HL Deb 17 July 1905 vol 149 cc807-15
*LORD BRASSEY

rose, "To call attention to the Report of the Select Committee on Steamship Subsidies and to the Reserves of the Navy in ships and in men." The noble Lord said: My Lords, all will regret the absence of Lord Cawdor when Admiralty matters are under discussion. The wish is universal for his early restoration to perfect health. In introducing the subject to which I desire to call attention, it is not necessary to insist on its importance. "Frigates, more frigates!" was the cry of Lord Nelson. In giving evidence before the Committee on Subsidies, Lord Charles Beresford said that success or defeat in the initial stages of a war might turn on speedy information and the maintenance of long lines of communication. Where shall we obtain at the least cost the most efficient vessels? Lord Charles Beresford told the Committee that no ships could do the duty of scouts better than the ocean greyhounds of the mercantile marine, built for speed in any weather.

Can the mercantile marine, unaided by the State, supply the ships we require? In the ocean carrying trade British shipowners more than hold their own. Our share is steadily increasing in the entrances and clearances at British and foreign ports, and notably in the traffic through the Suez Canal. In first-class ships—the pride and glory of a maritime nation—we are falling behind. Taking vessels of 4,000 tons and upwards, our British tonnage has increased in five years from 211,000 tons to 975,000 tons, while German tonnage has gone up from 480,000 tons to 1,230,000 tons. Of the nine ships built since 1895 exceeding 10,000 tons displacement and twenty knots speed, one only, the "Oceanic," of the White Star Line, is under the British flag. We are third on the list of speedy vessels, and we should be first.

The explanation is not far to seek. The trade of the North Atlantic is the only trade in which the fast vessels required for the Navy can be run without loss; and foreign shipowners have advantages not shared by their British competitors. The ocean services of Germany have an advantage in the geographical position of Bremen and Hamburg, in communication by railway, by canals, and canalised rivers, with all the industrial centres. In the port of Hamburg the largest barges and the largest ocean steamships lie side by side. German ocean shipping is concentrated in two powerful combines, under able management, aided and assisted in every way by the Government. They are practically a department of the State. The Hamburg-American Company is continually growing by the absorption of smaller companies. The process is extending to services under the Austrian, Danish, and Italian flags, as well as under that of Germany. The Atlantic services under the flag of the United States, though not directly aided by the Government, have the powerful support of the great railway companies. The French ocean steamships are liberally subsidised.

When the Atlantic combine was formed His Majesty's Government took steps to secure that a service should be maintained under the British flag and under British management. They desired that the ships should be second to none. These considerations led to the agreement with the Cunard Company. The policy of the Government has commanded general approval. From a naval point of view we have not gone far enough as regards numbers; we have been, perhaps too exacting as to speed. It is not necessary to dwell on the objections to subsidies paid for the encouragement of trade. The failure of that enervating system is conspicuous wherever it has been tried. It has been well that our shipowners have had to depend on their own unaided efforts and the skilful management of their business. When we come to deal with the requirements of the public service other considerations must be brought into view. Under existing conditions, without subsidies we shall not obtain from the British mercantile marine the vessels of exceptional speed required for the Navy.

If subsidies are given, in what service shall the ships be employed? A fast direct mail service has long been desired in Canada. The Government has made offers. The commercial community would wish that they should be more liberal. Senator Sir George Drummond appeared in their name before the Committee on Subsidies. He believed that an annual subsidy of £400,000 would be required to open a line. In a short time it would become self-supporting. He hoped for a contribution from the mother country in aid of an enterprise which would open up Canada and greatly promote the Imperial work of closer union. In the same year in which the Committee on Subsidies reported, a congress of chambers of commerce met at Montreal. It was attended by hundreds of delegates from all parts of the Empire. After full debate the following resolution was unanimously passed— This Congress considers it of the utmost importance, in thy interests of the Empire, that the United Kingdom and her Colonies should adopt a policy under which lines of steamships will be secured and retained, (1) for fast mail services on the several routes; (2) for the development of trade between the mother country and her possessions, and between the Colonies themselves. Coming from a representative body that resolution should have weight with your Lordships. At a time when, without distinction of Party, we are seeking by every practical means to strengthen Imperial unity, a fast service to Canada should merit consideration.

Lord Charles Beresford proposed an alternative to the payment of subsidies. He suggested that the Government might pay the expense of building ships, and might hand them over to one of the great companies to be worked for profit. The ships might yield a fair return on their cost. A share of the profits might be paid to the Government. Being constantly at sea, the ships would at all times be absolutely fit for service. If such a plan were considered feasible, an opportunity now offers which may never recur. The Admiralty have at their disposal numerous cruisers, protected but not armoured, as to the retention of which in the Navy list the Board has been in I doubt. A Return obtained by Mr. Robertson included nine ships of 11,000 tons, with speeds exceeding twenty knots. Is it impracticable to employ some of these ships in opening a mail service to Canada? The cost of alterations would be inconsiderable in comparison with the cost of building a fleet of fast ships. The Admiralty would be relieved of the cost of upkeep, and the ships would be always ready.

The Australian mail services are maintained by joint contributions from the Imperial and local Governments. In the interest of Imperial unity it is desirable, that the mails should be accelerated. In future contracts it should be insisted that some at least of the ships of the contracting companies should fulfil Admiralty requirements as to speed and other essentials. The result would be to secure a well distributed and adequate number of mercantile auxiliaries and at the least cost. Fast steamships can run in conjunction with large fleets of vessels of lower speed, such as those of the Hamburg-American, North German Lloyd, and P. and O. companies, with commercial advantage to the fleets as a whole, though, individually, the fast vessels might not pay.

The policy of subsidies has not been in all respects satisfactory in the past. Many vessels to which subsidies have been paid, under agreements of recent date, have not been equal in speed to the ships formerly obtained. Nor have the engagements for preventing transfers to foreign flags been sufficiently strict. The Committee over which Lord Camper-down presided recommended that transfers should be prevented by registering the Admiralty as part owners. The Return moved for by Lord Spencer showed that expenditure on subsidies had been relatively inconsiderable. Though spread over many years it had been less than the cost of a single armoured cruiser, and far less than the cost of the eight scouts now completing. Objections have been urged to subsidies on the ground that the Navy should not depend on auxiliaries. On this it may be remarked that no increase can be proposed in the Shipbuilding Votes. In amount, and in the rate of increase, they far exceed those of France and Germany. Increased expenditure on any type must be met by reductions. In battleships completed we are in a stronger position than we have ever held before. In ships building we are below the two-Power standard. We seem to be building too many cruisers in proportion to battleships. Scouts are cruisers without protection. We shall not strengthen the Navy by cutting down battleships and laying down scouts.

It may be urged as a further objection to subsidies that they are not necessary to secure ships required in an emergency. I was a member of the Board of Admiralty which in 1885 stood face to face with a possible outbreak of war within a few days with a first-class European Power. A vote of £10,000,000 for warlike preparations had been suddenly called for by Mr. Gladstone, and granted by the House of Commons without debate. We were not prepared. It had not been the policy of Parliament or of any administration to keep the Navy fully prepared for war. It was imperative to reinforce the Navy in cruisers, and to prevent our fast merchant steamers from passing under foreign flags. A Government in difficulties cannot negotiate on favourable terms. Our experiences were not lost upon our successors. In 1887, when contracts for the conveyance of the mails to New York were being renewed, they addressed a letter to the Treasury, an extract from which I will read— My Lords would desire to state that the experience derived from the events of 1885 has led them to believe that true economy and real efficiency would be best promoted by securing the use to the Admiralty in time of peace of the fastest and moat serviceable mercantile vessels. It will be remembered that in 1885 a sum approximating to £600,000 was expended in retaining the services of several fast merchant steamers, so as to prevent their being available for the service of any Power inimical to the interests of the United Kingdom. Had arrangements existed similar to those now contemplated, their Lordships believe that a very considerable portion of this expenditure would I have been averted, and a degree of confidence felt by the nation on which it is very difficult to place a money value. Turning from reserves of ships to the I reserve forces for manning the Navy, new and important branches of the Reserve have been recently enrolled in the Colonies and at home. It is satisfactory to learn from the First Lord's statement that these reserves have made a good start. It would be of interest to Parliament and the country to have the latest information as to recruiting, the provision of drill-sheds, the numbers embarked in His Majesty's ships and their discipline and efficiency. Nor should the training of the officers of the Naval Reserve be neglected. Nothing has been done for the professional training of the cadets and the midshipmen entered in large numbers in the Reserve. The mail services to our Colonies should be organised as a national service, and the vessels utilised as training ships for officers of the Reserve, and for the training of those British seamen and firemen who are so much needed to man our mercantile marine. Subsidised mail steamers should be utilised for the training of junior engineers and newly-entered stokers of the Navy.

In conclusion, the charge for subsidies, limited to those special services for which they seem to be required, would be inconsiderable. We do not want many ships to do scouting for the Fleet. Lord Charles Beresford asked for eight. Shall we say twelve ships? Take the annual subsidy at £500,000. Assume a contribution from Canada of £200,000 a year. Let us hope for some aid from the Australasian dependencies. Let us assume a contribution from the Post Office. The balance chargeable on Navy Votes would be a small payment for the reinforcement of the Fleet in a class of ships indispensable for efficiency in time of war, and which in peace would be the training squadron for our Reserves. As mail steamers they would be a link with the Colonies. In naval administration nothing can be done well which is done hastily. I ask the Government to give consideration to the subject which I have, I fear. imperfectly dealt with, and to act when opportunities offer.

THE SECRETARY FOE SCOTLAND (The Marquess of LINLITHGOW)

My Lords, I wish in the first place to acknowledge on behalf of the First Lord of the Admiralty the kind words spoken by the noble Lord with reference to his enforced absence from this House. I am sure your Lordships will understand that no one regrets more than the noble Earl himself his inability to reply in person to the remarks of the noble Lord opposite, whose long connection and close acquaintance with the question of naval reserve in all its branches is well known to your Lordships, and whose views on these subjects are always entitled to the greatest respect both from the Admiralty and from your Lordships' House.

The noble Lord has in his speech dealt with two subjects—the question of subsidies to merchant cruisers and the state of the Reserve personnel for the Fleet. Now with regard to subsidies, from the point of view of the Admiralty the question of the advantages to be gained by various Colonies or by the mercantile marine from the subsidising from public funds of fast merchant ships, however desirable in themselves, is one which must be kept quite distinct from that of securing the assistance for the Fleet in time of war of fast merchant ships to be used as scouts or armed cruisers. It is for the latter urpose only that money from naval funds can be expended. Before embarking on any proposal to spend money in subsidising merchant ships, the Admiralty have carefully to consider whether such a plan is in the end more economical and efficient than that of building warships to do the work. It must be remembered that when the policy of subsidising merchant steamers to be used as auxiliaries to the Fleet in war was inaugurated, the best merchant ships of the day excelled in sea speed the fastest warships. Since then the speed of merchant ships has increased, but the increase is but slight when compared with the corresponding increase in the speed of warships. Speed is the essential quality, whether these ships are used as scouts or as armed cruisers, and the cost of building a merchant vessel of such speed as to be of much service for these purposes is becoming almost prohibitive.

The noble Lord alluded to the small amount of money paid in subsidies for merchant cruisers relatively to the cost of building a scout. But in this connection I would point out that the subvention paid for one of these merchant vessels is in the nature of a retaining fee, and the cost of hiring them in time of war would be very large. For instance, let me take the first ship on the Admiralty list of such ships at the beginning of 1905—the "Oceanic." Her annual subvention is £10,000 a year. The cost of her armament excluding that of fitting it on board, would be about £26,000; and her surrender value, which would be claimed if she were lost while in the Government service, is £705,617; so that if the "Oceanic" were lost in war she would have cost the country a sum approaching a million of money. On the other hand, the estimated cost of one of the new scouts, some of which have been recently put in commission, is £294,204 when complete and ready for commission. Without controverting in any way the noble Lord's view of the useful part which ships of the merchant service could play in war, I have said enough to show that the financial side of the question is one which the Admiralty have very steadily to keep in view.

Turning to the second part of the noble Lord's speech, I am able to say that the composition and training of the Naval Reserve forces is receiving the attention of the Admiralty at the present time. The work of the personnel of the Navy is constantly undergoing change and improvement, and the problem of the means of keeping the men who do not belong to the active service of the Navy in peace time fully acquainted with the duties which will be demanded of them in war is one which they must always have before their minds. It is difficult to impart to men of the Naval Reserve adequate training in drill batteries on shore, and the expense of keeping the ordnance in these batteries, always up to date is very great. Far more can be learnt by a course of service on board sea-going warships of the Fleet, where the actual conditions of service afloat are present.

With regard to the recruiting of Royal Naval Reserve men, the full number estimated for was reached long before the end of the last financial year, the figures of the entries in the various branches being—1,595 seamen, 1,062 firemen (ordinary), 788 firemen (special) and 488 engine-room artificers. Good reports as to the efficiency of the men engaged in the Colonial Reserves continue to be received from Australia and Newfoundland. At Malta the Reserve has been formed so recently (about twelve months ago) that sufficient data as to its usefulness are not yet forthcoming. There is a special difficulty, i.e., the slight knowledge of the English language possessed by a number of the men enlisted.

The work of the new Naval Volunteer Reserve is steadily progressing. Two new divisions for the Mersey and Sussex were formed during 1904, and another has recently been created on the Tyne. Besides drill-sheds, some of the divisions have been provided with naval vessels. In addition to the "Buzzard," which was taken over by the London Division last year and moored in the Thames, the "Rose" cutter has been lent to the Clyde Division, and the "Melita" is being similarly prepared for the Mersey Division. As the noble Lord is no doubt aware, a branch of the Reserve from which the Admiralty have great expectations is the Royal Fleet Reserve, composed entirely of men who have served as active service ratings in the Fleet. The numbers of this Reserve, apart from the "A" or pensioner class, has now reached over 7,000—namely, 4,982 seamen and stokers and 2,152 marines—and the new system of engaging special or non-continuous service seamen on the condition that they will enter the Fleet Reserve on discharge should add materially to its strength later on.