THE TERRITORIAL ARMY.

HL Deb 16 July 1908 vol 192 cc1008-48

*THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

rose "To call attention to the state of the Territorial Army on 1st July, 1908, and to the Report of the Director of Recruiting for 1907, and to the statement showing the number of recruits enlisted for the Special Reserve between the 15th January and 16th May, 1908 [Cd. 3935]." The noble Duke said: My Lords, I beg to call attention to the state of the Territorial Army on July 1st. In estimating the present value of the Territorial Army it is necessary to remember that His Majesty's Government has bestowed that force upon the country, not as an additional force, but in substitution for, first, the whole Militia and the whole Militia system destroyed; secondly, in place of 100,000 Volunteers and Yeomanry, for that is the difference between the strength of those forces given in the Annual Report of the British Army for 1908, and the numbers of the Territorial Army on the 1st July; and, finally, in exchange for great reductions in the Regular Army and its Reserves.

Let me say at once that I attach far more importance to the effect which the recent Territorial and Reserve Forces Act may produce on the Regular Army than to any influence it may have on the Territorial Force. The fighting efficiency of the Regular Army has been impaired by the loss of many excellent Reserve-creating cadres, and its strength will be further diminished by the shattering of its present recruiting system. The Director of Recruiting comments, in paragraph 63 of his Report for 1907, on the changes which that Act may make in the future of recruiting. He writes— The changes which must necessarily take place in the future consequence of the legislation enacted by the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, 1907, may affect recruiting materially, It maybe found, for instance, that by the abolition of the Garrison Artillery Militia, Garrison Artillery recruits may be harder to obtain. It is possible that in some areas the formation of the Territorial Associations may materially assist in popularising the Army and aid recruiting. On the other hand, large reductions have been made in the Permanent Staff of the present Auxiliary Forces which will in themselves reduce the numbers of recruiters throughout the United Kingdom. Experience only can show what changes and modifications will have to be made in future to meet the new conditions of affairs. The number of recruits obtained for the Regular Army in the year 1907 was 34,916. Of this number the Militia Permanent Staff enlisted directly for the Regular Army 11,752, and for the Militia 15,034. Last year 12,113 men transferred from the Militia to the Regular Army, all of whom had been obtained by the Militia Permanent Staff. We find, then, that in 1907 the Militia Permanent Staff raised 23,865 men for the Regular Army. Thus nearly three-quarters of the recruits for the Regular Army were obtained by the Militia Permanent Staff. It is a fact that the Militia Permanent Staff is, and has been for many years, the chief recruiting agency for the Army. It follows that if great changes are made in the Permanent Staff of the Militia great differences must result in recruiting for the Regular Army. In 1907 there were 2,232 non-commissioned Officers of the Militia Permanent Staff actively engaged in recruiting duties throughout the United Kingdom.

The whole duty of the Militia Permanent Staff, when it has boon converted into the Staff of the Special Reserve, will be confined to drilling small squads of Special Reservists on the barrack square, and as each squad will be in a different stage of instruction many instructors will be required. The impossibility of the Permanent Staff being on the barrack square and at the same time engaged in recruiting work was apparent to the Army Council. They therefore ordered that two non-commissioned officers from every third Special Reserve battalion should be sent out recruiting, all the remainder being wanted for duties in barracks. The net result, then, is that instead of the Militia Permanent Staff amounting to 2,232 non-commissioned officers all engaged on recruiting duties during eleven months of the year, there will now be, according to the new regulations, 148 sergeants on the staff of the Special Reserve employed for that purpose. Now 148 recruiting agents cannot possibly give the same results as 2,232. That is what the Director of Recruiting means when he alludes to— Large reductions in the Permanent Staff of the Auxiliary Forces which will in themselves reduce the number of recruiters throughout the United Kingdom. I ask the noble Lord the Undersecretary of State if any arrangements have been made to replace the Regular Army's Recruiting Staff, or if it is not considered necessary to trouble about recruiting for the Regular Army because we are now blessed with a Territorial Army on paper?

You cannot look to the Permanent Staff of the Territorial Army to recruit for the Regular Army. The Permanent Staff of the Territorial Army is less than that of the Volunteers and of the Yeomanry. By the Recruiting Return for 1907 I see that the Volunteer Permanent Staff raised 3,168 men for the Regular Army, and the Permanent Staff of the Yeomanry raised sixty-two men for the Regular Army. At present the whole of their energies arc required for bringing, their own force into existence. No doubt there are the County Associations. There is an idea, founded on I know not what, that in some mysterious manner those County Associations arc to be of enormous benefit to the Regular Army in the matter of recruiting. For instance, in the Report of the Director of Recruiting we read— It is possible that in some areas the formation of the Territorial Associations may materially assist in popularising the Army and aid recruiting. Again, I read in a paper written by the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State on the duties of County Associations, the following— In that I include the advantage that should accrue from being linked up more closely with the Regular Army, she greater sympathy between the Regular and citizen forces which must come with assimilation of system and organisation. I am not sure that I follow the meaning of the noble Lord, and I therefore ask him to explain how the sysmpathy will assist the County Associations in recruiting for the Army? "An ounce of practice is worth all the dry theory in the world." The noble Lord will recognise that sentence as another quotation from his own writings. Let me give him my ounce of practice in recruiting for the Army through the Militia, as I knew it. Perhaps he will tell me, in return, how I can in future help the Regular Army through the County Association, now that the Militia has been abolished.

First of all I used to have, not two, but ten or twelve non-commissioned officers out on recruiting duties, and that in a small county. When the recruits were assembled for preliminary drill, I used to send them home to their villages, from Saturday to Monday, smartly dressed, and with their pay in their pockets. Then I asked them to bring others back with them, and this they did, thus making every recruit into a recruiter. I urged them to bring their friends and relatives to see the manner of life which was led in barracks. By means of the local Press I informed parents that, when visiting barracks, if they saw anything to which they, as parents, objected, I hoped they would at once directly communicate with me. A large number of the men's friends and relations were constantly visiting the barracks. This ounce of practice, so well said to be worth all the dry theory in the world, consists of the commanding officer dealing personally with the recruit, the recruit returning home, and there himself acting as a recruiter, and the friends and relatives of the men coming from their homes into barracks. The recruit, if he had a fancy for Regular soldering could go the Regular Army, and many went; if he preferred Militia soldiering he was free to remain in the Militia. If he disliked both he could buy his discharge with his bounty at the end of the training, and put ten shillings in his pocket as well. Above all, he knew he could make his own choice and would never be trapped into doing what he did not wish or intend.

My experience of the past two winters training of the Militia recruits is that voluntary enlistment conducted on the lines I described would give you a Regular first line and a Militia second line, but enlisted for foreign service, closely connected, mutually dependent, and numerically sufficient. But the Government will have none of it. They look to the Territorial Army and the County Associations as the future foundation of our military system. Now, will the noble Lord tell me the practice, not the dry theory, of the aid which members of the County Associations can give recruiting for the Regular Army? There is no such thing as recruit training for the Territorial Army carried on in barracks, and the men of the Regular and Territorial Army are so different in stamp, conditions, and employment, that it is impossible to bring them together as the men of the Militia and Line used to be brought. For my own part I believe that the advantages which may accrue to the Regular Army in Great Britain from County Associations to be nil, and I must be right in the case of Ireland, because Ireland is excluded from the Territorial Force.

It is clear from the paragraph I have first quoted from the Report of the Director of Recruiting, that he considers that the recruiting system for the Regular Army has, like much else, gone into the general melting pot, and that we must wait and see what may come out. We are now half way through the year, and can begin to discern some of the results. From the statement relating to recruiting for the Special Reserve in the first quarter of this year we can compare recruiting for the Militia in the corresponding period of 1907. In the first place, in Great Britain between the 15th January and the 16th May of this year, during the best quarter of the year for recruiting, for the Special Reserve Infantry, 6,389 recruits were taken. During the corresponding period of last year for the Militia Infantry, 9,110 recruits were taken. That is a drop of 2,721 infantry recruits in Great Britain in the best recruiting quarter of the year. In the case of Ireland the falling off is much greater. The figures there are: Recruits for the Special Reserve Infantry, 495; for the corresponding period in last year for Militia Infantry 1,697—a drop of 1,202.

Last year showed a decrease in recruiting for the Militia of only 156 for all arms in the United Kingdom, but the Government have achieved for their Special Reserve in the first quarter of this year a drop of 4,545 for all arms. Now this drop has come about when the full recruiting staff of 2,232 were at work, whereas at the end of this summer there will only be 148 recruiting agents available, which makes a further drop inevitable. I have no doubt I shall be told that recruiting for the Regular Army has not fallen off. Well, why should it, because the Permanent Staff of the Militia will not be reduced until the end of this summer? Again, it is in the matter of transfers from the Militia to the Army that the Army must lose heavily when the Militia has been abolished. It is a certain loss of 12,000 men for the Army next year. Every man now in the Special Reserve has taken £2 to stay out of the Army for a year, and the remainder of the Militia have gone. But for a year at least the results of the abolition of the Militia on the strength of the Regular Army need' not be revealed.

Recruiting for the Special Reserve does not and will not interfere or compete with recruiting for the Regular Army for the simple reason that a younger, a weaker, and an inferior class of boy is taken for the Special Reserve. It is essential for the existence of the Regular Infantry that every Special Reserve recruit on attaining Army standard should be passed into the Army. Consequently, bounties are offered to Special Reserve recruits to join the Army and rewards to non-commissioned officers to promote their transfer. It is too early yet to ask for any Return of Special Reservists joining the Regular Army, because they must have served in the Special Reserve for three months before they are allowed to join the Army, but from my own knowledge and from all accounts I have heard from Militia Officers every Special Reserve recruit who has become qualified for the Army has joined the Army. A Line recruit used to be kept at the depot for three months before he joined his Line battalion. Now a Special Reserve recruit is kept at the depot for three months, and, if up to Army standard, is sent to the Line with a bounty of 30s. at the end of three months. If not fit in three months, then; at the end of six months; and finally, if still physically unfit for the Army, he is posted to the Special Reserve to form with his fellows of like quality the backbone of the British Infantry when mobilised for war. I should like to ask the Government if they are satisfied that a Reserve for the Regular Army composed of boys and men whose presence in that Reserve is due to their unfitness to serve in the Army, is a sound piece of military re organisation.

We are told in an Army Memorandum on the military forces of the United Kingdom, dated February, 1907, that— On mobilisation, including the numbers required to meet wastage for six months, nearly 3,500 officers and 75,000 men would be required for the Special Contingent. The bulk of these men will receive six months' recruit training. That is more than a year ago, and we have heard very little about the Special Contingent lately. Could the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State say if there is any prospect of obtaining these 3,500 officers and 75,000 men? They are part of the first line and are absolutely essential to the expeditionary force.

One more question as to the non-combatant braches of the Special Reserve. We were informed in the Army Order of 23rd December last, that— The conditions under which officers and men of this category will join the Special Reserve will he published hereafter. The noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for War, in the same note from which I have already quoted, writes— Think of an Army Service Corps whose drivers came from Pickfords, whose butchers from Smithfield, whose bakers from Spiking, mid the men who serve out the grocery rations from Fortnum and Masons. —a charming and imaginative picture. But can the noble Lord say if any progress has been made in its realisation?

Page 4 of the statement of recruiting for the Special Reserve gives the strength—that is, the number of men actually serving on the 1st January last—of the twenty-throe disbanded Militia Battalions as 10,307 men. Of these 10,307, 4,632 have joined the Special Reserve, and the rest have taken a free discharge or remained Militiamen till time expired—a loss of 5,675 men. It seems to me that the Government may now rely on one half, or perhaps rather more than one half, of the Infantry Militia accepting the £2 bounty and joining the Special Reserve. The strength of the Militia Infantry in 1907 is given as 76,473, which should give 40,000 Special Infantry Reservists. But it must be remembered that this balance of men obtained from the Militia at a cost of £80,000 are subject to rapid waste. For instance, many would have joined the Line in their first or second year of service, but having taken the £2 they must stay out of the Line for a year. Many of my own men who took the £2 are now asking to be allowed to join the Army, but cannot refund the £2. Others have joined the Special Reserve because they have but a short time to serve before getting their discharge. They are ready enough to take the £2 and chance it for a couple of years. This balance, then, is a dwindling balance and in two years time it will become a negligible quantity. If the numbers of the Special Reserve are to be maintained that can only be effected by recruiting, and the failure for recruiting for the Special Reserve during the first quarter of this year is apparent by the Return now rendered. What will be more serious than the failure of the Special Reserve will be the effect of the abolition of the chief recruiting agency for the Regular Army, which will render the collapse of recruiting for the Regular Forces certain. But that, again, need not appear for a year.

The Militia Commanding Officers have always advised the War Office that they would not be able to enlist men in sufficient numbers—that is the point, sufficient numbers—for foreign service under the conditions proposed for the Special Reserve. As regards transfers, it appears probable that the Army Council will obtain half, or rather more than half, of the Militia now serving, which means that 40 per cent. of the Force will be lost. Undoubtedly, without the costly inducement of the £2 bounty no men would have transferred from the Militia to the Special Reserve. Many Governments have resorted to bounties in time of need. It will get you the men for the moment, but it is a hateful system. It means that you go with money in jour hand to a man, in this case a poor man, and persuade him by means of a bribe to risk taking conditions of service which he would not, and in many cases ought not to, accept. It also promotes the practice of a zealous commanding officer advising the man to take the bounty and sign the paper and not bother about the contents, saying that he is himself bound by the same conditions which make no difference to him. True, no doubt, as far as the officer is concerned, but too often untrue in the case of the man. The unsoundness of the plan is that the men taking the bounty soon become time-expired. In this case the Government may spend £50,000, or they may spend £100,000, according to the number of men they get, it does not matter which, because the Force vanishes at the end of two years never to be replaced. It is, no doubt, advantageous for the moment for the Army Council to say we always knew we could get 50,000 men from the Militia for the Special Reserve, but then they should in fairness add we have got them at a cost of £100,000 and in a couple of years we shall lose them.

The creation of the Special Reserve means the transfer of some thousands of men from the Militia to the Special Reserve at a cost of £2 per head, who will disappear in two years time, and an immediate drop in recruiting of 4,545 of all arms in the first and best recruiting quarter of the year. It means the loss of several hundred capable and experienced officers, who are not anxious to resign but are not allowed to remain as Militia officers and whom the Government have no chance of replacing. It means a loss of 892 non-commissioned officers to the first line, due to the disbandment of twenty - three Militia battalions, and the reduction in the permanent staff of 101 Militia battalions transferred to the Special Reserve, and the abolition of 101 depot sergeant majors. It means the discharge of some 30,000 men. It means the final break up of the whole Militia system and of all Militia traditions and regimental spirit. It is the disappearance of a force which found 120,000 men for the purposes of the past war, went abroad a month after war was declared, and was our only military force capable of providing complete units of itself for active service. You cannot dispense with a force of that kind without creating a dangerous gap in Imperial defence.

Last year I urged the Government to leave the Militia as a force in being for two years, whilst the Territorial Army was in process of formation. But they then considered that two years was too long. One year, we were assured, was amply sufficient to get the Territorial Army perfectly ready to march on guard, and relieve the Militia and take over all their duties. The Militia is gone. But I gather from numerous interviews granted by the Secretary of State for War to members of the Press that the right hon. Gentleman is at present of the opinion that it is unreasonable to expect to form the Territorial Army under two years. The Secretary of State informed us last year that the third line, the Volunteers, were to become the second line in place of the Militia abolished, and consequently to undertake the duties, training, and conditions of second line troops. Let me say at once that I do not wish to disparage the service of men in the Volunteers or in the Territorial Army. I fully recognise that their patriotism far surpasses that of their fellows. My opinion, expressed last year, was that the Government cannot get second line training and duties from third line men, and my contention this year is that the failure to obtain sufficient numbers for the Territorial Army under these conditions shows that my opinion was correct.

You will remember that the Territorial Army was to have come into existence on the 31st March last. But so long as the conditions and training necessary for second line troops were insisted upon no men would join or transfer. So the Government decided to abandon the fifteen days camp, the four years enlistment, and all the other conditions pertaining to troops of the second line, and to offer conditions of service even more indulgent than they were in the Volunteers. The Financial Secretary to the War Office, in a letter to The Times, wrote— There is no hard and fast compulsory attendance at camp for eight days or fifteen. No one will be fined for non-attendance if there is a good reason. You cannot make a third line into a second with these conditions of service.

The strength of the Territorial Army on 1st July is given at 173,351 men and 8,326 officers. That is below establishment by 128,848 men and 3,049 officers. The establishment of the Territorial Infantry is fixed at 194,727 men and 5,863 officers. On July 1st (in round numbers) of these, 112,000 men and 4,747 officers had been obtained, mostly by transfer from the serving Volunteers, leaving some 83,000 men and 1,116 officers to be raised by recruiting. Last year for the Volunteer Infantry 49,914 recruits were obtained. Let us say 40,000 for the purposes of calculation. In order to complete the proposed establishment of the Territorial Infantry in this year's time the Volunteer intake of recruits must be doubled. Now the Government must allow that the conditions of service in the Territorial Army have proved themselves far less attractive than in the Volunteers. In addition, you must allow for wastage. Last year the Volunteers, numbering, in round numbers, 180,000, gave a wastage of 40,000 men. Therefore the 112,000 Territorial soldiers would show a wastage of 25,000. A shortage of 83,000 plus 25,000 for wastage equals 108,000. But 78,000 are enlisted in the Infantry for one year only on the old Volunteer conditions and a promise of a free discharge at the end of the year. This body of men will give an extraordinary wastage at the end of their year's service for which extra allowance must be made.

Assuming that half of these one-year men claim their free discharge, that would be 39,000. Therefore for ordinary wastage allow 25,000, for extraordinary wastage 39,000, and 83,000 short of establishment; this shows that 147,000 recruits are required during the coming year to bring the Territorial Infantry up to establishment. The County Associations must raise 13,000 recruits for the Territorial Infantry per month for a whole year. Last month, after the most special appeals on the part of the Government, 6,000 recruits were obtained. That number must be more than doubled for every month for a year to complete the Infantry establishment, and there are more than 1,000 officers to be obtained. Now will to failure to find these recruits and officers rest on the County Associations or is it to rest on His Majesty's Government? The establishment for the Territorial Army I understand to be the minimum, consistent with safety, having regard to the reductions in the Army and the abolition of the Militia. But if it is impossible to come anywhere near that minimum what happens to the safety? Possibly the Goverment who are responsible for the safety will inform us.

The Infantry of the Territorial Army now number 112,000 on paper. But what will be their field strength? The Annual Return of the Volunteer corps shows that there are 28½ per cent. of the men in the Volunteers under twenty years of age. It may be said, Why deduct boys of under twenty when it is a case of home service? The answer is that the whole reason for the existence of the Territorial Army, as stated by the Secretary of State for War, is not only to meet, but also to beat, possible raiders from the Continent. It is certain that if any invaders do come from the Continent they will not be untrained and immature boys. The persons who come will be seasoned men and soldiers. No one would suggest that it was possible to beat a carefully selected first line Army of trained soldiers with a third line force having 28½ per cent. of untrained boys in its ranks. So that boys must be deducted from the strength of the Territorial Army before it takes the field to repel the foreign foe.

In 1905 a partial medical examination of the Volunteer Force, not at all of a severe character, showed that out of 180,000 serving Volunteers examined 29,000 were medically unfit; that is, 15 per cent. All the 29,000 unfit men were retained in the Force, and many are now, no doubt, in the Territorial Army, because for the Volunteer who transfers to the Territorial Army no medical examination is required. I cannot accept the contention that unfit men have not been allowed to transfer from the Volunteers to the Territorial Army in view of the fact that all medical examination has been expressly prohibited in the case of transfers from the Volunteers. We must deduct 16 per cent. on account of physical unfitness. On embodiment for permanent service a margin must be allowed for absentees. For my own part I have always maintained that it will be impossible to embody the Territorial Army because it is composed of precisely the same men who could not, when called Volunteers, owing to the circumstances of their civilian life, give two months of consecutive service during the South African War. I have often asked the question, but I have never yet got an answer. Why should the Volunteers, because they are now called Territorial soldiers, have changed all the conditions of their civilian life and be able to give that embodied service in 1910 which they were not able to do in 1900?

The Volunteer is being constantly exhorted by the War Office to transfer to the Territorial Army because his duties will be just the same as when a Volunteer. The Government may make that true in peace, but it cannot be made true in war. The noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for War, describing the functions of the new second line army, writes— In the first place it accepts the whole responsibility for home defence, and in the second place, if there is need for expansion of the forces in the field, it is asked to volunteer in companies or even in whole units for service at the front. These are entirely new duties which never belonged in the past to the Volunteers. We can see that the Territorial soldier is meant to be a third line man in peace, but a second line man in war. For instance, it is said that because the Volunteers have never been embodied since their formation consequently the Territorial soldier need not be apprehensive of embodied service. But the Volunteer was a third line man, and the Territorial soldier is a second line man, and there is the difference. The Volunteers, being third line troops, have never been embodied, but it is due to the fact that the Militia, the second line, has always stood between them and embodiment, so long as they were the third line, and also because the only time when it was proposed to call them out on permanent service it was found impossible to do so.

I read in the paper written by the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for War on the County Associations and their work, as follows— If the Territorial Army had existed in the nineteenth century it would certainly have-been embodied during the Napoleonic wars. It would also, according to the Act, have been embodied after the events of 1899 in South Africa. So I am only talking now of what occurs at most once in a generation. I take it that the meaning of the noble Lord is that after the battle of Waterloo the Territorial Army would not have been embodied until the South African War. I do not admit that that is true of a second line into which the Government have now converted the Volunteers.

Under the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, by the calling out of the Army Reserve the whole Territorial Force is automatically embodied. It is said that the whole Army Reserve must be first called out. Now it is certain that any war with a civilised power will necessitate the calling out of the whole Army Reserve and the whole Special Reserve—that is, if the Special Reserve ever comes into existence. Take from the Crimean War in 1854 to the South African War in 1899; assume that the second line, the Militia, was non-existent as it now is; assume also that the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act was then in operation, and that the Territorial Army was the only Force supplementary to the Regular Army. Then the Territorial Force would have been called out on permanent service on the following occasions:—first, during the Crimean War; secondly, during the Indian Mutiny; thirdly, in 1877, when all the Army and Militia Reserve were called out during the Russo-Turkish War; fourthly, in 1885, when the Reserves of the Army were called out and there was a partial Militia embodiment; and finally, during the South African War; when it would have been embodied for upwards of two years and required to serve abroad within a month of the declaration of war. That is to say, five times in fifty-five years, or an average of once in eleven years.

By Clause 10 of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act every man enlisted into the Territorial Army is enlisted under the Army Act, and is an enlisted soldier, subject to the same severe penalties as men of the Regular Forces. Therefore any man absent on embodiment can be apprehended and thrown into prison. For my own part, I doubt whether any Government could imprison a man of the Territorial Force for absence on embodiment, and whether they could imprison him for leaving his regiment and staying absent at home after serving for a short time on permanent service. It is obvious that many men in the Territorial Army cannot give permanent service—men employed in arsenals, in dockyards, and on railways, bank clerks, and men employed in houses of business, to say nothing of married men. I understand that the Admiralty would have first claim on all Territorial soldiers employed in arsenals and dockyards in case of embodiment. Then why enlist such men? On the embodiment of the Territorial Infantry we must deduct 28½ per cent. for men under twenty, 16 per cent. for men physically unfit—these are official figures—and I suggest the very low figure of 5½ per cent. for absentees. In other words, 50 per cent. of the Territorial Infantry will not be available for field service on embodiment. So 112,000 comes down to 56,000, and of these 56,000 two-thirds are enlisted for one year only, and under the distinct understanding that they are to serve under more indulgent conditions for their last year than they have ever done before.

It is, of course, possible for the Government definitely to abandon all second line conditions of training and preserve precisely the same conditions as obtained in the Volunteers, but that will not meet the point of embodied service. I am glad to think that we have at last ceased to regard any military force from a purely peace point of view. We look at all our military forces now from the point of view of war. It is only just becoming clear to the country that the Militia is destroyed, because the disbandment is seen in actual operation, and that in consequence the third line must, as the Secretary of State told us last year, take the place of the old second line abolished. It is useless for a man to join the Territorial Force unless he is prepared to give prolonged permanent service, which the Volunteer need not have contemplated.

The present field strength of the Territorial Infantry may be taken as 56,000. The fighting efficiency we can judge of from the Report of the Norfolk Commission on the Volunteers—and we are dealing now with the same men and the same conditions of training. That Commission reported that:— Taking the Force as a whole, neither the musketry nor the tactical training of the rank and file would enable it to face with a prospect of success, the troops of a Continental Army. That is not to the discredit of the Volunteers. No third line force can be equal, on short notice, to a picked Regular force. That is why the Territorial Army, if ever we get it, will be so hopelessly unfitted for the very purpose for which it was called into existence, namely, to meet and beat the best Continental troops. Let us recognise frankly that the new organisation means, a weakened first line, no troops of the second line, and a third line which may or may not be formed.

Finally, this body of 112,000 men, with a field strength of 56,000 and a fighting efficiency described by the Royal Commission, will be absolutely the only body of Infantry left to us outside the Regular Army. But whatever may be our military weakness at present, we shall be far weaker in a year's time. In the first place, 78,000 of the Territorial Infantry have been induced to transfer for one year only, and on third line conditions of training. We were told that this plan had been adopted in order that Volunteers who transferred might give the new system a fair trial for one year, and see how they liked it. But this is precisely what they are not doing. They are not trying the new system. They have told you they do not like it, and will not have anything to do with it. They are serving under the old system, plus a promise of easier and more indulgent conditions than they ever served under before and a free discharge at the end of the year. Is it likely that they will take second line conditions of training at the end of this year for four years, having just refused to serve under them as a trial for one year?

At the end of the year two courses are open to the Government. First, to insist on the four years term of enlistment, and on the training conditions first proposed, by which the third line was to be rendered an efficient second line. In this case you will lose most of the men you have retained for one year on third line conditions. I strongly urge this course, because there can be no further idea about the Territorial Army as a second line. But what I anticipate is that you are going to tell the men that they may continue in the Territorial Army on more indulgent terms of service than they ever had in the Volunteers. This course, would be perfectly consistent with the great principle of the Territorial Force, namely, that it is not meant to be available for garrison duties until six months after the declaration of war. This must be the case so long as the Territorial Army is not trained to second line duties in time of peace. But it means that the Regular Army, that is, the expeditionary force, is tied down to home garrison duties for six months. In short, when the crisis is upon us we have no power of offensive action overseas for an indefinite period. Are we to understand that the principles of Imperial defence to which the Government has finally committed us are—war first, military training after, and no power of immediate offensive action overseas? It is said that before an expeditionary force can leave this country command of the sea must be obtained, and that that will take the required six months. Yes, but how did that apply to South Africa? Does it apply to India? At any time you may be called upon suddenly and swiftly to double the white garrison of India. At the present moment you could not do any such thing for an indefinite period.

My view of the result of the reorganisation of the forces of His Majesty's Governments best expressed in a sentence used by Mr. Windham in Parliament in 1803 of Mr. Addington, the then Prime Minister. Early in 1800 there were 380,000 Volunteers in Great Britain and 70,000 in Ireland. Mr. Windham, a subsequent Secretary of State for War, summed up the value of that force created by Mr. Addington, by saying that— not only had the right hon. Gentleman not provided an Army, but lie had made it impossible that an Army should be provided. On Mr. Windham's accession to office in 1806 as Secretary of State for War he said, previous to the disbandment of this Force— It is a fact that during the three years and a half that this system has existed, it has cost the Government no less than five millions sterling in allowances to the Volunteers. The expenses that the Volunteers themselves have gone to, and the various subscriptions and contributions that have been made in aid of the system, amount to at least as much more. I am stating below the mark when I say that the security which the country has derived from the Volunteers for the last three years and a half has been purchased at the enormous expense of above ten millions sterling, besides depriving our more efficient descriptions of force of many men who would otherwise have entered into them. Peace came in 1814, followed by the return from Elba in March, 1815, the reign of 100 days, and the battle of Waterloo, fought by an Army with a strong Militia element, because it had been thought perfectly safe, war in Europe being impossible, to send a great part of the Regular Army to America. But the period of 100 days is suggestive. The whole foundation for the new scheme of Imperial defence is that six months—that is, 180 days—must be allowed to elapse before the Territorial Army is fit for garrison duty at home, and consequently before the Regular Army can be set free for service abroad. The Territorial Army of to-day will never compete with the Regular Army for men, but it will itself suffer competition from the rifle clubs and the proposed Reserve for Volunteers. Under voluntary enlistment the tendency is always to gravitate towards the least disciplined force. The Territorial Army has bled and will bleed the Regular Army for money, and has in that sense already bled the Militia out of existence. Every extra grant which County Associations obtain for the Territorial Army will be paid for by the Regular Army. Many of those belonging to the County Associations, especially the Associations of smaller counties, no doubt see that as far as private contributions are concerned the moment has come when the hat must be sent round. I am myself of opinion that nothing could be more unsound in principle than supporting our second line Army by private contributions, and the Government, by accepting that unsound principle, has abandoned one of its most essential duties.

It will take a year before we really touch bottom in the matter of the destruction of our military system and forces. In twelve months the one year go-as-you-please men of the Territorial Force will leave, and the inadequate supply of Territorial recruits, inadequate to bring it up to establishment, and inadequate to meet the ordinary and extraordinary wastage from the Force, will become apparent. At the end of the year or a little more the Militiamen bribed by the bounty into the Special Reserve will have left to join the Regular Army or on becoming time-expired. It will be clear that the 75,000 men of the Special Reserve have no existence. At the end of a year the effect of abolishing the Militia, the great feeder of the Line, and the chief recruiting agency for the Army, will make itself felt in a lamentable shortage of regular recruits. Then when these three facts burst upon an astonished and alarmed country the military authorities who have urged His Majesty's Government to pursue their present military policy will triumphantly proclaim that the voluntary system has broken down. And so it will have done, but it is His Majesty's Government who have destroyed it, and on them must over rest that responsibility. I submit that if His Majesty's Government blow up the bridge of voluntary enlistment over which men were wont to pass into the military forces of the Crown, they will not be justified in running about the country wringing their hands and declaring that the bridge of voluntary enlistment has broken down. It is they themselves who have blown it up, and they are perfectly incapable of reconstructing it.

In the near future we must be faced by the breakdown of our military forces, the inevitable result of the policy pursued by His Majesty's Government. The soldiers will then raise the cry for compulsory military service. I am myself convinced that compulsory military service is impossible. I cannot conceive that any political party can appeal to the country with compulsory military service as part of its programme and be returned to power. It seems to me that there can be but one solution—a return to the three line organisation, an organisation which, however imperfect, has never failed to pull us through our difficulties. The County Associations could continue to administer our third line, but under third line conditions of service which alone are possible and acceptable to the men hitherto known as Volunteers.

I do not see much difficulty as regards the County Associations and the third line. The task of reconstructing the second line, the foundation of the Regular Army, matters of much greater importance, will not be so easy. Meantime we have lost all power of offensive action overseas. The great expeditionary force about which we have heard so much is relegated to the position of acting as the garrison of the United Kingdom from which the Government dare not move it, because they have no force ready or likely to ready to relieve it of homo garrison duties. His Majesty's Government commenced their tenure of office by delivering an ultimatum to a land Power. But that was before the Regular Army had been reduced, the Militia abolished, and the Volunteers shattered. I quite understand that His Majesty's Government, having successfully delivered one ultimatum, are perfectly satisfied to rest content, reduce all their forces, and deliver no more. But, unfortunately, if you are impotent to deliver an ultimatum you are a hundred times more likely to receive one, and that is the perilous position in which we are placed for some years to come. It is the price which we have paid for our Territorial Army.

LORD RAGLAN

My Lords, my noble friend the Duke of Bedford has gone most exhaustively into all the results of the proposals of the right hon. Gentle- man the Secretary of State for War, and I venture to think any impartial person will admit that the noble Duke has shown that everything which when the matter was discussed last year he and those who think with him prophesied would happen is rapidly coming about. The appalling state to which the land forces of this country are being reduced and the still more appalling state to which they will shortly fall, is a matter which, I venture to think, except to those very few persons who are still believers in the scheme of His Majesty's Government, must be patent and easily seen. Never in the history of this country have its defences been in a more lamentable and dangerous condition. As to the Navy, I have no knowledge of naval matters. All I know is that we have always been told that all is for the best in the best of all possible Navies. Yet within the last very few years we have seen the most far-reaching reorganisations and the most far-reaching changes made in the whole of our naval policy. All I can say is that if what existed a few years ago was right then, that which exists now cannot be right, and vice versa.

There are one or two points with regard to the Regular Army to which the noble Duke did not allude, and to which I will venture presently to call your Lordships' attention. We all know that an immense and most dangerous reduction has been made in the Regular Forces by His Majesty's Government, but it is amazing that quite recently the War Office have closed almost the whole of Section D. of the Army Reserve. I should like to ask the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for War why Section D. of the Army Reserve has been closed. It is most remarkable that the War Office seem determined, whenever it is in any way possible, to reduce the number of His Majesty's soldiers. If they can issue an order, such as that closing Section D., which will affect very large numbers of men, that order is issued; if they can, by any twisting of regulations, issue an order which will discharge men, that is done; and the result is that the Regular Army, as regards both officers and men, is in a state of commotion and turmoil, and in a great number of cases in a thoroughly dissatisfied condition.

The noble Duke has called attention to the reduction of the permanent staff of the old Militia and its inevitable effect on the recruiting for the Regular Army. That reduction has fallen with the greatest possible severity upon the non-commissioned officers of the two arms of the service which I myself happen to know something about—namely, the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers. It was almost impossible for a sergeant in those forces to complete sufficient service with the rank of sergeant to entitle him to his full pension, and it was only by going to the permanent staff of the Auxiliary Forces that those men were able to extend their service, and thereby earn a full sergeant's pension. I venture to think that the falling off in recruiting is largely the result of the fact that a very large number of non-commissioned officers on the permanent staff have, at very short notice, been dismissed into civil life. These men have always been more closely in touch with the civil population than any other description of His Majesty's soldiers, and the way in which they have been treated has gone abroad throughout the length and breadth of the land, and has had the most deleterious effect upon recruiting for the Regular Army as well as for the Special Reserve.

I was one of those who endeavoured to impress upon His Majesty's Government that the proposed conditions of recruiting for the Special Reserve were such that an immense falling off was bound to accrue. In the Royal Monmouthshire Engineers, which regiment I know best, we have during the last seven years enlisted, on an average, somewhere between 350 and 400 recruits during the year. They were all men earning good wages and of a similar stamp to the miners, iron workers, and so forth, who enlisted in similar regiments in South Wales and neighbourhood. Those men were perfectly able to do the ordinary sixty-three drills as a recruit, and to give from four to eight weeks to training in the year, but you will not get them to come out for six months. It is quite possible to get agricultural labourers but not industrial labourers, of which the bulk of the recruits of the old Militia in South Wales and other districts were composed.

There had been for a very considerable time—I think I have alluded to the fact before—a strong and a violent hatred of the Militia on the part of a certain section of soldiers of the Regular Army. Why that should have been, I know not. It can hardly have been from jealousy; but there was a strong feeling against the Militia, which is most remarkable, and the result of which we have seen in this new system. I am firmly convinced that, in destroying the Militia, His Majesty's Government have killed the goose that laid the golden eggs. I should like to emphasise, before passing away from the Special Reserve, what fell from the noble Duke with regard to the number of the Special Reserve, especially the Army Service Corps. We were told last year, if I recollect aright, that the future number of the Special Reserve would be about the same as the old Militia—about 85,000 or 90,000 men. As far as I make out now, the future establishment of the Special Reserve will not be more than about 50,000 or 60,000. Perhaps the noble Lord can enlighten us upon that point. The new conditions in the Yeomanry are practically the same as the old, and we may say that the Yeomanry have transferred en bloc to the Territorial Army. The artillery is a new toy, and the recruiting has gone fairly well on that account. But the infantry, as has been so clearly shown to the House by my noble friend, is, after all, the most important part of an Army. Cavalry are all very well; artillery are useful in their place; but after all, the solid nucleus of an Army, the thing upon which its whole fighting capacity must rest, is its infantry; and it is in the infantry where the failure is the most patent.

Now, my Lords, I come to the question of the training of the Territorial Army. The noble Duke has alluded to that, and I do not wish to labour the point; but we have arrived at this, that all the flourish of trumpets about the amount of training which was going to be given to the Territorial Army is boiled down to this, that they are going to receive considerably less training than the old Volunteers. The Volunteer did sixty drills as a recruit and twelve annually as a trained soldier; the Territorial will do forty and ten respectively. I think the noble Lord will find that I am correct.

*THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Lord LUCAS)

That is only the Engineers.

LORD RAGLAN

I think the noble Lord is incorrect there. However, I pass from that. I venture to think that in this question of training the War Office were misled by the Volunteer commanding officers, as every War Office Committee which has discussed this subject has been misled. Every commanding officer of Volunteers knew, at the bottom of his heart, that the training was absurd, ridiculous, and most inefficient; and, therefore, in consultation with the War Office he always pressed for more training for his men. In conversation any commanding officer would say he could do this and that, and his men were prepared to do the other. But, when it came to the actual point, he found that his men could not and would not do it. That is an absolute fact of which I can give half-a-dozen instances from my own personal knowledge; and this has misled the War Office and the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War. Personally, I would far rather have to deal with men who had never had any training in their lives than with men who had learned the work of a soldier under a wrong system. The net result of the changes introduced by His Majesty's Government is that we have practically lost 200,000 of the armed forces of the Crown and have nothing whatever to put in their place. When war breaks out we shall be unable to use the Fleet or to send out the Expeditionary Army until the Territorial Army is sufficiently trained to take its place, and that will be a very long time.

I have only one more word to say. It appears to be rather the fashion now that if anybody says a word against the proposals of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, he is accused of want of patriotism, and it is said that any failure that may result from this scheme will be largely attributable to its critics. I venture to think that if any scheme is essentially sound it ought to be able to stand on its own merits, and ought not to depend upon the casual voice of any humble Member of your Lordships' House such as myself. But I do not believe for one moment that it is possible that anything that can be said, either inside this House or outside of it, can alter the essentially wrong idea upon which the whole of this scheme is founded. We have seen how little success it has had during the time it has been in operation. It has had every possible advantage. The enthusiastic Gentleman, the Secretary of State for War, I believe to be a thorough believer in his own scheme. It has had the entire support of the Press of the country; and I venture to think His Majesty's Government have also had the entire and whole-hearted support of their political opponents in your Lordship's House as well as ill the country. It is a pity, I think, in many ways, that it has not received more support from their own political supporters. But I venture to think that when one believes, as I honestly and thoroughly do believe, that this scheme is not only based on wrong ideas but is exceedingly dangerous to the country, it is his duty to speak. In my opinion the breakdown is complete, and the sooner the country understands that the better. I believe, with the noble Duke, that when the country wakes up to what has been done, His Majesty's Government will regret that they did not pay more attention to those who know something as to how military forces should be raised and trained.

*LORD HARRIS

My Lords, I should like to offer to the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for War one crumb of comfort to help to remove the gloom which I have seen gradually spread over his countenance during the speeches of the two noble and gallant Lords on this side. I am rather hopeful that the Yeomanry will still exist, not because the Government have given it any encouragement, for they have done everything they could to discourage it, but because it is accustomed to knocks. For by far the greatest part of its existence it had no friends in Parliament, except the officers who belonged to it. There was no one to say a word for the Yeomanry. Even Secretaries of State and under Under-Secretaries could afford very little encomium for it. The cost was small, and therefore they managed to keep it afloat without any very serious efforts at defending it. It was not until after the war, when it was found to be a really useful body, that politicians were encouraged to defend it; and now it is as rare to find anyone attacking it as before it was to find anyone defending it.

If the men have transferred, it is not because of any advantage they receive under the scheme. They have lost their title of Imperial Yeomanry, their pay has been reduced, and their status as the mounted branch of Militia has been taken away. But the Yeomanry has been so accustomed all its life to knocks that I think it is even going to stand these knocks. My noble friend behind me said just now that the new conditions in the Yeomanry were practically the same as the old, and that they had transferred en bloc because they were not affected. That is hardly correct. The conditions affecting the present Yeomanry are in several particulars different; and it remains to be seen whether in a year's time the class from which the force has hitherto recruited will recruit as readily as heretofore. Personally, I am really in hopes that, notwithstanding these changes, the Yeomanry will go on. As I said before, it is accustomed to these knocks.

Regarding the scheme as a whole, it has always been a matter of profound astonishment to me, what induced the right hon. Gentleman to take it up. I never could understand what he thought he was going to get from it. It is obvious that he is not going to get more drill out of the men than he got before. I cannot help thinking that his idea—I have absolutely no authority for suggesting this, it is merely something that has occurred to me—was that the counties, through the County Associations, would come forward, as they did before the war, with large sums of money, to support the Territorial Army, and as a result large sums would be saved to the Regular Army. It must have been a great disappointment to the right hon. Gentleman when the first thing the county organisations did was to pass a self-denying ordinance declining to do that. I fear that the right hon. Gentleman, basing his scheme, I suppose, somewhat upon the Swiss system, conceived that he would be able, with financial assistance from the counties, to create a Territorial Army very much on the lines of the old Auxiliary Army with the financial help of private individuals. Not having had very great experience of the Auxiliary Forces, the Secretary of State overlooked this fact, that the Auxiliary Forces did obtain a very large measure of assistance from their friends and neighbours; their friends and neighbours have already contributed very large sums towards the maintenance of the companies and troops of the Auxiliary Army, and it is highly improbable that they are going to put their hands any deeper into their pockets than they did before. And, therefore, from that source it is unlikely that the right hon. Gentleman is going to get any greater assistance than the Auxiliary Forces got before. I sincerely hope that my forebodings will not be fulfilled. The subject is far too serious for anything but the most careful consideration. I am happy to offer the Under-Secretary one small crumb of comfort by expressing the belief that the force which has been treated worst will show the best results.

LORD WILLOUHGBY DE BROKE

My Lords, the utterly illusory character of the Territorial Force has been well illustrated in the speeches which have been delivered. I do not propose to add anything to that very telling indictment; but if the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for War will give me his attention for one moment I would like to ask one question about the equipment of the Yeomanry, a force which I venture to anticipate he will find a very useful addition to the Territorial Army should it ever take actual effect. I understand that the Yeomanry are to act as the cavalry of the new Territorial Force, and that, I think, will give very great satisfaction. May I ask the noble Lord whether it is the intention of the Army Council to give the Yeomanry another arm in addition to the rifle they now carry? Are they to have the new rifle, as now served out to the cavalry, and are they to have a sword also? I am told that the Yeomanry are to be utilised, with the rest of the Territorial Army when it comes into being, for purposes of Home defence. In that event it would be highly desirable that they should have an additional arm to defend themselves with at close quarters. It is impossible to prevent sudden surprises in any cavalry action in an enclosed country. I speak with very great diffidence about military matters in the presence of so many who know such a great deal more about them than I do; but the small experience I have had in the Yeomanry has shown me that it is almost impossible to avoid getting to close quarters. Therefore, in the event of invasion it is essential that the Yeomanry should be armed with a sword in addition to the rifle.

*LORB HENEAGE

My Lords, I should like to say one or two words with regard to the Territorial Force. I cannot accept all the facts as stated in conjunction with the gloomy prophesies to which we have listened. In the first place, I do not think that the Territorial Force is in quite such bad circumstances as have been put forward. Many people seem to think—and some noble Lords seem to think—that the Territorial Force was started on the 1st January. No doubt nominally it was started on that date, but the War Office were not ready, and as a matter of fact, very little could be done till the latter days of March. The force has therefore not had the six months it ought to have had to embody its members and complete its establishment. I am happy to say, however, looking at it from a practical point of view, that I am very well satisfied with what we have done since March in the county with which I am connected. We have done extremely well up to the present. There were several matters which made it very difficult to proceed. In the first place, there was a great deal not ready. The Financial Memorandum was not sent down to the Associations until 20th March. Nobody knew what money we should have to spend, and we could not do much in any way. The commanding officers were also very anxious to know the terms on which their men were to serve. We had, indeed, a great many difficulties thrown in our way. We had no guns for our Artillery until quite late in April; and I think that what has since been accomplished in my county is very creditable both to the commanding officers and to the men. The Yeomanry regiment with which I am associated is entirely up to strength, and has been in camp, where the men acquitted themselves well. We sent one battalion of Artillery into camp with three new guns, yet Colonel Hammond gave them an excellent report, in which he stated that their firing, considering the weather, was very creditable to them and could not have been improved upon even by Regular Artillery, which I think is a pretty good report in all the circumstances. We took our own horses into camp, and so satisfied are those who lend them that we shall have no difficalty whatever in getting the horses for these operations next year. We have had considerable difficulties to contend with owing to the breaking up of one of the battalions and the disruption, if I may use the word, of some seven or eight companies; yet notwithstanding that we have done well. Therefore I hope that those who have joined the Territorial Force will not in any way be discouraged by the gloomy forebodings to which expression had been given.

*LORD LUCAS

My Lords, I think a small amount of actual fact is worth a great dual of theory. The noble Duke's speech consisted entirely of conjecture as to what was going to take place, and of predictions and prophecies of various forms of failure which were bound to befall the new Army scheme. These were based upon the very insufficient data which we have before us at present with regard to recruiting and other matters.

I must say I did not follow the line of argument which the noble Duke took up. I understand his argument to be that the Regular Army will be in considerable danger of losing that flow of recruits which it has hitherto derived from the Militia; and I understood him to say immediately afterwards that the old Militia class of man was not going into the Special Reserve, and that the class of men going into the Special Re- serve used it as a stepping-stone into the Regular Army. The noble Duke cannot have it both ways. Either the Special Reserve is going to form an efficient Militia, or else to be a funnel for recruits for the Regular Army. If it is going to starve the Regular Army of recruits it will be an efficient Militia, for it will keep its recruits. If it is going to supply the Regular Army we need have no fear as to any failure in the supply of troops required for the Regular Army. The noble Duke tells us that the Special Reserve is going to be altogether inferior to the old Militia. He bases his view on the fear that by no means all the old Militia are joining the force, and he predicts that when the present Militia have passed away others will not take their place, on what ground we do not quite know.

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

The falling off is shown in the recruiting returns.

*LORD LUCAS

The noble Duke will probably agree with me that during a period of transition such as we are going through at the present moment you can hardly build up a safe prediction as to what is going to take place in the future upon the basis of what is happening now while the scheme is new and the men are in a state of considerable uncertainty. How great is that uncertainty is seen in the varying effects the scheme has had upon different battalions. The noble Duke is to be condoled with on the ill-success of his efforts to induce his young men to transfer into the Special Reserve; but your Lordships have heard also of the individual success which has befallen a neighbouring battalion commanded by the noble Marquess on the front Opposition bench.

LORD RAGLAN

I do not wish to interrupt the noble Lord, but surely they are quite different cases.

*LORD LUCAS

The noble Marquess has transferred something like 70 per cent of his men, whereas the noble Duke, I believe, has only succeeded in transferring 40 per cent. We have not yet had the Returns in from the various units of the Special Reserve, and where you have such startling differences as that, it is, of course, absolutely impossible to predict in any way what the results are going to be. The reports, as far as they have come in, show that the class of men we are now taking as recruits are, on the whole, superior to the class of men who have hitherto enlisted in the Militia, and, if one can believe that, it is presumable—I am not going to commit myself any further than that—that, with a better class of men coming in, you will, at any rate, maintain as force, the average a special reserve number who went into the old Militia and remained there.

The noble Duke raised a very important point as to the question of recruiting. That is a point which we are watching very carefully. It is too early yet to say what the result is going to be, but if we find that the present Permanent Staff cannot provide us with a sufficient number of recruits, we are prepared with other methods of augmenting their efforts. The character of the debate is really summed up in a single sentence by the noble Lord (Lord Harris) when he said that he could not conceive what induced the taking up of this scheme. That has been the attitude of almost all the speakers who have hitherto spoken upon it. I can tell the noble Lord in one sentence what induced the taking up of this scheme. The reason for the reorganisation of the Army was that the Army could not fulfil its commitments at the time the Government came into office, and, therefore, some reorganisation was necessary. It was impossible for the Government to put into the field any force approaching 100,000 men, and maintain it there during hostilities. It was also impossible to do what every military authority has insisted ought to be done—to keep that force up to its strength in the field, with a proper supply of properly trained drafts, and have in this country any sort of organised force for the defence of these shores after the Regular Army had left. Those, very shortly, were the reasons for which this reorganisation was undertaken. And when the reorganisation took place, all branches of the service and the various lines on which the Army was based had to be considered, not solely from the point of view of what was best for their individual interests, but also from the point of view of what was best in the interests of the whole military system of the country.

I deplore that the Militia was in that intermediate position between the first line and the third line which could not be maintained, and that it has, therefore, as far as its individual interests are concerned, to undergo, perhaps, more inconvenience than other branches of the Service. But the first thing of all that the Government had to consider was the efficiency of the Regular Army in the field, and they also had to face the fact that, having placed the Regular Army in the field, it was their duty to maintain it when it was there. That is a point upon which we are all agreed. From the whole tenour of the speeches delivered by the noble Duke and the noble Lord who followed him, it is obvious that the Militia were the class who could be looked to and depended upon to come out for that purpose in the event of hostilities.

The noble Duke has based his case almost entirely upon the question of numbers, which is the sole criterion he has taken in estimating the efficiency of the Army. But there are a great number of other considerations. There is the use to which you are going to apply them, when you have got them, and I say without hesitation that, from the point of view of the whole of our military system, one Special Reservist who is prepared to go out as a draft to fill the depleted ranks of the Regular Army is worth one and a half or two Militiamen who could not be called upon to fulfil that function. Therefore, though your Special Reserve may not reach in numbers what the Militia was before, the value of your Special Reserve is proportionately much greater, man for man, than the Militia was before. Similarly in the case of the officers. The officer of the Special Reserve will in future be available for filling those gaps which we know will exist in the Regular Army on mobilisation, and in that way every officer we get in the Special Reserve is an officer to the good from the point of view of the general military situation. In other ways the whole of this scheme has from the beginning been aimed at making the first line and the second line of the Army a more coordinated machine than it was before. We have devoted ourselves to filling up the gaps that existed in it before. After all, as I say, numbers are by no means the only consideration in the efficiency of an Army. A large Army with a bad staff has often, as your Lordships know, been beaten by a very small but more efficient Army. We have devoted ourselves to that. We have done what we can to increase the numbers of officers and improve their training. All these things have to be taken into account when you are considering the relative efficiency of the Army before and since the reorganisation was begun.

With regard to what Lord Raglan said as to the hardships that are incurred by the Permanent Staff, nobody realises that more fully than we do, and nobody deplores more than we do that those hardships have to be incurred; they are consequent upon any scheme of re-organisation, and it is very much to be regretted that that is so. We are doing all we can to save individuals from incurring hardships. The noble Lord mentioned the new conditions of service for the Special Reserve. The six months training, and the shorter period afterwards, is, to a certain extent, in the nature of an experiment. It is perfectly open to modifications, but, as the noble Lord, I think, himself admitted, there are certain classes of people whom it undoubtedly does suit to come out for six months recruit training. They are the men who cannot give up a very long and indefinite period, but who yet have six months at their disposal at a certain period of their lives; and that suits them. The object of the Army Council in laying down these conditions is to secure the greatest efficiency possible, but, if it is found that there are large classes of men who are precluded from joining the Special Reserve by reason of those conditions, I have no doubt modifications will be made in them to suit the circumstances of these men as long as it does not impair general military efficiency.

I now pass to the question of the Territorial Army. I am not going to follow the noble Duke in the figures into which he entered, and which were pure conjecture. We have no reason to be in any way despondent as to the figures of the Territorial Army at the present time. I think that from every point of view they are perfectly satisfactory. We did not expect there would be a great rush, and that we should at once fill the establishments. It is much better that we should not do that; it is better that we should go slowly and pick our recruits, as is being done. There are a large number of units in this country which could be up to and over their establishments at the present moment. A large number of units are only about I two-thirds of their establishment because, for the first time, care is being exercised to secure a really efficient class of men. The reports we have in all tend to show that the Territorial Army, from a physical point of view, is far more efficient than the Volunteer Force was before. This transformation has acted as a purge upon the force. Speaking broadly, we have been able to keep the most efficient men, while the men who are not efficient and who did not intend to make themselves more efficient than they could possibly help, have been got rid of. The class of men who are coming in are of a most excellent standard and quality. Only to-day in the War Office, I saw an official report from one of the divisions which said that, although smaller in numbers, the Territorial force is a far finer force in physique and general efficiency than the force which it has superseded. The medically unfit to whom reference has been made, are the men to a great extent who have been weeded out by this process of transformation, and the men now coming in are being I subjected to a far more rigorous medical examination than ever before. In otherways, there is an enormous improvement in the Territorial Force.

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

Perhaps the noble Lord will inform me if I am right in thinking there was no medical examination in the case of transfers?

*LORD LUCAS

The men transferred were not medically examined, but at the same time the great majority of the men who when they were examined some years ago were found physically unfit have been weeded out of this force by the transformation which has taken place. I should have thought that we had by this time laid down very clearly what the functions of the Teritorial Force are, and that to fulfil those functions we are going to do our best to give them a satisfactory training. I differ entirely from the view, which has been expressed more than once, that if the Territorial Force is, as a whole, unable to fulfil the whole fortnight's training provided in the Act, it is, therefore, going to be unable to fulfil its function as a second line force. Whether you give a force a week's training or a fortnight's training, you have only to read the opinions that were expressed by a number of prominent soldiers before the Norfolk Commission to see that neither of those two periods will fit a force of this nature to take the field at the outbreak of hostilities. We have all along said that this force must have a certain amount of training on embodiment before it can take the field against trained foreign troops, and it is a misconception of what a second line force really is if you say that because it is not prepared on the outbreak of war to take the field at once, it is, therefore, a failure. No second line force could.

I will not follow the noble Duke into his views as to the possible embodiment or not of the Territorial Force. There we are getting into the region of even more remote speculation than we had been in up to that point; but after all, the Act provides for the embodiment of the Territorial Force and the immediate commencement of its training as soon as the whole of the Reserves are called out. My recollection of what took place during those various times which the noble Duke mentioned is not sufficiently accurate to enable me to say whether it was the case that the whole of the Reserves were called out in 1885, and on the other occasions. But the embodiment is absolutely automatic. As the Reserves comes out the Territorial Force has to be embodied. It does not require an Act or an Order in Council or anything of that sort, and I do not think that the point is worth arguing whether or not the Government will avail itself of the power in the case of a great emergency.

Finally, the noble Duke suggests a return to the three line system. I should like to know how the noble Duke proposes, first of all, to supply the Regular Army when in the field with drafts of properly trained men. I know that he will not agree—I, at least, imagine he will not agree—to start the Militia Reserve again. I should like to know how we are going to provide that Reserve which is absolutely essential when we have used up the Regular Reserve. In the second place, what are the functions of a force which the battalions under the present scheme will not be able to carry out? And, in the third place, where does the great difference come in between the position of this country with the Regular Army gone from it, a certain number of battalions on lines of communication, and the remainder of the Militia and the Volunteers left in this country—where does the great difference come in between that and the position when you have got the Territorial Army automatically embodied? If you return to the old system you return to a system which does not give you an organised force; whereas this force does really represent the best efforts of the country to form a second line Army. The noble Duke has not in his speech in any way met those considerations. To say that the system has broken down is, I think, premature, and to advocate a return to the three line system without explaining how he proposes that those functions should be discharged certainly does not carry conviction.

My Lords, I must apologise for having detained you so long. I hope your Lordships in considering this question, will realise that the Army is going through a transition stage, and that it is too early at the present moment to judge of the success or the failure of the Territorial Force. It is an enormous ploblem. I am sure that noble Lords who are Presidents or members of their County Associations, will agree with me when I say that they have not yet begun to touch the fringe of the recruiting problem in most of the counties, and cannot tell whether or not they will get all the men required until a couple of years have lapsed. When this scheme has been working for some time, and when it is seen how far the country responds to the appeal which has been made to it, then will be the time, and not until then to say whether the scheme of the Territorial Army is a success or not.

*VISCOUNT MIDLETON

My Lords, I am sure the last words of the noble Lord will have evoked a sympathy on the part of your Lordships and a desire to suspend judgment upon every point upon which judgment can be suspended. But I must say, after the powerful indictment of the noble Duke, that the speech of the noble Lord was not altogether a reassuring one. The noble Duke drew a very clear picture, and certainly the figures which the Under-Secretary was able to give to the House were few indeed. I entirely agree that many of those figures are incomplete, but I do not agree with the noble Lord when he said that we had not yet touched the fringe of the recruiting problem. I know that in some counties every effort has been made by meetings of all kinds to induce recruits to come in; and I regret to say that in some cases the recruiting for the Territorial Army has shown a very marked falling off.

I have no desire to say a word, if I can help it, which will in any way increase the difficulties of His Majesty's Government. Whether we like the scheme or not, it is the only scheme upon which we can depend at this moment for the defence of the country. But I deprecate as strongly as I can the tone of confidence in which the noble Lord speaks in all these matters and some of the statements he has made this evening, which I do not believe can be for a moment substantiated. I put away the inducements which he has held out to me to challenge his statement I that the organisation which has been set on foot with a much smaller number of men will discharge the functions which the late organisation with a much larger number of men could not discharge. But when the noble Lord claims that the men we have enlisted into the Territorial Army are of a different and more reliable class altogether than the old Volunteers and Yeomanry, I reply that the noble Lord has not seen as many of them as I have. I saw 4,000 of them the other day, and noticed with regret the lack of physique, age, and stamina amongst them. It was a matter of general remark; and, so far from the noble Lord being justified in saying that the change has caused the transfer of all the best men, I believe that, on the contrary, the additional demands made upon them have caused many of the best men to feel that they were not able to transfer. The noble Lord shakes his head. But I am afraid he must give us a little more in the way of chapter and verse before he can induce us to believe that a far finer force now exists than that which has been practically disbanded.

I would call the noble Lord's attention to two points in particular. In the first place, I think that the large number of the one-year Territorials enlisted and the enormous amount of recruiting which may be rendered necessary as a consequence must give us cause for serious anxiety. We have not up to this moment had any pledge from the Government—any reliable pledge—as regards their intentions in the future. One point was not mentioned, and that is the state of recruiting for the Regular Army. It is not merely the recruiting for the Territorial Army and the Special Reserve which has fallen off; the recruiting for the Regular Army has been at a lower ebb than for many years. Your Lordships will, perhaps, allow me to give you a few figures. Recruiting for the Regular Army has fallen off from 39,000 in 1898 and 40,000 in 1899 to 35,000, 36,000, and 34,000 respectively in the last three years. That number of men is not sufficient to keep the Regular Army even at the reduced strength at which it has been placed by the present Secretary of State for War.

LORD LUCAS

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but, if he looks at paragraph 2 of the Report, he will see why the numbers are smaller in those years.

*VISCOUNT MIDLETON

. I cannot follow out Paragarph 2 at this moment. But, whatever the cause may be, the reduction in recruiting is certainly a fact. Now, I want to ask for a definite pronouncement on the part of the Government. I do not wish to build upon what seem to me the anxious statistics of the last few months at all more than they ought to be built upon. On the contrary, I hope that the next few months may see a large increase of recruiting for the Territorial Army and of the number of transfers from the Militia to the Special Reserve. But, pending that result, I want to ask His Majesty's Government whether they will categorically promise us that no further reductions of the Regular Army will take place. A question on this subject was put in another place somewhat in these terms— Whether it is intended to effect any further reduction in the Infantry of the Line; and, if so, whether it is proposed to effect this reduction by destroying additional units, or by reducing the strength or establishment of existing units. The answer was in the negative. But since that answer was given ominous language has been used by Members of the Government, and we have had statements in the public Press by which the public mind has been gravely disturbed upon these matters.

Last year we addressed a serious warning from this Bench to the Government, with regard to the effect on the Militia of what was proposed; and there were also serious warnings from men of experience in Territorial work as to the effect of the Secretary of State's proposals. We then urged upon the Government with all the force we could that they should see their foundation formed before they built upon it by destroying those units of the Regular Army which they thought would be unnecessary when they had this Special Reserve, from which they expect so much and from which they have received comparatively so little. I think the condition of our forces at this moment is one of supreme national danger. You have largely reduced the Regular Army; and you have considerably induced for the moment the second line. Is it too much to ask that until those confident expectations which the Under-Secretary has voiced this afternoon has been made effective, His Majesty's Government should refrain from further reducing the Regular troops? My Lords, I put that question to the Government. I see the President of the Board of Agriculture in his place, and I hope he will be able to answer it. But if he is unable to give us a categorical answer in that respect, I will put the question on Monday to the noble Lord the Leader of the House. I hope I have not said a word which is likely in any way to reflect upon recruiting, or to have any effect, except to urge upon His Majesty's Government at this moment, when everything is, as it were, in the melting-pot and when the new organisation in Brigades and Divisions has not even been brought into work, not to sacrifice what they have got in the expectation of something which may never be realised. I ask the noble Earl to go as far as he can in giving me an answer, because the expectation of further reductions is operating as a pall over the whole military system and is paralysing the efforts of those who are most anxious to assist the Government in this matter.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (Earl CARRINGTON)

My Lords, I feel that a very important question has been raised this afternoon, but I am not quite certain that the case is so bad as has been made out. I have had some experience of a Militia regiment—my father commanded one for forty years, and I had the honour to command one for five years. It was a very good regiment; and, during the whole time I was in command, we never had one single court-martial. They were a very good class of men; and, if there is an improvement on them now, we certainly may congratulate ourselves upon the class of men we have been fortunate enough to secure. As regards the Yeomanry, we had a re-assuring statement from Lord Harris. He is one of the best Yeomanry officers we have, and, according to his statement this afternoon, that branch of the Service does not seem to have suffered or to have been terrorised in any way. Then, as regards the Territorials, I think the House must, in fairness, remember that they have only been three months in existence. We have been told that already 60 per cent. of the total number required have been secured, and that during a period of transition. The noble Lord opposite called attention to the physique of the Territorials he had lately seen. Well, I saw them too, and I cannot say that they were not what we should wish to see in the great Territorial Force of this country I think, in fairness, he will agree with me that there were some that were a very good class of men indeed. I saw the Territorials in the South of England at Bristol during the same week; and their appearance was so good as to call forth a well-deserved compliment from His Majesty himself, who was pleased to express his satisfaction. We have been told that there is a great danger in these men being bound for only one year. Well, as an outsider, I think one must suppose that if a man gets a chance of joining for one year or for a number of years, it is probable that he would join for the shortest period just to see how he got on, and how he liked it. I do not think it can be said that because he joined for only one year it therefore followed that he would be unwilling to continue the service for two, three, or four years, or longer. The noble Lord opposite has asked for a definite pronouncement from the Government that they will make no further reductions in the Regular Army. I do not agree with the noble Lord's view that the country is in a position of supreme danger, but nevertheless, in the name of His Majesty's Government, I desire to thank him and other noble Lords opposite for their promise of assistance in the difficulty we are supposed to find ourselves in at the present moment. The question will be very carefully considered by the Secretary of State for War, but it is absolutely impossible for me to make any definite pronouncement.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, I do not rise for the purpose of challenging the statements made by the noble Earl the President of the Board of Agriculture, although I must say I think at some points his testimonial to the excellence of the present military arrangements was not a very conclusive one. I wish to say one word with regard to the request made by my noble friend beside me for a specific assurance with regard to future reductions in the Regular Army. It is quite natural that the President of the Board of Agriculture should feel that a pledge of that kind is one which he may not be in a position to give upon the spur of the moment, but it is a pledge which we desire, if possible, to obtain. We admit the force of that part of the argument of the Under-Secretary of State which rested upon the contention that we were passing through a period of transition, and that during that period it was not unnatural that at some point there should be a certain amount of weakness in our military position. But what we desire to know is whether, while that period of transition is still in progress, it is or is not the intention of His Majesty's Government to carry further those large reductions in the fighting strength of the Regular Army which have already taken place. Those reductions have filled many of us with a feeling of great anxiety, and after what has fallen from the Under-Secretary of State this evening we feel more strongly than ever that no further reductions of the kind should be allowed to take place.

LORD RAGLAN

The noble Lord the Under-Secretary has not answered my question as to why Section D. of the Army Reserve has been closed.

LORD LUCAS

Owing to the three years enlistment, the Reserve at the present moment is so unduly inflated that it has been thought that that section should be closed for the time being. It is only a temporary measure.