THE NAVY AND THE ADMIRALTY.

HL Deb 21 March 1905 vol 143 cc600-26

*EARL SPENCER,

in rising "to call attention to the statements of the First Lord of the Admiralty of December 6th, 1904, and February 14th, 1905, and to move for Papers," said: My Lords, in making the remarks of which I have given notice, I think I may claim for myself that never at any time, whether in office at the Admiralty or since, in the House or out of it, have I discussed naval matters in a personal or Party sense. In former days the conduct of business at the Admiralty was occasionally actuated by Party motives, but I am glad to say that of late years this has not been the case. What we aim at to-day at the Admiralty is to do our utmost to secure the sufficiency and efficiency of the Navy, to enable them to fulfil their heavy responsibilities to the nation, to preserve the commerce of the nation, the country itself, and its great dependencies all over the world.

The noble Earl, who may to-day address the House probably for the last time as First Lord of the Admiralty, in his Statement accompanying the Estimates of the year informs us that the Estimates for the year 1905–6 amount to £33,389,000 as compared with £36,889,000 last year; that is coming down £3,500,000. I cannot help, in looking at these Estimates, referring to those of previous years. I will divide the years with which I propose to deal into three periods. First there is the period when I was First Lord of the Admiralty; next the period when Viscount Goschen succeeded me; and thirdly, the term of office of the noble Earl who has just resigned. The figures with regard to these three periods are very striking. When I went to the Admiralty the number of men, boys, and Marines in the Navy was 74,100. In the second period the number was 83,400. In 1901–2, when the noble Earl succeeded to office, the number was 118,635. Last year the number was 131,100. Of course this large increase in men is a necessary consequence of the increase in the number of ships in commission which have to be manned by sailors and Marines; and coming to shipbuilding we find these increases: first period, £4,771,000; second period, £6,986,000; and third period, £14,976,000. During the term of office of Viscount Goschen he explained that the large increase which he proposed was in consequence of the action of Russia in advancing beyond her usual annual grant for new shipbuilding by something like £10,000,000. The noble Viscount made the very statesmanlike offer that if the other Powers would come to terms as to the increase of their respective navies he would not ask for the increase which he then proposed. But, as we all know, that offer was refused, and this very large increase had to be made.

Altogether the increase in the Navy Estimates up to the present comes to more than double the total Estimates of 1894–5. That is really a stupendous increase, and I think we should have some explanation of it. I am not condemning it, because I have always felt that those who are not in office, and therefore do not know the facts, take upon themselves a great responsibility in condemning the Government for doing what they think necessary for the stability of the Empire and the efficiency of the Navy. What I do say is that we have not had a sufficient explanation of this enormous increase in naval expenditure. The duties which fall upon the Navy have been clearly and succinctly explained in a passage from the Report of the Royal Commission on Coaling Stations presided over by Lord Carnarvon. It says— The Royal Navy is not maintained for the purpose of affording direct local protection to seaports or harbours, but for the object of blockading the ports of an enemy, of destroying his trade, attacking his possessions, dealing with his ships at sea, and, we may add, of preventing an attack in great force against any special place. It is by the efficient performance of these duties that our commerce and Colonies will be best protected. Our seaports must rely for their immediate defence on local means, leaving Your Majesty's Navy free to act at sea, There have been in recent years various standards of the naval strength which was thought necessary to carry out these duties. First of all there was the standard of the Naval Defence Act, when Lord George Hamilton was First Lord. It was then laid down that the annual cost of new construction should be £2,300,000. That represented what we may call the waste of the Navy. The depreciation now amounts to over £4,026,878; this increase does not depend simply on the increased number of ships, but on the capital value of the ships, which has now very largely increased. We find that ships live only a certain number of years; that after those years they become obsolete or of very little use, and have to be replaced by the most efficient and modern type of vessel. But it is necessary that we should know not only the proper standard of the efficiency and sufficiency of the Navy, but the amount of depreciation, and waste which must be made up for every year by building new ships.

We have now what is called the two-Power standard. That standard was originally invented, I believe, by a great statesman who is now, in regard to an entirely different matter, greatly praised on one side and attacked on the other—Mr. Cobden. It did very well for a certain time; but I venture to say that at the present moment our naval force exceeds immensely the two-Power standard. I dislike bringing other Powers into this matter, but it is well known that the two-Power standard has always applied to France and Russia. One of these Powers, as we all know, has met with the greatest possible disasters. It is difficult to ascertain the full extent of Russia's enormous losses in the war with Japan, but I think I am under the mark when I say that she has lost five battleships and five cruisers. Therefore, the two-Power standard has broken down. Besides, it must not be forgotten that in a great war we may have the ships of another Power on our side helping us.

I ask, therefore, whether it is not within the competence of the able administrators of the Admiralty to tell us what force in battleships and cruisers we now require to strike a severe blow on the fleets of an enemy wherever they may be, and also to carry out the duties of the Navy as laid down by Lord Carnarvon's Commission. No doubt we require a much larger number of cruisers, independently of fleets of battleships, than other nations; but I believe at this moment we have an enormous number of vessels, both battleships and cruisers—owing to the policy which has lately been carried out—which will be able to perform the work which we think is the duty of the Navy in the event of war. I do not feel in a position to condemn the Government, but I think we want more explanation as to why this enormous increase has been made. I should also like to hear that we now have an ample supply both of battleships and cruisers to do the great work which is thrown on the Navy.

I will now come to the new policy which has been initiated in two Statements, one issued in December, and the other quite lately, by the noble Earl the First Lord of the Admiralty. I propose to refer to two points principally in those Statements. The first is the removal from the list of active ships of a certain number of vessels, and the second the diminution of the forces of defence and the means for carrying out dockyard work at the naval bases or coaling stations, which is not so clearly defined, but is referred to in both of these statements. With regard to the first point, I must refer to the speech made in Glasgow on 13th January by the Prime Minister. Part of that speech I entirely endorse, but part of it, I think, gives a somewhat exaggerated view of what has been done. The Prime Minister said— At first sight perhaps, a critic looking over the figures might say, 'What has this Government been doing?' They have abolished 130 vessels—my figures are not exact, I speak from memory—130 vessels which figured upon the list of the British Navy. They have in so doing made an economy; they have not weakened the Navy in the process for the mere sake of saving so many hundreds of thousands, or millions a year; they have not sacrificed the strength of the force on which the very being of this country depends. I do not at all object to such an interpretation of what has been done. At this point in the right hon. Gentleman's speech a member of the audience observed: "Good riddance of bad rubbish," and Mr. Balfour proceeded— That brief interruption puts even more concisely and pithily than I can do one of this aspects, but only one of the aspects, of the great reform. It is not merely that the Board of Admiralty has laid down the rule that a ship however useful in time of peace—and we have to do, it must be admitted, a great deal of small police work in a time of peace for diplomatic or other purposes—is not only useless, but worse than useless, in time of war if it possesses neither fighting power nor speed; it is merely a ship which exists to embarrass British Admirals and to discredit the British flag. Well, with one courageous stroke of the pen, as it were, these ships have been removed. The cost of their maintenance, the cost of their repairs—I will not give you the figure to which it comes, it is a very big one—are all struck off the annual Estimates. I agree with the general principle. The proposal is that we must not cumber the seas in time of peace with ships that are no use in time of war. Presently I will refer again to the question of the diminution of cost. I think that the Prime Minister rather exaggerates what this actual change, at the present moment at all events, has effected. There is a matter about which I should like to ask a question. We have had two Returns—one of ships which have been struck off, and another of ships which remain on the active list. But on these lists the names of sixteen vessels are repeated.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (The Earl of SELBORNE)

I will explain that at once. The words "non-effective" in the Return are Mr. Robertson's words. I do not admit that these ships are non-effective. Mr. Robertson wished to have included in the Return ships treated in a different manner than they have hitherto been treated. There, fore we included all the ships that have been reclassified and are being treated in a different manner. The consequence is that some of them appear in both Returns, the Return headed "non-effective ships," according to Mr. Robertson's expression, including a considerable number of ships which have very real value for secondary purposes in war.

*EARL SPENCER

I am obliged to the noble Lord for the information. I will return to that question again in a moment. There are three classes of ships. The intermediate class has been wittily described as the llama class, being the class between the sheep and goats. As far as I hear, many people who understand the subject believe that this unfortunate llama class will deteriorate very rapidly, and the llamas be transformed into goats. Then there are some ships on the first Return on which very considerable sums have been spent within the last few years. The "Collingwood," I believe, appeared in the Estimates for over £20,000. That vessel now becomes a vessel of the llama class.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

What was the date of that expenditure on the "Collingwood?"

*EARL SPENCER

I think it was in the Estimates of last year. There is a large sum put down to the "Naiad," some £38,000, and to the "Pallas," £7,200. There are considerable sums for other vessels. Whether these sums have been spent I cannot say, but they have been put down in the Estimates. Undoubtedly very large sums of money have been spent on ships that have been put among the llamas or goats. It rather surprises me that the Government should have so recently laid out, or estimated to lay out, very considerable sums on these ships, and should now condemn the vessels as useless; that seems to me almost a condemnation of their own policy. There are a great many of these ships that are of light draught and even now might be extremely useful for certain purposes. There are a great many places both in the East and in Africa where large ships, even large cruisers, cannot approach the shore. I shall be glad to hear whether the Admiralty calculate that they have in the ships that are left an ample number of vessels of small draught to do the duties which require to be done in places where vessels of larger draught cannot go.

There is another point. We all know that every fleet of battleships must have a certain proportion of cruisers. The efficiency and power of a fleet depend on having a sufficient number of the very best cruisers; they are the eyes of the fleet. I am not sufficiently a tactician to know whether the redistribution proposed is good. I notice that there are to be a number of affiliated squadrons of cruisers. These squadrons are to do certain peace duties and show the flag in various parts of the world. Anyone who has been at the Admiralty knows how large a demand there is for this sort of ship. The Foreign Office invariably wants ships of this sort here, there, and everywhere, and it is often with the greatest difficulty that the Admiralty can find ships commensurate with these demands. I quite believe in the policy of not having a single ship in peace which is not useful in war, but I wonder whether the Admiralty have sufficiently considered this matter. Suppose a demonstration is necessary in a certain part of the world, and suppose the cruiser squadron belonging to the Atlantic Fleet is sent on this service. Of course I shall be told that by means of telegraphs or wireless telegraphy you can immediately get back these cruisers in the event of an emergency arising, but I maintain that for the moment, while they are away, the fleet which is dependent upon them for scouting will be much weaker than it ought to be. It is possible, of course, that my fears are unnecessary, and that the great fleet of battleships will never be without these cruisers, and if the noble Earl says so then there is an answer to my question.

I quite understand the excellence of these general proposals. I hope your Lordships will not think that I am trying to get credit for the Board over which I presided, because I do not wish to do so for that more than for any other Board; but what has happened now is that the work which has been done for the last fifteen or sixteen years at the Admiralty, work begun before my time, in increasing the number of ships and of men, has enabled and required this great change in the whole policy of the distribution of the Fleet. Therefore I congratulate the noble Earl and the able Board who act with him on having taken this opportunity of revising all these arrangements. I entirely approve of the general principle on which the revision has proceeded.

I come to another point, to which I attach great importance, that of coaling stations and naval bases. We ought to have a full discussion of that subject, because the present position of those stations and bases is not a sudden creation, but is the outcome of the very able and important Report of the Royal Commission over which Lord Carnarvon presided. That Report declared that it was not merely important to secure the fighting power of the Navy, but you must also secure that all over the world there shall be coaling stations, without which the power of the Navy would remain entirely useless. I am only asking for information. The Admiralty may be perfectly right in their policy. As far as I know the great change in these stations has been made in the West Indies—at Halifax, St. Lucia, Antigua, and Jamaica. The noble Earl in one of his Papers says that the dockyards in all those places are to be reduced to a cadre. I must say that I have always objected to the use of a French word where an English word would do, and I should like to know what the word cadre means in this case. I see it means in a military sense "a staff," in a naval sense, "a cot"; it is rather, I presume, intended to mean a skeleton. But in regard to St. Lucia I am told that enormous sums have been spent in past years not in the Naval but in the Army Votes. Then again, the importance of Jamaica was dwelt upon by Lord Carnarvon's Commission as the centre of British interests in the West Indies and as being the nearest British territory to the Panama Canal. Considering the great importance and value of the Report of this Commission, we ought to know from the Admiralty why they are altering their policy in respect to coaling stations.

I am glad that the Admiralty are satisfied with regard to the number of the reserves. It is of great moment to have a sufficient number of reserve men, for that is the true way of relieving the large number required of the more costly but highly efficient body of men on the active list. I see that there is a very considerable increase on the Estimates this year for the Royal reserve of merchant cruisers. I hope the noble Earl will explain this, and it may be a condition of the contracts that a larger sum should be paid at one period than at another, but I confess that I always look with some suspicion at this Vote, for, in my opinion, though it is very important to have these greyhounds of the ocean, in war we should be able to get them always when we want them without having a very heavy charge made on the annual Vote for the Navy. In my day the sum was about £60,000, but now-a-days it has grown very much larger owing to exceptional circumstances and the contracts you have made with the great Cunard Company. Those contracts were entered into in order to secure the fastest possible ships to meet certain fast ships that might be employed in time of war in attacking our commerce. I have always felt considerable doubt whether this enormous expenditure was justified. I am told that it is justified in this way, that the sum the Government have paid will not nearly meet the cost of the ships, and that we shall get two ships that will be unrivalled in case of war.

My Lords, I thank you for having listened to me with such patience and courtesy. I feel that it is important to get the voice of the First Lord, whom I wish we might have longer in the position which he has so ably filled for the last three years. As it is, I think he is still First Lord, for I know how long it takes to carry out the formalities of a change of office; but in any case I think it is only fair that he should have an opportunity of answering some of the criticisms that I have made—made, as I hope he will think, in no hostile or Party spirit. I beg to move for Papers.

Moved, for Returns showing (1) numbers of nucleus crews at present borne in each battleship, cruiser, and torpedo vessel of the Fleet in commission and reserve; number of crew when complete for war in each ship; number of special ratings now actually borne and when complete for war. (2) Amounts actually expended in current financial year out of the amounts shown in the Navy Estimates for 1904–5 as to be expended on repairs and refits for the "Collingwood," "Pallas," and other ships since struck off the effective list.—(Earl Spencer.)

VISCOUNT GOSCHEN

My Lords, before the First Lord of the Admiralty replies it maybe convenient that I should offer what remarks I have to make on the naval situation, so that my noble friend may have the opportunity of having the last word. The noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition has asked what are the causes of the great increase in expenditure on the Navy. It is important that that Question should not only be answered in this House, but should be properly apprehended by the nation at large. I think the nation does understand, but still it may be expedient from time to time to remind the public of what it is getting for its money and of the necessity for the expenditure of that money. Why is that expenditure bound to increase? Look at the changes that have occurred in Europe during the last fifteen years; look at the changes in the balance of power; look at the new navies springing up in the Far East and in the Far West, across the Atlantic and across the Pacific; and look nearer at hand at the new naval Power in Europe itself. The two-Power standard is gone. It is no longer applicable to the state of Europe.

The noble Lord asks whether the Admiralty can state precisely what they want, and why these changes in the policy of successive Boards of Admiralty have been made. They have been largely brought about by changes in the naval policy of other countries. As long as changes continue in the balance of naval power and in the fleets of other countries it is impossible for the Admiralty to lay down any fixed standard. The noble Lord asks why it is necessary for us to maintain such a naval force as the present. I wish to be thoroughly understood. The whole situation of neutrals to the great naval Powers has changed during the last fifteen years. So long as there were a very few naval Powers, you could say that a two-Power standard was sufficient. The other Powers had such insignificant navies that, to a certain extent, they could be left out of account, in consideration of the fact that one Power, with the same number of ships as two other Powers, must have a great advantage over them in the possession of a single purpose and directing will.

But if there is one thing which has come out strongly during the course of the Boer War and during the present war, it is the fact that difficulties may arise continually with neutrals through the exercise of the usages and privileges of war. What would happen if, when we were locked in a deadly struggle with two, or perhaps three, Powers, some unfriendly neutral were to threaten to cast his sword on one side or the other, and we were not able to make such dispositions as would be sufficient to meet the threat? In calculating your naval force you must look now not simply to two Powers, and not only to the European antagonists whom you may have in direct conflict, but to the means of asserting and maintaining your attitude in regard to neutrals It is always a delicate question to discuss these matters of semi-naval and semi-foreign policy; but other Powers do it. Count von Bülow is occasionally very candid, and I do not think there can be any harm in discussing the question in the most friendly manner. When there is a Power with twelve battleships ready in commission within a few hundred miles of your coasts, that is a factor that has to be considered side by side with your preparations to meet any two Powers.

If the noble Earl returns to the Admiralty, he will be impressed with the fact that these are not times to look back to the smaller naval force that we once thought sufficient. The situation must be faced, and we must maintain as strong a Navy as the changed circumstances demand, especially having regard to the accepted attitude to the Army. The responsibility of a reduction of the Army has been undertaken, and, therefore, it is all the more necessary that the proposals made by the Admiralty should have the full support of the country and of both Parties. Another reason for the vast increase in naval expenditure is to be found in the changes which have taken place in the nature of armour and guns and ammunition and all the accessories of the Navy. Those changes make it extraordinarily difficult to lay down a standard. What is the part to be played by submarines and torpedoes, and, above all, by torpedo-boat destroyers in any naval war? The advent of the destroyer has made a considerable change in the whole situation; and the number of destroyers attached to a fleet may to a certain extent remove the necessity for so many cruisers being attached. The destroyers may be used as scouts and for considerable duties outside the primary duty.

All these circumstances have created such a change in naval warfare that ships which were excellent before are now considered nearly useless; and the Whole expenditure has to be differently distributed. A vast expense is being incurred—and rightly incurred—by having torpedo flotillas all round the coast; and great credit is due to the present Board for the attention which they have given to the less sensational item of accessories, such as hospital ships, water ships, and repairing ships. If the expenditure on the Navy were submitted to any fair-minded body of men they must say that it has been justified by the extraordinary changes that have taken place.

As to the great number of ships that have been struck off the list, I agree that the policy is a wise one; but I am not sure whether it has not been carried out in a too sensational and slap-dash manner. It is a tremendous thing to have struck off at one stroke all these ships Probably individual attention has not been given to any one ship, but they have been considered in classes. The Admiralty has determined how each class should be dealt with. I was interested in the remarks of the Prime Minister on this subject which were read to us by the noble Earl, and in the interjection of "old rubbish." Many of these ships have been fine ships in their day. The rubbish of one day has been the glory of another; and it is melancholy to reflect that vessels that have been the pride and darling of their period come to be laid on one side as useless in this way.

I think that, on the whole, the Prime Minister was rather extravagant in the statement that he made. It appears from the reckoning of the Prime Minister as if the sum of £3,500,000 had been made through administrative changes. There are two ways of effecting economies, and your Lordships will know the difficulties in each case. There is the difficulty of change in administration, of economising in administration, and the difficulty of economising in purchasing. If your Lordships look at your own household expenditure and the management of your estates with a wish to economise, you will find an extraordinary difficulty, and your stewards and bailiffs who can effect an economy deserve the greatest gratitude and consideration. But there is another way to economise which is much easier, that is to say, not to buy so many pictures or so many horses. You can do that with a stroke of the pen. So in the administration of the Navy. You can economise in two ways—by means of the dockyards, by cutting off all unnecessary expenses and seeing that there is no waste of labour, that there are not too many to do the same amount of work, and by lopping off branches Where no good results are obtained, You can say, "I will not lay down so many ships, and I will cut off so much of the shipbuilding programme." My noble friend out of £3,500,000 economised this year, obtains £2,200,000 by the simple process of cutting down the new construction of ships, and by that amount the progress and power of the country is weakened.

I do not say whether it ought to be done or not, but no credit except that of a change of policy is taken. It is not in administration; you lay down so many of your ships and you do not push forward the ships you have. Now out of £3,500,000, £2,200,000 are due to the new construction. One battleship only is to be laid down this year. I am far from holding the view of my noble friend opposite that we are too strong. If I had any doubts at all, I should be inclined to doubt whether one battleship is sufficient. I should like to know what the programmes of other nations are. There is this difference in the shipbuilding of foreign countries. They build for each other. Russia orders her ships in France and in the United States, and in the United States, at all events, they can build as quickly as we can. Though Russia has lost a certain number of ships, it is not a question of finding shipbuilding resources in her own country to replace them. She can give an order to great establishments elsewhere for the renewal of her navy. In fact, now it seems that for some Powers credit really stands where formerly you had to have docks and shipbuilding appliances to a large extent. These are questions, therefore, to be, borne in mind in the course of forming your programme. I do not say that the programme is insufficient, because my noble friend knows the progress made better than I do. But I doubt whether it is sufficient in view of the arrest of a decided and vigorous new construction of our ships.

I wish to touch on one other point. Why have the changes been made in the distribution of business at headquarters at the Admiralty? I see that this movement has given rise to a great deal of comment. In general, I think it is a pity to touch any such distribution of business and duties unless it is absolutely necessary. But I concur in the First Sea Lord having been relieved of a great deal of the detail which formerly was his share. It is a good thing to relieve him and to give him more time for the larger questions that ought mainly to occupy his mind. But all that might have been done without a change in the distribution of work. Speaking from my own experience, I can say that personally I never gave much attention to the paper distribution of duties. I have seen in offices how laborious was the care shown to set out the work in parallel columns assigning duties to this man and to that, and avoiding overlapping; but the real point of importance lies in the quality and in the temperament of the various men. It was these qualities which decided who got the work. If you have men determined to push their own views, who are more industrious, who have more ideas, you may tie them down and say that these are not their duties, but their influence will be felt in any administration. It would be a disaster if by any changes that general, common action of the Board should be in any way infringed upon. The success of the various Admiralties has been attained through co-ordination, through the various men in the administration sinking their own individualities, at all events before the public, so that their common action should represent the Board. I hope that my noble friend the First Lord of the Admiralty will carry to the new office to which he has been called all that ability, straightforwardness, and industry which have so distinguished him at the post which he is about to leave; and I say this most earnestly, not only as a friend, but as a predecessor of the noble Earl.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

My Lords, I am greatly obliged to my noble friend who has just sat down for the kindness of his concluding words. I recognise very fully the absolute truth of what the Leader of the Opposition said. He has never treated naval policy in this House as a Party question. Indeed, I have nothing but gratitude for the spirit in which the Opposition, as well as my own side of the House, have always approached naval questions since I have been First Lord; and I am sure that it is wholly for the good of the country that the Navy and naval policy should be removed absolutely from the arena of Party contention. What my noble friend who has just sat down said about the source of the reduction of three and a half millions in this year's Estimate si sabsolutely true. Two millions and a fraction are due to policy, shipbuilding policy, and the balance is to be credited to administration. The reason why there is a reduction on the Shipbuilding Vote is that, as I explained in my Memorandum, the liability at the present moment for ships now under construction is less than was the liability on the ships under construction a year ago. That means that there are so many tons less shipping at the present moment under construction than there were twelve months ago. It does not mean that we are bringing in any delay in the completion of ships now under construction. On the contrary, the whole of our efforts have been constantly to increase the rapidity of the construction both in the dockyards and in the private yards.

The noble Viscount asked whether the programme of ships to be laid down in the coming financial year, which I admit is a small one, had been drawn up with a full knowledge of the programmes of foreign Powers. Yes, that is the case. Although there are rumours, many of which have appeared in the Press, there is no information at present of a definite fresh programme not included in the Dilke Return on the part of any foreign Power—no fresh programme of battleships. I do not say that in the year that lies before us information may not accrue which is not now available, but at the present moment there is no definite information that I could give to Parliament which I could reckon as in any sense certain and accurate of a new programme on the part of other naval Powers.

The noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition asked me why has there been this great increase in naval expenditure in respect of the Fleet since 1892. I think that my noble friend the noble Viscount behind me has answered that Question. It is because the whole naval aspect of the world has changed in those years. A vast new navy has sprung up in the western hemisphere. The fleet of Japan has come into existence; the German Navy has come into existence; and the great French Navy has maintained its shipbuilding and its efficiency as heretofore. In the old days there were only two great naval Powers—France and Great Britain—while Russia and Italy were important naval Powers. Now, while Italy has stood still, Russia has become a naval Power of the greatest importance. Japan has rivalled her. Germany and America have evolved navies of equal efficiency and strength. Therefore my answer to the noble Earl is that this country has done no more than recognise facts that stare her in the face—has done no more than make prudent preparation of a defensive nature which the exigencies of the situation demand. This country has never forced the pace in shipbuilding. She has followed prudently, taking note of what other countries have done. For that reason I recognise the full wisdom of the course the noble Earl himself followed, and the noble Viscount behind me and myself, in that we have never published a programme. We always took into account what other navies were known to be doing, but we have never published our intentions more than for the one year in which Parliament was asked to vote the money. And the reason is obvious. It is not desired to give any additional stimulus to the shipbuilding of other nations.

What are the duties and functions of the Navy? I do not dispute the general accuracy of the noble Earl's quotation from the Report of Lord Carnarvon's Commission, but he will forgive me when I say that I regard that description as quite inadequate. The duty of the Navy is to preserve these shores from invasion, and not these shores only, but the shores of every portion of the British Empire. It is the British Navy and the British Navy, alone, which stands between the manhood of this country and conscription. Not only that, but you on the other side, who are so ardent in your advocacy of the principles of our present fiscal system, should never forget that the present fiscal system would be an impossibility were it not for the Navy and the maintenance of the strength of the Navy. To maintain the daily employment, the wages, the food of the population—that is the function of the Navy. It s not only to guard your shores and those of every colony and dependency in the Empire, but it is to bring the bread to the working men of this country, to bring to the loom, to the forges, to the factories, the means by which they can earn the wages to support wife and children. That, and nothing less, is the duty of the Navy.

How can anyone examine the question of expenditure from the narrow point of view of an accurate balancing of tons and men? The two-Power standard applies only to battleships. It never has applied to cruisers, for reasons which I will presently explain. And the two-Power standard never has applied to any two particular nations, but always to the two strongest naval Powers. The two strongest Powers of Lord George Hamilton's Board in 1889 were France and Italy. If you compare the margin of security which Parliament provided under the Naval Defence Act of 1889 with the margin of security we at present enjoy, the margin was greater then than now. So far am I from agreeing with the noble Earl in thinking that our margin of security in battleships is now unnecessarily large, that I entirely and emphatically dissent from that view.

I turn to the noble Viscount's eloquent picture of the state of the world as it is now, with the influence of the neutral Power ready to make itself felt if opportunity occurs. I do not advocate, I never have advocated, a three-Power standard, because I do not think the finances of this country could afford it. As I have said before, stability of finance is just as necessary for this country as the strength and efficiency of her Fleet. You have to balance one against the other. But the spirit of the two-Power standard is not equality. The object is to win. It is reasonable security of victory in a contest with other Powers. The noble Earl is in entire concurrence with me that the two-Power standard never applied to cruisers.

*EARL SPENCER

I certainly considered that the two-Power standard applied chiefly to battleships, but also took cruisers into account; but I have always maintained that we must have a much larger number of cruisers than any two other Powers.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

There is no difference between the noble Earl and myself. The duties of cruisers are two-fold. They have to act as the eyes and ears of the battle fleet and also to protect our trade. Now I can only say in that respect that I am more anxious on the subject of cruisers than I am on the subject of battleships. Considering what does depend on the commerce of this country, considering all that is at stake, and the number of powerful ships that might prey on our commerce, and the enormous area of the ocean routes, the difficulties of finding a cruiser that has got at large and is preying on our commerce, I do not think we have any too many fast modern armoured cruisers, and I should be very sorry if any succeeding Board of Admiralty in any way slackened off in their supply to the Navy of those ships.

Now, with respect to the list of ships headed "vessels struck off the effective list and vessels not struck off," I have always objected to that heading. It does not represent the opinion of the Board of Admiralty. I have no responsibility for it. The Return was moved for in the House of Commons, and, therefore, it has to stand in the form in which it is; but it does not represent the facts of the case. Hitherto there have been only two classes of ships in the Navy, the fighting fleet and the non-effective fleet.

*EARL SPENCER

Surely there are reserve ships, which are not in the first fighting line.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

These are all included. Roughly, there are only two classes of ships, the ships in the fighting line and those not in the fighting line. Though the first class are not all going to be used immediately a state of war is declared, they are all effective fighting ships. Now as long as a ship was classified under the fighting fleet the obvious duty of the Controller was to keep her absolutely repaired. He could not tell when war was going to take place. It might take place within the next few months, and then he would be responsible if that ship was not in effective fighting order. The consequence was—I freely admit it—that considerable sums were spent on ships that shortly afterwards were put on the sale list. Now one of the reasons, though not the only reason, for the reclassification of ships has been, from the point of view of economy, to establish an intermediate class of ships that are still combatant ships, but which are approaching the time when they will be struck off the effective fighting list. On that middle class it has been decided not to spend money in repairs; so that in future it will be impossible to find ships on the sale list upon which a few years before a large sum of money has been spent. But it must not be implied that these ships of the middle class are of no use. On the contrary, these ships would be employed to supply the waste in war. If war were to break out they would not be immediately manned, but they would be brought to the dockyards near which they lie for the necessary repairs, and they would come in to supply the waste in war. They are by no means rubbish. If you turn to the experiences of Japan and Russia in the present war, you will find that they both found use for almost every conceivable class of ship, not, of course, in the fighting line, but for the many subsidiary purposes of the fleet. These ships with which I am dealing would be available for these purposes in time of war, and would be used for these purposes.

*EARL SPENCER

I did not say the ships of the llama class were rubbish. The ships that are rubbish are, of course, those that are about to be sold.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

It is quite true that among those which have been sold will be found ships on which money has been spent in repairs recently, and it is to avoid that expenditure in the future that this intermediate class has been established. But I would ask the noble Earl to remember that the "Medea," on which a considerable sum of money was spent, was used for the Boiler Committee's experiments, and that another of the vessels referred to was specially fitted as a tender to one of the gunnery schools, and has done a great volume of work during the three years she has been employed in that capacity. Therefore that expenditure has all been fruitful. As to the Return for which the noble Earl asks, perhaps he is not aware that an almost similar Return has been granted in the House of Commons, which will be published in a day or two. I would ask him not to press this Motion now, but when he sees that Return to tell me or my successor whether there is any fresh information which he desires, and I am sure that, with one exception, the Admiralty will be glad to meet his views. The one exception is that we have never given the exact complement of ships, and we do not desire to do so now.

I have been asked whether in the new distribution of the Fleet enough ships have been left to do the work of Imperial police and to go into shallow waters. I hope so, and I think so. I think that n this matter we have hi herto been most extravagant. The demands of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office have been very constant. Many of their calls have been quite inevitable; but I cannot but think that not all of them would have been made if ships were not known to be at the disposal of the Ministers and Consuls concerned. Still, there is an amount of Imperial policing that must be done. It is of two kinds—first work by small craft to go up rivers, and secondly work by big cruisers displaying the flag either in the King's dominions or at some foreign port. As regards small craft I think we have left sufficient for the work they are called upon to do; but, as to that, experience will show.

As to the cruiser squadrons, they will undoubtedly, besides working with the battle fleets with which they are affiliated, be used to show the flag on the coasts of the American Continent and elsewhere. But I do not think our policy is open to the strictures of the noble Earl. He asks whether we do not run a serious risk in parting, even for a few weeks, the cruisers from the battleship fleet with which they would work in time of war. Of course, these two fleets will not be parted if the political horizon is not clear. But consider how easy it is to recall them, and how fast they can move. Under the present circumstances I would never say that it is not possible to separate the cruisers from the battleships with which they work. I am one of those who believe that a great war is not going to drop from the sky on a day when there is no diplomatic cloud on the horizon, and when our relations with all the Powers are of the most friendly nature, when there is no question of any sort or kind agitating the Foreign Office. To say that a cruiser squadron should not be sent across the Atlantic for a few weeks is a doctrine to which I am not prepared to subscribe.

The noble Viscount behind me asks me two Questions. He asks, Cannot destroyers be used for cruisers' work, and have they not been so used by Japan in the present war? I am not a naval officer. My opinion is, of course, but that of a civilian who takes a great interest in these matters and has had some experience, and as such I have no hesitation in expressing the view that a destroyer could never be employed to do the work of a cruiser. The functions of a destroyer are totally different from the functions of a cruiser, and I do not think it can be shown that the Japanese have ever employed a destroyer to perform the proper work of a cruiser. The reason why destroyers have loomed so large in the present war is that the struggle has taken place round a port in which there was a fleet in being that might emerge at any moment, supporting itself by a formidable torpedo flotilla, and that there was away, within a not too distant area, another fleet in being that was anxious for the first news of the movement of the other fleet in Port Arthur, and had cruisers outside Port Arthur waiting to convey that news. The part which the Japanese destroyers played was not that of cruisers, but that of guarding their own cruisers from the Russian torpedoes while watching for the Russian fleet in Port Arthur; and as that protection had to be constant week by week it frequently happened that duels occurred between Russian torpedo craft emerging from Port Arthur and the Japanese destroyers which were guarding their own cruisers.

The noble Earl opposite asks whether this change has not been made in a sudden and theatrical manner. I admit that it was done quickly, and that it may have the aspect which the noble Earl ascribes to it. But surely, once the policy was decided on by the Board of Admiralty, it was my duty to give the Chancellor of the Exchequer the fullest benefit he could get from it; for, if the change had been delayed or spread over a longer period, then so much money would have been spent which otherwise could have been saved. Therefore, my object was to do the thing at once and save as much money as I could in the process. The noble Lord criticises my use of the word "cadres," in referring to coaling stations in my Statement. If I had known that he had any objection to that word, I certainly would have chosen another. I innocently slipped into this word, which, of course, is commonly employed in military treatises. But what I meant was that we did not propose to use the dockyards at Halifax, Esquimault, and Jamaica for the repair of vessels in time of peace; but that if war broke out we could at once send out the necessary men and machinery to bring these dockyards into full operation.

Now, as regards policy. The Carnarvon Commission on Coaling Stations was a very important one, but since that Commission the whole naval situation in the West Indies has been completely revolutionised. What is the change? It is one of the most marvellous changes that has taken place in modern history. It is the rise of the American Navy. When the Carnarvon Commission sat that navy had a great history, but it was a very small and feeble navy judged by the number of its ships and men. Now those of you who have read the very striking articles of Sir William White in The Times describing his journey through the United States will remember his descriptions of what he witnessed in the dockyards on the Atlantic and Pacific seaboard. I think he enumerated sixteen armoured cruisers and thirteen battleships on the stocks in the United States. In addition there is the magnificent navy afloat. Your Lordships would be amazed at the preparations made for the navy in the future. A deputation from the Board went over last September to see a famous American naval college. They were received with the utmost courtesy, hospitality and cordiality, and were shown everything. If your Lordships went down to Dartmouth or Osborne perhaps those who are of an economical turn of mind might think that the Board of Admiralty had been ratter extravagant in the naval colleges they have provided. Those two colleges together will, if my memory serves, have cost about £600,000. But what do you think the Congress of the United States have appropriated for a naval college? Over 11,000,000 dollars; and the place is almost one of the wonders of the world. There is princely accommodation for the education of as many naval cadets as we are going to have as our maximum. That is the change that has taken place since the Carnarvon Commission reported.

Then the noble Earl asked me why there was an increase in the amount inserted for merchant cruisers in the current Estimates. I was surprised to see it myself, and I asked the Financial Secretary, who reminded me that this year the old contract runs out and the new contract begins, and that there is overlapping payment—almost a double payment in one year. Then I come to a very important matter which I am grateful to my noble friend for mentioning, because it has been mentioned in the other House and alluded to in the Press—that is, the changes which have been made in the distribution of business at the Admiralty. I have never been more surprised during the course of my term of office at the Admiralty than I was at the meaning which has been read in some quarters into these changes. For these changes I, and I alone, am responsible. I use the word "I" advisedly, because this distribution of business is by Orders of Council the special responsibility of the First Lord. The subject is one in which I have taken great interest, and my opinions during the years that I have been First Lord bad been very clearly forming themselves as to the distribution of business which was to be aimed at.

So far from my object being to make the First Sea Lord anything approximating to the old Commander-in-Chief in the Army, exactly the contrary was my intention. He had certain executive functions. I desired to relieve him of those executive functions. I desired to make him responsible for advising the First Lord on literally nothing else than naval policy. That is my object. I will remind your Lordships of two functions of which I am responsible for relieving the First Sea Lord. The First Sea Lord was responsible for discipline. Can anything be more important as a, mark of the Commander-in-Chief than to be responsible for discipline? I have taken that function from the First Sea Lord. The First Sea Lord was responsible for the appointment of commanders. I have relieved him of that. The reason was not that I distrusted him, but that I wanted to reserve him entirely for advising the First Lord on the preparation for war, all large questions of naval policy and maritime war, as to the fighting and sea-going efficiency of the Fleet, its organisation and mobilisation, and the distribution and movements of all ships in commission. With that also went the control of the Intelligence, Hydrographical, and Naval Ordnance Departments. What is the genesis of this? My opinions had been formulating themselves in the way I have explained. I did not want to introduce the change while Lord Walter Kerr was the First Sea Lord, because it is rather difficult to ask a man who has been accustomed to work one system and to perform certain duties to consent to a change and to give up some of those duties during his tenure of office. Therefore I said I would make the change when the change took place in the First Sea Lord; and it was made the moment Sir John Fisher succeeded Lord Walter Kerr.

VISCOUNT GOSCHEN

Has this change been in operation from the time Sir John Fisher entered the Admiralty?

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

Yes.

VISCOUNT GOSCHEN

I understood that the change was only just recently made.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

The changes were made absolutely on the day Sir John Fisher came to the Admiralty, but one other very small change was made the other day, and so a fresh Order became necessary. My attention has been drawn to the note at the end of the Statement issued regarding the distribution of business. The note says— It is to be understood that in any matter of great importance the First Sea Lord is always to be consulted by the other Sea Lords, the Civil Lord, and the Parliamentary or Permanent Secretary, and he will refer to the First Lord for any further action considered necessary, such as, for instance, bringing the matter formally before the Board. It is, of course, understood that all members of the Board will communicate direct with the First Lord, in accordance with immemorial custom, whenever they wish to do so. It never occurred to me that anybody would object to that note. It was not intended to introduce any new procedure into the Board of Admiralty, but to describe exactly what always has gone on at the Board of Admiralty. I go further and say that unless that went on the Board of Admiralty could not do its work. How is it possible for the First Sea Lord to advise on questions of policy unless his colleagues, with their separate responsibilities, are in constant friendly communication with him? It is the way the work is always done. How is the Fourth Sea Lord to provide for the proper coaling of the Fleet unless he knows what policy is in the mind of the First Sea Lord as to the distribution of the Fleet? How can the Civil Lord see that proper barracks, docks, and other buildings are provided unless he is kept constantly in touch with the First Sea Lord in respect of any possible changes of policy? All this note is meant to indicate is that what has always been done should be done, and that on all questions of great importance—and the word "great" is used very advisedly—there should be constant communication and conference between the Sea Lords.

Then it is supposed that when I say that the First Sea Lord will refer to the First Lord for further action considered necessary that that is as much as to say that the question cannot be brought forward before the Board by the First Lord unless with the concurrence of the First Sea Lord. Nothing could be further from the fact. It has always been possible for any member of the Board to bring any subject absolutely independently before the First Lord, and I go further and say that any member of the Board has a right to claim that any question he chooses shall, with the concurrence of the First Lord, be brought before the Board formally for settlement. Until I saw the public comments it never occurred to anybody inside the Board of Admiralty that this described anything but the constant, immemorial, necessary usage. If there is a difference of opinion between the Sea Lords it is the First Sea Lord naturally who will bring the matter to the First Lord. There never was a First Sea Lord more steeped in the traditions of the Admiralty as to the Navy than Lord Walter Kerr; there never was a First Sea Lord more conscious of his responsibility for maintaining the full rights of the Board; there never was a First Sea Lord less likely to try and impair the authority of his colleagues or to fail in respect for their separate and independent position. If there was a difference of opinion between the Sea Lords which could be settled, they always went to Lord Walter Kerr, who came to me and said, "This point we are obliged to refer to you." Therefore this note does nothing more than indicate what has always been the custom.

In conclusion, I wish to say that if the Board have been able in the last year or two to advance the efficiency of the Navy, as has been so generously admitted by Lord Spencer and Lord Goschen, it is only because of the work of the Boards that preceded them under Lord Goschen, Lord Spencer, and Lord George Hamilton. The whole has been one long process of evolution. Every point of our policy has its starting-point in the work of Lord Goschen, Lord Spencer, or Lord George Hamilton, and I hope it will always be so. The Board have always worked as a Board and never as individuals, and I hope that it will remember that its great reputation in the country and with the services rests on the fact of that complete cohesion and loyalty of each member to the rest of the Board, and on the fact that there never has been, as there never ought to be, a revolution in naval administration. We have had one continual development and change from the days of Nelson to the present day, and as long as that remains true the Board of Admiralty will deserve the confidence of the country.

Motion, by leave of the House, withdrawn.

House adjourned at half-past Seven o'clock, to Thursday next, half-past Ten o'clock.