§ * LORD NEWTON,who had given notice "To call attention to the correspondence recently presented to Parliament 1260 respecting the affairs of South-Eastern Europe and to move for further Papers," said: My Lords, just about a year ago I called attention to the threatening aspect of affairs in Macedonia, and the Foreign Secretary, in his reply, made what I think was the fullest statement that has yet been made with regard to British policy in that part of the world, and the most important statement which was elicited from him was that His Majesty's Government had determined, in conjunction with the other signatory Powers to the Treaty of Berlin, to leave the decision of the question to the Austrian and Russian Governments. A year has passed since then, and I do not think it is any exaggeration to say that the state of Macedonia and of European Turkey generally has gone steadily from bad to worse. Since the date of the reform scheme which was put forward by the Austrian and Russian Governments and accepted by the Porte, twelve months have elapsed. During that period many thousands of persons have lost their lives, some in fair fighting, others in the course of massacre; many hundreds of villages have been destroyed, and many thousands of refugees are now existing in a miserable state both inside and outside of the provinces in question.
Upon whom does the responsibility for this state of things lie? The majority of persons in this country have no difficulty whatever in determining upon whom the responsibility rests. The majority of persons in this country place the whole responsibility upon the Turkish Government, but I cannot help pointing out that in many instances there appears to be a somewhat erroneous conception of the situation. It is generally assumed—more especially in ecclesiastical circles—that the present condition of affairs in Macedonia is due to the general persecution of the Christian inhabitants by the Mussulmans. It has been already pointed out more than once, but perhaps it is worth while pointing it out again, that that is not an exact definition of the present state of things. The present state of things arises directly from the determination of the Bulgarian inhabitants of Macedonia to free themselves from Turkish rule, and I do not know that they can be much blamed for that 1261 determination. I would observe to your Lordships that this contention of mine is amply justified by the fact that the insurrection which is maintained by the Bulgarian inhabitants of Macedonia, receives not only no support from the Greeks and the other Christians in the provinces, but is actively opposed by them.
To return to the question of responsibility. I admit to the full the responsibility of the Turkish Government; but that responsibility must be shared by the irreconcilable section of the Macedonian insurgents; it must be shared also, in a more modified degree, by the Bulgarian Government, and, lastly, I regret to say it must be shared to some extent by the Austrian and Russian Governments, which have undertaken, with complete unsuccess, the pacification of the country. Dealing first of all with the responsibility of Turkey, no one can deny that the Turkish Government is the original culprit in the matter. No one in their senses would attempt to defend the massacres and the outrages that have been perpetrated by the Turkish troops, and no one will deny, or attempt to deny, the continual obstruction of the Turkish Government to all proposed reforms—an obstruction which is due to the innate stupidity of the Ottoman Government. But, at the same time, with the best will in the world, supposing that the Turkish Government had really been anxious to carry out the reforms which have now been pressed upon them, I for my part am unable to see how they could have succeeded. During the last year—you may say far more than that—there has been a permanent insurrection going on in the country. The position of the Turks is very much like to a man whose house is on fire and who is surrounded by his friends who order him to put out the fire according to their instructions, but in his endeavours to put it out, he finds that it is continually being set ablaze in other parts. The fact is, the Turkish Government is totally unable to put an end to the insurrection, and the insurrection in itself is sufficient to prevent the introduction of any reforms. I say that the Turkish Government, so far, has shown itself absolutely incapable of putting"] down the insurrection, and, as a 1262 proof of the almost complete demoralisation of the Turkish Administration, I am credibly informed that the insurgents draw the greater quantity of their military supplies through Turkey and by means of the Turkish officials and the Turkish officers.
But there is another point which, I think, must have forced itself upon everyone who has taken the trouble to read the last two Blue-books. I maintain that it is as plain as possible, and I maintained so last year, that the revolutionary committees have not the slightest intention of allowing the reforms to be introduced. The object of the revolutionary committees or their leaders, or, at all events, the object of some of the leaders, has been to render the introduction of reforms impossible; and, what is much worse, they have in some instances, I regret to say in many instances, deliberately endeavoured, by the commission of crimes themselves, to goad the Turks into perpetrating atrocities on a large scale. If anybody doubts the truth of this assertion I need only refer him to the despatches from the Consuls who so ably represent us in that part of the world. The Blue books teem with evidence of the crimes of some of these revolutionary bands and of their methods, and I repeat that this information does not come from the Turkish Government, but is supplied by independent witnesses such as the Greeks and His Majesty's Consuls. I should like to quote one single instance. In June last year I observe that the Greek Minister in London handed to the noble Marquess a list of between 100 and 200 Greeks who had been deliberately murdered, apparently in cold blood, by the Bulgarian insurgents in pursuance of their irreconcilable programme. These men have not only murdered inoffensive men, and women too, in cold blood, but they have burnt villages and blown up railways and banks, and one of their most notorious leaders announced in the summer of last year that if the committees were suppressed he would take measures for the assassination of the English, the French, or the German Consul in Salonika.
The Prime Minister was not long ago much found fault with for his version of the balance of criminality. I admit at 1263 once that, if it is a question of quantity the balance of criminality is decidedly in favour of the Turks. They have undoubtedly burnt more villages, massacred more people, and committed atrocities on a much larger scale than their opponents. But what I should like to point cut is this, that the work of the irreconcilable insurgents has been of precisely the same character as that of the Turkish troops, although not upon the same scale, and if it comes to a question of quality and of character I am not at all sure that the crimes perpetrated by the insurgents are net the worst of the two. Although the crimes committed by the Turkish troops are outrageous in their nature, yet they are crimes which are perpetrated by men who in many instances are little better than semi-barbarians, and who have been goaded by extreme provocation; on the other hand, the deliberate crimes of the Bulgarian insurgents, under some of their leaders, have been committed by Christian and highly educated men.
With regard to the responsibility of the Bulgarian Government, which I said was a lesser form of responsibility, I think that the position of that Government is well defined by Mr. Elliot, who wrote in the summer of last year that the limits of the Bulgarian Government are prescribed by the amount of repression which the country will stand. If I diagnose the Blue-book correctly, the country will not stand any repression at all. At all events, the Bulgarian Government has never made any very serious effort to cope with the difficulty. It cannot be denied that the bands are formed there and start from Bulgaria; that they retreat there when they are; too severely pressed; that they are in many cases officered by officers of the Bulgarian Army; and that they are frequently armed with rifles taken from the Government stores. There is an active and flourishing manufacture of bombs carried on in the country, and when the insurgent chiefs return to Bulgaria they meet with triumphant receptions. But the Bulgarian Government supplies the one humorous touch in this gloomy tragedy. Towards the end of October, when the prospects as to peace were slightly better, it was proposed that troops on both sides should 1264 be disbanded, and Mr. Elliot explained that the Bulgarian Government would be glad to send as many men home as possible in order that they might take part in the general election. I am not surprised at this desire of the Bulgarian Government, because I once happened to be in Bulgaria whilst a general election was going on, and I remember observing that every voter as he approached the ballot was taken charge of by a soldier, who took care that he voted the right way. I imagine that older Governments must wish that they had similar means at their disposal in order to secure a majority when a general election occurs.
I now pass from the responsibility of Turkey, of the insurgents, and of the Bulgarian Government, to the responsibility of the Austrian and Russian Governments. As far back as February. 1902, it had begun to dawn even upon these two Governments that the situation in Macedonia was threatening, and in that month, to use their own affected language, the two Governments were having a "loyal exchange of views." For a whole year they continued to loyally exchange views with no result; but in 1903, owing in great measure to the efforts made by the noble Marquess, they succeeded in producing a feeble scheme of reform which was accepted by the noble Marquess and by the other signatory Powers to the Treaty of Berlin, the noble Marquess being judicious enough to accept it in principle and to reserve to himself the right of making further suggestions that he might think necessary. This scheme was not happy in its start. It dealt largely with the question of the gendarmerie, and amongst other things recommended a general amnesty. A. general amnesty took place; but what was the result? A good many thousand prisoners were released, and, as the Consuls pointed out would be the case before it happened, they all immediately went off and joined the insurgent bands. Another recommendation was that a certain proportion of the gendarmerie should be Christians, but I gather from a despatch from one of the Consuls that each one of these Christian gendarmes, required a special bodyguard to protect him in doing his duty. Fighting was going on all the time. I will quote a passage from the Blue-book showing the 1265 view with which the Austrian Government treated the threatening danger. In the summer of last year Count Goluchowski, the Austrian Foreign Secretary, was asked by our Ambassador how things were going on, and he replied that he hoped that things there would turn out less bad than they generally expected, and the foundation for this optisism was that he had received very few telegrams lately from Macedonia.
Owing to the pressure exercised by the noble Marquess—and I will say this for the noble Marquess, that he and Sir N. O'Conor, our Ambassador at Constantinople, appear to be the only two persons who throughout this business have shown any sense of the gravity of the situation—towards the end of October the Austrian and Russian Governments put their heads together and came out with a new scheme, which is known as the Murzsteg scheme. I will not go into the details of this scheme, but it was submitted to the noble Marquess, and he approved of it generally, making the same reservation that he had made with regard to the former scheme, and adding the somewhat obvious observation that there was no provision in the scheme for the payment of anybody in connection with it. In order to show the dilatory procedure of the Austrian and Russian Governments, I should like to point out that on 4th November this scheme was presented to the Porte and flatly refused. There upon His Majesty's Government were naturally rather perturbed, and again applied to Count Goluchowski. Count Goluchowski, declining absolutely to be hurried, said increased pressure must be exercised on the Porte, but first of all careful examination of the answer must be made. On 9th November, the Russian and Austrian Governments sent a Note saying that they were—to use their own language—' "painfully embarrassed" by the reply they received. People who receive a flat refusal generally are pain fully embarrassed. On 24th November, the Porte consented to accept the reforms in principle, but reserved the right of opposing them in detail.
On 30th November, a step further was taken. The two Governments actually agreed upon two assessors, but] I should like to call attention to a notable fact 1266 with regard to them. I observe that the Austrian assessor was apparently selected on account of his knowledge of Russian, not the language which one would imagine to be the most useful in the circumstances. The assessors were agreed upon, but both Governments considered that it was inadvisable to send out any foreign officers as yet—this being one of the suggestions made by the noble Marquess. On 4th December the Russian Government also deprecated sending any European officers out, as being a course likely to arouse the susceptibilities of the Sultan. On 5th December the two Governments, as if they had not already wasted sufficient time, actually proposed to leave the selection of the officer, who was to reorganise the gendarmerie, to the Porte. On December 12th the Austrian Government were still uncertain as to the nature of the European officers who were to be employed. On 9th December Sir N. O'Conor called the attention of the Russian Ambassador in Constantinople to the necessity of doing something, and Sir N. O'Conor says that the Russian Ambassador appeared to think that there was something to be said for it. On 15th December Sir N. O'Conor wrote home, and I think a quotation from this despatch really places the whole difficulty in a nutshell. He wrote—
Every week's delay makes the chances of the reforms pacifying the country less and the probability of a fresh outbreak in the spring greater. Should the preliminary negotiations even proceed a good deal faster than hitherto, the General can hardly arrive much before the end of the year, nor is it probable that the foreign officers who are to be attached to him will have all arrived even by that date. Probably January will be well advanced before any scheme of reorganisation is prepared and ready for adoption. By that time the spring will be at hand with its attendant dangers.A few days after that the noble Marquess himself lost a certain amount of his inexhaustible patience and wrote—It cannot be said that even the initial step s towards putting it into practical effect have been accomplished.As I have already remarked, the noble Marquess and Sir N. O'Connor are really the only people throughout this business who seem to have taken any real interest in it, and who have made any suggestions. I daresay the noble Marquess will tell me that a certain amount has been done since the Blue-book closed. The 1267 Blue-book practically closes with the despatch which I have just read. I do not exactly know what the position is now, but the position after about six months of the first programme had gone by was this, that there was nothing to show for it except the presence of the Inspector-General Hilmi Pasha, and two Swedish offiicers, neither of whom could speak Turkish or had anything to do.It is true that some progress has been made. Since the Blue-book closed, an Italian general has been selected to reorganise the gendarmerie, and has arrived, I understand, at Constantinople. The two assessors are, I believe, at Salonika, where they are working under the superintendence of Hilmi Pasha, who shows no desire to encourage their journey into the interior of the country. What I think this Blue-book does show is that the Austrian and Russian Governments have proved themselves quite incapable of dealing with the situation, and I do not think myself, although the noble Marquess may not admit that I am right, that the reason is very difficult to find. These two Powers—Austria and Russia —who have been called in as physicians to minister to the disease of the sick man, also consider themselves to be his heirs and I have no doubt each of them considers himself entitled to the position of residuary legatee. It is clear to me that these two Governments have been just as much occupied in watching each other as they have been in superintending and introducing reforms. What I want to point out is that time is everything in this business. All the indications point to an outbreak before long. I myself contemplated a visit to that part of the world, and I have been making inquiries on my own account and am told that anybody who thinks about going out there had better lose no time because the end of March is about the latest period on which one can count upon even the present conditions being maintained. Owing to the absurd and dilatory tactics of these two Governments, who have done little else but play—involuntarily, no doubt—into the hands of the Sultan and the Porte, precious time has been lost.
There remain about six weeks in which to put matters right. As I said a 1268 moment ago, an outbreak generally seems to be anticipated about the end of March; but it is not merely an outbreak of insurrection which is anticipated, but a war between Turkey and Bulgaria. That war appeared imminent a year ago, but it looks very much more imminent now, and, unless I entirely misread the signs, both sides are eager for a fight. The Bulgarians are more prepared than they were this time last year. They have got an excellent Army, which man for man, is probably much superior to the Turkish Army; and, on the other hand, the Turks feel no doubt that the situation has gone on long enough and that if they can go to war and defeat the Bulgarians they will at all events secure a certain amount of peace. In view of the gravity of the situation—a gravity which I do not think can well be exaggerated—I appeal to the noble Marquess whether the time has not come when he should produce the alternative which he alluded to, not only in his despatch, but in the speech which he made on the Address. The noble Marquess made use of these significant words in the speech which he delivered on the Address—
If these schemes should fail to produce the desired result, we reserve to ourselves entire liberty to take into consideration and to propose alternative and more far reaching measures.Well, my Lords, I do not know whether the noble Marquess considers that the time for making suggestions and proposals has arrived. I have no idea what his reply will be to me on this point. But, at all events, if he does not consider that the time is yet ripe for these alternative proposals, I presume he will have no objection to making a statement, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that all the forces of our diplomacy will be exercised for the purpose of localising this war if it should break out, and of limiting it to the two countries which are directly concerned.
§ Moved, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for further Papers respecting the affairs of South-Eastern Europe."—(Lord Newton.)
THE EARL OF LYTTONMy Lords, in spite of the extremely humorous description which the noble Lord has given of the situation, I think everyone will agree that its gravity is quite sufficient 1269 to justify a general discussion on the matter in your Lordships' House. The jiresent moment is a very critical one, because everyone feels that time is getting on and that before very long the moment will have arrived when the labours of the reformers who are working at this moment to bring about a peaceable settlement of this Eastern question will necessarily be brought to an end. It it obvious that all discussions in Parliament upon matters of foreign affairs are necessarily handicapped to a certain extent by a feeling of constraint and the knowledge of the necessity of carefully choosing words which will not be misinterpreted in the far regions to which they will be immediately telegraphed. It is obvious that the Minister in charge of our foreign affairs cannot make a speech on matters of foreign policy in Parliament without very great attention being paid to everything he says, and without in some cases his words being received with a certain disposition to misunderstand them. At any rate, he cannot take part in such discussions as if they were matters of ordinary debate. Therefore, though I join with my noble friend in desiring to urge upon the noble Marquess that he should give us some more reassuring evidence than has yet been put before the public with regard to a settlement of this question, I disclaim any intention whatever of wishing to embarrass his position or to complicate the difficulties with which he is now necessarily confronted.
I agree that the noble Marquess has shown himself throughout these negotiations to be the Minister most in earnest in seeking for reform —a matter for which we owe him a great debt of gratitude. I only intervene, therefore, to state the effect which the Blue-book has had upon myself. I feel very little interest in any attempts to work out the balance of criminality, or to settle the precise degree of responsibility for what has taken place in the past. My interest is not in the past. These outrages and acts of violence which have taken place are matters which we all regret, but my anxiety is rather for the future and what is going to take place. I leave out, therefore, any attempt to try and lodge the 'responsibility for what has taken place upon any particular shoulders, but I feel that no one can read these Blue-books without feeling that three facts stand out 1270 very markedly from them. The first is the failure of the present system of dual control, which has been left exclusively in the hands of Austria and Russia—the failure, that is, on their part to restore peace in the troublous area or to produce reforms which are received with any degree of satisfaction. The second fact is the certainty that, in a very few weeks, the insurrection will break out again, with the extreme imminence of war between Bulgaria and Turkey. And the third fact is that Great Britain is really the Power to whom all concerned look with the greatest amount of confidence, and the Power which appears to have the power to control the course of events. Putting these three facts together, it follows that a very considerable responsibility rests upon the shoulders of His Majesty's Government; and it is unnecessary to prove that, if they have it in their power to prevent a renewal of these acts of violence of which the Balkan Peninsula has been the scene so recently, and which are an insult and an affront to the whole civilised world, and to prevent an outbreak of war between Turkey and Bulgaria, and secure both these ends, they will have gained the gratitude, not only of everybody in this country, but of all the nations in Europe. The point, therefore, of the utmost importance at this moment is whether these two objects can be accomplished.
The noble Karl the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs has laid down two conditions as necessary for any permanent settlement of this question. The first is, that Turkey should realise that her administration in practice, whatever it might be in theory, is utterly unsatisfactory; that it is a gross violation of all her treaty obligations, and a menace, not only to the security of her own rule, but to the peace of neighbouring states. The second is that the law-abiding population in that part of the world must be made to understand both the ability and determination of the European Powers to safeguard them against any misgovernment in the future. These are two conditions which may be accepted, so far as they go, as satisfactory by all who are interested in the matter; but the point which follows is, what has been done to satisfy, in any way, these conditions? So far as the Blue-book goes I venture to say that it leaves one on the last page with the idea that nothing has been done to satisfy either of these two conditions. A year has passed 1271 by since the mandate was given to the two Powers in question to carry out the resettlement of this part of the world. It was not until 25th November that they produced, and got the Porte to accept, any scheme of reform which would make matters the least bit better—that scheme, by the way, was put forward in the first instance by the noble Marquess himself—and the Blue-book ends on 28th December without any advance having been made whatever. The Porte merely gave a qualifying acceptance of those proposals of reform-— accepted them, that is to say, in principle—and from that moment to the present, so far as we are aware, nothing whatever has been done in order to get them effectively carried out.
We have always been told that matters have been left to these two countries, because they are most interested in that situation. That, I think, no one could question; but is it not a fact that the mere interest which these two Powers have in that part of the world necessarily prevents them from being as active as one could wish in the cause of reform? My noble friend has said that they are like residuary legatees. If I might pursue that simile, I should say that they are like two trustees who have been left in charge of a ward whose fortune, at his death, would go to them —that is to say, that a man, in leaving his fortune to his successor, and after him to two other persons, had left those two other persons as trustees of the ward during his lifetime. In that case, would not the law have laid down that the mere interest which these two had in the death of that particular person did not make them qualified to be trustees in that situation? It seems to me that these two Powers are exactly in that position, and the very fact of their great interest in that part of the world makes their policy mistrusted rather than trusted. Well, they have at least produced a reform scheme which passes anything that has been proposed up to the present moment, but even that scheme has its short-comings. I should like to get to-day some further information from the noble Marquess with regard to the scheme— some information that will carry us further than the Blue-books which up to the present have been published—and 1272 some assurances as to the means which will be set on foot to get it carried out.
There are, in my opinion, several defects in the scheme. The first is that the Inspector-General, who is to have charge of the administration of the country for the next two years, is himself a Turk, and still subject to the control of the Sultan himself, and the policy which he pursues in the meantime will be a determining factor in his future career. Is it to be hoped that a man in that position, directly connected with the Government of Turkey, can act as independently as an administrator in those circumstances is bound to do? Then, too, the Inspector-General is a man who, so far as I can gather, is not likely to inspire great confidence in the minds of those who are creating disturbances in this part of the world. He has, to a large extent, already forfeited their confidence, and that I consider to be a very vital defect in this scheme of reform. Then there is the further point that the Turkish governors of the three provinces are left entirely independent of him. As your Lordships are probably aware, it is the practice in Turkey for every official to receive his orders direct from the Sultan, and they are enabled in many cases to override those who are placed over them. Therefore, I have very grave doubts whether, with the, best will in the world, this Inspector-General can carry out a very effective administration of the country. Two assessors responsible to the Powers have been placed under him to advise and to watch his actions, but the powers of those two assessors are at present entirely indefinite. That is a matter upon which I hope we may possibly get a little more information, because it seems to me there is great likelihood that they will be referred to in order to justify anything that may happen and in order to share the responsibility of the Inspector-General, without having any power to get their wishes enforced.
Then, with regard to the gendarmerie—the reorganisation of which is satisfactory so far as it goes, what I should like to know is whether, when the reorganisation of the gendarmerie has taken place, the 1273 European officers who have been introduced in order to carry out that reorganisation, will be placed in positions of command, and whether they will be assisted in any way in re-establishing order in the country. I should also like to know how many officers it is proposed should be sent by European Powers to help the gendarmerie to carry out their work. At present, so far as I can make out, there is only one officer sent by the Powers, and, no doubt, while these officers might be useful in reporting what is going on, it cannot be shown that they will be in any way an effective force in reestablishing order. Then there is another point which has not yet been referred to, namely, the exclusion of the vilayet of Adrianople from the scheme of reforms. Here is a case in which not even an attempt at reform has been made. That part of the country has teen left altogether out of consideration. The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs imagines that so successful will be the reforms in the other parts of the Sultan's dominions that the Sultan himself, seeing how satisfactory they are, will be induced to include the part left out in the reorganisation. I cannot help thinking that that is a very sanguine view to take. I have not such confidence in this scheme of reform as laid down at present, to imagine that when it is carried out the Sultan will be so filled with admiration at the result that he will propose to extend it. I regard the exclusion of the vilayet of Adrianople as a serious defect in the scheme. So far as I can make out, no general amnesty is included. I see that in this case it has been replaced by a mixed Commission, both of Christian and Mahomedans, to try those brought before them for political offences. I cannot help thinking that this mixed tribunal of Christians and Mahomedans is not likely to have the same effect which the promise of an amnesty would have; that the absence of this promise is a defect in this particular scheme of reform, and that the scheme will fail altogether to inspire that spirit of confidence which the noble Earl said is so essential to the re-establishment of order.
The noble Marquess the Foreign Minister throughout, these negotiations 1274 has repeatedly reserved to himself the right to propose more important and more far-reaching measures of reform when the moment should arise, and in view of the very critical situation in which we find ourselves I should like to ask him whether that moment has not now arrived. There are two circumstances which do not lead us to have great confidence in the future, which will necessitate still more delays, and will prevent the two Powers in charge from improving the methods which they have adopted in the past. First of all, there is the outbreak of war in the Far East, which must necessarily, to a very large extent, absorb the interest and attention of Russian Ministers; and, secondly, there is the fact that Austria herself is now occupied with internal affairs of very great importance. The Austrian Government has been met by opposition on the part of the Hungarians to her army policy, the result of which is that the Hungarian Parliament has refused to vote the necessary money for the raising of new recruits. No less than five military riots have already taken place, and the Austrian Government is very much occupied in this matter. Beth of the two Powers concerned, in whose charge the affairs of Macedonia have been left, are more occupied at this moment with other affairs than before, and it is not likely that the future will bring any greater precipitancy on their part or will find them more active than they have been in the past; in fact, there is really little doubt that nothing short of a complete change of policy and the adoption of the proposal which the noble Marquess himself made in September Last year will bring about a peaceful solution.
I cannot help feeling some regret that the opinion expressed in the noble Marquess's despatch of 29th September, was not expressed more strongly. But no doubt there were reasons for trying other methods in the first instance. If the noble Marquess is unable to consur in the view that it is necessary now to put forward that alternative scheme, I trust he will give us some reassurance as to the methods which will be employed to carry out the scheme of reforms which has been accepted. The opportunity at 1275 this moment is a favourable one for pressing still further the claims of this country in the Near East. There is the fact that these two Powers are occupied with other matters; there is, further, the fact that this country is regarded with a greater degree of confidence than any other Power by the persons concerned in Macedonia. There have been petitions from the Mahomedans themselves memorialising the British Government to interfere, and reputed petitions have been sent in on the part of the insurgents to His Majesty's Government to the same effect. Then there is the feeling of Turkey herself. Turkey, who in this, as in other matters, remains about fifty years behind the times, still believes that Great Britain is a traditional supporter of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and has, owing to that feeling, great confidence in the British Government; and all the other independent States in that peninsula are beginning to look to Great Britain, as it were, as the defender of their national sentiments. In other words, all the parties concerned do look towards Great Britain with a considerable amount of confidence, and the mere fact that we are not interested in the same sense as the other two Powers gives to the British Government enormous authority on this question.
Many have urged, on the other hand, that the British Government has no interest in interfering in this matter, but I would remind your Lordships that it is a tradition of our Foreign Ministers, and has been ever since the Conference of Berlin, that Great Britain has great interests in the Near East—interests which she must, at all costs, support. It is true that the policy which was adopted by this country at that date has very considerably changed, just in the same sense that the policy of Russia has changed. In the days of the Treaty of Berlin, the policy upheld in this country was one of supporting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which was opposed to the Russian policy of setting up independent States in which Russia could exercise certain control. But from the day that Bulgaria freed herself from this Russian influence, and showed that an independent Power had been established with a considerable amount of influence, from 1276 the days, that is, when Northern and Southern Bulgaria were united and became a strong and independent Power, the policy of these two countries changed. The policy of Russia is merely one of keeping affairs simmering, or still posing as protector to these Slav nationalities, while encouraging the seditions and insurrections which go on in that part of the world. At the same time the policy of this country has, ever since that day, been to maintain the independence of these Powers as far as possible. It was the policy which the late Prime Minister (the Marquess of Salisbury) endeavoured as far as possible to carry out in regard to Armenia. Lord Salisbury, at the time that the Armenian difficulty was at its height, did his best to promote the consolidation of Armenia. He was opposed in that policy by Russia, and was obliged to give way on account of the opposition which was placed in the way by the other Powers. But, although the policy of this country and of Russia has changed since the days of the Berlin Treaty, I do not know why our interests should be less or our methods of protecting them less effective. At that time our interests were put forward and maintained by every effective means, and I would urge that, in so far as we have interests now, they should be put forward and backed up by means no less effective. Therefore, as I have said, I hope we shall get some reassurance that, as regards the present scheme of reforms, at any rate, all the influence of this country will be brought to bear to see that they are most effectively carried out. I would only remind your Lordships once more that the time in which anything can be done is getting very short. The daylight of temporary peace which has been enjoyed in that part of Europe is rapidly drawing to a close, and the night-time of war, bloodshed, and massacre, is rapidly approaching—a time at which all work of reform will necessarily be brought to an end.
§ THE EARL OF ABERDEENMy Lords, I think the House will feel that the noble Lord opposite has done good service in bringing forward this matter, and he has brought to bear his diplomatic 1277 experience in an effective manner in dealing with it. I am sure that the attendance in your Lordships House this afternoon does not adequately represent the feeling in the country regarding the importance and gravity of this subject. I do not pretend that as yet there is a very widespread and vigorous sentiment awakened in the country, but I feel that if there was in regard to Macedonia one-half or one-quarter of the trouble taken and the money spent through the Press and otherwise, in imparting information as there was with regard to affairs in South Africa four years ago, there would have been a very strong feeling indeed created throughout the country. As your Lordships will remember, the agitation which went on in South Africa at that time, nominally in the interests of those who were subjected to grievances, real or imaginary, was supposed to be, not merely on behalf of British subjects, but of all the persons in that region who were affected; in fact, we were told that steps should be taken for the relief of the oppressed. There can be no question about the oppression in the case of the Balkan Peninsula, and, though I am fully in accord with the main drift of my noble friend's statement, I cannot see altogether eye to eye with him in regard to some of his contentions. The noble Lord said that there was an erroneous conception, and added that it had obtained more especially in ecclesiastical circles. Well, I do not know that the impression he referred to is altogether confined to ecclesiastical circles—the impression, that is, that the responsibility in regard to this deplorable state of things primarily or principally rests upon the Turks.
§ LORD NEWTONI said "not solely."
§ THE EARL OF ABERDEENThe noble Lord says it is not correct to refer to the Mussulman persecutions as being solely responsible for the trouble. He also said that the insurgents received no encouragement from a large portion of the population, but I have not understood that these people have, on that account, been exempt from outrage and disabilities at the hands of the Turkish authorities. The noble Earl who spoke second in the debate said it was not of much interest to him to discuss the 1278 question of the balance of criminality; but, surely, that is not a mere academic question. We want to strengthen the hands of the noble Marquess in whatever action he may take on behalf of His Majesty's Government in pressing for reforms. You cannot put pressure on insurgents; you can only put pressure on a Government, and the Government you have to deal with is the Turkish Government. The House will fully agree that the manner in which the so-called negotiations and measures of reform have been conducted by the Russian and the Austrian Governments leaves much to be regretted.
With regard to the simile that has been used, I am reminded of the incident of a sick man who said to a visitor as he entered the sick room "Did you meet the doctors in the hall? They have just gone." "Oh, yes," he said. "What was their opinion of my case?" inquired the invalid. "Well," replied the visitor, perhaps too candidly, "they cannot agree about you, but they say it will all be plain at the post-mortem." No doubt Turkey is pretty astute as to the attitude of Russia and Austria, and the Turks are not very likely to be highly influenced by Powers which are supposed to have that kind of interest in the provinces in question. As to the main essential point, the powers which ought to be placed in the Inspector-General who is to carry out the reforms, I think we all feel that it is now amply evident that what is needed is that he should have a large measure of independence of the Turkish Government and should be under the joint authority of the Governments interested, including that of Great Britain.
The noble Earl opposite said that Great Britain has a peculiar interest in this question. Of course we have permanent and immense interests in the whole matter, and we also have great responsibility. It is absolutely certain that those representing Turkey—I do not say always with the authority of Turkey—have committed, not only persecution, but intolerable outrages on women and children—outrages an account of the nature of which it would be impossible to read in any public assembly. The insurgents have not been guilty in the same degree. 1279 These unspeakable crimes have been committed nominally under the cegis and auspices of the Turkish Government; and therefore I earnestly join in the hope that the noble Marquess, although he may not feel able to announce what particular steps he is recommending the Government to take, will be able to give us some assurance that the Government will not tolerate a continuance of these crimes but will insist on the reforms which have been indicated being carried out.
* THE LORD BISHOP OF ROCHESTERMy Lords, I desire to say a few words on this important question. I do not know whether the noble Lord who opened the debate will altogether welcome any support that might come to him from these Benches.
§ LORD NEWTONOh, certainly.
* THE LORD BISHOP OF ROCHESTERThe noble Lord referred to a natural ecclesiastical feeling. Well, my Lords, the word "ecclesiastical" is capable of a larger or a smaller denotation, and certainly if I or any other Bishop speaking here, represent an amount of ecclesiastical feeling in the narrower sense, I think it may be even more confidently asserted that he represents it in the largest sense possible.
§ LORD NEWTONI beg the right rev. Prelate's pardon, but I did not use the word "ecclesiastical" in any offensive sense.
* THE LORD BISHOP OF ROCHESTERI quite understand that. What I have chiefly in my mind is the condition of feeling in the country, and I am quite certain that, if those whom I directly represent feel acutely on the matter, those with whom I am not accustomed to act in many matters feel even more acutely—in other words that the Christian sentiment of the country has been deeply moved in this matter. Is there any fault in this? We feel, as Englishmen, sympathy immediately there is the least touch of injury to the honour or the interests of England. May we not as Christians feel as quickly for those who are linked to us in faith? But though it is true that we sympathise The Earl of Aberdeen. 1280 very specially with our fellow-Christians, our hearts go out to all sufferers, irrespective of religion or nationality. Yet I think that public feeling finds less expression, it would, from the very fact that the case is proved up to the hilt. It is pathetic when sufferings cease to move us only because they are so familiar and the arguments cease to bite only because we are so accustomed to their force. That is the case in this instance. But some people I know withhold their sympathy because the crimes of both sides are of a piece. What is the answer to that? The first that it is not true. It is among the debts which we owe to the noble Marquess that he has put this on record in his reply to the outrageous attempt of the Turkish Government to arrest our relief measures. The noble Marquess wrote—
I have no hesitation in saying that the ruin and destruction brought about by Turkish soldiers are greater than any resulting from the action of Bulgarian bands.Secondly, if the bands have committed crimes, it is the unhappy people upon whom the sufferings and vengence fall. But I go further and I say that even if it is admitted that those who represent the revolutionary committees have done a great deal that was bad—and undoubtedly they have—still when we consider the history, and what the treatment of these provinces has been, is, and I am afraid looks as if for some time it will be, we must not judge them too severely. What I think people sometimes forget is that the dominant factor of the situation for many decades past has been the rule of a Power which our leading public men of all Parties have as it were taxed their vocabulary to characterise; and when we turn to the conduct of those who have suffered from having that Power over them what can we expect to find? Do we expect to find an advanced state of civilisation, of frankness, or of openness of behaviour? When people ask me to consider the behaviour of the Bulgarians it is that which I have in my mind.A friend of mine told me yesterday that he did not think opinion was strongly moved because people said to themselves that these men, after all, were rebels, and rebels generally ought to 1281 be put down. I do not know whether many members of your Lordships' House will accept either the opinion or the authority if I recall what I remember hearing Mr. Gladstone say towards the end of his life. He said that whereas he had started by believing that in any case of collision between the rulers of a country and its subjects, the probabilities were nine to one that the rulers were right and the subjects wrong, he had ended by thinking that the case was exactly contrary. I do not think, however, that we need fall back on any generalisation of that kind, for it is absurd to talk about rebels when they have to serve under such a Government. What astonishes me is that any should judge the case without remembering that it is only one chapter more in a long and tragic history. In that history we have the same ghastly recurrences of cruelty, the same repetitions of diplomatic delays, the same suggested doubts on the part of, perhaps cynical, or, at least, critical opinion in our own country, and all the while the terrible undernote of both chronic and periodical suffering on the part of the population in these provinces. I wish we could have it brought before us in this House with the eloquence of some who have once sat upon its Benches, what that history is, and how it bears upon the case to-day. In my opinion it is idle to suppose that the troubles in the Balkan provinces can be removed except by practically neutralising the power of Turkey over the territory which she oppresses. I read a phrase used by the noble Earl the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in another place, that "what is required in the Turkish provinces is not political change so much as thorough administrative reorganisation." I do not want to quarrel with a phrase, and if the administrative reorganisation is to get the Turk out of the way altogether, and only save his face and pay him compliments, then I can accept the noble Earl's phrase; but if it means anything short of that, it would appear to me a going back to the old state of things which has deceived us so often.
None of us can seriously doubt that the honour and duty of England are deeply involved in the existing state of affairs. Noble Lords have shown with 1282 humour and with seriousness what must, I think, be plain to all men, about the will and power of the two Powers to which the matter has been left. On the one side it looks to the outsider like a long farce; but, on the other, we know it has been a long tragedy of the most ghastly kind. Whether the noble Marquess has the power—I should not doubt that he had the will—to terminate this by some action of a more reasonable, commonsense, and practical sort, of course we outside cannot tell. But possibly the present condition of things which makes the hands of Russia full in the Far East will make it palpably clear that nothing really is to be hoped from the prolongation of the action that has already been so futile, and I hope, therefore, that the noble Marquess, true to the best instincts of English feeling and the noblest parts of British tradition, and appealing to what is generous in the minds of the great Mediterranean Powers, may be able even now, to do something to establish in those lands a real rule, impartial, ordered, and strong, and so to bring about the deliverance of these unhappy peoples.
§ * THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEMy Lords, I feel sure that there can be but one opinion in this House as to the value of the debate to which we have just had the privilege of listening; and although there are, no doubt, some occasions when Ministers would gladly be spared the trouble of stating a Government case, I certainly feel that upon this occasion the speeches which have been delivered will strengthen our hands and give us courage in the course which we have been endeavouring to pursue, and I think also place us in a better position to pursue it with success. My noble friend who spoke first gave your Lordships a very interesting review of the recent history of affairs in the Balkan Peninsula. The noble Lord, using an unofficial freedom which I am afraid I cannot venture to imitate, belaboured—I will not say indis criminately—all the parties to these unhappy transactions. He complained of the dilatoriness of the two Powers, of the stupidity of the Turkish Government, of the provocative tactics of the insurgents, and the excesses of the Turkish troops. I think there was reason for 1283 most of the complaints which he made; and when I consider how he laid about him, I am all the more grateful, because he not only spared me from a share in the blows, but gave me a few kindly words of encouragement and support.
I venture to agree with the noble Earl as to the futility of endeavouring to determine exactly how the responsibility for these terrible events should be distributed. I agree with the right rev. Prelate in believing that, at any rate within the last few months, the balance has inclined heavily on the Turkish side. I fancy that my noble friend Lord Newton who, with the frankness that characterises him, does not conceal his leaning towards Turkey, must have welcomed the first Blue-book as bearing out the view which he has sometimes supported in this House; but when he came to peruse the terrible tale in the pages of the second Blue-book he must have felt that it was no longer possible to represent these occurrences as entirely due to the agitation and the machinations of what we speak of as the Bulgarian bands. The fact is that we are surrounded by a vicious circle. On the one hand you have chronic and grievous misgovernment, which provokes and leads to outrage and agitation, and on the other you have the fact that the prevalence of this agitation renders the application of reforms doubly difficult. The question we have to consider is, what can His Majesty's Government do to bring about some improvement in a state of things which to all of us has appeared for a long time past intolerable.
But, my Lords, while I share the fierce indignation which these events have provoked, I desire to say one or two words as to the amount of responsibility which attaches to this country. I do not think stress has been laid on the point this evening, but it is constantly said that an extra share of responsibility devolves upon this country for the condition of affairs in the Balkan Peninsula. We are constantly told that it is due to our action in particular that in 1878 the Macedonian provinces were handed back to the tender mercies of the Turkish Government; and we are represented as having washed our hands of Macedonia and remained indifferent to its fate. 1284 That is, I think, a libel upon our country. The fact is that the Treaty of Berlin, which certainly withdrew a considerable portion of the European dominions of Turkey altogether from the control of that Power, abounded in provisions of precaution for the welfare of those parts of the Turkish Empire which were still left under Turkish authority. In particular, the 23rd Clause provided for the institution of local commissions which were to elaborate statutes and regulations for the future government of those parts of the Turkish Empire. Other provisions had reference to Eastern Rumelia and the Asiatic provinces of Turkey. But I confine myself for the moment to Macedonia. It is the greatest mistake to suppose that the Government of this country allowed those provisions of the Treaty of Berlin to be set aside or neglected. The records of the Foreign Office show a continuous series of efforts to give effect and reality to them. Throughout 1878 and 1879 we were constantly pressing for the production of these organic statutes. Local commissions were appointed, which displayed a most portentous amount of industry. At one moment a draft was in existence containing no less than 900 sections. In the beginning of 1880 the report of the local commissions were received, and they were referred to the European Commission which, under the treaty, had been formed for the purpose of providing an organic statute for the province of Eastern Rumelia. The Commission examined the report, and recommended its partial adoption; and the British Government in which the late Lord Granville was Foreign Secretary issued a circular to the Powers pressing them to put the new statute into force as soon as possible. But the Powers were half-hearted; the Porte was characteristically reluctant; then came troubles in Greece, then troubles in Montenegro, and then the Egyptian question, and the organic statute quietly sunk out of sight in the quicksands of European diplomacy. The attempt to secure improved administration of the Asiatic provinces of Turkey had very much the same fate. But no effort was neglected, so far as the Government of this country was concerned. There are on record vigorous warnings from Lord 1285 Granville, from Lord Rosebery, and later on from Lord Salisbury. But again there arose international complications and troubles, and nothing was done. I have dwelt upon this chapter of history because there are conclusions to be drawn from it which are worth noting. In the first place, I think it shows that this country, at any rate, spared no effort to induce the other Powers to give effect to the provisions of the Berlin Treaty; and in the next place I cannot help thinking that the humiliating failure of all these remonstrances and negotiations shows that the European Concert is not always a very effective piece of machinery for bringing about practical measures of reform. Count Goluchowski lately spoke strongly of the cumbrous inefficiency of the European Concert as an instrument of reform. And when my noble friends animadvert so severely upon the failure of the two Powers concerned in the dual scheme, I think they should remember that the only alternative was a further recourse to the cumbrous machinery of the European concert, the results of which have shown themselves so disappointing in the past.
Now, even if there had been no question of treaty obligations in this matter, I entirely agree with what was said by the right rev. Prelate to the effect that it is our duty as a great Christian Power to do what we can to bring about a solid amelioration of the condition of things in the Balkan Peninsula. We have been told that the scheme put forward by Austria-Hungary and Russia is unsatisfactory and disappointing. Let me point out to those who criticise that scheme that it is the easiest thing in the world to draw up on paper a scheme for the reform of the European provinces of Turkey; but it is when you come to put a scheme of that kind into execution that your troubles begin. If you have got a clean slate to start with, if you can first pull down, it is not so difficult afterwards to build up; but in this case the ground is occupied; you have to deal with the existing Government of the Porte and its notorious recalcitrancy; you have to consider the susceptibilities of the other Powers; and lastly, but not least, you have 1286 to take into account the rivalries and animosities, often of the most pitiless kind, of the different races by whom that part of the Turkish Empire is occupied. We were in this position. We were offered in the beginning of last year the scheme of the two Powers which, from their geographical position and their political interests, were most immediately concerned. What were we to do? It has sometimes been suggested that His Majesty's Government, believing as they did that the scheme fell short of what is required, should have taken a line of their own and acted for themselves. My Lords, I say with deep conviction that I cannot conceive of any course of action which would have been less likely to bring about a speedy relief to the suffering Macedonians. We knew exactly how the matter was regarded by the other Powers. Russia and Austria-Hungary were, of course, deeply committed to their own project. Germany had made it plain that she had no desire to take an active part in pressing that or any other scheme upon the Turkish Government. France had officially undertaken to support the two Powers; and Italy, though I believe cordially anxious, then as now, to co-operate with us in giving reality to those reforms, had also declared herself for the time being content to accept the joint scheme. We should have had to act absolutely by ourselves; and I fail to see how any action of ours could have had the effect of bringing about what we most desire—the prompt relief of the suffering population of Macedonia. Any such action would have had one effect which I think you will agree with me would have been deplorable. It would have shown to the Turkish Government that there was discord amongst the Great Powers. We have, any at rate, in supporting the scheme of the two Powers, and endeavouring to improve it, been able to show a solid front to the Turkish Government, not I think, without good results.
The noble Earl on the Back Bench criticised the Murzsteg scheme. I will not deal with his criticisms because I think most of them are criticisms which I have made myself and which are officially recorded in the Bine-book. But the scheme was the best we could get, and I humbly 1287 conceive it was our duty to give it all the encouragement we could and to make it as effectual as possible. The noble Earl expressed the hope that I should be able to tell your Lordships something of the progress which has been made in giving effect to the programme of the two Powers. I think something has been accomplished. In the first place, we may fairly say that the appearance of the Murzsteg scheme had one important result, I mean the disbanding of the large force of irregular troops which the Turkish Government had during the summer maintained in the Balkan Peninsula. It certainly seems to me, judging from these Papers, that the falling off in the number of outrages and excesses coincided with the disbandment of the Ilaveh battalions, of which a large number throughout the year had been in occupation of Macedonia. Then the noble Earl made rather light of the appointment of the two European assessors. We did not regard their appointment as by any means an ideal arrangement; we agreed to accept it as an alternative for the more thoroughgoing and far-reaching arrangement which was indicated in our despatch. We hear, however, that the assessors are at this moment actually engaged at work, and we hope that good results may come from their efforts. But the point on which, for my part, I am most inclined to rely is the reorganisation of the Macedonian gendarmerie. I place that measure in the front rank in point of importance, be-cause if we can put the gendarmerie upon a satisfactory footing we shall at any rate have something concrete to which we can point, and something which is not merely a paper reform.
Progress has certainly been made with regard to the gendarmerie. The Italian General has taken up his duties, and at this moment a number of staff officers, one deputed by each of the Powers, are engaged in the preparation of a scheme for the reorganisation of the force Their meetings have, we hear, passed off satisfactorily, and although I cannot announce to your Lordships the final shape which their proposals have taken I am able to say that they are about to put forward a scheme under which the gendarmerie will be divided into 1288 a certain number of battalions, each battalion to be officered by officers deputed by a European Power, and entrusted with the custody of a particular section of the country. That seems to me to be a practical and business-like arrangement which ought to work well. We have already selected a certain number of British officers, I think six or eight is the number which has been spoken of, and I hope that before we are many days older it may be possible to send them out, and to place them at once in a position to commence the discharge of their duties.
§ LORD NEWTONWho will pay them?
§ * THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEThey will be paid by the Turkish Government; but we propose that it should be arranged that they should not be liable to dismissal by the Turkish Government. I need not point out that the presence of a large number of European officers in Macedonia will be of the greatest value, not merely on account of the service which they will be able to render to the gendarmerie, but also because they will be there as trustworthy witnesses upon whom we shall be able to rely for some account of the manner in which events are passing in the country. I should also mention that the Turkish Government has assigned revenues, to the extent of £250,000, to provide a financial basis for putting the reorganised force on a proper footing. The noble Earl who spoke second suggested to me that the moment had come when we might brush aside the imperfect and inadequate proposals of the two Powers, and when we might put forward for acceptance more far-reaching proposals of our own. My Lords, we have from the first contemplated that it might become necessary for us to adopt this course; but I am bound to say that this particular moment seems to me to be ill-chosen for any such demonstration on our part. I hope I am not too sanguine, but I believe that in spite of all the delays that have taken place we never were nearer to the achievement of a certain amount of satisfactory progress than we are at this moment. If the gendarmerie can be reorganised, it is not too mch to hope that the people 1289 of the Balkan Peninsula who are watching these events with so much anxiety may be reassured, and may be content to abstain from any action calculated to produce a fresh crisis at the beginning of the spring. I may be too sanguine, but I do earnestly hope that the experiment which is now being tried, and to which we are to some extent committed, will be given a fair trial. If it be, and if, after having received such a trial, fails to produce the results which we anticipate then I think noble Lords will be amply justified in reminding the Government of the pledges which they have given, and in calling upon them to put forward more drastic and more thorough measures of reform for these long-suffering provinces.
§ * EARL SPENCERMy Lords, I do not like this very interesting debate to close without making some observations on the part of those with whom I usually sit. I think the House may be congratulated on the remarkable debate that has taken place. I believe that the debate has on the whole truly represented the almost unanimous feeling which exists in this country on this great question at the present moment. What the country requires is that every effort that this Government and every other Christian and civilised Government can make, should be made to put an end, once for all, to the gross and grave disturbances which have occurred in the Balkan Peninsula. The noble Lord who opened the debate argued, I think, that the condition of those provinces was so acute and so dangerous that a complete reform must be made there. I welcome that statement from the noble Lord, for I fancy that on previous occasions he did not press so hardly on Turkey as some of us have done. The noble Lord mentioned one of the reasons why I think such heavy blame rests on Turkey, and why, as long as Turkey holds her power without restraint in these districts, there will always be great danger to the liberty and happiness of the people.
The noble Lord said that when we consider the agents of Turkey we must, perhaps, make some excuse for her. That is one of the grave considerations connected with this subject. In reference to these agents of Turkey, who have brought about disastrous results, it must 1290 be remembered that Turkey has brought into the European Provinces Asiatics whose ways are barbarous to the extremest degree; and she has also brought wild tribes on the West of Macedonia, the Albanian regiments, who, I think, are very little better. This is one of the reasons why I think pressure ought to be brought to bear on the Government of Turkey. We had the pleasure of listening to an eloquent speech from the noble Earl who spoke second in the debate. He brought forward, in a most lucid way, all the arguments that could be adduced from the Blue-books and from other sources to show the grave state of affairs existing in Macedonia. Then we had a speech which, I think, everyone in this House heard with the greatest pleasure, and which I am sure will be reechoed throughout the country—I refer to the speech of the right rev. Prelate. I am sure that in the eloquent language which he used the right rev. Prelate voiced the feelings of the whole of the Episcopal Bench. He spoke most nobly as to the duties of England in this matter, and I fully share his view. I his country has a deep and heavy responsibility.
The noble Marquess in his speech—and there is very little that I wish to seriously criticise in that speech—made some reference to what he called the extra share of responsibility which people sometimes say attaches to the British Government in this matter. I must say I feel very strongly that we have an extra share of responsibility. The noble Marquess referred to the clauses in the Treaty of Berlin, and told us how Secretary of State after Secretary of State had urged that these provisions should be carried out, and the noble Marquess seemed to think that with the representations that have been made TO get the provisions of that treaty carried out we have relieved ourselves of our share of responsibility. That, no doubt, is quite correct with regard to the Treaty of Berlin? but the noble Marquess did not refer to the heavy responsibility which rested on this country with regard to the revocation and withdrawal of the previous treaty that had all but been wrung from Turkey by the Russian Government—I mean the Treaty of San 1291 Stefano. If that treaty had been carried out, would all these horrors and all this mismanagement have taken place? I think that in this respect alone we have a very heavy responsibility, and I venture to differ from the noble Marquess when he said we hardly had that extra share of responsibility which many people chose to put upon us.
§ * THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNENot a greater share of responsibility than any other Power.
§ * EARL SPENCERWell, I do not know. It has always been one of the boasts of our friends opposite that they had the principal share of responsibility in doing away practically with the San Stefano arrangement. The noble Lord referred to Austria and Russia as being in the position of residuary legatees, having no great interest in carrying forward the negotiations and in bringing them to an issue. Well, I hardly understand that. I hey may have been dilatory in carrying out their scheme of reform, but I cannot think, as Lord Newton seems to imply, that these two Powers, which are by their geographical position in so much greater contact with the disturbed provinces than any other Power, can have any interest whatever in prolonging the unfortunate state of difficulty and difference. I cannot help thinking that their wish would be to see peace and good government reigning in that part of the world. We all know that Russia, in consequence of the unfortunate events that are going on in the Far East, will have her hands very full, and that may make a considerable difference in the amount of pressure which she will be able to bring to bear on Turkey in this matter. I sincerely trust that in that event other Powers will step in and supply the necessary pressure, and that reforms in Macedonia will not suffer by what is going on elsewhere. I entirely associate myself with what the right rev. Prelate so well said in regard to many passages in the noble Marquess's despatches. I think the greatest possible praise must be given to the noble Marquess, and I feel I cannot use too strong words of praise for the very noble and dignified reproof which he gave to the Turkish Government when they 1292 appealed to him not to protect those who were going from this country to relieve the unfortunate people who are suffering in Macedonia, and I am quite sure the whole country will be grateful to him for the attitude and the line which he took up in this respect. The noble Marquess referred to the fact that the Austrian Foreign Minister had commented upon the cumbrous inefficiency of the European concert. We know what the noble Marquess the late Foreign Secretary said with regard to the European concert—that it was like a steam roller, very powerful, but very slow. I rather gathered that the noble Marquess was hoping to bring greater pressure to bear on the European concert. It would be interesting to know how he can bring that pressure to bear upon it. I remember how the European concert was outdone entirely by another method in the case of Crete. I am afraid that can hardly be done on this occasion. The European concert was unable to effect reforms which were required in Crete, but they were carried out efficiently by a distinguished friend of mine, a gallant naval officer who at that time was in command of our ships there. The late Lord Salisbury at that time gave very high praise to the efficacy of naval diplomacy. He praised Admiral Noel in that way. But I am afraid the noble Marquess will hardly get the assistance of the Navy in Macedonia. That distinguished and gallant officer is now in a very difficult place, for I rather think he commands, or is about to command, our Fleet in China. I was glad to hear from the noble Marquess a repetition of what he said some time ago with regard to a Christian Governor-General. But unfortunately, on that occasion he gave the two Powers an alternative, and they took the lesser of the two, and instead of following the much wiser advice of the noble Marquess by pressing for the appointment of a Christian Governor-General who should act independently, they were content with two assessors.
I sincerely trust that the noble Marquess will be able to renew his representations as to the appointment of a Christian Governor-General to the two Powers, especially as they seem almost inclined now to follow his advice. I fear that 1293 without that being done there is little chance of the establishment of good government in the country. The noble Marquess attaches immense importance to the proper and efficient reorganisation of the gendarmerie; but I fear, from what we hear, that the appointment of the distinguished Italian general has been so recent that he will hardly have time, before the spring comes on, to have the force in working order. I sincerely trust, however, that the hopes of the noble Marquess may be realised, because the establishment of a thoroughly good gendarmerie would conduce more than anything else to a satisfactory settlement of the country. I noticed with satisfaction that the noble Marquess does not consider that the proposals made by the two Powers are adequate for what is required. All I can say is that I am quite sure the country will support him with vigour and enthusiasm if he presses forward with all the strength and influence of His Majesty's Government such changes as will make the reforms adequate.
§ LORD NEWTONMy Lords, I have no intention of detaining your Lordships, but I should like to remind my noble friend the Foreign Minister that he has not said whether he is going to lay any further Papers or not. With regard to the measures upon which the noble Marquess relies for the preservation of peace, I only desire to make one observation. It is this—and I think everyone present will agree with me—that these measures to be really effective ought to have been put in operation months ago by the Austrian and Russian Governments. As to the speech of my noble friend, I will only say I hope he will be justified in the somewhat optimistic view he takes of the future.
§ * THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEWe shall present further Papers, but I do not think immediately. When my noble friend put his notice down at the beginning of the session he had only one of the two Blue-books in his possession. The second Blue-book has been presented since his notice was on the Paper.
§ Motion, by leave of the House, withdrawn.