HL Deb 30 July 1907 vol 179 cc721-31
*LORD BRASSEY

said: In bringing very briefly under the consideration of your Lordships the discussion at the Colonial Conference relating to maritime defence, I once more cake the opportunity of expressing full confidence in the administration of the Navy in all its leading features. As to ships, manning, and training, we have at no time during my recollection—and I look back across the years —stood so well as we do to-day. There must always be occasion for suggestion or criticism. With regard to maritime defence, the result of the recent deliberations at the Colonial Conference was disappointing. The Premiers came to the Conference desiring to assume a larger-share of the Imperial expenditure on the Navy. The Colonies have taken a first step by the enrolment of Naval Reserves. And they have taken that step at the instance of the Admiralty. At the Conference of 1902, the enrolment of Colonial Naval Reserves was strongly urged by Lord Selborne. I may quote from his speech— I want the Colonial Governments to regard the Navy as their own, at least as much as ours, and with that object I wish to see in the Navy more Colonial officers and a contribution of Colonial seamen. I want, in fact, if I may use such a term, to increase the maritime spirit of the Empire. After all, we are not in this country all sailors, yet we are all imbued with the maritime spirit. Here you have the great Colonies covering vast geographical tracts of country. Is there not a danger that in the far interior, unless we take precautions, the maritime spirit may be lost? The appeal of Lord Selborne fell upon attending ears. The Colonial Governments called for volunteers, and the call has been answered with enthusiam by our fellow-subjects across the sea. Naval Reserve men have been enrolled in considerable numbers in Australia, Newfoundland, and Malta. A beginning has been made in South Africa. In his Memorandum on the Navy Estimates of the current year my noble friend the First Lord of the Admiralty bore testimony to the quality of the Colonial Naval Reserves. He had himself inspected 120 men from Newfoundland, during their visit to the port of London. A most favourable impression was created by their general appearance. In raising men for the Reserves, and in providing for their shore training, the Colonies have done their part. At the Conference, the Premiers asked the aid of the Admiralty to complete the work of training by the loan of suitable vessels. These; reasonable demands of the Colonies were not complied with. The policy of the Admiralty in relation to the Naval Reserves generally has changed. My noble friend said in effect that the Navy was already over-manned, and that Reserves were no longer needed. If we compare our numbers with those of foreign Powers the Admiralty may truly say the Navy is over-manned. The reduction, to be gradually made, should not fall wholly on the Reserves. It is the permanent force which has been increased beyond our needs, and at burdensome cost to the taxpayer-. At the Conference my noble friend rightly insisted that all the higher ratings—-in the engine room, in gunnery and in the torpedo service—required a training of at least six years. These highly trained men are a limited proportion of the crews. All foreign navies fill up complements with Reserves. In dealing with the Reserve forces for the Navy we cannot put out of view the fact that the mercantile marine has ceased to be a nursery for seamen, as in the old days. If the supply of seafaring men is falling short at home, it becomes the more desirable to encourage the Colonies to help us. This we can do by the loan of vessels which we are well able to spare, suitable for the training of seamen.

I turn to another point of view. Cruisers are needed in Australian waters, not only for the training of seamen, but for the protection of trade. In an able report by a Committee of naval officers of the Commonwealth, which was laid before the Conference, the over-sea and inter-state imports and exports of Australia are valued at £170,000,000 a year. The officers urge that a local naval force is required for the protection of this important trade. War operations might at any time require the service of the Imperial Squadron at a distance from Australia, Another report on Colonial maritime defence was laid before the recent Conference. I refer to that of the Committee on Imperial Defence. They took a different view from that put forward by the naval officers of the Commonwealth. They recommended that the defensive preparations of our Colonial fellow-subjects should be directed rather to the protection of harbours and the development of military forces. The Committee of Australian Naval Officers dissented from those views. The vast distances, the sparse population, the insufficiency of railway communication, make it impossible to mass troops to meet any possible invasion, and the lines of communication along the coast are of great length. Mr. Balfour's observations in the House of Commons in May, 1905, are appropriately quoted. Dealing with the contingency of the Fleet—that is to say, the Mediterranean Fleet—the Atlantic Fleet, and the Home Fleet, being away from the British shores, Mr. Balfour felt it necessary to give the assurance that England would not be left in maritime helplessness. He enumerated the strong force of battleships and cruisers, the torpedo flotilla and the submarines, which would always remain in home waters. The contention is surely not unreasonable that the same means of local defence which are necessary for the homeland are desirable for Australia. The naval force available should include vessels capable of holding their own in the fierce winds and long seas which sweep the Australian shores. Sea-going destroyers may be useful. Large cruisers are essential. It is beyond the present resources of Australia to provide such vessels. The mother-country can supply them.

A Return has recently been presented to Parliament, on the motion of Lord Cawdor, giving the strength of our own and foreign navies in battleships and armoured cruisers. The comparison shows our overwhelming superiority. And the list officially presented to Parliament does not include six cruisers of the most powerful type, which are near completion, nor does it include more than eighty cruisers on the Navy list, many of which are not obsolete, or even obsolescent, for the protection of trade in distant waters. There are other ships, not suitable perhaps for the protection of Australian trade, but well fitted for the training of reserve men. From this long list, some vessels, I submit, might be handed over to the Commonwealth.

In helping the Colonies by the loan or gift of a few cruisers we shall incur no new expense. We are bound to build up to the two-Power standard. In shipbuilding, invention will never cease. As new ships are completed, the older ships pass out of commission. They should be sent to Australian and other Colonial ports. They would do service for the training of seamen, and would give security to Australian trade.

There was another proposal before the Conference, of the first importance, indirectly connected with maritime defence, as to which I need not address any observations to your Lordships. I refer to what is popularly known as the "all-red "route. It is satisfactory to know that this proposal is under consideration. We have the assurance of the Government that they favour a liberal policy. Fast ocean services expand trade and promote intercourse. It is certain that swift communications are a bond of Empire not open to criticism from any point of view.

*THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (Lord TWEEDMOUTH)

My Lords, I think the whole House will agree that there is no person here who is more fitted to give an opinion with regard to the Colonial naval defences than my noble friend who has just sat down; he is an expert navigator and seaman; he is the owner of a world-famed yacht; he has discharged high duties in the office of the Admiralty; and he has been Govenor of a great Australian Colony; so that he ought to be in a very good position to express an important opinion on this subject, and I am sorry that my noble friend seems to think that the result of the Colonial Conference this year, so far as naval defence is concerned, was not altogether satisfactory. I thought myself that we had gone long way in coming to an understanding with the Colonial Premiers on this subject. The question is a very important one, and one that has caused a great deal of anxiety to myself and to the Board of Admiralty to which I belong. It is an intricate and difficult, as well as an important question, as the King's Dominions beyond the seas are very scattered and have various wants. They have various ideas of what is best for themselves, and there is, in fact, very little homogeneity to be found among them. Still, I believe there is a solid basis on which we can found a scheme for joint Imperial naval defence; it can be summed up in six words—"One Empire, one sea, one Navy." I do not think any scheme can be worked that does not acknowledge the supremacy of the great Navy of this country, and that our great Navy must defend our Colonies as well as ourselves; at the same time, a great deal can be done by the Colonies to help us and to help themselves. That was the basis on which I endeavoured to discuss the subject with the Colonial Premiers.

I think it is perhaps desirable that I should state very shortly the exact position in which we stand. In 1887, when Lord George Hamilton was First Lord of the Admiralty, this question of help from the Colonies was first raised, and a certain amount of progress was then made. At the time of the Colonial Conference of 1892, Lord Selborne, who was first Lord of the Admiralty, and Mr. Chamberlain, who was Colonial Secretary, both pressed very hard for increased help from the Colonies, and especially pressed for it to be done by way of subsidy. In consequence of the Conference of 1892 an arrangement was come to with the Australian Colonies for ten years, until 1913. By that agreement Australia was pledged to give £200,000 a year to this country, and New Zealand was similarly pledged to give £40,000 a year, on condition that a certain squadron should be kept in Australian waters. That agreement is still in effect, and cannot be broken without the vote of the Australian and New Zealand Parliaments, as well as of our own. The annual cost of that squadron is £581,954. With regard to South Africa, also, there is an arrangement by which Cape Colony gave £50,000 and Natal £35,000 to the old country. A squadron has been kept there, but there is no special time mentioned for that arrangement to last. The squadron at the Cape costs us £155,355, and we have spent out of the Naval Works Loan Account no less than £2,104,076 for harbour works at Simon's Bay. Of course, in the event of war South Africa would become a centre of our general connection with the East and with the South. These are considerable sums which are charged to us annually, and it is not fair to say that we have shown ourselves in the past at all neglectful of the interests of the Colonies. The case of Newfoundland is different, because there we have no agreement with regard to ships, but only that a certain number of Naval Reserve men should be raised and trained, and this is done to large extent on ships which go to Newfoundland from this country. These men are, as the noble Lord said, extremely good sailors. Newfoundland pays £3,000 as a subsidy. The case of Canada, too, is totally different. The Canadians have always refused to give anything by way of subsidy, and at the Conference the Canadians, as a set-off, and as showing that they were willing to help the general naval interests of the Empire, talked about the protection they gave to the fisheries on the Labrador coast, the work they did in the great lakes inland, and the fact that they took over the works at Halifax and Esquimalt as involving a considerable relief to the Imperial funds. The cost of the establishment at Halifax had been £31,600, and at Esquimalt £27,300 a year. Providing the Canadians keep up these two docks and harbours in a proper condition they will be doing a very great service to the Empire at large. I am sorry, however, the Canadian Government do not see their way to give more direct help to the naval defence of the Empire, but with regard to these defensive questions they have their own ideas and views, and I thought the line we ought to take towards the Colonies is that it must be very much a matter for them to decide in what way they are to help the Imperial Government in the matter.

His Majesty's Government have made no change, and proposed no change, with regard to the agreements made with the different Colonial Governments. What we do say is that we want to get as much help as we can from the Colonies, and to take that help in such a way as would be most convenient and useful to the Colonies as well as to the Imperial Government. His Majesty's Government said they would like more substantial help, and questions were discussed as to how that could be given. The Australians, by the mouth of Mr. Deakin—I do not take all that he said as the absolute opinion of the whole of Australia—put forward very strongly their desire for the establishment of something in the nature of an Australian Fleet. The Admiralty raised no objection to that. They only pointed out that they thought, to start with, the best defence they could have was to establish a flotilla of destroyers and submarines. That would form a very substantial defence against any casual raid, and in the event of a war a flotilla of well-manned destroyers and submarines would be of the greatest possible assistance to a British Fleet which had to operate in those waters. The smaller class of vessels cannot be taken over the ocean, and they would be of great advantage in defending those particular Colonies. Of course, during peace-time, they would be entirely under the control of the Colony who adopted them, but in war-time, we insisted that, if we had to send out a big Fleet, the flotilla of destroyers and submarines should be attached to it, and be under the command of the British admiral. That is a plan which involves the assent of the Colonial Parliament and of the Imperial Parliament. I think the various discussions we had brought us nearer to agreement, and before long I hope an agreement will be arrived at. As to New Zealand, that Colony has preferred to adhere to a subsidy. Since the Conference I have heard that the New Zealand people are to raise their subsidy from £40,000 to £100,000, but they do not altogether refuse the idea of having also a submarine or destroyer flotilla as part of the subsidy, or instead of the subsidy altogether if they found that the cost of it was greater than the amount of the subsidy. South Africa is inclined to increase the number of its naval volunteers and to include their training. There are three different sets of Volunteers in South Africa—at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and Natal. The suggestion made to Cape Colony and Natal was that they should join up their three different companies, and that one ship should go from one to the other station to train the Volunteers at each place. 1 do not at all think that is an impossible arrangement to arrive at. In the first place, however, Acts of Parliment have to be passed in the Colonies themselves in order that we may put the Naval Volunteers there on a footing of Royal Naval Volunteers, and those Acts have to be sanctioned here. There, again, there is no desire to reduce the amount of help to be given to the Imperial Government below the cost of the subsidy now given, but there is a desire possibly to take a portion of the subsidy now paid to the Imperial Government for the purpose of carrying out some sort of naval defence in the Colonies themselves.

Then Lord Brassey raised a question about men and Reserves. His argument was that, if at any time the active service ratings and Reserves of the Navy aggregated larger number than were estimated to be required, the consequent reduction in numbers should be shared by the active service men and the Reserve. He argued that in the last nine years the number on active service ratings had increased from 97,000 to 129,000. It is now 128,000. It is perfectly true that foreign navies largely depend upon Reservists to man their navies. But the position of foreign countries is totally different from our own. We depend upon our Navy as our first line of defence, and to preserve the safety and the prosperity of our country. We cannot afford to wait for the mobilisation of our Reserves. We must, if we want to bring our fleet on to the sea and into operation, have it ready to go to sea at once fully manned and fit to meet the emergencies which it will be called upon to meet. The recent policy of the Admiralty has been to perfect the machinery for mobilising the fleet, and the position we now hold in that respect is very different from that of the time my noble friend remembers when he was at the Admiralty; indeed, the number of men in the Navy are carefully estimated for on the principle that Reserves, though available, cannot be counted on as instantly available on mobilisation. The Navy cannot afford to wait; it must be in a position to man its striking force at once. To keep up this high standard it is necessary to have your men ready at hand to man their ships at a particularly short notice, and for that reason it is not desirable to trust to Reserve men to meet such emergencies. It must not be assumed that our Reserves are being reduced below a very considerable number. We have in the first place established a comparatively new Fleet Reserve, called the Royal Fleet Reserve, which consists of men who are engaged on a comparatively short time of service. The men serve five years on board ship, and for seven years they are in the Reserve, and ready at any moment to come up for mobilisation. There were on 1st January last 16,222 men with the Royal Fleet Reserve, and in the Royal Naval Reserve 21,167 men. The full number in the Royal Fleet and the Royal Naval Reserve on 1st January, therefore, was 43,389 men, besides the 128,000 men on the active list who are ready at any short notice to come on board if they are not on board ship at the time. Then another important Reserve has been established in the class of Royal Naval Volunteers. We had on 1st January 1907, 3,735 of these Naval Volunteers. They are situated in six places, viz., the Clyde, the Tyne, the Mersey, the Thames, the south coast of Sussex, and in the Severn. 1 do not think it is possible to speak too highly of the class of men who come in with the Naval Volunteers. As you see, they are all at big seaport places, places where shipbuilding goes on, and you get Naval Volunteers made up almost entirely of workmen in such works as Armstrong's on the Tyne. You get a lot of expert men, mechanics, shipwrights, engineers, and so forth—the very men you want at a time of emergency, men who can give the sort of work so very necessary on modern battleships in time of war to keep things right. I think from the point of view of personnel we are really extremely well off. I know the Admiralty is accused of paying too much attention to material and not enough to personnel. I do not think it is a true criticism of the present policy. I think our personnel has been exceptionally well cared for, is exceptionally well trained, and will be found extraordinarily effective if it is called upon.

There was one more point my noble friend alluded to. It is the question of sending our cruisers to the Colonies instead of dealing with them in other ways. I am not myself very much attached to sending odd ships off to odd places in all parts of the world. I believe the very essence of modern policy is to concentrate your fleets as much as possible. 1 think, however, I may just hint to the House that we have in our minds a new and extended cruiser construction policy, which we shall bring forward in the next or following year. After all, the cruiser is the ship with which eventually we keep our dominance over the sea. The battleships are really only sort of policemen which keep the ring. The cruisers are the antennœ of the fleet who bring the news to the battleships. The battleships keep the sea free; it is their business to destroy the fleets of the enemy and to leave the sea free for our cruisers to safeguard our own commerce and to interfere as much as possible with that of our enemies. I hope, my lords, I have fairly well stated what is the present view of the Admiralty, and that my noble friend will think the answer I have given is a sufficient one.

*LORD ELLENBOROUGH

My Lords, I listened very carefully as I wished to hear the conditions connected with the grant Australia is going to give towards our Fleet. I did not gather what they all are. I think that some of them were not mentioned by the noble Lord, and I only rise to say it would be advantageous if he would issue some paper or document stating what those conditions are. Regarding the protection of Australia, all there is any chance of any European Power sending out there until she has smashed up our Fleet is an occasional cruiser, and the best way to impede her is to keep torpedo boats available somewhere on that station. Every cruiser at some time or other has to put into harbour for repairs, and, if she knows that a torpedo boat is in the neighbourhood, she cannot act in the same way as if she knew the coast were clear. If the commander knows there is a torpedo boat about he has to keep a number of his men at the guns all night, and to keep the spaces round those guns clear so that he can work them. Men who spend half the night at their guns cannot work full hours at repairs. That will impede the ship, and, instead of the repairs taking a week, they will take a fortnight. During the extra week the cruiser will be doing no mischief, and our own cruisers will hear of her and be able to come up and engage her. There should be local defences in New Zealand and Australia, the officers and men should be kept together and worked together so as to give them training, and there should be competition of one ship against another, and then they could be afterwards dispersed if necessary. The Australian reserves certainly would not arrive in time for any decisive contest that might take place in our waters. But I think it would be a good thing to have more local reserves to fall back upon to fill up vacancies and repair our ships in cases of long war. We might easily spare, I should think, some of the vessels mentioned by the noble Lord, and the Percy Scott system of teaching the men how to fire is not expensive. It is very desirable to have electricians and mechanics of various descriptions in the reserve ready to assist in the repairs of our own vessels. I hope the noble Earl will be able to give some further information about the conditions of the Australian grant.