camperdown, E. Iveagh, V. Sandhurst, L.
Carlisle, E. Shute, L. (V. Barrington.)
Cathcart, E. Basing, L. Silchester, L. (E. Longford.)
Cawdor, E. Brancepeth, L. (V. Boyne) Sinclair, L.
Cromer, E. Brodrick, L. (V. Midleton.) Stanmore, L.
Devon, E. Cheylesmore, L. Stewart of Garlies. (E.Galloway.)
Doncaster, E. (D. Buccleuch and Queensbury.) Clinton, L. Templemore, L.
Cottesloe, L. Trevor, L.
Fortescue, E. Curzon of Kedleston, L. Vivian, L.
Lovelace, E. Ellenborough, L. Waleran, L.
Lytton, E. Estcourt, L. Wenlock, L. [Teller.]
Onslow, E. Harris, L. Willoughby de Broke, L.
Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.) Hindlip, L. Wynford, L.
Waldegrave, E. Kilmarnock, L. (E. Erroll.) Zouche of Haryngworth, L.

Amendment agreed to accordingly.

Clause 4 agreed to.

Clause 5:

* LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON

On this clause, may I ask the noble Viscount a question? I understand that the clause provides for the rules which will authorise the discussion of the annual financial statement of the Governor-General in Council and of the local Governments, as the case may be, and of any matter of general public interest, and also the putting of questions. I understood the noble Viscount to say, in his opening speech to-night, that in the public interest the Viceroy may, without giving any reason, closure any supplementary question. I wish to ask if the same power will be vested in a Governor and Lieutenant-Governor, because it is in the Provincial Legislative Councils that the trouble is far more likely to arise.

VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN

I quite understand that that will be so.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

The present rule runs thus— The President may disallow any question without any reason therefor, other than that, in his opinion, it cannot be answered consistently with the public interests, and in such a case the question shall not be entered in the Proceedings of the Council. I take it that the new rule will be virtually in accord with that?

VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN

That is in the Viceroy's Council?

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE : Yes.

VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN

I think that will go on.

LORD HARRIS

May we understand that the same rule as to the power of disallowing supplementary questions will apply in the Provincial, Councils?

VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN

I suppose so.

* LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON

It is very important that we should be quite clear on the point of supplementary questions. I understood the noble Viscount to say that no discussion would be allowed in respect of any answer that might be delivered by an official to a question, but that the maximum power conceded to the interrogator would be that he might supplement his first question by a second, or possibly even a third, but that the supplementary question or questions might only be on questions of fact, and that whether they were on questions of fact or otherwise it would be within the power of the President to disallow them in the public interest, if he so desired. Is that a correct version of what the noble Viscount said?

VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN : Yes.

Clause 5 agreed to.

Clause 6:

* LORD AMPTHILL

moved to amend this clause, which ran— The Governor-General in Council shall, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State in Council, make regulations as to the conditions under which and manner in which persons resident in India may be nominated or elected as members of the Legislative Councils of the Governor-General, Governors, and Lieutenant-Governors, and as to the qualifications for being, and for being nominated or elected, a member of any such council and as to any other matter for which regulations are authorised to be made under this Act, and also as to the manner in which those regulations are to be carried into effect, by inserting after the words "a member of any such Council," the words— including the conditions under which and the manner in which persons otherwise qualified under the regulations shall be disqualified for being, and being nominated or elected a member of any such council. The addition of these words might seem, at first sight, superfluous or mere tautology, but he thought he could show that that was not the case. He was well aware that qualifications necessarily connoted disqualifications. If they declared that certain persons were qualified, they ipso facto excluded all others who were not so qualified and thus set up disqualifications; but he thought it was very important to emphasise the fact that there were to be positive disqualifications from being elected a member of one of the Legislative Councils. The noble Viscount had enumerated certain disqualifications of a very obvious and inevitable kind; but in regard to sedition mongers and persons who had been associated with anarchism in India the Secretary of State hesitated and refused to commit himself to a definite conclusion. The noble Viscount had said that to exclude definitely persons who had been engaged in political agitation of this kind would leave a ragged edge. His (Lord Ampthill's) view was that if they left a loophole for the election of any such persons to these Councils they would be creating a ragged edge and preventing the smooth perfection of the whole scheme. An idea was widely current in India that the surest road to official advancement or honorary distinction was abuse of the Government. We were responsible for the existence of that notion, and he thought that now was the opportunity of removing so mischievous an impression. The idea was due to a variety of causes. In the first place, it was due to the general scheme of education imposed upon the people of India. Universities had been set up, and there had been chosen as a subject for the contemplation of undisciplined bands of young men in India the constitutional history of England. That history was generally a history of men who had been on the worst possible terms with the Government of the day. Students in India had not those moderating influences at hand which acted upon students in this country, and if they were brought up on the poetry of Milton, the history of Macaulay, the rhetoric of Burke, and the philosophy of Mill, we had only ourselves to thank if they turned that inaccurate history, that misleading rhetoric, and that entirely—to the East—inappropriate philosophy against ourselves. That system of education had undoubtedly produced the idea that agitation against the Government and abuse of constituted authority was the best road to prominence and distinction; and—

THE EARL OF CREWE

I venture to think the noble Lord is travelling some way from his Amendment.

* LORD AMPTHILL

said he was sorry the Leader of the House should inflict that rebuke upon him, but what he was trying to prove was that it was necessary to show that political agitation was not the road to advancement. That idea existed, and it was necessary to show that it was incorrect. The existence of the idea was also due to the constant example afforded by party politics in this country and to the mistaken generosity of the Government in India, which was inclined to apply English notions of political license to the different conditions of the East. On this account it was desirable to lay down marked disqualifications as well as the negative disqualifications which resulted from the existence of qualifications. The addition of the words in his Amendment did not in the slightest degree alter or affect the sense of the clause. They merely emphasised that which they knew it was the intention of the noble Viscount and of the Government of India to carry out.

Amendment moved— In page 4, line 1, after the word 'council' to insert the words 'including the conditions under which and the manner in which persons otherwise qualified under the regulations shall be disqualified for being, and being nominated or elected a member of any such council.'"—(Lord Ampthill.)

VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN

I cannot think that anything would be gained by the addition of the proposed words; and may I say that I did not see, any more than the noble Earl behind me, the relevance of the noble Lord's references to the rhetoric of Burke, the poetry of Milton, and the philosophy of Mill. This is a matter of regulation. It is one of those regulations upon which, as I told the House at the beginning of our proceedings to-day, our minds are not made up. But I should not easily come to the conclusion—I say this frankly and in advance—that the fact of a man having one day or another taken a mischievous part in a political agitation, when he was young, perhaps, should act as a disqualification for ever for his sitting in a Legislative Council. I shall be very hard to convince upon it, but it is under discussion and we shall see.

* THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, I cannot help feeling some doubt whether the categories of disqualification which the noble Viscount gave to the House earlier in the evening will really prove to be a sufficient way of achieving the object we all have in view—namely, the exclusion from these Executive Councils of persons who really will not only add nothing to their efficiency but whose presence upon them will amount to something very like a scandal in the eyes of the people in India. I notice that at one point the disqualification extends very far indeed. A person, the noble Viscount told us, who has been dismissed from the service of the public is to be disqualified. I can quite conceive that a man may have got into a scrape early in life and lost his place in the Service, and subsequently, by many long years of good and honest work, retrieved his reputation: such a man might make a very useful member of Council. On the other hand, when the noble Viscount tells us that in his view it is extremely doubtful whether a person who has been deported under the Regulation of 1818 for being implicated in seditious practices should not be qualified for a place on a Council, I confess that there I part company from him. I greatly prefer the old system under which the elected members of Council were in the first place elected and then had their election confirmed by the head of the Government. That, I know, seems to the noble Viscount a very ridiculous arrangement, but I can assure him that it is one which has a very considerable significance, because in the eyes of the public in India there is all the difference in the world between a member of Council who owes his place in Council simply to the fact that he has been elected by what the noble Viscount describes in the introduction to this Bill as the popular vote—there is all the difference in the world between a man who comes in with the popular vote behind him and nothing else, and the man who comes into Council having been elected by his neighbours or fellow countrymen but whose election has been sanctioned and approved by the Government. This arrangement enabled the Government with due discrimination, to exclude improper people from the Councils; I am afraid on the other hand that no scheme of categories, however elaborate, will be sufficient to prevent from time to time the preferment of men with very questionable antecedents, men whose admission to membership of the Legislative Councils will be looked upon with wondering eyes by many people in India, and will be very far, indeed, from conducing to the efficient conduct of the legislative business of the country.

VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN

If I thought there was going to be a great return of these extreme and obnoxious characters I would have no more to do with the Bill. It is because I do not anticipate that that I am making these proposals. I submit to the noble Marquess that to ask the Government of India to frame categories of exclusion is a very delicate and difficult thing. I would far rather trust to the power of the Councils in the matter. Not so many years ago a member was returned to the House of Commons for an Irish constituency, and the House declared that he could not sit as he had not purged himself of certain serious offences. In the same way I take it that these Councils, with an authoritative president, would be able to exclude a thoroughly obnoxious person.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

How could they keep him out?

VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN

By by-laws, or other means. It might just as well be asked how did the House of Commons declare that the particular person to whom I have referred should not take his seat. I cannot imaging why this could not be left to the discretion of the Councils. I can assure the noble Marquess that innumerable difficulties will present themselves by drawing up classes and sub-classes.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

It is the noble Viscount who has been drawing up classes and sub-classes. My argument is that I do not like classes and sub-classes, and would very much prefer to go back to the old arrangement, under which, for sufficient cause, a particular individual elected by one of these constituencies could be refused by the head of the Government.

VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN

But even there you have difficulties, for you are leaving it to the caprice possibly of the head of the Government.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

I would not leave it to the caprice of the head of the Government. I would allow the refusal of the head of the Government to be subject to the consideration of the Governor-General in Council, or, if the noble Viscount prefers it, of the Secretary of State.

THE EARL OF CREWE

May I remind the Committee that the only question before us is the Amendment of the noble Lord opposite, by which a positive form is to be given to certain unnamed disqualifications rather than leaving it in a purely negative form. The discussion seems to me to have wandered very far indeed from that.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 6 agreed to.

* LORD AMPTHILL

moved to insert, after Clause 6, the following new clause— Before any proclamation, rule, or regulation under this Act is made, the draft thereof shall be laid before each House of Parliament for a period of not less than sixty-five days during the session of Parliament, and if either House before the expiration of that period presents an Address to His Majesty against the draft or any part thereof, no further proceedings shall be taken thereon, but without prejudice to the making of any new draft, proclamation, rule, or regulation.

He said the clause embodied a suggestion he had ventured to make on the Second Reading. The noble Earl the Leader of the House said, at the conclusion of the debate on the Second Reading, that he did not think the Secretary of State could accept this Amendment; he trusted that this was merely a cautious reservation of opinion and that the noble Viscount had meanwhile recognised that something of this kind was desirable. The object of the new clause was to reserve to Parliament the right of considering constitutional changes in the Government of India before they were actually carried out. The Bill had been described as a blank cheque; and, in fact, supposing Clause 3 were reinstated, it would enable the Governor-General in Council, subject merely to the approval of the Secretary of State, to alter the form of I government in any of the Provinces under Lieutenant-Governors—a great constitutional change. But, as it stood at present, the Bill enabled the Secretary of State, at his own discretion, to make changes of hardly less magnitude in the constitution of the Presidency Governments. Nobody could hold more strongly than he did the opinion that Parliament should not attempt to direct the details of administration in India, and he agreed most cordially with the principle by which the effective part of this Bill had been left to regulations in order to give the necessary elasticity and discretion to the men on the spot. But when it came to an actual constitutional change it was another matter, and Parliament should not part with the right of withholding final approval. It was for this reason that he thought any proclamation which might be made under Clause 3, supposing that clause to be eventually restored, and any rules and regulations made under Clauses 5 and 6, should be laid before Parliament in the manner suggested by ample custom and precedent. The noble Earl the Leader of the House, in his remarks on this subject, had suggested that Parliament should cut off its nose in order to spite its face; in other words, he would deprive the House of Commons of an undeniable right and an important duty in order that that right might not be exercised or that duty performed by their Lordships' House. He could not believe that the Secretary of State for India or His Majesty's Ministers as a whole would take this view, which he ventured to think was not only unsound from the point of view of Imperial statecraft but also obviously inconsistent with the principles of the democratic government of the Empire. He did not think there need be any fear of unnecessary or capricious use of this power by Parliament. Indian questions were not, and never had been, made a subject of party politics in their Lordships' House; and there was the further consideration, put forward by Lord Crewe himself, that a great number of the men most competent to deal with these questions were members of that House. In each session of Parliament there were between fifty and 100 sets of rules and regulations laid for the appointed number of days in this manner on the Table, but during the past ten years only ten addresses to the Crown had been moved, and of that number only two were moved in their Lordships' House. As regarded the length of time which he suggested, sixty-five days, there were two considerations—first, the great distance of India and the time that communication took; and, secondly, the immense importance of the questions as compared with that of other questions treated in this way. He could also furnish ample precedent for a period as long as sixty-five days, and cited various Statutes with this object. His Amendment was designed solely to safeguard the elemental rights and responsibilities of the Imperial Parliament, and it was not likely, having regard to the traditional attitude of Parliament and the usage of both Houses, that any administrative inconvenience would result from the adoption of this course.

Amendment moved:— To insert, after Clause 6, the following new clause: 7. Before any proclamation, rule, or regulation under this Act is made, the draft thereof shall be laid before each House of Parliament for a period of not less than sixty-five days during the Session of Parliament, and if either House before the expiration of that period presents an Address to His Majesty against the draft or any part thereof, no further proceedings shall be taken thereon, but without prejudice to the making of any new draft, proclamation, rule, or regulation."—(Lord Ampthill )

* LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON

I rise not entirely to support the noble Lord but to deliver a few observations on the subject of his Amendment. The noble Viscount the Secretary of State was kind enough to tell us earlier what would probably be the course of events followed with regard to filling up the blank cheque and making it operative in India. As I understand, there will be a series of regulations and a number of rules and proclamations, and the question is whether it is reasonable for us to ask the noble Viscount to let us see any of those regulations, rules, and proclamations before they come into operation.

In his speech to-night the noble Viscount divided them into three or four different classes. He told us, first, that a number of rules had already been settled, and that these rules related in particular to the numbers of the Councils, the quorum to be present, and the tenure of office; secondly, that there was a class of rules which had been settled in principle only but not in detail, and that these related to the discussion, for instance, of the Budget both at Calcutta and in the Provincial Councils; thirdly, that a discussion on general questions was proceeding between the Secretary of State and the Government of India; and, fourthly—and this is the point to which I invite the attention of your Lordships—that there was a large range of subjects not yet settled. We quite understand that. These are vital questions that it may well take time to decide.

What are included in this range of subjects on which the Government of India and the noble Viscount have not yet made up their minds? First, there is the question of disqualifications. Is it possible to suggest, I will not say a compromise upon this matter, but a combination of the features of the system suggested by the Secretary of State and of that advocated by the noble Marquess behind me? The Secretary of State has sketched a category of very necessary and very obvious disqualifications, and I am sure we can trust the Government of India and the Secretary of State in combination to draw up a satisfactory category of this nature. But is there not very great force in the argument that fell from the noble Marquess—the argument that it is quite conceivable that persons may be returned to these Councils in the future who may be, not merely political agitators in the ordinary sense, but people who have dabbled in sedition even if they have not been actually convicted of crime? To this the noble Viscount replies that he has every confidence that that class of man will not be returned. I wish in all sincerity that I could share that confidence. I feel tolerably certain that as time advances places on these Councils will be the recognised reward of political agitation. It is sometimes a passport to the House of Commons for a man to have been engaged in a conflict with the Government and even to have been a guest of His Majesty in prison. So also you may find in India that persons quite unfitted to sit upon these Councils will be returned. I admit the difficulty of framing a net which will catch persons of that sort.

During the whole time, however, that I was in India I never heard any objection to the present rule giving the Governor-General power to decline to nominate any person who had been recommended for nomination; and so well did that rule act as a safeguard that I cannot recollect its being put into operation. I remember that there was once a possibility of a gentleman being returned to Council who would not have been accepted. Steps were taken to ascertain from me in advance what would be the attitude of the Governor-General in the matter, and as soon as it was known that the appointment was one which the Governor-General could not accept the nomination was not proceeded with. I submit as a suggestion to the noble Viscount whether it is not worth considering that side by side with the system of exclusions which he has outlined some such power should be reserved to the Governor-General as has hitherto been enjoyed by him without the slightest dispute or difficulty.

Among the other subjects still unsettled is the entire system of nomination and election in the future. That is one of the most stupendous changes to be introduced by this Bill. As we all know, there is some apparent difference of opinion between the Secretary of State and the Government of India on the matter. The Government of India are opposed to any system of indirect election through colleges. At any rate, in their despatch they recommended a system of election through existing bodies or associations, supplemented, in cases where these bodies did not exist, by nomination by Government, but the noble Viscount would not have anything to say to that, and proposed a system of election by electoral colleges. He has not told us what has been the answer of the Government of India to his suggestions. I do not desire to press him upon that point to-night, but I submit that inasmuch as so many of the vital questions of this Bill, that which really fills in the framework of what we have been discussing to-night, have still to be settled by these rules and regulations, it is not unreasonable to ask that Parliament should have some opportunity, I do not say of delaying, but, at any rate, of considering these matters.

VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN

Considering them after or before the rules are framed?

* LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON

I will explain. The noble Lord behind me (Lord Ampthill) proposes that before any proclamation, rule, or regulation is made the draft thereof shall be laid before each House of Parliament for a period of not less than sixty-five days during the session of Parliament, and then he suggests the contingency of either House presenting an Address to His Majesty. From what fell from the noble Viscount the other day, I think that is a course which he would not favour. I hold myself that it is in excess of the necessities of the case. All that we want is an opportunity of seeing these rules, regulations, and proclamations, and an opportunity in a perfectly friendly manner of discussing them across the floor of the House with the Secretary of State. The noble Viscount might, therefore, consider the question of agreeing to the Amendment down to the words "session of Parliament," substituting, if he wishes, forty for sixty-five days. The suggestion I submit is that the noble Viscount may, perhaps, be prepared to agree to the proposal that before any proclamation, rule, or regulation under this Bill is made—I mean before it comes into effect—the draft thereof shall be laid before each House or Parliament for a period of not less than forty days during the session of Parliament. The Secretary of State may ask what is the object of this. Our object would be to have an opportunity of discussion upon the matter, and, if thought desirable, of making representations to the Secretary of State. There is a great difference between what was done in 1892 and what is now proposed. You are now creating what is almost representative government, and it is not unreasonable to ask that when these great and vital changes are being made this House should have some idea of what is going on. I hope the Secretary of State will be able to meet us in the matter.

VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN

The noble Lord who has just spoken used very different language indeed in the proceedings on the Bill of 1892. He then said what I take to be the exact opposite of what he is now saying. In moving the Second Reading of the Bill I urged upon the House the advice given by Mr. Glad- stone in regard to an Amendment moved to the Indian Councils Bill of 1892. The noble Lord and I were then both in another place. A member on my side of the House and in the minority moved an Amendment. Mr. Gladstone rose and urged his supporter not to divide on the Amendment, and in doing so used this language— The best course we could take would be to commend to the authorities of India what is a clear indication of the principles on which we desire them to proceed. It is not our business to devise machinery for the purpose of Indian Government.

The noble Lord (then Mr. Curzon) said— Speaking on behalf of the, Government, I entirely endorse that part of Mr. Gladstone's speech in which he said that it is not for this House to determine a plan or devise the machinery of an Indian Councils Bill, but that the initiative must be made by the Government of India.

LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON : Hear, hear.

VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN

The noble Lord will, I know, draw a distinction between initiative and later proceedings. The point is the same. The point in 1892 was that it was only the Government of India who really could be satisfied as to the best technical details of machinery. On this occasion what is proposed is that before the Act comes into operation the two Houses of Parliament are to discuss and decide whether the regulations ought or ought not to come into effect.

LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON

I did not say that. I suggested that the Amendment should end at the words "session of Parliament."

VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN

I was, perhaps, wrong in bringing my noble friend Lord Curzon into that. But the noble Lord who moved the Amendment asks that before any proclamation, rule, or regulation is made the draft shall be laid before each House of Parliament for sixty-five days—Heaven only knows why the period of sixty-five days is taken—and that if either House before the expiration of that period presents an Address to His Majesty against the draft or any part thereof no further proceedings shall be taken thereon. The rules being made and the whole scheme being before Parliament for sixty-five days, suppose the House of Commons were to pick holes in it and come to a conclusion dissenting from some of the rules, while the House of Lords approved the rules? What a situation for the Government of India! My view is to leave to the Government of India as much elastic power as possible, so that they may, should circumstances seem to demand it, alter any rule. But this provision would prevent such alteration, however necessary the alteration might prove to be. Nothing could be more hideously inconvenient for effective government in India. It would be inconvenient and unconstitutional. On the question of its being unconstitutional, I will quote the language—for we are really now on a great issue—used by the late Lord Salisbury in June, 1893. Lord Salisbury said— I apprehend that the constitutional doctrine is this. The House of Commons has the absolute right of selecting a group of statesmen from whom an Executive is chosen, and it has the absolute right of dismissing those statesmen from office when it ceases to trust them; but it has not the right— this is what the noble Lord opposite is asking the House to assert— to take the management and conduct of the Executive into its own. hands. The Executive Government so selected has, according to our constitution, the right and the duty of discharging the office of Executive and the prerogatives of the Crown.

I should say that that doctrine was thoroughly sound. But under the noble Lord's Amendment the Government of India would be placed at the mercy of rival votes in the two Houses of Parliament. My view is that the regulations should come into force as soon as they have gone through the framing by the Government of India and received the approval of the Secretary of State, who is the representative of Parliament. I am quite willing to insert a new clause after Clause 6 in the following terms— All proclamations, regulations, and rules made under this Act shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament as soon as may be after they are made. There is no intention there to suspend their operation for one minute. The moment they have been passed in India and approved by the Secretary of State in Whitehall their operation ought to begin.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

did not think it would be difficult to show that the language of Lord Salisbury applied to a very different set of facts. One of the expressions used by Lord Salisbury was the "management of the Executive." He did not think any question of that kind arose in the suggestion of Lord Curzon. If the constitution were founded on the principle that a group of gentlemen were chosen to carry out the administrative work of government and that having been chosen their acts were not to be interfered with or refuted by Parliament, how was it that in one out of every ten Acts at least there was included the very clause which Lord Ampthill had moved, with the object of giving Parliament an opportunity of considering before an order which had been drawn took effect, whether it should be brought into action? If the noble Viscount had said that India was on a different plane, and that Indian Government was of so peculiar a character that Parliament having laid down certain principles should leave the whole responsibility in the hands of the Secretary of State, that, he thought, would have been a more tenable ground on which to found himself. The noble Viscount could not ride two horses at once. He could not tell them that the Bill was the opening of a fresh chapter in Indian history, and at the same time ask them to be governed by exactly the same rules and regulations as affected the Act of 1892, which was of a very much more limited scope. Personally, he could not see that the amended clause as proposed by Lord Curzon would in any way derogate from the authority of the Secretary of State. The noble Viscount had asked for very wide powers indeed under the Bill. He bad pressed the actual wording of the Bill to an extent which, having sat opposite to him for a great many years in the House of Commons, he had never known him to attempt in that House. The noble Viscount had now asked their Lordships to pass clause after clause without a single amendment and without a word of difference, and the more the noble Viscount insisted upon that the more he thought he was entitled to say that what was being asked for was a blank cheque as to the manner of filling in which Parliament was given no information. In the circumstances, although he hoped Lord Ampthill would not press the latter part of his Amendment to which so much exception had been taken, he trusted that the laying of the draft proclamations, rules, and regulations on the Table of Parliament would not be made absolutely the dead letter which it would be if the Secretary of State's suggested new clause were adopted.

THE EARL OF CREWE

There are two entirely separate propositions before the Committee. There is, first, the Amendment of the noble Lord opposite, Lord Ampthill, which does not, I gather, find complete favour with the Front Bench on his side of the House. I therefore will not attempt to deal at all fully with it. I said something about it on the occasion of the former debate. It does seem to me to be a most astonishing proposition. I can recall nothing like it in my Parliamentary experience. To suggest that any rule and regulation made by the Government of India under this Bill should be not merely the subject of full discussion in either House of Parliament, but that it should be within the absolute competence of noble Lords opposite, with their permanent majority, practically to frame any rule or regulation in any way they please, does seem to me the most amazing proposition I have ever heard put forward in your Lordships' House. On the other hand, there is the proposition of the noble Lord, Lord Curzon, which, I understand, is also favoured by the noble Viscount who spoke last; but, that, of course, is a far more moderate proposition, because, although it gives great scope for discussion in both Houses, it gives no power of alteration to either. The proposed rules and regulations may be picked to pieces dialectically to any extent, but no power of alteration is given to either House of Parliament. Before, however, the rule or regulation is made, it must lie on the Table for sixty-five or forty days during the session of Parliament. Is that a practical proposal? Some perfectly trivial rule is, we will assume, proposed in India in the early autumn, say in the month of August. It remains suspended until Parliament meets—and we do not, I hope, always meet in the autumn. It therefore remains suspended perhaps until the middle of February. It then has to lie on the Table, and cannot come into operation until after Easter. Is that a reasonable position in which to place the Government of India? I cannot conceive any body who would less like being placed in that position than Lord Curzon. If it had been done when he was Viceroy I think he would have regarded it as an unwarranted piece of interference, I do not say with the prerogatives of the Government of India, but with the current course of their business, that this matter should be discussed in this way in Parliament. Under the clause as proposed by my noble friend the Secretary of State the rules would come into operation, but it would be open to anybody in either House to discuss them and the power of amendment would be always there. If in your Lordships' House or in the other House a case was made out which convinced the Secretary of State and the Indian Government that a mistake had been made, any regulation could afterwards be modified or withdrawn. I should have thought that quite as great a safeguard as we possess in most matters of legislation. But I am reminded of another argument. Why is this state of things to apply only to India? Are your Lordships going to apply this sort of meticulous supervision to the Crown Colonies? In what respect does the case of Ceylon, or the West Indies, or Nigeria differ from India in these matters? And if every regulation which may be presumed to possess anything of a constitutional character is to be submitted to that spirit of preliminary observation in your Lordships' House, I can only say that the government of those parts of the Empire will be made as difficult as I think Indian government will be made if the noble Lord's Amendment is accepted.

* THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

I will not attempt to examine the analogy which the noble Earl has presented to the Committee. I distrust analogies generally, and particularly the series of analogies made use of in the discussion of this Bill. I cannot admit any analogy drawn from our great self-governing Colonies as a precedent which necessarily applies to the Government of India, I was indeed struck by the rather reckless use of such an analogy by the noble Earl the Leader of the House the other evening when he told us that he could not conceive any Indian Lieutenant-Governor having a difficulty with his Legislative Council, because, he said, a Colonial Governor always was able, or ought to be able, to manipulate his Council. Therefore I will not pay much attention to that analogy. The noble Earl was a little severe on my noble friend Lord Ampthill. What my noble friend was evidently anxious to obtain from His Majesty's Government was some assurance that these most important matters should not be entirely withdrawn from the cognisance of Parliament. After all, we are dealing, not with small and insignificant points of detail, but with capital points of first-rate importance—capital points with which the Secretary of State tells us he is not yet able to deal because some of them still require further examination and consideration, and with which, therefore, he intends to deal, not within the compass of the Bill, but by regulations and proclamations to be hereafter issued. We wish to have an early and sufficient opportunity of considering and offering observations upon those regulations and proclamations, and I do not think that a very unreasonable request. We are constantly stipulating that schemes issued under Acts of Parliament are to come up for consideration by the Houses of Parliament. We did it only last night in the case of a Bill creating new bishoprics. We said, not only that the schemes were to be laid on the Table, but that they were not to be effectual until Parliament had sanctioned them, or until they had lain a certain number of days without a resolution being carried against them. One word only with regard to the alleged precedent of 1892. Noble Lords opposite must know that the Act of 1892 was child's play compared to the Bill now upon the Table. But that is not all. When the discussion took place in the other House of Parliament to which the noble Viscount referred, what was being discussed was not an Amendment such as that proposed by my noble friend, still more not an Amendment such as was suggested by my noble friend Lord Curzon, but an Amendment which was simply to the effect that the rules and regulations were to obtain the "sanction" of both Houses of Parliament. We have none of us asked for that. Even my noble friend Lord Ampthill did not ask for that. Lord Curzon asks for a great deal less. He only asks that the rules before they take effect should lay for a certain number of days on the Table. The noble Viscount is, I think, anxious to meet us, perhaps not quite as much as we should wish, but to the extent of giving us as early as possible adequate opportunity of offering our criticism—we ask for nothing more—upon any of the more important regulations which may be issued under this Bill. What I venture to suggest to the Committee and to the noble Viscount is this, that my noble friend should not press his Amendment, even in the modified form, to-night, but that we should consider on Report the form of words which the noble Viscount read out to-us just now. That seams to me to be for the moment a reasonable solution of the difficulty.

* LORD AMPTHILL

said he was obliged to exercise his right of reply on account of the attitude of the Leader of the House. The noble Earl first tried to stop him by charging him with irrelevance, and then attempted to pour ridicule upon him by entirely misrepresenting what he had said.

THE EARL OF CREWE

I desire to explain that I had no intention whatever of holding the noble Lord up in any sense to ridicule. I was obliged to express my views most strongly on the subject of his Amendment, because its substance does seem to me extremely unusual. But I had no intention of saying anything at all offensive to the noble Lord.

* LORD AMPTHILL

said the noble Earl had asked fire House to believe that the proclamations, rules and regulations dealt only with trivial matters of administration. It was nothing of the kind: these proclamations and regulations were to bring about real constitutional changes. It was solely on this ground that he had urged Parliament to preserve its right in the matter. He gladly agreed, however, to the course suggested by the noble Marquess, the Leader of the Opposition.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Remaining clause and schedules agreed to.

Standing Committee negatived: The Report of Amendment to be received on Tuesday next, and Bill to be printed as amended. (No. 8.)