THE STRENGTH OF THE ARMY.

HL Deb 12 March 1908 vol 185 cc1658-704

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

rose to call attention to the strength of the Army at home; and to move for any Minute of the Army Council approving the further reduction in the numbers of the Regular Artillery, and the Report for 1907 of the late Inspector-General of the Forces, so far as it affects "the training and efficiency of the troops under the control of the Home Government, and the readiness and fitness of the Army for war."

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, after the discussions which your Lordships have heard in the course of this year on the present state of the various forces of the Crown I should have hesitated to come before you again or in any way to re-traverse the ground which has already been so admirably trodden by the noble Duke behind me (the Duke of Bedford) on behalf of the Militia and by many noble Lords on behalf of the Volunteers; but I have a genuine fear, for which I think I can show good reason, that the attention of the public and of His Majesty's Government is, by the great interest shown in the organisation of the Territorial Forces, being deflected to the Auxiliary Forces from the most important part of our Forces, the Regular Army. I do not know that it is sufficiently realised that the Regular Army has more need for advocates than the Territorial Army. From time immemorial the tongues of officers have been tied. There is no officer on full pay who, as a rule, will get up in this House or in the other House of Parliament and speak on the condition of the Army; equally officers to a large extent are prevented by their position from taking part in campaigns in the Press, or other methods of directing public attention to the subject, and, in that respect, they are in an absolutely different position from officers of the Auxiliary Forces.

From my own experience extending over many years in another place I know that it has fallen to the Secretary of State, and very often to the Secretary of State alone, to maintain the necessity for expenditure on the Army, and to resist the large demands made upon him on behalf of the Auxiliary Forces. Looking at the position to-day, instead of having the Secretary of State engaged on that mission, we have him in nearly all of his occasional utterances in the country drawing the public mind away from the Regular Army, his references to which are an oasis, and not always a brilliant oasis, in the desert of references to the Territorial Forces, about which he speaks with trumpet sounds of certainty, but with regard to which I think perhaps a more chastened tone would, at this early stage of its existence, be more justifiable. Let it be understood that I do not propose to trespass for one moment upon your attention with regard to any portion of the Forces except the Regular Army. I can say for myself, and for every noble Lord sitting on these benches, that we will, as far as our power and capacity lie, either in our respective counties or outside, do our very best to make the Territorial Forces a success; but when, at the invitation of the Secretary of State, we are up on the scaffolding trying to do our best to erect an edifice, we have a right to complain that the props of the scaffolding are being cut away—I mean the Regular Army—on which the whole edifice must depend, I am not using too strong language, as I think I shall be able to show. I am not going back upon the past. I am not going to speak of any other schemes than Mr. Haldane's, and I am not going to trouble your Lordships with a number of figures.

I assert broadly that, whereas a great reduction of expenditure with a minimum reduction of force was promised us two years ago, what we have got has been a great reduction of the strength of the Army and a minimum reduction of expenditure. The Secretary of State specifically calls attention, in his Memorandum, to the fact that the Regular Army is only 6,000 stronger than in 1898, before the war. In fact, the Memorandum is full of apologies that the Army is not even weaker than it was before the war. How much has there been of increase in the expenditure? While there is a gain of 6,000 men, the expenditure is £7,000,000 more than in 1898. This document is remarkable for other things which are not contained in it. Mr. Haldane takes credit to himself for having reduced the Estimates by £2,300,000 since his predecessor left office. There is no mention in the Memorandum of this fact, that in the last year of Mr. Arnold-Forster's period of office £1,200,000 was being spent on the rearmament of the Artillery, a service which has come to an end after four or five years of heavy expenditure. Deducting the £1,200,000 due to the completion of the armament of Artillery, the saving is, therefore, roughly £1,000,000.

And what have we lost for that million? I take the figures as they appeared unchallenged the other day in a letter of the late Secretary of State. We have lost, in establishment, between 1905 and 1908, 423 Regular officers, 2,400 sergeants, =and 33,500 rank and file. The Reserve, which alone enables the Army to mobilise, will be decreased by 17,000 men in 1909 and by 10,000 more in 1910. We have lost a whole Army corps and gained a million, of money! I go back to 1898, because that is the pivot of Mr. Haldane's Remarks. Why was the Army raised in numbers in that year? It was not raised in a panic. It was not raised from any idea that war was at the time expected, because in 1897, when we began, we were not even within sight of the South African war. It certainly was not raised in a hurry, because it had been sunder discussion for many years, and for many months by the then Government. It was raised when my noble friend Lord Lansdowne took the office of Secretary of State for War, and it was raised then because for years, as I can myself testify, the pressure of every soldier of experience had been brought to bear on successive Governments to prove that without more battalions you were not able to provide adequate drafts, that the strength of a battalion at 720 did not enable it to provide drafts and to mobilise, that therefore the strength of the battalions should be raised to 800, that our Artillery was weaker than that of any Army in Europe, and that we were greatly deficient in officers and had no proper reserve of stores.

My noble friend Lord Lansdowne took the view that we were bound to provide the number of men and the number of units which our military advisers said were necessary to complete the policy of the Cabinet. I think, even on financial grounds, that was wise. It is obvious that we are not striving to have an Army which will compete with Continental Armies; but the richest nation in Europe ought surely to have the same proportion of picked troops in its Army as much poorer nations with much larger Armies succeed in having. That is the reason why I shall direct your Lordships' attention to the case of the Artillery. What did Lord Lansdowne do? He added fifteen battalions to the Army. Nine of them have been disbanded by Mr. Haldane, and more are threatened. He raised the strength of the battalions at home from 720 to 800 to enable them to provide drafts and to mobilise. They have been reduced by the present Secretary of State to 720. He raised between fifty and sixty batteries of Artillery. Thirty-three of these are to be reduced into training depôts, and 2,400 more Artillerymen are to be discharged. In regard to officers, he raised the establishment by no fewer than 1,000. A reduction of nearly 500 has been effected by the present Secretary of State. He raised £ 10,000,000 worth of stores. It is very difficult to make out from the Estimates whether the stores taken for the year are in every case equivalent to -the expenditure of the year; but discussions have taken place, especially last year, in another place, which were by no means reassuring as to whether the stores laid in by the late Administration have not been heavily drawn upon and not replaced, especially in the matter of clothing.

And what is the condition of the Army at the present moment? The Paper which the Government were good enough to place on the Table of the House on my Motion a month ago is now in the hands of the public, and I venture to say that a more disquieting document has never been laid on the Table of Parliament as to the present strength of the Home Army. I know I shall be told that the condition of the Army at home is due to the large efflux of men to the Reserve under the three years system. That has something to do with it, but by no means all. In the first place, your Lordships are aware that all the men from eight battalions which have been disbanded have been distributed among other battalions, and therefore in the last year 6,400 men have become available to swell the total of the remaining battalions. Four or five battalions have been brought home from the Colonies, and they also go to strengthen the Home Army. In regard to the Colonies, I will not diverge to say anything as to these reductions in garrisons, except this, that I venture to warn the Government that the garrisons both of Malta and Gibraltar have been brought down to a remarkable extent, and if we are to calculate on having seventy-four battalions at home in future, and that calculation is based on the present garrisons in the Mediterranean, to say nothing of South Africa, I think it more probable that in the next two or three years the balance of battalions will be disturbed than kept as at present. But I will not labour that point.

I have made a careful study of the White Paper. The strength of the Home battalion ought to be 720; in the White Paper the average strength is at present 580. To mobilise the battalions of the Regular Army it has always been held that you ought to have 500 soldiers with the colours and then bring in 500 Reservists. The strength of these battalions, after taking off men under 20 years of age or under one year's service, though not both, because many are included in both columns—after deducting the least number the strength of these battalions for mobilisation is 330 a piece, and from that number you have to take away the sick and those temporarily unable to go abroad, which will bring the figure down to nearly 300. You must bring 700 Reservists into a battalion of that strength, and I ask what is the state of a battalion which may be engaged in active operation in a few days which contains only 300 men with the colours and 700 brought in, most of whom will have been away from the colours some years?

Take the total force. The Secretary of State talked last year of 28,000 men being required with the colours and 48,000 Reservists when mobilisation occurred; but at the present moment the number that could be produced is only 22,000 men with the colours and we require 48,000 Reservists. That is a most astonishing condition of things for a force, the fighting capacity of which, according to the Secretary of State, has been increased by 50 per cent. Then let us look at individual battalions. There is no secret about them. The Durham Light Infantry, one of the best regiments in the Service, if paraded to-day for foreign service would stand at seventy-six strong. The 60th and the Rifle Brigade could each only make up one battalion from the two at home. I am informed, though I have not been able to verify this absolutely, that when the German Emperor was in London and troops were required to line the streets, one of the First Brigades at Aldershot, the first Brigade to go abroad on active service, sent up every man it could, and the whole brigade of four battalions was only 982 strong. I say that that requires-some explanation from His Majesty's Government.

What I believe has greatly affected the position has been the disbandment of popular regiments. I hear that officers in the Northumberland Fusiliers belonging: to the disbanded battalion have been ordered to join the Somerset Light Infantry; but you cannot remove men in this way as you can officers. I was struck the other day by the remark of a Member of the Cabinet to the effect that, all they had done was to disband useless battalions. Of one of the battalions reduced and denounced as a useless battalion, a Report on the Army Rifle; Meeting last year in Ireland stated— The team of the 4th Battalion Royal Warwicksh re Regiment, soon to be disbanded, were rightly honoured as they came up, time-after time, to receive the cups which their-splendid efficiency had gained for them. Of the twelve trophies put up for competition; among dismounted troops of all arms, this fine battalion has won no fewer than seven. That battalion was disbanded a few months afterwards. I saw myself two battalions in the finest condition in South Africa; they were sent home to be disbanded. It cannot be said that that, is an encouragement to recruiting. Mr. Haldane recently stated in another place that the class of recruits was so improved, owing to the increased pay and better conditions of service established by the last Government, that the-military authorities could pick and choose among them. If that be so, I cannot help wishing that the picking and choosing had not been carried so far as to reduce these fine battalions to skeletons.

The Army at home was, twelve years ago, compared by Lord Wolseley to "squeezed lemons." That appellation describes every battalion in the list now lying upon this Table. The Army at home is absolutely melting away under the influence of these restrictions; and if the present Secretary of State for War were to cast up his account with the British public with regard to the British Infantry at this moment, he would be justified in doing it in the terms of the Irish veterinary surgeon, who sent in a bill "for curing your pony till he died." We have been told by Mr. Haldane that we should require 5,000 extra officers in case of mobilisation. It seems an extraordinary way of meeting that situation, to make a reduction of 500 trained officers. I know there is an elaborate scheme by which young men from the Universities and public schools are to be employed as a Reserve of officers, after having obtained a certain certificate from the Territorial Army. I hope that certificate is going to be a high one. Before I left Eton I was fortunate enough to obtain a certificate that I was fit to command a battalion in the field; and all I say is that, even if that battalion had been only of the strength of the Durham Light Infantry, I would have been very sorry for it.

The case of the Infantry is not the worst. I do not speak in any way as a military critic. I am only repeating what I have heard under the stress of twelve years' service in the War Office. I have always heard it said that if you have the cadres and the officers, you can improvise regiments of Infantry with comparative quickness. But Artillery cannot be improvised. What is the state of our Artillery? We have ninety-nine batteries of Artillery and howitzers at home. Their general strength is about 100, but when mobilised they require 183 men. So that beyond Reservists men will have to be filched from the lower batteries to fill up the higher sent abroad. I cannot help feeling the fallacy put forward by the Secretary of State, who said he came into the damnosa hereditas of ninety-nine batteries of Artillery, of which he could only mobilise forty-two. The statement is disingenuous, for the batteries had just been created and had not had time to pass Reservists through. Since then the Reserve has risen by 4,000 or 5,000 men and is still growing.

The idea is that sixty-six batteries are to be sent abroad in proper strength; thirty-three batteries will remain, whose strength is to be reduced by 2,400 men—or about fifty-five per battery. This deficiency will be made up by boys under twenty and Special Reservists, with less than eight months training. The only Regular batteries available against the picked Artillery of any European Power for the protection of England against invasion would thus be batteries manned one-fifth by Regulars and four-fifths by partially-trained men and boys. I do not wish to go into the vexed question of invasion, but the Secretary of State for War last night in another place, when asked what would happen when the sixty-six batteries had gone abroad, made this astonishing reply— Why should there be anything left? Why-shall we require them? We shall not send them abroad if there is any danger of invasion. We had a force of fifty-seven batteries of artillery in South Africa, and will any noble Lord say that during the whole of the time those batteries were out of the country we were free from the danger of invasion? There is no time when it is more necessary for the Government to pull its resources together than when the whole of the Army is abroad.

What is military opinion on this subject? I have over and over again heard Lord Wolseley give his opinion on partially-trained Artillery. It is his view, and I believe the view of the noble and gallant Field Marshal, who I hope will speak in this debate, that partially-trained Artillery cannot stand before Regular Artillery. Take the battle of Tsusima, which military critics are citing with regard to this effect of accurate shooting and training of Artillery. One could not fail to observe the terrible effect which even a slight difference of training made on the Russian ships; they found themselves struck time after time while their own shots went just wide enough to make the difference. A little while ago Captain Vincent, at the United Service Institution, after fifteen months with the Japanese Army, stated— Partially-trained batteries, like partially-trained battleships, are only a danger to their own side. That is a strong pronouncement, and Sir Ian Hamilton, who was in the chair, and who was himself in Manchuria the whole time, agreed that such batteries are a danger to their own side "if they are expected to hold their own, gun for gun, against Regular Artillery." He added that three or four of these partially, trained batteries might be pitted against one trained battery, and hold their own.

Have we come to this in this country that, when we have sent our expeditionary force abroad, we shall only have remaining Artillery which, unless it is three or four times as numerous as that of the enemy, will be incapable of holding its own I Can it not be realised what the danger is if we put such Artillery against the picked Artillery of the greatest Powers in the world? In words which I think I have heard from Lord Wolseley, the result would be either a shambles or a sauve qui peut. What I venture to ask the noble Earl the Under-Secretary of State for War is, Who is responible for the advice to get rid of these 2,400 Artillery and to employ partially-trained batteries after the expeditionary force has gone 11 wish to press that question. I have had some experience of military advice at the War Office. The question of Volunteer Artillery was brought up over and over again, and I have heard officers describe its use as a serious waste of public money. I myself pressed the War Office Council when the noble and gallant Field Marshal on the cross benches was Commander - in - Chief, in the interest of economy, as to whether the last thirty or forty batteries could possibly be put on a lower establishment, and the whole of my military advisers told me that it was impossible.

Not long after, the question arose of substituting a long service for the three years colour service. The three years colour service was maintained because of the Reserve which it was going to create. That has been done away with. I remember also that in the time of my successor, Mr. Arnold Forster, the question arose whether fifteen months service would be sufficient to train infantry, and great difficulties were put forward by the military advisers against that period being adopted; but to-day we are told that six months service or eight months with the two trainings will be enough for the Artillery. I am not asking for any secrets to be divulged. The condition of our Artillery is known to every Artillery officer in this country; it is known to every foreign military attache in London, and it is perfectly well known to the German General Staff. It is equally well known to, and is often made the subject of comment and sometimes of ridicule, by every military critic in Europe.

I ask, who advised the Secretary of State? On what military advice does he rely? There is one officer on the present Army Council who was on the Army Council which advised me—I mean Sir W. Nicholson. He was, I think, not there when this step was resolved upon two years ago. There is no officer of greater experience and knowledge in the Army. I would ask the noble Earl, does Sir W. Nicholson think the Regular Artillery is-capable of a reduction by 2,400menl Does. Sir W. Nicholson consider that batteries made up as these last thirty-three batteries are to be made up are fit to be-pitted against the best batteries of a Continental Power? I think I have a right-to ask that question. I should like to> inquire the opinion also of another officer who is a member of the Defence Committee. General Sir John French is an officer who is recognised by everyone as-capable of taking the highest command in war. I know this subject must have come before the Defence Committee Is he in favour of the reduction I If these two officers—the Chief of the General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief at Aldershot—are not. in favour of the reduction, I would ask. whether it is to be regarded as having, been made simply in the interests of economy.

With regard to the infantry, I cannot help thinking, also, that we have some right to know the opinion of the Inspector-General. The Secretary of State said a few nights ago in the House of Commons that the expeditionary force would contain 61,000 men serving with the colours. A few moments afterwards, I think through a slip, he spoke of 68,000 men serving with the colours. But I will take the lower figure.? cannot, putting the best face upon it, make out that more than 35,000> men serving with the colours could go into the expeditionary force. But the Secretary of State wants 61,000. I wish to know whether the Inspector-General of the Forces, who reviewed all these battalions last year, is satisfied with the-condition of the expeditionary force. The duties of the Inspector-General were laid down by rules at the War Office-four years ago. He is to report to the Army Council upon the training and efficiency of the troops under the control of the Home Government, and generally/ on the readiness and fitness of the Army for war.

The famous triumvirate on whose report the office of Inspector-General was created went a good deal further than this. They said that he was to be the eyes and ears of the Army Council. They represented him as being to the Army Council and to the public what the auditor of a company is to the shareholders. He has nothing to do with policy; he deals simply with facts—to see whether the securities are there, which the directors have had in their charge. I ask, Are there at Aldershot and elsewhere the securities which the Army Council have tried to persuade the country are in their charge? Have the practical results of the policy of the Army Council been such as to satisfy the Inspector-General? I will not labour that point, but I will just say one word with regard to the possible remedy.

It is not our businesses on this side of the House to suggest remedies, but I do most earnestly commend to the consideration of the War Office the re-adoption, to a limited extent, of some system of short service. I do not ask them to disturb their own conclusions in a single particular. I merely ask that these batteries and battalions at home which have had their establishments reduced should have added, say, in the case of battalions, 100 men, and in the case of batteries fifty men each—men of whom you ask a higher standard of age, education, and physique, and who for that higher standard may have the privilege of joining for three years and going for nine years to the Reserve. This would, no doubt, entail an additional 10,000 men, at an expenditure of less than half a million of money; but you would get efficiency, and I press the proposal on the Government very earnestly.

Before I sit down I should like to make an appeal to the noble Earl to enter into the policy which I have endeavoured to put before him in a broad-minded spirit, and not to content himself with reading to us a large number of details. His expositions of late seem hardly to have that individual strength or force to which we were accustomed when he was in a position of greater freedom. He has confined himself to typewritten documents. I remember him first at Oxford. He was then a fluent and adventurous public speaker, and when I have heard him at other times he has never lacked fire and force. I hope that he will return to those more generous methods in dealing with these questions, which are put forward with no desire to elicit merely figures, but to elicit some expression of policy in the direction we are aiming. I can assure your Lordships that I have no partisan or personal bias whatever in regard to the suggestions I have brought before the Government. But I resent deeply the continued reiteration by the Secretary of State of the fallacy that he has strengthened the Artillery by largely reducing the number of Regulars in it. I think the noble Earl ought to explain what is meant by the statement that fifty per cent. has been added to our military strength when we cannot mobilise our best battalions.

I think, also, that the noble Earl ought to realise that the first statement of this. Government when they took office was that they found the Army in a fine condition of efficiency, but needing better organisation. I say that that fine condition of efficiency has been frittered away in the process of improving the organisation. The Government found battalions which could be mobilised, and they have reduced them into a position in which they cannot be mobilised. They found an Army ready for war, but, if they proceed with further reductions and do not take steps to keep up the Reserves—which under their present system must be further considerably reduced—in a few years the Army will have become an Army to which peace will be a necessity. It is with a firm conviction that the present condition of the Army is a serious national danger that I ask the earnest attention of your Lordships to this matter.

Moved, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for any Minute of the Army Council approving the further reduction in the numbers of the Regular Artillery, and the Report for 1907 of the late Inspector-General of the Forces so far as it affects "the training and efficiency of the troops under the control of the Home Goverment, and the readiness and fitness of the Army for war."—(Viscount Midleton.)

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (The Earl of PORTSMOUTH)

My Lords, I was amused at the somewhat good-natured banter of my noble friend opposite, who complained that it was my misfortune, in dealing with military matters, to have to avail myself very largely of notes. I confess that, representing a highly technical Department like the War Office, I have felt it my duty to rely upon notes for details; and I am afraid that this afternoon I shall be obliged, if I am to place your Lordships in full posession of the facts, to enter very largly into matters of detail.

Before dealing with the two points raised by the noble Lord, I must, as a matter of courtesy, reply to the two personal questions he has addressed to me and of which he gave me notice in a private letter. He intimated that he would press me to speak specifically as to whether General Sir W. Nicholson, who was a member of the Army Council when the resolution to reduce the Artillery was arrived at, approved of that reduction. As a matter of fact, Sir W. Nicholson became a member of the Army Council on December 17 or 18, and I think Mr. Haldane was appointed Secretary of State about a week before that. Having received the letter from the noble Lord, I felt it my duty to see Sir W. Nicholson myself, and he wished me to state to the House, should the question be raised by the noble Lord, that he, as a member of the Army Council at the time when this subject was considered, accepted the fullest responsibility for the decision arrived at. As a matter of fact, there was no minute dealing with the matter. There was considerable discussion at various meetings of the Council, and it was dealt with as a part of the whole scheme.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

Would the noble Earl give us the terms of the decision? I presume a matter which had been frequently discussed at the Army Council would be made the subject of a resolution.

The EARL of PORTSMOUTH

There is no formal resolution on the subject. Then the noble Lord asks me a question as to the opinion of General Sir John French. Now, I have the highest possible respect for the opinion of Sir John French on any question connected with the Army. I recognise his distinguished position; I know the immense service he has rendered; but when the noble Lord presses the opinion of Sir John French upon me, not as a private individual, not as a gallant soldier, but as a member of the Defence Committee, then I must protest against the doctrine that seems to underlie the statement the noble Lord has made. I remind the noble Lord that the Army Council is a body responsible for the efficiency of the Army, and4f any member of the Army Council upon a matter of importance, such as this in relation to the Artillery, finds himself unable to concur with the Secretary of State, it is recognised by all the members of the Council that it would be the duty of that member to resign his position on the Council.

With regard to the Defence Committee, I would remind my noble friend of a discussion that took place in the House of Commons on May 11, 1905, and I will give your Lordships the view of the constitutional functions and position of the Committee of Defence as laid down by an authority of weight—Mr. Balfour. Mr Balfour stated "that it was not a new Executive Department. It is not an Executive but a Consultative Committee, and," said Mr. Balfour— If the Committee were to be treated as a Court of Appeal—and some hon. Gentlemen had endeavoured to say as much—against the decisions come to in their own Departments either by the First Lord of the Admiralty or the Secretary for War, in the first place, the Committee would be hopelessly overburdened, and, in the second place, the efficiency of the Departments", which it is supposed to supervise would be destroyed, and the responsibility of the Ministers at the head of them would be absolutely shattered. It is not for us to advise, much less to determine, what type of battleship, or armoured cruiser, or field gun shall be adopted, or what military organisation or naval distribution shall be accepted by the Government, by the House, and by the country. The present Prime Minister at a later stage of the debate on that occasion said— We are now told that the Committee of Imperial Defence has nothing to do with the organisation of the Army; that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are, of course, supreme in such matters, and that the Committee are only brought into play as a sort of Court of Appeal where the two Departments are involved. ‥ ‥ I am considerably relieved of some constitutional qualms which I have had about the functions of the Committee by hearing that account of their work. I do not happen to know—the noble Viscount, perhaps, does—what the opinions of Sir John French are on these matters, but with all due respect to Sir John French and his opinions, I must decline to be a party to having his name and authority brought into the question.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

I thought I traced in the noble Earl's remarks an insinuation or suggestion that I had been in communication with Sir John French on this matter I may say that I have not communicated with either Sir W. Nicholson or Sir John French, and I do not think either of them had the least idea that I should mention their names or ask for their opinions.

THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH

I knew, as a matter of fact, that the noble Viscount had not been in communication with Sir W. Nicholson, and I did not wish to imply that he had communicated with Sir John French. I now come to the question of Artillery. I know there has been a considerable amount of apprehension in this House and elsewhere that we were tampering in some mysterious, underhand way with the Field Artillery. We have been accused of attempting to weaken it. As regards this, I would remind your Lordships that on July 24, 1906, I gave an undertaking that we would not reduce any Regular Artillery men until we had an adequate number of trained Militiamen (or Special Reservists) to take their place. That undertaking I repeated in reply to a question put to me by the noble Marquess (Lord Lansdowne) on July 2 last year. And I now assert most emphatically that we have acted up to that undertaking both in the spirit and the letter. We have not abolished a single man in the Artillery. In point of fact, the total British and Indian establishments show a slight increase. I will give a few figures to prove this. The total establishment of the Royal Horse and Field Artillery (British and Indian combined) was 29,879 on April 1, 1906; It was 29,938 on April 1, 1907, and the corresponding establishment taken in Estimates for the year beginning April 1, 1908, is a total of 30,159.

To return now to the state of the Artillery at home. Of the 99 batteries of Field Artillery at home we found that only 42 could be mobilized, owing to the deficiency that existed to complete the ammunition columns. That is to say, we could only mobolize the Artillery requisite for four divisions. Under our proposals we hope to be in a position, by training Special Reservists for the ammunition column work, to mobolise the Artillery required for our expeditionary force of six divisions. It is true we have reduced the establishment in 33 batteries at home from 117 men to 52 for training purposes, but we have not abolished the men displaced in these batteries. The 2,400 effectives corresponding to the change in establishments we still retain.

If my noble friend will look at pages 14 and 15 of the Army Estimates for 1908–9 he will see an item under the Field Artillery "Excess numbers temporarily retained"—2,404. These we will retain until the newly organised training batteries give us the much larger number of trained Special Reservists for ammunition column work and work of a similar character. To make our position clear in this important matter I may recapitulate what I stated in your Lordship's house on the 24th July, 1906, to be a settled policy. At present we have got a number of artillerymen all trained on the same high standard under the old system. If we had to mobilise to-day under the old system, we should be forced to employ on less important work of ammunition columns men just as highly trained as those who would actually tend the guns. I do not think your Lordships are aware of the great change that is necessary owing I to the new gun. The old 15-pounder necessitated a total of 305 rounds per gun to be carried by the ammunition columns. The new 18-pounder necessitates 508; besides that, the ammunition is heavier.

The highly trained artilleryman is an expensive soldier, and if, as we propose, we can get at the cost of a single artilleryman, six or seven trained Special Reservists equally efficient for what he is called upon to do, we shall be in a position of being able, without extra cost, to have sufficient high-class gunners to be distributed amongst all our batteries in adequate numbers and a sufficient number of less highly trained men for less important work. The result will be that in each battery we shall have an adequate proportion of the highly trained gunners plus a number of men not so highly trained perhaps in the first instance, but quite capable of performing the duties assigned to them. So that, instead of having, as at present, only men for forty-two batteries all equally trained though allotted different duties, we shall be able to man adequately and efficiently the sixty-six batteries required for the Expeditionary Force for which we already have the guns.

So much for the artillery. I should like now to refer to the Infantry. We fully appreciate the present serious position of the infantry battalions at home, but we must emphatically decline any responsibility for their present state. We have taken steps to remedy the existing state of affairs, which is the result of a policy inaugurated not one or two, but several years ago. Even as far back as the summer of 1905 the noble Lord's successor at the War Office realised what was to happen during the ensuing three or four years. I do not intend to indulge in any unnecessary party recriminations in this matter, and I fully appreciate my noble friend's attitude in this respect; but if we wish to analyse the causes of the present weakness we cannot overlook the history of the last ten years.

I should like to explain as briefly as I can the conditions which all authorities are agreed upon as essential to the sound position of infantry battalions under the linked battalions, or, as it is often called, the Cardwell system. In the first place, assuming the even distribution of the linked battalions as between home and abroad, the home battalion has in peace to train recruits (after a short stay at the depot) and to supply annual drafts of men of the prescribed age and physical standard for the corresponding battalion abroad. In the next place, notwithstanding this annual drain of mature soldiers, the home battalion should still have a considerable residue of mature men to stiffen it when the Reservists are called up to join it on mobilisation. How is the home battalion enabled to accomplish this I Our aim should be that the term of colour service should be sufficiently long to secure that the men sent out in the annual drafts shall be able to spend an appreciable period (usually four years) on foreign service. Otherwise they must be replaced every year or every two years. Secondly, the annual intake of recruits should not be subject to violent fluctuations, so that men in the various periods or categories of service may be numerically as nearly equal as possible. Thirdly, the number of recruits taken annually should be such that when the men in any special category of service are drawn upon for the annual draft, there should still be a. residue over to keep the home battalion in a sound condition as regards mature men. Finally, my Lords, you must have continuity; you must have established such a condition of things as shall go on steadily year after year, as any dislocation has not only an immediate effect, but an effect often extending over a considerable period of years. Your Lordships will, therefore, appreciate the paramount importance of a definite and settled policy free from sudden changes in a matter of this kind.

Now it cannot be maintained that the conditions which I have just outlined have been allowed free and undisturbed play during the past ten years. When the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne>: was at the War Office in 1898–1899 such conditions did generally obtain, and the state of the home battalions before the South African War was generally satisfactory. The period of service with the colours was seven yearn, sufficiently long; to admit of men serving in India or Colonial stations for the normal period of four years. The individuals in the battalions were evenly distributed in the various age categories of service. The recruiting was normal. The result was that when the South African War broke out the home battalions on the whole did possess a considerable amount of seasoned men to enable them, when the Reservists-were called up, to take the field as efficient battalions.

In 1900 the noble Marquess left the War Office, and was succeeded by the noble Lord opposite. In 1902, as the troops returned from South Africa, and the Army came back to peace conditions, the noble Lord began his experiment. The period of colour service was reduced from seven to three years, and the foundations of the draft difficulty thereby laid. I am aware it was contemplated that sufficient men would be induced to extend their colour service, but this, anticipation was not fulfilled. My noble friend himself, speaking on Army Estimates on the 4th March, 1902, admitted that he was making a great, experiment, for he said— lam going to ask the House to take a' great plunge as regards both terms of service and the pay of the Army. The shorter period of colour service necessitated voluntary extensions and a bigger annual intake of recruits. The noble Lord hoped to persuade the young men to extend their colour service by various inducements. Experience, however, has shown that these inducements did not take account of what I may call human nature. For three years the common soldier had got the benefit of good food, clothing, &c. At the age of from 21 to 25 or 26 he found the opportunities and freedom of civil life (with his sixpence a day for nine years thrown in) much more attractive than the inducements to prolong his service with the colours. He preferred to take his chance in civil life with sixpence a day rather than to remain with the colours for 1s. 6d. a day.

My noble friend, in the speech to which I have referred, anticipated that 50,000 recruits of all arms would be forthcoming annually, and that the extensions under the improved conditions would be 50 per cent. Now, as a matter of fact, during the year October, 1903, to October, 1904, a year when his terms of service were in full swing, the total number of recruits was only 42,000, and the average extensions in the infantry never exceeded 30 per cent. I may here remark that in the opinion of the experts 70 per cent, extensions would have been necessary in the infantry, which was the important arm, to provide the drafts imperatively demanded by India and the Colonies, and also to provide a sufficient residue of seasoned men after these drafts had been drawn off.

I should like, while on this subject, to call your Lordships' attention to the effect the three years system has had on the Indian drafts. In the first place, as the necessary number of men did not extend, our home battalions have had to be stripped year after year of every available man over 20 years of age to supply the Indian drafts. Our home battalions have thus been left depleted of seasoned men. Even with this emasculation of the home battalions we have been obliged to let India go short year after year. For instance, in addition to next year's draft of 6,700 men, which would be about the normal, we shall have to provide at least 550 more to make up the shortage consequent on our inability to supply the full quota during the trooping season just ended. Then, again we have been compelled to have recourse during the last few years to the most, undesirable and expensive expedient of giving lump sum bounties to men in India to extend their service there.

These evil effects began to be felt ins 1905, and have become gradually more marked until they reached their lowest, point during the past year. We look forward to an improvement next year;, but that is duo to the fact that the three years system was definitely abandoned in November, 1904, and its effects have now exhausted themselves. We estimate the demand next year, including last year's deficit, to be about 7,600,. and henceforward we expect a steady improvement. My noble friend has, therefore, called your Lordships' attention in the Return which I laid on the Table to the strength of the home Army at a time when the effects of his terms of enlistment have just reached the climax and before the sounder system which we have, substituted has had time to produce-results. Furthermore, he has done this at the time of the year when under any system, sound or unsound, the home? battalions are of necessity weakest in. the matter of seasoned men—i.e., at the end of the trooping season, when they have just thrown off their annual drafts.

I have no desire to trouble your Lordships with unnecessary and complicated statistics, but the draft figures for the past three or four years and our efforts to supply India's needs are very instructive. But before I give them I would like to remind your Lordships of another result of the three years system as regards the Indian drafts. Not only have we-been obliged to adopt such "heroic" remedies as the bounty, but to prevent excessive shortage we have been obliged to send out three years men who had no intention of extending and who, therefore, had only spent a year or two in India when we have been forced to bring; them back again for discharge on completion of their term. All this tended to swell the annual drafts far beyond the: normal, and to increase the cost of transport, which, even in normal circumstances; is considerable. This extra cost could not be charged to India, and the Imperial Exchequer has had to bear the brunt of it. Your Lordships will be interested to> learn, in connection with this transport question, that the total extra cost involved in maintaining the Army in India in consequence of the three years enlistments has been £68,000 extra transport charges and £32,000 in bounties, making a total of £100,000, of which Army Funds have had to bear £ 80,000 and India £20,000.

I now come to the draft figures themselves. In 1896–7 we sent to India as drafts pure and simple, 7,288 men, in 1897–8 we sent 8,590, and in 1898–9 we sent 7,402, so that the average of these three years would be about 7,760 per annum. This indicates the normal drain on the home battalions at a period when the old condition of seven years colour service obtained. If we now take the period during which the effect of the three years system was felt we find some very interesting figures. In 1905–6 we sent out 8,953 men, in 1906–7 9,975 men, in 1907–8 8,586 men. The average of these three years would be about 9,000, as against the average of the earlier period of 7,760. That is a difference of 1,200 men. But that is not all. We began the year 1903–4 with a surplus of about 350 men in India, and have ended the present season, 1907–8, with a deficit of 550. That makes an additional 900 men on the wrong side. I think these figures amply prove the upsetting effects of the three years system.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

Does my noble friend entirely ignore the fact that he has taken as one of his years of comparison in regard to the number of drafts to India the first year of the war, 1898–9.

THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH

I have not taken that.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

If he has not taken that year, then I withdraw. He has also entirely forgotten that throughout the war we had to offer bounties to men in India to extend their services. Therefore, those men, as well as the three years men, have had to be relieved.

THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH

This, then, being the situation as we found it, I will briefly indicate the steps we have taken to improve it. We have reverted to the seven years system, which experience has shown to be the soundest as far as the Indian and Colonial drafts are concerned. The conditions of the home battalions when the noble Marquess was at the War Office is the best proof of this. We have reverted to the establishment of 720 rank and file, which stood the test of several years from 1892–3 onwards. I have not overlooked the fact that the noble Marquess, in order to strengthen the Reserve, raised the establishment to 800, enlisting 100 out of the 800 on a short service basis of three years. But we are dealing now with the question of drafts, not with the question of the Regular Reserve. I am aware it is often argued that an establishment of 750 rank and file is not large enough to meet the exigencies of the situation. My answer to that is this. Our figure of 720 is not necessarily final, and when we have got the recruiting into a normal condition again, we can, should the necessity arise, increase the establishment.

But as regards this figure of 720, there is one important factor to aid it now which was absent under the old conditions. I refer to the extraordinary decrease in the annual wastage. The policy initiated in 1902 by my noble friend of increasing the pay of the Army has been attended with excellent results in this respect, and I wish to congratulate him upon it. The two millions a year extra expenditure incurred in recent years on the pay of the Army have been well spent. We have developed that policy of generous treatment by laying down in November last that the 3d. messing allowance was to be given to every man on enlistment, instead of his having to wait until he had completed six months service. This general increase of emoluments during the recent years has been attended with very important results. The class of recruits we are now getting shows a marked improvement, and this fact, together with the generally improved conditions of the soldier's life, have resulted in considerably lessening the wastage. The number of men invalided has fallen from 4,973 in 1903–4 to 2,894 in 1906–7. The number of troops rejected as unlikely to become efficient soldiers has fallen from 1,373 in 1903–4 to 928 in 1906–7. And in the third category of wastage—discharges for misconduct—it has fallen from 3,656 in 1903–4 to 2,119. This gives a total decrease from 10,002 to 5,937, or practically 4,000 less. This decrease of wastage to the extent of 40 per cent, has a very important effect on the establishment we fix.

I may also remind your Lordships of another important fact in this connection. Lord Lansdowne before he left the War Office was apparently so convinced of the soundness of the system to which we have reverted that he actually began, for Reserve-producing purposes, an experiment of increasing the establishment to a total of 800, but of enlisting 100 of that number for a short period of service. The remaining 700, plus any voluntary extensions, were to supply the drafts. From this I think I am justified in inferring that the noble Marquess and his advisers were of opinion that the draft difficulties could be practically met, in normal conditions, by an establishment of 700, plus some extensions of short service men, because only that portion of the higher establishment of 800 would be effective for drafting purposes.

Before I sit down I should like to make some reference to the specific requests of the noble Viscount. There is no such Minute in existence as is referred to in the Motion, and, therefore, it will be impossible for us to comply with his request. As regards his further request for the production of the Report of the late Inspector-General of the Forces, I am afraid that, with every respect to my noble friend, and with every desire to place your Lordships in possession of the fullest information, I cannot comply with that request either. The Inspector-General is the eyes and ears of the Army Council, and their confidential agent. He gives us Reports of the most confidential character in relation to all questions connected with the Army, including individual regiments and even individual officers. If it were once accepted as a precedent that the Reports of the Inspector-General were not to be considered as strictly confidential, I am bound to say their value would be enormously diminished. It is essential that the Inspector-General should feel with absolute confidence that his Reports are entirely confidential documents, and exclusively at the disposal of the Army Council. The view of the Army Council is that their responsibility is complete and full, jointly and severally.

EARL ROBERTS

My Lords, I do not propose to trouble you with any remarks about the Army generally, as that subject has been gone into very fully by the noble Viscount who brought forward the Motion. My intention is to confine myself, on this occasion, to the-artillery, so far as that branch of the service is to form part of the Territorial Army. As regards the strength of the Artillery, my noble friend has drawn attention to the fact that it has been reduced during the last twelve months, by no less than sixteen officers and 2,676 men, and, unless I am mistaken further reductions are contemplated. Up to the present the reductions have only been carried out in the Garrison Artillery, and no one could reasonably object to such reductions if they had been made, because it was considered that, after providing for the artillery of the striking, force, a larger number of artillerymen would be left in this country than would be needed for its defence. But this is-not the contention. The reductions are not supposed to be made for this reason, for a far larger number of artillerymen, are to be recruited than have been, disbanded, no less a number than will admit of 196 batteries of horse, field, howitzer, heavy, and mountain being raised for the Territorial Army.

But what I want to draw your Lordships' attention specially to is the fact that, after the departure of the striking, force, the only Regular Artillery left-in this country would be eight horse and thirty-three field batteries; but only the-eight horse artillery batteries—and there is no knowing how soon these might be required to replace a wastage in the striking force—would be available for home defence, as it is laid down that all the Regular Field Artillery are to be used for training purposes. This seems to be a most extraordinary waste of good material, and the idea of using these; thirty-three batteries for such a purpose must be given up, for I cannot believe that the country will be satisfied with a sham artillery. We should then have forty-one Regular batteries for home defence, and it would be incomparably better to have this smaller number of thoroughly efficient Regular batteries; than the larger number of untrained inefficient batteries. I feel sure that every artillery officer of experience, if. asked, would endorse my opinion.

But I go further, my Lords, and say emphatically that the 198 Territorial batteries, by reason of their unsatisfactory composition, their want of proper organisation, and their lack of anything approaching to sufficient training and gun practice, would not, in spite of their "numbers, be of the slightest use in the field; and not only would they not be of the slightest use, but they would be a positive danger. My Lords, in making this statement, I am deeply sensible that I am taking a serious responsibility upon myself, a responsibility I most certainly would not venture to take were it not clear to me that the safety of this country depends upon the Territorial Army, for in time of trouble the Regular Army would, in all probability, be abroad; the Navy would be doing its legitimate work of seeking out the enemy's fleets, protecting our widely scattered commerce, and ensuring the safe delivery of our food supplies; it is essential, therefore, that that Army should be in all respects as efficient as it is possible for a citizen Army to become.

I feel it is due to the House, as well as to the right hon. Gentleman whose genius has created the Territorial Army, that I should explain to your Lordships the reasons for the statement I have made. Let me preface my remarks by saying that I am a firm believer in the vital importance of our having a Territorial Army, or, as I should prefer to call it, a National Army, and I have no hesitation in saying that this country owes a deep debt of gratitude to Mr. Haldane for all that he has done, and is still doing, in spite of the great difficulties, he has had to contend with, to provide us with such an Army. The right hon. Gentleman has laid the foundation of a National Army, the framework of which is quite admirable, but it is for the country to see that that framework is filled in with thoroughly serviceable material, properly organised to take the field. I will now explain why I consider that the proposed artillery portion of the Territorial Army can never be made sufficiently trustworthy for the duty it may be called upon to perform.

In the first place, I am satisfied that, if ever this country is invaded, it is almost certain to be done by surprise. This points to the supreme importance of the home defence Army being in a thorough state of preparedness. Now, the eight Horse Artillery and thirty-three Field Artillery batteries can and certainly ought always to be ready to move off at a couple of hours' notice, not perhaps complete in all respects, but sufficiently prepared to take the field; whereas the Territorial batteries could not possibly be moved without a delay of several days, and then, as I have said, they would be useless on account of the inexperience and insufficient training of the officers and men. I will go into details about this presently, but let me revert to the question of surprise, because, after all, the value of the Territorial Army depends upon whether it can always be in such a condition as will enable it to deal effectively with a surprise invasion. A little more than a year ago I drew the special attention of this House to certain facts brought forward by my noble and gallant friend Lord Lovat, which showed in the clearest possible terms that an invasion of this country by surprise is a danger we have to reckon with and must be prepared for.

The noble Lord who represents the War Office in this House pooh-poohed my suggestion that an invasion would be made at the time when we were least prepared for it. He expressed his astonishment at such a thing being thought possible between nations apparently on friendly terms; if I remember rightly, he said that such action would be brigandage. My Lords, this action may be called by any name which appears to the noble Lord to be appropriate, but of this we may be certain, that no fear of the action being so designated will ever deter any nation, coveting the possessions of another nation, from quietly making all necessary preparations to gain her object on the first favourable opportunity. This has frequently happened in the past, and it would surely be very optimistically foolish of us to flatter ourselves that it will not happen in the future. I conclude, whether your Lordships agree with me or not as to the possibility of surprise, that you admit an invasion in some form or another is possible, or where would be the need for a Territorial Army? And as no one in this House or anywhere else can say whether the warning we may receive will be long or short, we surely cannot run the risk of deferring to train the Territorial Army until some kind of warning is given. Dangerous as this would be in any branch, of the Army, it would be especially dangerous as regards artillery, and it is because I believe that, under no circumstances, could the Territorial Army batteries be given sufficient training to take their part in the defence of the country, that I venture to assert they would be not only useless, but dangerous.

Let us see what is to be the composition of the batteries of the Territorial Army, how it is intended to organise them, and what amount of training is to be given to them. As regards practice, where and how this is to be carried on is not laid down in the Army Orders of the 24th of last month, but evidently a ridiculously small amount of time is to be devoted to this important part of artillery instruction. There is to be one adjutant for every horse artillery or heavy battery and for every brigade of field or mountain artillery one sergeant-major for every brigade of field or mountain artillery; and one sergeant-instructor—or two in all—for every section in each battery, whether horse, field, heavy, or mountain. In other words, every battery of horse and heavy artillery will have one adjutant and two sergeant-instructors, and every brigade of field or mountain artillery, consisting of three batteries, will have one adjutant, one sergeant-major, and six sergeant-instructors.

The training as a unit will be eight to eighteen days a year, the individual training, forty-five drills recruit training and twenty drills annually in subsequent years—a drill being one hour's actual training and a day's training not less than six hours' work. Those eight to eighteen days a year are to include practice, so that the only training the unit would have of any practical value to artillery would be (leaveing out Sundays) seven to sixteen days annually. The horses are to be hired, which means that the batteries will only exist on paper, except for one week or fortnight in every year. I mention this fact, my Lords, not because I think that an invader would be deterred from carrying out his object if it happened to be arranged to come off during the artillery training, but to show your Lordships the absurdly small amount of training the batteries are to receive.

A limited amount of training has been already tried, I say limited in comparison to what is considered necessary for Regular batteries, but still a vast deal more than the Territorial Army batteries will receive, and the result was far from satisfactory. For several years past a brigade (three batteries) of Lancashire Militia Field Artillery has been trained for two or three months each summer on Salisbury Plain. It had the advantage of the following Regular Army staff:—One adjutant, one sergeant-major, three battery sergeant-majors, throe battery quartermaster-sergeants, one farrier, three shoeing and carriage smiths, three saddlers, three wheelers, nine corporals, nine bombadiers, 41 gunners, 27 drivers, and six trumpeters—total, 119 per brigade. Until last year the lieutenant-colonel was a Regular officer, as were the three battery commanders until 1906. The result of this experiment was, the senior artillery officer reported he thought that the batteries justified their existence if considered as Reserve to Regular batteries, from which they differed in (1) incomplete training and insufficient practice, (2) the high order of discipline essential in a battery. He added that they would, in a reasonable time after mobilization, be fitted for employment in the field, provided that the commanding officer, the adjutant, and the permanent staff were always retained. His report, in fact, was to the effect that it would be a dangerous delusion to imagine that Militia or Volunteer batteries could be produced fit on mobilisation to be able to cope successfully with the highly-trained batteries of a Continental army.

My own view is that it would be hopeless to expect the Territorial Artillery, with the few hours (I may almost say) of training to be given to it as a unit, ever to be fit for service, but that, given a high class recruit, as in the Honourable Artillery Company, and not less than five to six months consecutive hard training under experienced officers and non-commissioned officers the first year, gunnery could be taught, and also possibly riding and even driving (though the latter would be a great difficulty), but all ranks would inevitably fail in the application of minor tactics, such as in the selection and occupation of a position. Nothing requires more constant practice than this kind of work in the field, for a battery badly brought up to a position. exposes itself to annihilation in the course of a few seconds, before it has had time to fire a single shot. You will realise, my Lords, that this is no exaggeration when I tell you that a quick-firing battery, manned by trained officers and men, can fire sixty rounds in a minute.

From what I have heard, artillery appears to be the weak arm in the splendid national army of the Swiss, yet it has a fair amount of training; the men can ride and drive well, and look after their horses, but, for want of practice as a unit in the field, neither officers nor men have a sufficient knowledge of minor tactics. It was because the Boers realised that it was impossible to trust to insufficiently trained mobile artillery that they never utilised their guns in the form of a battery, or even as a section of a battery. They worked them, heavy or light, singly as guns of position, and in such a way that, from their intimate knowledge of the ground, they could get them away quickly when the time for retirement came. Later on in the war, when they had lost the services of the State Artillery, which was chiefly manned by Hollanders, their own want of artillery training forced them to realise the futility of attempting to work their guns themselves, and consequently they abandoned or destroyed them all.

Believe me, my Lords, to trust to amateur artillerists would be to court disaster. Guns cannot be treated as men, who, to a certain extent, in quantity may make up for quality. Under the most favourable conditions guns are more or less of an encumbrance to a mobile army in the field, and especially would this be the case in a close country like England; it is essential, therefore, that the Artillery with the Territorial Army should be of the best, however few its numbers. If we are not to have the best, it would be infinitely better to have no artillery at all, and to spend the money thus saved in establishing a well-organised mobile force of mounted riflemen, such as the Boers used with signal success during the latter part of the war in South Africa.

My Lords, I always feel, when speaking on military matters in your Lordship's House, that I am labouring under a serious disadvantage from the fact that I am a soldier. For some reason, which I confess is difficult for me to understand, the soldier, no matter how great his experience may be, always seems to be distrusted when he ventures to give an opinion upon the subject which he has made his life's study. When the enemy is actually in the field the soldier is generally given a free hand, because he alone is supposed to understand the work and to be able to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion. But when preparations are on foot for the conduct of a war for which he has to bear all the responsibility, the soldier is the last person to be consulted.

In all other professions the opinion of the expert is sought for and acted upon when a crisis arises; not so with regard to the Army. This may be accounted for by the idea that the soldier is always wanting to go to war, whether war is justifiable or not, and is always imagining that someone else is wanting to do the same, against whom he must protect himself. This feeling is exemplified in a quotation given by my noble friend Lord Cromer in his most interesting book "Modern Egypt," from a letter of the late Lord Salisbury, who wrote— If they (the soldiers) were allowed full scope, they would insist upon the importance of garrisoning the Moon in order to protect up from Mars. Well, my Lords, so far as I myself am concerned, whatever undue military ardour I may be credited with, it must, I think, be acknowledged that at my time of life and after all I have seen of war, I may be acquitted of any undue ardour, and that the one and sixty years that have passed since I had the honour of first putting on uniform as a Sandhurst cadet may have brought to me some measure of sound judgment with regard to the exigencies of war. My one desire is to use my experience for the benefit of my own country, and my hope is that I may be able to persuade the people of this country to insist on its being sufficiently garisoned to protect it from the invader. I have no axe to grind, and if I persist in telling you things which some of you may not believe, or which others, perhaps, may not wish to hear, it is because I venture to think I know what I am talking about, and because I desire to save the country from a disaster which will inevitably befall it, if it refuses to be warned by what has happened in the past to nations very similarly situated, and neglects to take the most ordinary preautions for the future.

EARL CROMER

Referring to the passage which my noble and gallant friend has just quoted, I should like to say that Lord Salisbury did not at all mean that the advice of soldiers should not be listened to in making preparations for war, but was alluding to the advice of soldiers in political matters which might lead up to war. That is quite a different thing.

EARL ROBERTS

I quite recognise that.

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

My Lords, the Return which His Majesty's Government has laid upon the Table of the House at the request of the noble Viscount, Lord Midleton, shows the ineffective condition of the Regular Army at home. The most serious revelation is the state of the Artillery. But the noble Viscount has himself dealt with that question. I propose, therefore, to confine my remarks to that branch of the service with which I am to some extent familiar, that is the Infantry. An examination of the Return shows that there are now something over 20,000 Infantry soldiers fit for the field at home, a number barely sufficient to furnish without mobilisation the Infantry required by two Divisions. But we are told the Infantry for six Divisions can be mobilised by means of the Reserve. It is to this Reserve that I beg to call your Lordships' attention. The Infantry Reserve is there 135,000 strong, and the most valuable military asset which is left to us. That Reserve la due entirely to the policy pursued by Lord Midleton when he was at the War Office, and when the noble and gallant Field-Marshal was Commander-in-Chief. His Majesty's Government have inherited that Reserve from their predecessors. I propose to show to your Lordships that this Reserve must soon vanish, and I challenge His Majesty's Government to show how, under the conditions which they have now established, it can be replaced.

After the South African War the most urgent question was to refill the depleted Army Reserve. To accomplish that object the late Government placed the whole Infantry of the Army on a three years basis of colour service from 1902 to 1906. Hence in due course a much more rapid transfer to the Reserve took place. We must remember that the late Government added fourteen Line and two Guards battalions to the Infantry of the Army. The present Government reduced eight battalions of the Line and one of the Guards after those battalions had been in existence from seven to eight years. This reduction was no doubt made because the Government found that they had more serving soldiers than they required. These nine battalions have been disbanded, but the men passed through them to the Reserve are still in the Reserve. These men cannot be replaced as they become time expired, because the cadres which created them are no longer in existence. In a few years the Reservists created by the disbanded battalions must disappear from the Reserve, also the large number of Reservists, due to the whole of the Infantry having been put on the three years basis of colour service, will pass out of the Reserve. The establishment of every Home Battalion has been reduced from 800 to 720, which means that there will be a smaller Reserve-creating unit, and a bigger shortage of men with the colours to be made up from the Reserve on mobilisation, an extra and immediate call on the Reserve amounting to upwards of 8,000 men due to the reduction of eighty men per battalion on the home and Colonial list. Thus a special and large outflow from the Reserve is soon due, and not only is there no special intake to balance it, but the normal intake in future must be less than it ever has been in the past.

The question I should like to ask the Government is this. When the last Reservists created by the three years basis of colour service have passed out of the Reserve, when those created by the nine disbanded battalions have become time expired, when the period of colour service is seven years instead of three, when the Reserve-creating battalions stand at 720 instead of 800, what will be the condition of the Reserve? And further, how do the Governnment then propose to mobilise the Infantry of the expeditionary force when some 8,000 additional men are required on mobilisation to make up for the reduced battalion establishments, and at a moment when all the Indian drafts have been sent abroad?

All the factors I have just mentioned tend to deplete the Reserve by drying up the source of supply. They are all coming into operation and are cumulative in their action. A Return was published by the Government last session making a calculation by which it was shown that with a diminished number of cadres, and with a reduced establishment in each cadre, and with a longer period of colour service, the Reserve of the Regular Army would be increased—a seeming impossibility which has not yet been explained Further, in dealing with the numbers of the Reserve, the Government have hitherto based their calculations on establishment instead of on the strength. That is to say, the value of a battalion as a Reserve-creating cadre is always reckoned at its full establishment, when very likely it has been more than 100 men short of its proper establishment. The number of the Reserve depends in no way upon the establishment, but solely upon strength. Again, every recruit enlisted is calculated as passing into the Reserve. No allowance is made for men who die, desert, are invalided, or discharged before completing their colour service, or extend their colour service and do not pass into the Reserve. My experience is that only one recruit out of every five reaches the Reserve.

In the Army Order of 23rd December last the statement is made that combatant units, which come into action on the outset of a campaign, should on mobilisation consist in due proportion of Regular soldiers and Regular Reservists. It is an elementary maxim in all military organisation not to swamp the serving soldiers of the battalion first for service by too large an influx of Reservists who must be more or less rusty. But what does the Government consider as the due proportion of serving soldiers to Regular Reservists? Lord Wolseley in his time has described the home battalions as "squeezed lemons." This Return shows the accuracy of that description to-day in a truly alarming manner. The height of the "squeezed lemon "season is just after the Indian drafts have been sent abroad. After the departure of the last of the Indian drafts, that would not be till April, there are fewest Line soldieis in a battalion at home of twenty years of age and fit for foreign service. The Return asked for by Lord Midleton is dated 1st February, but since that date two transports have sailed to India and two to the Colonies, reducing by some thousands the number of men over twenty years of age now at home. I do not know if there are yet more transports to go abroad. After sending out the last of the Indian and Colonial drafts if there is an average of anything like 300 serving soldiers of twenty years of age and fit for foreign service in the home battalions it is the very outside number.

To complete the battalion to war strength, that is up to 1,000 men, 700 Reservists must be added to each battalion on mobilisation. Now, do the military advisers of the Government assure them at that is a due proportion of Regular soldiers and Regular Reservists? How long do their military advisers tell them that battalions thus composed will require before they are fit to go into action with any chance of success against the trained troops of a military Power? Now these are the battalions of the expeditionary force. They will be very good battalions, but you must give them time, and time is the most valuable present you can make your enemy on the outbreak of hostilities. I understand it is the intention to reinforce these battalions in the field solely by a system of drafts derived from the Special Reserve. If reliance is placed upon drafts only, then the system can only be worked successfully by coming to-an arrangement with the enemy never to put more than a certain proportion of any one unit out of action at any one moment.

Assume that a battalion—and these things happen in war—goes into action 1,000 strong with a full complement of officers, and comes out with 300 men and five or six officers, then the Government propose to dip into the general drafting pool, that is the Special Reserve, for 700 or 800 depot-trained boys, who have never seen the Regular Army and are strangers to each other, being collected from many different depots, and unknown to the regiment to which they are to be drafted. They will go out under officers they have never seen, provided from the Government does not know where—the matter is still under consideration—and be added to the renmant of the regular regiment with the result that the unit will be useless for any military purpose, and must be struck off the strength of the field force. The unit cannot be replaced, because no system of expansion of the Regular Army by organised units is contemplated by the Government.

It is obvious that as the Regular Army and its reserves becomes more and more reduced in numbers, and the establishment has now beer reduced by 21,000 men, it is increasingly important to be able to place the whole of the remainder in the actual theatre of war, and as near the fighting front as possible. That can only be accomplished by freeing the Army both at home and abroad from all garrison duties, and duties pertaining to troops of the second line. The Government must relegate a considerable part of the reduced first line troops to second line duties, because they have decided to abolish the Militia, which has never failed to give embodied service at home and abroad, freeing the Regular Army for first line duties in the field. The abolition of the Militia is certain. The creation of the Territorial Army, or rather of anything which legitimately could be called an Army, is doubtful. I am only concerned with the Territorial Army in so far as it may aSect the fighting efficiency of the Regular Army.

We are informed in the Memorandum which accompanies the Army Estimates that the use of the Territorial Army is not only to free the Regular Army from all home duties—nothing is said about foreign service duties—but also to enable the Navy to act with greater freedom at a distance from these shores. Because apparently the Government trust that the Territorial Army will be so awe inspiring that no Continental invaders will attempt to approach our shores save in such overwhelming numbers that the very size of their flotilla would be an impediment to their advent, and a hindrance to their landing. Such is the view expressed in the Memorandum which accompanies the Army Estimates as to the value of the Territorial Army, which, by the way, does not yet exist. But the all important point is that that view should be shared by all possible Continental invaders. Are the Government really prepared to give us a distinct assurance that such will be the case? "We know perfectly well that the special contingent and the Territorial Army do not exist. They are but a phantom force invoked as an ignis fatuus to lure away the inquirer from his search after the true state of the Regular Army. I most strongly support the Motion of the noble Viscount for Papers giving farther information as to the state of the Regular Army at home.

LORD RIBBLESDALE

My Lords, I can promise that I shall occupy the time of the House for but a very few moments, and the remarks I have to make will have reference to what was said by the noble Viscount as to the Inspector General's Reports, and the reply of my noble friend the Under Secretary of State for War. I think the whole House must feel that there is a very wide divergence in the views of the noble Viscount, who spoke from large practical experience of War Office affairs, and of 'he noble Earl as to the nature of those Reports. After quoting Paragraph 10 of Section 3 of the Esher Report as to the Inspector General being the eyes and ears of the Army Council, the noble Viscount said that at that time it was commonly understood that the Inspector General was to act as a sort of auditor and accountant, who was to keep the public informed as to the solvency of our military resources. Nothing could be more different from that than the reply which was given by the noble Earl the Under Secretary. Whereas the noble Viscount said the public was to be informed as to the condition of these securities, the noble Earl below me told us that the public was not to be informed, and, practically, that the information of the Inspector General was for the Army Council, and should only reach the country in such doses as the Secretary of State for War sees fit to lay before Parliament. Whatever the practice is now, I would like to know what really was the spirit and intention of the Government by whom the Inspector General was appointed, and what in their opinion he was to do, and not to do. Though I can understand that my noble friend can give no promise that the Reports of the Inspector General should be laid on the Table, yet at this particular time and in relation to the Army, at all events, I hope there will be some reassuring statement as to the Report of the Inspector General on our military resources.

THE EARL OF ERROLL

My Lords, I should like to say one or two words in support of the Motion of the noble Viscount. I will not say anything as to the analysis of 'he Paper which has been placed before your Lordships. I think the noble Earl the Under Secretary accepted all the criticisms of the noble Viscount, as well as the responsibility for the state of those battalions. But, my Lords, I cannot help thinking that "the man in the street," when he opens his newspaper to morrow morning, will read with surprise, not to say with some alarm, that only four battalions of the sixty nine at home are up to strength, and I think he will begin to consider whether, after all, a voluntary system is suitable to the needs of the country.

We have been told that for mobilisation at home we should only be able to get about 30,000 men. To mobilise at all we should want 53,000 horses, and I should like to know from the Government whether these horses will be forthcoming. The noble and gallant Field Marshal who spoke from the cross benches told us that invasion, if it came, would be sudden. Therefore, I should like to ask whether these horses could be produced at a moment's notice. If not, I do not believe that it would be possible to mobilise this force under a very long period. We should have to fall back, I suppose, on the Territorial Army and take their horses, and I do not think they would be very pleased with that.

I do not think the public really quite realise the extent to which the Regular Forces have been reduced since the present Government have been in power. Their attention has been so much riveted of late on the Territorial Army that they have quite failed to grasp the extent to which the Regular fighting strength of the country has been weakened. Since 1905 some 26,000 efficient fighting men, with the Reserves they would have produced, have been taken from the Army. Three thousand of these were trained gunners. These figures are serious enough; but I understand that further reductions are to be made in the battalions being brought home from South Africa. The nine battilions which hive been reduced were admittedly in a highly efficient state. The reduction of these men has, as far as I know, never been justified on any military grounds whatever; it has been justified merely on grounds of economy and in pursuance of election pledges. There has been nothing at all scientific in these reductions. Mr. Haldane said himself that he had not been able to work out what the requirements of the country were. The grounds upon which these reductions have taken place are political, not military; and in the interests of the Liberal Party, not of the country.

Economy at the expense of efficiency is the falsest economy, and means pouring out money like water when the crisis arrives. I had hoped that the noble Earl the Under Secretary would have given us the opinion of some members of the Army Council upon these reductions. I am bound to say that outside the magic circle of the War Office I do not believe there is a single soldier of standing who would acquiesce in them. It has been claimed that these reductions will be compensated by increased efficiency. I grant that the formation of brigades and divisions is, to a certain extent, an improvement; but I think it is an odd way of improving your efficiency to reduce efficient men and replace them by those who are less efficient or by none at all. I cannot see how the reduction of 500 officers can in any way add to the efficiency of these forces.

Nothing practical has been done to add a single officer to the Army. Certain nebulous negotiations have been going on with schools and Universities. Youths when they leave these seats of learning will, I believe, be given captains' certificates, but they will have had no experience of military affairs or of leading men, and will add very little, I think, to the military strength of the country. The shortage of officers is due to the fact that the terms offered are not "good enough." The pay of the men has increased enormously during the last few years, but the pay of officers has remained unchanged for the past 100 years. I was told this morning by a friend of mine that two young relatives of his had gone into a Line regiment, and that their pay would be £90 a year, out of which they had to expend £60 on their kits. I do not think the wonder is that we are short of officers in these circumstances; the wonder is that we can get any officers at all. If the country wants officers it ought to pay them a living wage; otherwise, the officers will not be forthcoming, and the results will be disastrous.

If the Territorial Army is to be kept up in stores, equipment, and ammunition, I think the sum that has already been voted will be insufficient, and what I am afraid of is that when this is found out, further reductions will be made in the Regulars. One of the Government's supporters in the House of Commons said the other night that he thought further reductions were possible, and they must look for considerate reductions in the Regulars if they were to provide money for the complete equipment of the Territorial Army. Now, Auxiliaries, as I prefer to call them, cannot take the place of Regulars, and it is idle to pretend they can. I consider that it is dangerous to exalt Auxiliaries at the expense of the Regulars. It shows a great want of any sense of proportion, and it deceives the public by making the strength of the Army appear much greater than it really is.

I am not speaking in any spirit of hostility to the Territorial Army. I quite recognise, on the contrary, that it is our duty to do everything we can to make it a success; but what I object to is the starving of the Regulars for the Territorial Army. Savings by reduction of the establishment, or by depletion of stores and ammunition, are effected at the cost of efficiency. Before the war £5,500,000 were spent on military stores; now there is less than £2,000,000. I would press for assurances from the Member of the Government who will speak later that the stores and ammunition are adequate to the wants of the country. I notice that the Vote for small arm ammunition his been very much increased this year, and that the reason is that there is no surplus of ammunition in hand. I think this is a question of vital importance to the country, and one upon which, I hope, we shall have some information.

The withdrawal of troops from South Africa and the Mediterranean leaves India without reinforcements nearer than home. This concentration at home means reinforcing from the furthest point, and at a time when the Navy will not guarantee the convoy of transports until after a successful campaign has been won. Owing to the reductions in the Mediterranean garrisons it will no longer be possible for us to send eight seasoned battalions up to the Soudan, as we did in 1898. I know it is claimed by His Majesty's Government that the Reserve is very much larger than it has ever been before, but I venture to say that the old Reserve was better than, the one we have now. I thank your Lordships for the patience with which you have listened to me, and I think I have shown that the state of the Army is very serious and disquieting, and that the country is in a much weaker military position than it was this time three, years ago.

VISCOUNT HARDINGE

My Lords, I think most of your Lordships will agree that we are greatly indebted to Lord Midleton for having brought forward this Motion to night, for, no matter what our political opinions on other matters may be, we are deeply conscious of the fact that upon the statesmanlike solution of national defence depends the security and well being of this country. For this reason free discussion in this House, at any rate, is certainly most essential, for by this means alone can the country be made aware of the real military changes that the Secretary of State for War has brought forward since the present Government have been in office. For a false step or injudicious action may result in such disastrous consequences that it is the imperative duty of each and every one of us to prevent the possibilities of such consequences arising. It is, I believe, with this object that the noble Viscount has opened this discussion, and thereby enabled the public to understand more fully than they do at present what effect these changes have had, or are likely to have, upon the Army of this country as a fighting force. The present Secretary of State for War recognised in his first speech in the House of Commons that none of his predecessors had taken over the Army in so good a condition, either as regarded quantity or quality, and that he was convinced in the belief of a continuity of policy, but the policy he has adopted is a reversal of that of his predecessor. The policy of the late Government was that the Army should be maintained at an adequate strength, should be thoroughly organised for war, and should be capable of great expansion. By the universal opinion of military experts this is only possible by provision for increased power of expansion in time of war; an increased number of trained officers and men, an increase in the personnel of the artillery, more especially its reserve, and the creation of a striking force capable of taking the field on an emergency prior to general mobilisation. The scheme of the present Secretary for War satisfies none of these requirements. In a small Army like ours the preservation of units is of primary importance with a view to expansion in time of war; but Mr. Haldane has destroyed eight battalions of the Line with their reserves, one battalion of the Guards, with the promised, destruction of another, with their reserves, the Regular artillery to the extent of 5,000 men with their reserves, and the promise of a reduction of 3,000 additional trained men of the artillery with their reserves, 35 battalions of the Militia, and the conversion of the remaining battalions into Line depots, and of the artillery Militia into a force as yet not decided upon. Such a reduction as this fully justified the noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition in the statement he made in your Lordships' House on 26th June last, that— The amputations to which the Government have resorted will have a very serious effect in weakening the fighting efficiency of the Regular Army, for it seems to me that the policy must be one which tends to diminish the strength of the Army Reserve. It will be remembered that in 1905 the late Secretary of State for War, Mr. Arnold Forster, submitted to Parliament the proposal that the Militia should form the Territorial Short Service Infantry of the Regular Army. This proposal was generally denounced on the plea that it was nothing more nor less than the transformation of the Militia into sham Regulars. The present Secretary of State for War and his supporters joined in the cry. In spite of this fact, Mr. Haldane has adopted the principle of the proposal referred to, and has declared it as essential to the welfare of the Army; but with this difference, that under the present scheme the Militia as a force is virtually dead, for it becomes nothing more nor less than a recruiting depot for the Army. This fact, I must confess, I did not realise until the noble Earl the Under Secretary for War stated last month, in answer to a question put by Lord Raglan, that during the non-training period the battalion did not exist as such. When the present Government came in office two alternatives existed for the Militia—reform or destruction. When the Secretary of State in the House of Commons stated that— He would see that the Militia were not bled white, the force fondly believed that this indicated that he was in favour of reform. It is now evident, however, that this force is confronted with the other alternative, and is sentenced to death. By this step the Army is deprived in time of war of a potential reserve, the value of which has been proved on many occasions in the past. I would like, therefore, to ask the Under Secretary for War whether the reduction and changes of the forces to which I have referred are founded by the Government on the belief that we are justified in placing our reliance in time of war upon untrained troops and officers, and in discarding highly trained officers and men in order to obtain money for the Territorial Army which is to be brought into existence by the County Associations. If such is the case, then I believe that there is some truth in the words of a military writer, who said that— In accepting the new scheme we are deliberately neglecting the teaching of every war that has been fought since the world began, and are declaring in unmistakable terms that every nation which has fought and expects to light for its life is making a tremendous error. We are assuming that we alone have learnt the secret that without preparation, without sacrifice, without training, and without leading we can safely commit the fortunes of the nation to the stern arbitrament of battle, confident an the efficacy of good intentions, amiable speeches, and half measures to work a miracle In our favour—a miracle which has never been vouchsafed to any other people in the world. I commend those words to His Majesty's Government, and I hope they will ponder before destroying the Militia, that constitutional force which has done great service for the country in the past.

LORD WENLOCK

My Lords, I hope it will not be long before His Majesty's 'Government give a reply to the remarks which have fallen from the noble and gallant Field Marshal on the cross benches. I do not think that since the discussions on the Army have taken place we have heard a more solemn and more serious utterance than that which the noble and gallant Earl has made to night on this subject. I am bound to say, anxious as I am to promote the success of the new scheme, that I cannot help thinking there is a great deal of truth in what he has said. As chairman of one of the County Associations entrusted with the organisation and equipment of a portion of this new force, I can fully endorse what the noble and gallant Earl said as to the difficulty of raising field artillery. We are having great difficulty with the men for the new force. We are to ask them on 1st April to change their old occupations and take up new ones, and the only way in which we can get field artillery is by turning to the old garrison artillery and explaining what is to become of them, that they will become field artillery and be taught to ride and use guns in the field. Naturally, in that case they will say: "Let us have the guns and we will proceed." But we understand that one gun per brigade is all that we are to have. The result is that the men are getting so disappointed that they are dwindling away in numbers every day, and I am told that by the time the guns are ready in my part of the country there will not be any men to man them. Therefore, I think this is a matter which the Government should very seriously consider, and I trust that they will not delay in making an answer to the statement of the noble and gallant Earl. A Volunteer artillery force, would, in my opinion, end in a ridiculous failure.

LORD HAVERSHAM

My Lords, I rise to correct a misapprehension in the mind of the noble Viscount who initiated this discussion. He said there had been, dangerous reductions in the Mediterranean garrisons, and that we should not be able to draw upon that Reserve in case of another war. It is the fact that there have been considerable reductions in the garrisons at Malta and Gibraltar, but they have been in a great measure compensated for by the very large increase of 2,500 men in the Egyptian garrison. The upshot of the whole thing is this, that whereas under the late Government the whole strength of the Mediterranean garrison was, roughly, 18,000, it is now, roughly, 17,000. That is the only change that has taken place.

The reduction in the Guards has been referred to by Viscount Hardinge, but at the time that reduction was made these extra battalions of the Guards wer not fulfilling the duties for which they were called into existence. They were formed in order that they might constitute part of the Mediterranean garrison. But they were never used in that way. As there was not sufficient barrack accommodation for them in London and elsewhere, a great number of the Guards were put down permanently at Aldershot, and the service became unpopular. It was impossible to get the requisite number of men, and the commanding officer of the Grenadiers stated that there were not enough officers to go round. That was the reason for the reduction in the Guards, and it has been viewed as a very sensible one. I know that there are officers very high up in the Guards who ara glad that the reduction has taken place.

With, regard to the Northumberland; Fusiliers, the noble Viscount, Lord Midleton, knows very well that these battalions were reduced because they were brought into existence for the war. They were exceptional cases in which two battalion regiments were made up to four; and they were accordingly reduced, but I take it that it is pretty certain the men and officers would be employed in the other battalions. I think it must be very satisfactory to the military authorities to have seen the enormous growth of the Reserve. In September, 1906, the Reserve amounted to 110,000 men; the number has since been augmented to 135,000, and in the Estimates it is further increased to 142,000. That is an enormous increase, and I think it will be satisfactory to the noble Duke who spoke to night that a great number of the men have been enlisted for periods which will take them on into the Reserve until 1911–12. There is another solution which might be adopted, by means of which we should be relieved of danger when the great depletion of the Reserve takes place. Men might be invited to join Section D, and give four more years service in the Reserve. When attacks are made on the present system, I think we should look with pleasure to the growth of the Reserve, which is the best reservoir of our strength.

Moved, "That the debate be adjourned until Monday."—(Lord Lucas.)

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

On the Motion for adjournment, might I ask whether, on the resumption of the debate, the Government will be able, in addition to other matters, to give figures showing the present strength of the Artillery Reserve?

THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH

I cannot give an absolute pledge, but I will inquire.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

I should hope that the figures would be available.

THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH

Perhaps the noble Viscount will put a Ques- tion on the Paper that I may know exactly what he wants.

On Question agreed to, debate adjourned accordingly.

House adjourned at half past Seven o'clock, to Monday next, a quarter past Four o'clock.