DIVORCE IN COUNTY COURTS.

HL Deb 14 July 1909 vol 2 cc473-507

LORD GORELL

My Lords, I have to ask your Lordships' indulgence while I move a Resolution in these terms— That it is expedient that jurisdiction to a limited extent in divorce and matrimonial cases should be conferred upon County Courts, in order that the poorer classes may have their cases of that nature heard and determined in such Courts. The County Courts Bill which was introduced by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack last week, for reasons which he explained at the time, did not contain any reference to the subject which forms the basis of this Motion. The Committee appointed to inquire into certain matters of County Court procedure, and over which I presided, had various matters to consider, and, amongst others, the particular matter upon which I am now about to address your Lordships. The other matters with which they dealt have been discussed for a lengthy period, but the particular matter which I propose to place before your Lordships has not had similar consideration.

The Report of the Committee deals very fully with the subject, and I propose to refer to one or two points in it when I have placed your Lordships in possession of the facts upon which I base this Motion. The Committee were unanimous, with one exception. This is a subject of very great importance, and I feel the gravity of it and the responsibility of endeavouring to put what I think about it and the facts before your Lordships. I do not think I should have attempted to do so unless I had a long experience of the subject, and unless I had felt myself impelled by years of watching this class of case to come to a conclusion about it which I feel it to be my duty to lay before your Lordships. I wish to make it plain, at the outset, that this Motion does not propose to deal with any alteration in the law. I do not propose to enter into what might be a very controversial subject as to the merits or demerits, the advantages or disadvantages of a particular system of divorce law. My Motion is confined to a matter of procedure, and its object is to bring the reform effected by the Statute of 1857 within the reach of those who at present cannot afford the cost of proceedings in the High Court.

The grounds upon which I have thought it desirable to bring forward this Motion are two—first, that poor people may be able to assert the rights which they see other people asserting and which they cannot afford to assert themselves; and, second, because the conviction has been forced upon me, by a long experience of this unfortunate class of work, that the present state of affairs is adverse to the best interests of public morality. I do not wish to refer at any length to the state of things before 1857. Everyone is more or less familiar with the history of the causes which led to the passing of that Act. The law before 1857 did not allow of any divorce a vinculo, but only a mensâ et thoro, which is in the form of what is termed a judicial separation. For 150 years before that Divorce Acts were passed in Parliament. I have taken the figures as far as I am able to do so at this distance of time, and I find that from 200 to 250 Divorce Acts passed through both Houses in the 150 years that elapsed before the 1857 Act came into force. These were mostly cases in which the petitioners were husbands, but there were some cases in which wives were the petitioners. It is clear that a regular course of procedure was adopted. The Standing Orders of the House pointed out how the procedure had to be carried out, how the proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Courts had to be laid on the Table, how the verdict against a co-respondent had to be produced. The cases went through the Courts if the evidence permitted it, and the Bills went through both Houses and became Acts of Parliament; and thus by an elaborate machinery marriages were dissolved.

In moving the Second Reading of the 1857 Bill, Lord Cranworth referred to the procedure, and said that relief was beyond the reach of all but the wealthiest classes. That Bill became law, and has stood, with slight amendments and improvements in procedure, for the last fifty years. It established a central Court in London, and gave certain powers to send cases down to Assizes, but those powers were practically useless. It also contained provisions for the purpose of enabling petitions to be presented to the Judges of Assize in order to obtain decrees of judicial separation and decrees of restitution of conjugal rights. But that was not found practicable in working, and the following year those powers were repealed, and the whole work of this country was left to be dealt with by the central Court in London so far as it related to matrimonial cases. The Act took away the jurisdiction which existed in the various Consistory Courts.

When the Act of 1857 was before Parliament there was a discussion with regard to the proposal for giving the County Courts jurisdiction in these cases. It was felt that the Bill would not reach the poorer classes, but objection was taken to trusting the County Courts as they then stood, and in the end only the central Court was established, because it was not considered that County Courts could be safely trusted with the exercise of this delicate jurisdiction. But now the position has very much changed. The County Courts have had enormous increases to their jurisdiction in all classes of work. In the County Courts Bill at present before your Lordships' House there is a proposal that the County Courts should have unlimited jurisdiction in Common Law cases, subject only to the right of defendants to have their cases removed into the High Court if they so desired. The want of confidence displayed in 1857 has really, I think, come to an end, and there is now such confidence in these Courts that a demand has been set up throughout the country that County Courts should have jurisdiction—I am not thinking for the moment of the exact jurisdiction—so that poor people could bring their cases before them.

The Act of 1857 put the power of bringing matrimonial cases within the reach of persons who had adequate means to come to the High Court, but it did not put that power within the reach of the vast masses of the community. In 1878 an Act was passed which gave magistrates in petty sessions the power, which had not been entrusted to the County Courts in 1857, to make a judicial separation order where a wife had been assaulted in an aggravated form by her husband and had summoned him before the police court. The order which was thus permitted to be made was an order permanently separating the two parties to the case. In 1866 another Act was passed to meet cases in which men had deserted their wives, giving the magistrates power to order the payment to the wife of a weekly sum for her maintenance. But it gave no power to order permanent separation. That was not wanted in cases of desertion. What was wanted was the money. Lastly, in 1895, there came the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women's) Act, which amalgamated both those Acts, and gave the magistrates power to make a permanent order of separation on five different grounds. Magistrates were empowered to order a permanent separation where there had been cruelty. They had power to order a permanent separation where there has been desertion or neglect to maintain a wife. They had power to order persons to be permanently separated in cases where there had been cruelty and protection was wanted, and also in cases, where protection was not wanted but mere payment was really required—that is to say, in cases of desertion, and in cases where a husband had refused to maintain his wife. No powers were given in favour of the husband against the wife. They only dealt with cases put forward by the wife. But they were to be dealt with in petty sessions, although these powers had been refused to the County Courts and although these orders have a life-long effect on the people concerned.

In 1896 the subject of giving a local jurisdiction was before the Council of Judges, with a view to reporting to the Lord Chancellor on the question of a demand by Lancashire for local sittings of various kinds; and at that time I considered this subject in order that a report should be made upon it. I wish to read to your Lordships the view I took then, and to state why I have since felt under an obligation to change the view I then expressed. In one paragraph this appears— It has hitherto been considered desirable that all divorce cases should be tried before one tribunal sitting permanently in London, and there appear to be very serious considerations weighing against any proposal to extend the trial of these cases to different parts of the country, considerations which seem to preponderate over the advantages to some individuals of lessening expenses to be incurred by them in these cases. Under the existing law of divorce, the Court has to exercise its functions, not merely in the interests of the parties before it, but of society at large, and it is important that the Judges who administer this branch of the law should be thoroughly familiar with it, able to take counsel together when necessary, should preserve uniformity in the exercise of the large discretionary powers conferred on the Court, should be assisted in guarding against collusion by a staff of officials whose experience is of the greatest service to the Court, and should be aided by a Bar familiar with the mode of conducting this peculiar class of work. I think it is highly undesirable to allow these cases to be tried at Assizes. I have to withdraw from what I then said, and the reason for that action I will put before your Lordships. At that time I had not had anything like the experience which I have since been able to gain. I had not—no one had then—been able to appreciate the effect of the operation of the Act of 1895, which had only been in force a few months. The effect of that Statute and the investigations I have made over a number of years has led me to change the view I expressed in 1896, but only so far as it relates to the poorer classes. I do not change that view in the least with regard to people who can afford to come to the central Court.

I find that poverty prevents large numbers of people—what those numbers may be it is quite impossible to say—from having access to the Court in London. A second point is what I believe to be the very disastrous results produced by the Act of 1895 in some respects. As to the poverty of the people, the Committee over which I presided dealt with that question in the following paragraph— There is a close analogy between the state of things which still exists and that which existed before 1858. For there is still practically one law for those who can afford to bring a suit in the Divorce Court and another for those who cannot, and the latter embraces a very large portion of the population who cannot afford even the moderate expense of a suit in the present Court. The cost of bringing or defending a suit in London and having the hearing there, renders it quite impossible for many of the poorer classes to get the relief which those better off obtain. The great proportion of the cases are undefended, but proof of the facts before the Judge is necessary; and even in these cases, poor people very frequently cannot find the money to commence and proceed with these suits and bring their witnesses from a distance to London, nor can they find the time or leave their employments for sufficient time, either to file their petitions in London, which practically they have to do themselves unless they have a solicitor, whom many of them are too poor to employ, or to attend a hearing in London. This is especially the case with parties who are at any substantial distance from London. Letters on this subject have been constantly received by the late President of the Court from poor people urging reform in this matter, and protesting against the injustice to them of the present system. On the one side, people often cannot find the means to bring their suits at all, or only after saving up for years to do so. Many instances of this latter class come to the notice of the Court. On the other hand, many persons cannot find the money or time to come up to London to defend themselves. And, further, as the husband usually has to find the means to enable the wife to defend herself or sue him, many cases are stayed because of his inability to do so, a state of things which may last for months or years, or never be overcome, and this even applies to cases where there is really no defence. Without doubt there is a practical denial of justice in this matter to numbers of people, and these are people who belong to ranks in life in which the relief to be obtained under the Divorce Acts is probably more necessary than in ranks above them. I can myself vouch for the points made in that paragraph. I have made it my practice for a number of years to inquire of the poorer people who came before me, and whose cases were obviously brought at a very much later period than the dates of the offences, how it was that they were able to bring the suit at all; and I have never experienced a more unpleasant feeling than when these people have told me how they have had to borrow or save the money. People have been before me who have been saving the money for twenty years to get a divorce in a case to which there was no defence at all. I have made inquiries from one of the most experienced Registrars, and he reports to me that the amount of the petitioners' costs in ordinary undefended cases may be taken to vary from £40 to £60. The whole of the costs practically fall upon the husband, who must provide them before he can start at all. And further, he usually has to find the money to enable his wife to conduct her suit. If it were suggested that people might proceed in formâ pauperis it might be pointed out that then only the Court fees, from £6 to £8 are saved, so that there is still a great expense.

In addition to the question of costs there is this difficulty, that people in this class of life cannot easily find time to come to London, even if they had the money to do it. They are in small occupations, in factories, and in all sorts of small occupations, and to ask masters and mistresses to let them go away presents very serious difficulty especially if they have to be some little time in London. There was one case before me of a woman who, after many years, had saved £20 to enable her to bring a suit. I asked her, "How did that enable you to bring your case on?" The reply was, "The solicitor is helping me and doing it for nothing." In many cases solicitors have behaved most handsomely in this matter. In addition to those broad facts, I received letter after letter when President of the Divorce Court from people complaining bitterly of their inability to bring their cases into Court. My recollection of the substance of one of those letters, which was most pathetic, and only a sample of many I received, was as follows— I am a poor workingman earning only 18s. a week. My wife has chosen to go away with another man, and is actually living with him only a short distance from me. I could prove it in a minute, but I cannot go to London to prove my case there, and I am absolutely debarred from the divorce which I am entitled to. It is not pleasant for a Judge to receive letters of that kind and to feel that he can do nothing. Again, what are the consequences if a man like that is left without any remedy? I am informed that cases have been met with frequently where people have committed bigamy because they were left without remedy; they have felt justified in marrying again and taking their chance of what would happen.

There is another side to this question. Letters have been received from women who have been left by their husbands, with little or nothing—in the case of people of the working class—to enable the woman to sue. The husband disappears, and goes to America, or Canada, or Australia. She has no remedy at all, for her means will not enable her to trace him. This is one of the points I would like to emphasise as showing the change in the present condition of things as compared with 150 years ago, when people could not move away, but were subject to the influences of their surroundings. Those conditions have disappeared. Now the first thing that happens in these troubles is that the man or the woman, but chiefly the man, is off to America. They can get across for a few pounds. They often make a new home and take up a new wife or husband, as the case may be, and the one who is left behind never hears anything more of them again. Practically speaking, the working classes have almost an insuperable difficulty in bringing their cases properly before the Court. And there is another aspect. I have frequently had letters from persons who cannot afford the money to defend. I have mentioned the case of a man or woman who, by borrowing from friends, has succeeded in getting the money together to launch a suit; but the other side may not have money to come to London, though they could attend in a local Court. This shows what a difficulty there is, if a local jurisdiction to some extent is not given, to meet this grievance, and the object of my Resolution is to meet that grievance.

I may say that my successor in office has also been struck with these features of this unfortunate class of business. Is it not this class of person who want relief more than those in the upper circles, who have many amenities, not possessed by the poorer classes, to enable them to bear their difficulties? The causes which lead to divorce are found more among the lower than among the upper classes. The chief is the miserable cause of drink. I believe that if the effects of drink could be abolished altogether the Divorce Court might almost close its doors. There is also the pressure of the struggle for existence upon the lower classes. The bulk of divorces take place after a considerable number of years of marriage, and that is because the pinch of existence is felt more at that time with the result that sometimes weariness, exhaustion, and so forth drive people into dissipation and produce disastrous consequences. The County Courts really exist for these people. The objection may be raised that this proposal would flood all the local County Courts with cases that are not desirable. The proposition in the Report does not go to that extent. It is that the Courts should be at places selected by the Lord Chancellor as suitable. Let us take the great cities of Lancashire and elsewhere, such as Birmingham and Leeds. Why should those people be obliged to come to London? If, as is said, the jurisdiction and work of County Court Judges might be so much extended that the number of Judges would have to be increased, justice should still be done, even if it cost the country something more.

I pass from that part of the subject to what I call the serious effects of the Act of 1895. I think that the serious effects produced by that Act could have been little anticipated in 1895. That Act gave the power to order permanent separation for causes which I am satisfied are in many cases trivial. I venture to say with conviction that the effect of those orders is extremely bad. I have known cases in which summonses for desertion have been taken out at the end of a week or month, and permanent orders for separation made between persons who are fairly young, and, who in the natural order of things, have many years of their lives before them. What is the immediate consequence of that? For a time the man will pay. Then he will cease to pay, will cross the sea, and will next be heard of in America. When you get a situation like that how can you possibly do what in former times you might perhaps have done—that is, bring people together and induce them to make the best of things? It cannot be clone, because in cases like I have mentioned the man becomes a citizen of another country, and his wife gets no money. That, I think, is frequently the consequence of these orders—a consequence which is often most disastrous to the morality of both the parents, and to their children.

I think, my Lords, the consequences to a woman living like that may be readily understood. She has nobody to keep her and she cannot marry. The consequences to the man are very much the same, but very often he goes to America or to some other country and sets up a new home altogether. I venture to say that very many of these cases would on investigation be found to be cases in which a divorce would be capable of being obtained if that course were open to the parties suing for a separation order. Let me tell you, if I may, the number of these separation orders granted per annum. The annual average between 1903 and 1907—I have not the statistics for 1908 yet—is 6,959. I venture to say that if you take this as going on year after year, with an annual average of about 7,000, it must be evident that an enormous number of orders have been made under which people are living apart at the present time.

It may be true that in certain cases people return to each other, and, by living together again, put an end to these orders, but I am satisfied that in a vast number of cases they do not do so, because many cases heard before me, in which a suit for divorce has been instituted when means have, after a time, become available for the purpose, have begun with a separation order. It is also probable that if only the means were forthcoming many of these 7,000 cases would be cases in which divorce would be granted if the Court could exercise divorce jurisdiction. I draw this conclusion because I have seen the necessary proof given when sufficient money has been saved to bring an action for divorce after a considerable interval, and also because in the High Court there were 623 divorce cases in which decrees absolute were made in 1907, while there were only twenty-three decrees of judicial separation. That is to say, there are a very small number of decrees of judicial separation in the High Court and a very large proportion of decrees absolute. I think, therefore, the inference may reasonably be drawn that of the large number of separation orders which I have mentioned many would be found to be cases in which, if there were jurisdiction, the matter might be put an end to by a proper decree.

For this purpose, my Lords, there should be a proper Court. Magistrates in petty sessions can hardly be considered an adequate or satisfactory tribunal for disposing of cases which require very careful consideration, and which have life-long effect on the people who are affected by the orders made and far-reaching consequences to their children. The means by which we ventured in the Committee's Report to suggest that this evil should be dealt with is by giving jurisdiction to a limited extent to such County Courts as may be approved for the purpose, very much as the Bankruptcy and Admiralty Courts are selected and approved to deal with cases. The limit of jurisdiction is somewhat difficult to fix, but after reflection the Committee came to the conclusion that it might be exercised in cases where the joint income of the parties was less than £150. That would bring relief within the reach of persons to whom the payment of costs amounting to £40 or £50 would be an impossibility.

Persons who wished to bring cases would, of course, have to satisfy the learned Judge in the first instance that their incomes were below this amount, and if they did that the jurisdiction of the Court could be exercised. If the learned Judge thought there was any suspicion about the case he might be allowed the power to order it at once to be sifted in London. It is suggested in the Report that in all cases the papers should be examined in London before the case came on. At the present moment no case comes before the Judge of the Division which deals with work without an official of Somerset House going through the papers and certifying that they are in order. Some control by the High Court could easily be exercised. It may be said that this would occupy much of the time of County Court Judges, but I have endeavoured to suggest an answer to that; and I would ask your Lordships to bear in mind the further point that most of these cases would probably be wholly undefended. Let me tell your Lordships how the matter stands in the High Court. In 1907, 631 cases were tried or disposed of in the High Court in London and of that number 502 were undefended. The latter cases took I suppose on an average some ten minutes or a quarter of an hour each to dispose of. Only 129 of the cases were defended and I think it would probably be found, if the statistics could be examined more closely, that the bulk of even those so-called defended cases were not defended when they came into Court. It is probable that the bulk of cases that might be brought in the local tribunal would be undefended and would be capable of being dealt with very briefly.

One other objection has been suggested as militating against these proposals—namely, that if the proposals were adopted every local town would have its newspapers full of reports of these unpleasant cases. I do not think that would amount in the end to an adequate objection, because I should go so far as to suggest that the publication of such reports should be entirely prohibited. I should myself have been very glad to see that prohibition extended to the High Court of Justice. I do not mean to suggest the closing of the Court so that those interested in a case should not be able to attend and see that justice is properly administered. But I can see no advantage to be gained by publishing details of these cases, and that is an opinion I have expressed more than once. Of course, the decrees might be published, as is the case in France, where no detailed reports are allowed to appear in the Press of divorce trials.

I feel so strongly on this point that I took action in the matter some time ago. I found that the illustrated papers were in the habit of sketching everybody who came into Court and publishing those sketches. My powers enabled me to stop that in the Court, and I was then asked by various persons interested whether they might sketch from memory and so forth, and also sketch outside. Of course I had no power to stop that, but I appealed to the most important of the illustrated papers and asked them to consider whether they thought it was to the advantage of the British public that they should be furnished with these sketches, and have special attention called to these cases. What was the answer? The illustrated papers practically said that they had not considered the matter from that point of view before, but now that they saw it in that light they would give orders to stop the publication of all sketches of the kind. I could not tell your Lordships how grateful I felt that the appeal which I had made to those papers was met in that courteous and responsive way. The result is that to a very large extent, if not entirely, those illustrations have ceased to appear, not as the outcome of any order, but by the voluntary action of the Press when the matter was brought to their attention. Is not that a step in the direction of prohibiting the publication of the details of divorce cases altogether? If that step were fully taken I believe that no harm could arise from the fact that divorce cases were tried in country places as well as in London.

I am aware, my Lords, that the proposals I have ventured to put forward in the shape of this Motion will not meet with approval in all quarters, and more particularly in the case of those who on principle are opposed entirely to the complete dissolution of marriage by decrees of divorce. But I would suggest for the consideration of those who take that view that the question now raised is not whether there should be a law of divorce or not. That question, I venture to say, was thrashed out and disposed of fifty years ago. The question we have now to consider is whether a large portion of the community should be left to feel that the remedies given by law are out of their reach while they are within the reach of persons with more means than they have.

My motion is based, first, upon the ground that poor people should have adequate opportunities of asserting their rights, which they cannot be said at present to possess. For all practical purposes they are in the same position as they would have been in if the Act of 1857 had contained a clause saying that no divorce should be granted to people with an income of less than, say, £150 a year. Just imagine what would be said if any attempt had been made to introduce such a clause; and yet that is practically the position to-day. Secondly, my motion is based on the ground—and I think this is almost the most important ground—that unless these people can get the remedies, unless those remedies are brought within their reach, immorality is certain to result. It is to the best interests of public morality that in cases where a right to divorce is given by law, and the necessity for it exists, the injured party should be able to obtain divorce and not merely an order for Judicial separation.

I am glad to think that the fate of this Motion will not depend on any words I use. It must depend on whether the fact I have brought to your notice commend it to your Lordships' favourable consideration or not. It may be that these matters with which I have become familiar are not so familiar to your Lordships, and that you require further inquiry. It may also be that the points I have raised touch upon larger matters which require consideration, and if, at the end of this discussion it is thought that there should be further inquiry, either by a Committee, or, as I would prefer, by a Royal Commission, into the whole subject of the law of divorce and its administration, then the matter might be dealt with in that way without pressing this Resolution to a decision. But in the meantime, with the object of bringing this matter before your Lordships—a matter which is of very grave and great importance, and one which I felt it was my duty to ventilate in this House—I beg to move the Resolution standing in my name.

Moved to resolve, That in the opinion of this House, it is expedient that jurisdiction to a limited extent in divorce and matrimonial cases should be conferred upon County Courts in order that the poorer classes may have their cases of that nature heard and determined in such Courts. —(Lord Gorell.)

THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY

My Lords, I am quite sure I am expressing the feeling of every member of your Lordships' House in thanking the noble and learned Lord who has just sat down for the lucidity, moderation, and force with which he has brought before the consideration of the House and the country a matter of supreme and vital importance. We cannot fail to be impressed with the weight legitimately belonging to his prolonged experience, although that experience is—I shall return to the point in a moment—of one particular sort and has been gained from one particular point of view, and requires, perhaps, the qualification which is to be found in the aspect the question may present when it is looked at from a different standpoint and by those whose experience of the subject is, I will not say equally great, but is derived from another mode of intimacy with the problem.

Every one in the House must have been interested in the historical summary and the contemporary picture of facts which the noble and learned Lord has given us. I am certain, too, that every one in the House shares the sympathy which the noble and learned Lord expressed for particular cases which have come to his notice of sorrow, difficulty, and, it may be, of extreme hardship. And yet, with all that, I venture to believe that we should be acting with supreme unwisdom were we to pass the Resolution which he has moved to-night. Quite apart from the great question of principle which is indirectly raised by any discussion of this subject, we should not, I believe, as I shall try in a few minutes to show, gain by the proposal which the noble and learned Lord has made the end which he has so clearly and definitely in view. It is, of course, simply impossible to exaggerate the importance of such questions as these in their direct and indirect bearing upon the home life of great sections of the people of this country.

There is a real clangor when a man Who is a past master of some particular branch of knowledge, technical, difficult, perhaps even unpleasant, gives to the House or to the country his views upon it with all the weight that experience entitles those views to, that people may, so to speak, be frightened away and not venture to challenge either his premises or his conclusions. I am going to be rash enough to challenge both the premises on which he has based a good part of his argument, and the conclusion he draws from them; and I am quite sure, alike from the noble Lord's judicial eminence and from what he said at the conclusion of his speech, that he will be the first to wish that we should see to it that, before we come to any conclusion upon this matter, our knowledge of it should be as accurate, as extensive, and as varied in the sources from which it comes as can possibly be contrived.

May I clear out of the way two Matters of debate? I was relieved to hear the emphasis laid by the noble and learned Lord upon the fact that he was not to-night dealing with, or asking the House to deal with, the great fundamental questions which concern the existence of divorce laws or their operation in the country as a whole. The general question of the rightness or wrongness of those laws is one upon which very different opinions exist in the country and in this House. We probably should not agree about the details; possibly we should not agree even about the large and fundamental principles. That matter, however, is not, as Lord Gorell has reminded us, before us to-night. The noble and learned Lord is not asking us to deal with, change, or affect in any way the great principles which are at stake. He has spoken, if I understood him rightly, on the working hypothesis, let us call it, that the country is perfectly clear about its divorce laws. He does not ask us to alter the conditions which are at present a necessary preliminary to the granting of a divorce. He is speaking simply of the administrative process by which, once those conditions are satisfied, divorce can be brought within the reach of a larger number of people than is the case at the present day. I must guard myself by saying that, if the larger question were raised, I should be perfectly ready to deal with it, and that, if we believe harm to be the outcome, on the whole, of divorce laws, we shall watch necessarily with anxiety and even with alarm any administrative extension of their application.

One other point. I have, of course, no sort of desire to plead for, or wish to see maintained, a distinction in this or in any other matter between the rights and privileges of the richer and poorer classes. If a thing be right in itself, useful to men, and conducive to the best happiness, then I should entirely agree that it ought, as quickly and as widely as possible, to be made accessible to everybody. But I will try to meet the noble and learned Lord's arguments on his own grounds and on the basis of what he has himself put before us in the extracts which he has read from the clear and elaborate Report for which he is responsible and in the speech to which we have just listened. I need not guard myself again against being supposed to abandon any larger principle that may be raised here.

The main part of the argument of the noble and learned Lord was based upon the result which he thinks has followed from the laws which allow, or multiply, the granting of separation orders. This argument, unless I misunderstood him, is in general outline this—that per- manent separation orders have become very common under the Act of 1895, and I think also under the subsequent Act of 1902, which allowed drunkenness to be brought in in a special way; that there are nearly 7,000 of such orders given annually in this country; that the operation of these leads to immorality, and that, of necessity, homes must be made unhappy to a far greater degree than would occur if divorce were given instead of separation. The noble and learned Lord and others who have taken up the cause which he has argued to-night say that there are great numbers of illegitimate children—shall we say needlessly illegitimate children?—brought into the world, under the circumstances he has described, as the outcome of these separation orders,—children who need not have that slur upon them if their parents had been able to obtain divorce. Therefore, he says, multiply the facilities for divorce among the poorer classes of the population and some of these evils, at all events, will be alleviated or removed. I should like to meet that first of all by reference to statistics, although I do not want to lay special emphasis on that, and then by reference to the experience of those who are in daily touch with this question, alike in the administration of the law and in tile homes of the people. I must apologise for the roughness and perhaps the paucity of the details or statistics which I can produce on the subject, but, as the House knows, the time available for obtaining them since the noble and learned Lord gave notice of his Motion has not been very long, and at this season of the year all of us are not men of absolute leisure.

The argument with regard to separation orders is that from 1895, when they were multiplied, it has been clear that immorality must be increased by the existence of those facilities to a degree that would not have happened if the parties had all been divorced. From that premise we should expect to find two or three things follow. The first is that after 1895 we ought to be able to trace in the statistical returns which give the number of illegitimate births an increase of immorality; next, that there ought to be a larger percentage of illegitimate births found in the places where separation orders were most frequent, and then, I presume, that there ought to be comparatively few applications for separation orders in London and the metropolitan area, where, as the noble and learned Lord has pointed out, the Divorce Court is accessible. In his Report he specially says that he does not make his proposals apply to London for that reason.

Now, as a matter of fact what do we find? In the last thirty years there has been a perfectly steady diminution in the number of illegitimate births, and that diminution has not been in the least affected or retarded by the passing of the particular Acts of 1895 and 1902. There has been no check to the decrease. In his Return the Registrar-General takes 1,000 unmarried women or separated or widowed women—women who cannot legitimately have children—and he shows the proportion of illegitimate births to the proportion of such women. In 1880 the proportion was 14.1, in 1894 the proportion was 9.9, and in the last Return available, it was 7.8. That reduction has been going on quite steadily. If you take the table in another form it shows that, whereas in 1880 there were 48.3 illegitimates out of every 1,000 babies born, in 1907 there were only 39.4 per 1,000.

In the next place, the conclusion from the noble and learned Lord's premise is that illegitimacy should be greatest where separation orders are most frequent, but the very contrary is the case. The largest number of separation orders in proportion to the population are given in Lancashire, the metropolitan area of London, and in the West Riding of Yorkshire. In none of these is the illegitimate rate high. In London it is 6.4 per 1,000. Turning to regions where separation orders are very few, we find that in Anglesey illegitimacy is 12.9 per 1,000 of unmarried women, in Merioneth 12.7, and in Norfolk 12.8, double the proportion which is found in some of the places where separation orders are most frequent.

The statistics, I quite admit, cannot with any confidence be relied upon as in themselves proving the matter one way or the other. Many incidental causes may affect them, but if we accept the argument of the noble and learned Lord we ought to find in the statistics what we markedly do not find, that is, evidence in the direction of the consequences he would apprehend. So far from the statistics corresponding with the result which his argument would lead us to expect, they show abundantly that we ought to be very cautious before we accept the noble Lord's conclusions as definitely proved, and they seem to me to show abundantly the need there is for inquiry before any action is taken in the direction he desires.

But far more important, far more worthy of weight, is the experience of those who have had to deal practically with this matter. The time allowed has been short, but I have done what I could. I have been in touch in the last few days by means of letters or interviews with some of the police court magistrates who have given the largest number of those separation orders, and, what is in some ways as important, with the chief clerks of the police courts who are in daily touch with the problem. One of these officers has been most kind and considerate. I did not give him the shadow of a hint as to my expectation of what the facts would turn out to be, but he took untold pains; he told me he had seen the warrant officers, the police court missionaries, the relieving officers and other people habitually about the courts who would be in closest touch with the kind of people concerned. Besides that, I have been in communication with some of the clergy who have special knowledge of the poor of our great cities, going in and out among them, helping them with counsel or warning, and whose experience is most likely to be helpful in a matter of this kind.

Now, what is the outcome of these inquiries? It is not doubtful. For example, I have had a long conversation with one magistrate of vast experience in two different parts of the poorest districts of London, and he is absolutely clear—first, that in very few cases indeed in which applications for separation orders have come before him is adultery even alleged, or so far as can be learned does it exist. He thought ten per cent. at the outside; the chief clerk said that it would not be so many. By far the majority were cases of respectable, hardworking women who were being bullied, ill-treated, and neglected by cruel and drunken husbands.

The noble and learned Lord said with perfect frankness that he had no detailed information on that subject and what he has urged has been based largely on what he would naturally expect to be the result, and on particular letters which have in individual cases come under his notice in dealing with Divorce Court cases. I am describing now the experience of those who have to deal practically every day with this question, and the first information they give me is to the effect that, as far as they are able to judge, these are not cases which would be capable of being regarded as justifying divorce had they come before the Divorce Court.

What is extremely important evidence is the satisfactory working of the present law whereby separation orders involve the payment by the man of an allowance to the wife. Maintenance orders, amounting to, perhaps, as much as 7s. a week, are very satisfactorily collected even during long terms of years while the man is living away from the woman. A few bolt, but the number of such cases is surprisingly few. If the woman is immoral, if, that is to say, the result which Lord Gorell thinks will follow from a separation order does in fact ensue, she ceases to be qualified to obtain her aliment order, which she forfeits if she can be shown to be tripping.

But, my Lords, perhaps the most important of all the evidence which accumulates from different quarters is the very large proportion of cases in which separation orders have been in operation for a little while and then the parties make it up and come together again. Many such cases were brought before my notice this morning. I have statistics from one Court where 150 separation orders have been granted in the last twelve months, and in fully one-half of these the couple are living together again as man and wife, while of these only four have so broken down as to impel them to ask for a new separation order. That seems to be a kind of evidence which it is difficult to get over, and requires us to be very careful before we proceed to the course here recommended, for if divorces had been granted these reconciliations would never have taken place.

I turn from the magistrates and magistrates' clerks to the clergy. Some of your Lordships may, perhaps, think that is evidence to which less importance should be attached, but in the short time available I have, without the least attempt to pick particular men, except as to their qualifications and experience, communicated with clergy in London, Portsmouth, Birmingham, and elsewhere in order to find out what is their view after a large and varied experience of the poorest class of the population with whom they are in constant touch, both in pastoral ministration and through relief committees, charity organisation work, and various other agencies of a similar kind. Their answer is practically unanimous that separation does not usually imply unfaithfulness, that the return to one another is quite common, and that maintenance orders on the whole are well paid. In some cases the applications are granted much too easily, but the evidence is most striking that where the magistrates tell the applicant, "Don't take your order to-day; wait a fortnight and see if you cannot make it up again," in many cases they never hear any more of the matter. I venture to say that the contentions in this Report require to be very carefully examined before we can accept them as proved.

A very few words on the larger aspect of the question. The noble and learned Lord has told us to-night that one main cause of the mischief is drink. He said that if the curse of drink were abolished the Divorce Court might close its doors. I am not disposed to differ from him on that point, and the utterance is one of extreme importance which will not speedily be forgotten. But how would the proposals in this Report meet that difficulty? He does not propose that divorce should be obtainable on grounds of drunkenness—a proposition on which I should have a good deal to say. I do not quite understand, therefore, how the argument bears on the difficulties which the noble Lord desires to see removed. It has been said by many that the sheer pressure of existence, hard times and the cost of bringing up children, leads to divorce, but this is not borne out by statistics. The returns from America correspond to our own in showing how large is the number of divorcees who have no children. According to the table for 1906 nearly forty per cent. of the divorcees in England and Wales had no children, twenty-three per cent. had only one, and only two per cent. had large families. With all respect to the experience of those who use the argument I have referred to, I hold that children are a deterrent to divorce and not a cause.

Anyhow, how would this proposal of County Court divorce meet those difficulties I What I believe would happen, if we were to give the wholesale facilities for divorce which are suggested by the Report, is that we would lower the gravity of the popular ideal of the marriage bond. You would encourage pressure to make divorce obtainable for other causes than those for which it may be obtained at present. That I believe to be the main danger that underlies the whole proposal. The noble and learned Lord disclaims that, but that such must be the tendency I think we cannot doubt. Look at what it has been across the Atlantic, where the facilities for divorce have been so increased that now decrees are granted annually in the United States to the number of 72,000. Whereas the increase of population in the last ten years has been twenty per cent., the increase of divorces has been sixty-six per cent. All the best public opinion in America is outspoken on the gravity of the evil, and all attribute it to the wide range of causes for which divorce is granted. That is the risk we incur if we were to go forward in the direction recommended. In America the evil has reached such a point that I notice in a recent newspaper triumphant reference made to a Judge in San Francisco who a few weeks ago heard and decided seven cases of divorce in twenty-eight minutes, and granted the decree in every case.

I do not touch upon the question of publicity through reports in the Press. I am in complete sympathy with Lord Gorell as to the mischievous and ever polluting character of those reports; yet we dare not forget that publicity has its gains as well as its disadvantages; there is a wide difference of opinion on the subject. Neither will I touch on the question whether the County Court is the right authority to choose. That is really a question for lawyers and Judges rather than for me; but I say strongly that I know well the contrast of the feelings entertained among the poorer classes towards the County Court and the feelings they entertain towards Courts whose jurisdiction is of a different character. To go before a magistrate is a serious thing but to go before a County Court is almost a humorous thing, and it is not supposed to imply discredit to any one. The point to bear in mind is the mischief that would come about if we placed this grave marriage question within the category of mere petty disputes which come before the County Court.

But the really important question is this —Is any change in this direction needed, and will it help towards maintaining public morality? I am prepared to deal with the question to the best of my power when it is deliberately brought up for consideration and decision, but all the conclusions of my own investigations are to the effect that though separation orders are undoubtedly necessary in a great many cases, they are often granted too easily and too lightly, and that the present system calls for full inquiry and careful attention if we desire to legislate and move in this matter. As for divorce itself, if we believe that on the whole there is no real boon conferred or gain obtained for the community at large, no real healthy security created for the morality of home life among the classes who take advantage of the facilities, we must of necessity look with profound anxiety on any proposal in favour of extending, almost lavishly, these facilities to other classes than those who take advantage of them now.

VISCOUNT HALIFAX

My Lords, I should like to ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gorell, one question in regard to a matter which I do not clearly understand in the proposals he has made to the House. I probably misunderstood him, and if I have done so he will correct me. In a speech which Lord Gorell made on April 27, 1909, his Lordship was understood to express his desire not merely to increase the facilities for decrees for dissolution of marriage by extending the power of granting such decrees of divorce to County Courts, but also to increase the number of causes for which they could be granted. Was that the case?

LORD GORELL

I do not recollect any speech of the kind in which I gave public utterance to that view. The only statement I might have made bearing upon that is to be found in the report of the case "Dodd against Dodd," in which I suggested matters worthy of consideration. I do not recollect any speech of the kind.

VISCOUNT HALIFAX

I am extremely glad to hear that that is the case, and after the statement of Lord Gorell there is nothing more to be said on that point. But however much the noble and learned Lord may wish to confine his proposals to the mere extension of facilities for divorce which are permitted by the existing law, that is not the way the subject is looked upon by many others. One result of the proposals which Lord Gorell has put before the public has been the attention called to the subject in the Press, and the advocacy of an increased number of causes for which divorce might be granted. There has also been established a Divorce Law Reform Union which very much applauds Lord Gorell's proposals, and it recommends nine additional causes for which divorce ought to be granted. There is, first, wilful desertion, and in his speech the noble and learned Lord alluded over and over again to desertion, persons leaving the country, and the facilities for travelling which enabled them to disappear, and if there was any inference to be drawn from those allusions it was that in cases merely of desertion and nothing more divorce ought to be granted.

But it is not merely wilful desertion which this Divorce Law Reform Union are advocating as an additional cause for divorce. They are advocating divorce in cases of insanity, habitual drunkenness, unconquerable aversion, cruelty, incurable disease and penal servitude, and, in a pamphlet written by a Mr. Haynes and published and circulated by the Union, incompatibility of temper is given as a reason why a divorce decree should be granted. I am satisfied that anyone who is the least conversant with the literature which is springing up on this subject will see that the noble and learned Lord's proposals are welcomed as a step in a much wider direction than anything his Lordship himself has contemplated. Therefore these proposals do open a very wide door, and the matter is much too serious to be taken up lightly. It requires to be gone into to the very bottom before we accept legislation which will be looked upon as only a step to something wider, and which will be absolutely deplorable for the morals of the country. The police magistrates in London, since the noble and learned Lord's proposals have been made known, have been advocating that they should have jurisdiction to grant divorces, and also on the grounds which I have mentioned.

I should like to bring to your notice what is the experience of persons most conversant with this subject. Take the late President of the Divorce Court, Lord St. Helier. He has left it on record that in regard to divorce we have to consider that the Court has to exercise its functions, not in the interests of the parties before it, but of society at large; and I think it most undesirable that divorce cases should come before the sort of tribunal here advocated. Anyone who is familiar with the proceedings of the Divorce Court is aware that that Court is a perfect sink of collusion and perjury. The intervention of the King's Proctor does, to some extent, reduce the admitted evils of that Court, but if jurisdiction in regard to divorce is going to be extended, even to the limited extent that the noble and learned Lord proposes, over the country, how will it be possible for the King's Proctor to intervene in the hundreds of cases in which he ought to intervene? I cannot imagine anything more destructive of the morality of the country than this extension of the number of Courts which will have jurisdiction in cases of divorce.

The noble and learned Lord himself is conscious of the evil that would be done by the publication of the proceedings in these cases throughout the country. No one can look with greater disgust than I do upon the reports that we see from time to time in the papers in regard to these proceedings. They are deplorable in themselves and they are deplorable reading; but yet I have come to the conclusion, most unwillingly, that, bad as it is that these reports should be published and read, there is, as the most reverend Primate hinted, a great deal to be said on the other side. There are many persons who would not shrink from divorce in itself, but who do shrink from the publication of their evil deeds before the world; and it would be a very serious thing to get rid of that deterrent.

I wish to add a word to what fell from the most reverend Primate in regard to the state of things in America. If you will consult the official statements made about divorces in America you will find that the average duration of marriages terminating by divorce in America is ten years, and that from 1887 to 1907 no fewer than 945,623 divorces took place in that country. That is, one out of every twelve marriages in America is dissolved! President Roosevelt, only a short time back, speaking of American law in regard to this matter, said the divorce law in America was "an appalling curse." There are more divorces in the United States of America than in any other country in the world, and in an official report, published after extensive investigation, it is stated that divorces are multiplying three times as fast as the population.

I do not, as a rule, give credence to stories, but this is a fact which I could prove, and I could give the names if necessary. It occurred in what is thought to be the best society in America, and this is the conversation which was overheard not long ago. One little girl said to another, "You know, we have got a new papa, and I hear that you have got our old one." My Lords, these are horrors. But when one thinks of the wretchedness and the misery that are the result of these proceedings, one does look with the greatest apprehension on any legislation which may have the effect of increasing divorces, and, as a direct result, lowering the view of marriage, the sanctity of the home, and the security of family life. The noble and learned Lord made one statement that certainly seemed to me very extraordinary —namely, that if there was no drink, the Divorce Court might close its doors. From the little knowledge I have of the poorer classes, I should certainly not assent to that statement; and I think that if your Lordships, without looking down to the poorer classes, would turn to what we see going on in our own society, you would certainly be the last to say that drink is the cause of the troubles we see about us.

I should like to earnestly endorse what fell from the noble and learned Lord at the close of his speech. Our marriage law is in a state of complete confusion. We have one law in Scotland, another law in England, another in Ireland, and another in the Colonies, and you have the whole question of domicile, which is a most difficult one. Persons in England unable to get a divorce by our law, go to America, get domiciled and obtain a divorce and come back here. Then questions arise as to whether those persons are legally divorced in this country. You have the law of divorce on one side, and the conscientious convictions of all kinds of people on the other; and I do suggest to the noble and learned Lord and to the Lord Chancellor whether, not merely in regard to these matters but in regard to the whole marriage law, the time has not come when there should be a Royal Commission to look into the whole subject and to try and bring some order out of the present chaos. If His Majesty's Government would appoint a Royal Commission to look into the whole question, I should hope that the outcome would be some simplification of our marriage laws, and that we might see some end to our present confusion, and might hope to have peace in the future in regard to all these difficult problems. But we shall never have that until something on the lines suggested is done on the responsibility of His Majesty's Government.

The LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (VISCOUNT WOLVERHAMPTON)

My Lords, I sympathise with a great deal that has been said as to the danger and uncertainty which arises from the present mode of procedure with reference to divorce, but this is not the question which has been raised by the noble and learned Lord. The most reverend Primate has given very forcible reasons and evidence, were we discussing this afternoon the question of the desirability or non-desirability of separation orders. That, however, is not the question brought before the House by the Motion. The most reverend Primate said, very truly, that this was not the time or place to go into the great question of principle involved in any discussion of the divorce law. I agree. The question of whether it is right or wrong to have a divorce law, or a system which allows of divorce, is not raised by this Motion.

The present divorce law is the law of the land, and every one of the King's subjects is entitled to have access to the advantages or disadvantages conferred by that law. The noble and learned Lord has laid before us that which has been a matter of notoriety for many years, that practically the law of divorce as at present administered is a law entirely for the benefit of the wealthy classes. The poor man or woman is deprived of its benefit. The defect in the system which has grown up, and which, in my judgment, is getting worse and worse, is that the expense, the delay and the difficulty of getting cases heard in the Divorce Court are at present insurmountable to the poor, and under the present administration the largest class of the community are deprived from getting the advantages of the law. Where adultery has been committed—and it is a curse to any circle or family where it is committed—we know that the poorer classes are shut out from having the relief which the law of the land provides. The only question before the House is one of administrative process, and not of a principle. I ask you to dismiss from the question whether divorce be right or wrong. The divorce law exists, but you shut out one class, the class which has not the money to obtain divorce. Can any noble Lord maintain that it is a right principle in this country? Why should one class of His Majesty's subjects be deprived of this remedy? Why should they be shut out from a remedy by the cost? From what I have heard, the costs are not a matter of two figures only; they generally run into three, and sometimes, in a disputed case, into four figures. It is impossible for a poor man or woman to have any remedy under the present state of affairs. The noble and learned Lord is not asking the House to commit itself to an extension of, or to give reasons for, divorce, but to consider whether the present mode of administration of the law can be improved.

I agree with the noble Viscount opposite as to the evils of the American system. It is a public scandal, and any approach to introducing it here we should all oppose. If a man earning eighteen shillings a week has an unfaithful wife who is a curse to his home, let him have the relief which a wealthy man can get without any difficulty. That is the evil the noble and learned Lord has asked us to deal with. I should have thought it was one of the very first principles of justice. For the recovery of civil debts we give the poor a simple Court, and we give them a system which, by prudence, will enable them to get justice readily and cheaply. Why not apply this to this greater curse and evil? I ask your Lordships to put on one side the general question of the divorce law. We might sit here almost for a week arguing that question, and no one would be convinced. Now that we have rescued ourselves from the state of things which existed before 1857 and which the noble and learned Lord described, we ought to do something on the lines of this Motion.

I would recall the well-known observations of Mr. Justice Maule in 1845. A poor man was brought before him charged with bigamy, which he had committed under circumstances described in similar cases by the noble and learned Lord. Mr. Justice Maule told the man the procedure he ought to have taken. He ought to have brought a civil action for damages; then he should have gone to the Ecclesiastical Court and obtained a divorce a mensâ et thoro; and finally, having spent a large sum of money in taking these preliminary steps, he should have gone to Parliament for a private Act to have the divorce made full and complete. The expense might amount to five or six hundred, or, perhaps, a thousand pounds. The prisoner said he was a poor man, but he must understand that the law was the same for the poor as for the rich. That was the state of things which existed then, and now we find that the remedy which the Legislature gave is incomplete. I do not say I should agree with all that the noble and learned Lord proposes. He only asks us at the moment to approve of an inquiry being held. I understand that the noble Viscount, Lord Halifax, would not object to that. Whether or not it should take the form of a Royal Commission, I will not say, but I think the time has arrived when the matter should be looked into. This is a crying evil in the administration of justice in this country, and it is the duty of both Houses of Parliament to find a remedy if they can, and one which will work satisfactorily.

THE EARL OF HALSBURY

My Lords, the noble Viscount opposite has misunderstood the Resolution moved. I should be very glad of an inquiry, but the matters spoken of by the noble Viscount show, I think, that he has omitted to read the Resolution. Apart from a great many other circumstances to which I shall have to refer, nothing could be more inexpedient than passing without inquiry a Motion like the one before the House. The old story of the difference between rich and poor is applicable to every kind of litigation. And when the noble Lord tells us that the divorce law is the law of the land, I would point out that that law, when it was passed, was said to be guarded by the peculiarity of the Court to which it was confided, and a great many of the difficulties which might arise in the ordinary course would not apply. With reference to the noble and learned Lord's experience, he was a party, I understand, to the statement which he has read, I think, with great candour. But I wish to point out that when he says he has since changed his mind, he has done so in a great measure by reference to what he considers to be the effect of the orders under the Act of 1895. I hope I do not misunderstand him.

LORD GORELL

And the experience that I gained by inquiry into the cases that came before the Court.

THE EARL OF HALSBURY

Yes, but will he allow me to call his attention to what the statement was? This is the statement of which the noble and learned Lord approved and which was adopted by the Committee of the Council of Judges— It has hitherto been considered desirable that all divorce cases should be tried before one tribunal sitting permanently in London, and there appear to be very serious considerations weighing against any proposal to extend the trial of these cases to different parts of the country, considerations which seem to preponderate over the advantage to some individuals of lessening expenses to be incurred by them in these cases. Under the existing law of divorce, the Court has to exercise its functions, not merely in the interest of the parties before it, but of society at large, and it is important that the Judges who administer this branch of the law should be thoroughly familiar with it, able to take counsel together when necessary, should preserve uniformity in the exercise of the large discretionary powers conferred on the Court, should be assisted in guarding against collusion by a staff of officials whose experience is of the greatest service to the Court, and should be aided by a Bar familiar with the mode of conducting this peculiar class of work. I think it is highly undesirable to allow these cases to be tried at the Assizes. Now I have read that very deliberately again in order to ask the noble and learned Lord as to which of the very important allegations suggested in that statement he desires, as the result of experience, to alter or qualify. His experience of the facts which came before him appears to me to throw no light upon that. Are any of those advantages which are peculiar in the Central Court to be found in the County Court? There is the question of having a Bar familiar with the practice of the Court and a large staff belonging to the Court peculiarly acquainted with the necessities of inquiry into collusion and so on. Is it suggested that a large staff of that character is to be supplied to every County Court to which you are to give jurisdiction? Not one of those propositions seems to me to be met by the experiences the noble and learned Lord has had. I am unable to follow the reasoning which suggests that his experience has led him to change his mind.

One of the reasons why I should refuse to vote for a Resolution such as this is that you do not know to what extent you are expected to go. If I had a concrete Bill before me, I could understand what was intended; but this Resolution says that you are to alter a law in this most important respect, and that one of the securities in giving the original jurisdiction is to be taken away. You are not to have a central Court, you are not to have a familiar Bar, you are not to have a whole staff of persons engaged in administering this particular form of justice. The difficulty I have in dealing with the question is that until I have a Bill before me I do not quite know where we are. Does the noble and learned Lord suggest that a County Court may grant a divorce where a person has disappeared—that there is to be no question of misconduct in itself? That would be a very serious alteration of the law, and I do not quite understand from the noble and learned Lord what he means in that respect. As to the picture he has painted of the poor woman deserted by her husband, the County Court would have no jurisdiction unless there had been a matrimonial offence, and the picture that he paints of the deserted wife remains. Does he suggest that, without giving notice to a man who has disappeared, the wife should be able to sue him for divorce in a County Court and obtain a decree? I do not think he would suggest that. A great deal of what my noble and learned friend has told us on the subject, although very pathetic no doubt, is quite outside the question. I do not wish to discuss the More general question when the matter before us is a Resolution which, under any circumstances, I think your Lordships should not adopt.

When it is suggested that divorce should be extended, we have a right to look at what has been the effect of that divorce which has been permitted since fifty years ago. Will anybody say that it has not seriously injured the purity of family life? And when we are asked to extend it, and to make it a more familiar and common thing, I cannot forbear saying what I believe to be solemnly true, that it has inflicted most serious injury upon the purity of family life in this country. That may be a subject for inquiry, but certainly to frame a Resolution without inquiry in the first instance seems to be a very serious and rash undertaking. The remedy, such as it is, of proceedings in formâ pauperis exists there as well as elsewhere. With reference to the very old story of Mr. Justice Maule and the observations with which we have been regaled to-night, we have heard the story a great many times before. Mr. Gladstone once said it was true that an application was made in formâ pauperis where a divorce was procured by an Act of Parliament. But what is intended here is that you should go out of your way to alter the present law, give the power of divorce without restrictions, and make it so cheap and so common that it may be one of the ordinary incidents of human life. With reference to one question raised by the noble and learned Lord, I may say that my experience has not been very favourable to the attempt to suppress the publication of proceedings in the Divorce Court. I brought in a Bill on the subject in this House, and, I have no doubt wisely, the House refused to read it a second time. The view was, and I have no doubt that was in the minds of the most reverend Primate and the noble Viscount, that the publication of proceedings in the Divorce Court is to some extent a deterrent.

The noble and learned Lord was good enough to tell us some of the places where he proposed that these Courts should be established, but he has not told us in what way you are going to distinguish the litigants. I can well understand, with such a procedure as he speaks of, that persons who desired to escape the publicity of the Courts in London would have recourse to the County Courts in a convenient place, without much scruple about claiming the privileges of poverty. That is one of the modes in which I think this would be a mischievous proposal. To my mind the great objection to this House committing itself to such a proposition as this is that the facts upon which it is proposed to base such a change in the law should be framed as to procedure simply on the suggestion of the noble and learned Lord, based upon certain experiences he has had. As to his accuracy, as far as he himself is concerned I have no doubt, and I hope he will not think I am doubting him; but in reality they are based on conjectures of a much wider character than he is capable of giving personal knowledge of, and I think those matters ought to be tested before such a change as this is brought about. I hope your Lordships will not assent to the Resolution.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD LOREBURN)

My Lords, my noble and learned friend Lord Gorell has had his first experience of the difficulties which always arise when anyone attempts anything in the direction of reform, but I hope he will not be discouraged by the reception which in some quarters his proposal has met with. The proposal, I venture to think, has been completely misunderstood. It is not a question as to whether any good has resulted from the Separation Act. No doubt some good has resulted. It is not a question whether any alteration ought to be made in the law either of marriage or of divorce. I should be very careful, I hope, at any time not to suggest an alteration in the law of marriage or divorce without inquiry and full consideration, and should then proceed step by step, taking only one step at a time, knowing the difficulties before me.

Nor is this a question as to whether divorce is a good thing. Ever since we emerged from the Middle Ages, divorce has been accepted in principle hundreds of times by both Houses of Parliament. There have been private Acts passed up to 1858, by the score, at all events, and I believe by the hundred. That was done by Parliament, but whether done by Act of Parliament or by a Court of law is immaterial so far as the general acceptance of the principle is concerned. At the present time we constantly have cases of Divorce Acts being proposed from Ireland. There have been some this year, and ever since I have been on the. Woolsack we have had some private Acts for divorce from Ireland. Nobody ever says a word against them, not because any one who knows the subject desires to see divorce or fails to see a great deal of evil in it, but because by consent of Parliament it has been held that the evil is more than counterbalanced by the advantages. I do not want to go back upon that subject.

An Act was passed under which if a man has £100 he can get a divorce, if he has £50 perhaps he can get a divorce, but if he has less than that he has to submit to the injury and ruin which you allow other people to resent and remove. I cannot understand on what principle of policy or fair play you can defend that. I grant that we must have regard to the principle that in our tribunals there is a third party constantly present—namely, the public interest; but I cannot see how we can justify saying that if a man has £100 he shall have his remedy, but if he has not £100 or £50 he shall not. The fact is that the poorer the people are the harder are the consequences of matrimonial mis- conduct. When a man has children and no one to look after them, and is obliged to bring up those children in destitution, in a miserable hovel, he suffers more than a man in affluent circumstances, who has the misfortune to encounter sorrow of that kind.

I heartily agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Gorell in every word that he has said. I think he is right in his proposal, and for my part I shall always support that view. As to the County Court as the tribunal to which it is proposed to give a limited jurisdiction, it is true, as Lord Halsbury has said, that we do not define the limit in the Resolution. It is always the criticism on a general Resolution. If you bring in a Bill many will say, "I would vote for the principle, but I cannot approve the details." It is proposed that a limited jurisdiction should be given to selected County Court Judges. My noble friend said that the Lord Chancellor for the time being should have power to appoint places in which this jurisdiction should be exercised. There is such power in cases of bankruptcy and other cases; and I undertake to say, deep as is the respect which I have for the Judges of the High Court, that you will find County Court Judges who are quite as capable of conducting these cases and watching the public interest as are the Judges of the High Court. What we want is a straightforward, able, experienced man who will be able to do justice. Justice is not at all difficult to do when once you know the facts.

I want to express my concurrence with my noble and learned friend in another matter, which, perhaps, is not particularly relevant to this debate. He said that there ought to be an end to the publication of proceedings in the Divorce Court. I thoroughly and heartily agree with him, and I was a member of a deputation which waited upon the noble Earl when he was Lord Chancellor to urge upon him such a reform. Publish the names of the parties if you like, and publish the decrees, and let the disgrace be the punishment of the guilty party, and let everybody know whether people have been divorced. But it seems to me very strange that anybody should think that there should be any compensation for the mass of dirty stuff which you see constantly published in some newspapers which are a disgrace to journalism. In my opinion people are not nearly free enough in their criticism of the Press. The Press is uncommonly free and I hope will always remain free to criticise your Lordships' House. They are welcome to criticise me as much as they like; but I intend to take the liberty of criticising the Press, and I say it is a disgrace to journalism that some of these things should be published in the newspapers as they are. It does nothing but harm, especially to young people.

My noble friend in bringing forward this Motion indicated—and I think he was quite right—that if inquiry into this subject were desired he would not resist it. That is the view of the noble and learned Earl and of Lord Halifax. I do not think we ought to resist any suggestion for inquiry. Nobody would desire to thrust legislation touching this grave matter upon either House of Parliament. I shall certainly bring all that has been said before my colleagues, and I believe and hope that they will take a favourable view of the suggestion as to an inquiry. The terms of the reference would not be very easy to draw; probably there must be some limit. But if that would meet the views of your Lordships, perhaps my noble and learned friend may not think it necessary to divide the House upon this Motion.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, the concluding words of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack have afforded me great relief. The noble and learned Lord began his observations by saying that he feared the position was being misunderstood by the House. The matter is so full of difficulty that I was fully prepared to find that on many points I might be uninformed; but what I do think I understand clearly is that the noble and learned Lord on the Cross Benches by his Motion asks me to commit myself to the view that jurisdiction to a limited extent in divorce and matrimonial cases should be conferred upon County Courts. I am very glad that I am not to be invited this evening to pronounce a hurried opinion on such a point. When the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack the other evening introduced a Bill dealing with County Courts—a Bill, I think, founded to some extent upon the Report of Lord Gorell's Committee—he omitted from that Bill proposals dealing with this very question, no doubt because he felt that it was not altogether expedient to load his Bill with so difficult and embarrassing a question.

I am not going to recapitulate the arguments, but the main arguments upon which the noble and learned Lord rests his case do appeal very forcibly to me. He tells us, in effect, that the law in this country with regard to divorce is in such a condition that the relief which is easily, or comparatively easily, accessible to the wealthier classes is practically denied to those whose means do not permit them to seek such relief. I think it is stated in the Report of his Committee that, even in undefended cases, the trouble and time necessary were such that poor people were debarred from seeking the relief which they required. It is, however, impossible to listen to the debate without feeling that, strong as that argument undoubtedly is, there are other arguments to be considered. What kind of tribunal are you going to set up if you are going to give these unrestricted facilities for divorce? What would be the effect of our action, not only upon the parties concerned, but upon society as a whole? These are matters which require to be considered, and surely if we are to weigh these different considerations the only way of doing it is to adopt the suggestion of My noble friend, Viscount Halifax, and to appoint a Committee or Commission to deal with the matter. I understood the noble and learned Lord himself to be agreeable to that course, and the noble Viscount opposite, Lord Wolverhampton, I think addressed the House under the impression that that was what we were being asked to do, which is not quite the case. The noble and learned Lord ended his speech by saying that justice is not difficult to do when you know the facts. My Lords, let us have an inquiry and endeavour to ascertain the facts.

LORD GORELL

My Lords, after what has fallen from your Lordships, and after the intimation from my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack, I think that the right course for me to adopt is to ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw my Motion. In doing so I would express the hope that before long inquiry would satisfy everybody as to what is the true view to take on this subject.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.