HL Deb 28 July 1905 vol 150 cc735-46
THE EARL OF WEMYSS

rose to call attention to the Under-Secretary of State for War's answer to direct inquiries as to the preparedness of the different commands to move to any point on the East Coast at short notice fully equipped and organised in all respects for war. The noble Earl said: Your Lordships will recollect that about a fortnight ago a Resolution was accepted by His Majesty's Government and by your Lordships' House without a division, the effect of which was that it would be unwise and contrary to the interests of the Empire to trust only to the Navy for our defence, and that it was essential that at all times we should be in all respects on land so strong that no nation would in any form attempt a hostile landing on our shores.

Soon after that was carried I received a letter from a dear old friend of mine, a colonel of the Hampshire Horse, who forty years ago solved the problem of mounted infantry in much too perfect a way for the War Office, who allowed this force to die out, but now ask us to spend £3,000,000 on a new arm for the cavalry, when the infantry arm already in existence, if carried on the Bower plan, would have met all requirements and been absolute perfection. He wrote congratulating me on my success in getting this Resolution carried, and added— Be sure and keep the tambourine a-rolling. It was to keep the tambourine a-rolling that I asked the noble Earl the other day the Question referred to in my notice. What is the use of passing such a Resolution unless you know whether or not you have the means to carry out that Resolution? I therefore asked for information from the noble Earl; but how was it met? The noble Earl threw the monthly Army List at my head. He told me I should get all the information I wanted from that book. I have looked at the Army List. It tells you nothing as to your state of organisation, as to your armaments, as to your transport, and all that is necessary to make your different commands a fighting unit capable of going anywhere. It tells you nothing. The noble Earl raised as much official dust as any motor ever did on the road— dust to throw in the eyes of your Lordships and the public as to the state of what you call your preparedness. His Answer took the form that it would not only be unwise but wrong on the part of the War Office to let your Lordships and the public behind the scenes, and to tell the world what the secret strategic plans of the War Office are. Now I asked for no information on that point. I do not care what your strategic plans are. I do not want to know them. I want to know whether you have the means of carrying them out, whether the commands, as you call them, are capable of moving and within what time. That is all, and to say that that information is a strategic secret is absurd, for it is known to every military attaché in London; it is known to every man who goes about with his eyes open at Alder-shot and elsewhere.

Having been snubbed in this way by my noble friend, I thought the best thing to do would be to try and get information for myself, and that I have endeavoured to do. I happened by chance to meet an Aldershot friend— a man of some importance at Aldershot—and I asked him— How long would it take you to organise in all ways as a fighting unit, ready at short notice to go anywhere? He at once said it would take ten days, afterwards modifying that by saying it would take from seven to ten days. The Aldershot command differs from all the others inasmuch as it is composed purely of regulars. There are no Auxiliary Forces— no Militia, no Yeomanry, no Volunteers. But there are other commands in which they have these different; forces and I asked a brigadier of one of these forces how long it would take his mixed command to move. He replied, "Seven days." But he made this mistake. He thought I meant his own brigade. I said "No; I mean what you call the command, the whole Army complete in all its parts." The reply was "I cannot tell you." That is the information I received.

I am a kindly disposed person, and would rather return good for evil. I have therefore endeavoured to get information which at any rate your Lordships have not got, and I think the House will be much interested in some of the figures I am going to give you as to the preparedness in every way of foreign forces. This is an absolutely reliable list. Much of it is in print, for abroad these strategic secrets which my noble friend will not give me are in print in many cases that the people may know where they are to go to when they are wanted. I find that in the smallest and poorest of these States— Switzerland— they have got 200,000 men in the 1st Elite. All these men can be ready in from twenty-four to forty-eight hours, completely fitted with everything for war, to move in any direction they are ordered. There are 200,000 more in the Landsturm. They can be ready in a week as supports, complete in armaments, ammunition, guns, horses, transports, ambulance, commissariat— as fighting units. Italy has twelve army corps. The railway system is bad for speedy mobilisation, but Italy can concentrate the whole of the twelve army corps in the Po Valley in eight days.

Now I come to Germany. The first army mobilisation is 1,300,000 men, and they are mobilised in seven days, the lowest time given for Aldershot, where the number of men concerned is, as we know, considerably below 1,300,000. Then behind that force there is another million in the Landsturm. Both can be brought in the field in this short time complete in all things. Lastly, I turn to Prance, and I find that they can put 900,000 men in the field in a week, and 1,000,000 in the second line in another week. Here too is a very remarkable thing which I would press on the attention of my noble friend, that not only are they prepared to have these armies ready in the time stated, but for every horse serving in the field France and Germany could instantly lay their hands on a reserve of five horses. These figures are very telling and very instructive, and I hope the War Office are imitative enough to follow so good an example. I have here a letter which I have received from a great military instructor, Dr. Miller Maguire, who has now a Professor and two Officers from Germany attending his lectures. This is what he says on the state of our Army— I do not believe you could have our so-called commands ready in a month. But in point of fact there would be no use in their trying to be ready. It would be only readiness for ruin. There are no guns for either Regulars or Auxiliaries, no system of commissariat for any mobile Army, no staff, no organised methods of any kind, and half of the Regulars are quite unfit for even a fortnight's war in our own isles. Much better test and reject one-third of these paid men at once, and then worry Volunteers next. As against our present so-called Army, any army half as good as Napoleon's at Boulogne in 1804, could, by the admission of eight-ninths of our officers, do as they pleased in our country. He goes on to say— Our military force could not be organised in a month, and if mobilised one-third of the Regulars could not keep the field for even a fortnight. Our Army organisation, officers, staff, guns, and rifles would be absolutely, and relatively to possible rivals, in a worse case than Gambetta's in 1870– 71. We have no Army fit to cope with any civilised adversary. Your Lordships heard what Lord Roberts had to say in this House the other day as to the state of our Army. Lord Wolseley in a letter to me some time ago said— It is no use having an Army List; we have no Army. You, therefore, have the opinions of these two great generals with reference to the present state of our Army. Do not forget the condition the Army was in which we sent out to South Africa. In 1860 we had the biggest field guns in the world, but these big guns became obsolete through the improvement of the ordinary field gun, and they were never replaced, with the result that if it had not been for the Navy's guns we should have been driven into the sea in South Africa. Lord Roberts is to speak on Tuesday next at a great meeting at the Mansion House, and I have received a circular letter inviting me to attend, at the conclusion of which Lord Roberts says— I propose to deliver a short address in furtherance of the remarks made in my speech in the House of Lords on July 10th on the inadequacy of our present means for the defence of the Empire. Nothing is being done that is really satisfactory to better this state of things. An excellent letter appeared in The Times on July 20th last, written by their military correspondent, in which he says— It is difficult to credit that Mr. Arnold-Forster's colleagues can feel or express anything but formal sympathy with a plan which aims at the conversion of eight good into eight inferior battalions; which leads nowhere and proves nothing which is not already known; which imposes fresh burdens on the taxpayer, and offers results inferior to the system it displaces, and finally helps to render the provision of the necessary drafts impracticable. So much for the Army I cannot understand how my noble friend Lord Lansdowne and the Cabinet allowed the present Secretary of State for War to play with the Army as if they were tin soldiers in a nursery. He tried to do away with the Militia absolutely. We beat him there. This year he has tried to alter entirely the terms of service and to make it compulsory for them to serve abroad. But this Bill will not pass.

The Volunteers are a force of Englishmen who prefer serving the King as Volunteers at home to taking their chance of ballot for the Militia, and these men Mr. Arnold - Forster is having measured and examined— for home defence? No, for foreign service. I read that three regiments have declined to be examined for foreign service. They are quite right. There is no breach of discipline in declining to do what you did not undertake to do. It seems to me it is a great pity that Mr. Arnold-Forster did not stick to what he said at a dinner at which I was present at the Royal Academy in May,1904. He told the Company— I am attending zealously to the intellectual equipment of the British Army. It is to be regretted that he did not stick to this and leave their corporeal entities alone. It is admitted that you have a shortage of 10,000 officers. You have on the one hand the suggestion of the Duke of Bedford that lords-lieutenant and deputy-lieutenants should become recruiting officers. Then Lord Lovat suggests that the Universities and seats of learning should be used as recruiting grounds. My noble friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs knows perfectly well that there is one simple way of dealing with the whole thing. Our Secretaries of State for War break down because they attempt to be original and are not content with what satisfied the Duke of Wellington and has satisfied this country hitherto. At a dinner which I attended this summer my host said— Wemyss, will you undertake to be Secretarv of State for War? I replied—. Certainly, if I am allowed to do what I want, and am not expected to be original. It is this attempt at originality that is breaking down things. All the administrators and writers go in for something different from that which has existed hitherto. The other point on which they break down is that of moral courage. This I am sorry to say is not confined to Secretaries of State, but extends to the whole Cabinet. If you would enforce the existing law which you annually suspend, all your difficulties would disappear and you would have a cheap Army.

What would be a perfect state in this country? It would be this, that every Englishman, Scotsman, and Irishman should be trained as a youth in gymnastics, drill, and sword-play, which I thank my parents for having made me go through, and should be trained to shoot also, and that process of training should extend up to and through the Universities. And, as regards the question of shooting, you do not want a large sum of money. I tried an interesting experiment as to this. At my home in Scotland, where there is a Volunteer company and a drill hall, I got the drill sergeant to take two recruits, neither of whom had ever had a gun in his hands. They were trained with the Morris tube in the drill hall, and when their instruction was perfected they were taken to the butts to see how they could shoot there. The result was that they actually shot better than men whose whole training had been at the butts. Instruction in rifle shooting could be easily and cheaply given at Morris tube ranges. I think the matter is certainly worthy of consideration. Do not imagine that it is a bad thing for a youth to be drilled. A distinguished engineer, Sir Joseph Whitworth, many years ago told me that it is the best thing possible for working men to be drilled. He said they learnt to work together, to be obedient and orderly, and he added that he would give 1s. 6d. a week to any workman who had been drilled over the wages he would give to one who had not been drilled. Therefore, nothing can be better for the nation than such a system as I have ventured to describe.

Nineteen would be the age when in the mildest possible form you would apply the existing law, which is simply the embodiment of the liability of every Briton to pay for his privilege of being born a Briton by serving his country. When a youth reaches nineteen years of age I would have him this once— though you would, of course, keep the power, in case of national emergency, of extending the period— run the chance of being balloted for the Militia. Can anything be simpler than that? Yet we hear from the occupants of the two Front Benches that the British nation will never stand this. How dare you libel the nation in that way? Have they ever shown that they will not stand it? Have you ever asked them? I do not think either Front Bench has. I have spoken in this sense for forty years, and I have never heard, whenever I have ventured to voice these feelings, a single objection raised.

I tested it in a practical way by sending a circular round to all the county and town authorities, chairmen of quarter sessions, chairmen of county councils, mayors, provosts, and others. I put two questions to them. The first was, "Are you satisfied with the present state of things as regards the Army and home defence?" Four hundred circulars were sent out, and over 200 answers were received, and to this question 75 per cent, of those who replied returned the answer "No." The second question was, "Do you suppose that the nation would accept a modified form of compulsory service for home defence, and home defence only?" The replies were two to one, "Yes." And yet you go about libelling the British race and assuming that they have less patriotism than the little Jap, our ally, when you have never dared, for fear of votes— and this is the only thing that rules now-a-days— to ask them. And yet what an example of the patriotic spirit of our nation you had, when, on an appeal from the War Minister, General Peel, my noble friend Lord Spencer, the then Lord Lome, and so many of your Lordships, rushed to arms, and within twelve months over 40,000 Volunteers marched past their great Queen in Hyde and Holyrood Parks.

And now I venture to think that if the Government would have the courage to again make an appeal to the nation, they would meet with a like patriotic response, and could apply in the modified form I have suggested the existing law of ballot for the Militia, and then all difficulties would vanish and you would get, as I have said, a cheap Army for in that case Volunteers would have to do as we did. We. paid all our own expenses when we began. I hold, then, that patriotism is not dead, and if the Government would only appeal to the people they would have such a response as I am sure would surprise them. Depend upon it, no nation that wishes to come here will give you any warning. In twenty-four hours, if your Fleet does not prevent them, they will have landed, on our shores, at any rate for a raid.

My Lords, let me in conclusion say that for home defence no more is needed than the application of the modified form of compulsory service to which I have referred. No more, I say, is needed; to do less is treason to the State.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (The Earl of HALSBURY):

My Lords, before the noble Earl the Under-Secretary replies, I would like to call your Lordships' attention to the rules of debate in this House. No one, I think, would desire to interrupt the noble Earl who has just spoken. We are all, I am sure, glad to have instruction from him; but I think it is irregular and inconvenient to raise the whole question of compulsory service and home defence on a Question of this kind. The noble Earl's notice on the Paper reads as follows— To call attention to the Under-Secretary for War's answer to direct inquiries as to the preparedness of the different commands to move to any point on the East Coast, at short notice, fully equipped and organised in all respects for war. If that sort of Question is allowed to be debated in this way, I venture to think it will be very difficult to arrange the business of the House. There is an important Bill waiting to be discussed on Second Reading, and I put it to the noble Earl who leads the Opposition and to the noble Marquess the Leader of the House whether in some way or other something could not be done in this matter.

THE EARL OP WEMYSS:

My Lords, the last thing in the world I wish to be is disorderly. So great is my desire not to be disorderly that instead of speaking from the front cross bench I have come here close to the Lord Chancellor, so that if I am irregular in any matter he can call me to order. I certainly did not imagine for a moment that I was exceeding my legitimate right in saying what I believe to be the truth, and in stating how, in my opinion, our Army can be placed in a better state than it is in at the present moment.

EARL SPENCER:

My Lords, with regard to the point raised by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack, my impression is that my noble friend Lord Wemyss is not out of order in. having made the speech to which we have just listened. I think, if we look back, there have been some of the longest debates in this House on a mere Question. I admit the Lord Chancellor is right, that sometimes it is not very convenient to have a long speech when you are not quite prepared for it; but on this occasion, according to the Orders of the House, Questions have precedence of Bills. That is sometimes an inconvenient course. I do not know what other Members of the House may think, but I think the difficulty would be got over if at this period of the session the Government obtained power to put their Bills down before Questions. I admit the inconvenience sometimes of a debate like this arising on a Question, but I am afraid I must differ from the noble and learned Earl as to my noble friend being irregular in what he has said.

THE SECRETARY OP STATE POR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of LANSDOWNE):

My Lords, I venture to think there is more to be said in defence of the view expressed by the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack than the noble Earl who has just sat down quite realises. There is nothing further from our thoughts than to deprive this House of the fullest opportunity of discussing any of the important military questions to which the noble Earl referred in the course of his lengthy remarks, but the notice which he put on the Paper had reference to a very different subject. It had reference to a statement, made upon a particular point by my noble friend behind me on the occasion of a recent debate in this House, a statement which was concerned with the military arrangements designed for the purpose of dealing with sudden raids upon different parts of our coast. The noble Earl was not satisfied with my noble friend's explanation, and had a perfect right to comment upon it to night; but what he did in effect do was to discuss at great length the question of compulsory service, to say nothing of a few other extraneous matters, such as the use of the Morris Tube and the need of gymnastic and other physical education being given to the youth of this country. I do say, in the first place, that that is somewhat an abuse of the Rules of this House; but I say more than that, that it is scarcely fair to those who on behalf of the Government have to reply to the statements made by our critics in this House. It was absolutely impossible that my noble friend the Under-Secretary should have known that subjects covering such an immense extent of ground were going to be discussed to-night merely by seeing the notice which my noble friend had put on the Paper. I therefore trust that the appeal of the noble and learned Earl on the Woolsack will not be disregarded, and that we shall at any rate come to an understanding amongst ourselves as to the rules, whether written or unwritten, by which our debates are governed.

THE UNDER - SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (The Earl of DON-OUGHMORE):

My Lords, the noble Earl at the commencement of his speech: aid that in the debate on July 17th I administered to him a snub. I absolutely repudiate that suggestion.

THE EAEL OF WEMYSS:

It did not hurt me.

THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE:

I am very glad to hear it. The statement I made to your Lordships was that it was not in the public interest for the details of our mobilisation arrangements to be made public; that is to say, it was not in the public interest to state, to use the words of the noble Earl in his question, how long it would take any particular unit to reach the East Coast. I mad that statement fully understanding the responsibility. I had been advised by those responsible at the War Office that it would not be advisable in the public interest that this information should be given. The noble Earl said I gave that Answer with the object of throwing dust in your Lordships' eyes. I absolutely deny that, and I claim that we have the right to state definitely that in our judgment a certain thing is not in the public interest to be published, and we have a right to be believed when we make that statement. I do not wish to follow the noble Earl as to the figures he gave, which were based on the authority of anonymous correspondents. I have seen the true figures. These figures exist, of course, in the War Office, and I utterly fail to appreciate the accuracy of the noble Earl's figures in view of the facts that have been placed before us. I can only repeat that those who are responsible for these matters at the War Office have again today told me that it would not be in the public interest that these facts, which are obviously intimate facts in our scheme for the defence of this country, should be published, and I hope your Lordships will not press for this information.