HL Deb 17 May 1904 vol 135 cc12-22
*EARL SPENCER

My Lords, I rise to call attention to recent events in Tibet, and to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any information to give to the House. It is not quite a month since we had a debate-of some length on this important subject; but since then some grave, and, I might almost say, disastrous, events have taken place which impel me to ask for further information before the holidays. I am not going into the whole question of the policy which led the Indian troops and this Mission into Tibet. We-have already had a long discussion upon that, and I stated on the last occasion that I addressed your Lordships upon it that we on this Bench endorsed the views which were put forward by my noble friends Lord Reay and the Marquess of Ripon as to the policy which led to this Mission. I venture to say that the events which have since happened strengthen the belief that we were right. I shall not, however, refer to the points then raised. In my opinion from the very first it was impossible to expect that this Mission would continue to be a peaceful one. I understand now that time after time there have been serious conflicts, in which happily we have not incurred any great loss, but in which the unfortunate Tibetans have suffered very seriously. There has been, I fear, renewed complication. The Mission has been again attacked, and our troops, the escort of this so-called peaceful Mission, have been obliged to clear the villages round in self-defence, and very serious fighting has taken place.

I would refer to the several stages of this subject. On 6th October there was a question of advancing to Gyangtse. At that time the Government informed the Viceroy that an advance to Gyangtse was authorised if a complete rupture of negotiations at Khambajong proved inevitable. That was followed by another stage which began on 6th November when the advance was sanctioned under very special conditions. Those conditions were contained in a telegram from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy; they were that the step should not be allowed to lead to permanent occupation of the country or to permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs in any form, that the advance should be made for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction, and that as soon as reparation was obtained a withdrawal should be effected. The next stage was on 13th April, when there was an important debate in another place, in the course of which the Prime Minister made a strong speech on the subject. He said— The telegram of 6th November was most carefully considered by the Cabinet before it was sent. It represented a policy—not a departmental policy of the Secretary of State in Council—but the carefully thought out views of the Government. It represented their views on (6th November, 1903; it represents those views in April, 1904; no change whatever has occurred; and I do not think that any change is likely to occur. He concluded with these remarkable words— My hon. friend who spoke last but one seems to think that circumstances will be too strong for us, and that we shall be driven on from one stage to another, until nothing short of permanent annexation is reached. Well, I contemplate no such unhappy contingency, and were it to occur I should consider it one of the greatest misfortunes that could possibly happen to the Indian Government or to this country. A few days later there was the debate in your Lordships' House, when the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made a similar declaration of policy. The noble Marquess concluded with some words of caution which, perhaps, it is only fair that I should read. He said— I do not by that mean to say that whatever happens we are never to move an inch beyond the limits therein laid down, but the policy was adopted after the fullest consideration and by it we shall be guided in dealing with the future aspects of the question. I should like to know whether the policy enunciated on those occasions is the Government policy of to-day. There was another discussion on this subject on the 12th of this month, when an important decision was announced by the Secretary of State for India. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Government had arrived at the conclusion that recent events in Tibet made it inevitable that unless the Tibetans consented to negotiate at Gyangtse the Mission must advance to Lhasa. This was qualified by the statement that the Government of India had been authorised to give the Chinese Amban notice that if no competent Tibetan negotiator appeared in conjunction with him at Gyangtse within a period to be fixed by the Government of India, steps would be taken to negotiate at Lhasa itself.

That is a very rapid change in the decision of His Majesty's Government. It is not for me to say what is necessary at the present moment. That is a matter entirely for His Majesty's Government who have full information on the subject which we in opposition do not have. I would like to hear what the noble Marquess has to say as to the policy which is hereafter to guide us in reference to this subject. This is a matter of the utmost importance in view of similar occurrences in India in years gone by which have led to serious disaster. I accept in full what the noble Marquess stated on a previous occasion with reference to Russia, and will not now further refer to that phase of the matter. But I should like to know what our relations are with China. We hear in other places statements with regard to the co-operation of China in order to bring about a complete settlement of this difficulty. What is the nature of this co-operation? We have heard rumours that the Chinese Amban has at last reached Lhasa, after, I might almost say, long months of wandering in the dismal districts between China and Lhasa, and we also learn that he is going to meet Colonel Young husband. Then we hear rumours that he has done nothing to prevent the attacks on us by the Tibetans, and that four of his servants or those of Captain Parr have been murdered by Tibetans. I should like to know what our relations are with China; whether we are in close touch with the Chinese Government at Pekin; whether they are helping us to settle this difficulty, and whether any attempt has been made by the Amban to try and influence the Tibetans, and prevent these attacks upon us. I sincerely hope that the Government will be able to give the House information, both with regard to the position of the Mission at this moment and to the future policy they intend to carry out in Tibet.

*THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (The Earl of HARDWICKE)

My Lords, the noble Earl prefaced his remarks by saying that he would not enter into the reasons for the despatch of the Mission into Tibet. He told the House that he adhered to the views expressed by his noble friends Lord Reay and Lord Ripon on the occasion of a recent debate on this question. I have a very clear recollection of that debate, and I do not think that the views expressed by Lord Reay were at all consistent with those expressed by the noble Marquess Lord Ripon. The noble Marquess objected to the Mission absolutely, and implored His Majesty's Government to withdraw it. Lord Reay did no such thing. He merely asked for information as to the object of the Mission, and we willingly promised him all such information as we could give, and Papers were laid on the Table. I have ventured to recall this small point because it is a little difficult to know what view noble Lords opposite take of our policy with regard to Tibet.

There was only one point which the Government of India and His Majesty's Government had to consider before deciding to send an expedition to Tibet, and that point was simply this. Were all attempts to get into communication with the authorities at Lhasa to be abandoned? Were we to have no redress, simply because we could not get into communication with the authorities, for offences committed against Indian subjects, for the pulling down of our posts on the frontier, and for the non-adherence to a convention agreed to between the two countries? His Majesty's Government decided that that position was intolerable, and that the only way to remedy that state of affairs was to end it. They, therefore, decided to send a Mission into Tibet. The House will recollect that in the first instance we sent Colonel Younghuband to Khambajong, just over the Tibetan frontier. The Mission was decided on in April, 1903. It remained at Khambasjong for many weary months. There were certain Tibetan officials there, but they informed Colonel Young husband that they could not converse with him, neither could they pass on any communication he might give them to the Dalai Lama. They said they were prevented by tradition and by their religion from having any communication with the Mission at all. His Majesty's Government then decided that the Mission should advance to Gyangtse, and that advance, as the noble Earl has pointed out, was sanctioned in the telegram of November 6. That telegram clearly laid down the policy of His Majesty's Government. The Mission arrived at. Gyangtse on 12th April last. It has waited patiently for the Chinese Amban and for duly accredited Tibetan envoys, but they have not arrived. Colonel Young husband's force has been attacked on various occasions, and, as the noble Earl has pointed out, it has been necessary to remove Tibetans from certain posts that they occupied to the danger of our position.

That brings us to the situation as it is at present, and I would like incidentally to remark that the difficulties that have recently arisen, and the hostility that has been shown towards this Mission by the authorities at Lhasa, do not prove that the policy of His Majesty's Government was wrong, but rather that they had a danger to face which events have made easier for the public to realise. The principal question which the noble Earl addressed to His Majesty's Government was, What is our present policy? He endeavoured to show that the Government's policy, as declared by the noble Marquess and by the Prime Minister in another place, had undergone a sudden change in the decision that has been come to, to allow the Mission to advance as far as Lhasa if within a reasonable time delegates do not come to Gyangtse. I do not know on what statement the noble Earl bases his contention. Nothing has ever been said, so far as I am aware, by any member of His Majesty's Government that debars us from going to Lhasa if all our attempts at negotiating at Gyangtse fail. The policy of the Government is contained in the telegram of 6th November, which I will read to the House— In view of the recent conduct of the Tibetans, His Majesty's Government feel that it would be impossible not to take action, and they accordingly sanction the advance of the Mission to Gyangtse. They are, however, clearly of opinion that this step should not be allowed to lead to occupation or to permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs in any form. The advance should be made for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction, and as soon as reparation is obtained a withdrawal should be effected. While His Majesty's Government consider the proposed action to be necessary, they are not prepared to establish a permanent Mission in Tibet, and the question of enforcing trade facilities in that country must be considered in the light of the decision conveyed in this telegram. So far as I am aware, no other policy has been enunciated and there is nothing to debar our going to Lhasa. The next declaration on the part of His Majesty's Government to which the noble Earl referred was the answer given by my right hon. friend the Secretary of State in the other House on the 12th instant. In that answer my right hon. friend said— His Majesty's Government have arrived at the conclusion that recent events in Tibet make it inevitable that, unless the Tibetans consent to negotiate at Gyangtse, the Mission must advance to Lhasa. The Government of India have been authorised to give the Chinese Amban notice that, if no competent Tibetan negotiator appears in conjunction with him at Gyangtse within a period to be fixed by the Government of India, we shall take steps to negotiate at Lhasa itself. The Government of India have at the same time been informed that His Majesty's Government do not intend I in any way to depart from the policy laid down in the telegram to the Viceroy of the 6th November last. I do not think it is possible for me in more definite terms to state what the views of His Majesty's Government are. The Government have clearly declared their view that it is not desirable permanently to occupy Tibet or permanently to interfere in the internal affairs of that country. But it is necessary to point out that circumstances have changed during the last few days. We are no longer in Tibet on a peaceful Mission; we are at the present moment at war with Tibet; and until we have by force of arms vindicated our position, and shown the Tibetans that we are not to be trifled with, His Majesty's Government ought not to be called upon by noble Lords opposite to give any definite pledge as to the exact form the settlement will take when hostilities are concluded.

The noble Earl asked what was the exact position of the Chinese Amban. I do not think it would be possible for a more difficult question to be put to any member of the Government. The Chinese Amban is at the present moment at Lhasa. He has had correspondence with Colonel Young husband, and has declared that he is doing his best to get transport, and that he will come to Gyangtse at the earliest possible moment. But we have to face the fact that he has never arrived. The noble Earl has asked for information about the Chinese official whose servants were brutally murdered. They were the servants of Captain Parr, who is in the employ of the Chinese as a Customs officer, and is, I believe, under the orders of the Chinese Amban. With regard to the question as to Chinese co-operation, which is also difficult to answer, I think I am correct in stating that the Chinese are very anxious that we should come to a settlement with the Tibetans. They recognise that the Tibetans have given us grave cause for dissatisfaction, and that unless we are able to persuade the Tibetans to allow the Chinese representative to come to Gyangtse to discuss matters with us we shall be justified in advancing to Lhasa to conduct the negotiations there.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

My Lords, the noble Earl who has just sat down has endeavoured rather to turn the questions of my noble friend by starting fresh point s. The noble Earl asked what was our view of the policy of the Government in respect to this expedition to Tibet, and he rested the greater part of his defence of the expedition on events which had happened to the Mission whilst it was still occupying a peaceful position. He talked about the length of time that the Mission was kept waiting and of the insults that it received from the Tibetan authorities. Our objection to the Government's policy starts from a much earlier period. What- was the original cause of this peaceful Mission? There were, I think, three causes put forward—first, the unwillingness of the Lama at Lhasa to receive the letters of the Indian Government; secondly, the removal of certain pillar posts on the frontier; and, thirdly, disputes about the grazing rights on the two sides of the frontier. I admit that these are subjects which would naturally give rise to feelings of annoyance on both sides. What we find fault with is that the Government settled on this Mission without fully realising what it was certain to lead to. The question really was, was: it worth while, for the sake of the advantages that might be gained, to run the; grave risks which such a Mission involved? The chances of difficulty and I danger were far greater than any possible benefit that could be gained by India or by Great Britain from the efforts of the Mission. It seems to me that on this occasion, as on many others, the Government have proved themselves confirmed optimists. They always look for that to happen which could only happen under the most favourable circumstances. They never seem to regard the possibility of any operation in which they are engaged going wrong. Just as they thought, in the case of the South African war, that the Boers would not fight, so, apparently, they thought in the case of Tibet, that the Tibetans would also be found unwilling to fight, and that it was only necessary to, make a sufficiently big demonstration on I the Tibetan frontier to bring the Tibetan' authorities to their bearings. By this Mission to Tibet the Government of India seem to me to have brought us almost to an impasse. Whichever way we turn difficulties of the gravest character are to be found. If we retire the dangers as well as the difficulties are patent to the most casual observer but if we advance; to Lhasa and find the Lama is not there, is it proposed to follow him into the misty regions beyond? And, having got to Lhasa, will the process of retirement to which you are pledged be found easy? I feel that a great deal more explanation is required than the Under-Secretary has given.

The noble Earl said that my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition had questioned him as to the position of the Chinese Amban. I think my noble friend's question went a great deal further. It had reference to the relations of His Majesty's Government with China at this moment. How far, he asked, have His Majesty's Government received the support of the Chinese Government from Pekin or elsewhere? The position of the Chinese Amban is of small importance. The real question is, how does China look upon these warlike operations within, the territory of its vassal? Does it approve of them? Is it going to support you in bringing force to bear on the Lama at Lhasa, and in requiring concessions from the Lama? And will China be willing to see a Resident placed in parts of Tibet, which is only too-likely to be involved by the course you are taking? I know the delicacy of speaking on this subject at this moment, and I can assure the House that I would not say a word to increase the present difficulty, but if the Government call for the support of men of all Parties to get them out of this trouble the least they can do is to take the country into their confidence and tell us exactly the position and the policy they mean to pursue.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, the noble Lord who has just sat down has attacked Colonel Young-husband's Mission from its first inception, and, not for the first time, we have had it suggested that the causes which led to the despatch of that Mission were causes so trivial and insignificant that we might well have declined to take notice of them. Well, no doubt, if you take them one by one they are small matters; but it is the cumulative effect of these acts of insolent aggression that the Government of India has had to take into consideration. I do not think it is just to the Government of India to suggest that they dealt in a precipitate or vindictive manner with the aggressive conduct of the Tibetans. On the contrary, the Government of India showed itself extremely long-suffering, and it was not until its patience had been tried to breaking-point that it was determined to take some measures to vindicate our authority on the Tibetan frontier. So far from failing to realise the seriousness of the task which lay before us, it was because we realised that Colonel Young-husband's Mission was a service of danger and might involve us in collision with Tibet that we sent with Colonel Young-husband that considerable escort, the presence of which was so much criticised by noble Lords opposite as inconsistent with the peaceful character of the Mission. But for the presence of that considerable escort the Mission would undoubtedly be at this moment in a position of danger which I hope I may say it actually is not.

*EARL SPENCER

It could not have gone.

THE MARQUESS OF LANDSDOWNE

Then the noble Earl throws us back on the alternative of again turning our face to the smiter and allowing the Government of India to be absolutely contemned. In regard to our relations with China in connection with Tibet, let me repeat again that from the first we have done our utmost to secure the co-operation and concurrence of China; and we certainly did secure the concurrence of China before the earliest steps were taken. And at this moment, so far as professions go, China is doing what she can to bring the Tibetans to reason. It is with that object the Amban has been sent to Lhasa. It is the presence of the Amban which is the outward and visible sign of such power as China has. If the Amban has not arrived at Lhasa until after interminable delays and wanderings in remote; regions, if at this moment he is at Lhasa desiring to come down and negotiate with Colonel Young husband nod unable to do so because the Tibetans steal his transport from him—all that is evidence which I proves conclusively how impotent the Chinese Government is to control the action of the Tibetans, and how little we can rely upon their aid in extricating us from the position in which we now find ourselves. We are in constant communication with the Chinese Government. We have given them every opportunity of assisting us through diplomatic channels; but I am afraid that the measure of their ability to assist us is the power of the Amban, who, as we all know, is more or less a prisoner at Lhasa.

I take it the Leader of the Opposition has brought this subject on because he desires to elicit once more from us a declaration of our Tibetan policy, not in setting up the Mission, but so far as the future is concerned. As the representative of the India Office has said, our policy remains the same. I venture to suggest it is not likely that when His Majesty's Government have deliberately adopted and announced a policy they should be driven from it merely because their Mission has been attacked by a lot of ragged barbarians in a remote region adjoining the Indian frontier. We do not so lightly as that abandon the policy we have arrived at. With regard to the advance to Lhasa, the noble Earl suggested that in itself denoted a change in policy. I express the contrary opinion. It seems to me that, whether at Gyangtse or at Lhasa, the policy remains the same policy — the policy of obtaining a satisfactory settlement from the Tibetans and reparation for the injuries they have done to us. So far as we are able to reassure the noble Earl by telling him that our policy remains what it was, I am very glad to give him that re-assurance; but, of course, so far as the operations now in progress are concerned, we must reserve to ourselves a certain amount of discretion in carrying them to a conclusion which will be honourable and satisfactory to ourselves.

House adjourned at a quarter before Six o'clock, to Thursday next, half-past Ten o'clock.