§ Order of the Day read for resuming the adjourned debate on the Motion of Viscount Midleton that an humble 121 Address be presented to His Majesty for any Minute of the Army Council approving the further reduction in the numbers of the Regular Artillery, and the Report for 1907 of the late Inspector-General of the Forces so far as it affects "the training and efficiency of the troops under the control of the Home Government, and the readiness and fitness of the Army for war."
*LORD LUCASMy Lords, the debate of last Thursday covered practically the whole ground of the reforms which are at present being carried out in the Regular Army and in what are at present the Auxiliary Forces. But perhaps I may be allowed to trespass on your Lordships time in an endeavour to reply to one or two of the chief points brought forward in Thursday's debate. The point most reiterated in that debate was that of the present strength of the Army as shown by the Return on the Table. Attention was called by Lord Midleton to the strength of the Army as revealed in that Return; but, with a true perception of the causes of the existing weakness of the Army, he did not attach the blame for that to the present Government as was done by subsequent speakers. I must say I thought the noble Earl the Under-Secretary provided a very complete answer on that point, but it did not deter other speakers from repeating the attack.
If I may be allowed to do so, I would give your Lordships the figures showing how the three years system has affected the particular battalion—the 2nd Durham Light Infantry—which was singled out by Lord Midleton. The three years system was in force from April, 1902, until October, 1904, and that meant that from April, 1905, to October, 1907, not only were the seven years men of from 1898 to 1900 passing into the Reserve, but also the three years men. There was a double drain going on at the same time, and the way in which that affected the battalion in question is shown by the following figures referring to rank and file. In February, 1904, the strength, not including recruits at the depot, was 701, and there were 442 men over twenty years of age. There were at that time 455 three years men in the 122 battalion. The draft required for India in that year was 155; the following year it was about the same. At that time 137 three years men had had to go out to India. In 1905 the three years men began passing out; in 1906 the strength had fallen from 701, two years previously, to 562. The number of men over twenty years of age had fallen to 348, and the draft that had to be sent out had risen to 209 men. The following year the strength fell to 461; the draft requirements rose to 290, and the battalion was unable to meet them all. The men over twenty in the battalion were only 241. The draft required this year was 257, and 232 men have gone, the actual number of rank and file over twenty left being 56. Fortunately we have now passed the worst time, because the three years men are done with and we are gradually climbing up again.
The attack made last week upon the policy of the expeditionary force of 160,000 men was not so much in reference to the size of the force as to the doubt if the number could be realised. I may here parenthetically remark, with regard to a point raised by the Duke of Bedford, that the actuaries do not count as passing to the Reserve every man who enters as a recruit; they took the actual number in normal conditions—estimated over a long period of years and it works out at roughly, one out of every two recruits. The calculations are made on the establishments, and it is quite possible that the number will not be forthcoming; but I cannot see how Lord Midleton's proposal to add 10,000 of the three years men would improve matters. He says, I think rightly, that you can sometimes raise three years men when you cannot raise seven years men. How far the raising of three years men interferes with the getting of seven years men is a question that is difficult to decide offhand. But suppose you do not get sufficient recruits to give you the full 160,000 men, surely you are not going to make things better by increasing your establishments and asking for more recruits still. As I have shown in the case of the Durham Light Infantry, the strength fell so greatly below the establishment that the reducing of the establishment was a 123 mere paper transaction which did not affect the strength of the Army.
I maintain that the reductions in the strength of the Regular Army which have been the subject of so much criticism can only fairly be considered in relation to the whole scheme of Army reform. The idea of an expeditionary force is not a new one, as was indicated in Mr. Wyndham's letter to The Times of last Saturday, in which it is stated that the noble Marquess opposite also had the idea of organising the whole of the troops at home into a large expeditionary force of about the same size as the expeditionary force which Mr. Haldane proposes to organise; and at the outbreak of the South African War we had to despatch about the number the noble Marquess proposes to organise. Having sent that expeditionary force abroad we then were compelled to raise new units of every sort. Fifty-six new batteries of field artillery were raised, and numerous expedients were resorted to in regard to infantry. Those units had to perform double functions—to train drafts for South Africa, and at the same time to provide for home defence.
*LORD LUCASI speak under correction, but apparently the Militia was not considered adequate defence for the country at that time. As I say, you were calling upon these units to perform double functions—to train drafts for South Africa, and at the same time to provide for home defence. Fortunately they were not required to discharge the latter duty. Experience of the South African War shows that when you have a force abroad you must also have the machinery in this country for training drafts. This is one of the advantages of the new scheme that may be said to have been bought by the reductions made in the Regular Army. It is a great asset from a military point of view that for the first time in the history of this country we shall be free from the necessity of having to improvise in the face of the enemy.
124 There is another point of view from which we ought to look at these reductions. It was argued on Thursday that if you reduce infantry battalions you thereby reduce the value as a fighting machine of your Regular Army. As a matter of fact the value from a purely military and fighting point of view of an infantry battalion per se is a very indefinite thing. It may be of no more use to you than a bottle of Worcester sauce would be if you had no cold mutton to eat it with. It is fair to regard these reductions from the point of view of divisions, and not from that of single units. The noble Duke, the Duke of Bedford, on Thursday drew a lurid picture of the position of a battalion coming out of action with only 300 men and having to be filled up with 700 or 800 Special Reservists. He asked what would be the fighting value of that unit. That raises a very important point, but it only touches on the fringe of it. I believe the usual military procedure in the case of a battalion which has incurred disaster and been cut up is to send it down the lines of communication, and replace it by another battalion. The noble Duke spoke of the men not knowing one another. But what about generals commanding divisions not knowing the officers under them, not knowing who are trustworthy and who are rash, not knowing the men who are slow and those who are quick? That is a part of military organisation to which no attention has been given hitherto. It is not the object of Army organisation to produce a number of single units; but hitherto the British Army has always gone out to fight as a scratch crew. In South Africa there was only one brigade whose units had trained together in peace time. If a proper organisation and a training machine for the army in the field can be secured, the country will have obtained an important military asset very cheaply at the price of these reductions.
I pass to the speech of the noble and gallant Field-Marshal on the cross benches. I think anyone reading that speech could not fail to interpret it as a sweeping condemnation 125 of the whole idea and the whole principle of the Territorial Force. The noble and gallant Field-Marshal confined his remarks to the artillery, but I think he will agree that what he said about the artillery applied equally to the other branches of the Territorial Army.
§ EARL ROBERTSNo, certainly not. The artillery is the most scientific branch, and requires a training that is not necessary to the other branches to the same extent. You might raise infantry quickly if you had the officers, but you could not do that with artillery. In saying that, I was supported, not only by artillery officers, but by every officer in this country who has seen service. I hope it will not be thought that I was condemning the whole of the Territorial Army. I thought the framework of that Army was what we wanted, but you must fill it up properly, and you cannot fill it properly with untrained artillery.
*LORD LUCASWould the noble and gallant Field-Marshal say that a fortnight's annual training is enough for cavalry having to operate in the most difficult country in the world? And what about the Staff? After all, that requires more training than any other part of the Army.
§ EARL ROBERTSIf you are going to have a fortnight's training for the cavalry and for the staff, you will have no Army at all.
*LORD LUCASThen I do not think I was wrong in saying that the noble and gallant Field-Marshal's speech implied a sweeping condemnation of the whole of the Territorial Army. Because that Army cannot beat off a surprise attack at the outset of a war it is to be condemned. But that is not the function of any second line army. Mr. Haldane and his advisers have no delusion on this head. They have maintained all through that you were not going to get a Territorial Army that was fit to face the enemy at once on the outbreak of war. I think I am not overstating the position when I say that it is impossible for a man to combine a strenuous civil profession with the necessary amount of 126 military training to enable him to go out straight from his home and face a highly-trained enemy. The Army Council realise the absolute truth of the statement of the Norfolk Committee, that if the purpose is to produce a force which can be relied upon to turn out at short notice and defeat an invader, then improvements in the Militia and Volunteer Forces will not be sufficient. This scheme amounts to improvements in the Militia and Volunteer Forces, and therefore, Mr. Haldane and his advisers do not anticipate that the Territorial Army is going to be able to turn out at once, without further training, to resist the best-trained troops that could be put against them. If you contend that a second line Army is going to be of no use you must, to be consistent, show that the Militia has never been of use in this country all through its history. I do not think anyone will go as far as that. The only possible solution of the position raised by the noble and gallant Field-Marshal seems to be this, that if you cannot defend your coasts from invasion during the early months of a war it is absolute madness to send the whole of the Regular Army out of the country. You must keep two or three divisions at home, and, if you do that, you will still have as big a force capable of being sent straight away as it took five months to send to South Africa. But that was not the solution given by the noble and gallant Field-Marshal. His solution was that you should give up the idea of raising Territorial Field Artillery and keep Regular Field Artillery in this country. According to his view, therefore, the idea of raising field artillery for the Territorial Army must be abandoned. That means that the Territorial Army can never be an Army in the true sense of the word. However long a war may last, however long the Territorial Force may remain embodied it will never be able to defend this country without the help of Regulars because it will have lost all semblance of being an Army.
§ EARL ROBERTSIf it is only a semblance it is a sham Army.
*LORD LUCASIf that view is to prevail the County Associations may as well be disbanded at once, and the Volunteers 127 be allowed to slip back into the slough of disorganisation from which we are raising them and abandon the idea of a second line Army to be gradually moulded and trained so as to be fit in the great crisis of war to defend this country and to fight side by side with the Regulars. Last year the noble Field-Marshal gave a qualified blessing to this scheme. Now, when a critical stage in its development has been reached, and every one was looking for a few words of encouragement from the noble Field-Marshal, he passes this heavy sentence on a yet unborn child because it cannot carry out functions which it was never intended to carry out. I can only regard that as likely to make the task of the County Associations heavier and more difficult than it is at the present time.
LORD WYNFORDMy Lords, as one who has served in the horse and field artillery for a period of sixteen years I ask your Lordships' indulgence while I say a few words on this matter as affecting field artillery. Notwithstanding the explanations which were given by the noble Earl the Under-Secretary last Thursday, and by the noble Lord who has just sat down, I think that this Return which has been the subject of debate shows a very unsatisfactory state of affairs as regards that branch of the service. According to this Return we have at the present moment only 9,800 rank and file Regular field artillerymen fit for service. Our expeditionary force will consist of sixty-six field artillery batteries, and their complement at war strength of rank and file, including brigade ammunition columns and first line reinforcements, is 18,600. Now suppose we had had to mobilise on 1st February this year, and suppose, too, that we had had sufficient special reservists to man divisional ammunition columns, we should have had to make up the expeditionary force with 8,800 rank and file Reservists—nearly half the force—and, in addition, denude the remaining thirty-three batteries.
How, my Lords, can we afford to de duct from our present number of efficient men 2,400, the number which the Government contemplate reducing? I think 128 the margin is far too narrow already, when we consider that we have to allow further for reinforcements to India and for the wastage of war, and, in addition to this, that our Reserve will be decreasing annually. Are we to infer that these Special Reservists will be employed in the brigade ammunition columns as well as in the divisional ammunition columns. If so, I think it is dangerous, as it brings them one step nearer the firing line, and I am of opinion that these men will never be fit to take their place in the firing line. They may not be intended to do so, but they are bound to as casualties occur, and it must be remembered that in our latest experience of war we had no trained artillery opposing us and few casualties to replace compared to what we may expect in a campaign against trained gunners. The artillery of the Special Contingent will prove useful in the divisional ammunition columns, and I think the country should be grateful to Mr. Haldane for this provision; but to expect these men, with six months' or even a year's training, to take their place in the firing line is absurd.
I hope the noble and gallant Field-Marshal Lord Roberts will not think me presumptuous, bearing in mind the smallness of my experience compared to his, when I say that I entirely agree with him that partially trained artillery will only be a danger to their own side. I have no faith whatever in artillery which is not properly and fully trained. The noble Viscount Lord Midleton referred in his speech to a lecture given by a very able officer—Captain Vincent—at the United Service Institution in December last, and he quoted some remarks made by General Sir Ian Hamilton at the conclusion of that lecture. Sir Ian Hamilton disagreed with an opinion expressed by the lecturer, but—and this is a point I do not think the noble Viscount brought out—he concluded his remarks by saying that he gave his opinion merely as an infantry officer. A battery in the field is, or should be, the highest trained unit in our Army; it is a machine in which each man forms one of many essential component parts, and any little mistake on the part of one of those men may render the whole machine absolutely useless, and mean disaster to the force of which it forms a unit.
129 In the Memorandum presented to this House last August, entitled "The principles to be kept in view in training the Territorial Force and Special Contingent," it is directed that gun practice for the Artillery Special Contingent is to be carried out in four years out of every six. That is very false economy; but I pass that over because a more important point follows. The training of specialists is very casually laid down. These specialists consist of layers, signallers, range-takers, observers, patrols, etc. They form a considerable portion of a battery—in fact, nearly 50 per cent. of the gunners in the firing line. Now, these specialists cannot possibly be trained in six months with a casual rubbing up every year for fifteen days. To be of any service at all these men require continual training. It is of no use saying that we are going to have four or five times as many men. Five men cannot combine their mental ability and training at will in one of themslves, they cannot all look through one telescope at one time or all wave one flag. My Lords, too many cooks spoil the broth, and it is quality we want rather than quantity. It is for this reason that I view with much concern the reduction of these 2,400 trained men whom we now have. We are told they are not reduced yet, and I hope the Government will see their way to retain these men, if only on the three years service system as suggested by the noble Viscount Lord Midleton. We should then have them continually going through the mill and passing to the Reserve, having learnt, in addition to their drill, those habits of discipline which are so essential to an efficient Army.
There is a point as regards the Special Contingent which I do not think has been touched on yet. These training brigades are already being reduced to mere skeletons, and I presume will be further reduced when there are five partially trained men to every one of those 2,400. May I ask whether the officers are going to be eventually reduced in the same proportions, and, if not, how are these Regular officers, with practically no men and no horses, to keep themselves up to that pitch of excellence which is expected of them? If they are to be reduced, is it possible 130 that His Majesty's Government intend to replace each of them by five officers of the Special Contingent? I have the greatest admiration for those officers of the Special Reserve Artillery who attempt to become efficient, but to become an efficient artillery officer one must start young and devote one's whole service to it; and I do not see how it is possible for these officers, with the best will in the world, to reach that standard which will enable them to take their place in a battery on service. I notice, however, that the supply and training of these officers is still under consideration by a Committee dealing with this subject, and I shall look forward to a further Memorandum at a future date. I would not have addressed your Lordships but that I feel considerable misgiving about the policy of His Majesty's Government as regards the field artillery, and I am firmly convinced that a very large majority of artillery officers hold the same views as myself. I must apologise for going into a few technical details, but I have endeavoured to put the importance of this question before your Lordships to the best of my ability.
LORD RAGLANMy Lords, I have listened with the greatest possible interest to the speeches that have been, delivered from both sides of the House, and I venture to think the noble Lord who addressed us last from the Government Benches endeavoured to do what we on this side have tried to prevent—namely, to switch off the discussion from the Regular Army to a panegyric on a force which does not exist, and which, in my opinion, never will exist, at any rate in the numbers the Secretary of State imagines. The noble Viscount Lord Midleton drew attention to three matters of great importance: (1) The loss of numbers in the Regular Army; (2) the loss of quality; and (3) the very serious position in which the country is now placed by being deprived of all assurance that there is any military approbation behind these changes. A reduction of 30,000 men and 500 officers would be a serious question for any Army in the world, and it is particularly so in the case of a small Army like our own. And when on the top of the reduction in numbers there is a great 131 falling off in quality, then the position becomes dangerous. The noble Earl the Under-Secretary, in endeavouring to answer my noble friend, said that this was entirely my noble friend's fault, and was due to the introduction of the three years system. I cannot agree with that, because a considerable time has elapsed since the three years system of enlistment came to an end, and there has been ample time to have recovered from that experiment.
When we examine the White Paper laid before your Lordships and to which the noble Viscount has drawn attention, we cannot fail to see that the numbers of the Regular Army have been allowed to fall to a very dangerous point; and I think it is most unfortunate that no attempt seems to have been made by the War Office to rectify this state of things, although they saw it happening. The noble Earl, replying to the criticism regarding the reductions in the artillery, said that no reduction had been made in horse and field artillery. He avoided all allusion to garrison artillery, in connection with which there has been a reduction of something like 5,000 men. The garrison artillery are physically and intellectually the picked soldiers of the British Army, and as long as you have these men behind the field artillery it was always possible to utilise them in filling up deficiencies. But this reserve will be lost to the field artillery in the future. I am credibly informed that the permanent staff of the Militia artillery is to be very largely reduced if not done away with altogether, and I wish to know if this reduction is to be over and above the present reduction or to be part of the 2,400 of which we have heard so much. The noble Earl repeated the misleading statement with regard to the forty-two batteries; over and over again it has been explained that the fact that those batteries had been but recently raised had prevented them from creating their reserve. Notwithstanding that, however, the noble Earl repeated the statement that such was the state of of the Reserve that no more than forty-two batteries could be raised.
Lord Lucas made some attempt to answer the very serious speech of the noble and gallant Earl on the cross 132 benches. I venture to think that that speech was one of the most serious made in your Lordships' House for a considerable time, and I hope something will yet be forthcoming from His Majesty's Government to mitigate the effect of that speech and to reassure us a little more. Lord Lucas said that if the noble and gallant Earl did not think a fortnight's training sufficient for artillery, how was it possible to train cavalry and infantry in that period? I venture to think that that part of the noble Lord's speech was one of the strongest indictments of the Territorial Force as a whole. I will not labour the point of the Territorial artillery, for I do not think anything I could say would add to the effect of the very serious words which fell from the noble and gallant Field-Marshal. I have never yet come across any soldier who believes it possible to form batteries of artillery with the absolutely inadequate training proposed. Lord Lucas made the remarkable statement that no previous attempt had been made at the organisation of the British Army. My memory is not quite so short as that. I remember the attempt that was made by my noble friend below me to organise the Army in Army Corps, and the contempt which was poured upon his efforts by the then Opposition, now His Majesty's Government. Therefore the noble Lord is not correct in saying that the organisation of the Army had not been attempted before.
Then the noble Lord said it does not matter whether you disband battalions, because the important thing is to have divisions and brigades fully organised for war. Well, I would much rather have a scratch brigade composed of well-organised battalions than I would have a well-organised brigade composed entirely of scratch battalions. I cannot help thinking that that must be the inevitable effect of the new organisation as proposed by the Secretary of State for War. Lord Lucas also said that it was for this system of organisation and for this magnificent Territorial Army that we had paid the price of these reductions. We have paid the price, but we have not got the article for which we have paid; and I have extreme doubt 133 whether we shall ever get that article. The noble Earl the Under-Secretary, in the course of his remarks, made some reference to the duty of the military members of the Army Council. I am always sorry that in these debates we do not have the advantage of the presence on the cross benches of the noble Viscount who was at the head of the celebrated triumvirate to which reference has been made in the course of this debate; because it is possible for two people to read the same passages and arrive at exactly opposite conclusions as to what they were intended to convey. I am bound to say that I agree with the noble Earl that if the military members are not satisfied with the proposals of the Secretary of State, then it is their duty to show their dissatisfaction by resignation. That is all very well, but they do not resign. The Army Council appear to have blessed with equal unanimity the scheme of Mr. Arnold-Forster and the scheme of the present Secretary of State. They are complete changes in half a dozen different ways, the present scheme constituting reversals of all previous military advice given to the Secretary of State. After the statement of the Under-Secretary, I suppose we must assume that these officers approve of these kaleidoscopic changes, for they do not resign.
In my opinion it is the business of the Inspector-General to act as the auditor of the nation in regard to our land forces, and the doctrine laid down by the noble Earl the Under-Secretary that the Reports of the Inspector-General were for the private information of the Army Council is not my idea of the duties of an auditor. The auditor of a company is appointed by the shareholders, and it is his business to certify to the accuracy of the accounts. What would be said of a company who contended that the auditor was the servant of, and worked under, the directors, and that his report on the state of the company was entirely for the private ear of the directors? That seems to me to be the War Office idea of an auditor. All I can say is that it is not mine. We have paid the price; there have been destroyed 30,000 men of the Regular Army, and 90,000 of the Militia; what are we going to get for it? 134 We have got nominally a saving of £1,000,000. Will any one on the Treasury Bench assure me that that £1,000,000 has not been obtained by starving the stores? Are the mobilisation stores in a complete state? Is there any surplus ammunition? We have paid the price; are we ever going to get the article?
LORD LOVATMy Lords, I would like to occupy a few moments of your Lordships' time to call attention to one or two points on which we differ from the Secretary of State for War. It has been inferred from the other side of the House that we have changed our opinion on the subject of the Territorial Army, and that what we backed at one period we now condemn. I think the boot is on the other foot, and that some of the promises in regard to training and organisation which were held out when the Territorial Army was being thought of have not materialised. On the subject of training I do not think it is necessary to say anything as regards the artillery, because that point has been admirably dealt with by my noble friend on my right.
As regards the Yeomanry, we were told that enormous strides were to be made in the matter of training, but I maintain that the Yeomanry now will not be as well trained as under the old state of things. As to mobilisation, one of the reasons why we were all anxious to see the scheme come into operation was that we felt that the question of mobilisation was going to be definitely tackled. Many noble Lords twitted the late Government with the fact that, although a mobilisation scheme was promised every year, no scheme arrived. Not only have we not got a mobilisation scheme now, but I do not think we have any chance of ever getting one. May I give your Lordships a statement of what the mobilisation arrangements are? The other day a document was received by the County Associations to the effect that the Army Council consider it most important that the Territorial Force should not, in the event of a general or partial mobilisation, start their horse purchasing operations until the units of the expeditionary force have been completed with the 135 horses required. That means that the mobilisation of the Territorial Army cannot begin until the whole of the horses of the expeditionary force are purchased. It is no good mobilising an Army without horses, and if you have to wait until the whole of the 59,000 horses required for the expeditionary force have been procured, how can you say that any advance in regard to mobilisation has been made? Yet, as I have said, one of the reasons why many persons have been anxious to see the new scheme put into operation was precisely their belief that the mobilisation question was to be definitely tackled.
We were told that the deficiency of from 8,000 to 11,000 officers was going to be dealt with, and £50,000 was put into last year's Estimates in connection with the matter. I believe, however, that not a farthing of that money has been spent on officers, apart from the expenses of the Commissioners who sat to elaborate a scheme. Then I understand that the whole of the benefit of the scheme which was formulated was cut out by reducing the pay the officers were to get. I speak as one who is a believer in the Teritorial Scheme if it is given a chance. If it is going to be starved for money I do not believe in it. I fear that at the present moment the Secretary of State for War is looking, not to those who are backing up his scheme and trying to carry it through—and none are more prominent in this direction than Members of your Lordships' House—but to the extreme Left of his own Party. But is he getting much help there? Are the trade unions coming forward to give him the men? I doubt it. If Mr. Haldane wishes to carry out his organisation and get his men he would surely do better to look to those who have helped him.
There is another point on which we have a difference with the Secretary of State. I refer to the promise which was given that nothing should be taken away until some definite substitute could be put in its place. I agree with the noble Lord opposite as regards the deplorable state in point of numbers of the British Army at the present time. There is some limit to the power of men serving with the colours to absorb 136 Reservists and keep up the efficiency of the unit as a whole, and the only class who could give trustworthy information on this matter—the captain or subaltern of a regiment—was not represented by the witnesses called before the Elgin Commission. If inquiries were made among that class it would probably be found that the opinion is that when a limit of 50 per cent. is passed the decrease of efficiency goes down at a rate which is geometrical rather than arithmetical. Then, as regards the question of the numbers in a battalion and the efficiency of each unit at war strength, what is important is not only their value per se, but as compared to, say, the most efficient unit of the German Army. After all, the point of consideration in regard to a battalion at war strength is that it has to fight somebody, and therefore, it is reasonable to ask how those men could compete with battalions they may have to face.
In the German Army all the men join after their twentieth year—from twenty to twenty-three years of age. The battalions on a peace basis are from 590 to 630, and in one case, that of the rifles, from 630 to 683. Then they have men who have done their term with the colours, and go on and serve as sort of minor non-commissioned officers, and they add to the efficiency of the corps. Then they have their Reservists; they are not brought out in driblets to be trained, but 345,000 are brought out in the year. These matters are thoroughly gone into in Germany and not left to chance. Moreover, they have added enormously to their number of subalterns and have excellent classes for training them. If one of our attenuated battalions was asked to compete against a German battalion, can you expect them to meet on anything like equal terms? I do not wish to touch on the subject of the artillery, but there is one question I should like to ask regarding the actual conditions under which the Regular Artillery is trained. The artillery officers tell me they have only sixty horses per battery. Yet our artillery is the most essential part of our forces. I understand from a statement made in another place by Sir Charles Dilke, who is always well informed on 137 Army affairs, that our horses have gone down by some 800 as compared with last year, and from what one hears it is clear that 1,500 artillery horses are long passed casting age.
There is one other point to which I should like to refer. The Secretary of State for War, speaking in another place, said that in certain circumstances we might require two divisions for service at home in case of invasion. That would at once lower the expeditionary force, but the statement shows that we are at last approaching some point of sanity on the subject of the possibility of invasion. We have arrived at a point when, apparently, the possibility of invasion is to be believed in. Then we have been told that we cannot expect the Territorial Force to be ready at once to act. I believe, however, that the infantry and cavalry could give a very good account of themselves. After all, the question is whether the force will be sufficient, with its small battalions and artillery not trained, to cope with the possibility of an invasion. I venture to think that His Majesty's Government are incurring a grave danger by taking a single man off the Regular Army, or reducing a single unit, whether Territorial or Regular.
LORD HARRISMy Lords, I hope that before this debate closes, or at some early date, we may get some more satisfactory reply from the Government to the criticisms of the noble and gallant Earl on the cross benches, with regard to the use of the Territorial Artillery. I am sure we must all sympathise with the noble Lord on the back benches opposite, Lord Lucas. The noble Lord complained of the change as regards the treatment of this beloved child of the present Secretary of State for War, which, he said, started on its career with so many congratulations last year, but now suddenly, at a most critical period of its existence, found itself severely criticised. The noble Lord's evident enthusiasm for the scheme arouses one's sympathy; but I hope he will not think me uncomplimentary if I say that his answer to the criticisms of the noble and gallant Field-Marshall was a feeble one.
138 The noble Lord fell back upon the Report of the Norfolk Commission, who stated that our Auxiliary forces were not fit to be put in the field against first-class troops. He fell back upon that as an excuse for not improving the Auxiliary Army at all. If the noble Lord thinks that, as regards the training of troops and their use in the field, any orders that have been issued are going to change the character of the Auxiliary Army, I can assure him he is very much mistaken. There is not a single order that has been issued that is going to alter one iota the character or utility, as far as units go, of the present Auxiliary Army. In fact, in one small point their efficiency is likely to be reduced. The Secretary of State is being criticised by his own Party for being extravagant in regard to the Territorial Army. Well, he has effected one or two small economies. He has cut down the Yeomanry by a day, and though a field officer is entitled to forage for three or four horses he will only get railway carriage for one, so that he will be discouraged from bringing more than one horse.
I protest against the idea that, at any rate, two branches of the Territorial Army are of no use in case of sudden attack. That may have been said by the Norfolk Commission, but I do not agree with it. I maintain that a Yeomanry regiment, composed of men who can ride and shoot and look after horses in camp, would be of use even in a sudden emergency. What chance under the present scheme has the War Office of horsing either the Territorial Artillery or the Yeomanry in case of sudden engagement? I protest against the noble Lord's assertion that the Territorial Army is not meant for the purpose of resisting sudden invasion. Why, the whole object of raising the Yeomanry and the Volunteers was to resist sudden invasion, and the conditions of service show that that was the intention. To suggest now that this Auxiliary Army has never been of any use for the defence of the country and that the Territorial Army is going to be of use, is an assumption in favour of the scheme of the War Office which I most decidedly refuse to accept.
I remember asking Lord Wolseley what he would do in the event of a sudden 139 raid on the shores of England, and he replied—
I would pour Volunteers on them.That would be the use of these bodies all round the coast. They could be on the spot quicker than Regular troops in a great many cases. I ask what are the chances at the present moment of the War Office being able to horse either the Territorial batteries or the Yeomanry? The instructions we have received, one of which was referred to by my noble friend Lord Lovat, show that we are to do nothing. I have never been a believer in the County Associations. The War Office could have done everything by Royal Warrant; they had no occasion to set up any of these petty War Offices. I hold His Majesty's Commission, and it is my business to carry out orders and try to make a success of this scheme. One order issued is that we are to do nothing with regard to horses until the Army is satisfied. That is discouraging, and I hope we may receive some instructions from the War Office which would enable us to set about a practical scheme of registration for the mounted branches of the Territorial Army. I believe it would be perfectly feasible without interfering with what the Regular Army may want. I believe it would be feasible for the Association to set on foot within its own area a scheme which would not be expensive, but would enable officers commanding mounted units to lay their hands upon the horses that are wanted in so short a space of time that their units could be mobilised and put into the field at least two days quicker than under the present mobilisation orders of the War Office.
§ *THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEMy Lords, the debate which has been continued to-night from last week must, I think, be regarded by most of your Lordships, and I think it will be so regarded by the public outside, as distinctly discouraging. I share the hope expressed by my noble friend who has just sat down that the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who has some expert knowledge of Army matters, will be able to give us information more satisfactory than that which we have up to the present moment been able to elicit from the representatives of His Majesty's Government.
140 I am not going to travel again in detail over the points which have been so well dealt with by my noble friends behind me. Some of their comments have not been traversed, and are not likely to be traversed. There is, in the first place, the question of the reduction of the strength of the Regular Army. It is admitted that the Army has been weakened by something like 36,000 men, including 500 officers and some 2,000 or 3,000 non-commissioned officers, and that nine or ten valuable units disappear from the Army List. The noble Lord who spoke from the second bench opposite in support of the War Office said that these reductions must be considered with reference to the whole scheme of Army reform, and we are quite ready to consider them with reference to the whole scheme; our object is to look about and see in what part of the scheme we are to find compensation for this undoubted weakening of the fighting strength of the Army.
Then there is the reduction of the establishments of the home battalions from 800 to 720 men. The noble Lord who spoke for the Government told us that we ought not to fix our attention too much on single units, that the value of a single unit is a very indefinite thing, and that the reduction of the unit beyond a certain number of men does not after all matter very much. I recall a statement made by the Under-Secretary the other evening when he gave us much valuable information as to the duties and functions of the home battalions, of which he spoke with thorough knowledge. These home battalions have to supply drafts to the battalions abroad, they have to train men, and have on occasion to appear in the rôle of fighting units when duly reinforced by their proper quota of Army Reservists. These are very heavy duties, and I have always believed that if you impose them on a battalion of insufficient strength, you run a fair chance of breaking the heart of the battalion. We were, at any rate, firmly convinced that an increase in the strength of these battalions was essential, and I very much regret that His Majesty's Government propose to undo what we did.
§ THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTHI am sorry to interrupt the noble Marquess, but I stated distinctly, in the course of my speech, that upon this question the Government were quite prepared for reconsideration, and, if necessary, for increase of the establishment when recruiting became normal again.
§ *THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI was about to refer to that. I understand from the noble Earl that the Government are not wholly committed to this reduction, and that when the prospects of recruiting become better, the War Office, with an open mind, will be prepared to consider a return to the old strength. I am glad to have elicited that statement from my noble friend. There is another matter, upon which I do not wish to dwell too much, and that is the effect of these reductions on the strength of the Army Reserve. The Commission presided over by the noble Earl opposite was, if I remember right, emphatic as to the need of a strong Reserve and as to the value of these Army Reservists when they took their place in the battalions which we sent out to South Africa. I therefore greatly regret any changes which will tend in the direction of reducing the strength of that Reserve. It is quite true that at the present moment the Reserve is very strong, but we have to look ahead to the time when the three years men brought in by my noble friend behind me will terminate their period of service End when the strength of the Reserves must drop suddenly and to a very marked extent. All the changes the Secretary of State for War is introducing tend, and must tend, to reduce the Reserves. The matter is capable of mathematical demonstration, you cannot have weaker units and fewer units with a longer term of colour service without automatically weakening the Reserve-producing power of those units.
We are told to look for compensation to the new Special Reserve which His Majesty's Government will call into existence, bat the statements to which I have listened with regard to the Special Reserve, I must say, fill me with considerable misgiving. In point of numbers, they will be fewer than the old 142 Militia, and what will they be in point of quality? Their functions will be to feed the Line, for which they will require some 10,000 men per annum; they will have to make good the wastage of the Reserve, which will require about 11,000 men annually; and, in addition to these functions, they are expected to maintain a somewhat precarious existence as a unit of a kind.
And what kind of a unit will they be, recruited as they are to be recruited? The best men will pass out, and there will remain in the battalion a residuum of the least fit of the lads who enter. Besides this, you are going, I understand, to get rid of all the men over thirty, a change which will still further add to the youth of these so called battalions. When I am told to look for compensation to the Special Reserve, I ask myself what sort of recruits will the Special Reserve pour into the fighting line in the place of the seven years men, thoroughly trained, seasoned and disciplined, to whom we were accustomed in the past? The Secretary of State for War has told the public that the fighting first line of the Army is now organised as it has never been organised before, and that when, in time of need, a great commander steps forward he will find an instrument to his hand at least scientifically more perfect than it has ever been before. Well, I do not know what may be the scientific perfection of the instrument, but when I consider its practical value I fail to see how there is a great improvement on the instrument we have known in the past.
I wish in particular to say a few words on the subject of the artillery. When the Government of the late Lord Salisbury were in power the question of the artillery was very carefully considered by His Majesty's then advisers. Before the South African War we had added fifteen batteries, and by the time we went out of office we, had added in round figures, about sixty. I know I shall be told that these batteries thus suddenly called into existence were without their full complement of Reserves and that consequently it was impossible to mobilise them. But no one ever pretended that you could call a battery of artillery with 143 the necessary Reserves into existence by a mere stroke of the pen, any more than His Majesty's Government can call a new Territorial Army and Special Reserve into existence by merely preparing a paper scheme for the purpose.
I was rather amused when the Under-Secretary revealed to us as a new discovery that the proper complement of guns was five to every 1,000 men. The discovery is a very old one. I have in my possession a copy of a Minute which I prepared for Lord Salisbury's Government, in which I applied—advised by Lord Wolseley who was then Commander-in-Chief—for the increase of artillery to which I just now referred, upon the ground that it was necessary, in order to give us the very proportion of five guns per 1,000 men which apparently now finds favour with the military advisers of the Crown. We instituted this important increase of artillery, and I cannot help regarding it as most unfortunate that a large proportion of the batteries then added to the artillery are now to be reduced, to mere training batteries with only two guns apiece. I understand there are to be something like forty men per battery, and the gaps are to be filled up by men trained on a Militia basis, who must naturally be unfit to take the place of skilled men in the field.
I will not refer to the matter further, for it has been thoroughly dealt with by Lord Wynford, who has addressed us this evening for the first time with a knowledge of the subject derived from the fact that he had for some time the honour of holding a Commission in the Royal Artillery; but I desire to say a few words in regard to the artillery of the Territorial Army. I understand that the same proportion of five guns per 1,000 men is to obtain in the Territorial Army, and that 196 batteries of artillery are to be created. I can only describe this as a most tremendous plunge. Are we sure that we can get the men? Are we going to get officers? Are we sure of getting horses? Are there reasonable grounds for believing that ranges will be available? And when you have got all these things, are there sufficient reasons for believing that under the conditions 144 that will prevail you will attain that degree of efficiency without which artillery is not only useless, but much worse than useless? The speech of the noble and gallant Field-Marshal holds the field. Lord Lucas treated my noble and gallant friend not quite fairly, because he represented him as having denounced the whole Territorial Force, lock, stock, and barrel. But, if I remember aright, my noble friend went out of his way to express his obligation to Mr. Haldane for having created the Territorial Force, and it was only with regard to the artillery of that force that he spoke strongly. My noble friend voiced the general uneasiness of the public in regard to this question, and he voiced, not only that, but I believe the unanimous opinion of every officer who has ever made public his view with regard to the artillery question, and of every soldier of eminence, from Napoleon I. down to the present Army Council.
What was the noble and gallant Earl's description of the Territorial Artillery? He said that, even if we could get them and mobilise them in time, they would be useless against professional troops. Surely we must make our calculations on the assumption that it is professional troops that they will be called upon to meet. But I may be told that after all this Territorial Artillery is the best that we can get and that we must be grateful for it, and that they will make up in point of number for what they lack in point of quality. I am afraid that that statement cannot be reconciled with the statement of the noble and gallant Field-Marshal; for he told us that not only would these insufficiently trained artillerists be useless, but that they would be a source of positive danger to those with whom they serve. And he went so far as to say that the penalty they would pay in action for their want of sufficient training and discipline would be the penalty of annihilation. That is a serious statement coming from so high an authority, and we have a right to ask whether that statement is seriously challenged, and, if so, on what authority it is challenged. All that I and my friends, who have also served at the War Office, can say on that point is that our military advisers gave us 145 a clear and unambiguous opinion on the value of this partially trained artillery.
Unless the noble Earl's statement can be challenged, and unless the impression which that statement created can be removed, then I venture to say that His Majesty's Government can scarcely do otherwise than reconsider their whole position with regard to this question of the Territorial Artillery. I say that they should do so not only because it is due to the public generally, but because they are bound to do it in fairness to the County Associations which they have called into existence all over the country. You have given these County Associations a very hard task, but the hardest nut you have given them to crack is this formation of batteries of artillery. If they are to approach that task without a reasonable prospect of success, I say you are imposing on them a burden which you ought not to ask them to bear. I can scarcely resist repeating a conversation which I had the other day with a friend of mine to whom it was suggested that he might aid a County Association, with which I am connected, in raising artillery. He said—
I will do anything that the Association asks me to do; but if you ask me to raise artillery, I cannot help asking myself what kind of artillery I am likely to be able to raise in this part of England, and whether I may not produce something which is of no value.That feeling prevails in many parts of the country.The Secretary of State for War the other day announced that it was impossible to put heart into the Territorial Forces unless we showed that we relied on them for all arms of the Service. I think that is a statement that requires careful examination. I endeavour to project my mind into the future and to imagine a body of Territorial troops engaged with the enemy, and I ask myself whether it would put more heart into them to know that they were supported by, let us say, a brigade of Regular Artillery, or, let us say, by two brigades of the home-made article. I will ask a question on this point. Are noble Lords opposite able to point to any foreign country in which an experiment anything like this is being tried? I think I can tell them of one, if not of two cases, which scarcely fit in with their 146 theory. I am told on what I believe to be good authority that in Austria it has been thought desirable lately, to attach Regular Artillery to the Territorial troops, and I am told that in Switzerland the artillery has lately been taken away from the Cantons and placed under the Federal Government for the reason that the Cantonal Artillery was thought to be not sufficiently trained or qualified.
I am not going to suggest to His Majesty's Government that they should drop their scheme. But what I do suggest, and earnestly beg that they will take into consideration, is that before they commit themselves beyond recall to this colossal project of raising 196 batteries of Territorial Artillery, they will try the experiment in a few carefully selected districts. If it succeeds, by all means let them push the experiment further, and no one will be better pleased than the noble and gallant Field-Marshal if he finds that his anticipations are mistaken.
There is only one other point on which I need say anything more. My noble friend has moved for Papers. The Under-Secretary gave a two-fold answer. He said, in the first place, that he would not produce the Papers, and, in the second place, that there were no Papers to produce. He said that there were no decisions, no records, and no minutes.
§ THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTHI said that the matter was discussed at a meeting of the Army Council, but that there were no minutes.
§ *THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEIf there is no official document which can be given to the House, is it impossible for the noble Earl to find some means at any rate of informing the public how it is that this tremendous revolution in military opinion has been produced? If there are grounds for such a complete departure from the old traditions, let the public know them, and, above all, let the County Associations know what the grounds are.
As for the Report of the Inspector-General, of course if that is a privileged document we shall not press for its production. But there, again, I must say, that it seems to me a little 147 hard that nothing should be given to Parliament and the public. I ask you to remember that the appointment of an Inspector-General, who was to be regarded as the Auditor-General of the public in regard to military questions, took place concurrently with the abolition of the appointment of Commander-in-Chief. In the distribution of duties that prevailed before that abolition, the Commander-in-Chief was entrusted with the general command and inspection of the Forces. The Commander-in-Chief was usually a Member of this House. He frequently took part in our discussions, and it was always possible for him to reassure the public, or perhaps sometimes to alarm the public, if he thought it necessary. But the Inspector-General is a much more remote and impalpable person, and if we are to get nothing from him, I do think that those who take an interest in the efficiency of the Army have some cause to complain. At any rate, I trust that some means will be found to give to Parliament and the public a general idea at all events of the grounds on which this new departure in the artillery has been decided on.
*THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (The Earl of ELGIN)My Lords, I shall at this hour of the evening say what I have to say in as few words as possible; and partly for that reason, and partly because I do not feel that I am competent to answer Questions of detail, I am afraid I cannot attempt to reply to some of the many questions which have been put by noble Lords on the other side of the House. But I wish to reply definitely and distinctly to one of them—to the question of stores for the Territorial Army. I have to say that there has been no reduction in the stores of the Regular Army, and the guns and ammunition for the Territorial Force are surplus to the requirements of the Regulars. I was surprised to hear what Lord Harris said on the subject of the provision of horses, because I myself, as president of a County Association, have already been consulting with the chairman as to the provision of horses in my county. I have no doubt the noble Lord is correct with regard to the Papers issued, but I 148 think it stands to reason that the County Associations would be well advised as soon as possible to exert themselves in regard to the provision of horses.
LORD HARRISWe have been distinctly told we are not to do anything with regard to horses until the Army is satisfied.
§ *THE EARL OF ELGINI do not mean that we should interfere with the Army The noble Marquess appealed to me on the ground of my having some acquaintance with military affairs to say whether the Reservists who were called into the ranks in the South African war were fit for the purpose to which they were put. I certainly can endorse the statement that this was the opinion of the Commission. As far as the numbers of the Reservists were concerned, they were then supplied under the system of enlistment now again in force, and the Special Reserves would, at any rate, have as much training as, if not more than the Militia. In the opinion of those who are qualified to judge, we ought to have in the Special Reserve men as capable of serving with the Line as the Militia Reserve formerly was. The noble Lord who opened this debate was not quite fair to the Secretary of State. He said that the Secretary for War was drawing away the public mind from the Regular Army, his references to which were an oasis in the desert of references to the Territorial Army.
§ VISCOUNT MIDLETONHear, hear.
§ *THE EARL OF ELGINBut the noble Viscount has forgotten how long it is since he has been out of office, because if my right hon. friend is able now to argue the case of the Territorial Army with energy it is because in 1906 he dealt first with the Regulars. I think also that the noble Lord is not quite fair in asking for the views of the expert advisers of the Government. After all, these officers are responsible to the Government. Their advice is freely given to the Secretary of State, but if it was made public that responsibility would become unbearable. The phrase "Auditor-General" was merely a phrase which has 149 been taken to indicate the general position which the Inspector-General should occupy, and not to lay upon him in any sense the special duties which the auditor of a company discharges. But if the noble Lord wants to know how this matter has been dealt with in the past, I would remind him that, in reply to a question in the House of Commons on 15th March, 1905, as to whether he had received the Report of the Inspector-General of the forces for 1904, and whether it was intended to lay it before Parliament, Mr. Arnold-Forster said that the Report had been received by the Army Council, but that it was not intended to make it public, that the essence of a Report of this kind was that it should not be made public. It seems to me that the Secretary of State must necessarily act on the advice he receives from his confidential officers, and that it is impossible to hold that they should be questioned in any way.
A good deal turns on the question, What is expert evidence? Noble Lords know very well from the practice in private Bill Committees how, when expert evidence is produced on one side, it is almost certain to be contradicted by expert evidence on the other side. Military experts are really in the same position. In this connection I can quote the noble and gallant Lord on the cross benches (Lord Roberts). I had once the honour of examining the noble and gallant Lord as an expert, and of putting a question to him which was so essentially for military expert advice that we only consulted three field-marshals. The noble and gallant Lord and another field-marshal gave opinions which were diametrically opposed to each other, and when the third field-marshal was asked for his opinion he declined to give any opinion at all, on the ground that the two former opinions showed that strategy was not an exact science. I never undervalue any opinion which is given by the noble and gallant Lord on a question like this now under discussion. If I did I should stand alone, not only in your Lordships' House, but in the country; and I accept what the noble and gallant Lord stated, that his one desire was to use his experience for the benefit of his country.
150 Not only as a Member of the Government, but as president of a County Association which has been considering what, if any, artillery is to be introduced, I have been personally interested in this question. If it was so clear as it seems to be now to many noble Lords, why was not the question raised during the debates of last year? The main point of the noble Lord's criticism is an expression of his belief that the men would be insufficiently trained. In proof of that contention reliance is placed on the period of training found in the regulations to be observed in ordinary circumstances. Before, however, I accept this proof I would ask whether or not it is a reasonable hypothesis in the case of invasion? I admit that it is not impossible to argue on these lines, but I also hold that it may be represented as going beyond the bounds of reasonable calculations. What does it mean? It means the concurrence of three ex-ordinary events. There must be at one and the same time the despatch of an expeditionary force of 150,000 men; secondly, a disaster to the Fleet which must be sufficiently serious to leave it hors de combat; and, thirdly, there must be an invasion. There is no precedent in the history of this country for a concurrence of these three events.
As far as I know there is only one precedent, viz., that of the South African war to illustrate the first contingency of the despatch of so large a force as 150,000 men. But that is subject to qualification. Lord Lovat suggested that it might turn out to be possible to use only four divisions and to leave two divisions at home. That may be so, but I am considering the case put forward in the debate, and assuming that the whole of the expeditionary force of 150,000 men is to be used. But in this matter events must follow in a sequence. There could be no expeditionary force despatched if the Fleet was disabled before that step was taken. If the Fleet was disabled first, the force would remain at home and become a garrison. If there was no disaster to the Fleet, are we to anticipate a serious invasion? The noble Lord said that we must always expect to have an invasion. 151 Without using the word "raid," may I not put it in this way? Supposing there was an invasion and a foreign force was landed: if the Fleet still held the seas, how would that force be able to get supplies and reinforcements? But, suppose that all went against us, and that the disasters of which I have spoken followed each other in their order. In the first place, the first step to be taken is the despatch of the expeditionary force. How long would it take to despatch a force of 150,000 men across the sea? I think I could ask the noble Marquess to give an opinion on that point with great confidence. In the South African war the pressure to send out troops was enormous. The first troops left this country on 1st August, 1899, and it was not until 31st July, 1900, that 150,000 men were in South Africa. What is to happen during this year? During this year the future garrison of the country, according to the scheme of the Government, will be embodied and trained. Before the last man sailed, therefore, and before any serious disaster happened to the Fleet, there would be in this country a force trained for several months. The force would not only be ready, but would be posted in the position, it was called upon to occupy. No doubt I may be told all this is unproved. How can it be otherwise? But, if anyone accuses the Government of want of preparation, surely it is at least a reply to some extent to say that we have done our best to form a scheme for meeting the emergency, and that we believe, on the strength of our advisers, that it will work.
I should like to say one word to noble Lords opposite. I know that many of them speak and feel with great affection of and belief in the Militia Force in which they have served and which they know so well. I entirely appreciate and sympathise with that position. But may I put it in this way? Parliament has deliberately determined otherwise. Your Lordships' House, joining with the other House of Parliament, has decreed that there should be a new order of things, and His Majesty has enjoined upon us, who represent him in the counties, that we should undertake the duty of organising 152 the new force. Is the course taken by some noble Lords calculated to assist us in that duty? It appears to me that some of the observations, some of the bitterness, which I find in some of the speeches may rather create obstacles and deter men from entering the force. And if I wanted a good illustration of my meaning, I could not have wished anything better than what was said by Lord Dartmouth at the beginning of the debate, when he showed that already he, as Lord Lieutenant of his county, has encountered difficulty, owing to that very cause.
§ VISCOUNT MIDLETONMy Lords, I should not have troubled your Lordships again, but there were one or two statements made by the Colonial Secretary which I can hardly allow to pass unchallenged. The whole course of this debate, so far as it has been conducted by the Government, has been to some extent disappointing to us on this side of the House. Even the noble Earl who has just sat down directed his remarks, not so much to justifying the heavy reductions which have been made in our effective forces, as to endeavouring to show your Lordships and the country that there was no cause for alarm, because some further period of training would be possible for the less effective forces. We have entirely failed in this debate to obtain from the Government any assurance that they will take steps of any sort to improve the condition of the infantry. We welcome from the noble Earl the statement that they have not said the last word; but they speak as if there were only one method of enlistment—the seven years method, and that there were no other men to be got under any circumstances. I hope they will think better of that.
With regard to the artillery, I believe I am expressing the opinion, not only of every noble Lord on this side of the House but of every man who has read this debate, when I say that profound uneasiness will be the result of it. The noble Earl said that I had not been fair to the Secretary of State for War in asking for the opinions of the expert advisers. The last thing in the world I should wish to do would be to be unfair, or even unreasonable, in regard to my inquiries; and if, in asking for the 153 opinion of the expert advisers, I have done anything unfair, I can only say it is a discipline to which I have myself been subjected night after night at the hands of the noble Earl's colleagues in the House of Commons. I have been made specifically to say whether Lord Wolseley was in favour of such and such a course, whether Sir Redvers Buller had given his authority to it, and whether in proposing either an increase, or, in some cases a decrease, we could cite military opinion in favour of our proposal. This debate terminates without any military opinion whatever having been set against the opinion of the noble and gallant Field-Marshal, and the opinion I cited from Lord Wolseley. The noble Earl the Under-Secretary told us, with regard to a particular officer on the Army Council, that he accepted full responsibility; but the noble Earl guarded himself from saying that the officer approved of these reductions.
§ THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTHAs a matter of fact he took full and complete responsibility for the step that was taken. Sir. W. Nicholson joined the Army Council on 18th December, immediately after the Government was formed, and therefore he understood the whole of the change and everything that led up to it.
§ VISCOUNT MIDLETONI really do not wish to push this particular point any further, but it is one thing for a man to say that in view of the whole position placed before him, which includes an amount of money which the Government are going to give—it is one thing to say that in those circumstances we must dispense with this, that, and the other, and it is another thing to express the opinion that the country is safe if that is done. The noble Earl says an officer ought to resign if he does not agree, but we have before us something which is impalpable, a body which sits without minutes and without recorded decisions. I think the opinions of the military advisers will be found to vary very considerably when they are tested from a different standpoint. I only wish to refer to two other points. Lord Lucas did a considerable injustice to the efforts which were made in the War Office under the noble and 154 gallant Field-Marshal when he said there was now an organisation which there had never been before, and that, thanks to that organisation of the Regular troops, it was no longer so material if some of them were reduced. So far as I know, there is absolutely nothing with regard to the expeditionary force which has been changed or improved since the organisation which had the sanction of Lord Roberts.
LORD LUCASMy point was, first, that there had been an enormous improvement in regard to the organisation of the expeditionary force, so that the units that would train together in peace would go out together in war. That was, I said, a great improvement as compared with what happened before. Secondly, I said that nothing had been done by the Conservative Government ever since the war to make any provision for that training machinery which they had to set up very inadequately and in a hurry after war had broken out.
§ VISCOUNT MIDLETONI quite see what the noble Lord means, but it does not meet my point. The noble Lord told us that there was no halfway house, and that you must either trust the Territorial Force or it is no use at all. After our expeditionary force had gone we left behind a sufficient body both of infantry and artillery, to form a stiffening of the Territorial Force as it then existed. I say that that makes the whole difference. You will have no battery of Regulars left which you can mobilise in case of invasion. The noble Lord spoke as if we should never send the whole of our expeditionary force abroad if there were any apprehension of invasion. The Secretary of State the other day pointed out that circumstances might arise in which it would be very difficult for the Fleet to defend this country, and he added that in that event we should have to rely on our Territorial Force for defence against invasion. I will not at this late hour enter into that point, but I submit that to take the experience of the South African War as in any way a criterion of the pace at which we should send troops abroad, as was done by the noble 155 Earl the Colonial Secretary, is entirely misleading. We did not set out to send more than 30,000 or 40,000 men. We did not begin to do that until December, and the press came later. There are men in this country and on this side of your Lordships' House, who believe that if there were to be a raid on a large scale, we should not have six months, not six weeks, perhaps not even six days, in which to mobilise, and I think that the proposal to denude this country of all the Regular troops on whom we can depend, especially in the case of artillery, is one on which we should be granted further explanation. One satisfactory feature of the debate is that the opinions given will make it impossible for the Government to continue their reduction of the artillery. As the Government have stated that the production of such Papers as I have moved for would not be in the public interest, I ask leave to withdraw my Motion.
§ Motion, by leave of the House, withdrawn.
§ House adjourned at Eight o'clock till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.