TERRITORIAL ARTILLERY.

HL Deb 18 May 1908 vol 188 cc1532-84

*THE EARL OF DENBIGH

rose "To ask His Majesty's Government whether they are prepared to reconsider the general scheme for raising horse and field batteries of the Territorial Forces, and whether they will in the first instance confine themselves to the raising of a limited number of such batteries in certain selected areas where the local conditions may be considered favourable and encouraging, and whether, until the practicability of these Territorial batteries as efficient units for war is considered proved, the Government will devote the balance of the money already allocated to Territorial Artillery to maintaining the Regular Horse and Field Artillery at a greater numerical strength. "

The Noble Earl said: My Lords, the Question which stands in my name has been on the Paper for some time, and I greatly regret that it was not possible for me to ask it at an earlier date. The reason mainly was that the sudden and unexpected adjournment of Parliament happened on the day on which I had it on the Paper, and it has been impossible to bring it forward before now. I know many will say that it is now too late to discuss this question of the Territorial Artillery, that no good can be gained thereby, and that the argument ought now to be considered as closed. I beg to differ from that. There was plenty of plain speaking on this subject a year ago, but unfortunately it was very difficult to direct public attention to the details of the whole scheme at that particular time, and it is only recently that the people of this country have begun to realise what it all means. The result is that anything which is said now on the subject of the Territorial Army attracts considerably more attention than exactly the same thing did when said a year ago. The reason why I venture to bring this matter forward is that there are large numbers of those whom I respectfully consider to be most competent judges, who regard it as a most serious and vital question; we feel that a very great mistake has been made, and we are trying, even at the eleventh hour, to make people realise this fact, that a Territorial Army is one thing, but that the question of having that Army entirely dependent on Territorial Artillery is a totally different one.

I wish to say, in the very clearest way, that I do not desire to utter any criticism whatever upon the Territorial scheme as a whole. In common with most people, I look upon it as a most ingenious and praiseworthy one, and I sincerely hope it will succeed. It is because I hope it will succeed that it is my earnest wish to see one of its weakest spots remedied, and that weakest spot I consider to be the question of the field artillery. We are told that we must not criticise, and that the whole scheme is hanging in the balance. But if this new creation is of such delicate growth that the merest breath of criticism will make it wither and die, then I respectfully suggest that the sooner we know the fact the better.

To begin with, I consider that the whole artillery scheme was founded upon absolutely wrong lines from the very beginning. We were told of what had been effected with the Lancashire Field Artillery Militia, and we heard a great deal of the C.I.V. battery which, went to South Africa, and which was formed from the corps that I have the honour to command, Neither of these is in any way a proposition similar to one of the Territorial batteries which is now being formed. In South Africa they never met any properly-trained artillery; but there is no getting away from the fact that the special purpose for which the Territorial Army and the Territorial Artillery are being formed is that of meeting the trained artillery which will most assuredly accompany any Army that may land on these shores, whether it is bent on a raid or actual invasion. Then we are told what single guns of the Elswick battery did in South Africa, and of similar work done by other corps. I believe their work was very good indeed, but it is not the class of work that is going to be required of the Territorial batteries in this country.

Next we are told that we must have the full Continental proportion of five guns per 1,000 men for our Territorial Army. We are told that the country will not pay for regular artillery to that amount, and I daresay it would not, because it would not be necessary, and that, therefore, we must have Territorial Artillery; and I noticed the other day that the eloquent and gifted Military Correspondent of The Times, who seems to hold a brief for the War Office at the present moment, stated that the reason for adopting the present scheme of Territorial Artillery was that when it came to the question of providing artillery for the Territorial Army this particular scheme was believed to be the cheapest and the quickest. Now, I admit the cheapness of it, but it is certainly not the quickest, and it will be many years before any of these batteries now being formed will be of the slightest possible use as a fighting unit. Then, again, with regard to the proportion of guns required, I know it to be the fact that many most distinguished and experienced officers, some of them occupying the highest commands in this country and looked upon as leading authorities, are entirely unable to understand why it should be necessary to adopt this particular standard of five guns per 1,000 men for use in an enclosed country like England, where it would be practically impossible to use such large masses of artillery. I received a letter the other day from an artillery friend of mine, from which I should like to read to your Lordships a paragraph. He says— Another fact in which I think the War Minister has made a fundamental error is in allotting only Volunteer Artillery to the Territorial Army. The Territorial Infantry cannot be as highly trained as the Continental troops, and it was an axiom with such masters of war as Frederick and Napoleon that as the quality of their infantry fell off so they increased the efficiency of their artillery. We, on the other hand, allot our least-trained artillery to our least-trained infantry, and to make matters worse the theatre of war (viz., England) in which such artillery is to be used is the most difficult in Europe for the successful employment of the arm. That is worth thinking over. Mr. Haldane and the Army Council do not agree with Frederick the Great and Napoleon. They either refuse to admit that what was true in Napoleon's day is ten times more true in these days of modern weapons of precision, or they shrink, from motives of economy, and perhaps from political reasons, to tell the people the real truth, and they prefer to let the country think that artillery on the cheap will answer the purpose just as well.

We are suffering at the present moment from lamentable ignorance on the part of the general public as to what is required of field artillery and what constitutes the training of field artillery of which we hear so much. The first thing to remember is that artillery cannot win battles of itself. Artillery exists for the purpose of helping infantry to win battles, and in modern warfare infantry cannot win unless they are backed and supported by good artillery. When I say good artillery I mean artillery that is absolutely reliable, and I assert that reliability cannot be obtained except under certain conditions which are well known to every artillery officer. We hear about the mysteries of artillery. Mysteries of artillery only exist in the minds of those who know very little about it. There are no mysteries of artillery; but surely those who have been through the mill and are acquainted with artillery training may be credited with knowing perhaps a little more than those who have not.

I wish to say, therefore, that one of the first requirements is good and experienced officers, more especially battery commanders. There has been a vast amount of most mischievous and pernicious nonsense talked recently in the country as to the ease with which artillery work can be picked up. I call that nonsense most advisedly. I think it is a great pity that the people of this country, who are not familiar with artillery work, should be misled and be made to think that artillery work can be picked up easily, when the reverse is the fact. I would suggest that if it is so simple to pick up artillery work, then the donning of artillery uniform must have a singularly deadening effect on the intellects of our cadets when they leave the Woolwich Academy, or else we spend unnecessary tiny and money in training artillery officers. A good artillery officer must be a good rider. If a battery commander is always thinking what his horse is going to do next he cannot give proper attention to what he ought to do next with his men. He must have a good eye for country, he must be capable of quick decision, he must be a good horsemaster, and have a thorough knowledge of fire discipline and gunnery; above all things, he must be a good and trained observer of fire. Although it may sound not a very difficult matter to judge the burst of a shell and to say on which side of a target it falls, if those who doubt the difficulty would watch some of the artillery practice carried on on Salisbury Plain they would very soon find how singularly deceptive the observation of fire is, and how dependent on correct observation is anything approaching to accurate practice. This, as I say, is a most difficult matter, and requires constant practice.

Then, again, the non-commissioned officers and men must be well trained until the whole battery is like a machine. No battery commander can make good practice with a bad battery, and the best-trained battery in the world must fail absolutely in the hands of an incompetent battery commander; it would not only fail, but would be absolutely at that battery commander's mercy for good or for evil, and it might easily be annihilated in a very short space of time through some misjudged act or move on the part of the commander. To have either officers or men well-trained requires constant work with the battery as a whole. Yet at the present moment you are raising Territorial batteries all over the country to be commanded by men who have had absolutely no field artillery experience whatever; not only that, but I notice that in some places the batteries are being divided in sections, two guns in one place and two guns in another; and I read with astonishment two days ago of a horse artillery battery which is to be divided, with each of its four guns in four different towns situated some eight or ten miles apart. The consequence is that the commanding officer will rarely be able to get those guns together except in camp, and it will, therefore, be practically impossible for him to train either the men or himself. The result is that when he gets into camp he has to begin teaching his men elementary work which should have been learned weeks before, and the camp training in this way loses half its value.

It is impossible to exaggerate the helplessness of ill-trained artillery, or of an ill-trained battery or battery commander, in the face of a well-trained quick-firing battery. The latter would come into action quicker; it would get its first gun off quicker; it would pick up the range quicker, and then possibly with a blast of shrapnel would obliterate the other battery before it had begun. People do not realise what a quick-firing gun is. It is not a gun for the purpose of continual firing at great speed, for in that way you would soon use up the ammunitions. A quick-firing gun has been aptly described as a gun of opportunities. It is one which enables you to take advantage of your enemy if you catch him at a disadvantage, and it enables you, in that particular case, to pour in a fire that is absolutely overwhelming. All that requires great quickness, coolness, thorough knowledge, and accuracy; and I respectfully state that those conditions cannot be obtained without very careful and elaborate training.

Then take the case of covering infantry in the ssault—one of the most responsible and difficult duties of field artillery work. This means being able to keep up an accurate and well-timed fire over the heads of your own infantry up till the last possible moment, for the purpose of compelling the enemy to keep their heads down and take shelter and thus prevent them pouring in an accurate rifle fire themselves. If the supporting artillery engaged in this delicate and critical work is not absolutely reliable in its shooting, it would demoralise the very best of infantry; it would demoralise them at the most critical moment of the attack, and might bring about an awful disaster.

We are told that this great scheme of Territorial Artillery is absolutely essential to the Territorial scheme as a whole, that its absence would spoil the symmetry of the organisation. When I hear that I am afraid I feel inclined to say rather irreverently: "Hang your symmetry." But in your Lordships House we must not say that sort of thing, and therefore I will content myself by observing that I think the results to be obtained are of rather more importance than the symmetry of the scheme. If the rest of the Territorial Army would only realise the position and the real duties of artillery in the field, I think they would be the first to insist that they should be supported by something better than Territorial Artillery. I am perfectly well aware of the fact that the Secretary of State for War has said on many occasions that there was no intention of using Territorial Artillery untrained, and that the whole basis of the Territorial idea is that we are to have six months of preparation before the enemy lands in this country. If that comes off, all well and good; but Mr. Balfour, in the other House, pointed out, in a very forcible way, the unsoundness of tying the whole argument to this one hypothesis. Is it not the least likely that we might be attacked by a fresh enemy, and is it absolutely certain that we shall be able to choose our own time for sending the expeditionary force from these shores? At all events, it must be conceded, I think, that there is very considerable risk in the matter. I think that risk ought to be guarded against, and surely it would be a wise precaution to guard against a breakdown of your scheme by taking exceptional precautions regarding the artillery portion of it, which everybody admits is the most important and the least capable of being improvised at short notice. It is because we feel so strongly on this point that, even at this late hour, we urge the Government, in the strongest way, to consider the advisability of doing something in the way of stiffening the Territorial Artillery with Regulars in some form or another.

I am fully aware of the fact that at this, period mere destructive criticism is very undesirable, and does no good. I agree entirely with Mr. Haldane when he say: that there is a large amount of most admirable material in this country well suited for the manufacture of the rank and file of Territorial Artillery. Personally, I hope to see the Territorial Artillery succeed, and I do not wish to say a word to discourage any genuine efforts in that direction. But what I say is: "Give it a chance, "which you are not doing at the present moment. Confine your efforts to suitable localities, places where you can get your batteries all together, where horses, officers, and men are available, where you have manœuvring and practice ground within reach. And, most important of all, I suggest that where the Government have not already got capable Volunteer officers in command—and I think the Volunteer Field Artillery officers really capable of commanding batteries in this country might be counted upon the fingers of one hand, certainly of two—they should set capable and suitable Regular officers, with ample instructional staffs, to take command for the first few years, and thereby give the batteries that chance which you are not giving them at present under the Territorial scheme.

You want to encourage your junior Volunteer officers. I daresay a good many of them would come on to be capable battery commanders, but, to make a capable battery commander, you have to catch your officer young and catch him early. You have to find the man who is an enthusiast, and who is able and willing to give a sufficient amount of time to acquiring the requisite knowledge, and I do not think you will find that men of that description grow on gooseberry bushes. If you will give your Territorial Artillery a chance, as I say, by limiting the numbers of batteries, by selecting those localities where such batteries can be formed, and by sending Regular officers to give them a start, then I think as time goes on you will have junior officers coming up who will be competent to take command, and you will be able to encourage them by letting them know that those who are capable will be given the chance of commanding batteries. I think that is the very least that could be lone. Personally I would very much sooner have seen some scheme for having brigades in which one battery was a Regular one, coupled with two of the Territorials. The Regular battery would be of very great assistance to the Territorials; and I think you will find that the Territorial batteries, where they are situated in places with no Regular artillery in reach will find themselves very seriously handicapped. But you are, as you are starting these batteries now, doing your very best to make the Territorial Artillery an absolute farce, and more especially the horse artillery, which you are arming with a gun very much too heavy for the purpose.

It may interest you to know that some years ago—I think in the year 1891 or 1892—when breech-loading field guns were being introduced into the service, there were some cavalry manœuvres on the Berkshire Downs, under Sir Evelyn Wood. They had the 12-pounder gun, which in those days weighed about 38 or 39 cwt. behind the horses. One day early in the manœuvres they had to make a somewhat rapid advance of five or six miles, a thing that might occur any day in warfare. The result was that one of these batteries killed five horses which dropped dead in their tracks, many others being incapacitated, some of them for ever. This caused a considerable amount of thought to be given to the proper weight for a horse artillery gun. The weight was thereupon reduced, by taking off ammunition and in other ways, to 30 cwt., and it was then found that they could keep up with cavalry. I am informed that it was that circumstance which set the proper weight for a horse artillery gun at about 30 or 31 cwt. I asked the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for War a question the other day as to what gun it was proposed to provide for these horse artillery batteries, and he replied that the weapon proposed was the 15-pounder converted gun, which weighs about 41 cwt., though I believe it is proposed to reduce the weight to about 39 cwt,. by taking some of the ammunition out of the boxes. The result will be that your Territorial Horse Artillery batteries will be armed with a gun fully 8 or 9 cwt. too heavy for the purpose, and all in the interests of economy.

Now, I wish to say a word on a question which is just as serious. This Army scheme involves the reduction of thirty-three batteries of the Royal Field Artillery to practical nonentities, all, again, in the interests of economy, whilst money is being thrown away in other directions upon Territorial Artillery. I most sincerely hope that consideration will be given to that fact. I will not say more about it now, but I believe that the noble and gallant Field-Marshal on the Cross Benches, who can speak with so much authority, will address your Lordships on that particular point presently. I will only say now that I have not addressed myself to this subject without a due sense of the responsibility of bringing it forward at the present moment. When I first took an open part in this controversy I was roused to do so by the absolutely erroneous statements and false deductions brought forward with regard to the batteries of which I have a particular and special knowledge. I cannot claim to have had any very extensive war service like many noble Lords in this House, but I respectfully submit that ten years regimental duty in the Field and Royal Horse Artillery, and fifteen years subsequent command of the only Volunteer corps in this country which has attempted anything in the nature of Volunteer Horse Artillery, at all events gives me some right to speak on this subject in your Lordships' House; and I think I may claim that the experience I have had has given me some insight into the details necessary for the moderate success which we have been able to achieve, and has also enabled me to form some reliable opinion, not only as to the capabilities of Volunteer Artillery, but also, what is still more important, some idea as regards their limitations. I wish all success to the Territorial Artillery, but I do not believe that. His Majesty's Government are going the right way about it; and I hope that even now at this late period the Government will do something in the way I have indicated to make the movement a greater success than it promises to be at the present time.

EARL ROBERTS

My Lords, on the last occasion I had the honour of addressing your Lordships I ventured, with a full sense of the responsibility that I was incurring, to express my carefully-weighed opinion as to the uselessness of the artillery which Mr. Haldane is about to create. The remarks I then made about the artillery have been interpreted by Lord Lucas—who, I trust, will allow me to offer him my warmest congratulations on the important position he now holds—as applying "equally to the other branches of the Territorial Army," and "as a sweeping condemnation of the whole force." A similar interpretation has been given to my words by the Secretary of State for War in another place. Lord Lucas also made the statement that, whilst I— Last year had given a qualified blessing to the scheme, now, when a critical stage of its development has been reached, and everyone was looking for a pat on the back from me, I passed a heavy sentence on a yet unborn child. My Lords, I am no master of dialectics, and I must confess that I am at a loss to understand how anything I have said can be made to bear the interpretation put upon it by Lord Lucas and Mr. Haldane; and I trust I shall be able to satisfy your Lordships that there is not the slightest foundation for that interpretation, and that the opinions I have expressed about the Territorial Army have been consistent throughout. To that part of the scheme which is sound, practical, and in accordance with the exigencies of war I have given my heartiest support, while all that is unsound, unpractical, and that cannot be of any use in peace or war I have unhesitatingly condemned.

In support of this assertion, I should like to explain to your Lorships that, when the question of Territorial Artillery was first mooted, I told Mr. Haldane of the trial that had been made on Salisbury Plain, when I was Commander-in-Chief, with the batteries of the Lancashire Militia Artilery, and that after they had been given far more training than it is intended, or would be possible under the scheme to give to the Territorial batteries, and having had besides the great advantage of being assisted by a large staff of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the Regular artillery, it was reported that, efficient as they had become, they could not hope to cope successfully with the highly trained batteries of a Continental Power. Then when for the first time it was officially intimated in Army Orders of February, 1907, that, with the exception of eight horse and thirty-three field batteries, the Territorial Artillery would be the only artillery left in this country to meet an invasion after the despatch of the expeditionary force, I took the earliest opportunity—namely, in June of that year—to bring the matter to your lordships' notice, and to point out the danger of trusting to Territorial Artillery.

Let me repeat what I said then. My words were— Are we to send amateur artillerists, equipped with obsolete guns, into action with highly trained experts, provided with the deadliest modern weapons Whatever else, my Lords, we may think we can improvise in the hour of danger, or begin to train after the crisis has arisen, artillery cannot be improvised. Artillerymen must be trained before the crisis and not after, and given a very different training to the annual week or fortnight, which is all the proposed scheme provides. A glance at Hansard will show you that these were my exact words. I can detect no uncertain sound in these words, nor do I think they convey the idea of a blessing—qualified or unqualified—as given by me to the proposed artillery. On the contrary, at the very outset I expressed a decided opinion as to the futility of trusting the defence of this country to inadequately trained Territorial batteries.

Then as to my remarks upon the Territorial Artillery being pronounced "a sweeping condemnation" of the whole force, let me recall to your lordships' memory what I said only a few weeks ago in this House. It. Was— I am a firm believer in the vital importance of our having a Territorial Army, or, as I should prefer to call it, a National Army, and I have no hesitation in saying that this country owes a deep debt of gratitude to Mr. Haldane for all that he has done, and is still doing, in spite of the great difficulties lie has to contend with, to provide us with such an Army. The right hon. Gentleman has laid the foundations of a National Army, the framework of which is quite admirable, but it is for the country to see that that framework is tilled in with thoroughly serviceable material, properly organised to take the field. I cannot conceive how anybody can impute to these words "a sweeping condemnation "of the Territorial Army; but, as misconception has arisen, I should like very briefly to state my opinion of Mr. Haldane's scheme in connection with the reorganisation of the Yeomanry and Volunteers.

To my mind the scheme represents an earnest and carefully planned attempt to raise a Territorial Army on a voluntary basis, and, as I said before, the framework appears to me to be admirable. The chief merit of the scheme lies in the manner in which it is sought to bring the Army into touch with the nation, to stimulate public interest in the Army throughout the country, and to bring local influence in each county to bear upon the actual provision of the troops. I consider it to be a most praiseworthy effort in the right direction, and I hope, with all sincerity, that it may be crowned with success. When, however, the details of the scheme come to be examined, there appear to be very grave defects. As regards training, I do not disguise the fact that, in my opinion, an opinion which I feel assured is shared by the Army generally, and by a large number of civilians as well, the period fixed by the Act is far too short to permit of any branch reaching a reasonable standard of efficiency. But, whereas it may be possible to give the Yeomanry and infantry a very moderate amount of military knowledge in the limited time at their disposal, provided they are commanded by officers who have themselves been properly trained, I have no hesitation in saying that it is absurd to suppose that the artillery could be taught even the rudiments of their business in so brief a period, how much less could it be given the training necessary for combined action with the other arms. So far as organisation is concerned, I think it is an undoubted advantage that the Yeomanry and infantry should be formed into brigades and divisions under permanent commanders; but, holding the opinion I do, as to the uselessness of Territorial Artillery, I cannot be expected to agree, merely for the sake of symmetry, to its being included in the organisation. To include it would, in my opinion, be a wasteful expenditure of an enormous sum of money for a purely fanciful purpose.

My Lords, I am told that my criticisms are valueless from the fact that I am under a total misconception of the basis underlying the whole scheme; and Mr. Haldane has taken pains to show what he conceives to be the real foundation of our military strategy and the erroneous nature of my premises. Put as concisely as possible, Mr. Haldane's contention, as I understand it, is this, that, under no circumstances conceivable, will the whole striking force be allowed to leave these shores until the Territorial Army has been given a breathing space of six months in which to make itself efficient. In other words, that the Territorial Army can absolutely rely on six months respite for training and preparation after the declaration of war; or, failing this, that it will always have the Regular Army, or at all events a part of it, to assist in the defence of the United Kingdom. If this be, indeed, the foundation on which Mr. Haldane's scheme is based, the right hon. Gentleman spoke nothing but the truth when he said that he had "wholly parted company with" me.

This confession, my Lords, throws a lurid light on the military aspect of the scheme. Consider for a moment what it means. It means that we are deliberately to adopt a policy in peace which will entail interference with the strategic liberty of our expeditionary force in war. It means that, if our frontiers in India or Canada are threatened, or serious trouble arises nearer home, we shall be denied the possibility of putting out our whole strength to ward off the danger. A part, according to Mr. Haldane one-third, of the expeditionary force will have to remain at home, whilst our second line of defence is undergoing what is called "the hardening process." I say that this is an impossible foundation for our military policy, and one for which neither history nor common sense can give any warrant. I can conceive no more sweeping condemnation of the material of which the Territorial Army is to be formed than this profession of faith of the Secretary for War in the loving kindness of an enemy who, intending to attack us, will be considerate of our convenience to the extent of allowing us, when war is declared, six months for preparation to defeat him.

Mr. Haldane has sought to detract from any value my opinion may have by attributing to me two diametrically opposite views as regards the probability of invasion, quoting for that purpose a speech of Mr. Balfour's, based on calculations of the Committee of Imperial Defence, of which I was then a Member. That speech was made in May, 1905—three years ago; and the conditions on which the Committee then formed their opinion have undergone a very considerable change, and further inquiry has shown that the decisions then arrived at no longer hold good. Let us, for argument's sake, grant that we should enjoy immunity from invasion for six months after war is declared. Even then I still adhere steadfastly to my opinion that it would be utterly impossible to train such a mass of artillery—182 batteries—even dining the summer within anything like so brief a period. But what if the training had to be carried on during the six winter months? The men at that season would have to live in tents, for there would not be sufficient barrack accommodation for anything like the numbers that would have to be trained. Will my noble and gallant friend Lord Lovat say whether he would train the hardy Highlanders on the moors of Scotland in the depth of winter, and, if not, how much less could dwellers in towns and people working in factories and at mechanical trades be expected to bear up against such exposure? And at that season of the year, or indeed, at any other season, where would all the 182 batteries carry out their tactical training and their gun practice?

As Major-General Sir George Marshall, an officer of experience, who commanded the whole of the artillery during the late war in South Africa, pointed out in a letter published in The Times a few weeks ago— There are only four land ranges available in the whole kingdom. The greatest difficulty is often experienced in providing sufficient range accommodation for the Regular batteries usually serving at home—a little more than half the number that are proposed for the Territorial Army—and are these 182 Territorial batteries to be transported from all parts of the country to these four land ranges, one of which is in Ireland?

The noble Earl, Lord Lucas's predecessor, told us a short time ago that the County Associations had been instructed to see what could be done about local ranges. I fear there will be no satisfactory result from their researches, for Committee after Committee has been assembled for the same purpose, and their Reports showed that very few sites eight to nine miles in length and two miles in breadth were anywhere available, and that the cost of such ranges would be practically prohibitory. It is possible that sea ranges may be found in certain places, but minor tactics—perhaps the most essential, and certainly the most difficult, part of an artillery-man's training to learn—cannot be taught on a sea range.

Then the annual training is to be for fifteen days only; and even for this short time, under recent instructions, it would appear that no one who has anything else to do need attend; and I would ask you please to remember that this might be all the training the Territorial Artillery would get before an enemy lands on these shores. For, however much it may be desired, no one, not even the most sanguine of Mr. Haldane's supporters, would, I imagine, take upon himself to guarantee that we shall have sufficient warning to ensure the artillery being given the six months much-needed training. And is there anyone in this House who, after what has happened so often in the past, would feel absolutely certain, even if timely warning were given, that the Government of the day would take advantage of it to mobilise, seeing how fearful we always are of appearing to expect, or to make any preparation for, war?

From the fifteen days two must be deducted for Sundays, two for coming and going into camp, and one day for inspection, paying the men, survey boards, etc. Thus the fifteen days have dwindled down to ten days for actual training, two of which are to be devoted to artillery tactics and gun practice. Now, even if the ranges happen to be close at hand, this would allow a ridiculously short time for carrying out such essential duties. It really would seem as if this all-important matter of artillery tactics and gun practice had never been taken seriously into consideration by the War Office authorities, or the Secretary of State would surely not have ventured to propose the dangerous experiment of waiting until war breaks out before the training of the artillery could be properly taken in hand.

I am accused of inconsistency with regard to the possibility of bringing the Territorial Artillery up to a reasonable standard of efficiency—first, because I expressed approval of the work done by Volunteer Artillery in the South African War; and, secondly, in that, as commander-in-chief I agreed to the proposal of forming, as an experiment, twenty-one such batteries for three of the six Army Corps organised when Lord Midleton was Secretary of State for War. Where is the inconsistency? In the first place, one of the two batteries—the C.I.V. Battery—practically belonged to the Honourable Artillery Company. It was commanded by a Regular officer; its adjutant and the more important non-commissioned officers were Regulars, and the majority of the men had had many more advantages in the matter of training than it would be possible to give to the Territorial batteries. The other—the Elswick Battery—was chiefly manned by skilled artificers of unusual intelligence, whose business gave them a thorough knowledge of the weapon they had to use, and they were men of a type which it would be chimerical to hope to find for the personnel of 182 batteries throughout the country. Moreover, these batteries had each something like three months training in the field before they were seriously engaged with the enemy, and what is a very important matter—they were never opposed by highly-trained artillery, but only by artillery with little, if any, more training than they had had themselves. As regards Lord Midleton's proposal, I acquiesced in that experiment being made because I was able to imagine then, as I can imagine now, the feasibility of raising a limited number of batteries in certain selected areas—as is proposed by the noble Lord who opened this debate—where local interests and training possibilities appeared to hold out reasonable hopes of carrying such an experiment to a fairly successful conclusion. Surely no impartially-minded person can see any similarity between the experiment that was contemplated in 1901, to form twenty-one batteries in carefully selected localities as a reserve to the Regular artillery, and Mr. Haldane's proposal to raise indiscriminately 182 batteries in all parts of the country, not as a reserve to the Regular artillery, but to take the place of the Regulars and to be the sole artillery—with the exception of eight horse artillery batteries—on which we shall have to depend for the defence of this country.

I read the letter of the Inspector-General of the forces, which Mr. Haldane produced in support of his scheme for raising Territorial Artillery, but I must confess that I find it difficult to treat it seriously. I will only say that the deductions which I draw from military history differ fundamentally from those drawn by Sir John French. There is, however, one most important point upon which Sir John French touches when he says that "with effective instructors" much can be done in the way of training artillery in six months. The late Undersecretary of State for War, in replying to a question which I put to him privately, told me that arrangements were being made for the provision of the necessary instructors. Personally, I can see little chalice of any "effective instructors" being forthcoming. We are more than 4,000 officers short of mobilisation requirements for the Regular Army alone—irrespective of any demand that India might make upon us for the same purpose—and when war breaks out every officer that can possibly be made use of will assuredly be employed with the expeditionary force. The few Regular officers that may be left behind after the despatch of that portion of the expeditionary force which it will be permissible, according to the scheme, to send abroad will have their hands full in training men to replace the wastage of the Regular artillery; and if, as I ant confident would be the case in any great emergency, the whole expeditionary force had to be sent out of the country without regard to any time-limit the situation would be so much the worse. The Territorial Artillery, under these circumstances, would have to train itself—in other words, there would be no training at all.

I have no doubt whatever that when the crisis arises the men would, as Sir John French thinks, exert themselves to the utmost to remedy their want of training by personal courage and devotion to duty; but what Napier calls the "mechanical courage of discipline" cannot be improvised, nor can willingness to serve the country compensate for inefficiency, based upon ignorance of artillery tactics, and insufficient experience in the use of a complicated weapon. I prefer to agree with Prince Kraft, who, in comparing discipline with enthusiasm, says— Enthusiasm is but burning straw unless the true soldier spirit is present. It flares up a short time, but goes out at once as soon as it is chilled by the reality of war. I can imagine no more terrible fate for a commander than to be called upon to defend these islands with troops insufficiently trained, both as regards officers and men; and I sincerely trust for their own sakes that none of Mr. Haldane's military advisers who support the right hon. Gentleman's proposal to give this modicum of training to the Territorial Army will ever be required to undertake such an impossible task. No, I cannot alter by one iota the opinion I expressed in this House two months ago that the Territorial Artillery on such a scale as is proposed would entail vast expense to this country in peace without the hope of any corresponding return in war. I repeat that I consider it would be not only valueless, but a source of danger both in peace and war—in peace, because the fact of its existence would hill the public into a false sense of security; in war, because of its inability to afford the necessary support to the other arms or to cope with the trained artillery by which it would be opposed.

This is not a party question. It is essentially a national question; and, as a soldier sitting on the Cross-Benches, I should be most unwilling to take part in any Army debate which had for its object the injury of either party of the State. I have served in the field under both Liberal and Unionist Governments, and from no one have I received more kindness, more encouragement, or more consideration than from the two noble Marquesses one the Leader of the Unionist, the other the late Leader of the Liberal Party in this House. Then, Mr. Haldane is a personal friend of mine, and it is most distasteful to me to do or say anything to add to his difficulties, or to increase the heavy burden he has to bear. And I certainly would not do so did not my experience of war and my intimate knowledge of artillery satisfy me that by the course which is being pursued with regard to that branch of the Territorial Army the safety not only of the country, but of our great Empire, is endangered.

We are at present committed to nothing more than a paper Army as far as the artillery is concerned. And before any further steps are taken I implore you to make an effort to prevent the grievous error we should make if we consented to the formation of 182 batteries of Territorial Artillery. Let us confine ourselves, in the first instance, as Lord. Denbigh has suggested, to the raising of a limited number of such batteries. I would say twenty-one field batteries at the outside; in addition, there might be the fourteen heavy batteries, as proposed, and perhaps fourteen sections of pom-poms to serve with the mounted portion of the Territorial Army. Neither of these would require anything like the tactical training that is essential for horse and field artillery. Such batteries could be raised where there might be some hope of securing the services of the required number of intelligent men suitable for the artillery and where, possibly—I am afraid I cannot say probably—suitable range accommodation might be locally found. We cannot, we dare not, without running frightful risks, to say nothing of the great waste of public money, commit ourselves further than this at present.

Meanwhile it is essential for the security of this country that the thirty-three Regular batteries should be maintained at the full establishment, in order that they may be available on the shortest possible notice for home defence when the whole of the expeditionary force shall have been despatched. In such a condition they would be infinitely better fitted to assist in training the Territorial Artillery than they are at present on the lamentably low establishment of two guns, sixty-five of all ranks, and forty-five horses. And such batteries, though few in number, would most certainly put more heart into the other branches of the Territorial Army should they ever find themselves opposed to the highly-trained troops of a Continental Power, than any number of Territorial batteries, and they would cost much less in the end than the 182 batteries it is proposed to raise.

It has been urged that the Territorial batteries should be given a chance, and that we should wait for three or four years to see whether they could not be made efficient. My Lords, at the end of three or four years who is to pronounce on the efficiency of the Territorial batteries? Those who are responsible for their existence, and those who have honestly done their best to give them their so-called training, are they to be the judges? My Lords, there is but one test for the efficiency of artillery, and that test is war; and are we to wait for war in order to be certain whether the Territorial batteries are fit for the duties for which they were raised?

I am asked why I did not say last year what I am saying now about the Territorial Artillery, and I am told that to give expression to such views at this time is to discourage those who have been requested, and have consented, to raise Territorial batteries. I hope I have made it clear to your Lordships that, as soon as if knew that Territorial batteries were to be raised, I lost no time in pointing out as emphatically as I could that, unless they were given far more training than was laid down in Army Orders, they could not be trusted in war. I had no conception then, nor indeed did I know until this year's Army Estimates were published in February last, that the thirty-three Regular batteries were to be placed on such a low establishment as to prevent their being able to take the field, and that, with the exception of the eight horse artillery batteries which, as I explained on a former occasion, might at any moment be required to replace wastage in the expeditionary force, we should have to depend solely upon the 182 Territorial batteries for the artillery defence of these Islands.

And with regard to any discouraging effect my words may have had, my reply is that, if I could feel there was any reality about the proposed batteries, or see any prospect of so vast a number ever being of the slightest use, so far from doing anything to discourage their formation, I would gladly welcome them as a valuable addition to the Royal Regiment of Artillery. But, knowing as I do that it is hopeless to expect them ever to become efficient enough to be trusted in the field, and, as I have shown, that by the scheme they would be the only artillery available for home defence, I consider it my duty to use every effort to prevent the wholesale adoption of a measure which I regard as fraught with possible disaster to this country; and if any words of mine can help to this end, I shall feel that I have not appealed in vain, and that I have no reason to regret having taken up so much of your. Lordships' valuable time.

LORD OREN FELL

My Lords, when came down to the House this afternoon I had not the slightest intention of addressing your Lordships, and I do not rise now to denounce in any way the Territorial scheme. I am a member of the Territorial Association of my county, and shall do my level best to bring what is given us to do to a successful issue. But I listened with the greatest interest to the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Denbigh, and I rise simply to say that, I concur in every word he said with regard to the difficulty of training artillery. For the last four years I have had the duty of supervising a very large force of artillery in Ireland. I have invariably attended the practice camps and I know how difficult it is nowadays even for highly skilled officers and men to do justice to the new gun. I have watched carefully the work of officers which I have had to supervise, and it has often been my painful duty to recommend that certain officers in the Royal Artillery even should not be promoted to the higher ranks because of what by a civilian would be considered very slight deficiencies—want of the power of observation and of taking proper ground, and their inability to perform other duties which those responsible for training artillery should be able to perform. I only say this to show how difficult it will be for the officers of the Territorial Artillery to become efficient with the very small training they will receive. The noble Earl who called attention to this question to-day suggested that the force should consist of two batteries of the Territorial Artillery and one battery of Regular Artillery. To make things safe I would say let the proportion he two batteries of Royal Artillery and one battery of Territorial Artillery. Lord Roberts has mentioned the great difficulty in England of providing proper ranges. Even in Ireland, with the large force of artillery I had under my command, we had not a proper range. When I was in command in Ireland I endeavoured all I could to induce the Government to purchase more land for the purpose, and I hope that under my successor the absolutely necessary ground will be obtained. It has been my duty to search for suitable ground for ranges. I visited a great many parts of Ireland for that purpose, and I realise how very difficult it is, with all the various rights that exist in England and in Ireland, to find sufficient ground for proper practice with the new gun. As I have said, I am a member of the Territorial Association of my county—Buckinghamshire—and I am sure that we shall always support any scheme propounded by the Government of the day, and do our level best to make it a success. But I hope that after what has been urged by the noble Earl and by the noble and gallant Field Marshal the greatest possible care will be taken in carrying out a scheme which to us soldiers presents the very greatest difficulties.

*THE UNDER-SECRETARY oF STATE FOR WAR (Lord LUCAS)

My Lords, the speeches to which we have listened have dealt chiefly with the question of the Territorial Field Artillery. No alternative to the plan of arming the Territorial Army with its own field artillery has been forthcoming, but suggestions have been made that they should be allowed to have a certain proportion of batteries of the Regular Army. The question of the reorganisation that is taking place in the Regular Army has also been mentioned. With your permission I would like, before dealing with the question of the Territorial Artillery, to put before your Lordships the position with regard to the Regular Field Artillery. Though the two questions are entirely separate, they have a distinct bearing on one another.

As your Lordships know, the proposal is to organise an expeditionary force of six divisions, for the mobilisation of which sixty-six batteries of field artillery are required. The raising of a force of sixty-six batteries, which is a considerable increase on what has ever been proposed before, is at the present moment exceedingly difficult for two reasons. In the first place, the force of artillery required now is larger, because in common with foreign countries we have hid to increase the number of guns per 1,000 bayonets and sabres; and, in the second place—and this is where our chief difficulty comes in—the new gun has entailed an increase of 50 per cent. in the personnel of the ammunition column. Therefore we are faced, first of all, with the problem of producing a larger number of field batteries, and, secondly, we have to increase the personnel of the ammunition columns.

The position is that if the sixty-six batteries and their ammunition columns were mobilised with Regular Artillerymen, under the present system of enlistment—that is to say, six years with the colours and six years with the Reserve—there would be a deficit of no less than 7,000 men. That is a deficit which it is extremely difficult to meet. Even if we had continued the system of enlistment which was in force when the present Government came into office—three years in the Colours and nine in the Reserve—and even had we been able to get sufficient men to prolong their service in order to provide drabs for India, it would not have been me. There is no practical proposal on the lines of the plan suggested by hold Midleton of enlisting a number of three-year men that would enable the necessary men to be obtained. The Army Council, therefore, were forced to adopt the system of manning the ammunition columns with the Special Reserve; there was no alternative open. The shortage of 7,000 is after stripping the thirty-three surplus batteries and returning the guns to store. We have never yet in this country had any mobilisation scheme which provided the full complement for the ammunition columns and the rest. We have never had any scheme which did not entail returning surplus batteries to store, and it is, as a matter of fact, a delusion to consider those surplus batteries as combatant units. They are nothing of the sort, as you demobilise them automatically as you mobilise the rest of your force. Partly for that reason the number of artillery batteries kept in this country has never been in very strict proportion to the number that would be required on mobilisation. There have always been these surplus batteries, and under any scheme of mobilisation it has always been intended to absolutely strip them and do away with them as combatant units.

Under the present scheme you have an improvement upon that. You have your skilled training cadre. When this scheme is in working order we shall, for the first time, not contemplate returning those guns to store; they will remain as training batteries with Regular complements, and will have a certain combatant value. That is, as I say, far in Advance of anything we have had up to this time. To say that by the present system combatant units are being destroyed is not at all an accurate statement. You could not have had these thirty-three batteries as combatant batteries. The advantage which we claim for this scheme, and which certainly could not be said about the artillery system in force when this Government came into power, is that, in the first place, it enables the necessary drafts for India to be provided; secondly, it enables you to mobilise the whole of the sixty-six; and, in the next place, it will provide training machinery to replace the wastage of war. In so far as it has been said that the policy of the present Government is to starve the artillery, I would point out that there is an actual increase in numbers at the present moment of between 200 and 300 men.

I now turn to the question of the Territorial Army. It has been stated from the very beginning that the Territorial Army was intended to be the Second Line; it was never intended that it should take the field immediately on the outbreak of hostilities. That is not the function of a Second Line Army. If it was ever thought possible that a Second Line Army could take the field on the outbreak of hostilities, surely no Continental Power or any other would maintain a much more expensive and elaborate First Line Army. We look, as we have always looked, to the Navy and the Regular Army as the First Line, and the position remains the same with the Regular Army stronger by better organisation, enabling an expeditionary force of something like 100,000 men to be sent abroad with yet from 40,000 to 60,000 of the Regular Army left in this country with their proper complement of all arms.

We do not say that we have suddenly revolutionised the whole system of defence of this country. We have never laid claim to anything of the sort. What we lay claim to is that we have set up the machinery that will place this country in a position far stronger than it has ever been in before to meet the strain which comes upon a nation after six months of war. At about the end of that period it is intended that the Territorial Army should be fit to take the field, and this will enable the country to get, so to speak, its second wind, which it could not do before. It is like the difference between a man in training and a man who is not. At the end of six months, or about that time it is intended that the Territorial Army should be fit to take the field absolutely independent of the Regular Army. That being so, it is absolutely essential that it should have a proper complement of the necessary combatant arms.

The Army Council have made allowance for the difficulty of using artillery in this country, and have decided on the proportion of four guns to the 1,000. In regard to the question of the artillery of the Territorial Force I confess I have not been able to follow Lord Denbigh's reasoning. Either your Field Artillery is going to be efficient at the end of six months training on mobilisation, or it is not. If it is not going to be efficient, why does the noble Lord propose to allow to each brigade of artillery two of these inefficient batteries? If, on the other hand, it is possible to have two efficient batteries of field artillery in a' brigade, surely it is not beyond human capacity to raise a third battery. And if, as Lord Roberts says, the six months continuous training on mobilisation is not going to give the force the efficiency you want, then I do not see what is the point of the National Service League, an organisation which proposes to give considerably less training.

The Army Council have never underrated the objections which may be raised to their proposals in regard to the Territorial field artillery. But if your Lordships have read the speech made by Mr. Haldane on the subject in another place you will have seen that these proposals have the support of the artillery expert advisers of the Army Council. I am willing to admit that, to a certain extent, it is an experiment, but it is an experiment against which no one has been able to produce a prima facie case, while, on the other hand, there is a certain amount of prima facie evidence in its favour. There is the remarkable case of the Honourable Artillery Company, a corps commanded by the noble Earl Lord Denbigh. When the noble Earl started field artillery he was met with the same sort of opposition as he is now Offering to our scheme. He was told that what he aimed at was impossible of achievement. If they succeeded in attaining so high a standard of efficiency in a fortnight's training, surely it is not too much to hope that the six months training on mobilisation will be sufficient to enable the Territorial artillery to attain to something like the same condition of efficiency. There are also the batteries commanded by Colonel Allen in Sheffield, and by Colonel Grant in Glasgow—they afford remarkable evidence of what can be done, in spite of a certain amount of opposition from the War Office.

Reference has been made to the amount of instruction which the officers of the Territorial artillery will receive. The Army Council quite recognise, as was emphasised by both the noble and gallant Field-Marshal and by the noble Earl who initiated this discussion, that it is of the utmost importance to have skilled and well-trained commanders of the batteries. In each command there will be an officer commanding and a staff officer who will be either Regular or ex-Regular officers. In each brigade there will be a Regular adjutant, a Regular sergeant-major and six sergeant-instructors, so that when a battery is going through its ordinary preliminary work it will have what is considered to be a sufficient amount of expert help and advice. Then with regard to higher training, it is the intention of the Army Council to concentrate it, at present, upon the officers and non-commissioned officers of the batteries and to leave nothing undone to provide them with first-class instruction and experience. First you have the machinery supplied by the training brigade which will be able to give a large amount of instruction and assistance. Besides that, officers will have, within financial limits, which I think will be wide, practically unlimited opportunities of being attached to Regular batteries for training and fire practice. In fact I am told by officers of the Regular artillery that it will be perfectly possible, under this scheme, for officers of the Territorial Artillery to have more general instruction, especially in firing work, than was possible for officers of the Regular artillery fifteen or twenty years ago.

VISCOUNT HARDINGE

Will they get any extra pay when going through those courses?

*LORD LUCAS

They will receive the pay of their rank.

LORD AMPTHILL

How are they to find the time?

*LORD LUCAS

The question of time is, I agree, an important one. But if the noble Lord suggests that there are not 180 or 360 people in this country who can afford to give up sufficient time to do this work, then all I can say is that he has a higher opinion of industry in this country than I have. There are very difficult matters which officers have to learn and without which knowledge they cannot become good battery commanders. The question of observation of fire, which has been mentioned by the three previous speakers, is a very technical one, and I am told by Regular artillery officers that it is so difficult that there are many officers in the Regular artillery who cannot learn it. It is a gift, and if you have not got the gift no training can give it to you. On the other hand, if the officer has this innate gift, it is their opinion that the amount of training open to him should be sufficient to make him a good observer of fire.

With regard to ranges, land ranges are more suitable than sea ranges for artillery practice, but between land and sea ranges there is at present a sufficient number for the preliminary work of all the batteries of the Territorial artillery, and it is hoped that by the time the first two years training is over greater facilities still for firing will be provided. After all, the whole point of this debate turns, not so 'much upon a condemnation of the Territorial field artillery, as on a doubt whether it is possible to raise so many as 182 batteries. I gathered from what was said that it is not denied that it is a possibility.

EARL ROBERTS

I beg your pardon. I say it is an absolute impossibility.

*LORD LUCAS

After considering all the questions we hold a different view from the noble and gallant Field-Marshal, and regret that we cannot include him among our supporters. I may say that I am very sorry if I misinterpreted in any way the noble and gallant Field-Marshal's previous utterances on the general question. The noble Earl, Lord Denbigh, seemed to think it would be possible to raise batteries only in certain suitable districts, and he suggested that you should only raise them where you found capable Volunteer officers.

*THE EARL OF DENBIGH

I suggested that the first efforts should be confined to certain suitable localities, and that where you could not find capable Volunteer officers to command them you should send down Regular officers to start them for the first few years.

*LORD LUCAS

After all, what is a suitable locality for raising field artillery? Is there only one class of man capable of doing field artillery work? How can you tell what is going to prove a suitable locality until you try? These things spring up in the most unlikely places. Who would have thought that in the heart of the City of London would be found the very best Volunteer field artillery that exists in this country? The men from the centre of London are not born horsemen. A great many of them, I take it, are not the kind of skilled mechanics and artificers whom Lord Roberts admits make fine artillerymen, such as in the ease of the Elswick Battery. Yet you have been able to raise in the City of London an extremely efficient battery, and if we can get many more batteries like that we shall consider the experiment a success.

*THE EARL OF DENBIGH

One of the great factors in the success of the Honourable Artillery Company has been the assistance they received from the Royal Horse Artillery at St. John's Wood. But one horse artillery battery has only a limited number of horses. It could give assistance to us, but it could not do so in the case of all the batteries you wish to raise in London.

*LORD LUCAS

The Honourable Artillery Company have, no doubt, received greater assistance than we can give to a, larger number of batteries, but there is no ground for thinking that it is not proposed to give other batteries assistance from Regulars. We are going out of our way to find assistance for the Territorial Army. The Honourable Artillery Company has had these advantages, owing to the public spirit and loyalty of the members, and, possibly, because it is a rich company. We are going to offer to other corps very nearly the same facilities as have been enjoyed by the Honourable Artillery Company, but at no cost to themselves at all. We are going to ask that these batteries may be raised everywhere, and I do not see how anyone can say that, with the teeming population in this country, it will be impossible to raise sufficient men to give us 182 batteries. Even if the attempt fails in certain places it will not be proved that 182 batteries cannot be raised. It is quite true that capable artillery officers do not grow on gooseberry bushes, but it is only by having work with a battery that a man can ever become an efficient artillery officer.

Finally, I disagree entirely from the point of view that, because you cannot raise certain batteries, von will not be able to raise batteries in other places. On the occasion of a great national emergency, if it were a question of training the Territorial artillery against time, to say that we should not get ranges and facilities, is putting a very low estimate upon the public spirit of the citizens of this country. There will be heaps of ranges and heaps of opportunity for training offered. When the war fever is upon people and it is a race against time, with the skilled instruction and guidance that they would always have with them to direct their efforts, I venture to think that energy of that kind—not the kind described by Prince Kraft and referred to by the noble and gallant Field-Marshal—is a very valuable thing, and by it the Territorial artillery will be able to do in six months twice as much as they could do in time of peace.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

My Lords, I am sure that your Lordships welcome with great satisfaction the noble Lord the Under-Secretary in his present position. At the same time I believe there is not one of your Lordships who will not have sympathised with the noble Lord in having the uncongenial task of trying to make what appears to us an impossible case against the very powerful arguments addressed to the House by the three noble and gallant Lords of great experience and authority who preceded him. I do not think You could have a stronger consensus of opinion than that supplied by the noble Earl on my left, who has himself great experience of Territorial batteries, and of the sort of material out of which our Territorial batteries will be composed by the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Roberts, whose authority is second to no man in the world on the subject of artillery; and by the noble and gallant General, Lord Grenfell, who has had recent experience of handling auxiliary troops in his Irish command.

I rise not to enter into the details of the controversy before your Lordships, for so far it must be admitted that many of the arguments put forward by the three noble and gallant Lords to whom I have referred have gone by default of answer in their favour. But I ask your Lordships to consider what is the position in which we are left by this discussion. You have heard the official voice of the Under-Secretary telling us that there is no possibility of having better trained artillery than the Territorial Army when we have sent the expeditionary force out of this country; and you have heard the trained experts telling the country in no uncertain voice that that Territorial artillery would be perfectly unfit to face an invading artillery. Then are we to close this debate with nothing better than the assurance from the Government that they must send all the Regular artillery abroad, and that they are prepared to remain in a condition which leaves us practically defenceless at home in case of invasion?

I put this point. Either there must be more Regular artillery at home, or there must be less Regular artillery sent abroad. As regards the numbers at home, I think the noble Lord, the Under-Secretary ought to pursue a little more logic in his arguments. What he said, practically, was this, that we had 7,000 men too few, and then he said that we should be in a better position when we had reduced the batteries by 2,400 men. Since Mr. Haldane became Secretary of State for War, the terms of service have been altered. When Mr. Arnold-Forster left the War Office the terms were three years with the Colours and nine with the Reserve—that gave you a Reserve of three for one.

LORD LUCAS

The three years system is only possible if you get a sufficient number of men to continue in the Reserve in order to find the Indian drafts, and if you do get sufficient men to continue their service it does not give you anything like three times the amount of Reserves.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

2,400 men are to be reduced. We are still in possession of those troops, but it is said that they must be disbanded. I say that every word which has passed to-day makes it an act of criminal folly on the part of the Government to disband them. We are spending £27,200,000 for a position of absolute insecurity, and we refuse to spend £27,500,000 so as to give us a nucleus of field artillery that would enable us to defend ourselves against invasion. What is the authority for this change? The noble Lord the Under-Secretary said that Mr. Haldane had stated in another place that the Army Council were perfectly satisfied and took the responsibility for the change. Can the noble Lord name any officer on the Army Council who will get up and say that these Territorial batteries can be trusted one by one against Continental batteries. The outside that the Army Council have said is this— We have got a certain sum of money; certain amount has to be done, and we take the responsibility for this change. I will take one by one, the distinguished officers who have spoken on this subject. General French was cited in the House of Commons. All that he said, apparently, was that with six months training he could "make something "of these Territorial batteries. But will they get six months training? Sir Ian Hamilton said that three or four of these batteries might be pitted against one Regular battery; and Sir George Marshall wrote to The Times the other day expressing the gravest doubt, in almost the same terms as were used by the noble and gallant Lords who have spoken from the cross-benches to-day. Absolutely the only testimony we have had first hand has been that of the noble Lord the Under-Secretary himself, who, speaking in a position of greater freedom and less responsibility, told the country that if he could get hold of the King's outriders and a few men from Maxim's, he would undertake to have an efficient battery in a week. I am glad that in the official position he now occupies he has not repeated that fallacy.

What is the chance of their having the necessary training even for the six I would urge on the Government again months proposed? I take some exception to the language used by the Secretary of State for War in this matter. He says that, when sending troops abroad, we must be careful not to send more than we can spare, consistently with our home defence, until the Territorial artillery hardens into efficiency. That is an admirable doctrine, but how often has it been possible to carry it out? When we sent out troops in 1814 to America did we suppose that Napoleon was going to escape from Elba and that we should need every man and horse we had sent there in Flanders? Or did the Tsar of Russia before the Penjdeh incident consult the convenience of this country as to whether our troops were or were not locked up in the Soudan? Did anyone in September, 1899, suppose that by January, 1900, we should require every battery of Regular field artillery which could be sent to South Africa? I submit that this is an altogether false thesis to rely upon; it is a position which cannot be defended in practice, and it is one to which we ought not to make ourselves parties.

I have already troubled your Lordships on this subject in the course of the present session. I will say no more. Nothing that I or any other civilian could say could add to the strength of the warnings to which we have listened in the course of the last two hours. The doubts that were caused by the previous debate have been doubled by what has taken place to-night. The promise that these thirty-three batteries shall not be done away with until the Territorial Force has been got thoroughly into condition, or, to use the words of the Secretary of State, "until four or five men exist for every one who is to be done away with," may be being kept in the letter, but it is not being kept in the spirit. Those thirty-three batteries have been so reduced that they could not mobilise for many weeks. Whether the men are still in the service I know not, but they are not with the batteries. The process of dismembering those batteries is still going on, and your Lordships have a right to protest against that pledge not being strictly adhered to.

I would urge on the Government again that they have a great scheme. They can have no difficulty about money because their Scheme contemplates more than 300,000 men, and there is every reason to suppose that the numbers, even if the scheme can be a success, cannot be raised to a higher level than that of the old Auxiliary Forces. That being so, no questions of money arises, and when there is so universal a profession of opinion against these batteries being done away with I trust the Government will re-consider the position. We sincerely wish well to the Territorial Force, but there is nothing which has caused us so much discouragement or distrust in connection with the scheme of the Government as their determination to rest on the Territorial Force in the matter of artillery responsibilities with which they cannot cope, and to leave them without that backing of Regular artillery which we are told by experts in the matter to be absolutely essential.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

My Lords, I am not a military expert, but all my life I have taken a great interest in ordnance. In the first place, let me say I am delighted with the universal compliments which the Territorial Army has received from all sides of the House. It is practically admitted that the whole of the infantry and Yeomanry sections are likely to be a great success, but the case put is that artillery under a territorial arrangement is not possible or is not sufficient, and that it should be largely supported by Regular Artillery.

*THE EARL OF DENBIGH

By Regulars in some form or another.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

That it should be supported by Regulars in some form or another. While welcoming the remarks of Earl Roberts in approval of the principle of the Territorial Army, I doubt whether the speech he has delivered to-night and the speeches of other Army officers in the country will assist in getting officers and men to join the Territorial Army. I think they ought to have the good side of the Territorial Army pointed out rather than the bad. I do not deny the bad side in the least. I do not deny that the whole business is, to a large extent, a gamble, but it is one in which I am very willing to lay odds on its success. Any words that the noble Field Marshal says on this subject must have attention paid to them. What I propose to do now is to lift the veil upon official secrets. I am going to tell you what has taken place in the Defence Committee. There has been a little syndicate which has given us a great deal of information with regard to a possible raid from Germany. That syndicate consisted of the noble Field Marshal, Colonel Repington, who is a great friend of the noble Earl's—I am afraid that, by my experience, he is an enemy of mine—Lord Lovat, and Sir Samuel Scott. I can, however, from a letter written in The Times by Colonel Repingtion, answer the Field Marshal upon every detail. Colonel Repington said it was not true that the present Government found the Army ready for war— It found an Army possessing many valuable and excellent qualities, both of a moral and of a material order, but readiness for war was not one of them. The letter went on to say that men were lacking for service of ammunition columns necessitated by the adoption of new artillery, and the artillery of the expeditionary forces was lacking in numbers required for the initial mobilisation. But the condition of the artillery of the Auxiliary Forces was infinitely worse, the guns in charge of Militia and Volunteers being hopelessly antiquated, and there was no organisation for war. Colonel Repington went on to say that Lord Lansdowne's rearmament of part of the Volunteer artillery with modern 4.7 and 15-pounder guns showed that he hoped to make use of them; while Lord Midleton included twenty-one batteries of Volunteer artillery in his plan for the 4th, 5th, and 6th Army Corps, and Lord Roberts declared that this could be done without danger.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

Is this a public document?

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

A public document, which appeared in The Times newspaper.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

Was it submitted to the Committee of Defence?

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

No, no.

EARL ROBERTS

The noble Lord has pointed to me as if I had something to do with the letter. Colonel Repington can write what he likes. I am in no way responsible.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

I was only trying to show the difference between Colonel Repington and the noble and gallant Field Marshal.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

Our ears must have played us a strange trick. I thought I understood the noble Lord to refer to a communication made by what he described as a small syndicate of which the noble and gallant Field Marshal is a member—a representation made by this syndicate to the Committee of Imperial Defence; and did he not refer to the substance of that communication?

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

No, not a word.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

Then how did the syndicate come into the noble Lord's argument?

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

Colonel Repington is a great friend of the Field Marshal.

EARL ROBERTS

How do you know that?

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

I have seen you sitting together.

EARL ROBERTS

I may sit with people and they may not be my friends.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

Does the noble and gallant Field Marshal deny that Colonel Repington is a friend of his?

EARL ROBERTS

I do not say that he is or that he is not.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

All I am saying is that Colonel Repington wrote a letter to The Times on the subject of Territorial artillery, and I am reading that letter.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

The noble Lord said he would tell us the opinion of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

I will come to that.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

I would ask the noble Lord to give us that opinion, instead of sheltering himself behind the opinion of the military correspondent of The Times.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

I am going to make the best case I can. Colonel Repington, as I have said, referred to Lord Midleton's inclusion of twenty-one batteries of Volunteer artillery in three of his Army Corps, and said— Lord Roberts declared this mold be done without danger. Rearmament was only partial and incomplete. Training was even lest attended to. Mr. Haldane has not sweps away a single battery of horse or Field Artillery. The only living subject of the King who has suppressed or swept away a battery of Field Artillery is Mr. Arnold-Forster, who committed this indefensible act in the year 1905. Mr. Haldane has also not appreciably diminished establishments. Total available number of horse and Field Artillery in 1905, 36,702; in October, 1907, 39,380. Second Line Artillery—Three courses were possible: (1) It might, have been exclusively Regular; (2) it might have been strengthened like the Lancashire Field Artillery Militia by some 40 per cent. of officers and men, who were serving or had served in the Regulars; (3) it might have been formed on the same lines as the rest of the Territorial Army. This is being done— (1) Would have taken many years, and the cost would have been prohibitive; (2) had the disadvantage of all half-measures, and would have cost £1,250,000 annually; and the result could only have been qualified efficiency; (3) became practicable by the conversion of the 15-pounder gun. The converted 15-pounder stands comparison with the German gun in rangy and muzzle, velocity, and neither gun has fixed ammunition. Territorial Artillery.—Mr. Arnold-Forster, in his book' The Army in 1906,' bears testimony to the efficiency of the Honorary Artillery Company. He advocated four years enlistment, compulsory attendance in camp for at least fourteen days, and additional drills, together with obligations to join the Army Reserve. What he recommended himself he condemns when carried out by Mr. Haldane. There is no reason to suppose that the Honorary Artillery Company conditions are peculiar to London. Conclusion.—The decision to improve and increase the existing Volunteer Artillery is sound, because (1) the Territorial Army must have Artillery; (2) this Artillery is provided at the smallest cost and in the shortest time; (3) the possibility of future developments; (4) fair and reasonable prospect of a certain degree of efficiency; (5) no alternative plan.

* THE EARL OF DENBIGH

Will the noble Lord read to the House my letter to The Times in reply to that letter?

*LORD TWEEDMOUTH

It was a very good letter. I think Colonel Repington's letter is a complete answer the noble Field Marshal, and it suggests a very important question for your Lordships' consideration. I wish to say a word about the 15-pounder gun. Last month I saw a trial at Eastney with a battery of six of these old-fashioned 15-pounder guns without shields. I do not think your Lordships would disagree with the opinion of the Blue Marines in regard to this gun. It shows that it is a very useful gun and likely to suit the Territorial Army. The target was, I think, about 2,000 to 2,600 yards out to sea, and it was only one foot square. The battery was brought up with great cleverness, and the practice made was extraordinary. If anybody had been sitting on the target, he would have been shattered by the shrapnel. A Report which was furnished to me by the Marine authorities on this trial stated— The battery consists of 15-pounder breech-loading guns identical with those till recently used by the Royal Field Artillery. These guns are very good and accurate up to a limited range, but they are not powerful enough for the requirements of modern war, and they have, therefore, been superseded by the 18-pounder for the Royal Field Artillery. The old guns are to be used by the Territorial Force, and would be useful for fighting in a close country where very long ranges could not be obtained. That is exactly the kind of country in which the Territorial Force will act. The system of instruction at Eastney is thoroughly up-to-date. The ranging of the battery (that is, the rapid finding of the range by a system of trial shots) and indirect laying (that is, the system of concentrating the fire of the guns on the enemy without being exposed to the enemy's view) are carefully taught. It is hoped that very soon the new 18-pounder gun will be available for instruction at Eastney, as the Marine Artilleryman is expected to be able to use any gun whether belonging to the sea service or land service. That is, I think, a very good statement; and the Navy are always ready to cooperate with the Army whenever they can possibly do so. The 15-pounder gun was the gun used by our Field Artillery during the South African War, and on many occasions its range was found insufficient. The noble Field-Marshal will admit that firing in South Africa was very different from firing in the confined land of Great Britain. I think that is rather a good case.

* THE EARL OF DENBIGH

For gun or for the Territorial artillery?

*LORD TWEEDMOUTH

For both. The total establishment of the Royal Artillery is as follows:—Headquarters divisional artillery, 56 officers, 266 other ranks; field artillery brigades, 943 officers, 24,477 other ranks; field artillery (howitzer) brigades, 224 officers, 5,222 other ranks; horse artillery, 100 officers, 3,000 other ranks; heavy artillery batteries, 114 officers, 3,669 other ranks; mountain artillery brigade, 29 officers, 752 other ranks; and garrison artillery companies, 286 officers, 7,360 other ranks. That total of 1,745 officers and 44,739 other ranks is a fair proportion of the 185,000 men of the Regular Army in this country. Lord Midleton and Mr. Arnold Forster have each attempted to reorganise the Army, and my right hon. friend found the Army absolutely disorganised and the War Office in a state of chaos.

LORD HENEAGE

It is still.

*LORD TWEEDMOUTH

My view is that it is entirely altered, and I believe Lord Lucas would be inclined to say so also. We have two lines of defence. The Regular Army of 185,000 men are instantly ready to strike and to be moved where they are wanted. The Territorial Army will be trained as well as they can be, but they are not expected to be called out at a moment's notice; they would have three or six months notice. I do not suppose that more than two-fifths of the Regular Army would be moved out of the country until the Territorial Army had become trained. We must not forget that we have a strong Navy, manned by officers and men who would give a good account of themselves in time of war. The concentration of the Navy in home waters would make it very difficult for an enemy to land on these shores. The Army would have the co-operation of the Navy, and I do not believe the Navy would be likely to let an enemy get through.

Yesterday I had a conversation with an artillery officer who said he believed the 15-pounder gun would be more useful to the Territorial Force than the 18-pounder, because the 18-pounder required a great deal more ammunition. Moreover the noise caused by quick-firing was very distracting, and it required a very steady officer to govern the firing in a satisfactory manner. The view of this officer was that it was better to break up the batteries of four guns into batteries of two guns, because a company would be likely to get better results if attached to two guns than they would get if they worked the battery as a whole. I am told that the 15-pounder gun which is so sneered at is really a most efficient weapon at its own range. It would have an extremely effective shield of hard steel, a quarter of an inch thick, and weighing 1 cwt. The shield would resist a rifle bullet at 500 yards, and as shrapnel has less power of penetration than a rifle bullet, it would give great protection to the men who were working the gun. The view of this officer was that in England the Territorial Force would get as near to the enemy as they could, and they would be able to use the 15-pounder gun at comparatively close range with great effect. I have endeavoured to state something in favour of my right hon. friend, and I hope I have had some Success.

LORD AMPTHILL

My Lords, what I have to say will not take more than a minute. I rise merely to correct an erroneous statement made by the Under-Secretary. The noble Lord went out of his way to refer to the National Service League, and said that under Mr. Haldane's Army scheme more training would be given to the Territorial soldier than under the scheme proposed by the National Service League. That is not the case. The National Service League propose six months training, with this essential and important difference—that the training should precede the outbreak of war instead of coming afterwards. There are other differences between the principles advocated by the National Service League and those of the Territorial scheme, and if the former principles were adopted there would be no fault to find with the Army scheme. I venture to suggest that it is part of the duty, not only of the Secretary of State, but also of the Under-Secretary, to become acquainted with the actual nature of those proposals before referring to them in public, and it is also part of their duty to see that the movement of the National Service League is an important social movement which is daily growing in force, and which will, I firmly believe, become before long the most important movement in this country.

*LORD LUCAS

As a point of personal explanation, I might say that I took what is the most widely read and most interesting publication of the National Service League—the compiled speeches of the noble and gallant Field-Marshal; and at the end I read a short statement, signed by him, saying that the terms proposed were three or four months.

LORD AMPTHILL

If I may, I shall be very glad to send the noble Lord sonic literature.

LORD WYNFORD

My Lords, Lord Tweedmouth, implied that this debate would have the effect of deterring enlistment in the Territorial horse and field batteries. Whether this will be the case or not, I feel sure that the intention of those who have initiated these discussions, and have written to the newspapers or spoken on the subject, has never been to dishearten intending recruits so much as to point out the difficulties which lie in the path of success, with a view to overcoming them. I wish to associate myself with the noble Earl who initiated this debate in all he said, and I think, with him, that there are grounds for believing, in some instances, in particular localities and under special conditions, that these difficulties may possibly be overcome; but, like him, I fear that in many instances they will be very great. The noble Earl pointed out the extreme disadvantage under which a great many batteries which could not be raised in one particular locality or district would labour. He showed that the different sections of the batteries would never be able to be brought together for drill except at the annual training. The noble Earl also spoke of the immense demands that would be entailed on the time of the battery commander, who in the artillery must be a great deal more in touch with his, non-commissioned officers and men than is necessary in other arms of the service. In the big towns and cities the facilities are greater. They are no doubt greater where there are large central drill halls within easy reach of the officers and men, and where the batteries can be easily horsed. We have heard a great deal of the battery of the Lancashire Artillery, which was reparted, on the Scottish manœuvres, to have negotiated a bank on foot which the Regular artillery were either unwilling or unable to overcome. But, my Lords, I never attached much 'credence to that story, and I have good grounds for believing that the facts were not quite as quoted by Mr. Haldane in another place. However, I do not question that this battery, and many others in similar circumstances, and under similar conditions, could be well horsed for their week's training, and might possibly reach a fair standard of drill and fire discipline. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, a short time ago, in a speech, rather made light of the training which has to be undergone by a battery of field artillery. He seemed to think that all that was required for an efficient battery was a few drivers, a few men, their gun works, and a week's training. Will the noble Lord permit me to suggest that if he attended one of these practice camps, either at Okehampton, Salisbury plain, or in Wales, for a fortnight or even for a week, he would alter his opinion considerably, even if he did not altogether change it. In his speech he seemed to ignore the question of trained officers, and as regards the men I myself can say that a man who is a skilled mechanic and has been employed in gun works, has a very great advantage over others. The actual handling of a gun is easy to grasp, and will be learned more quickly by the more intelligent and educated class whom we hope to get in the Territorial field batteries, than, of course, by a recruit who joins the Regular artillery. But the noble Lord does not appear to grasp the fact that when a commander of artillery knows his men perfectly you have not then obtained an efficient battery. You have yet to train these men together, to carry out certain laid down principles of drill, and to conform to the strictest discipline, and they have yet to pass through the experience of a practice camp, where they can manæuvre and fire under as nearly as possible service conditions. Now, my Lords, for that we must have artillery ranges. A great many people until recently were under the impression that an artillery range required a ground very similar to a rifle range. But I think that impression has been removed, and it is now understood that a flat plain or a level sandy stretch makes the most impracticable range that could possibly be imagined, and that such ranges as Shoeburyness, Barry, Colwyn Bay and others are useless for the training of artillery under service condition. It is a satisfaction to hear that His Majesty's Government realise this to a certain extent, and intend taking steps to provide proper artillery ranges; but it must be clearly understood that none of these Territorial field batteries can be considered efficient until their efficiency has been satisfactorily proved under conditions as similar as possible to what they would meet on active service. By that I mean a selection of and manoeuvring into the most advantageous firing positions, and the direction of fire on targets in positions that the enemy would necessarily occupy. Two or three years, at the very least, will pass before this can be accomplished. I wonder where these 148 batteries of the Territorial artillery are going to practice even in the next two years. They will ail require to practice either at Whitsuntide or during August Bank Holiday week, and it will mean that in the space of about twenty days arrangements will have to be made for the odd batteries to fire 200 rounds each.

My Lords, let me say one word about the horse artillery. These require to be more perfectly trained, both when mounted and when in action. They require to be more perfectly trained as a unit, to be better horsed and the Government are giving them a gun that is too heavy for them. Would not better results be obtained with the same personnel and the same horses if these batteries were formed into batteries of 3-pounder Hotchkiss guns, or even maxims?

Let me turn for one moment to sonic remarks that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, made. He said that the officers of the Territorial field batteries are to have unlimited opportunities of being attached to Regular batteries. I cannot imagine where the noble Lord is going to find the officers who are to have the unlimited opportunities. They may be given the unlimited opportunities, but if they have the opportunities, can they spare the time? Lord Lucas also stated that they would have greater opportunities of observation of fire than battalions of Regular artillery had ten or fifteen years ago. Well, my Lords, in ten or fifteen years the Regular artillery have not stood still. The Regular artillery have advanced considerably. The observation of fire requires practice, a great deal of practice, and it is not the slightest use to say that because an officer can come down and watch practice and drill and observe fire, he will be able therefore to command a battery of artillery.

Let me turn for one moment to the thirty-three training batteries of Regular artillery. His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that the Royal Field Artillery should not be reduced. But the noble Lord, Lord Midleton, said that one of these batteries is already reduced in numbers. It has come to my knowledge that some of them have been reduced in strength by as much as 30 per cent. or more. I can only infer that these men have been transferred to batteries on the higher or lower establishment, and I trust my inference is correct. But what I particularly wish to point out is the effect of reducing the establishment of these thirty-three training batteries. For all practical purposes they will cease to exist. The establishment of gunners and drivers alone in these batteries is forty, excluding non-commissioned officers. Well, my Lords, there there are always a certain number of men employed, in the battery not available for military duty, such as officers' servants, grooms, clerks, storemen, and others, and when these have all been reckoned, and you deduct 1 per cent.—not a large percentage—for sick men, there remains not one single man available for parade. The staff of noncommissioned officers is far too small for the work to be performed, considering they will have to instruct, not merely the Special Reserves, but also the Territorial artillery. It will not permit of any non-commissioned officers or men being sent on courses of instruction, nor will it allow of any non-commissioned officers or men being granted a fortnight.

*LORD LUCAS

Perhaps the noble Lord will allow me to say that the establishment of these training batteries is provisional at present. The whole thing is in the nature of an experiment, and if it is found that the establishment is not big enough to carry out training properly, there is no reason why it should not be increased.

LORD WYNFORD

But I am trying to point out to the noble Lord the difficulties that will be entailed on battery commanders who will have their batteries reduced on this establishment. How can you expect to give good instruction to your special reservists under such circumstances as these?

*LORD LUCAS

The reports from these training batteries are quite excellent. General Sir John French, the Inspector-General, has been round inspecting a number of men who have been under training for three months, and he reports very favourably indeed on them, saying they are not only learning their work very well, but are an exceedingly good class of men.

LORD WYNFORD

I do not doubt what the noble Lord says, but I am not talking about Special Reservists in the cadre of the battery. It does not matter what the report is this year or even next year, the batteries will gradually go down hill and cannot possibly exist on the present establishment, and I can only hope that the Government will take early steps to raise the establishment and to enable the men to carry out the duties imposed on them.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

The noble Lord who last spoke on behalf of the Government occasioned a somewhat bitter disappointment on the House, because when he rose from his place he said it was his intention to lift the veil of secrecy as to the Imperial Defence Committee. We expected, particularly when we called to mind his recent record, that we should have something of an extremely piquant and interesting description, and, therefore, our hearts sank within us when it turned out that his great revelation was nothing more nor less than the reading of extracts from a letter written by the special military correspondent of The Times, a letter which most of us—I for one—have had many opportunities of perusing, and which is certainly very well worth reading. The noble Lord made use of that letter for the purpose of a class of argument of which we have heard a great deal during the course of these discussions as to the Territorial artillery. I mean the argument which we naturally describe as an ad hominem argument, which seeks to confute one's opponent by attributing to him opinions dissimilar from those which he expresses at the moment. I confess I am not greatly moved by arguments of that class, and I say, frankly, I would very much prefer that the whole of us should be convicted of the utmost inconsistencies rather than that this country should remain vulnerable to a foreign foe. Let us he inconsistent, let us also be invulnerable. The noble Lord made the best use of the military correspondent's letters, and they are, I think, a very admirable defence of the Government plan; I think, on the whole, the best defence to which I have listened. But, upon the whole, what is the gist of Colonel Repington's defence I speak from recollection, but I think it does not come to very much more than this, that the Government plan gives you the best you can get, considering all the circumstances, considering the limitations in point of numbers of men, and above all, the limitation in point of money available; and, therefore, he argues, "Accept that and make the best you can of it. "But I am not quite sure that it is fair to quote that distinguished authority in support of the view that these Territorial batteries will really be so very praiseworthy as noble Lords opposite suppose. I will not quote the military correspondent of The Times as fully as my noble friend quoted him, but I will read one brief extract from another letter. This is what he wrote, I believe, last year— If any politician believes he is going to obtain officers fit to command modern quick- firing batteries from among people who do not give up their whole time to the study and practice of the science of artillery, the first battle in which these persons are engaged will disabuse him of his belief. Half-trained officers and half-trained men have no business to touch these guns. They will not get half the results obtained by the trained hands, they will get no useful result at Better far to arm them with ancient smoothbores and the simple contrivances of museum artillery, for then, at least, their efforts would not be wholly wasted. Well, my Lords, I have been told that I am in the great army of the inconsistent authorities upon these subjects, and I have been told that when I had the honour of being connected with the military administration I too had contemplated the idea of placing modern weapons in the hands of these auxiliary troops. Let me remind the House what the then Government did do. We found that a number of Volunteer batteries—batteries to which had been assigned certain defensive positions under the scheme of defence which then found favour with the military authorities—were armed with old-fashioned, obsolete guns of position, and we put in their hands a certain number of modern 4.7 guns. But these were not field artillery and still less horse artillery, but guns of position, to be used as such. In regard to the remainder of the Volunteer artillery, to whom we gave a certain number of the 15-pounder guns, I may say that these guns were given, not for use with mobile troops in the field, but for use as guns of position, for which, I am told, they were equally serviceable. Well, so much for my consistency in the matter. The noble and gallant Field Marshal, on the cross-benches, has given a very good account of his consistency, and I am not going to hold a brief for him, for he has made his own defence, and a very triumphant one it was. My noble friend behind me has shown that when he included a certain number of Volunteer batteries in his Army Corps organisation, he did so by allowing two batteries of Regular artillery alongside of each battery of Volunteer artillery, thereby giving them not only a stiffening, but a great deal more. It was a very moderate dilution of Regular artillery by the addition of some of the best of these Volunteer batteries, and that, he reminds me, was the very proportion recommended by the gallant Field Marshal who spoke on the second bench, Lord Grenfell, whom we were so glad to hear for the first time.

Then we have heard a great deal also in regard to the inconsistency of the military advisers of the Government, and I still maintain, as I have maintained before in this House, that, particularly if we were allowed freely to quote from documents which are not public property, we should be able to show that the high military authorities who have at various times served the War Office, have recorded opinions extremely adverse to Volunteer artillery as an adjunct to Regular troops in the field. But I think we sometimes do too scant justice to the gallant soldiers who advise the military authorities at the War Office; after all, their advice is given subject to limitations which are notorious and which we all of us understand. The military advisers of the War Office are perfectly aware that, whatever they may think as to the military measures which might really be advisable if you are to place this country in a position of entire safety, that they have to reckon with the Secretary of State; he has to reckon with the Cabinet, and with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who is a very formidable obstacle; and so it comes to this, that you give the military advisers of the day something notoriously a great deal less than they would like to have, and they have to make the best of it. And when I am told that in this case the military advisers of His Majesty's present Government are satisfied with what is now being done, I bear these circumstances in mind; indeed, I find in the letter quoted by Mr. Haldane in the House of Commons, from Sir John French, a perfectly clear and explicit statement, comprised in four lines, to that effect. Here is what Sir John French said— Of course, all soldiers would prefer the highest trained artillery they could get, but the country insists on economy, and I assume no regular artillery is available. That is the position of the military advisers of the Government. It is under these conditions that the great experi- ment which Mr. Haldane is engaged in trying is to be conducted, and what we have to say in regard to it is that in our opinion that experiment ought to be tried with the utmost caution. We think there is a great risk in trying it for the sake of symmetry. Until you have some knowledge of the extent to which it is likely to succeed, you commit a great mistake when you weaken the forces of the Regular artillery which remains to you.

Now, I do not think there is anything unreasonable or anything unpatriotic in putting forward these considerations; and I venture to maintain that the discussion which has taken place shows that we have been entirely reasonable in taking up this view. For, after all, it has been admitted—frankly admitted—that you cannot expect these Territorial Associations to, produce Volunteer artillery fit to take its place alongside of Regular artillery. There may be exceptional cases, such as the ease with which my noble friend, Lord Denbigh, is connected.

LORD LUCAS

We only attempt that on the outbreak of war.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

Quite right, I will come to that in a moment. I was saying that there are, no doubt, exceptional cases, such as the battery, and the batteries of the Lancashire and the Honourable Artillery Companies; but nobody can contend that these are typical of the class of field artillery which you could raise indiscriminately all over the country; the conditions are entirely different. What the Under-Secretary of State said a moment ago is perfectly true. You admit that it must be a work of time to convert the raw material into the manufactured article, and you say, roughly speaking, you think you can do it in six months. Well, my Lords, I own that I am filled with apprehension when I hear it confidently stated that this period of six months will be sufficient for the purpose. In the first place, are you quite sure you are always going to get six months? I think that point has been dealt with by my noble friend, (Lord Midleton) and I will not labour it any more. But look at what was said by the noble Lord who represents the War Office. He said—I hope I do not do him an injustice—that while in this intermediate period, the period during which the hardening process was to take place, he anticipated that only three-fifths of the expeditionary force would be absent from these shores. If that is true, or if it is anywhere near true, what becomes of the scheme of the Government to be able to send away from this country, at a moment's notice, a larger and better equipped force than any Government has ever been able to command? If that is really to be expected, that the departure of the full expeditionary force is to be contingent upon the successful conversion of the raw material in these county batteries into the fully developed field and horse artillery, then I must say it does seem to me that a very serious weakness has been disclosed in the scheme of the Government. The noble Lord spoke of the achievements which would be possible while the war fever prevailed. He spoke of the race against time which would take place while that fever was burning. My Lords, those are ominous words. We have had some experience of a war fever, and of a race against time, and those who recollect the events of that day will not be found very ready to expose themselves to a repetition of the occurrences which then took place.

LORD LUCAS

You had no training machinery to speak of.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

The Lord President of the Council said it was a gamble. Is he prepared to get up and announce, on any platform in this country, that the Government are prepared to gamble with the safety of the country? I hope not.

Therefore, I submit to your Lordships that what I venture to call the prudent policy recommended by my noble friend, Lord Denbigh, is an eminently reasonable one. He does not suggest that you should give up your scheme. He is quite ready, and so, for the matter of that, am I, to believe that you may, in time, be able to form a number of very valuable batteries in the country, but we suggest that in common prudence you should carry out this great experiment where the circumstances are most favourable, that you 'should not lay so much stress, as you do at present, upon mere circumstances of symmetry, and above all, that while you are doing this, you should do nothing to weaken the strength of the Regular artillery.

My Lords, the Secretary of State for War has admitted more than once that he is engaged upon a great experiment. Let him try it as an experiment, and let him regulate his position by the success of the experiment as it proceeds. I hope that he, and noble Lords opposite, will remember that it is an experiment which may involve the safety of the very heart of the Empire.