HOME DEFENCE.

HL Deb 10 July 1905 vol 149 cc4-49

THE EARL OF WEMYSS

rose to move to resolve, "That in the opinion of this House, it would be a danger to the Realm, and limit the power of the Navy as an offensive force in war, to trust to it alone for home defence, and, inasmuch as it is admitted that the Navy cannot guarantee us against so-called hostile 'raids,' it is the more needful that our land defences should at all times be such that no nation would ever attempt in any form a hostile landing on our shores."

The noble Earl said: My Lords, I ask your Lordships' indulgence while I endeavour to give a few reasons in support of the Motion which stands in my name. In The Times and the Morning Post of May 12th last there appeared reports of a speech by the Prime Minister upon our defences, and in that speech the Prime Minister is stated to have declared that— Serious invasion of these islands is net an eventuality which, we need seriously consider. I had intended to take those words as my text to-night, but I received yesterday from the Prime Minister a corrected copy of his speech. It does not differ very much, but the passage I have quoted, as corrected in the Prime Minister's copy, is as follows— Serious invasion of these islands is not a possibility which we need consider. That seems to me practically the same thing. Now, my Lords, I propose to show your Lordships, as far as I can, why I think this speech of the Prime Minister's is a dangerous one. I think the danger of it is that it is calculated to put people into a state of confidence with reference to our defences which is not justified by the facts, and that course is certainly not desirable. Moreover, it is, I venture to think, a remarkable speech as coming from a Scotsman, because I have always been told that Scotsmen are known proverbially for their caution. This appears to me to be a very incautious speech, and I venture to traverse the position taken up by the Prime Minister—namely, that serious invasion is a possibility which we need not consider. I venture to think that the history of our past, and opinions which are worth listening to in the present, all point in a contrary direction. Supposing one of your Lordships pricks his finger, what happens? A drop of blood oozes forth. Now, what does that drop of blood spell? It spells invasion, for no civilised country that I know of has been so often successfully invaded.

Let me give a short statement of the invasions which have produced this very mixed blood in English veins. I shall take this not from English history, but from a novel—a foreign novel which appeared towards the close of last year. It is called, "The Coming Conquest of England," and this is what I read in one part— For nine hundred years no hostile army had landed on the shores of England. Certainly in ancient times Britain had had to fight against invading enemies. Julius Cæsar had entered as a conqueror. Canute the Great, King of Denmark, had subdued the country, the Saxons had come over from Germany to make themselves masters of the land; Harold the Fair-headed, King of Norway, had landed in England. But since the time of William of Normandy, who defeated the Saxons at Hastings and set up the rule of the Normans in England, not even her most powerful enemies, neither Philip of Spain nor the great Napoleon, had succeeded in landing their troops on the sea-girt soil of England. Then comes the question, the writer being a German— Would a German army now succeed? I would just remark this in passing. In the extract I have read reference is made to the failure of Philip of Spain and Napoleon. To what was that due? It was due to chance, to the chance of a storm, to the chance of Nelson being out of the way, and to the chance of Sir Robert Calder tackling the French fleet and destroying it, and stopping Napoleon having those six hours which he said was all the time he wanted for landing his 150,000 men and the subduing of England. See what part chance plays in the affairs of the world! I am inclined to think that the Prime Minister and the Defence Committee, of which he made himself the mouthpiece, have not taken into consideration the chances there are in war. As I have said, it is not my intention to give my own opinion but I will quote the opinions of those who are entitled to speak with authority on this subject. The novel I have quoted answers the question of invasion iu this way: It supposes that a German army of 60,000 picked men lands somewhere convenient in the Firth of Forth—I am not sure whether it is at Dalmeny or Hopetoun, Lord Linlithgow—and marches straight to London, where they are met by the French army, the Russian army having already taken India from us, and peace is made, after our defeat and capture of London, at Hampton Court. The Prime Minister is the negotiator for England, and the result is that India goes to Russia, Egypt to France, and South Africa to Germany, and nothing is left to us I excepting Malta.

I will proceed to quote the opinions of naval and military experts to which even the Prime Minister must how; they are opinions contrary to his view and to the view of the Defence Committee with regard to the present situation. I take the Report of the Duke of Norfolk's Commission, which Commission did its duty nobly by the nation in spite of the opposition it met with from officialdom in all ways. In that Report there is no end of evidence in the sense to which I have referred, evidence counter to the view of the Prime Minister and of the Defence Committee. I will quote some of the evidence given before that Commission, and will first take that of Sir John Ardagh, who was Director of Military Intelligence from 1896 to 1901. In answer to Question 3243, Sir John Ardagh said— Invasion is highly improbable, but possible. It is unwise to put all our eggs into the naval basket. No pains should be spared to ensure that, our Navy is amply sufficient to blockade the enemy's ports and to fight him besides in the open sea. That I heartily endorse. Sir John Ardagh continues— And behind all that it is indispensable that we should have in the United Kingdom a thoroughly reliable force— not six battleships, as proposed under the new naval arrangements, but a thoroughly reliable land force— which we can put in the field at a very short notice to oppose 150,000 men. The reasonable hypothesis is that if one method of defence may fail you do not trust to one alone—trust to more than one. A home-defence army is indispensable. If invasion was threatened the Fleet would never be allowed to leave England; there would be a demand for protection from all quarters. I now come to a naval authority, and will quote the opinion of Sir John Ommaney, who was Controller of the Navy from 1888 to 1892, Commander-in-Chief in the North America and West India Station from 1892 to 1895, and Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean from 1896 to 1899. Now, what does Sir John Ommaney say? He says— Looking as the question as a whole, I think it is shortly summed up by saying that, though there is no probability of an invasion, there is a possibility of one which should be guarded against. German papers and magazines think there is no doubt about the practicability of an invasion. That being so, we should be prepared for it. He decidedly thinks, as did the Duke of Wellington—vide his letter—that Steam makes the position more perilous to England. I shall next quote the view of a noble and gallant Viscount than whom no braver or better soldier ever lived— Viscount Wolseley. The noble Viscount says— It would be living in a fool's paradise were the English people to depend entirely on the Navy for the defence of this country against invasion. Again he says— It would be the madness the gods used to send to those whom they wished to destroy. Taking England as a righting man, it would be like tying one of his arms to his side if you tied your Fleet down to the Channel. Invasion will take place much more quickly than you imagine. Your Lordships will have observed that I have put off this Motion on several occasions. I did so in the hope that Lord Wolseley would be able to be present in his place in your Lordships' House, but as he has not been able to come I wrote and asked him if he would send me his opinion on the question at issue. Lord Wolseley, in reply, said— You ask me for my views upon the possible invasion of these islands. The subjects is one that I have long studied in all its aspects— I am told that he has made a study, in the same way as the Duke of Wellington did, of all the different places on the East Coast where it would be possible to land— The subject is one that I have long studied in all its aspects, learning from history whatever it can teach us upon this somewhat technical and highly professional question. A great deal of nonsense has been written about it. Admirals anxious to see our great and splendid Navy made still greater, preach upon the useless-ness, the folly, of spending large sums upon keeping up an Army for home defence. The only fact, I think, necessary to adduce is that England has been successfully invaded in the past, and that, as regards the future, its feasibility was believed in by Napoleon, Nelson, Wellington, and by other great soldiers and sailors in the nineteenth century. Lord Wolseley then refers to the Duke of Wellington's correspondence with Sir John Burgoyne, and adds— I have not their letters by me, but I remember that in one of them the public was reminded that the invasion of England had recently become a much simpler matter than it was formerly because it was now joined to France by an isthmus of steam. The very thing which we are told makes us safe is here declared to have made the invasion of England a much simpler matter than it was formerly. Continuing, Lord Wolseley says— May I say without offence to those who preach upon the safety of England as long as we keep up a very powerful Navy, that any great naval combination against us—which is a very possible contingency—might drive our fleets into their harbours. Further, that we have very imperfect data upon this modern naval question to warrant us in depending for the safety of these islands exclusively upon the floating ironclad batteries, which, now manned by artillerymen dress d as sailors, have taken the place of the sailing fleets manned by our seamen skilled in the management of ships under sail beyond the sailors of all foreign nations. I am inclined to think that before the Japanese War the tone of Russia was very much the tone of the blue-water school in this country at the present moment, and they no doubt said that no harm could come to them while they had their splendid fleet. In his speech the Prime Minister talks about the improved state of telegraphy and means of communication which would prevent the possibility of such a decoy as took place with Nelson in 1805 before Trafalgar. We have an object-lesson in the Far East. With all the appliances of the present day, fast steamers, telegraphs, and so forth, did the Russians know where Admiral Togo was? They did not know; and, therefore, the reasons connected with steam which have been given for safety are reasons for the reverse. I will now quote the opinions of two experts in strategy, Mr. T. M. McGuire and Colonel Lonsdale Hale. Mr. McGuire says— I have gone over the statement with regard to the possibilities of successful invasion with some of the ablest naval and military experts in England. We have also considered the chances of a raid which would paralyse out commerce and upset every industry of our people for months on the data given in The Times report of MR. Balfour's speech. We have also worked out, in company with able officers, schemes of invasion based on the history of combined naval and military operations before and since the use of steam and the nationalisation of armies; and we have come to the conclusion that Mr. Balfour's speech is not— using the words which Mr Balfour applied to the possibility of invasion— is not worthy of serious consideration. Colonel Lonsdale Hale, in a letter to me on this subject, says— These 'blue-water maniacs' seem so terribly cocksure of what would be the result of one great naval battle. He heartily endorses paragraph 7 of the Report of the Norfolk Commission, and adds— Even naval enthusiasts do not assert that the victors will have much more kick in them left than the vanquished. Some Power will quietly look on while the combatants smash each, other, and that Power will be the one untouched. As to guarding against raids we seem to be judicially blind. I have nothing more to say upon the question of serious invasion. I have not given my own opinion, but I have quoted authority which I think your Lordships must accept as such. The view I have quoted was the one held by the Duke of Wellington. It has the authority of Cromwell, who said Lord Palmerston was one of the wisest Prime Ministers who ever ruled this country, and what was his view of the blue-water school? He said "that a man must be mad who trusted to the Navy alone."

I pass from the question of serious invasion to that of raids. Now, all these blue-water men tell you that they cannot guarantee you against a raid, and raids are looked upon as rather pleasant interruptions to a monotonous country life on the coast. The Romans, however, took a different view when in occupation of England, for they built the great Roman wall seventy-four miles across the north of England, to protect raiding from the northern scourge, and, later on, when raiding was rife on the Scottish border, on both sides of the Tweed, there was an organisation by the appointment of Lords of the Marches to prevent it. But raids must be regarded from two points of view. You must look upon them as they affect the locality, and also as they affect the share market. Let us take locality first. In non-blue-water days, when there used to be raids, they were not looked upon as desirable things locally, and I very much doubt, the blue-water school notwithstanding, whether a raid would be regarded with pleasure by any of the towns on our east coast. I think they would all of them be asking for that protection from the Navy which, in one of the quotations I gave to the House, it was said would be the result of trusting to the Navy alone for home defence. As to individual properties, do you think the owners would like to have 10,000 men landed near their doors, and their castles or houses occupied? I rather think they would not.

There are two raidable places to which I would refer. One is Whittinghame, the home of the Prime Minister. Some of your Lordships may have read that not only was the Thames raided by Paul Jones, but that there was also an attempt to raid the Scottish coast at Dunbar But happily for Dunbar, and for the Whittinghame of the day, which is within easy reach of Dunbar, this attempt of Paul Jones was defeated. But how was it defeated? Not only by an adverse wind, but mainly by the prayers of a Kirkcaldy minister. I do not know whether the prayers of a Whittinghame minister would be as powerful if another raid was attempted in that part of the country, but Whittinghame is not more than eight or ten miles from Dunbar and is an easily raidable place. The other most raidable point in Great Britain is Sandringham. I do not, however, wish to dwell upon this question of a raid from the personal point of view, but from the national point of view. The question of the City is an all-important one. Last year when this question was up I asked a Member of this House what the effect would have been in the City if it was known that 10,000 hostile troops had been landed anywhere on our shores, and my friend disliked the question so much that he bolted, shouting, "I don't know." I holloaed after him, and said "But I do." I asked another City man the same question, and his reply was, not that he did not know, but that he knew too well. He said every man who had anything to sell would sell it for what he could get, and Consols would be down to 30.

We have the very definite opinion on this subject of that great financier, Lord Overstone. In 1860 there was a Committee appointed by Mr. Sidney; Herbert, then Secretary of State for War, to consider the defences of the United Kingdom. That was forty-five years ago, and we are just as badly off as we were then, and perhaps more so. This Committee turned their attention, in the first instance, to the Channel, and then said— This is the first and most obvious line of defence; but it is one that could not, in our opinion, be entirely relied upon at the present day, even if England had no greater external interests to protect than the countries which may be opposed to her. The Committee asked Lord Over-stone his opinion as to the effect on commercial and monetary affairs that would follow the landing of an invading army, and his answer was— We may be well assured that the general confusion and ruin which the presence of a hostile army on British soil must produce will be such that it would be absolute madness on the part of the Government and people of this country were they to omit any possible measure of precaution, or to shrink from any present sacrifice by which the occurrence of such a catastrophe may be rendered impossible. Further on he said, when asked as to the probable effect of the invasion of London— I cannot contemplate the consequences of such a supposition. My only answer is—It must never be. It is in that belief, my Lords, and in the spirit of that answer, that I venture to propose the Resolution which stands in my name. Your Lordships will have observed that I have not given my own opinion. The Resolution practically embodies all I have said in the present stage on the question. It does not say what you are to do. My noble friend the Under-Secretary of State for War smiles, because he does not in the least know what he is going to do.

THE UNDER-SECR BTARY OFSTATE FOR WAR (The Earl of DONOUGH-MORE)

I know what the noble Earl wants.

*THE EARL OF WEMYSS

The Government does nothing except undo what is the safe foundation of our military system in regard to the Militia. You are undoing, you are not doing. There is only one way of dealing with this question, and that is by taking it out of the domain of Party. Surely if foreign affairs are, as a rule, taken out of the domain of Party this question of national defence should be similarly treated. What ought to be done is this. The heads of one side should communicate with the heads of the other and say: "Let us consider what is necessary, no matter what it may be, to render the nation absolutely safe." It should be made so safe as regards our land defences that our fleets may go anywhere the world over, protecting our commerce, destroying the commerce of the enemy, and blockading him and pursuing him everywhere. At home our means of immediate defence should be so perfect that no nation, be they ever so strong, would dream of coming here any more than a sane man would think of putting his head into a roaring furnace. That is what is wanted and what ought to be done. Whether it will be done or not I know not. At any rate, this Resolution of mine, though it does not tell you what to do, is a step in the right direction; and it is in that spirit, and with the hope and belief that it may help to bring about a better state of things, and that something may be done, that I beg to move the Resolution which stands in my name.

Moved to resolve, "That, in the opinion of this House, it would be a danger to the Realm, and limit the power of the Navy as an offensive force in war, to trust to it alone for home defence, and, inasmuch as it is admitted that the Navy cannot guarantee us against so-called hostile 'raids,' it is the more needful that our land defences should at all times be such that no nation would ever attempt, in any form, a hostile landing on our shores."—(The Earl of Wemyss.)

*EARL ROBERTS

My Lords, I do not propose to discuss directly the question brought forward by the noble Earl, but rather to show that, whether invasions of, or raids on, this country are possible or not, it is essential that we should possess armed forces, fit in all respects not only to protect our own country, but our large possessions abroad. During the last few sessions the subjects of Army reform and Army administration have received a good deal of attention in your Lordships' House, in the House of Commons, and in the public Press. But, so far as I can remember, no allusion has been made, except by the Prime Minister in his speech of May 11th last, to the scope of the demands which the armed forces of this country must be prepared to meet, and how they can best be organised so as to ensure success when called upon to respond to those demands.

We may reform the Army to the end of time, and the system of Army administration may be changed as often as the Government of the day may see fit to change it, and yet we may be no nearer than we are at present to the solution of our difficulties as regards having the kind of Army we require for our peculiar needs and responsibilities. That solution must depend upon a correct, authoritative, and generally - accepted definition of our military requirements both at home and abroad. For, after all, is not that the initial problem which we have to solve? We must take into consideration, not only the protection of these islands, but the protection of the vast commercial interests of our widely scattered Empire, upon which the very existence of the United Kingdom depends.

I much doubt whether the public generally have ever considered the subject in this light, or have ever realised what the armed forces of this country will really have to do should war break out; and, therefore, they have never thought it incumbent upon them to satisfy themselves that these forces are in all respects capable of successfully carrying out any duties they may be called upon to perform. Five years ago the great fact that the life and prosperity of these islands are bound up in the existence of what is now known as the King's "dominions beyond the seas" was forcibly brought home to the British public. For the moment they realised this fact, and, unprepared as they were for any such service, they sprang patriotically to the call made upon them. But five years have passed since then, and other subjects have engaged the attention of the nation; the lessons of South Africa have been forgotten, and I have no hesitation in stating that our armed forces, as a body, are as absolutely unfitted and unprepared for war as they were in 1899–1900. The public still appear to restrict their ideas of precaution to the defence of the shores of this country. They lose sight of the fact that His Majesty's dominions are no longer a kingdom but an Empire, the greatest Empire the world has ever seen, and that if we intend to maintain the integrity of this great Empire, which means the prosperity of Great Britain, we must accept the burden which the responsibilities of such a charge entails. So far as I can judge these are matters in which the public think they have no concern. They are much troubled with the smaller details of home defence, forgetful of the larger issues which mean so much to them, and which may, and probably will, require our being prepared as a Continental nation not only to defend our possessions in the East, but to take an important part in affairs nearer home, either or both of which would necessitate our being able to place in the field an Army as large and as efficient as any that might be brought against us.

If my appreciation of the state of affairs is correct, of what avail is a discussion within the narrow limits of the Motion brought forward by the noble Earl? The question with which we have to deal is one of infinitely greater importance; it may, indeed, be one of life or death to this country, and it cannot, therefore, be left to be settled by some impromptu action when the time of trouble arises. We must calmly consider the dangers with which we may be confronted, and we must do all in our power by timely preparations to ensure our being able to cope successfully with those dangers whenever or wherever they may occur. The mere fact of our doing this would surely put a stop to the annual discussions on the Army Estimates being conducted in what I may be permitted to describe as a somewhat parochial spirit, and would enable us to arrive at some definite decision as to the strength of the Regular Army both for peace and war, also—a matter of supreme importance—as to the part to be taken by the Auxiliary Forces, not only in the defence of these islands, but in the defence of the Empire. This would, moreover, have the inestimable benefit of giving a certainty to Army life, and would obviate that feeling of restlessness which now permeates all ranks, and which is so detrimental to efficiency and to the best interests of the service.

What we have to aim at is to get the people of this country to identify themselves with the Army, and to take an intelligent interest in what the Army may have to do. The peoples of other countries are identified with their armies from the fact that every man has borne his share of military duty, and for the best years of his life is liable to be recalled to the colours. With us, I grieve to say, it is very different; the Army is looked upon as something quite outside the national life. No thought is bestowed by the civil population on the means available for the training of the troops; not only so, but the law is often invoked to protect the rights of individuals against the requirements of military training.

Modern war is not now a matter of brute force, as was more or less the case in former days. Both officers and men now need to be most carefully trained. The officers must be given every opportunity of educating themselves to accept responsibility, and to carry out intelligently the arduous duties, either as staff officers or commanders, upon which success in the field mainly depends. The men must be given the means to practise shooting, so as to be able to use their rifles with skill and confidence when required to do so. But, I would ask you, how is it possible for these essentials to be obtained when manœuvring areas are so seldom available, and when year after year funds necessary for manœuvres are cavilled at, and either considerably reduced or denied altogether; when even ordinary training grounds are only obtained with the greatest difficulty, where ranges are few and far between, and where people object to the presence of troops in their immediate neighbourhood—one class because the noise of firing may disturb their game, another class because of an unreasonable fear that soldiers may create, disturbance—a fear entirely due to their ignorance of military life, and which has been entirely dispelled, I rejoice to think, in those places which have had soldiers amongst them during manœuvres?

I am not exaggerating. These very excuses have been made to me personally as reasons why manœuvres should not be held, or gun and rifle ranges established, in this or that particular locality. And yet it is this Army, reduced to a minimum in numbers, trained in a most inadequate manner, with far too little musketry practice, and without the Auxiliary Forces so organised as to form a sufficient and efficient Reserve—a Reserve which can never be provided by the Regular troops, by reason of the conditions of our service—it is this Army, I say, which the nation expects to perform the most trying and difficult service in foreign countries without ever a mistake, and which is condemned when a disaster occurs consequent on its want of training. It is this Army which is expected to uphold the honour of the country against whatever odds may be opposed to it.

When war breaks out there is a sudden change of feeling towards the soldier; too much cannot then be done for him, money is freely spent in providing him with comforts, on the sick and wounded, and in looking after the women and children; and I am sure that every soldier was most grateful for all that was done in this way during the war in South Africa. But, my Lords, should patriotism end here? This evanescent enthusiasm does not entail any self-sacrifice, and it passes off as soon as war is over, and the danger has disappeared. When we consider the grievous disadvantages under which our officers and men labour I think it is nothing short of marvellous that His Majesty's troops should so often and so successfully have performed the severe and onerous duties which have from time to time been required of them in various parts of the world.

But surely such a haphazard state of affairs should no longer be allowed to continue. Will our fellow-countrymen never realise the very grave risks we run—courting disaster, in fact—in attempting to maintain our position in the world under such eminently inadequate conditions as now exist, and when all the nations in Europe are so many nations in arms? How can we expect to protect our own interests and keep our Empire intact unless the whole nation will rise to the occasion by either personally bearing their share in the defence of the Empire or by enabling those to whom they delegate this responsible duty to become in all respects efficient for the work?

I offer these remarks because I feel that I should be signally failing in my duty to the nation were I to keep silent on a subject which is of such supreme importance to its future prosperity—indeed, I may say, to its existence as a first-class Power. I have long wished for an opportunity of telling my fellow-countrymen what I believed to be the true state of our armed forces, and what I believed to be in store for them unless they bestir themselves to remedy our great shortcomings. I have no intention of blaming the present Government, or any former Government, for having failed fully to realise the military requirements of the British Empire. For is not every Government inspired and actuated by the national sentiment? And if that sentiment is apathetic or merely critical, how can we expect a Government to take any decided action towards national improvements?

It is to the people of the country I appeal to take up the question of the Army in a sensible, practical manner. For the sake of all they hold dear, let them bring home to themselves what would be the position of Great Britain if it were to lose its wealth, its power, its position. I would ask them not to allow the Army to be the shuttlecock of Party politics, or its organisation to be dependent on fanciful theories. The people of this country should return no Members to Parliament upon whom they cannot depend to make a study of the services the armed forces may have to perform, and to consider in a broad and liberal spirit under what system of organisation those duties can most effectually be carried out.

We do not require a large standing Army. It is comparatively easy to come to a satisfactory conclusion as to what the constitution and strength of that Army should be. It mast continue to be constituted on the voluntary system, because one-half is always abroad while the other half is preparing to go abroad, and there are certain fixed quantities by which its strength must be guided—as, for instance, the number of men required to garrison India, South Africa, Malta, Gibraltar, etc, and, in addition, the number of men required annually as drafts to keep the several units abroad up to the established strength. Behind this standing Army there must be a Reserve large enough to mobilise all the Regular troops, and to expand the Army to and maintain it at such a size as circumstances may require. It is this Reserve to which attention must be chiefly paid. The Regular troops, as I have already explained, can only provide a very limited portion of the Reserve, the main body of which must be formed by the Auxiliary Forces and by the manhood of the country generally. It is for the people of this country to decide how this Reserve is to be brought about, whether by conscription or by some practical system of universal training. For in no other way is it possible for Great Britain to possess an Army so organised and trained in peace time as to be equal to the probable demands of the Empire in war.

*LORD ELLENBOROUGH

My Lords, though I partly belong to the blue-water school myself, I think that it is best to have two strings to one's bow. The blue-water school would, I think, be more suitably named if it was called the "single - string school." At present, however, when compared with other nations, that "single string" is a very strong one, and if it is not cut by surprise it may be found sufficient to protect us, provided we keep up a moderately strong Army. As for the dinghy school, those who believe that no body of troops, however small, can ever be landed in this country, I sincerely hope that posterity will never have a chance of comparing it with the "gaiter-button school" which brought so many disasters upon France in 1870. A single ship can land 5,000 men.

It has recently been stated that France is not likely to have in her harbours at any one time more than a 100,000 tons of shipping, and that this amount is insufficient to cam 70,000 men; that the French estimate for that number is 210,000 tons; and that our Admiralty estimate is 250,000 tons. When the Prime Minister said this, I think that he must have misunderstood his advisers, and mixed up the quantity of tonnage necessary for a voyage of twenty days to the Cape with that required for a passage of about twenty hours in the Channel or North Sea. On referring to the Board of Trade "Instructions as to the survey of passenger accommodation," I find that what is termed the home trade includes the United Kingdom and all that part of Europe which lies between the River Elbe and Brest. It therefore includes all the lines of steamers running from England to Hamburg, Rotterdam, Flushing, Antwerp, Ostend, Calais, Boulogne, Dieppe, Havre, St. Malo, and Cherbourg, lines with many of which your Lordships must be acquainted. In the home trade, a deck space of nine square feet and one ton of gross tonnage is allowed for each passenger. So that, according to our own Board of Trade rules, 70,000 tons would be allowed to carry 70,000 passengers to or from the Continent if the deck space was sufficient. Our excursion steamers are under somewhat different rules. Each passenger must have nine square feet of deck space, but there is no tonnage limit whatever. These vessels run all over the Channel. Folkestone boats may go as far as Newhaven, and vice - versa. Dover boats may go to Newhaven or Sheerness. They must, however, be "of such substantial character as to be capable of standing bad weather if caught in it."

I am presuming that an enemy would bring infantry, dismounted cavalry, and I artillery without horses, but that he would carry a few horses for officers. There are plenty of horses in England. In considering the question of tonnage, the enemy's guns and ammunition need scarcely be taken into account, as their weight would form useful ballast for the troopships. The weight of one of our thirteen-pounder six gun batteries of Horse Artillery with 176 rounds per gun may be taken at about thirty tons. A soldier carrying three days' provisions, knapsack, rifle, great coat, and water bottle, would individually take up much less space than a passenger with the average amount of hand luggage allowed under the one - ton rule, but he would require somewhat more than the ordinary excursionist, to whom the one-ton rule does not apply. Still, as the troops would be under discipline, they would pack much closer than excursionists, and would not endanger the I ship by running from one side of the I ship to the other like a Bank-holiday crowd. For a raid, or a surprise invasion, I do not think that an enemy would ever allow more than one gross ton per man, as an average. Ships are, however, built in very different shapes, and some can carry much more than others in proportion to their gross tonnage.

It has also been laid down that the enemy's fleet of transports would either come from Cherbourg or from Brest. Now, if it is presumed that an enemy would make every conceivable mistake it is easy enough to beat him on paper. France has ten harbours on her north coast. On her west coast there are at least five. At all these ports troops could be embarked. It would be a very difficult thing to assemble 70,000 men at any one harbour such, as Cherbourg or Brest without attracting notice. Besides, the overcrowding would cause confusion, whereas if from five to ten thousand men were to be embarked at each of the different harbours that I have referred to, it could be done with much less trouble, and there would be no need for any large assemblage either of ships or men at any one place. If a powerful enemy were to invade France, and we decided to send every available man to her assistance with the least possible delay, we should embark our soldiers simultaneously on the banks of the Tyne, the Humber, and the Thames, besides making use of seven, or more harbours in the Channel; we should not think of restricting ourselves to the use of one harbour only.

Germany possesses at least nine harbours on the coast of the North Sea at which she could embark troops, to say nothing of those she holds in the Baltic. Her gross available steam tonnage is more than double that of France. If only modern steel ships are considered it is treble that of France. No less than 1,260,000 tons of her commerce are in the hands of two companies only, a circumstance which would greatly facilitate concentration of steam tonnage at any prearranged time or place. If a country that disposed of an armed force of 3,000,000 men were to attempt to invade us with 70,000 men and we drowned every man of them, its loss would be less than 2½ per cent, of the total force at its disposal. Some wives and mothers might weep, but the strength of our adversary would remain practically unimpaired.

Many theories that I consider to be quite untenable have also been deduced from our last year's raid at Clacton-on-sea. I therefore thought it worth while to spend a week-end there, and to take a large scale Admiralty chart with me. Among other things it is assumed that an enemy's force would take as long to disembark as ours did, but it would be unwise to suppose that an enemy's troops would, like ours, have had no previous training in landing on a beach. Besides, our expedition might have been better equipped with more modern appliances. Mr. Arnold - Forster has drawn a harrowing picture of the fleet of transports waiting all night at anchor, exposed to an attack from torpedo-boats. But the War Office had issued instructions declaring that the command of the sea was to be considered as definitely and completely secured and that no naval opposition of any kind was to be expected. Had it been otherwise, had it been a real war, and not a make-believe manœuvre, very different tactics would probably have been adopted.

My solution of the problem may not be the best, but I would suggest that the transports might, during daylight, one hour after high water, have been run on shore after letting go stern anchors, not only at Clayton, but at Little Holland, where they would have been closer to the shore. Being nearer to the beach the troops would have been lauded in less time. Then, though torpedo-boats might have damaged some of the vessels they could not have sunk a single ship nor have drowned a single soldier. Being unsupported by battleships, the torpedo squadron would probably have lost half its numbers in breaking through the screen of protecting cruisers, and half the remainder in trying to return to a place of safety. Some of the invaders' guns would, as soon as landed, have been placed in positions which would have enabled them to assist in the protection of the transports. In peace manœuvres the value of the lost or damaged vessels would, of course, have to be considered, and expense is one of the reasons that make manœuvres so unreal. We are, I believe, right to continue them, but one hour of Russo-Japanese experience is worth a month of manœuvres.

Under our present arrangements our Home and Channel Fleets should never be sent to a distance from our coasts for fear of a naval surprise. If we were at war with any one Power, a large naval force would have to be kept in home waters for the purpose of watching neutrals. Until the principle of universal home service in some form or another is adopted, I shall always have the greatest sympathy with all Secretaries and Under-Secretaries of State for War, whoever they may be, and whatever Parties they may belong to. They may organise and reorganise, change the names of everything twice a year, but whatever money they may spend, and however able and industrious they may be, they cannot under our present laws give us an Army capable of defending our unique position on the surface of this globe. The conditions of the problem are perpetually changing, but if we look the dangers of raids or invasions straight in the face, never allow ourselves to minimise them, or to deceive ourselves about our real position, we shall be able to ward them oft. If, however, we declare them to be visionary and impossible, we shall run a great risk of being exposed to the disagreeable reality.

*THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE

My Lords, we entirely agree with the noble and gallant Field - Marshal who spoke second as to the necessity of taking a broad view at all times of our military requirements, and I am sure the noble and gallant Earl will have noticed that the speech of the Prime Minister, which is so much under discussion this evening, was essentially one possessing the attributes which he considered so necessary. It was certainly not a parochial speech, to use the noble and gallant Earl's own phrase; it was a speech dealing not only with this country, but with the needs of India and the Colonies; and I am perfectly certain that the noble and gallant Earl in his efforts to interest the public in the Army will find allies on both sides of the House.

I turn to the Motion which has been moved by the noble Earl at the Table, and it may, perhaps, be convenient if I state at once what are the intentions of His Majesty's Government with regard to it. The Motion contains two very tangible statements, and I for one would certainly not quarrel with either of them. The Motion first of all states that it would be unwise to trust to the Navy alone for home defence. I think that is a statement that everyone will agree with. I am not aware, indeed, of anyone having expressed a contrary view. At the same time the noble Earl, I am sure, will admit that there is a danger in certain quarters of a statement such as this being misunderstood. There is the danger of considering the Navy as a unit, whereas it is nothing of the kind. It is a collection of different units, some of which can very rightly be looked to to take their share in home defence. I merely mention this, because I think it is a fact which is too often forgotten in dealing with the important question to which the noble Earl has turned his attention this evening. The Motion goes on to state that it is needful that our land defences should at all times be such that no nation would ever attempt in any form a hostile landing on our shores. My Lords, I think that, like the first, is a self-evident truth; and, as the Motion contains two statements which are practically axioms, I need not say that it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government to ask your Lordships to vote against it.

But when I have said this about the Motion I have not said all that is to be said upon the debate that we have had upon it. The Motion only touches the fringe of the subject. I regret that, but, of course, I do not question the right of the noble Earl to move the Motion in any form he pleases. I pass on to refer, very briefly, to some of the points made by the noble Earl in the course of his speech, points which were not so much aimed at commending his Motion to your Lordships as aimed at the Prime Minister's speech of May 11th. The noble Earl first of all expressed surprise that a speech which he considers incautious should have come from a Scotsman. As a humble Member of your Lordships' House who is not a Scotsman, but who has the greatest respect for the Scottish nation, I might perhaps be allowed to say that the fact that the speech was made by a Scotsman is almost sufficient proof that it was not incautious. But, passing from that point, I would remind your Lordships what this speech was. The speech consisted of an exposition of the reasoned conclusions of the Defence Committee after, I think, rather more than a year's work.

But what were the authorities which the noble Earl brought against these conclusions of the Defence Committee? First of all, he quoted a recent German novel. I am not appalled by that. Personally I have no time to read novels, but I did skim through a translation of the book to which the noble Earl referred, and I am bound to say that my belief in the conclusions of the Defence Committee—that is to say, in the combined conclusions of the political, naval, and military experience of the Empire—has not been shaken by what is, after all, only a "shilling shocker," although it may be clothed in the decency of a foreign language. Then the noble Earl went on to quote evidence given before the Norfolk Commission. Royal Commissions are so thoroughgoing in their investigations that you can nearly always be sure, in going through the evidence of a Royal Commission, of finding portions to prove almost any view in connection with the subject with which you are concerned.

The noble Earl should remember that all that evidence was available to the Defence Committee when they came to their decision. The Report and evidence of the Royal Commission have been in print since last July, and there was obviously plenty of time for the Defence Committee and the Government—for the Defence Committee has no authority save as an advisory body to the Government—to weigh all the evidence in coming to the decision at which they arrived.

Then the noble Earl went on to quote other authorities. He quoted Lord' Wolseley. I am going to say nothing whatever depreciatory of Lord Wolseley, but as a humble student in the realms of history I cannot help thinking that Lord Wolseley in his letter was quoting a very bad witness when he cited Lord Nelson as being opposed to the idea that the Navy could guarantee us against foreign invasion. My humble opinion always has been that Lord Nelson very strongly believed in the efficiency of the Fleet to protect us from foreign invasion, and I see this fact was mentioned by the Prime Minister in his speech. The noble Earl then went on to quote the letter which he so kindly printed and sent round to your Lordships—the letter written by the Duke of Wellington. He also quoted the opinion of Oliver Cromwell and Lord Palmerston. I would only urge one thing against the very interesting pamphlet which the noble Lord sent round, and that is that the letter of the Duke of Wellington cannot by any stretch of imagination be claimed as applying to the problem as it now exists.

The proof of that is in the letter itself, for what does the writer say? In the first paragraph the Duke of Wellington speaks of having received a note from Sir John Burgoyne discussing the state of affairs under "our present system of military preparation." That, my Lords, was sixty years ago. Later on there are other sentences in the letter which show that the Duke of Wellington was thinking of the forces at that time. The letter was not meant to be a general treatise on the question of home defence, and I do maintain that the decision arrived at by the Defence Committee after consultation with the military and naval authorities must necessarily be vastly more valuable than an opinion expressed in a private letter sixty years ago, the writer of which obviously could not know the peculiar circumstances underlying the problem at the present day.

I would only say one or two words with reference to the subject of steam. The noble Earl adopts the view of the Duke of Wellington, arrived at when steam was in its infancy and when its real powers were not fairly understood, that steam is all in favour of attack, and he neglects altogether the improvements that steam has made possible in the organisation of the defence. I would remind your Lordships that steam leads to concentration, that concentration is vastly helped by wireless telegraphy, and that it is to concentration that we must look as our great help in the defence of these islands. The noble Earl concluded his speech by an eloquent appeal to your Lordships to treat this matter in a non-Party manner. I am confident that that is an appeal which will be fully acceded to by your Lordships; and I am sure the noble Earl will have noticed that the spirit underlying that appeal was felt by both Parties in the debate which took place upon the Prime Minister's speech in the other House. I would remind your Lordships that the decision of the Defence Committee is not a hurried decision; it is a reasoned decision come to after months of labour; it is a practical decision founded on facts as they exist at the present time; and it is one which, I think, should not be lightly rejected on the opinion of former authorities, however eminent, who at any rate cannot be claimed as having been cognisant of present day facts.

VISCOUNT GOSCHEN

My Lords, I asked myself, on reading the speech of the Prime Minister, what his object was in making it, what impression he intended to convey, and whether it had been conveyed. The Prime Minister stated that he hoped that it would be possible by the decision of the Defence Committee to put an end to the wrangling which had existed between different schools and between the military and naval departments. That was a sanguine hope. I doubt whether these wrangles will come to a conclusion, notwithstanding the view taken by the Defence Committee. The Prime Minister put his examination of the case—a most careful and brilliant examination—before the House of Commons in considerable detail. He dealt with it as a concrete case. Concrete problems have been put before the authorities of the War Office and the Admiralty before, and the public ought not to be allowed to think that these problems have not been attacked in the same spirit by previous Administrations.

The merit of the Defence Committee has been to bring the matter to a crisis; but the examination took place in precisely the same form in the beginning of 1891, and a Report was made in 1894. It is an interesting piece of history that the War Office approached the Admiralty and put the hypothesis of the bulk of the Fleet being away, and asked what, given certain circumstances, would happen in that case. The reply was that the idea was so inconceivable, so preposterous, that it would be a waste of time to assume that the Navy would be away. However, the War Office insisted; and in the end two distinguished I naval officers, two distinguished military officers joining them, examined into the problem in exactly the same way as it was put to the Defence Committee by the Prime Minister, with the one distinction that they assumed a landing of 100,000 men, whereas the Prime Minister assumed 70,000 men. They made exact calculations as to the tonnage required to carry the invading troops, what ships the foreigners possessed, I what provisions they would require, how many water-tanks would be necessary, and how many hours of daylight would be required to disembark the troops They studied the history of previous invasions and omitted nothing that bore on the question under examination.

The naval and military officers made separate memoranda which were read by Ministers with the same interest and anxiety with which your Lordships must have read the speech of the Prime Minister. Ought they to have been published? The documents seemed to me to be conclusive against the possibility of invasion. The language used was very strong, and was to the effect that the possibility was beyond the necessity of being taken into serious consideration. The question whether these documents framed so many years ago ought to have been published involved the consideration of the calculations I have referred to. Would it have been wise to publish these calculations, to put out all these details for foreigners to criticise? I think it would be awkward if they were put before French and German candidates for promotion, with directions to find flaws in them. I expect that there may be flaws which would suggest themselves to the eyes of foreigners. There is this flaw, of course, that the hypothesis is based simply on the attack of one Power, whereas all our naval strategy has been based on the possibility of two Powers being associated. If part of the plans are published where is it to stop The nation will ask awkward questions. Are those questions to be answered? They may say, "We are satisfied with your conclusions as they stand, but supposing there were two Powers?" When I was at the Admiralty I was sounded as to whether I would give a guarantee that the Navy would be able to resist every form of invasion. I declined altogether to give that guarantee, because I felt that there was so much of the element of the unforeseen which could not be left out of consideration in a matter of this supreme importance. We have seen the unforeseen occur in foreign countries, and, in regard to our own South African War, I think most military officers would have guaranteed that 15,000 British troops would have been able to hold Ladysmith, because it was assumed that it was impossible to bring the big guns from Pretoria, and mount them over Ladysmith. In the same way the naval authorities did not believe that it was possible to use the 4.7 guns on shore as they were used. War develops a number of possibilities which the most acute forecast of military and naval experience can scarcely reach; and, therefore, in a matter of this immense importance, while the case may seem clear on paper, there are certain conditions which must be kept in view at the same time.

What is likely to be the effect on the Reserve Forces of the suggestion that invasion is impossible? Will it not lead them to feel that they are, after all, only an ornamental force? It must be remembered that it was the idea of invasion that created the Volunteer force, and it would have a very bad effect upon them if they were discouraged in any way. Would it not be more difficult, if a trying time ever came again, to find such a force as was sent to South Africa? Any discouragement of our Reserve Forces would, I believe, affect our resources very materially. The value of the Volunteer does not only consist in his being a good shot and well disciplined. It is also admitted that there is great advantage in the military knowledge which he obtains, and that he could on that account be more easily and quickly turned into an efficient soldier than the rustic or the town clerk who had never been in the ranks. The existence of the force familiarises the country generally with what a soldier ought to be, and arouses a certain interest in military matters in every part of the country.

It is quite possible that there are some extreme opponents of militarism who would regret that; but, looking to the duties that are before this Empire, I think that a movement which strengthens I an interest throughout the country in military affairs is greatly to the advantage of the country; and, therefore, I would deplore it deeply if the result—it is not intended to be so—of Mr. Balfour's speech should be in any way, not only to discourage the Volunteers, but to produce an impression in the country that our efforts are to be relaxed because our splendid Navy has given a guarantee that our shores are inviolable. I have addressed your Lordships mainly in order to deprecate such a result as that from the speech of the Prime Minister. A speech guaranteeing the country against invasion may be a powerful argument in the hands of those who wish to reduce our military forces, but I do not for a moment hold that the present situation of Europe and the world is such that we can to any extent lessen the efforts we are obliged to make.

May I be allowed to say one word with regard to raids. I must say I feel inclined to agree with my noble friend Lord Wemyss, on that point. I think sufficient attention was not given to raids in the speech of the Prime Minister. Raids were scarcely dealt with at all, yet they are a most important subject for discussion, and I have no doubt the Defence Committee has examined that question and gone into it. But there, again, arises the wisdom of publicity in this matter. As they have published their views on the subject of invasion, the country will say, "We want to know how we stand against raids?" The big towns may say, "What measures of defence can be extended to us?" It is, I venture to say, a problem that has to be worked out with as much care, and in as much detail, as the other problem with which the Committee have dealt so exhaustively. The noble Earl who raised this discussion dwelt on the question of panic. I associate myself to a very great extent with what he said. But I will put an argument to which he gave no prominence, but which, I think, is a very important argument, and that is that any idea of the possibility of raids on the coast when war breaks out might disorganise the plans of the Government and the arrangements for sending out a military expedition, because every locality would clamour for a certain portion of the troops to be kept at home. Assuming the guarantee of the Government that we are safe, we cannot guard against panic, notwithstanding the investigations which have been made. Having regard to all the circumstances, I cannot with equanimity look upon any decrease in our military forces.

But I am open to conviction. Let it be examined. Let us know what raid is possible. Is a raid of 10,000 men possible? Is a raid of 20,000 men possible? On that a great deal depends. But, quite irrespective of the actual danger, the very belief that raids are possible would have a terrible effect on the feeling and disposition of the country. I do not quite agree with the answer given to Lord Wemyss by some one in the City, that if 10,000 men were landed Consols would fall to 30. I do not go to that length. A panic might be produced which would disorganise the Government in their plans of defence. That is a much more probable eventuality. There was another part of the defence of the country with which, I think, the Prime Minister did not deal adequately—the question of the Colonies. The defence of the Colonies is closely wrapped up with the defence of these shores, and we must deal with the problem as a whole. From what I have heard I have doubt as to what progress the Government have made in their plans for utilising the military arrangements of the Australian and other Colonies and working them into a general result.

In addition, we see that the situation has changed vastly, owing to the altered international situation. Colonies which were formerly so far removed from possible danger that they might, so to speak, snap their fingers at the would and fail to realise the enormous necessity of remaining firm to the Imperial connection are now in a different position. The international situation has rendered necessary various changes in the disposition of our naval forces. I think the concentration of our main fleets near home, which has been carried out with so much resolution and courage by Lord Selborne, was a wise move, and I am inclined to pay a high tribute to him, because I know how difficult it is to move in such matters, looking to the traditions of the Navy and naval officers on whose advice one must rely. As to St. Lucia, Bermuda, Hong-Kong, and other colonies I am not so satisfied; but I admit the general principle that, if your opponent's forces are either diminished or increased, it requires a revision of your policy with regard to them. It may be necessary, therefore, when Powers grow or decay, grow or become I weakened, to readjust the forces you are going to set against them. You must distribute your forces differently. It is said that there has been a frightful waste of money in the expenditure which has taken place on certain posts which we are now evacuating, or almost evacuating. If that policy, however, was justified in a former international situation, it does not follow that those who were responsible for that expenditure deserve blame.

I have considered it my duty to make this speech. I am sure the object of the Prime Minister was patriotic. As I one who has served at the Admiralty and can claim, I think, to have looked into these questions with as much attention, interest, and anxiety as the members of the present Defence Committee, it has been my desire to convey my impression that whilst the facts in the argument of the Prime Minister were very powerful, they ought not to have too great an effect upon the nation in placing a band of complacent security upon their eyes. In the speech of the Prime Minister we can see that he is alive to the necessities with which I have dealt; but at the same time the speech has produced the impression that great changes may now be undertaken in our military forces which before the production of that remarkable evidence it would never have been safe to undertake.

LORD NEWTON

My Lords, I venture to think that the importance of the Resolution moved by the noble Earl has been somewhat overshadowed by the speech of the noble and gallant Field Marshal on the Cross Benches. I have listened to a good many military debates in this House, but I do not recollect bearing any statement made which approached the importance of that of the speech delivered by the noble and gallant Earl. That speech will, I hope, be studied by persons who have hitherto paid little or no attention to the question of national defence, and I trust it will induce them to think on the subject. I cannot help wondering whether the speech will not make the Prime Minister also think on the subject. The views of the Prime Minister have no doubt given considerable satisfaction to many people. They have no doubt given satisfaction to the adherents of the blue-water school, and to all those who consistently refuse to anticipate any danger to this country; and nothing suits a certain class of people better than to be told that if we would only consent to spend a certain amount of money on ironclads everything else may be left to take care of itself.

No country on paper, apparently, enjoys such absolute security as this country. First of all, we have the Secretary of State for War announcing that without his permission a boat's crew cannot land upon these shores; and the Prime Minister improves upon that statement and tells the country that with our Army absent and with our Fleet absent it is equally impossible for an expedition to land upon these shores. This statement appeared so overwhelmingly optimistic that apparently it has been found necessary to interpret it, and the noble Viscount, whose exact position I am not quite clear upon, has come forward as the interpreter, unofficial or official, of the Prime Minister, and has explained, if my recollection has not failed me, that the Prime Minister's views apply to today and to to-morrow, but not to the day after to-morrow, whereas I confess it was my impression that the Defence Committee existed for the purpose of studying complications in the future.

If everybody expressed the same optimistic views we might be perfectly happy, but in addition to Lord Esher, whom I have quoted, we now have the noble and gallant Earl coming forward and telling us in so many words that the nation which does not prepare for war in peace is preparing disaster for itself; that we alone among civilised nations have refused to learn the lesson of the war; and that the country which enters unarmed into a life-and-death struggle with an organised and prepared enemy is courting its own destuction. In other words, what Lord Roberts says is that with our haphazard hand-to-mouth voluntary system it will be impossible for us to face a conflict with an organised enemy whose military power is based on the principle accepted by modern civilised States.

The statement of the Prime Minister contained two most important propositions. One of them is that it is impossible to invade these shores. I will say nothing upon this point because I am not competent to discuss the question, and we know that all the most eminent authorities are disagreed upon it; but the other most important proposition is this, that the Indian or Afghan frontier is the only place in the world where we are likely to be called upon to conduct serious military operations. This is a contention which, I venture to think, any person with the most elementary knowledge of modern history or politics is competent to criticise. I should like to ask, who is there in this House or outside it, whether it be the Prime Minister or an ordinary citizen of this country, who can predict with any sort of certainty where we shall be called upon to fight on land?

Is there anything in the history of the last century or the former century which justifies this assumption? Can anyone predict with certainty even upon which Continent we may be called upon to fight? It is quite true that probabilities indicate that when we have to embark on a contest on land with a great Power the country in which we shall have to fight will be Afghanistan or the neighbouring region. But it is surely obvious that there are other places on the globe where we might conceivably be called upon to fight, it not actually for our existence, at all events in a more important struggle than we have been involved in for many years. It might be in Asia Minor; it might be in Egypt; it might be again in South Africa; it might be in the New World—which Heaven forbid!—or upon the Continent of Europe, not so far from these shores. I venture to think that if anybody ten years ago had predicted that we should find it necessary to send 400,000 men to South Africa he would have been looked upon as little better than an imbecile. These contingencies may seem improbable, but, as the late Secretary of State for War observed on another occasion, we cannot afford to run our Empire on an off-chance. Noble Lords sitting on both Front Benches know that the only real way of efficient preparation for war is to adopt the principle of universal service, as has been pointed out by Lord Roberts and by two Royal Commissions.

What was the most important conclusion arrived at by the Elgin Commission? It was that the true lesson of the war, in their opinion, was that no military system would he satisfactory which did not contain powers of extension outside the limits of the Regular Forces of the Crown, whatever those limits might be; and the Norfolk Commission pointed out how that expansion was to be obtained. Now, I ask, what has been done to obtain this force outside the limits of the Regular Forces of the Crown? For five years, if not more, we have been talking of reform and efficiency; Ministers have come and Ministers have gone; Commanders-in-Chief have come and gone; Army Councils have come; Defence Committees have sat; Commissions have repotted; and what is there to show for it? Where are the powers of extension to which I have alluded and to which Lord Roberts alluded; and where is that national force which alone will enable us to grapple with a great emergency? When that great emergency does come again, as no doubt it will, Heaven forbid that it should find us still discussing such questions as the reorganisation of the War Office, want of officers in the Militia, behaviour of cadets at Sandhurst, waste of stores in South Africa, and other subjects which have occupied our attention during past sessions.

LORD MUSKERRY

My Lords, there is one portion of the question which has not been touched upon. I understand that it is proposed to take the defence of our harbours away from those to whom it is at present entrusted, and to place it in the hands of naval officers. I think that would be a very grave error, and I am sure the noble and distinguished Field Marshal will agree. The Engineers have done their work splendidly, and it we were so unfortunate as to be engaged in a great naval war we should require every single naval officer there. I wished just to point that out.

*THB SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of LANSDOWNE)

My Lords, in the course of the interesting speech delivered by the noble Viscount who sits behind me, he dealt with much emphasis on the fact that the great problem put by the Prime Minister before the House of Commons in the remarkable speech which we are discussing to-night was not raised for the first time by Mr. Balfour, but that it was a problem with which other Ministers had no less concerned themselves. My noble friend is perfectly right. I, for one, can recall interesting discussions when, if not exactly the same problem, at any rate problems closely resembling it were raised by the Admiralty or by the War Office, as the case might be. But I think there is this difference between the position which resulted from those earlier discussions and the position which has now developed itself, that owing to the manner in which the reconstituted Defence Committee has been able to deal with these problems the Government of the day is able, with the full weight of the authority of its military and naval advisers, to state to the public plainly and definitely what conclusions have been arrived at after a full interchange of views between the Departments concerned. My noble friend suggested, although I do not know that he pressed his suggestion very hard, that it was questionable whether conclusions of this kind should have been laid before the public at all. I fully appreciate the nature of the misgivings of my noble friend. On the other hand, it does, seem to me that in these days, when these questions of Imperial defence are so fully discussed and possess such an overwhelming interest to the people of this country, it is impossible to keep back from them conclusions such as those which the Defence Committee and His Majesty's Government have arrived at in this case. We are constantly pressed to tell the people of this country what our Army is intended to do, what our Navy is for; and unless we are able to answer those questions, and answer them categorically, I fear we shall find it, difficult to justify the great sacrifices to which we ask the taxpayers of this country to submit.

My Lords, the Motion of the noble Earl, and I am afraid I must add several of the speeches to which we have listened this evening, seem to me to proceed upon a fundamental misapprehension of the proposition which the Prime Minister enunciated. I will quote from the Resolution— To move to resolve 'That, in the opinion of this House, it would be a danger to the Realm and limit the power of the Navy as an offensive force in war, to trust to it atone for home defence.' Now, my Lords, who, sitting on these benches or connected with His Majesty's Government, has been found to say for one moment that we were prepared to trust to the Navy, and the Navy alone, for home defence? Not only did Mr. Balfour say nothing of the kind in the speech which has been referred to, but he said the contrary. He said it in terms. He assumed throughout his argument the existence of sufficient land forces for the purposes of home defence. Here are his words— We assume land defences, we assume Volunteers, we assume Militia, we assume a residue of Regulars. and then further on he goes on to say— So that an effective home force is assumed in the very statement of the problem we are attempting to solve. Well, my Lords, is it. fair, in the face of those explicit declarations of Mr. Balfour's, to tax him, and to tax those who think with Mm, with being out-and-out members of what you are pleased to call the blue-water school, and as being content to rely exclusively upon naval defence for the security of these islands? The noble Lord who spoke just now referred—it is not for the first time that it has been done—to a statement attributed to my right hon. colleague Mr. Arnold-Forster, who is represented as having said that he would undertake to guarantee that even a boat's crew should not land on these shores. Mr. Arnold-Forster said nothing of the kind. He was describing the extreme blue-water school, and he said that he believed there were some people who would be found to contend that even I the crew of a dinghy could not land with; safety on these shores. We are, I think, entitled to beg that when our opinions are quoted in this House they may be quoted with some approach to accuracy.

Now, let me turn for one moment to the problem as it was put by Mr. Balfour in his speech. He desired to assume a condition of things as unfavourable as possible to this country. He assumed that the Army was abroad, as it was in the year 1900 at the outset of the South African War, and, let me say in passing, is not that a very extreme assumption? Is it very likely that we shall be again at war with a Power possessing no fleet, and therefore at war under conditions which rendered it possible for us at the very commencement of hostilities to send the whole of our Army across the sea. Then the Prime Minister assumed that our main fleets were engaged at a distance from home. Again, I say, is not that also an extreme assumption? Is it likely that our fleets would be occupied in waters remote from this country and that simultaneously the greater portion of our Regular Army would be absent from these islands? I take it that before any large proportion I of that Regular Army is likely to be sent abroad we shall have endeavoured to take some steps, at all events, to establish our superiority at sea. Well, what; was the next assumption? It was that a sudden and secret concentration of troops and of the transports necessary for the conveyance of those troops had taken place at some port not distant from our coast, and that, finally, this force, assumed to be a force of 70,000 men, had been successfully conveyed across the Channel, and not less successfully disembarked. Now it is only after the whole of those somewhat improbable conditions have been fulfilled that the military problem pure and simple begins—I mean the problem of the resistance to be offered to the invading force by the land forces of this country—and it is not until then that the result of what Lord Goschen so well called the unforeseen would begin to be felt. Then, and not till then, will our land forces find themselves opposed to the invading force. Well, is it true that when that moment arrives we shall be so entirely unprovided with the means of resistance as has been supposed? We shall have the remains of our Regular Army; we shall have the Militia; we shall have the Volunteers, and I should hope that with those forces we should be able to render a good account of any invading force that landed on our coasts. That, at any rate, is certainly an aspect of the problem of which we have not lost sight; and we are determined that those Auxiliary Forces, on which in the case I am supposing we should have to rely, shall be both so sufficient in numbers and so efficient in point of armament and equipment as to render them fit for the duty which they would in that case have to perform.

But is it of any use to attempt to separate the military and the naval problems? The two problems are really one and indissoluble. There may be people whose minds are so constituted that they are content to say, "Give us a strong Army, fortify this country sufficiently, and we do not much care what happens to the Fleet." There may be others who will tell you that if your Fleet is sufficiently strong you need concern yourself very little with your land defences. We have nothing to do with either of these extremist schools. In our opinion we must consider naval and military defences together; and military and naval defences were so considered by the Prime Minister in his recent speech. And surely we may take this for granted, that, however we may regard the matter, anyone who undertakes to invade this country will certainly look not only at the naval but also at the military problem. Will the invader not ask himself two questions—in the first place, "What kind of resistance am I likely to encounter in reaching my destination," and, secondly, What further resistance am I likely to-encounter after I have readied it. Then there is another proposition which is indirectly affirmed in the Motion of the noble Lord; the Motion suggests that by relying on the Navy we limit its power as an offensive-force. I venture to say that that proposition shows an entire misapprehension, of the rôle which we intend—and I believe not only the present Lords of the Admiralty but their predecessors have always intended—should be fulfilled by the Navy of this country. The business of the Navy is to find the enemy's ships wherever they are and destroy them; and to talk as if we or any one else had suggested or implied that the battleships of England were to be tied up in the Channel, like punts in the River Thames, for the purposes of home defence, is to impute to us a heresy which certainly never possessed our minds. But I would venture to suggest this, that, if it is indeed the business of our Navy to damage the enemy at sea, there would probably be no more effectual mode of damaging him than by attacking the kind of flotilla of transports which is supposed in this case, and which would have to cross the Channel under circumstances of very great difficulty and in a very helpless condition.

I may, perhaps, notice at this point one or two of the special criticisms which have been made upon the statement of the case by the Prime Minister. It has been suggested that the task of the invader would not be attended by so many difficulties as the Prime Minister suggested. We are told that he considerably over-estimated the amount of tonnage which would be necessary for an invasion across the Channel; we are told that he contemplated a hostile concentration at only one port, but that such a concentration might take place at more ports than one. Or, again, it is suggested that a hostile landing might take place simultaneously at several points; and another criticism is that we have not sufficiently taken into account the fact that the invading flotilla would probably be accompanied by a covering naval force of some kind. As to all these criticisms let me, in the first place, say that the problem as stated by the Prime Minister was not intended to convey an exhaustive statement of every possible hostile combination which might be made against these shores. For example, take the case of the tonnage which would be necessary for such an invasion. The estimate taken by the Defence Committee was the best estimate which we could obtain from our expert advisers; but supposing, for the sake of argument, that you have to take away 50,000 tons from the tonnage estimated by Mr. Balfour, does that really essentially alter the conditions of the problem? Again, supposing, for the sake of argument, that the concentration has taken place at several ports instead of one; would it not be the case that if such a concentration were going on at several ports we should hear something about it? The whole of Mr. Balfour's hypothesis was based on the assumption that the attack was to be delivered suddenly and secretly. If there were to be a general concentration, if, for example, a whole fleet of liners were taken oft from the usual routes, of course the thing would get out, and we should take very good care that our main fleet was not far off when the time came.

Then there is the question of the covering force. We naturally assumed that an invading flotilla would be accompanied by a covering force of some kind; but we are confident that the attacking force which we should be able to produce, even during the absence, remember, of our main fleets, would be amply sufficient to deal with the enemy's covering force as well as with the flotilla which it escorted. In a case of that kind there would be an enormous advantage on the side of those who were attacking the flotilla as against those who were defending it, because it is almost inconceivable, even if the two naval forces were evenly matched, that some ships of the assailant force would not be able to break through the line and deal havoc among the herd of boats and vessels which are supposed to be conveying the force across the Channel.

Then my noble friend Lord Goschen told you that the Prime Minister had not dealt at sufficient length with the question of raids. It is quite true that the passage in which raids were referred to was not very long; but let me say that, if the Prime Minister had attempted to deal with the whole of the conceivable incidents connected with the attack upon, and defence of these islands, no speech ever delivered in the House of Commons would have contained all he might have said or the subject. I am able to tell the noble Viscount, however, that the question of raids has certainly not beer left out of consideration. But when he suggests that, just as we have published statements of our views with regard to an attack upon a large scale, so we might give to the public information as to the manner in which raids would be dealt with, then I am tempted to say that at that point we arrive at a stage where greater reticence is essential; because you could not publish a disquisition upon the possibility of raids on different parts of the British coast without indicating pretty clearly what the raidable points were, and thereby giving information which it is not desirable to disclose.

My Lords, if I may sum up in the fewest possible words our view of the case I would say this: The problem is a composite one, concerning both the military and the naval defence of these islands. We put the question of naval defence first, because in our view if we were to lose our supremacy at sea we should find ourselves face to face with the vastly superior military resources of Continental nations, and we should find that the sea, instead of being a barrier against attack, had become a bridge over which the attack could be delivered. In that event, which I should be sorry to contemplate, I doubt whether a Volunteer army would suffice for our needs, and I feel convinced that the growth of our military Estimates would be of a kind which would appal even the most extravagant advocate of Army expenditure. We believe that in putting naval defence first we are taking the view that the history of the world and of this country supports.

Lord Wemyss at the outset of his speech quoted extracts from a German novel, but I thought I heard him say that the novelist admitted that for 900 years the British Islands had been immune from invasion. For home defence we regard the land forces of this country as auxiliary to the naval forces, bat we do not for that reason for a moment suggest that the importance of a land force should not be sufficiently recognised. We feel it is necessary not only that we should have a strong Army for the purposes of offence abroad, but that the rest of our forces should be adequately organised for defence at home. That is the object which the present Secretary of State for War has in view.

Some complaint has been made that we have achieved so little during the last few years. Well, I can say in the first place that we have achieved something. We have, in deference to a general demand, reorganised the central machine by which the affairs of the Army are administered. When we are told that, in the case of the Auxiliary Forces, we have not accomplished as much as some noble Lords would like, let us, at any rate, remember how immensely difficult is the task of those reformers who wish to make fundamental changes in the intricate constitution of the British Army. It is, at any rate, within our recollection that last year the present War Office desired to deal with the Militia forces, but they were stopped from doing so, and the original scheme had to be taken back and reviewed. Within the last few days again a suggestion has been made that some information should be collected as to the efficiency of the Volunteers. The immediate result of the appearance of these questions in the public Press has been to raise a general alarm and to produce interrogations in this and the other House of Parliament. I merely mention these things to show how difficult it is in a short space of time to deal in the thoroughgoing fashion which some noble Lords advocate with these military questions.

My Lords, it only remains for me to say that, after very carefully considering the terms of the noble Earl's Motion, we find in it, if it is reasonably interpreted—and I am sure that the noble Lord does not desire to place any strained interpretation on his words—nothing to which we can really take exception; and, therefore, we gladly avail ourselves of his suggestion that this question should be dealt with without any attempt to bring Party considerations to bear upon it; we shall, therefore, when he puts his motion to the House certainly not vote against it.

*THE MARQUESS OF RIPON

My Lords, the result, at which my noble friend appears to have arrived is rather a startling one, because he has been converted by the noble Lord near me and is going to accept his Motion. But I think the House must be somewhat disappointed that my noble friend has made no allusion to the very grave and startling statement made by my noble and gallant friend on the Cross Benches. I understood my noble and gallant friend to say that our Army at the present moment was not in any better state of preparation than it was at the commencement of the South African War. Coming from such an authority as Lord Roberts that is a statement so grave and serious that I think it ought to have been taken notice of by my noble friend, and that the House and the country ought to have received some explanation or statement of the views of the Government in regard to it. My noble friend appears either not to have heard that statement of Lord Roberts or to have thought it inadvisable to reply to it, but I hope that some words calculated to inspire more confidence in the public than they can feel after what has fallen from Lord Roberts with be forthcoming from some member of the Government before this debate closes

I was very much struck in the speech of the Foreign Secretary to observe the different aspect in which he placed the questions raised in the speech of Mr. Balfour from that which they presented to the public when that speech was first delivered. I thought the "blue-water" scheme had rather retired into the distance; we heard a good deal more about the military defence of this country against the danger of invasion than we had heard on any previous occasion. My noble friend quoted certain expressions of Mr Balfour's. He said that Mr. Balfour had stated— Assume the Volunteers; assume the Militia; assume a special Regular force for the defence of the country. Well, my Lords, if the Government are relying not only upon the Navy, but also upon a force of that descriptian to be retained in the country for our home defence, we are entitled to ask: What is the present condition of the Militia; what is the present condition of the Volunteers; and what becomes of the territorial army for home defence? We had a discussion on the Militia the other night, in the course of which my noble friend opposite said—if I understood him rightly—that some battalions of the Militia were to be reduced and some were to be amalgamated. But, my Lords, you can do nothing with the Militia until you tell them how you are going to treat them. My noble friend says we must not press the Secretary of State for War. Well, we cannot wait indefinitely to have this question settled, particularly when we are told on the authority of Lord Roberts what the present condition of the Army is. These are questions which will not wait until Mr. Arnold-Forster is able to come to a decision in respect to them. They are questions of vital importance to the country, in regard to which, before this session closes, we ought to have some clear explanation of what is the policy of the Government.

Then my noble friend spoke of the Volunteers, and he complained of the criticisms which had been directed to a recent Paper issued by the Secretary of State for War, and which has just been laid on the Table of this House. My Lords, it was not the fact that the Secretary of State for War made inquiries in respect to the present condition of the Volunteers which startled people in regard to that circular; it was the fact that the Secretary of State asked to be informed as to what number of Volunteers were fit for foreign service. The question is, what do you mean? You have made the Militia a part of the Regular Army Reserve.

THE EARL OF WEMYSS

Not yet.

*THE MARQUESS OF RIPON

My noble friend is more hopeful than I am.

THE EARL OF WEMYSS

The Bill has not passed its Second Reading yet.

*THE MARQUESS OF RIPON

And you are now asking questions about the Volunteers as if, instead of their being intended for home defence, your first view was that they were a force from which you could draw recruits for the Regular Army. In the late war many Volunteers went out, and I believe did excellent service. But accepting Volunteers who may be willing in the course of a war to go out on active service, and making it in any respect the declared intention of the Government that they should be employed for the purpose of service out of the country are very different things. The Volunteers—and, according to my old-fashioned notions, the Militia, too—are engaged for service at home. You admit that you must have a competent military force in the country, at all events, to resist possible raids, and yet, as far as we know, you have wasted the session in. regard to the organisation of both these forces.

Then, my Lords, there is what is called the territorial army, or the short-service army, which was to be specially for home defence. Does it exist? Of course, I know it does not.

THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE

It was never suggested that the short-service army, or what the noble Marquess calls the home-service army, was to be for home defence; it was to go abroad in time of war.

*THE MARQUESS OF RIPON

Of course the noble Earl knows better than I do, but surely it was stated that the force which was being recruited for a two years service was meant for home defence?

THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE

No.

*THE MARQUESS OF RIPON

Then what is the home defence? I may be quite wrong, but I have certainly always understood, and all those with whom I have discussed this question have always understood, that that short-service army was meant for home defence, and that it was thought desirable to have a long-service army, with a nine years enlistment, to go abroad, leaving here the two years service army for home defence. However, if I am wrong in that, so much the worse. What is your army for home defence? You are recruiting now nothing but a long-service army to go abroad; where, then, is this force to which my noble friend alluded intended for home defence? We ought to have some clear and definite statement of what are the intentions of the Government with respect to the defence of these islands—I will not say the defence of these islands against a great invasion; I will, for the purpose of this discussion, accept the blue-water theory as far as it goes, but it is admitted now by His Majesty's Government that raids of considerable importance are possible, and what we ought to know before Parliament separates is this: What have you done and what are you doing to provide immediately against a danger of that kind?

THE EARL OF WEMYSS

My Lords, I should like to say a few words to take stock, as it were, of the situation. If this discussion had done nothing more than procure for us that admirable statement from Lord Roberts it would have been well worth while making the Motion and having the discussion. Nothing could be more unsatisfactory than that statement as to the state of the Army, and, to confirm it as regards the home force, here is what the Norfolk Commission Report says— The result of our protracted inquiries is this, that Your Majesty's Militia, and Volunteer forces have not at present either the strength or the military efficiency to enable them to fulfil the functions for which they exist. That is a most unsatisfactory state as regards the Volunteers and the Militia. My noble friend Lord Lansdowne seemed rather sore that what they intended to do with the Militia was stopped last year. Now what was it the present Secretary of State for War tried to do with the Militia? He tried to do away with it altogether as a Militia. It was to be absorbed. I put the Question, "Do you mean the whole of it?" and my noble friend Lord Donoughmore said, "Yes, we do mean that the whole of the Militia should be absorbed in the Regular Army." That is doing away with the constitutional force of the Militia, which was originally raised absolutely for home defence, with power to volunteer for, foreign service. Being defeated in that what does the Secretary of State next propose? Why, to alter it indirectly in this way: he brings in a Bill called the Militia Service Bill. That Bill passed this House through the support of Militia colonels, but happily it has not yet passed the House of Commons; it has not yet passed its Second Reading, and I do not think it ever will. In that case my noble friend will have further cause of complaint as to the Secretary of State's salutary measures for Army reform by getting rid of the Militia or altering its character being stopped.

What are the alterations that this Bill proposes to make in the characte of the Militia? The Militia is the constitutional force for home defence, but it has the power of volunteering for foreign service with the Regular Army, and it has done so on many occasions to the great benifit of the nation. Bu under this Bill, instead of being enlisted for home defence, with power to volunteer for foreign service, all fresh members of the Militia will be liable to be sent on foreign service. Of course, existing members will be on the old footing. But the difference is this: under the original constitution you invite them, "Dilly, dilly, come and be killed"; whereas under this Bill you will say "Dilly, dilly, go and be killed." That is a great constitutional change which I hope will not pass the House of Commons. I trust that that Assembly will stand by the old Militia, thereby forcing the Government to find some other means of improving our home defences.

My Lords, for my part I am thoroughly satisfied with the result of the debate on this Motion. What have we got? My noble friend seemed to think that all I said about the blue-water school was directed against the Government. It was directed against the school—Sir J. Colomb and others, the "Colombines" as we call them. By the acceptance of this Motion we have at any rate got the assurance that the view of that school is not the view of the Government. That is a great step. The Motion says— that … it would be a danger to the Realm, and limit the power of the Navy as an offensive force in war, to trust to it alone for home defence. That is a great step gained. Then another step we have gained is this—the agreement that we should at all times have our home land defence in such a state that no nation would ever attempt either a serious invasion or a raid. My noble friend discussed the position that the ships were to occupy under the speech of the Prime Minister. But what we want is that the ships should be perfectly free, and that they should not be required to be in the Channel to watch against invasion, because we should be in that state that no nation would ever attempt an invasion of our shores, either serious or otherwise.

I would end by saying this. In the remarks which I made to your Lordships in support of this Motion I urged that this question was one of such vital importance to this nation that the two sides of the House—the leaders of the two sides—should meet and settle between them what should be done, and, that having been done, neither should endeavour to make political capital out of it. It should be treated as the most vital question in the world, as it concerns the safety not only of our hearths and homes, but the safety of the Empire as a whole. That, my Lords, is what I think should follow on the acceptance of this Motion which I have had the honour of bringing forward, and which I am thankful the Government have accepted.

On Question; Motion agreed to.