HL Deb 17 December 1908 vol 198 cc1974-2000

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Viscount MORLEY OF BLACK-BURN) rose to make a statement on the proposals of the Government of India, and to present Papers. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I feel that I owe a very sincere apology to the House for the disturbance in the business arrangements of the House of which I have been the cause, though the innocent cause. It has been said that by the delays in bringing forward this subject I have been anxious to burke discussion. That is not in the least true. The reasons which made it seem to me desirable that the discussion on this most important and far-reaching range of topics should be postponed were—I believe the House will agree with me—reasons of common sense. In the first place, discussion without anybody having seen the Papers to be discussed would evidently have been ineffective. In the second place it would have been impossible to discuss those Papers with good effect—the Papers which I am going this afternoon to present to Parliament—until we know, at all events in some degree, what their reception has been in the country most immediately concerned. And then thirdly, my Lords, I cannot but apprehend that discussion here—I mean in Parliament—would be calculated to prejudice the reception in India of the proposals which the Government of India and His Majesty's Government agree in making. My Lords, I submit those are three very essential reasons why discussion in my view, and I hope in the view of this House, was to be deprecated. This afternoon your Lordships will be presented with a very modest Blue-book of 100 or 150 pages, but I should like to promise noble Lords that tomorrow morning there will be ready for them a series of Papers on the same subject of a size so enormous that the most voracious or even carnivorous appetite for Blue-books will have ample food for augmenting the joys of the Christmas holidays.

The observations which I shall ask your Lordships to allow me to make are the opening of a very important chapter in the history of the relations of Great Britain and India; and I shall ask the indulgence of the House if I take a little time, not so much in dissecting the contents of the Papers, which the House will be able to do for itself by and by, as in indicating the general spirit that animates my noble friend the Viceroy of India and His Majesty's Government here in making the proposals which I shall in a moment describe. I suppose, like other Secretaries of State for India, I found my first idea was to have what they used to have in the old days—a Parliamentary Committee to inquire into Indian Government. I see that a predecessor of mine in the India Office, Lord Randolph Churchill—he was there for too short a time—in 1885 had very strongly conceived that idea. On the whole I think there is a great deal at the present day to be said against that idea.

Therefore what I have done was at the instigation of and in concert with the Government of India, first to open a chapter of constitutional reform, of which I will speak in a moment, and next to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into the internal relations between the Government of India and all its subordinate and co-ordinate parts. That Commission will report, I believe, in February or March next, February, I hope, and that again will involve the Government of India and the India Office in Whitehall in pretty laborious and careful inquiries. It will not be expected—it ought not to be expected—that an Act passed as the great Act of 1858 was passed, amidst great excitement and very disturbing circumstances, should have been in existence for half a century and that its operations would not be the better for supervision.

Now, I spoke of delay in these observations, and unfortunately delay has not made the skies any brighter. But, my Lords, do not let us make the Indian sky cloudier than it really is. Do not let us consider the clouds to be darker than they really are. Let me invite your Lordships to look at the difficulties—the considerable difficulties, even the formidable difficulties—that now encumber us in India, with a due sense of proportion—I can give no better example which I would wish Members of this House, or of any other House, to imitate than what I may be perhaps allowed to call the intrepid coolness of Lord Minto.

What is the state of things as it appears to persons of authority and of ample knowledge in India? One very important and well-known friend of mine in India says this— The anarchists are few, but, on the other hand, they are apparently prepared to go any length and to run any risk. It must also be borne in mind that the ordinary man or lad in India has not too much courage, and that the loyal are terrorised by the ruthless extremists.

It is a curious incident that on the very day before the attempt to assassinate Sir Andrew Fraser was made he had a reception in the college where the would be assassin was educated, and his reception was of the most enthusiastic and spontaneous kind. I only mention that to show the curious and subtle atmosphere in which things now are in Calcutta. I will not dwell on that, because, although I have a mass of material, this is not the occasion for developing it. I will only add this from a correspondent of great authority— There is no fear of anything in the nature of a rising, but if murders continue a general panic may arise and greatly increase the danger of the situation. We cannot hope that any machinery will completely stop outrages at once. We must be prepared to meet them. There are growing indications that the native population itself is alarmed, and that we shall have the strong support of native public opinion.

The view of important persons in the Government of India is that in substance the position of our Government in India is as sound and as well-founded as it has ever been.

But I shall be asked, has not the Government of India been obliged to pass a measure introducing pretty drastic machinery? Well, that is quite true, and I, for one, have no fault whatever to find with them for introducing this machinery and for taking that step. On the contrary, my Lords, I wholly approve and I share, of course, to the full the responsibility for it. I understand that I am exposed to some obloquy on this account—I am charged with inconsistency. Well, that is a matter on which I am very well able to take care of myself, and I should be ashamed to detain your Lordships for one single moment in arguing that. Quite early after my coming to the India Office an attempt was made—pressure was put on mo to repeal the Regulation of 1818 under which men are now being summarily deported without trial and without charge, and without intention to try or to charge. Well that, of course, is a tremendous power to place in the hands of an Executive Government. But I said to myself then, and I say now, that I decline to take out of the hands of the Government of India any weapon that they have got in circumstances so formidable, so obscure, and so impenetrable as are the circumstances that surround British Government in India.

There are two paths of folly in those matters. One is to regard all Indian matters—Indian procedure and Indian policy—as if it were Great Britain or Ireland, and to insist that all the robes and apparel that suit Great Britain or Ireland must necessarily suit India. The other is to think that all you have got to do is what I see suggested, to my amazement, in English print—to blow a certain number of men from guns and then your business will be done. Either of these paths of folly leads to as great disaster as the other. I would like to say this about the Summary Jurisdiction Bill—I have no illusions whatever. I do not ignore, and I do not believe that the noble Marquess opposite or anyone else can ignore, the frightful risks involved in transferring in any form or degree what should be the ordinary power under the law to arbitrary personal discretion. I am alive, too, to the temptations under summary procedure of various kinds, to the danger of mistaking a headstrong exercise of force for energy. Again, I do not for an instant forget, and I hope those who so loudly applaud legislation of this kind do not forget, the tremendous price that you pay for all operations of this sort in the reaction and the excitement that they provoke. If there is a man who knows all these drawbacks I think I am he. But there are situations in which a responsible Government is compelled to run these risks and to pay this possible price, however high it may appear to be.

It is like war, a hateful thing, from which, however, some of the most ardent lovers of peace, and some of those rulers of the world whose names the most ardent lovers of peace most honour and revere—it is one of the things from which these men have not shrunk. The only question for us is whether there is such a situation in India today as to justify the passing of the Act the other day and to justify resort to the Regulation of 1818. I cannot imagine anybody reading the speeches—especially the unexaggerated speech of the Viceroy—and the list of crimes perpetrated, and attempted to be perpetrated, that were read out last Friday in Calcutta—I cannot imagine that anybody reading that list and thinking what they stand for, would doubt for a single moment that summary procedure of some kind or another was justified or called for. I see about a tendency to criticise this legislation on grounds that strike me as extraordinary. After all, it is not our fault that we have had to bring in this measure. You must protect the lives of your officers. You must protect peaceful and harmless people, both Indian and European, from the bloodstained havoc of anarchic conspiracy. I deplore this necessity, but we are bound to face the facts. I myself recognise this necessity with infinite regret, and with something, perhaps, rather deeper than regret; but it is not the Government, either here or in India, who are the authors of this necessity, and I should not at all mind, if it is not impertinent and unbecoming in me to say so, standing up in another place and saying exactly what I say here, that I approve of these proceedings and will do my best to support the Government of India.

Now a very important question arises, for which I would for a moment ask the close attention of your Lordships, because I am sure that both here and elsewhere it will be argued that the necessity, and the facts that caused the necessity, of bringing forward strong repressive machinery should arrest our policy of reforms. That has been stated, and I dare say many people will agree with it. Well, the Government of India and myself have from the very first beginning of this unsettled state of things never varied in our determination to persevere in the policy of reform.

I put two plain questions to your Lordships. I am sick of all the retrograde commonplaces about the weakness of concession to violence and so on. Persevering in our plan of reform is not a concession to violence. Reforms that we have publicly announced, adopted, and worked out for more than two years—it is no concession to violence to persist in these reforms. It is simply standing to your guns. A number of gentlemen, of whom I wish to speak with all respect, addressed a very courteous letter to me the other day that appeared in the public prints, exhorting me to remember that Oriental countries inevitably and invariably interpret kindness as fear. I do not believe it. The Founder of Christianity arose in an Oriental country, and when I am told that Orientals always mistake kindness for fear, I will say that I do not believe that any more than I believe the stranger saying of Carlyle that, after all, the fundamental question between any two human beings is—Can I kill thee or canst thou kill me? I do not agree that any organised society has ever subsisted upon either of those principles or that brutality is always present in the relations between human beings.

My first question is this. There are alternative courses open to us. We can either withdraw our reforms or we can persevere in them. Which would be the more flagrant sign of weakness—to go steadily on with your policy of reform in spite of bombs, or to let yourself openly be forced by bombs and murder clubs to drop your policy? My second question is—Who would be best pleased if I were to announce to your Lordships that the Government have determined to drop the reforms? It is notorious that those who would be best pleased would be the extremists and irreconcilables, because they know very well that for us to do anything to soften estrangement and appease alienation between the European and native populations would be the very best way that could be adopted to deprive them of fuel for their sinister and mischievous designs. I hope your Lordships will agree in that, and I should like to add one reason which I am sure will weigh very much with you. I do not know whether your Lordships have read the speech made last Friday by Sir Norman Baker, the new Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, in the Council at Calcutta dealing with the point which I am endeavouring to present. In a speech of great power and force he said that these repressive measures did not represent even the major part of the policy dealing with the situation. The greater task, he said, was to adjust the machinery of government so that their Indian fellow-subjects might be allotted parts which a self-respecting people could fill, and that when the constitutional reforms were announced, as they would be shortly, he believed that the task of restoring order would be on the road to accomplishment. For a man holding such a position to make such a statement at that moment is all the corroboration that Lord Minto and I and His Majesty's Government need for persisting in our policy of reform. I have talked with Indian experts of all kinds concerning reforms. I admit that some have shaken their heads, they did not like reforms very much; but when I have asked, "Shall we stand still, then?" there is not one of those experienced men who has not said, "That is quite impossible. Whatever else we do, we cannot stand still."

I should not be surprised if there are here some who say: You ought to have some very strong machinery for putting down a free Press. A long time ago a great Indian authority, Sir Thomas Munro, used this language which I will venture to quote, not merely for the purpose of this afternoon's exposition, but in order that everybody who listens and reads may feel the tremendous difficulties which we and our predecessors have overcome. Sir Thomas Munro said— We are trying an experiment never yet tried in the world—maintaining a foreign dominion by means of a native army; and teaching that army, through a free Press, that they ought to expel us, and deliver their country.

He went on to say— A tremendous revolution may overtake us, originating in a free Press.

I do not deny that for a moment. On the contrary, I recognise to the full the enormous force of a declaration of that kind. But let us look at it as practical men who have got to deal with the government of the country. Supposing you abolish freedom of the Press or suspend it, that will not end the business. You will have to shut up schools and colleges, for what would be the use of suppressing newspapers if you do not shut the schools and colleges? Nor will that be all. You will have to stop the printing of unlicensed books. The possession of a copy of Milton or Burke, or Macaulay, or of Bright's speeches, and all that flashing array of writers and orators who are the glory of our grand, our noble English tongue—the possession of one of these books will, on this peculiar and unfair notion of government, be like the possession of a bomb, and we shall have to direct the passing of an Explosives Books Act. All this and its various sequels and complements make a policy if you please; but after such a policy had produced a mute, sullen, muzzled, lifeless India, we could hardly call it, as we do now, the brightest jewel in the Imperial Crown. No English Parliament would permit such a thing, and the last man to acquiesce in such a policy is the present Governor-General of India.

I do not think I need go through all the contents of the despatch of the Governor-General and my reply, containing the plan of His Majesty's Government, which will be in your Lordships' hands very shortly. I think your Lordships will find in them a well-guarded expansion of principles which were recognised in 1861, and are still more directly and closely connected with us now by the noble Marquess opposite in 1892. I have his words, and they are really as much a key to the papers in our hands as they were to the policy of the noble Marquess at that date. He said— We hope, however, that we have succeeded in giving to our proposals a form sufficiently definite to secure a satisfactory advance in the representation of the people in our legislative Councils, and to give effect to the principle of selection as far as possible on the advice of such sections of the community as are likely to be capable of assisting us in that manner.

Then you will find that another Governor-General in Council in India, whom I greatly rejoice to see still among us, my noble friend the Marquess of Ripon, said in 1882— It is not primarily with a view to the improvement of administration that this measure is put forward; it is chiefly desirable as an instrument of political and popular education.

The doctrines announced by the noble Marquess opposite, and by my noble friend are the standpoint from which we approached the situation and framed our proposals.

I will not trouble the House by going through the history of the course of the proceedings—that will be found in the Papers. I believe the House will be satisfied, just as I am satisfied, with the candour and patience that has been bestowed on the preparation of the scheme in India, and I hope I may add it has been treated with equal patience and candour here; and the end of it is that, though some points of difference arose, though the Government of India agreed to drop certain points of their scheme—the Advisory Councils, for example—on the whole there was complete agreement, even remarkable agreement, between the Government of India and myself as to the best way of dealing with these proceedings in Legislative Councils. I will enumerate the points very shortly, and, though I am afraid it will be tedious, I hope your Lordships will not find the tedium unbearable, because, after all, what you are considering to-day, what you are beginning to consider to-day, is the opening of a great chapter in the history of British responsibility to India, and, therefore, I hope you will pardon the tedium of these rather technical details. There are only a handful of distinguished Gentlemen in this House who understand the details of Indian Administration, but I shall be very pleased to explain them as shortly as I can.

This is a list of the powers which we shall have to acquire from Parliament when we bring in a Bill. I may say that we do not propose to bring in the Bill this session. It would be idle. I propose to bring in a Bill next year. This is the first power we shall come to Parliament for. At present the maximum and minimum number of Legislative Councils are fixed by statute. We shall come to Parliament to authorise an increase in the numbers of those Councils, both the Viceroy's Council and the Provincial Councils. Secondly, the members are now nominated by the head of the Government, either the Viceroy or the Lieutenant-Governor. No election takes place in the strict sense of the term. The nearest approach to it is the nomination by the Viceroy upon the recommendation of a majority of voters of certain public bodies. We do not propose to ask Parliament to abolish nomination. We do propose to ask Parliament, in a very definite way, to introduce election working alongside nomination with a view to the aim admitted in all previous schemes, including that of the noble Marquess opposite—the due representation of the different classes of the community. Third, The Indian Councils Act of 1892 forbids—and this is no doubt a very important prohibition—either resolutions or divisions of the Council in financial discussions. We shall ask Parliament to repeal this prohibition. Fourth. We shall propose to invest legislative Councils with power to discuss matters of public and general importance, and to pass recommendations or resolutions to the Government. The Government will deal with them as carefully, or as carelessly, as they think fit—just as the Government do here. Fifth. To extend the power that at present exists to appoint a Member of the Council to preside. Sixth. Bombay and Madras have now Executive Councils, numbering two. I propose to ask Parliament to double the number of ordinary members. Seventh. The Lieutenant-Governors have no Executive Council. We shall ask Parliament to sanction the creation of such Councils, consisting of not more than two ordinary members, and to define the power of the Lieutenant-Governor to overrule his Council. I am perfectly sure there will be differences of opinion as to these proposals. I only want your Lordships to believe that they have been well thought out and that they are accepted by the Governor-General of India at this moment.

There is one point of extreme importance which, no doubt, though it may not be quite diplomatic for me to say so at this stage, will create some controversy. I mean the matter of the official majority. The House knows what an official majority is. It is a device by which the Governor-General or the Governor of Bombay or Madras may secure a majority in his Legislative Council by means of officials. And the officials, of course, for very good reasons, just like a Cabinet Minister or an Under-Secretary, whatever the man's private opinion may be, would still vote, for the best of reasons, and I have no doubt with perfect wisdom, with the Government. But anybody can see how directly, how palpably, how injuriously, an arrangement of this kind tends to weaken, and I think I may say, even to deaden, the sense of trust and responsibility in the non-official members of these councils Anybody can see how the system tends to throw the non-official member into an attitude of peevish, sulky, permanent opposition, and, therefore, has an injurious effect on the minds and characters of members of these Legislative Councils.

I know it will be said—I will not weary the House by arguing it, but I only desire to meet at once the objection that will be taken—that these councils will, if you take away the safeguard of the official majority, pass any number of wild-cat Bills. The answer to that is that the head of the Government can veto the wild-cat Bills. The Governor-General can withhold his assent, and the withholding of the assent of the Governor-General is not a defunct power. Only the other day, since I have been at the India Office, the Governor-General disallowed a Bill passed by a Local Government which I need not name, with the most advantageous effect. I am quite convinced that if that Local Government had had an unofficial majority that Bill would not have been passed, and the Governor-General would not have had to refuse his assent. But so he did, and so he would if these gentlemen, whose numbers we propose to increase and whose powers we propose to widen, chose to pass wild-cat Bills. And it must be remembered that the range of subjects within the sphere of Provincial Legislative Councils is rigorously limited by statutory exclusions. I will not labour this point now. Anybody who cares, in a short compass, can grasp the argument of which we shall hear a great deal, will find it in Paragraphs 17 to 20 of my reply to the Government of India in the Papers which will soon be in your Lordships' hands.

There is one proviso in this matter of the official majority in which your Lordships may, perhaps, find a surprise. We are not prepared to divest the Governor-General in his Council of an official majority. In the Provincial Councils we propose to dispense with it, but in the Viceroy's Legislative Council we propose to adhere to it, though let me say that here we may seem to lag a stage behind the Government of India themselves—so little violent are we—because the Government say, in their despatch—On all ordinary occasions we are ready to dispense with an official majority in the Imperial Legislative Council, and to rely on the public spirit of non official members to enable us to carry on the ordinary work of legislation. My Lords, that is what we propose to do in the Provincial Councils. But in the Imperial Council we consider an official majority essential. It may be said that this is a most tremendous logical inconsistency. So it would be on one condition. If I were attempting to pet up a Parliamentary system in India, or if it could be said that this chapter of reforms led directly or necessarily up to the establishment of a Parliamentary system in India, I, for one, would have nothing at all to do with it. I do not believe—it is not of very great consequence what I believe, because the fulfilment of my vaticinations would not come off very soon—in spite of the attempts in Oriental countries at this moment, interesting attempts to which we all wish well, to set up some sort of Parliamentary system — it is no ambition of mine, at all events, to have any share in beginning that operation in India. If my existence, either officially or corporeally, were prolonged twenty times longer than either of them is likely to be, a Parliamentary system in India is not the goal to which I for one moment would aspire.

One point more. It is the question of an Indian member on the Viceroy's Executive Council. The absence of an Indian member from the Viceroy's Executive Council can no longer, I think, be defended. There is no legal obstacle or statutory exclusion. The Secretary of State can, to-morrow, if he likes, if there be a vacancy on the Viceroy's Council, recommend His Majesty to appoint an Indian Member. All I want to say is that, if, during my tenure of office, there should be a vacancy on the Viceroy's Executive Council, I should feel it my duty to tender to the King my advice that an Indian member should be appointed. If it were on my own authority only, I might hesitate to take that step, because I am not very fond of innovations in dark and obscure ground, but here I have the absolute and the zealous approval and concurrence of Lord Minto himself. It was at Lord Minto's special instigation that I began to think seriously of this step. I quite admit it is a very important step, but I think this concurrence points in the right direction. Anyhow, this is how it stands, that you have at this moment a Viceroy and a Secretary of State who both concur in a recommendation of this kind. I suppose—if I may be allowed to give a personal turn to these matters—that Lord Minto and I have had a very different experience of life and the world, and we belong I daresay to different schools of national politics, because Lord Minto was appointed by the party opposite. It is a rather remarkable thing that two men differing in this way in antecedents and so on should agree in this proposal—Lord Minto zealously concurring in it, even instigating it. We need not discuss what particular portfolio should be assigned. That will be settled by the Viceroy on the merits of the individual. The great object, the main object, is that the merits of individuals are to be considered and to be decisive irrespective and independent of race and colour.

But I am not altogether without experience, because a year ago, or somewhat more, it was my good fortune to be able to appoint two Indian gentlemen to the Council of India that sits at the Indian Office. Many apprehensions reached me as to what might happen. So far, at all events, those apprehensions have all been dissipated. The concord between the two Indian members of the Council and their colleagues has been unbroken, their work has been excellent, and you will readily believe me when I say that the advantage to me of being able to ask one of these two gentlemen to come and tell me something about an Indian question from an Indian point of view is enormous. I find in it a chance of getting the Indian angle of vision, and I feel sometimes as if I were actually in the streets of Calcutta. I do not say there are not some arguments on the other side, but this, at all events, surely is common sense—to have in the Government of the country, for the Governor-General to have at his side a man who knows the country well, who belongs to the country and can give him the point of view of an Indian, surely that is likely to prove an enormous advantage.

I can say, further, in the Judicial Bench in India everybody recognizes the enormous service that it is to have Indian members of abundant learning, and who add to that abundant learning a complete knowledge of the conditions and life of the country. I propose at once, if Parliament agrees, to acquire powers to double the Executive Council in Bombay and Madras, and to appoint at least one Indian member in each of those cases, as well as in the Governor-General's Council. Nor, as the Papers will show, shall I be backward in advancing towards a similar step, as occasion may require, in respect of at least four of the major provinces.

I wish that this chapter had been opened at a more fortunate moment; but, as I said when I rose, I repeat—do not let us for a moment take too gloomy a view. There is not the slightest occasion. None of those who are responsible take a gloomy view. They know the difficulties, they are prepared to grapple with them and to keep down mutinous opposition, and they hope, and we hope, to attract the good will which must, after all, be the real foundation of our prosperity and strength in India. We believe that is so far unsapped, and we believe that this admission, desired by the Governor-General and desired by us, of the Indians to a larger and more direct share in the government of their country and in all the affairs of their country, without for a moment taking from the central power its authority, will strengthen the foundations of our position. It will require great steadiness, constant pursuit of the same objects, and the maintenance of our authority, which will be all the more effective if we have, along with our authority, the aid and assistance, in responsible circumstances, of the Indians themselves.

Military strength, material strength, we have in abundance. What we still want to reacquire is moral strength—moral strength in guiding and controlling the people of India in the course on which time is launching them. I should like to read a few lines from a great orator about India. It was a speech delivered by Mr. Bright in 1858, when the great Government of India Bill was in another place. I would like to read this language, and I hope your Lordships will like it. Mr. Bright said— We do not know how to leave India, and therefore let us see if we know how to govern it. Let us abandon all that system of calumny against natives of India which has lately prevailed. Had that people not been docile, the most governable race in the world, how could you have maintained your power there for 100 years? Are they not industrious, are they not intelligent, are they not, upon the evidence of the most distinguished men the Indian service ever produced, endowed with many qualities which make them respected by all Englishmen who mix with them?… I would not permit any man in my presence without rebuke to indulge in the calumnies and expressions of contempt which I have recently heard poured forth without measure upon the whole population of India.… The people of India do not like us, but they scarcely know where to turn if we left them. They are sheep, literally without a shepherd.

However that may be, we at least at Westminster here have no choice and no option. As an illustrious Member of this House wrote— We found a society in a state of decomposition, and we have undertaken the serious and stupendous process of reconstructing it.

Macaulay, for it was he, said— India now is like Europe in the fifth century.

Yes, a stupendous process indeed. The process has gone on with marvellous success, and if we all, according to our various lights, are true to our colours, that process will go on. Whatever is said, I for one—though I am not what is commonly called an Imperialist—so far from denying, I most emphatically affirm that for us to preside over this transition from the fifth European century in some parts, in slow, uneven stages, up to the twentieth—so that you have before you all the centuries at once as it were—for us to preside over that and to be the guide of people in that condition, is, if conducted with humanity and sympathy, with wisdom and political courage, not only a human duty and a great national honour, but what was called the other day one of the most glorious tasks ever confided to any country.

* THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, it is a long time, I venture to say, since this House has listened to a statement of such absorbing interest as that just made by the noble Viscount, and I hope I may be permitted, in the name of those who sit round me, to congratulate him, not only upon the great eloquence which characterised his observations, but upon the directness and sincerity with which he approached the many difficult and, I may say, embarrassing questions with which he had to deal. I hope I may also congratulate him upon the fact that he was able, in spite of an indisposition that we all regretted, to perform his somewhat laborious task with conspicuous success. The noble Viscount told us that voluminous Papers would shortly be laid before us, and he suggested that in these circumstances it would be better if we did not attempt to discuss the details of proposals which are yet hardly before us. I make no complaint of that suggestion. I think it is a suggestion which I should have ventured to make myself if it had not been made to us. The noble Viscount told the House indeed that the policy he was unfolding marked the opening of a new chapter in the history of our relations with India; and when that chapter is presented to us with the high authority not only of the noble Viscount and of the expert advisers who surround him at the India Office, but with the authority of the Viceroy and his Council, I feel that it would indeed be rash on the part of any Member of your Lordships' House, upon the spur of the moment, to offer any criticisms which might occur to him at the time, but which he might afterwards desire to modify.

Let me say in passing with what pleasure I heard that part of the noble Viscount's statement in which he was able to tell us that in regard to the whole of this policy he and the Viceroy of India and his Council were at one. Anyone who has had to do with Indian affairs knows what an encouragement it is to the person who represents this country at the head of the affairs of India to know that he is not only in close touch with, but loyally supported by, the Cabinet Minister who has charge of the Indian business of the Government; and that solidarity, if I may use the word, is to my mind of particularly happy omen at the present moment. I shall, therefore, in these circumstances, in the few words which I am about to address to the House avoid any attempt to touch upon details, and I shall merely make one or two observations of quite a general character which have occurred to me.

The policy which is submitted to us is a twofold policy. There are proposal framed with the object of repressing disorder and of suppressing crime and anarchy, and there are other proposals for making far-reaching alterations in the machinery of the Government of India. I may be permitted to say that in my view each of these two sets of proposals should be considered strictly upon its own merits. It is our duty to restore a sense of security in India; it is also our duty to re-adjust the machinery of the Government of India from time to time should we be clearly of opinion that the country is ripe for a change and that a change will add to the efficiency of our administration. But I believe that it would be a mistake either on the one hand to be deterred from the introduction of reforms of this kind by the fact that in certain parts of India a dangerous agitation is in progress, or on the other hand to represent these great modifications of our present system of government as a counterpoise to the repressive measures, as the result of a kind of transaction in which one set of proposals was, as it were, to be set against the other. I do not think that the treatment of the subject by the noble Viscount was open in any way to the imputation that he dealt with these two proposals otherwise than as I have suggested.

The noble Viscount gave to your Lordships some description of the present condition of India. His account of the situation was, it seems to me, eminently judicial and temperate. It was not without its sombre touches, and we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there are dark shadows in the picture. But, on the other hand, he told us with confidence that the general condition of the country was sound; and I hope that we may take it from him that in his opinion these disorders, however dangerous, are of a local character, and that we need not assume that the whole country is honeycombed by the kind of organisations and conspiracies which are, unfortunately, prevalent in some parts of it. There is another consideration which seems to me to be satisfactory. As far as I am aware, it is not alleged that these disorders are in any way due to a general dissatisfaction with British rule or with the feeling that those who represent us in that country are harsh, oppressive, and unjust in their treatment of the natives of India. I believe myself that those Indians who think at all about these things are perfectly aware that our treatment of them has been, not only just, but generous, and that the withdrawal or disappearance of our rule would bring about chaos and calamity from which all races and all parts of the country would suffer.

There is another consideration—it is not in India alone that upheavals of this kind are to be noticed at the present time. These disorders seem to be the result of the somewhat unhappy operation of Western ideas of the most mischievous and dangerous type operating on the minds of an ignorant and impulsive population. It is like the case of some of those diseases which assume a peculiarly virulent type when introduced into new countries. In the same manner the political diseases which affect the Indian community seem to have acquired in certain parts of India a special degree of virulence and it seems to me that the noble Viscount established clearly that there is a case for special legislation designed to strengthen the hands of the Government of India against those who are responsible for these proceedings.

We have seen in the Press this morning an account of the new repressive measures introduced in the Viceroy's Council. I did not catch quite clearly from the noble Viscount whether that measure is specially directed against abuses on the part of the Indian Press; but I take it that offences committed by persons connected with the Press, if they come within the general scope and purview of the Bill, will be dealt with like other offences committed against order.

I am deeply convinced that it is necessary to strengthen the hands of the Government of India against the seditious Press of that country. Although the person who wreaks his own vengeance or spite by blowing up a number of his fellow-citizens with dynamite is a great criminal, I am not sure that the man is not a greater criminal still who, by the distribution of inflammatory literature, incites people to crime which he has not himself the courage to commit. I hope that I shall not be supposed to favour anything which can be described as interference with the liberty of the Press. The Indian Press enjoys a full measure of liberty already, and no one that I am aware of has ever desired to deprive it of that full measure of liberty. I mean by this that the Indian newspaper is perfectly free, and should in my opinion remain perfectly free, to criticise, and, if it likes, abuse the Government of the country, but it should not be left free to incite to sedition and to recommend the perpetration of crimes. There is no analogy between the Press in this country and the Indian Press. In this country the best antidote to abuses on the part of the Press is to be found in the Press itself. A gross mis-statement or an atrocious libel is detected in this country by the Press. It is exposed and promptly condemned; but only those who know India are able to say how utterly unscrupulous are the writers of these miserable publications and how absurdly credulous are those who read them.

I will not attempt this evening, therefore, to discuss the details of the repressive measures proposed by the Government of India. I will only say that it seems to me that they ought to comprise at any rate these features. In the firsts place, a strong Court, commanding general public respect; in the next place, a procedure so contrived as to avoid needless delay; and in the third place, penalties of a sufficiently deterrent character. I will add that the measures now put forward seem to me to be taken not a moment too soon, and not to be one whit too strong. We owe them to those able and devoted men who are carrying on the admistration of the Indian Empire for us. We owe them to the not les devoted women who share their risks and anxieties, and we owe them last and not least to those—if I may use the language of the noble Viscount—"dim masses of the people of India" whom we endeavour to protect against famine and against pestilence, and whom it is our duty to protect also against the still more dangerous contagion with which they are now threatened.

I pass for a moment to the proposals which have reference to the machinery of the Government of India. The noble Viscount was perfectly correct when he pointed out that this policy was not a new policy, but the extension of an old policy—a policy which, far from being forced on the Government of India, has been adopted by them readily, willingly, and of their own accord, in the hope of educating the people of the country to a better sense of their responsibility, and also in the hope if possible of lightening the heavy burden which falls on the shoulders of a necessarily very much centralised Government. The last step was taken, the noble Lord told the House, when I had some connection with the affairs of India; and I say unhesitatingly that those with whom I was associated at that time, if they had been asked whether what we then recommended was to be regarded as a final arrangement never to be hereafter modified, would have answered the question in the negative. The changes made in 1892, I believe, have worked on the whole well; and I do not think that any dissentient voice was raised when, in the Imperial Address to the Princes and people of India, published not long ago in the name of His Majesty, it was announced that the time had come when, in the judgment of the Viceroy and his councillors, the principle of representative institutions might be prudently extended. Therefore I approach that part of the scheme not only with an open mind, but with a mind predisposed in its favour. I will, however, venture to enter two reservations.

In the first place, although I am sure that in dealing with these bodies it is desirable to introduce so far as circumstances permit the principle of representation, I am not by any means convinced that it is wise to rely over much upon the principle of popular election as we understand it here, and unless I misunderstood what fell from the noble Viscount, I gathered that in this case he did not intend to proceed upon popular election pure and simple, but upon something more in the nature of an extension of the present plan under which members of councils are recommended by constituencies of different kinds, nominated but not absolutely elected in the sense in which a Member of the House of Commons is elected in this country by his constituents.

LORD MORLEY OF BLACKBURN

We do propose—not over the whole field—but we do propose the substitution of election in a large degree for the old process of recommendation.

* THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

I promised I would endeavour not to discuss details, and, therefore will not follow that further, but I am glad to have elicited the noble Viscount's explanation. I will only say this, that in my belief popular election in India is really an exotic idea. It is an idea which we ourselves introduced into the country. We did it cautiously and tentatively, beginning only with the local and less important bodies. I do not think those who know the country best will tell you that it has been an unqualified success, or that it is always greatly appreciated where it has been introduced. In the Indian municipalities, I am under the impression that it was at first regarded with considerable indifference, and that it worked very far from well wherever racial feelings ran high. But I pass from that.

The other reservation which I should like to make is this. As to the functions of these Legislative Councils, I am inclined to say by all means let us give them the fullest possible measure of opportunity for criticism, consultation, deliberation, interpellation, and so forth, but I think we must be extremely careful how we do anything which might have the result of paralysing the Executive Government. The noble Viscount himself pointed out how widely different were the circumstances of the Opposition in this country and the Opposition, so-called, in India. The Opposition in this country criticise the Government with the feeling at the back of their mind that a time may come when they will change place with the Government and when they will have to incur the responsibility which rests for the moment with the Government. But you can never allow the Indian Opposition to turn the Government out, and therefore the two cases really are fundamentally different.

I heard with some satisfaction the announcement that although there was to be an unofficial majority in the provincial councils, the noble Viscount intended at present that the official majority should remain in the Viceroy's Council. That seems to me to be a wise proposal, and it accords with what seems to me the sound principle in all these cases—namely, that you should work upwards from the bottom and make your reforms in the municipal assemblies and in the provincial bodies before attempting to touch the body which is entrusted with the high political affairs of the Indian Empire.

Only one word more. The noble Viscount announced that it was intended to extend the Executive Councils to other provinces, that it was intended to add native members to them, and that it was in contemplation to take the first opportunity of adding a native member to the Council of the Viceroy. I will reserve what I have to say upon these questions until some other occasion. I will only venture to say that the proposal to add a native member to the Viceroy's Executive Council is—and the noble Viscount evidently feels it is—a tremendous innovation, and I confess I should have thought it was an innovation which, whatever the technical legal rights of the case may be, ought not to be introduced until Parliament has had full opportunity of discussing the Government scheme in all its completeness. The noble Viscount admitted frankly that there were arguments on the other side, and I should have hoped that he would have listened to those arguments before burning his boats. The noble Viscount dwelt indeed on the advantage of having on the Viceroy's Council a member who knows the country. I should like to ask what country? There are a great many countries in India. If the noble Viscount could discover a native gentleman who knew the whole of the Indian Empire, and could speak authoritatively on behalf of all the different races and creeds concerned, I should say by all means give him a^ place on the Viceroy's Council. The subject is one of such interest that I have I am afraid, slightly transgressed the limits I had proposed for my own guidance. I will add nothing more except to say—and I am sure the noble Viscount will believe I say it with my whole heart—that it is my desire to support him so far as I can in a judicious extension of the reform of our Indian institutions, and that it is no less my desire—and I am sure it is the desire of those who sit behind me—to do all that we can to support and encourage the Government of India, who have, I venture to think, met a difficult and critical situation with a courage and self-restraint for which they deserve infinite credit.

* LORD MACDONNELL OF SWIN-FORD

My Lords, I promise not to detain your Lordships very long, but the statement of the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India is of such a momentous nature that I desire to state very clearly what my own thoughts are with regard to the more salient features of it. I would ask your Lordships to believe that my thoughts are not mere impressions formed while listening to the remarkable speech of the noble Viscount. They are the result of prolonged experience of an executive character in India, and the result also of years of anxious reflection on the problems of Indian government with which the noble Viscount has dealt.

The noble Viscount's remarks seem to me to fall naturally under three heads—first, as they related to the Government of India; next, as they related to the Provincial Governments; and, lastly, as they related to the inhabitants of the various provinces. I wish to say that, broadly speaking, I am in warm sympathy with the policy of the Secretary of State. Although on certain important points I differ, I believe the policy of the Secretary of State to be bold, courageous, and, in the circumstances, statesmanlike and prudent. But I regret to say I completely differ from the noble Viscount's remarks with regard to the Executive Council. The principle which, in my opinion, ought to direct and control our policy in India is this—the maintenance of complete and absolute control in the hands of a small body of picked officers of the Empire who form the Government of India, and, subject to that control, the fullest measure of local government in the provinces that each province is fit to administer. I believe you could not find in India any individual native gentleman, who as enjoying general confidence, would be able to give advice and assistance to the Governor-General in Council. I am certain that if you are to avoid discontentment you cannot appoint a Mahomedan to that Council without also appointing a Hindu. Nor do I think that if you did appoint a native of India and he were not of the politically advanced class against whom the legislation of which we have heard is directed, he would command influence amongst his co-religionists. Therefore, I agree with everything that has fallen from the noble Marquess opposite with regard to the Executive Council of the Viceroy.

I was also extremely glad to learn that the official majority was still to be preserved in the Legislative Council of the Viceroy. If under this new arrangement the councils of the local governments are enlarged and increased functions conferred upon them, the business which will fall upon the Council of the Governor-General will transcend local interests; it will be connected with high Imperial affairs, and with the disposal of those matters on which racial quarrels and religious difficulties arise. Consequently the Council of the Governor General will hold the position of arbiter; and, that being so, as complete authority should be retained by the Governor-General in his Council as in my opinion should be retained by him in his executive authority.

In regard to the local governments, the second division into which I thought the noble Viscount's remarks fell, I am glad to learn that the Executive Councils of Madras and Bombay are to be enlarged. I think the time for doing that has come. I also think the time has come for withdrawing the official majority in the local Legislative Councils. But if an enlargement of the Executive Councils be granted, then the power of the Governor of the Province should be increased so that he in the ultimate result may be able to check any shortcomings on the part of his council which may transpire. In addition to Madras and Bombay, the noble Viscount, as I understood him, said he proposed to give Executive Councils to two Lieutenant-Governorships and subsequently two more. I should like to know to which two Lieutenant-Governorships Councils are to be immediately given. I presume that one will be given to Bengal, as it now exists, and another probably to the United Provinces. The principle which should direct our policy in this respect is to give a larger measure of local government to Provinces as they become fit for it. In my opinion the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal, as it at present exists, is not fit for a Council. What does the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal consist of now? It consists of two divisions of Bengal proper, which no doubt are, so far as education and material resources are concerned, perhaps the most prominent in India. It also consists of a country which is different in the origin and in the language of its people, different linguistically and ethnically, I refer to the districts of Behar. Then it includes the high lands of Chota Nagpur which are inhabited by aboriginal tribes, and, finally, it includes Orissa, which is and always has been stagnant. To give a council to such a province as that and to place it on an equality with Madras and Bombay is, I think, to court defeat.

But if the wise and statesmanlike proposal of the noble Viscount had been put forward four years ago he would have had no difficulty in finding a province which would have satisfied all his requirements for a new Governorship with an Executive Council. The most advanced and forward province in India, whether you regard it from the point of view of material prosperity or of education, is what is known as Bengal proper. The idea of giving a council to Bengal proper is not a matter of to-day or yesterday, but has been a commonplace of Indian administrative thought for more than half a century. It was earnestly advocated before I went to India; but in the course of events, with the swing of the pendulum as regards official opinion, it came to be considered that the personal rule of the Lieutenant-Governor was better than the rule of a council particularly when the Presidency commands were abolished, reducing the council to three officers, and greatly increasing the risk of the Governor being in a minority. But the noble Viscount's opportunity has been diminished by what is known as the partition of Bengal. I do not know how that matter arose. Nobody seems to know how it did arise. The noble Lord who is reputed to be the author of it, in this House denied its authorship and threw responsibility on two noble Lords who were urgent in denying the soft impeachment. The partition remains now nobody's child, and is productive of much evil. The partition of Bengal, in my opinion—and I speak my mature opinion—is the greatest blunder which has been committed in India since Clive conquered at Plassey. If that partition can be undone, in the larger consideration of Indian administrative situations now under notice, then I think the noble Viscount will have in Bengal a field in which his policy will take root, with as a result the removal of all these difficulties which now confront him. For, in my opinion, these difficulties are nothing more than the outcome of this administrative blunder, which has driven mad the best of the young men in Bengal. I know I speak on an unpopular theme, but I feel very strongly on this matter.

When three years ago I heard of this partition I knew that a mistake had been made; since then I have kept myself absolutely aloof from all agitation, and from all agitators on this matter. But now in your Lordships' House, I do not think I should be doing my duty to this House and to the country if I did not say, with such authority as my experience in India may enable me to command, that this is a blunder, and that if it is not retracted and corrected, the great scheme of reform which has been launched to-night will fail, at all events in Bengal, of the success which it ought to command. It has been said that to go back on a mistake in India is to encourage the enemy. I have had larger administrative experience of India than most men, and speaking as the result of that experience, I say that the correction of a mistake has never been a bad thing for the Government of India or for the people of India. Those, my Lords, are the remarks which I desired to make on this occasion. When the Bill to which the noble Viscount's remarks point, comes before the House we shall be able to discuss its terms; but I did think it my duty, on the earliest opportunity, to say what I have said, and to congratulate the noble1 Viscount on having produced a scheme which, in my opinion, will be of the utmost benefit to India.