THE NAVY.

HL Deb 18 March 1908 vol 186 cc495-543

EARL CAWDOR

rose to call attention to the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty explanatory of the Navy Estimates; and to move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I do not think that any apology is necessary to your Lordships for calling attention this afternoon to the very important matters which are necessarily involved in the statements to which I refer. I shall deal first of all with a few points of minor importance—minor in so far as they do not overshadow in any way the greater issues we have to deal with later on, and important in themselves as showing the general progress of naval policy.

The noble Lord in his Statement tells us first of all with respect to the new system of entry and training of officers for the Navy that the scheme laid down a few years ago is answering its expectations, and, I understand, is considered to be generally very satisfactory. Your Lordships will note with some interest that recently the cadets who have passed through Osborne and Dartmouth have proceeded on a training cruise in the training cruisers allocated for that purpose. That cruise is to last six months, and I understand that some modification of the original scheme has now been sanctioned by the Board of Admiralty, under which these cadets after their six months training cruise will proceed further for five years by serving at sea before they can in any way specialise in the different classes of work they are desirous of taking up. That appears to me to be a very wise modification of the original scheme, and I hope your Lordships will understand that what was in the mind of Lord Selborne, who was responsible for this scheme, and in my own mind was that we must not be blindly tied to every detail of every scheme we may bring forward.

Every scheme may be liable to some changes, and in so far as the changes are wisely and carefully considered by the Board of Admiralty, they will always receive most careful consideration by the authors of the original scheme. There may be in the future difficulties to face with respect to this scheme, but I do not believe myself that they are likely to be in any way insuperable or beyond our powers of dealing with them. I think it will be a satisfaction to the country and to your Lordships—certainly it is a great satisfaction to the originators of this scheme, my distinguished predecessor Lord Selborne and the able Board associated with him—to find that whereas the present Board of Admiralty and the noble Lord wisely accepted the scheme provisionally in order to see how it worked, they have after careful consideration put their seal practically to the scheme as originally embodied. There are one or two changes that have taken place within the last year to which I wish to refer. One change is with reference to the supply of ammunition and guns. I understand it has been decided that in future the Admiralty will take their own responsibility with regard to the supply and issue of the guns. That appears to me to be a move absolutely in the right direction, and I trust that the fruits of it may be satisfactory.

Your Lordships will remember a most interesting debate upon some questions which arose out of a scheme of the London County Council as to their electric generating station in the neighbourhood of Greenwich Hospital. I am glad to hear that the difficulties which appeared likely to arise have been, in the view of the Board of Admiralty, successfully and satisfactorily overcome. I remember that interesting debate, and I do not think that any of your Lordships will easily forget two or three of the speeches that were then delivered One was from a noble Lord whose absence we all regret, and whose loss we all mourn—I mean Lord Kelvin. Another speech came from Lord Crawford, and both speeches, I am afraid, produced this result on me, that they taught me how very little I knew of the subjects which occupied the attention and exercised the brains of some of the ablest men in the country. These are things we remember with pleasure, and if the speeches of these noble Lords on that day did nothing but bring about the result which was subsequently arrived at, I am sure that their efforts were not made in vain.

We are told that the scourge of Malta fever, which had an unfortunate way of decimating the Fleet, and I assume also the troops at Malta, has practically disappeared. The fever appears to be put down to that unfortunate animal the goat. I do not know whether we are at liberty to ask, finding that the disease produced by the goats has disappeared, what has happened to the unfortunate goats, whether they are still thriving as they did at Malta in years past, or whether they have been eliminated with the disease.

There is an important question which I understand is still under discussion by the Board of Admiralty. It is the question of a better way of dealing with the coastguard. I understand from the noble Lord's statement that there has been an inter-Departmental Conference on this subject, which was a necessary preliminary to dealing with the subject on any broad lines. I understand that the Conference has reported to the Board of Admiralty and, I suppose, to the other Departments interested, and that the subject is still under consideration. I do not know whether the noble Lord can lay any Papers on the Table of the House with respect to that Conference, or whether he will as soon as he can inform Parliament exactly what is taking place with respect to that very important subject. Your Lordships should be informed at the earliest possible date.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Lord TWEEDMOUTH)

I will make a statement on the subject this evening.

EARL CAWDOR

It is a subject which has created a great deal of interest and feeling throughout the country. Though it is very difficult to trace definitely to the coastguard anything definite in the way of value as a recruiting agent, yet we should not forget that undoubtedly the coastguard is scattered all round our coasts and that it presents an object lesson to the public as to what it is the Navy leads to. The public see the coastguard as a respectable and respected class, living comfortably for the most part on what amounts to their retired pay, in comfortable, clean cottages, with respectable families, and themselves an object of respect and regard in the district. I do not say that you can absolutely prove from that its strength as a recruiting body, but it is a naval element present to the minds of the people, and shows them what the men in the Navy may grow into.

I come now to a question on which there appears to be some ambiguity, some difficulty in comprehending the details. It is the subject of redundant stores. A large quantity of these stores has been used up during the last four years. The sums varied from £700,000 to £1,000,000 and £1,250,000. I understand this year the proposal is to absorb the remaining £500,000, which will wipe out the whole of the redundant stores, and compel the Government, I think, to raise £700,000 besides. I am not clear exactly how these redundant stores arose, whether from dockyard reforms, the closing down of foreign dockyards, and the redistribution of the Fleet; but I ask the noble Lord to give us either figures or Papers to clear the subject up.

There is another figure which, I think, puzzles "the man in the street" like myself. We find that the total amounts for the purchase of stores have diminished by something like £1,000,000 a year. At the same time we find that, whereas in former years the practice was to issue less than you purchased, during the last few years the practice has been to issue more than you purchased. I am told with respect to the drop in the figure from £3,500,000 to £2,500,000, roughly, that it has been accounted for chiefly by the change in the form of keeping the accounts in recent years; but no doubt the noble Lord will be able to tell us as to the change which took place when I held office and during his own tenure at the Board of Admiralty.' It has been stated also—and the statement has not been contradicted—that there has been an annual reduction in the last few years in the amount of stores, as far as ammunition is concerned, of 40 per cent., 47 per cent. in torpedoes, and 37¾ per cent. for guns. I should like to know the explanation of that. I have no doubt there is a satisfactory explanation; and if the noble Lord can give it to us we shall be very much obliged.

The next subject is Rosyth. We hear a great deal of the line that is and must be drawn between battleships and large armoured cruisers before the date of the "Dreadnought" and "Invincible" and those that come after. They are, of course, ships of a much larger size than those that came before; they are to form the fighting fleet of the British Navy, standing in the forefront of battle, and naturally the public turns with some anxiety to know how and where these vessels are to be docked in case of need. I must tender my grateful thanks to the noble Lord for placing within the precincts of the House a block plan of Rosyth Harbour. In examining that plan I notice certain pencil marks of works not apparently at once to be carried out, but apparently part of the general scheme. I think there has been a general idea among some people that Rosyth is only for taking one "Dreadnought" or two. Could the noble Lord tell us briefly, not alone what is proposed to be done now—I mean in the next ten years—but what can be done under the present plan in the way of developing and adding further docks; and, if so, at what approximate cost?

It is almost incomprehensible that we should be willing to sit down under the idea that Rosyth, practically the only dock we are to have on the East Coast north of Chatham, is not to be completed for ten years. I suggest that more money might be taken even this year for the commencement of this great work. Connected with this subject is the ques- tion of loans. Loans are liable to abuse, but there are many large works which you will never carry to successful completion unless you face the question of loans and without the aid of some system of loans. In many great undertakings, commercial and otherwise, it is a very common plan to ask for tenders, not alone based on the actual cost, but based also on the time within which the works can be carried out. Will the noble Lord consider whether it might not be worth while to endeavour to tempt contractors to suggest prices at which they could carry out the work within a more limited time than ten years, and whether it would not be worth while to pay some considerable sum more in order to give us the accommodation at an earlier date?

I turn to the Home Fleet, and I propose to deal for the moment with that part of that fleet which I will describe as the nucleus crew ships. I believe that the nucleus crew system is one of very great value. It has given us a very effective Reserve. But if the country is to have real confidence in the nucleus crew system, I beg the noble Lord and his colleagues at the Admiralty not to put upon it more than it really can bear. Do not profess that it is doing one iota more than it is doing. Now I understand that under the nucleus crew system in the Home Fleet, ships are in the habit of coming home from abroad for the purpose of repair. These ships when they come home, being in commission, must be attached to another fleet, and, therefore, they are attached to the Home Fleet. I understand further that some of these ships do not retain upon them any nucleus crew at all while they are undergoing repair. In that case, they pass over to the dockyard authorities and do not appear as part of the efficient Home Fleet.

Sometimes it is found better that these ships should retain during repair, which might extend possibly to six months, a certain nucleus crew on board. In that case they are still ships in commission, therefore ships that must be attached to some fleet, therefore attached to the Home Fleet. If that is the arrangement, I say that these ships have no business to be classified as ships of the Home Fleet efficient Reserve. They are nothing of the kind. That is why I ask the noble Lord not to put on the nucleus crew system that which it is not absolutely bearing at a given time. It is perfectly simple. In the Navy List and Parliamentary Returns there should be placed, in brackets or otherwise, a clear statement that such ships are ships under repair. The public will then know exactly what they are, and will not think they have more ships in reserve ready for sea than they really have.

The Fleet at the Nore has as one of its component parts six battleships. That Fleet, I understand, went to sea for fleet exercise under the Commander-in-Chief on 9th March. I understand that of the six battleships the "Dreadnought," "Bulwark," and "Majestic" went to sea for the exercises, and, on the other, hand, that the battleships "London," "Magnificent," and "Victorious" remained at Chatham. I should like to know the reason of these vessels not taking part in the fleet exercises. I should like to know, also, whether it is true that, while these three battleships were left at Chatham, the battleship "Cæsar" was brought round from Devonport and went to sea with the Nore Fleet in order to make up the tactical unit for battleship exercises. If that is so, the noble Lord would relieve the feelings of the public if he would say how it is that three battleships, supposed to be ready for sea and battle at any moment, should have been left behind.

So far I have dealt only with details. I must now come to a matter of the very gravest importance—our position in relation to the two-Power standard. I think the mind of the public some little time ago was not unreasonably disturbed by various statements made by Ministers in high office with respect to the two-Power standard. First of all, the Prime Minister—and no one can mention the name of the Prime Minister at this moment without expressing the deep regret which all classes in this country feel at his serious indisposition and his being unable to take part in public life—used words which were thought to throw a distinct slur on the idea of the two-Power standard, because as far as I remember, he said he could not admit that, under all circumstances, we should be obliged to maintain that standard. I recognise at once that the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty has never taken that line. He has assured your Lordships' House that in his view the two-Power standard must be maintained, and I think he added "at all costs."

Then there was another Minister who in quite recent times has also, I think, thrown a certain doubt upon our position with respect to the two-Power standard—I refer to the Secretary of State for War. Mr. Haldane, in the course of one of those many speeches he made in the autumn on the merits of his great Territorial Scheme—a scheme which we all hope will succeed and which we shall all endeavour to make succeed—speaking on behalf of this child of his, Mr. Haldane took the opportunity to point out that the population of this country is far less than that of some foreign countries, and said he conceived it might be very difficult for us, with our small population, to maintain the two-Power standard against the enormous populations of ofher countries. And then he proceeded to the extraordinary statement that if that state of things should come about, our not being able to maintain the supremacy of the sea, we should then have to rely, not on the Navy, but on what? On the Territorial Force. God help the country then! That is really a trivial thing to suggest. Is it not a trifling thing to suggest that we should ever come to anticipate for a moment that we should not hold the supremacy of the sea?

Shortly after that speech Sir Edward Grey made a speech, and, in that language which he uses so effectively and so well, he said that, though the command of the sea might be desirable to other countries, it is absolutely essential to our existence, and, he added— The loss of the supremacy of the sea would mean to this country, not alone defeat but conquest. My Lords, that is the dominating feeling, the dominating reason why the people of this country will always hold to the view that, come what will, we must have unassailable superiority at sea. I only quote these few sentences to show that, while certain members of the Government have supported, and strongly supported, the two-Power standard, and have never ventured to anticipate the possibility of the loss of the command of the sea, there have been ominous words used here and there which have given the country cause for reflection and serious complaint.

There is one other point which has arisen mainly with regard to the same matter on which I will say one word, and which, I think, has also given rise to considerable uneasiness in the minds of those who study naval matters. There was a debate the other day in another place, on the reduction of armaments, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer moved an Amendment to the Resolution brought forward pledging the House to support His Majesty's Ministers in such economies in naval and military expenditure "as are consistent with the adequate defence of his Majesty's Dominions." It was suggested by the Leader of the Opposition that after the word "consistent" there should be inserted, "with the two-Power standard of naval strength." That would have made it clear what was in the minds of the Government and the majority in another place; but for some reason or other, which I cannot explain, that Amendment was rejected and the Government declined to have any mention made of the two-Power standard. That seemed to me a serious matter, and it made me wonder what was in the minds of the Government with regard to the two-Power standard. It may have been done merely for the purpose of getting over a political difficulty. I trust that was so, and I pass on to deal with one or two other statements made with regard to this all-important subject, the two-Power standard.

But before I do that, may I endeavour to disentangle it from another subject? There are the "Dreadnought" and "Invincible "classes, which are practically a separate and distinct branch of the Navy at the present day, and we must be careful that any statements made with regard to them are not to be taken as dealing at the same time with the question of the two-Power standard. The "Dreadnought" and "Invincible" type is a matter of enormous importance. I ventured to say a year or two ago that the nation which possessed the most "Dreadnoughts" and "Invincibles" would be the nation that would rule the sea in the future. I believe that is true to-day; but in dealing in another place with the particular question of how far it was or was not the case that the German Navy were rapidly overhauling us with respect to these particular classes of vessels, it was practically admitted by the Secretary to the Admiralty that, if the programme of the German Government was carried out, by the autumn of 1911 it might be the case practically that they would not only have overtaken, but possibly have passed us—that there might be then thirteen German ships of these types and only twelve of ours. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, however, gave an absolute and distinct pledge that if in respect of these particular classes of vessels it was found that the German programme was being carried out and was kept up to date, not only should other vessels be laid down, but those already laid down should be put forward for completion in order that in the autumn of 1911 it would be impossible that we should be only equal with or in a minority to the German Navy in respect of these vessels. That is an enormously important announcement, and it was made by the right hon. Gentleman, no doubt, intentionally and recognising its gravity. It lays a heavy burden on the years 1910 and 1911, but the Government have undertaken to bear it. They recognise it, and they do not flinch.

Now I come to the general two-Power standard, including all battleships that are up-to-date. The life of a battleship now generally accepted is some twenty years. That is accepted in Germany. I do not know whether the noble Lord opposite goes so far. I think we take it in this country at twenty-five years, and, including all ships of that age, we want to be assured that, with regard to any other two Powers in the world, we have what has been described by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as unassailable supremacy at sea. The Chancellor of the Exchequer practically adopted this two-Power standard, and said there was no difference of opinion with regard to it. I hope and believe that is so, but, in order to make our position perfectly clear, I think I may say that we consider that our position must always be, taking the words of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, one of unassailable superiority, and I add to that, unassailable superiority over the two most powerful navies to whatever countries they may belong. I should be glad if the noble Lord will tell me if he accepts that definition of the two-Power standard, or if there is any modification to be made in it. I hope he will make that clear to the House and the country to-night.

I ask that for this reason, you cannot leave your two-Power standard superiority to be gathered up when it is needed. You must take your stand on the firm rock of being always ahead of and always supreme against the two greatest navies of the world. You can break up the comity of nations, you can create a war in five minutes, but how long does it take you to build a battleship? If you wish to maintain European peace let ever country know that the people of this country always intend the two-Power standard as I have described it to-night.

But, my Lords, there has been for some reason, which, perhaps, I had better not try to describe, a regular pushing back of the programme of new construction from this year on to future years. I take your battleship programme. You have practically taken but a flea-bite of it this year. You will have spent not 10 per cent. by the end of this financial year. You are pushing back practically almost the whole of your battleship and "Invincible" programme of this year. You have also the pledge of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that if need be, he is prepared to face having to meet the German programme, if that programme is carried out within its time, so as to place us in a safe position as regards these large modern vessels, such as the "Dreadnought" and "Invincible," by the autumn of 1911. He has pledged himself to push forward, if necessary, the dates at which those vessels are laid down, in order that they may be finished by that time. What does that mean? You may require in the next financial year and the year after it, not alone to lay down, but to complete no fewer than four battleships. That would amount to eight battleships. I put them at £1,800,000 apiece. Therefore you have this undertaking of the Government that they will, if necessary, face an expenditure under that head of possibly not less than £14,000,000 or £14,500,000 in two years. I note this because it is so easy to talk airily of economy and raise a passing cheer by cutting down expenditure. But posterity has to bear the cost of what you are doing. I put down roughly the figures for eight battleships. But that is merely what may be necessary to keep our supremacy at the end of 1911. It takes no account of what you may be obliged to lay down in 1910–1911 for future requirements.

I will not say very much about cruisers, except that, in so far as the policy prevails of building and laying down cruisers of the "Invincible" class, so surely will those ships become less and less of value or available for the purpose of being the eyes of the Fleet. "Invincible" are to stand in the battle line against the battleships of other countries; they are practically battleships. Therefore, for the eyes of your Fleet you have to watch the provision of other vessels. I understand that the Admiralty propose this year to lay down six cruisers not of the first-class type. They are described roughly as "Boadiceas." One of these is, I believe, to be laid down in the dockyard at Pembroke, and £190,000 is taken to be expended in this year's Estimates. With regard to the other five which are to be built in private yards only a miserable sum of £6,700 per ship is taken. I believe the cost of the "Boadicea" will be about £400,000. I do not know what the other five vessels are to be, but certainly not less than that. Accordingly the Government are leaving a goodly heritage of cost to the next financial year. I do not know what the sum may be, but it cannot be less than £3,000,000.

I come to destroyers. The Government propose this year to lay down sixteen destroyers. I understand they will cost about £80,000 apiece, so that their total cost will be something over £1,250,000. The Government are only taking this year a sum of £4,000 for each of these vessels—a total of £64,000 out of £1,280,000, leaving for future years no less a sum than £1,200,000. With respect to destroyers, I pass to a story which fills me with concern and alarm. I have taken the Dilke Return for 1907 and the Navy Estimates of this year in so far as they in any way modify that Return. I have also taken it that the best part of the life of a destroyer is limited to eleven years. The figures I must now give would appear to me incredible if I had not got them from official documents. We have shown in the Dilke Return destroyers launched in 1893, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1897. In none of those years had either France or Germany launched any such vessels. But if the figures are worked out the position comes about to this. I am taking only vessels of eleven years old or less, and I find that in the year 1903 we had in this country, according to the Dilke Return of 1907, 123 destroyers. France had at that time 29, Germany had 32; together these two countries had 61. In 1904 France had 31, Germany had 38; combined the two countries had 69, and we had 127. In 1905 France had 33, Germany had 43—together 76—and we had 121. I leave out 1906 as being unimportant, though the drop was almost as great. In 1907, while France had 65 and Germany had 85—together 150—our force of destroyers of eleven years old and less had dropped to 93.

That is a very grave statement to make. I make it from the Dilke Return of 1907. I have made two alterations in that Return. I add to our Fleet the destroyers for 1907—five vessels more than appeared in the Dilke Return—because they appeared in the Estimates of this year as having been since put into commission. I also add to the German destroyers for this year twelve vessels, which I understand have been added to their fleet since that time. I am not very particular about those twelve vessels; what I call attention to as meriting the gravest possible concern and attention is that, whereat in 1903 we had 123 destroyers, against a united destroyer fleet of Germany and France numbering 61, we have to-day only 93 destroyers, against a combined fleet of Germany and France numbering 150 destroyers. That is a grave indictment, but I am afraid my figures are practically correct. If the noble Lord can show that they are absolutely incorrect, that we are in a perfectly satisfactory position in regard to destroyers, no one will rejoice more than I. I beg the noble Lord to give us a clear and definite statement of the position if these figures are wrong. It will not be an answer to say the figures are not right, unless he gives the official and correct figures.

I may be told that we have plenty of coastal destroyers. Coastal destroyers do not appear in the Dilke Return as destroyers at all. Coastal destroyers have been deliberately and intentionally placed by the Admiralty in the category of torpedo-boats. Therefore I do not think we can very well be told that these vessels are going to be taken out of that category and put into the category of destroyers. If so, I should like to know what their capacity to coal is, and how long they can stay at sea. In France alone in 1907 they increased the fleet of destroyers from 34 to 65; in Germany in the same year they increased the fleet of destroyers from 47 to 85. We have, in the meantime, allowed our fleet of destroyers to go down to 93. I may be told that I am wrong in taking eleven years as the period of effective service for a destroyer, and that twelve or fourteen years may be allowed, but it will require a good deal of persuasion to take me away from eleven years, the period provided in the Estimates in regard to depreciation. I may be told that many are quite efficient. Now, there are 59 of these vessels that go back from 1897 to 1893, and if we are told that they are quite capable for service, that they are quite fit for sea, and that they can do excellent service, then I ask will the First Lord tell us what service they have done in the past six months? Will he pick out of these 93 those that have done service? There are 25 built in 1895, 14 in 1894, and 16 in 1896. I should like to have a Return showing what the practice of these vessels has been, how frequently they have been to sea, how long they have been at sea, and to what extent they are in good repair. Apart from the inefficiency of torpedo-boats and destroyers, I would press this. Surely it is the fact that if you are to have efficient officers on these vessels they must be continually at sea. The speed of the vessels, the work required, call for the exercise of the utmost skill and nerve, and if you keep young officers on shore week after week and month after month, you will destroy their self-confidence and nerve and they will not show capacity when it is required.

I have not the least doubt that my finance is liable to criticism, but even if it is and to the extent of millions, the outlook in the coming years is grave enough. I ask the noble Lord, is it not within the mark to say that with the possibilities the Government have admitted, having to push forward the date for laying down vessels, would it not be fair to say that the calculation with reference to what will be required in 1911–1912, lands us in a prospective charge for new construction of something like £20,000,000 in two years?

I have detained your Lordships at great length, but so many are the subjects dealt with in this statement that it would be difficult to touch upon them all without occupying a very long time. What I would press upon your Lordships, upon the Government, and upon the country is this. For the sake of a temporary—may I without offence call it a political—economy you are laying a burden on posterity which it will be very difficult to bear. And I wish to call attention to this. This is not an accidental charge; it is not unlooked for; this outcome of the economies the Government are developing they have had their eyes open to. The Estimates were shaved down, first, by the pressure of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and, secondly, by the pressure of debate, until we see this present condition and example of bad economy, which piles up burdens for the future. I may be told the Estimates were untouched as a result of the debate on armaments; but I notice that in another place the Secretary to the Admiralty was challenged; he was asked if the Estimates had been altered not alone by the Chancellor of the Exchequer—we are all accustomed to his pruning hand—but also after notice was given of the Motion for reduction of armaments, and he was silent; he made no reply. We are at liberty, then, I think, to assume that, in addition to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's there was some other influence responsible for cutting down the Navy Estimates this year.

One word in conclusion. I have always striven—your Lordships will support that assertion in relation to my speaking in this House, and those who have heard me will do the same in reference to my speeches elsewhere—I have always striven to keep the Navy apart from party politics. I will keep it apart from political party pressure as far as I can; the issues are far too grave, far too serious to be mixed up with party contentions; they are matters upon which the safety, the security of the country rests. But if there is a duty of silence, the duty of endeavouring not to embarrass those in authority that duty we have carried out; we, those with whom I am connected in this House and elsewhere, have done this, so far as it is possible. I have been blamed for not speaking in harsher terms; but I would rather err in that direction than allow for a moment party or political considerations to come into the matter at all. But if that is a burden of responsibility cast upon us, and I accept it, there is another equally grave, equally clear duty incumbent on the Opposition if we find in the Estimates that which is not consistent with the interests of the country. Bound as we are not to mix the interests of the Navy with party politics, in the interest of the country we are bound to speak out fully, clearly, with no doubting, hesitating voice, if we find anything proposed which endangers the safety and prosperity of this great Empire. It is with this sense of responsibility I speak to-night, and beg the House to believe that I have said what I have said in no party spirit whatever, and I trust most sincerely that the noble Lord will give a satisfactory answer on all the points I have thought it my duty to raise.

Moved, "That there be laid before the House further Papers relating to the Navy Estimates"—(Earl Cawdor.)

LORD ELLENBOROUGH

My Lords, a study of the Naval Estimates, of the explanatory Memorandum of the First Lord, and of that part of the Press which devotes itself to naval matters, leads me to believe that these Estimates are the lowest that the naval members of the Board would agree to without resignation. Whether this hypothesis is correct or not will probably not be known for some years, but in the meantime I shall criticise the Naval Estimates from that point of view.

I begin by saying that I am in favour of the greater part of the reforms that have recently been introduced in the Navy. I agree with what is stated in page 5 of the First Lord's Memorandum about the nucleus crew system. It keeps the ships in better order than they used to be. I am also aware that when mobilised they were very rapidly manned, but I think that it would have taken some days for the mobilised ships to have completed with stores, ammunition, and coal, if orders had been issued for the whole of them to be sent to sea. For instance, at Keyham, one or two ships might have been got ready in a short time, but the simultaneous embarkation of stores, coal and ammunition for all of them, would have resulted in hopeless confusion, owing to the unfinished state of the pavement and of the approaches to the docks. I hope that there will be no further delay in completing them. We have spent millions on the Plymouth docks, and we ought at once to disburse the few thousand pounds necessary to enable us to make full use of them.

I was at Dartmouth in December, and was favourably impressed with the manner in which the cadets are being taught, and I firmly believe that the new system of training and amalgamation will be successful. Those who attack it ought to go to Osborne and Dartmouth, and judge for themselves, before rushing into print. Its opponents appear to forget that up-to-date executive officers ought certainly to be engineers in all that concerns guns, torpedoes, and electricity, and that an engineer lieutenant is only to be specialised for the larger engines used in propulsion. In fact, I think that some such term as "propulsion lieutenant" might be substituted for that of engineer lieutenant, as it would give a clearer idea of that officer's duties.

As regards the Hague Conference, I shall not say much about it now, because I believe it is likely to be the subject of a debate in this House before very long. In the next war no belligerent is at all likely to accept all the conclusions of the Hague or of any other Conference. They will make important exceptions favourable to themselves. Nor am I a believer in the impartiality of neutrals when sitting on an International Prize Court. Could we have expected just decisions from Dutch or Belgian judges during the Boer war? I hope, therefore, that the Prize Court of Appeal Convention will end in smoke.

I regret that I cannot find in the Naval Estimates or in the First Lord's Memorandum a single sentence from which one might infer that we might have to remove mechanical mines in time of war. It is true that we have destroyers to sink the vessels employed in laying them down, but how about removing them when laid? At the Hague Conference Germany claimed the right of using floating contact mines in case of necessity. We have thus received fair warning that we must be prepared to deal with thousands of mines on the North Sea and on any part of our coasts where Germany is able to strew them. Personally, I hate mechanical mines; they are a danger to friend and foe, to belligerents as well as to neutrals. I regret that it was possible to invent them. But there is no use in adopting the policy of the ostrich in dealing with them. I think, however, that we should feel very grateful to Germany for her honesty in opposing definite limitations to their use instead of agreeing to resolutions which might have lulled us to sleep. Depend upon it that the first use that any future Van Tromp would make of his broom would be to brush away any of the fine spun cobwebs of the Hague Conference, or of so-called international Law, which might interfere with the more difficult work of sweeping up the British Fleet.

I have seen in some of the papers that neutral countries would interfere and prevent Germany from laying down mines. What neutrals? Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and France are the countries whose commerce would be chiefly interfered with. But France would have the Atlantic and Mediterranean still open to her. As for the three smaller countries, if their remonstrances were serious they would probably find themselves part of the German Empire before the conclusion of the war. Our Admiralty will be exceedingly remiss if it does not take steps to deal with this danger by a well-organised system of coast defence. Now it would be folly to employ large and expensive ships on such a duty as sweeping and looking for mines. Small and cheap vessels, old ones for choice, should be employed on this work. As we shall have but few officers and men available from the Regular Service, we must trust this duty to the officers and men of the mercantile marine, and the Royal Naval Reserve. It is one to which they will not be found unequal if they are given a little training before war begins. Constant vigilance will be necessary, and fleets of coasting vessels fitted with the necessary apparatus, manned by Royal Naval Reserve men and officers will be most suitable for that purpose. Royal Naval Reserve officers should receive special instructions in the best known methods of dealing expeditiously with mechanical mines, not only on paper in the lecture room, but also at sea in vessels specially equipped for that purpose.

As regards the distribution of our Fleet, in February last year all our war fleets were, at Lagos, and our Eastern coasts were open to attack and possible invasion. Again last Christmas the ships, companies in all our harbours were on leave in watches at the same time, and most of our admirals as well. I think that it would have been better to give leave to ail the men in one fleet at one time, and to keep the men of the other fleets within the limits of the port where their ships were, until it came to their turn to go on long leave. I have, however, no wish to see the total amount of leave given in one year curtailed. If, however, the Admiralty had reliable information as to the exact state and condition of foreign fleets at those particular times such proceedings may have been justified, but great caution should always be exercised. We have been told to sleep quietly in our beds, but I confess that I should not do so unless I believed that the Admiralty kept a sharper look-out than it professes to do.

Those who hold my views have been called "scaremongers," "blue-funkers," and disciples of the black treachery school, If any words of mine cause any additional precautions to be taken against surprise, those who wish for reduced Estimates may call me all the names to be found in a slang dictionary. I joined the Navy in 1854, and have been in Texas, and have therefore a very strong vocabulary at my disposal if I thought that anything was to be gained by making use of it. The terms "scaremonger" and "blue-funker" are no more applicable to those who think precautions necessary against surprise, than they are to captains of mail-steamers who go slow, sound steam whistles, and double the number of their lookout men when going down Channel in a fog. Invasion is a danger that is far more imminent now than it was a few years ago, for railways and telegraphs had not been developed to their present extent; it has now become one that the present and future Admiralties must guard against.

If large numbers of ships require repairs after intermittent manœuvres, how much more would this be the case during a continuous war. Ask the Admirals of our seagoing fleets how many battleships they would require to have under their orders to ensure a permanency of twenty battleships near an enemy's coast. I do not think that any of them would put it at less than thirty. The whole of a blockading fleet has never been able to remain permanently on its station. A century-and-a-half ago Admiral Hawke said that he required to have twenty-four line-of-battle ships under his orders if he was to keep nineteen or twenty perpetually off Brest. He generally had two re-fitting at Portsmouth, and two provisioning at Tor Bay or at Cawsand Bay. Nelson, too, was unable to keep the whole of the fleet under his command constantly off Cadiz. When Trafalgar was fought, five of his thirty-two battleships were at Gibraltar. He had to send the "Royal Sovereign" home instead of taking her with him when he followed Villeneuve across the Atlantic. At present, in these days of steamers and more frequent refits, thirty ships would be required if twenty of them are to be constantly ready near an enemy's coast in the North Sea. This is one of the unfortunate conditions of warfare that is imposed on the Power that must always be in command of the sea. As long as we have so small an army, we cannot afford to lose that command for forty-eight hours.

At present, if we were at war with both Germany and Japan we should be unable to protect both Australia and England from invasion. As neither nation trains its manhood to arms, one or the other would have to succumb. Even while at peace with Germany we could not keep more than one-fourth or one-sixth of our naval forces on a distant station, even if our Navy was double that of the German Empire. What I say about numbers equally effects all classes of vessels. Battleships, like the knights of old, require trusty squires in the shape of torpedo vessels to despatch their disabled adversaries, and to protect them from night attack.

I do not intend to weary the House with lists and comparisons of ships built or building in this country and abroad. I shall, however, ask your Lordships to consider the following figures. According to statements made by the Government in another place, we are this year going to spend £11,250,000, and Germany intends to spend £9,500,000 on shipbuilding, repairs, and armaments. Now, no British Admiralty, however efficient, can get twice as much value from £11,000,000 as Germany can get from £9,000,000. We have only to continue our present policy for a year or two longer and the command of the North Sea will pass to Germany without a struggle on our part. Then, if we displease Germany she will starve us. There will be no question of a big or a little loaf, there will be no loaf at all. Whether in war or peace, if we lose command of the narrow seas, this country will be reduced to a position of a dog standing on its hind legs and begging for any crumbs that other nations may permit it to receive. Is the proud Anglo-Saxon race prepared to accept that position or is it not? What is the use of Education Bills to train a race that will have to submit to such indignity and suffering if it does not speedily mend its ways? What is the use of Licensing Bills if all the money we expect to save on beer may not be able to buy us bread;

Last week a former Prime Minister appealed to the Press of both countries to avoid producing irritating articles causing mutual suspicion. That mutual suspicion will, however, continue as long as the immediate future of Great Britain remains insecure. It was greatly increased by the departure from the Cawdor programme, which raised hopes in German bosoms which I trust will never be fulfilled. But it is not in ships alone that we must be prepared. Even if we build several "Dreadnoughts," by the time they are completed we should be unable to dock them when damaged. The only dock that we have on the East Coast could not dock a damaged ship. The only limit to the number of men and machines that ought to be at work at Rosyth is the number that can be employed without overcrowding. We have wasted four years in talk about Rosyth which ought to have been spent in work. Rosyth is to be ready in ten years. By that time fresh chapters may have been written in the history of Europe. The present programme ought to be complete in less than five. The new lock at Portsmouth ought to be hurried on as well.

The effect of a partial blockade of these islands has never been brought home to the people. Talk of old-age pensions, indeed. In the struggle for life that will ensue if our islands are blockaded by either ships or mines, when the horrors of famine are upon us, when our population is being reduced to the number that our islands can feed without assistance from abroad, the weakest will go to the wall, and there will be no old people left to draw pensions. Those who want to reduce the Navy should read the histories of sieges in bygone times, if they wish to have an idea of what sufferings they may have to undergo before death kindly puts an end to them. The accounts of the starvation of England will surpass in their horrors all that have hitherto been recorded by historians. Four days command of the sea would enable a foreigner to invade this country with forces that we should be unable to withstand. If he did not invade, but remained in command of the seas for four weeks, we should then have commenced to starve, and in four months we should have starved and fought one another for food in such a manner as to effect a considerable reduction of our population. The rich would starve as well as the poor. Motor-cars and "old masters" would be exchanged for loaves of bread. Racehorses would be eaten. Those suspected of hoarding food would be plundered and murdered, and their houses would be burnt over their heads by their starving fellow-countrymen.

The German newspapers met the reduction in our Naval Estimates in 1906 with derisive shouts of enjoyment at the sight of England putting her "hands up" to Germany at the first sign of the commencement of the financial struggle for the command of the North Sea. For whether we like it or not, the financial struggle has commenced and will continue for some years to come. Whether this country will arouse itself to the dangers of its position, and meet the impending crisis with the energy and dignity that it showed a century ago, when confronted by similar dangers, remain to be seen. Germany may get tired of wasting her money on unprofitable ambitions before Great Britain surrenders the means of ensuring her food supply, before we put it into the power of another country to dictate to us how much we should be allowed to export and to import, and under what conditions our trade and manufactures are to be carried on.

Germany has flung down the gauntlet for a financial struggle, and that gauntlet must be taken up whether we like it or not, if we wish to avoid starvation, serfdom, and national annihilation. We hear a great deal about the unemployed and about the evils connected with working overtime. Why are numbers of men connected with shipbuilding to be idle in 1908, and then given high wages for overtime in 1910? This is a strange policy for a Government that claims to be economical and to be a friend of the working man. The ships whose building we postpone will cost us a great deal more money in consequence of our delay. If ships are to be well and cheaply built, their construction should be as continuous as possible. The, departure from the Cawdor programme was the gravest financial mistake that a Government could possibly commit. We are relying too much on our assumed power of building more rapidly than other countries. Six of the principal private yards in Germany have declared that between them they could turn out a total of fifteen battleships in a year if they could only get the orders. According to the newspaper Admiral Tirpitz has at one time said that the Germans could build as fast as the English, and has latterly asserted the contrary. I can see no reason why they should not be able to build as fast as we can. They have our "Dreadnought" experience to go upon.

There is an old fable called "The Hare and the Tortoise." There is also an old German saying, "Ohne hast, ohne rast." In 1855 I saw the only German man-of-war of the time, an old wooden frigate, lying at anchor in Plymouth Sound. She had formerly figured on our Navy List as the "Thetis." In the sixties I was a shipmate of German military officers who had been sent on board our men-of-war to learn seamanship and gunnery, so as to be able to lay the foundations of a German Navy. We were excellent friends, and I have every reason to believe that they enjoyed their two years stay on board our ships. From these small beginnings a steadfast and unswerving policy has built up a formidable fleet. Now that the German tortoise has crept half-way over the course, the British hare is recommended to go to sleep on its form, and to let the tortoise win. I hope, however, that Great Britain will wake up, that it will insist upon Supplementary Estimates before it is too late, upon a larger building programme, upon an earlier completion of Rosyth, and upon a coastal scheme for removing mechanical mines.

*THE EARL OF ARDWICKE

My Lords, the question I have to put to the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty, and of which I have given him private notice, is with regard to the coastguard as connected with the lifeboat service. I wish to ask whether the coastguard is to be further reduced or abolished. The noble Lord, I know, takes as great an interest in the lifeboat service as I do, and I feel that the efficiency of that service will be much impaired by any great reduction of the coastguard. The secretaries and coxswains of lifeboats have gained quite half their information connected with wrecks and casualties along the coast from the coastguard. Then there is the rocket apparatus and 331 life-saving stations under the care of the coastguard. The number of lives saved by this means in 1900–7 was 268, an increase of 127 as compared with the total of the previous year. Then, again, there is the protection of derelict and wrecked cargoes against wreckers and a longshoreman. These are questions which, I hope, the noble Lord has well considered. It is only a short time ago that the coastguard was considered about the best organised body in His Majesty's service, by which, in case of emergency, from twelve to fourteen battleships could be ready for sea and for service in forty-eight hours.

*LORD LAMINGTON

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Cawdor stated, quite accurately, that there are many points in the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty which might be touched upon. There are two, in particular, to which I should like to draw his attention. We have a very large naval force stationed round these islands, and in 1905 public attention was very much drawn to this force by a process of re-classifying or re-labelling them rather than by any material addition made to our strength in home waters. These different fleets would, in time of war, be brought together under one command, and if the combined fleets are to be ready in time of war to act as one united whole it is most important that in time of peace the Navy should have sufficient practice in combined fleet action. It is essential that the Commander-in-chief should have had sufficient practice of this kind so that the ships may be utilised in warfare to the best possible advantage.

For a commander-in-chief to be able fully to control the movements of a line extending seven or eight miles, as would be the case if these three fleets—the Atlantic, the Nore, and the Channel—were brought together, a great amount of previous practice is necessary, for it is impossible to suppose that movements can be carried out with celerity and method unless those in command have been habituated to those exercises. Not only is this true of the commander-in-chief, but also of the flag commanders under him. The four days devoted to such combined manœuvres last year were wholly insufficient; the fleets were brought together for twenty days, but four days only were devoted to combined fleet action. I should like to ask the noble Lord why these fleets are not brought together for a longer period for combined manœuvring. That is what Germany, with her constantly increasing fleet, is doing. Everything should be done to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of paper and routine work. Instead of different fleets being, as a rule, dispersed, they should be, as a rule, combined.

The other point on which I desire to ask a Question is that of the submarines. I believe that, so far, certainly during last year, they have not taken part in any of the naval manœuvres; and in view of the expenditure of £500,000 upon new construction of submarines, and also the fact that vessels of larger size are going to be built, I should like to ask whether it has been thought out and considered how submarines are going to be utilised in attack, and also whether there is any scheme by which an attack of submarines is to be repelled. When torpedoes were first introduced great stress was laid upon their importance and vast sums of money were spent upon them. Subsequent events, particularly in the Japanese war, proves that the use of torpedoes had been very much exaggerated and magnified; and before we embark on this heavy expenditure as regards submarines we want an assurance that it has been fully considered how they are to be utilised, and also whether there has been any carefully thought out scheme of defence against submarine attack.

LORD INVERCLYDE

My Lords, I do not take part in this discussion as in any way criticising the Admiralty, but I wish to put before the First Lord the views of one engaged in commerce and deeply interested in the mercantile marine. It is absolutely necessary that our fleets should be kept in a state of complete preparation for war; but, in making preparations for war, the functions of the Navy in time of peace are apt to be overlooked. Nowadays the great idea appears to be to have all His Majesty's ships in fleets. Previously we used to have single vessels of the Navy in all parts of the world. This country has been the pioneer in regard to maritime commerce, and it must frankly be admitted that in achieving our present proud position we have been largely indebted to the ships of His Majesty's Navy.

In former days these ships were in evidence in all parts of the world; but now there are many parts where the White Ensign is never seen. You hardly ever meet a British man-of-war now in Zanzibar; you are far more likely to meet a German. There is seldom a British man-of-war on the West Coast of Africa or at the Cape. One is very seldom seen in the West Indies or the Pacific; there you often come across American men-of-war. It is of the greatest advantage to our commercial interests that there should be British men-of-war in all parts of the world. I know that the answer is that in time of war these single vessels might be a source of danger. My reply to that is that in time of peace single vessels are a source of power to this country and immensely beneficial to our trade. What this country needs is a Navy sufficient to protect its interests, whether that is or is not in excess of the two-Power standard.

There is another point I desire to refer to—namely, the present policy of building as many ships of the Fleet as possible in dockyards and not giving work to private yards. The dockyards ought to be used for repair work, and the private yards for building. The private yards are among the greatest assets of the country, and much capital has been sunk in them to meet the requirements of the Admiralty. I assert that the vessels built in private yards are of better value than those built in" the dockyards. Vessels built in the dockyard are constructed by Estimate; the desire is not to exceed the Estimate, and the owner of the dockyard and of the ship being one the inspection is not nearly so strict; and I believe it is well-known that when you come to sell obsolete men-of-war those built in private yards fetch the better price. The inspection of a vessel built in a private yard is exceedingly strict, naturally so; for it is the duty of the representatives of the Admiralty to get as much out of the private builder as they can for the money. I can speak from experience, for that is what we do ourselves.

The Admiralty have appointed retired admirals to look after the work in these yards and they discharge their duties most efficiently; but I venture to think it is a mistake that retired admirals should hold these appointments. I believe that if admirals on the active list went round these yards for three years or so and then returned to the Admiralty, the experience they gained would be of great advantage to the country. I regret very much that the Admiralty have not given greater encouragement to the Royal Naval Reserve. I quite appreciate the view of the Admiralty and the reasons why they do not do more, but, as far as we are concerned in the mercantile marine, we regard the Royal Naval Reserve as of the greatest benefit to us and to the country. I should like to ask if the noble Lord the First Lord of the Admiralty has considered what, if the Eight Hours Bill for Miners is passed, will be the additional cost to the Admiralty of coal; and whether, if I sent him a petition against the Bill, he would authorise the Secretary to the Admiralty to sign it.

*LORD TWEEDMOUTH

My Lords, the noble Earl who has raised this debate to-day made a strong and somewhat aggressive speech on the subject of naval policy. He declared that he had done his best to keep clear of party attack. I must say that I do not think he succeeded very well in carrying out his purpose. For the noble Earl certainly put the worst complexion on the Government's statement of its policy, and attributed to us the very worst practices of finance. I rather protest against that line. I agree that the office which I have the honour to hold does remove a man very largely from the general political work of his Party. He must, in naval affairs, be entirely outside Party; and it would not be right for him to take an active part in party affairs That is a principle on which I have always endeavoured to act.

I do not think that the noble Earl has altogether remembered the heavy responsibility that he must have felt when he held my office. The responsibility that falls upon a First Lord is a very serious one. It is a double one. His primary responsibility is, of course, to maintain the Navy in supreme strength. It must also be his business to consider how far the burden of naval expense may fairly be borne by the people of this country. The charge this year on the taxpayers is no less than £32,319,500. No one will say that this is a small burden. It represents more than one-fifth, nearer one-fourth, of the total expenditure of the country. It involves, I think, something like 14s. 6d. per head of the whole population of 44,000,000 within these islands. No one can say that this is a light burden, and it seems to me that the only answer that can be made to those who protest against that heavy charge is to point out that the building of battleships, the great addition to naval establishments, dockyards, barracks, and so forth, are very expensive things; but, in comparison with the expense of maintaining the Navy, I say that if you estimate what is the cost of battles, it will be found that the cost of our naval establishments is small indeed.

I believe that our command of the sea is a necessity to this country, and that it is absolutely essential we should hold that command. Our position as a country is very different from that of other countries. Other countries have extended land frontiers by means of which, even in time of war, they can get supplies, if not in one quarter, then in another. Besides that, they have large resources in the way of being able to feed their own people from their own land. That is not our case. We have to bring everything from across the sea. We have to bring our food to our people across the sea; we have to bring our raw material for our manufactures across the sea; and we have to send our manufactures and other exports again across the sea. The great dominions of the King beyond the sea were gained by us through our power on the sea, and it is by the sea that we can defend both them and ourselves. I must not be thought weak in holding the opinion that the command of the sea is absolutely necessary for us.

I will first answer the various questions that the noble Lord has asked me, and then I will endeavour to meet the greater part of his speech by taking up the three great classes of work we have to do in the Admiralty—I mean, ships, establishments, and personnel. The first question which the noble Lord brought prominently before your Lordships was the question of the two-Power standard. I do not think the definition of what is the two-Power standard is altogether a question for the Admiralty. I think that we are the servants of the Government to carry out what definition they may make for us. On the two-Power standard I am perfectly sound. I must remind the House that both the Prime Minister, whose grave indisposition we are all deeply sorry for, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer—the one last year, and the other only last week—accepted in the most decided manner the two-Power standard. According to what is recorded in the Admiralty, I find that my predecessors have always taken the two-Power standard as meaning the two next strong Powers abroad plus ten per cent. I have rather a wider formula myself. I am here speaking for myself and not for my colleagues; but I much prefer this definition as to the standard—namely, any reasonably probable combination of other foreign Powers. I would much rather not point to any particular one or two Powers, but I would say this—every Government has to consider the whole of the conditions of our position towards foreign countries, and it is by that that the standard we have to keep up should be maintained and regulated.

There was a small question about the goats at Malta. The goats still live; but it was not the goats that spread the microbes, it was their milk; and the way in which we got rid of the Malta fever was by preventing the sailors and marines of the Fleet from using any of the goats' milk. As a matter of fact, the Malta goat lives in a very dirty manner; it feeds on filthy garbage; and consequently the animal is liable to get its milk much contaminated.

The noble Lord asked me a question about the redundant stores. It is true that both Lord Cawdor and I have used up the redundant stores. These stores are chiefly accounted for by the scrapping of the smaller ships which took place during the time of Lord Selborne and the closing of the colonial and foreign dockyards. There was an enormous accumulation of stores, and they were transferred to the establishments at home. This procedure was absolutely right and economical. It was right that they should be used up, because stores deteriorate or get out of date. There are, for instance changes of fashion in cables and anchors and it was a proper course to take to use up these stores. As the noble Lord said it is perfectly true that this operation has been going on for four years; it has amounted on an average to nearly £1,000,000 a year, and we have got the benefit of the last £500,000 for next year In respect of future arrangements, it is found that owing to commercial improvements, we can get our stores very much more quickly than we used to do It is quite evident that, provided our stores are sufficient for the purposes for which they are required, and that the amount we have makes us perfectly safe in case of emergency arising, it is not wise to keep more stores than we need. A fixed sum has been decided upon, and we shall make provision to keep a sufficient supply of stores for all purposes that may be required.

The noble Lord accurately stated the fact as to the altered arrangement for ordering naval guns and ordnance. The decision with regard to guns and ordnance is now in the hands of the Admiralty. Our guns and ammunition are different from those under the charge of the War Office, and it seems to me to be an extraordinary thing that we should have received all this ammunition and all these guns through the War Office. The year 1901 was the year when the expenditure on ammunition reached its high-water-mark. A considerable amount of ammunition was saved, 'as well as annual expenditure, by the abolition of 150 ships that were scrapped, and the old ammunition which was on board the scrapped ships has been since used for the purposes of practice. It has not been wasted, and its use has avoided the purchase to some extent of further ammunition. There was a reduction in the number of types of guns and in the different kinds of ammunition also. The annual Vote for ammunition supplies what is required for practice and for ships building. The amount required is such as to ensure a full reserve for all guns at the end of the year without any reduction in the practice of the Fleet. The lull practice of the Fleet will be maintained this year, and the reserves will be kept complete. The Vote for guns depends on the ships building. We have fewer ships building, and, therefore, fewer guns will be required. The Vote for torpedoes depends on the number of torpedoes and mines. The mines have been taken away from the War Office, and instead of the system of working mines from the shores, we have now started mine-laying ships. Certain cruisers have been assigned to that particular work. To sum up, the ships completing will have their full ammunition, including the reserve of ammunition for the guns; the practice of the Fleet will be fully provided for and the total of reserve ammunition will be maintained. All this will be effected during the coming financial year. The Ordnance Vote, therefore, is fully adequate.

Now, in asking the attention of the House to the question of the ships, I have to say, in the first place, that some not very well-informed criticisms have been made with regard to the programme of the year. It is said that it is too small, that we are putting off too long, and that this will involve danger in future years. Well, there is something to be said on the other side. I believe that our present position is such that we are perfectly justified is not going on with a very big programme at the present moment. The principle on which our system of construction is founded is a totally different one from that of foreign nations. Foreign nations all make up their programmes of construction for a large number of years—sometimes as many as seventeen or twenty years. My Lords, you are all well aware what an extraordinary development there has been in the building of battleships. All classes of these ships at this moment are very much a question of experiment. We do not know what the types we are now introducing will do, and whether they will succeed or not. But of this I am sure, that we will learn a great deal if we observe prudence. That has been notably the case with the "Dreadnought." I do not at all encourage the repetition of the circumstance of the construction of the "Dreadnought." She was built in thirteen months, and, of course, we were very proud of it. But I do not think it is an experiment we ought to repeat, because the three "Temeraires" are better than the "Dreadnought," and the three "St. Vincents" will again be an advance on the "Dreadnought." It is really wise and good policy, if safety permits, not to enter into too big a programme. In entering into a programme we ought to be sure of the design of the particular new ships which we are going to lay down.

Now let me take the new construction programme of this year. In the first place, there is the fourth "St. Vincent," which is to be laid down at Portsmouth. There is also to be laid down a fourth—what I may call—cruiser battleship, another "Invincible," with improvements. The House will excuse me from saying what they will be; I think we had much better keep that to ourselves. But the result will be that in the spring of 1911 we shall have three squadrons of four of these great ships. We are going to have in one squadron the "Dreadnought "and the three" Temeraires," which will make four of that type. In the three "St. Vincents" and another to be laid down we shall have another homogeneous squadron of the latest improved "Dreadnoughts." We shall have a third squadron of four "Invincibles;" and I tell your Lordships most confidently that no Power in the world will have such a fleet of first-class battleships as we shall have in the spring of 1911, and I am almost inclined to go so far as to say that a combination of all the Powers in the world will not be able to put an equal squadron against us. I believe that a moderate rate of construction of these great experimental ships is a most desirable thing.

We propose to lay down six cruisers of an intermediate class. One of these cruisers is to be a replica of the "Boadicea"—which, I believe, will be a very useful ship, and will be launched in May. Of the other five cruisers, we frankly say that their design is not yet entirely settled. The Board have not yet had the final designs under consideration. But I will say that they are not "Bodiceas;" they will be considerably larger. The "Boadicea" is about 3,500 tons; the new ones will probably run from 4,000 to 5,000 tons. Again I will not enter into details. They will be protected cruisers—I say nothing further than that—and I believe they will be extremely useful ships. They will have very considerable coal endurance. The idea is that they should be able to keep the sea for a considerable time. They will also be fast ships of 23 or 24 knots. The noble Earl challenged me about destroyers. My information does not altogether bear out his, and mine is more satisfactory.

EARL CAWDOR

You have not taken them from the Dilke Return.

*LORD TWEEDMOUTH

I take the actual facts as they will be at the end of this month. The noble Earl made great play of the fact that certain torpedo boats which we call coastal destroyers were not of very great value, and had been wrongly classed. Let me say that I think that was an Admiralty mistake. I do not see that it makes any difference, but I think it was a pity that they were given numbers instead of names because really they belong to the coastal destroyer class.

EARL CAWDOR

They are not mentioned as destroyers in the Dilke Return.

*LORD TWEEDMOUTH

They ought to have been. However, they are not a very large number of ships; there are only fifteen of them.

EARL CAWDOR

They will not affect my figures.

*LORD TWEEDMOUTH

I count them in as destroyers, and will give a comparison between the British, French, and German destroyer fleets in the Home waters. We expect to have ready at the end of this month, of ocean-going destroyers of 33 knots, 4; of the river class, 34; of 30-knot destroyers, 48; of 27-knot destroyers, 28; of coastal destroyers, 15—making a total of 129. As a matter of fact we shall have altogether 142, but there are under repair or due for repair 13, thus reducing the number to 129. Germany has 57 destroyers, 10 divisional torpedo-boats—altogether 67. The French have 26 destroyers, making a combined total for France and Germany of 93, as compared with the 129 of Great Britain. I may say I have not made any allowance for German or French boats being under repair. If we were to take the same proportion as in our own case of destroyers under repair we should find that Germany and France have only 85 ready, in comparison with 129 of Great Britain.

So far as destroyers of eleven years and under are concerned, our figures for the same date are—ocean-going, 4; river class, 34; 30-knotters, 47; coastal destroyers, 15—a total of 100. The Germans have 57 destroyers and I divisional torpedo-boat—58 in all. The French have 26 destroyers. Altogether Germany and France have 74 destroyers, and we have 100 under eleven years in Home waters. I do not think that is a bad proportion, and, so far as the two-Power standard is concerned, I think I have made a good case for the destroyers. We are going to lay down 16 new destroyers. They will be of the last improved river class, still improved. They will do 33 knots, and I think they will be extremely good craft.

The noble Lord asked me a question about submarines. This year we are doing exactly the same as in former years, devoting £500,000 to the construction of submarines. Class 0, which is the last class but one, has been very successful. We are rather proud of the result of our submarines. Class D. is going through trials, and I believe from those trials we shall derive a very considerable amount of knowledge. These Class D. submarines have a much greater sea-going power than the old ones; they will be much more easily moved about from place to place, and will become more and more useful for the purposes of coast defence. We sent submarines last year all the way from Portsmouth to the Firth of Forth, and the results they gave as seaboats were very remarkable. We had much better not hurry in the building of these submarines, until we have full trials of the D. Class, in order that we may see that we are paying our money for what is really likely to be a good article.

I will now briefly state the distribution of our ships over the world at this moment. I would impress upon your Lordships what is the Admiralty policy in this very important matter. We believe that the great matter is to concentrate our big ships and our strongest ships round our own coasts. Naval war will involve instant action. The way you will win success in a naval war is by being able to send your fleets straight at the ships of the other Power. I believe a naval war now would be an extremely short affair; and it is absolutely necessary that our ships should be always at hand and always ready to do the duty required of them. We have scattered over the world a great many ships. We have a squadron of about ten cruisers in Australian waters; we have another small squadron at the Cape; we have another larger squadron again in China, and another in India, which works in the Persian Gulf. These squadrons are all made up of cruisers of different sizes, and I think they are very good for the work they have to do. Special vessels are provided for work in the Persian Gulf and for work in Chinese waters, and I have only to-day been told by Sir E. Grey that the work which Sir Arthur Moore has done in clearing away the pirates in the Canton River is beyond all praise. That very important work has been carried on with great success and tact. That being the case as regards our more scattered ships, I should also say there is a forth cruiser squadron consisting of six cruisers, which is mainly a training ship squadron. They also have the care of the other side of the Atlantic, and look after the fisheries, the West Indies, and so forth, and do very useful work.

Then I come to the fleets that are nearer home. First there is the Mediterranean Fleet, which has six battleships, with three atta hed cruisers and eleven destroyers, and the Third Cruiser Squadron as its help-mate. The Atlantic Squadron has six battleships and the Second Cruiser Squadron as its companion. Then we have the Channel Fleet, consisting of eight "King Edward VII.'s," the "Swiftsure," the "Triumph," and four other battleships. It has three attached cruisers, thirty destroyers, and has the First Cruiser Squadron as its companion. I believe there is not a fleet in the world that could equal it. I think Lord Charles Beresford has the finest set of ships under him that it is possible to conceive.

I come to the question of the Home Fleet. I wish, in the first place, to make it perfectly clear that we have never suggested that the Home Fleet was a complete fleet yet. The Home Fleet is the last new fleet, and a new fleet cannot spring like Minerva from Jove's brain completely armed and completely fitted up. The Home Fleet will become a very great fleet; it already is a very strong one. At this moment that fleet is cruising.

EARL CAWDOR

That is the Nore Fleet.

*LORD TWEEDMOUTH

Yes, the Nore Division. It has with it now four battleships—the "Dreadnought," the "Bulwark," the "Majestic," and the "Caesar." The noble Lord rather found fault because the "Cæsar" was added.

EARL CAWDOR

I did not find fault; I only inquired about the condition of the "Cæsar."

*LORD TWEEDMOUTH

The admiral commanding wished to have four battleships with him. The arrangement of the Home Fleet is that there are spare ships at Devonport and Portsmouth which are to be used when the ships in the Home Fleet are under repair or not available. The reason for sending the "Cæsar" was that the admiral wanted a fourth ship, and it was accordingly taken for this particular cruise. The other ships now cruising with the Nore Division of the Home Fleet are the armoured cruisers, "Achilles," "Cochrane," "Natal," and "Warrior," the protected cruisers "Charybdis" and "Dido," the third-class cruiser "Topaze," the scouts "Adventure," "Attentive," and "Patrol," the "Thetis" mine-laying cruiser, the "Circe," "Hebe," and "Jason" torpedo gunboats, and twenty-four destroyers. Altogether there is a total of forty-two vessels now at sea with Admiral Bridgeman.

I now come to the immediate future of the Home Fleet. The "Shannon" is just commissioned and is about to join the Fifth Cruiser Squadron as flagship, instead of the "Leviathan"; the "Minotaur" is completing for sea at Devonport, and will, it is expected, join the Fifth Cruiser Squadron early in April; the "London" battleship, will join the Nore Division at Invergordon in about a week's time; the "Lord Nelson" battleship has been delayed by the strike in the North, so that no date has yet been fixed for her joining the Nore Division; and the "Agamemnon" is undergoing her trials preparatory to joining the Nore Division. I think we may safely rely upon it that by the end of the year the Home Fleet will have become an extraordinarily strong fleet. I think we may be sure that the Home Fleet, if called upon to do its duty, will do it well. We have two different classes of ships which also belong to the Home Fleet, and I believe that what has been done in regard to these classes is an immense improvement on the old Reserve plan. One class of these ships, stationed at Chatham, Portsmouth, and Devonport, consists of ships with nucleus crews. There is also a second class of Reserve ships which it is not necessary to keep in so completely a ready condition, but which we also shall be able to produce with far greater celerity, at any rate in time to be of the greatest possible service.

THE EARL OF HARDWICKE

Are nucleus crews taken from the coastguards?

*LORD TWEEDMOUTH

No; nucleus crews are taken from the seamen on active service. A nucleus crew consists of a complement. All the higher ratings are in it. We have only to put on men of the lower ranks who have to do, if I may so describe it, the work of hewers of wood and drawers of water. I think I have now pretty well covered the ground with regard to ships.

EARL CAWDOR

There is one question I asked with regard to classification of nucleus crew ships—ships undergoing repairs and still kept in commission, and not noted as undergoing repairs.

*LORD TWEEDMOUTH

That system has been abandoned now. It is true that the two ships in question were put in to the Home Fleet because it was thought desirable to keep their crews together until such time as the dockyards could take the ships. There was not room in the dockyard to do the necessary repairs to these ships, and it was thought well to keep the men in them until they could be moved elsewhere. But that system has now been abandoned, and no vessel undergoing extensive refit will be shown as included in the Home Fleet.

A great deal has been said about the way repairs have been carried out. The amount which has been spent in repairs during the last two years is rather remarkable, and disposes of the charges made against the Admiralty in respect to this matter. The amount voted for repairs at home and abroad in the year 1906–7 was £1,628,100, in 1907–8, £1,800,198, and the amount estimated to be expended duirng the next year is £2,194,027. I ought also to say that this year an additional £200,000 will have been spent, and next year an additional £300,000 will be spent on the introduction of cooling apparatus into the magazines of warships. This was found to be of pressing-importance, and it was only fair to the officers and men that it should be undertaken, because cordite kept at a high temperature is extremely dangerous and likely to explode. Explosions have taken place in the French Navy, in Japan, and in America through the blowing up of the magazine by this kind of ammunition. I believe that can almost entirely be remedied by this system of cooling, which is done by a process of brine being circulated through tubes, the temperature being kept to about 70°. I am told that the deterioration of cordite does not seriously arise until a temperature of over 90° is reached. Therefore, we have a good margin. We have had only one or two slight accidents, none of them leading to loss of life, but sufficient to put us on our guard. An item under this head will inevitably be found in future Estimates.

Now I come to the question of works, and here I have been met with a considerable difficulty. The Government have decided—I think quite wisely—that no longer should the system of public works loans be resorted to to provide the necessary money, but that the proper course was that the cost of works should be borne in the Estimates for the year. That is sound finance, but it is very inconvenient for the people who have to carry out the principle. The result is that I find myself this year, in respect of loans for works done during the last twenty years, with a charge of no less than £1,260,000; that will go on increasing and in 1911 it will, I think, amount to £1,350,000, and will not begin to diminish till 1924. This is a very serious burden for any Department to bear when it also has very large works to carry out. I am sorry to say that I am face to face with very serious works—works which are of the utmost importance for the Navy and for the safety of the country. In the first place, I have to deal with the position of Portsmouth where new ships cannot be taken in without great difficulty. This is a very serious thing, and we are now making a new lock there of very considerable size. It will take four years to complete, and will cost over £1,000,000. I hope to get the contract let by the middle of June, and we shall then begin it and get on with it as quickly as we can.

I come next to Rosyth, which has been on the Parliamentary tapis for a good many years. I think the works proposed there are very much required, for on the whole of the East Coast we have no Government dock which will take a "Dreadnought" or an "Invincible," and it would be impossible for the country to continue in that position. We also want a big home for our big ships, and we propose to use the Forth and this new basin for that purpose. The Forth affords admirable anchorage. A very great number of ships can be accommodated, and even this year it will be used a great deal for the Fifth Cruiser Squadron. We shall get on as quickly as we can with Rosyth, but it is not very easy to do so. There is really prudence in delay. So many experiments have been made with docks and harbours which have proved tremendous failures that we ought to make very certain of our ground and of our plans before we decide finally. One of the great advantages of the Rosyth proposal, as I think, is that there is under this plan a very easy and quick possibility of enlargement. As it stands there is to be a very large entrance which may be used as a dock. There is another dock able to take a "Dreadnought" or an "Invincible," and there is also room left for two other docks, which can be very quickly constructed without interference with the other works if it is thought desirable hereafter. The noble Earl asked me what those docks would cost. I am told that their probable cost would be £350,000 each.

The noble Earl also asked me how long I thought it would be before Rosyth could be made use of. I believe, I hope, we shall be able to do the work, not in ten years, but in seven years. I want to make it quite clear that the small sum put down for Rosyth this year does not indicate any slackness on the part of the Admiralty in pushing the work forward. The Director of Works at the Admiralty has informed me that it will take the whole of his staff until July, working overtime, to finish the necessary drawings for the contract particulars. He says that it is a most faulty system to give out mere sketch plans. The contract should be let by September. With regard to the other point raised by the noble Earl I am advised that under the contract itself a clause which would suggest a higher rate of tender if the work is completed in a short time is not a desirable condition. We think a better plan is one I propose to adopt. I am going to propose that a bonus shall be given to the contractor who takes the work if he completes it quicker than the contract time. Something of this character I am advised is a better plan than the other.

I ought to say that the basin at Rosyth will accommodate twenty-two of these great new battleships of the "Invincible" and "Dreadnought" class double-banked against the quays, and that the dock and lock will each take the "Dreadnought" or "Invincible," and the lock itself would take the "Mauretania" if she were in the dock alone. Then we have in the Rosyth scheme a basin and camber for submarines and for destroyers. The cost of the plan as it stands now in the Royal Gallery is about three and a half millions, including machinery.

Then we shall make what is a very important change; we have determined to shift our torpedo manufactory from Woolwich to Greenock and have our torpedo range at Loch Long, which is very convenient to Greenock. Modern torpedoes have a range of over 6,000 yards, but the longest range we have is 2,500 yards at Portland, and there it cannot be used without inconvenience to the shipping in harbour. At Loch Long we shall have a range of 7,000 yards on the Argyllshire side. I think I ought to say a word in acknowledgment of the great courtesy extended to us by Sir Hugh Shaw Stewart so far as Greenock is concerned, by the Corporation of Glasgow and the County Council of Argyllshire; this has greatly helped us in making the necessary arrangements in regard to this scheme. I think the cost will be something over £100,000. Our intention is, where possible, not to dismiss our men at Woolwich, but to take the greater number of the torpedo experts to Greenock, where they will carry on their work. I believe this can be done at not very high cost and without causing very much inconvenience to the men and their families.

I come now to Haulbowline. There the dock is to be enlarged to a size that will take a "Dreadnought," and that means expenditure of another £100,000. We begin the work this year and hope to get it completed very quickly. It will be a Useful addition to our dock accommodation for the big class of ships. These works I bring before your Lordships' attention because they are all pressing, and the carrying out of the work must lead to increase of the Navy Estimates in the near future.

I come now to the question of personnel. We may have the finest ships, the finest guns, the finest establishments in the world, but they will not avail us unless we have a good personnel to serve us. The human element in the naval service is one of the first things to be considered. A great many people think that an immense saving might be effected by reducing the number of men, but, my Lords, never will I be a party to such a proposal. I believe it is absolutely necessary to keep up our numbers. I daresay an Army may be mobilised in thirteen days, but you must be ready to mobilise your Navy in thirteen hours. You cannot wait for a proclamation for mobilising; you must have the men at hand, in the ships, in the nucleus crews, or in the training establishments. You must have men of long service. A seaman cannot learn his business under six years. He is enlisted now for twelve years, and he may after five years' man's service go into the Royal Naval Reserve. I am thankful to say a great many men do not do so. They can re-enlist after twelve years for another ten years, after which they earn a considerable pension and secure a comfortable future. These men, officers and men, we must have well-trained. The working of a great modern warship is a trade by itself that takes much learning, it requires experts to carry it out satisfactorily, and it would be the rankest folly, the greatest want of economy, not to train the men and not to keep them ready for the time when the call must be made upon them. I do not then agree with the idea that anything considerable in the way of saving can be brought about by reducing the number of men.

I am anxious to do all I can to encourage a good feeling between the Navy and the mercantile marine. The latter can be most useful to us, and I hope they will be, but I say this, we cannot rest ourselves on the chance of calling together the reserves when an emergency arises: there is not the time for it. I think I ought to say a word in favour of the Naval Volunteers. They are a comparatively new force, and they are established on the Thames, the Tyne, the Clyde, and the Severn. They are largely made up of men engaged in shipbuilding and trades allied to that industry and may prove a very useful force. Then again I may remind your Lordships that it would be an unfortunate thing for the mercantile marine if in time of war we were to call off the best of their officers and men. We want the mercantile marine in war time to carry on the trade of the country, just as if war did not exist; the importance of the duties of mercantile seamen would be increased by a state of war, and therefore the best men should be left in that service, though a certain number we should be glad to have helping us. I put it to my noble friend Lord Inverclyde, is there not a good deal to be said for my argument?

With regard to the Coastguard, I have no objection to produce the Report of the Committee on the subject, and I can very shortly tell your Lordships the lines the Admiralty propose to follow. I think it is rather an anomaly that there should be thrown on the Navy the duty of the exciseman. As a matter of fact, in many parts all the work is done by excisemen, though in other places excisemen and coastguards work together. Though I do not think that excise work should be thrown on the Navy and Navy Estimates, I thoroughly believe that the coastguard should continue to do the war signalling and so forth, which is necessary and will become more necessary; it is not a small service. Again, I think they ought to retain the duties they have at present in the way of working the signal apparatus, the rocket apparatus, and the lifeboat service. At this moment undoubtedly the establishment of the coastguard is larger than we want; but I do not mean by reducing the number of the coastguard to reduce our number of seamen. My idea is that as we reduce the number of the coastguard and bring in more of the Customs men, I believe the Customs are perfectly ready to employ old sailors for their particular work; and we should transfer men to places in our seamen's ranks and so increase the strength of our active service.

Before I leave the subject of the personnel, I ought to tell the House what is proposed to be done in regard to engineer officers. It is an old question, and was settled by the Admiralty as far back as 1903, but for some reason it has not been carried into effect. In future the improvements in the pay and position of engineer officers will be as follows: Two good service pensions of £200 per annum will be established for engineer vice-admirals and engineer rear-admirals, and two of £150 a year for engineer captains. Pensions for widows and compassionate allowances to orphans of engineer vice-admirals, engineer rear-admirals, and engineer captains will be on the same scale as those for officers of corresponding ranks in the military branch. The pay of an engineer captain will advance from 35s. to 40s. a day by annual increments of 2s. 6d. a day instead of by increments of 1s. a day. The rate of pay of 24s. a day will be granted after sixteen years' service as engineer - lieutenant, or as engineer-lieutenant and engineer-commander combined, with retrospective effect to 1st April, 1903. The scale of retired pay and the ages for compulsory retirement will in future be assimilated to those established for officers of the millitary branch. Good service pensions are now awarded for distinguished services to flag officers and captains of the military branch, to general officers and colonels and lieutenant-colonels of the Royal Marines and to medical officers. It is a just recognition of the services rendered by the engineer officers that good service pensions should be instituted for the corresponding ranks of that branch. These arrangements will be a great boon to engineer officers, and will, I hope, improve their position. Well, my Lords, I end as I began. I hope your Lordships all think this is a case of salus civitatis suprema lex. We cannot afford not to keep up the Navy, and I hope all parties without any reserve will do what they can to support the Navy in the great work it has to do.

EARL CAWDOR

My Lords, I am sorry that the noble Lord considered my speech to be a party speech. I am afraid it has become usual when arguments are put forward that are disliked by opponents for the latter to take refuge in the assumption that they were made in a party spirit. I can only repeat that as in the past it has been, so in the future it will be, although I may not succeed to the satisfaction of the noble Lord, my endeavour to keep party out of Naval controversy.

May I ask the noble Lord when it is likely the six cruisers will be laid down, and when they are likely to be ready for commission? The noble Lord talked a good deal about finance, and suggested that the present Estimates are no light burden on the taxpayer. They are not. But if we compare it with the burden that will have to be laid on the shoulders of the taxpayer in the future, it may be found that it would have been much better for him to bear rather more this year and less in the future. I agree that the further we can set back the building of new battleships the better, but only provided that this postponement is not inconsistent with the maintenance of the two-Power standard, because the later the building the more perfect will be the design.

But we may then be confronted with another difficulty—the consideration of how much of a burden can be put on the taxpayer through the Estimates in any one given year or number of years. We cannot, therefore, keep back our battleships only to put them all in again two or three years hence in a great struggle to keep up the two-Power standard. The wiser policy is to spread their building more evenly over the years. The noble Lord has not told us quite all the story with regard to the position in 1911. His statement brought us up to the spring of that year. The statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was that by January, 1911, we should have twelve ships of this class. But when we come to November or December, 1911, which is the critical time for comparison, the Germans, if they are able to carry out their programme in the time suggested, will have thirteen, so that we should be one short. If the noble Lord had brought his story up to the autumn of 1911 he would have made a completer story. His colleague in another place has, however, supplied the information up to the autumn of that year. With regard to the nucleus crew ships under repair, I think we have been a little led astray by the statement of one of the noble Lord's colleagues in another place. Accepting the statement now made by the noble Lord, I come to the coastal destroyers, and I would urge that they should be kept in either one category or another, not taken out of the destroyers category at one time and put into the torpedo category at another. They should have some more secure and continuous resting-place. As the noble Lord said, the figures which he was kind enough to give as to the destroyers, answered the figures I gave, and I assume that the noble Lord will give them in a Parliamentary Return.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

That shall be done.

EARL CAWDOR

I hope they will be given as far back as 1893, and that the figures for other countries will also be given. We shall then be able to see how many destroyers exist in each country of eleven years and under. I gather from the noble Lord's explanation regarding the Nore Fleet, that the Commander-in-Chief, on going out for hit fleet exercises on 9th March, was anxious to take with him four battleships. He had six under his command at Chatham, and these six belonged to the Nore Fleet, which, it was stated, were always to be ready for sea at a moment's notice. They included the "London," the "Magnificent," and the "Victorious." Was none of those vessels fit to make up a fourth vessel? Apparently not, for they had to go to Devonport and fetch the "Cæsar" and leave the three others behind at Chatham. This seems to con- firm the view some people had that half the battleships in the Nore Fleet at Chatham were unfit to go to sea. The noble Lord's explanation was not reassuring.

With respect to the two-Power standard, I regret that the noble Lord has not been able to accept the form of words which I suggested. He preferred to give his assurance in a form which appeared to be based on the consideration whether a combination between certain Powers was probable. That is to rest the two-Power standard on something of a quicksand. The temptation is offered to a Minister under great pressure to put the two-Power standard on a basis for economic purposes which at the same moment would be undesirable as far as the safety of the country was concerned. I know of no safe plan of dealing with this two-Power standard but that of putting it on the bed-rock footing of always being absolutely supreme against whatever two Powers are strongest at sea, whether they are likely to oppose us or not. The noble Lord having been good enough to promise some Papers, I will withdraw my Motion and thank the noble Lord for the kindness and care with which he has endeavoured to answer the many questions with which I am afraid I have troubled him.

LORD LAMINGTON

I should like to ask for an answer to my question as to the Home Fleet being brought together.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

They are brought together for twenty days, and it is at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief as to how the vessels are to be exercised during that time. They were exercised in smaller divisions, and were, I suppose, doing as good work as could be done by the whole fleet manœuvring during the whole of these days together. In reply to Earl Cawdor, the "Magnificent" and "Victorious" were two of the battleships under repair. The "London "goes to join the fleet at Invergordon in a week's time. The six cruisers I spoke of will probably be laid down in October. With regard to the destroyers, their being numbered instead of named led to the confusion complained of in the lists. The Controller found himself at a great loss to decide on names for these smaller ships, so he decided to number them. It was that which led to the difficulty.

Motion (by leave of the House), withdrawn.