§ LORD NEWTONrose to call attention to the correspondence recently presented to Parliament relating to East India (Afghanistan). He said: My Lords, in drawing attention to this Parliamentary Paper, I need hardly observe that it is much more remarkable for what it does not contain than for its actual contents. The only item of novel intelligence which I have personally been able to gather from it is that the Amir of Afghanistan has advanced or been advanced from the rank of Highness to that of Majesty—a fact which possibly may be of some importance and which will no doubt be dealt with by my noble friend the Under-Secretary of State for India when he replies to me.
It is quite unnecessary for me on this occasion to enter into the question of our past relations with Afganistan, but I may briefly observe that, as everybody knows, the relations between the Indian Government and Afganistan were in what I may 547 call an extremely unsettled condition until July,1880, in which month a letter was sent to the Amir from Sir Lepel Griffin in which it was declared that if any foreign Power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of the Amir, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid His Highness to such extent and in such manner as might appear to the British Government necessary in repelling it, provided that the Amir followed unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations. This was followed by a letter from the then Viceroy, the noble Marquess on the Front Bench opposite (the Marquess of Ripon), dated June 16th, 1883, in which this assurance was repeated and an undertaking given that a yearly subsidy of twelve lakhs of rupees should be paid to the Amir for the purpose of improving the defences and reorganising his north-western frontier.
As long as the late ruler, Amir Abdur Rahman was alive, the conditions laid down by the Indian Government were complied with. He accepted rectification of frontier at our instigation, although it involved a loss of territory to himself; and in November, 1893, an agreement was entered into with him by the British Government, The assurance of assistance was repeated, the pledge was renewed, and in order, to use the words of the despatch, "to mark our sense of the friendly spirit manifested by the Amir" the annual subsidy was raised to eighteen lakhs of rupees annually—equal, roughly, to £120,000 a year—and the importation of arms into Afghanistan was permitted without, so far as I know, any restrictions. We now know from the Paper which has just been presented to Parliament that the result of the Mission is the reaffirmation of this old agreement of 1893. It is perfectly obvious that this agreement must be read and interpreted in accordance with the very important statements which have been recently made by the Prime Minister in this country. On January 13th of this year the Prime Minister, speaking in Scotland, said that the problem of the Army was the problem of the defence of Afghanistan—not the defence of 548 India, which is a very different thing, but the defence of Afghanistan; and quite recently he has made other most important speeches upon the subject, the effect of which partically is that any attempt on the part of Russia or any other foreign Power to violate the integrity of Afghanistan or to insist upon railways will be treated by us as practically a casus belli.
There is nothing which I personally detest so much as Jingoism, and especially irresponsible Jingoism, and I think that much benefit is derived from a clear pronouncement as to what you intend to do; and I will go so far as to say that I believe many of the foreign difficulties in which we have found ourselves involved in recent years have been due to the lack of such definite announcements. I take for instance, the announcement of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs upon the question of the Persian Gulf; that announcement could only be beneficial in its nature. But at the same time, whilst everybody probably approves of the definite declaration which has been made by the Prime Minister with regard to the exercise of foreign influence in Afghanistan, I am bound to say, personally, that I am, at the present moment at all events, unable to see how we are going to carry out our pledge to maintain the integrity of Afghanistan under the present arrangements, by which, as the House knows, we have undertaken not to interfere in any way with the internal administration of that country.
I think it is fairly obvious that what might have been, and doubtless was, perfectly satisfactory in 1893 can hardly be regarded as equally satisfactory in 1905, In 1893 the Amir Abdur Rahman was still alive. He was an instance of a highly intelligent and absolutely despotic Oriental, who did precisely what he chose in his own country and had very clear intuition as to where his interests lay. But I need hardly point out that the situation at the present day is totally different from what it was in 1893. The Russians have now got two strategic lines of railway which would enable them to bring practically unlimited numbers of troops whenever they please to the actual frontier of 549 Afghanistan. The danger in fact is admitted by the Prime Minister to be no longer a visionary one but a real one, and he made the statement which I have quoted in support of it.
The situation has not only altered in regard to the change in the Russian dispositions and in regard to the Russian forward movement; the situation is not the same in regard to Afghanistan as it was in 1893. Everybody knows that during recent years and since the death of the late Amir the relations between Afghanistan and the Indian Government have been far from satisfactory, and I do not think that people in this country in the least realise what I may term, without exaggeration, the extremely humiliating position in which we are placed in regard to Afghanistan. Nominally, Afghanistan is a friendly and protected State. Actually, while the Afghans are ready to take our money and while they count implicitly on our assistance, they practically claim to be an absolutely independent nation, and at the same time they do not treat us as a friendly Power, unless appearances are entirely fallacious, but as a hostile Power. Look at the actual facts of the case. Whereas we allow absolute and unrestricted liberty to the inhabitants of Afghanistan to do what they like; where as we allow them to enter our country, to trade in it and do practically whatever they please, Afghanistan is a sealed country so far as the British Empire is concerned. No Englishman, or, so far as that goes, no European, is allowed inside the country. If you stand on the wrong side of the frontier you are liable to be shot down like a dog. They, as everybody knows, will not allow us to maintain a Resident or representative in the country. I believe I am correct in saying that no British-Indian subject is ever allowed to enter the country, or, if he does enter it with a caravan or in that kind of way, he does so at his own risk. They place every obstacle in the way of trade; they maintain military posts along their frontier as if we were contemplating an invasion of their country, and they even carry ill-feeling so far as to forbid any inhabitants of Afghanistan to use our railway which runs up to the Afghan frontier.
550 In view of this state of things it is not very surprising, as I say, that relations between the Indian Government and the Afghan Government have not been particularly satisfactory, that the Indian Government found it necessary to suspend permission for the importation of arms, and that the payment of the annual subsidy became a matter of contention; and it was clearly in order to remedy this state of things that a Mission was sent to Kabul in the autumn. The Amir replied by sending his son to Calcutta, and as I observed a tendency to attach exaggerated importance to this Mission, perhaps it would be as well to explain that the Amir's son is a youth of sixteen and that it was obviously only a Mission of a purely complimentary and ceremonial character. The net result of the Mission to Kabul, which, of course, was the real Mission, is this—that we continue to pay the increased subsidy of eighteen lakhs of rupees, and we are, I understand, going to pay up the arrears, which amount to something like £400,000; yet, in spite of these concessions on our part, we have obtained no better terms than we obtained in 1893.
I would like noble Lords to consider seriously what this agreement really comes to. It really pledges us, in the event of hostilities breaking out between the Afghans and a foreign Power—which, of course, can only be Russia—to assist the Afghans in repelling such an attack and in recovering for them any such territory as may be annexed by the foreign Power; and I am afraid that the dangers of such an occurrence are considerable. The moral effect of the war in the Far East is felt, it is no exaggeration to say, all over the East. The Afghans are, unfortunately, an ignorant people, and, like other semi-civilised races, it is highly probable they are imbued with the idea that they are quite capable of fighting the Russians with a fair prospect of success. If the agreement means anything at all, I contend it means that we are bound to go to the assistance of these people and to recover for them any territory which they may have lost. It may be contended that we are protected by the wording of the treaty, because the treaty says that we shall undertake to help them by such means as shall appear 551 proper to us; but I cannot believe for a single moment that there can be any other interpretation placed upon it by the Afghans than this. They must interpret it in the sense that we are bound to go actively to their assistance and fight for the recovery of their territory. It certainly would be no consolation, or a very poor consolation, to the Afghans to be told, supposing they are invaded by Russia, "Oh we should like to help you very much. It is, however, not convenient to send an army to your frontier, but we are about to engage in bombarding Kronstadt, Odessa, or some other place which may be convenient to us." I confess it appears to me that, in honour, we seem bound to carry out this agreement in the sense in which it must be interpreted by the Afghans themselves.
Here I would like to ask anybody who has bestowed a moment's thought on this question, how we can do it. In the first place, with our somewhat antiquated military system we have not got the men to wage a long war with the Russians in Central Asia, and, in the second place, under this agreement we cannot get our forces to the Russian frontier of Afghanistan without enormous difficulty. If one country undertakes to protect another it has a clear right to insist that that duty shall be rendered as easy as possible, and it is clearly our right and our interest that the condition of Afghanistan should be made as sound as is possible under the circumstances. We are, therefore, clearly entitled to have a representative in the country in order that we may be informed as to what goes on there. Our knowledge of Afghanistan is of the very vaguest character. We really know very little about the condition of the country, and we are extremely ignorant of a great part of the physical characteristics of that country. The unknown parts of it ought to be surveyed. As I have said, we know very little about the physical characteristics of the country, and a great authority on Indian frontier questions states in an important work on this subject that it is probable that the roads and passes of Afghanistan were better known to the Macedonians in the year 335 B.C. than to the English 552 Intelligence Department in the year 1900.
If we are going to their assistance with our armies, clearly we ought to be allowed to send British officers to reorganise the Afghan forces, which, by the way, are greatly overestimated in this country. We ought to be allowed to have telegraphic communication with the principal towns; and, finally, it is,. I think, clear that we ought to be allowed to prolong the existing railways to such strategic points as may be considered desirable. The fact that we have vetoed the construction of Russian railways in Afghanistan is absolutely no reason whatever why we should place any self-denying ordinance upon ourselves in regard to this matter. As a matter of fact, we have two main railways leading straight to Afghanistan, but both of them terminate in the air. For a long time we have been preparing for the extension of the railway to Kandahar, and the material for that extension has been lying ready to be used for several years past. I do not know that these are extravagant provisions to put forward, but they are, in my opinion, only the minimum of what we have a right to expect in view of the undertaking we have entered into.
Personally, I can hardly bring myself to believe that the Indian Government would have consented to the despatch of this Mission had they known that nothing more would have come of it than the mere reaffirmation of the agreement of 1893. I presume from the fact, which I observed in the papers this morning, that the members of this Mission have been decorated, that the Home Government are satisfied with the result of the Mission. But I confess that I should much like to know what is the opinion of the Indian Government upon that result, and it would be extremely interesting if my noble friend would enlighten us upon this particular point. That is practically all I have to say on the subject, but I cannot conclude without making this observation, that I do not think we can fall into any greater error than to assume that, because the Russian schemes have met with a severe check in the Far East, therefore Russian activity in the Middle 553 East and the Near East will be paralysed. I do not believe that this is an assumption which will hold water for one single moment, and if I am told, as I possibly may be, that I have committed a foolish or indiscreet action in raising this subject, my reply is that you cannot dispose of difficulties by ignoring them, or by keeping silence about them. I trust, therefore, that my noble friend will give the House a full statement upon this subject.
§ THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (The Marquess of BATH)My Lords, my noble friend has given your Lordships a description of what I understand he would have recommended should have been the policy of His Majesty's Government in dealing with the new ruler of Afghanistan. I may, perhaps, be permitted to congratulate my noble friend on his return from that portion of the would and on the interest which he has shown in our affairs there. The noble Lord dealt with a large number of questions, and I trust that your Lordships will excuse me if I am unable to follow him absolutely in every detail, or entirely to satisfy his curiosity. The first matter that my noble friend alluded to was the title at the heading of the treaty, where the Amir is described as "His Majesty." It has always been the recognised custom in our correspondence and treaties with Afghanistan to use the Persian language; and this treaty is a literal translation of the Persian text. I do not know whether any great importance is to be attached to this subject; after all, the Amir is the ruler of his own country—it is in its internal affairs an independent nation—and he is, I take it, entitled to assume the title of "His Majesty" if he is so inclined.
Then my noble friend said that this Parliamentary Paper is remarkable not so much for what it contains as for what it does not contain. I do not know to what my noble friend refers, but I would venture, as he has raised the subject, to assure your Lordships that His Majesty's Government have placed before the House all the Papers that they felt they were justified in laying with due regard to the public interest. It was, as your Lordships will, I trust, recognise, impossible to publish the whole of the correspond- 554 ence, and a garbled version would certainly have been most inadvisable. My noble friend has attacked the treaty because it is, as I informed the noble Lord opposite earlier in the session, a continuance of the previous arrangement with the late Amir; and he asks how we are going to carry out our pledge to defend Afghanistan while we do not interfere with its internal administration. I may remind your Lordships, as is shown in the Papers which have been presented to the House, that there were distinct undertakings which were given to the late ruler of that country that we had no intention of interfering with the internal affairs of his dominions, and that we had no desire to establish a British Resident at Kabul. We expressed our desire, however, which was afterwards carried out, to have a Mohammedan Agent at that place; and this country has throughout consistently adopted the policy which was then foreshadowed, and there has never been any serious attempt to establish a British Resident in that country.
I do not know what my noble friend suggests should have been done had the ruler of Afghanistan objected to the proposals which he has just now placed before the House. Sir Louis Dane was despatched on this Mission, not with the intention of holding a pistol to the head of the Amir, but with instructions to enter into a friendly conference with him and to obtain an amicable settlement with regard to the Amir's relations with us. In these negotiations the hand of our Envoy was not tied as to details. My noble friend says that since 1893 the situation has changed. It is perfectly true that two lines of railway have been prolonged nearer to the Russian frontier than they were before, but our policy remains the same—the policy enunciated the other day by the Prime Minister in another place, that we cannot permit the extension of these railways into the territory of the Afghan nation, and so far as the position is concerned I venture to say that it is exactly the same as it has always been. My noble friend, with the experience he must have had in his recent travels, cannot fail to realise that the attitude and feelings of the Afghan, nation are of a very suspicious nature. 555 He says that they are semi-civilised and ignorant.
§ LORD NEWTONHear, hear!
§ THE MARQUESS OF BATHBut, after all, the policy of the rulers of Afghanistan has for many years been to preserve their country as an independent nation, and further, as an unmodernised one. I do not know whether that fact makes them absolutely uncivilized—I should have said that they had a civilisation of their own. I believe that if we continue the policy, which we have now pursued for many years, of cultivating friendly relations with that country, without forcing our attentions too prominently on them, we shall attain the ends we have in view, and shall have the best guarantee for peace and quiet in that portion of our Empire, which is, after all, our principal object.
My noble friend criticised the action of the Government with regard to the Mission, and was pleased to throw some ridicule upon the simultaneous despatch of the Amir's son to India. The Amir's son, it is true, is a young man, but I do not know that that is a reason for minimising the effects of his visit to India. The result, I believe, of the reception which he received at the hands of the Viceroy was to convince his father that the intentions of this country and of the Indian Government were purely amicable and friendly. I have no doubt that the result of the visit of the Sirdar was to expedite and assist the negotiations which Sir Louis Dane was carrying on at the same time at Kabul.
My noble friend asks me whether the Government of India approved of this treaty. I believe that the Indian Government expected to obtain, and perhaps rightly, larger arrangements on more points from the Amir than have been actually obtained. But, after the careful negotiations and discussions which passed between the two Governments, His Majesty's Government were satisfied, as, indeed, previous Indian Viceroys, I believe, were satisfied, that the arrangement which has now been 556 made was a good and sufficient one, and that decision the Government of India have accepted. My noble friend threw some doubt upon the value of this Mission if its only object was to obtain a renewal of these engagements with the late Amir. I may, perhaps, be permitted to remind him that the methods of diplomacy in Central Asia do not exactly correspond with the established practice among European Powers, and it was felt that it was judicious and advisable to obtain a solemn and formal renewal and ratification of the arrangements made with the late Amir in 1893, so that his successor should be not merely bound by the fact of his succession, but also by his personal undertaking.
I venture to point out that there is another advantage accruing from the despatch of this Mission and from the renewal or ratification of the treaty formerly made with Amir Abdur Rahman. By this solemn renewal the Afghan nation and the border tribes are publicly and formally assured that, although the personality of the Afghan ruler has changed, there has been no difference in the policy of the Indian Government, and that our pledge to protect the Afghan nation remains the same so long as the conditions under which that pledge was given remain unchanged. We are also enabled once more to convince the Amir of our will and our power to protect him, and of our determination to allow the interference of no foreign Power in his internal affairs while he is content to follow our advice in that respect. The Amir, as I have already said, is determined to carry on the policy of his predecessor, and he has shown the utmost willingness, as part of that policy, to accept the engagements which more than twenty years experience has shown make for rest and peace in those regions, and which, in our opinion, have fully carried out their purpose. We attach great importance to this treaty, but I doubt myself whether even greater importance is not to be attached to the friendly disposition which the Amir has evinced during the progress ofour negotiations; and, after all, the grand result of this policy is the continuity of the relations, the obligations, the associations, and the good will between the two countries.
§ THE MARQUESS OF RIPONMy Lords, as I was at the head of the Government in India at the time when the arrangements of 1880 were entered into with Amir Abdur Rahman, your Lordships will, I am sure, permit me to take part in this discussion. You will not imagine that I rise for the purpose of criticising the conclusion at which His Majesty's Government have come. That conclusion is, as has been stated by the noble Lord who has just sat down, the renewal of the policy which was adopted in India in 1880. When the noble Lord who opened this discussion speaks as if the Government had effected nothing in getting the present Amir to agree to a treaty confirming the arrangements made with his father I think he overlooks the fact that those arrangements were strictly personal to Amir Abdur Rahman. Upon his death they ceased altogether to have effect. We were no longer bound by them. The new ruler, Amir Habibulla, was not bound by them; and it is not a small success to have induced the Amir to re-enter into those arrangements with us into which his father before him had entered. Those arrangements are set out plainly, I think, in the document which embodied the Agreement of 1880.
It is not altogether surprising that the noble Lord or others may find it not very easy to follow the meaning of the new treaty, because it is couched in Oriental phraseology to a much greater extent than any similar document that I, at this moment, recollect; but I do not think there can be any doubt as to the meaning of the treaty, which is all with which we need concern ourselves, and that it does mean that the present Amir binds himself on his part and we bind ourselves on our part to be guided in our mutual relations by the arrangements made in 1880 and in 1893. It seems to me that that is the true position which we ought to hold. The noble Lord who opened the debate is very anxious—at least so I understood him, though perhaps some of his language about the Afghans was not quite so considerate as it might have been—that we should be upon the best terms and maintain close and intimate friendship with the present Amir. The best way 558 of doing that is not to follow the advice of the noble Lord, and interfere with the internal affairs of Afghanistan, but to enter, as His Majesty's Government, as I understand it, have entered, into a clear understanding with the Amir that we do not admit the right of any foreign Power to interfere in Afghanistan, and that, if he should be attacked by any foreign Power, or should get into any quarrel with any foreign Power, we should be prepared to help him so long as he was guided in his management of foreign affairs by our advice. These were the operative conditions of the arrangement of 1880, and they are repeated in the present treaty. I believe they are the most solid foundation of friendship with the Afghan nation, and I believe that that friendship will always be of great value to this country.
The noble Lord called the Afghan State a protected State. If he used the word in the technical sense in which it would be used in India, I do not think it is a protected State; it is an allied State under our direct influence, but I do not think it is correct to call it a protected State. The noble Lord desires to see railways made by us in Afghanistan, to see the old and fatal experiment of having an European British Resident at Kabul, and to see British officers sent to drill the Afghan troops. All those things we know, by long and bitter experience, are resented by the Afghan people; and I have long held, and hold now, that to attempt a policy of that description would be, not to make friends of the Afghan people, but to involve ourselves in great difficulties; to irritate them, to set them against us, to incline them to look elsewhere for aid, and to bring about a state of things such as that which existed in the year 1879 between the Government of India and the then ruler of Afghanistan. I think the policy of His Majesty's Government in this respect is quite right, and is founded upon sound principles.
I confess it was to me a very great relief when I learnt some time ago, from a statement by the noble Marquess the Under-Secretary of State for India, that the result of Sir Louis Dane's Mission to Kabul had been to renew with the present Amir the treaties and engagements 559 which had been made with his predecessor. I think it is right that the money which was held back for a time in consequence of difficulties which arose, should be paid over to the Amir, and if you are to regard him as your friend you cannot refuse him the right to have such arms as he may require, and as, indeed, we promised would be granted to him. Therefore, I have no criticism to make upon the new treaty, as I understand it, I should like some information, however, if it is convenient to give it, in regard to the question of the subsidy—namely, whether the amount of the annual subsidy remains as it was fixed, I think, by Lord Dufferin—it was increased after my time—or possibly by my noble friend opposite (the Marquess of Lansdowne, or whether it has been now further increased. The noble Lord took some objection to the Amir being described, or rather I should say describing himself, for that is what it is, as King of Afghanistan. That title is not without precedent. A treaty was made with Afghanistan as far back as 1809 in which the ruler of that country was called King of the Douranees, and we called Shah Sujah, the puppet whom we set up in 1839–40, "Your Majesty," and, although I was a little startled myself when I saw that title, as it is not without precedent it would be unwise, I think, to refuse it now, if the Amir desires it.
There is another Question I should like to address to His Majesty's Government—namely, is this treaty to be regarded, like the engagement which was made with the late Amir Abdur Rahman, as personal to Amir Habibulla himself? As I have said, the language of the treaty is Oriental and not quite clear to me. I hope, however, that this is the case. I think it would be unwise to go beyond that. We all know what difficult questions in respect to the succession to the throne of Afghanistan have from time to time arisen, and I do not think it would be wise, and I hope it has not been done, that we should bind ourselves any further than the life of the present Amir. The making of this engagement in itself proves that treaties of this kind can be renewed, if friendly feelings are maintained, and it is wise, therefore, that we should not be called upon prematurely to deal with 560 dynastic questions such as have arisen from time to time on the death of the ruler of Afghanistan. I do not ask His Majesty's Government to give us any further information than is contained in this Paper. I have no doubt that many negotiations went on. I believe Sir, Louis Dane was for a period of something like four months at Kabul, and no doubt he had many interviews with the Amir and discussed many questions with him. I do not think it would be wise, in dealing with delicate questions of this kind, to give the public such conversations as those. Dealing with Oriental potentates is a very delicate matter. Our true object is to keep friends with the ruler of Afghanistan. Do not ask him to give you that which past history shows he cannot and will not give, but place reliance in the friendship which was shown to us by the late Amir, and which, if I remember rightly, he laid down as one of the principal objects in the policy of his son.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of LANSDOWNE)My Lords, I agree so closely with the remarks which have just fallen from the noble Marquess opposite that it is scarcely necessary for me to prolong this debate. I add a few words to what has already been said, partly because, like the noble Marquess opposite, these questions have a peculiar and personal interest for me, and partly because he interrogated me upon one or two points as to which I desire to give him an answer. Let me say, in the first place, how entirely I differ from my noble friend Lord Newton in regarding Sir Louis Dane's Mission to Kabul as having been, as he represented it, entirely, or almost entirely, abortive. That Mission achieved the main object with which it was sent to Kabul, that object being to induce the new Amir of Afghanistan to renew the agreements which had subsisted for so long between his predecessor and the British Government. These agreements have been renwed. They have been reaffirmed in the shape of a much more formal contract than any into which, previous Amirs have entered, and that contract is, I am able to say, in reply to the noble Marquess, personal and not dynastic in its character.
561 The noble Marquess was, perhaps not unnaturally, a little puzzled by the phraseology of the treaty. I believe the draft was the composition of the Amir himself, and Amirs of Afghanistan, are no doubt human and prefer their own drafting to the alternatives which may be submitted to them by others. But we have examined the document very carefully, and we came to the conclusion that undoubtedly it was effectual for the purpose for which it was intended, and that it did have the effect of sufficiently and completely renewing the covenants of the old agreements. My noble friend the Under-Secretary reminds me that the Persian text was that for which the Amir was responsible.
What are the essential features of those old agreements that have been re-embodied in the new agreements? You will find them in the Parliamentary Paper which lies upon the Table of your Lordships' House. You will find them first in the correspondence of 1880, then in the correspondence for which the noble Marquess when he was Viceroy was responsible, and finally in the later document, better known as the Durand Agreement, which was contracted in 1893, when I was at the head of the Government of India. All of these agreements embodied three points. In the first place, that we were not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan; in the next place that we were to assume a carefully-defined liability to come to the Amir's assistance in the eventuality of unprovoked aggression upon him; and in the third place that the foreign relations of Afghanistan were to be under our guidance and control. Now, I submit to your Lordships that these three points are the points which are really vital, and that any other points are really of minor and wholly subsidiary importance.
These old agreements may not have prevented occasional misunderstanding and controversy, but upon the whole they worked well, and they have had, at any rate, the effect for nearly twenty-five years of keeping things quiet in Afghanistan and keeping the kingdom of Afghanistan intact. 562 There is no doubt, as the noble Lord who began this debate told your Lordships, that the state of things that has arisen under these agreements has not been in all respects as satisfactory as we could wish. There is room for improvement, and one Governor-General of India after another has hoped that he would be able to make some improvement in it. But I do not think I shall misrepresent any who have held that high office when I say that to one and all of them the idea of forcing such improvements and reforms upon the Government of Afghanistan was wholly repugnant. I think we should all of us have preferred to be content with a less satisfactory state of things cordially accepted by the Ruler of Afghanistan, rather than attempt a much more satisfactory and completely developed arrangement forced upon him by coercion of any kind. I must say that when I listened to my noble friends account of the kind of improvements that he would have liked to enforce if he had been given a free hand, I felt that under his administration the relations between this country and Afghanistan would have become of the most strained description.
I have often heard of the forward policy, and I think I was myself once taken to task by the noble Marquess opposite because he suspected me of having proclivities in that direction. But the forward policy of my noble friend behind me was more forward than anything I ever heard proposed by any one. I noted among the items of his programme the following:—That we should survey Afghanistan—I suppose whether the Amir liked it or not—that we should bring telegraphs into his country, that we should construct railways in Afghanistan, and that we should appoint Residents to occupy advantageous positions throughout the Amir's dominions. These may be all very desirable things, but if the Amir does not want to have railways, or telegraphs, or Residents, or surveys in his own country, we could scarcely suggest—perhaps the noble Lord would do so at the point of the bayonet— that the Amir should have these modern luxuries whether he desired to have them or not. I have had the 563 advantage of hearing toe opinions of many men of great experience in the East, and I have always learned from them that, in dealing with Eastern potentates such as the Amir, the greatest mistake that can be made is to force the pace, and to impose upon a reluctant recipient ideas congenial to you but thoroughly uncongenial to him.
The noble Lord asked why it was necessary to send a Mission to Kabul at all if only such small results were to be looked for. I believe that in cases of Ibis kind it is of the greatest advantage that the ruler of Afghanistan should be brought into personal contact with high British officials, and that the matter should not be dealt with merely by correspondence. When the Durand Agreement came to be negotiated, we determined to send Sir Henry Mortimer Durand to Kabul because we found that by mere letter-writing—letter-writing very often of an argumentative and controversial character—nothing could really be achieved. Then the noble Marquess asked me a Question with regard to the subsidy to the Amir. The subsidy which this Amir will receive will be the same as that received by his predecessor—the subsidy for a part of which the noble Marquess was responsible, and for a part of which I had my share of responsibility in 1893.
Before I sit down I must express the pleasure with which I heard the noble Marquess tell your Lordships that he had no desire to press us for further information as to the details of the discussions which have taken place in regard to this important question. As the noble Marquess knows, in cases of this kind the conclusion ultimately arrived at is the result of discussions in which there are three parties—the Amir himself, the Government of India and His Majesty's Government in this country. It was not likely that in a case of this kind there would be no difference of opinion. It is most important that these discussions should be as full and as frank as possible, and it would be obviously most detrimental to the public interest if every record of every communication and every conversation which 564 had taken place were to be given to the public. In such a case it seems to me there is only one thing you can do, which is to present to the public the outcome and the result of the discussions, and that we have done. This Paper, brief and concise as it is, shows to your Lordships and to the country what the results of these long negotiations have been, and it only remains for me to say that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government those results are satisfactory. We consider that it is fortunate that Sir Louis Dane's Mission was sent out, and that he was able to bring back a treaty renewing agreements which we regard as of the greatest importance and the lapse of which we should have considered to be a very serious misfortune.
§ LORD NEWTONMy Lords, it is only with the indulgence of your Lordships that I can speak again, but I think I may reasonably complain that my Question as to how we are going to carry out our obligations under this treaty remains unanswered. I understood my noble friend to say that the agreement had been approved by past Viceroys, but I did not understand that the present Viceroy approved it. I, therefore, wish to know whether my noble friend proposes to lay further correspondence on the subject.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI have already answered that Question.
§ LORD NEWTONI meant the correspondence with the Indian Government.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI expressed entire agreement with the noble Marquess opposite in the view that it is not desirable that the whole of this correspondence should be laid, and we do not intend to lay it.