§ THE EARL OF CREWEMy Lords, I rise to ask His Majesty's Government under what regulations and restrictions the ships-of-war of Foreign Powers are admitted to British and colonial harbours and coaling stations; whether any change has recently been made in respect to such regulations and restrictions; under what conditions British ships-of-war are admitted to the harbours and coaling stations of Foreign Powers; and to move for Papers. This subject is one which involves various points of considerable difficulty and great delicacy in relation to international politics, but it is one which is altogether removed from the domain of party controversy; and I hope to be able to show your Lordships that it is one which merits the attention of His Majesty's Government. The question has this peculiarity, that it concerns a number of public Departments. It concerns, of course, both the Admiralty and the War Office—the two Departments responsible for the defence of our harbours and coaling stations. It concerns the Foreign Office, because it deals, as I said, with delicate points of international policy. It concerns the Colonial Office, because many of these places are under the jurisdiction of that Department, and last, but not least, it concerns the Committee of Imperial Defence, over which the noble Duke the Leader of the House presides, and from the re-organised labours of which we all hope so much. I think that if any excuse were required for bringing forward the question, the facts I have mentioned would be sufficient excuse, because questions which concern more Departments than one are just those most likely to escape due attention.
With regard to the first two Questions I have placed on the Paper, I cannot do better than instance a case which came recently under my own observation. The other day, in our harbour of Colombo, there was present for nine days a squadron belonging to a friendly Power, consisting of eleven ships of war. The sight of so many foreign flags in the harbour, and so many foreign faces in the streets, might make one doubt whether one were in a British possession at all. But, that, of course, is merely a matter of sentiment. What is important is the 1064 fact that, if that friendly Power had been transformed into a hostile Power, there could not be, I think, the slightest question that the port of Colombo would have been absolutely at the mercy of that squadron. The squadron consisted of one battleship of nearly 13,000 tons, three cruisers ranging from 6,700 to 7,200 tons, and seven destroyers — all ships very powerfully armed and of the latest pattern. Their complement of crews could not, I imagine, have been less than 2,500 men, and among their armaments were four 12-inch guns, and upwards of thirty 6-inch guns. The available force, so far as I know, for the whole of the Island of Ceylon consists of two battalions of British infantry and one battalion of native infantry, and, so far as the defences of Colombo are concerned, of a battery and a half of artillery. Therefore, this foreign force, in the event of its developing hostile intentions, must have become the master of this supremely important place. It should further be mentioned that a squadron lying in the harbour does not come under the guns of the batteries of Colombo at all. I am not acquainted with the details of the defences of Colombo, and if I were I imagine it would not be proper to describe them in this House. But to anybody who has seen the place, it is evident that if such a squadron came under fire of any of the guns of the batteries it would only be at the risk, in firing on this fleet, of destroying the principal buildings in the town.
I need not dilate, I think, on what the fall of Colombo at the beginning of a war would mean to the Empire. The moral effect of such a loss would be enormous. The relations between Ceylon and India, especially Southern India, are exceedingly close, owing to the fact that hundreds of thousands of coolies pass backwards and forwards from India to Ceylon for the purposes of the tea plantations in the island; and I think it is not overstating the case to say that the fall of Colombo would be regarded in India as as great a misfortune as the capture of one of the Indian seaport towns. Again you must remember that Colombo is a very important link in the chain of our fortified possessions between this country and the East. From Aden to Colombo is a distance of 2,093 miles; 1065 from Colombo to Singapore, the next important port on the way to the far East, is 1,673 miles, making a total of 3,766 miles; and I do not know if my noble friend the First Lord of the Admiralty will contradict me when I say that I imagine there are very few ships in His Majesty's Fleet, except one or two cruisers, which are capable of making a journey of 3,766 miles without a stop for coaling. It is, of course, true that Colombo is not the naval station for that part of the world. The naval station there is Trincomalee, but it is a question, I think, how far, under the possible circumstances that I have indicated, Trincomalee would be available for the purposes of the Fleet. For one thing, Trincomalee is nearly 100 miles from the railway. A hostile squadron in the harbour of Colombo would be on the flank of our reinforcements sent out to the East, and it must further be remembered that if some of the heavy guns which I have mentioned were landed from a hostile fleet, Colombo would be made almost impregnable from the sea. I mention Colombo as a single instance, but I am not sure that the observations I have made do not apply with varying degrees of force to other places, particularly to Hong-Kong, and possibly to some extent to Singapore, Mauritius, and the Cape of Good Hope.
I ask your Lordships to consider a hypothetical case, which can be put, I think, by a private Member of your Lordships' House, without involving an offence to any foreign Power. Suppose it to be the case, as it is now, I am given to understand, that these powerful foreign squadrons have unrestricted access to the inner harbours of our important coaling stations; suppose that negotiations of an anxious and critical character were taking place between ourselves and some foreign Power on a question which might conceivably lead to war; and suppose by a singular coincidence that at the moment of those negotiations a powerful foreign squadron appeared off one of those harbours. If it is the invariable habit to admit them in times of peace, would it be possible to exclude them when negotiations of that kind were going on? If it became known 1066 that a foreign fleet had been excluded from a British port, the fact would be telegraphed all over the world; the effect would be felt in every Bourse in Europe, and it is possible that a war which might otherwise have been avoided would be precipitated. It may be said that wars are not declared offhand, and that it would be possible, and, indeed, easy, when war was pending, to refuse these facilities to a foreign fleet; but, after all, there have been in history such things as coups de main of a successful kind before wars have been declared. I would mention the action of this country in 1807 against the Danish fleet, and the action of France against China in 1884, while conflicting negotiations were pending and war had not been declared. What has happened once or twice might conceivably happen again, and it cannot be disputed that in some of our colonial ports considerable local uneasiness exists as to possible danger. I would, therefore, add to my Questions one of which I have given the noble Lord opposite private notice—whether any representations have been received from responsible authorities at any of these ports expressing a sense of danger such as I have indicated, and if so, what has been the nature of those representations? So far as I know at present no leave is asked before a foreign squadron of any strength enters one of these colonial harbours, all that is necessary being to ask formal leave of the harbour master, who, of course, is merely guided by the amount of shipping in the harbour at the time, and the possibility of berthing the ships in a convenient way.
Such being the position, the question arises, how do you propose to meet it? I should like to guard myself against being supposed to favour the principle which I know is advocated by some persons interested in the defence of the Empire, that every possible place that might be attacked in time of war should be fortified. There is a school—I think it is chiefly a military school — who would like to see Brighton bristling with big guns, and would urge the noble Duke, in his double capacity of ground landlord of Eastbourne and Chairman of the Committee on Imperial Defence, to turn that watering place 1067 into a sort of Cherbourg. I have no sympathy with those views. But there are two main sea roads, so to speak, with the defence of which we are absolutely concerned; the one, of course, being the route through the Suez Canal, on which our points are Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Colombo, Singapore, and Hong-Kong; the other the route round the Cape, in which the Southern Seas are reached by way of Cape Town and Mauritius. I therefore leave out of consideration altogether any desire to fortify strongly Australasian and West Indian ports, because I believe, from an Imperial point of view, those places are not likely to be seriously involved in any naval war in which we might unhappily be engaged. That being so, there are, it seems to me, three courses open to us—namely, to make the Fleet everywhere so strong that foreign fleets will have no chance of undertaking such operations as I have suggested, to make each place absolutely impregnable in spite of the admission of foreign men-of-war, or to exclude foreign men-of-war altogether from our harbours. As to strengthening the Fleet, it is very doubtful, in the first place, whether any strengthening of the Fleet would succeed in preventing such a coup de main as I have indicated; in the second place I believe it is a maxim of naval strategy that a fleet ought not to be tethered to a port; in the third place it seems to me that it would be more annoying to foreign Powers even than to be excluded from our harbours to have their movements perpetually dogged by a superior fleet in time of peace; and, lastly, in the case of the East India station, the unhealthiness of the station and the impossibility of escaping from extreme hot weather would make it very undesirable to strengthen the Fleet there to any great extent. The second alternative, to make the ports absolutely impregnable, would involve a very large expenditure of money; and consequently I proceed to the third alternative, the exclusion of foreign ships of war from our harbours. This, in my opinion, would be very unwise. In the first place because it would be an act of marked national discourtesy, and in the second place because we should thereby drive 1068 foreign Powers to acquire ports of their own in the Far East and other parts of the world.
The conclusion that I arrive at is that it is necessary in order to secure our safety to combine to some extent the second and third alternatives—that is to say, to increase, probably by degrees, the fortified strength of such important harbours and coaling stations as are at present unsafe under the conditions which I have described, and until that can be done, to place some sort of limitation upon the number of foreign men-of-war to be admitted to any harbour when in the opinion of those qualified to judge there is a risk of its falling into an enemy's hands in the event of war. The fact that foreign Powers do to some extent exclude our ships of war from their harbours has an important bearing on the reciprocal arrangements that may be made. If they exclude us they cannot complain if we place a limit upon them. For instance, I believe that we are excluded altogether from Port Arthur without express permission. I have tried to avoid painting a picture in anything like lurid or sensational colours; but there is a prevalent idea that we are more careless and indifferent in these matters than foreign countries, and are apt to treat these dangers in a more happy-go-lucky manner. The extent of our Empire, and the uncertainty as to the form naval warfare in the future may take, make it imperative, in my opinion, that we should not run any risks. It is just because we are at this moment on good terms with foreign Powers that it seems to me it would be possible to approach the whole question without giving offence in any quarter. In any case I venture to think the question is worthy of the careful consideration of the Committee of Defence, and I hope I may be assured by the noble Earl opposite that such consideration is being fully given to it.
§ Moved, "That there be laid before the House Papers relating to the regulations and restrictions under which the ships of war of Foreign Powers are admitted to British and Colonial harbours and coaling stations; and the conditions under which British ships of war are admitted to the harbours and coaling stations of Foreign Powers."—(The Earl of Crewe.)
1069§ THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (The Earl of SELBORNE)My Lords, my noble friend is quite accurate in charging the Government of this country, using that term as embracing all parties, with a rather haphazard method of dealing with the class of questions which he has brought to your Lordships' notice. But it so happens that this question is one of the exceptions. This is a question that has not been neglected; on the contrary, it has been the subject of frequent and continuous consideration. There have been several changes in the practice of this country in this matter. Up to the year 1887 there were practically no restrictions as to the admission of foreign men-of-war to our ports. In that year, after prolonged consideration between the different Departments concerned, a code of regulations was drawn up restricting the access of foreign men-of-war to our ports, and those regulations were in operation for six years. In 1893, in the light of the experience gained, the subject was again considered with great care and deliberation, and with the concurrence of the colonial authorities, the restrictions were abolished. That was the policy deliberately adopted by the Government of which my noble friend was a member, and adhered to by subsequent Governments. As to the practice of other Powers, so far as I am aware no Power forbids foreign men-of-war to visit their ports. In the case of one or two there are strict regulations in respect of the number of ships that may come at one time without notice, but in most cases I believe there are no regulations or restrictions at all. The noble Earl mentioned Port Arthur as a place to which he understood British ships were not admitted. I am not aware of that restriction; on the contrary, curiously enough, I received a letter only the other day from the British Admiral Commanding-in-Chief on the China station stating where he was going to cruise, and announcing his intention, if possible, of paying a visit to Port Arthur during that cruise. I may say that although it is true that the foreign Powers who mainly use our ports are not those whose ports it is necessary for us freely to use in the ordinary course of the work of the Navy, 1070 yet we do benefit very largely indeed from the hospitality of other Powers who give us perfectly free and unrestricted access to their ports; and, therefore, from the general principle of mutual hospitality of Navy to Navy, our share of gain is very large indeed.
The general view of the Government is that it is to the general interest that friendly Powers should be very accommodating to each other in this matter. Generally, it is certainly to our interest that this interchange of hospitality should exist with as few restrictions as possible. The noble Earl mentioned a rather unusual case of which he had been witness, that of eleven ships of war of a friendly Power lying for some days in the harbour of Colombo. That, I believe, was a completely exceptional case, and one arising altogether from accidental causes. I certainly have never heard of so large a visit of the ships of a friendly Power to one port except as a matter of special invitation, and I do not think it can be taken as any indication of the extent to which these privileges are generally used. The noble Earl has assumed the case of a period of tension between this country and another Power, and has asked what is to hinder that Power, while we were still at peace, from sending a squadron into one of our harbours, and either anticipating by a few hours the outbreak of war by a coup de main, or waiting there inside our defences till war was declared, in order to inflict a great blow to our prestige, and pro tanto to diminish the value of that port as an accessory of our Navy. I admit that the case is conceivable, but there are considerations which make such action very unlikely. I cannot conceive, in a period of tension, any Power being so foolish as to risk sending away an important fraction of its forces and not concentrating them together. Nothing could be more dangerous to any Power at such a time than to separate and scatter its forces. In war the object of Powers will be to concentrate their forces and not to disseminate them. Besides, I cannot conceive any squadron of a potential enemy of any importance being left unwatched by a corresponding British squadron. As to whether we are liable to this kind of 1071 action when there is no time of tension and no cause of quarrel, I refuse to contemplate such a contention, and I think that is not the case which the noble Earl meant to surmise.
Sound as I believe the general principles I have enunciated to be, yet they are only defensible on the ground of real reciprocity. I do not think it would be possible for one to defend the giving of unrestricted hospitality to the ships of a friendly Power in all our ports, if the same welcome were not extended, in a reasonable degree at all events, to our ships when they wished to visit the ports of that Power. And if the time should come when a Power enjoying our hospitality in no mean measure, endeavoured to put obstacles in the way of our ships visiting their ports, beyond what might be called reasonable regulations, then, I quite admit, the whole subject would have to be reconsidered. Before the Committee of Imperial Defence was created there were two other bodies doing most excellent work, the Joint Naval and Military Committee and the Colonial Defence Committee; and I think either of those bodies would be eminently qualified to thresh out this question further, and, if necessary, to review it up to date, and its decision could eventually be reviewed, if necessary, by the Committee of Imperial Defence. I do not promise that that Committee will change its opinion; all I can do is to take care that the arguments the noble Earl has brought forward, and his plea for what I may call a code of regulations, shall be brought under their consideration. I am not aware that we have ever had any representations on this subject from any colonial authority. I am informed that when the change was made in 1893 the colonial authorities concurred in it on the ground, I understand, of their experience of the working of the restrictions.
The noble Earl touched, in his interesting speech, on some rather large questions on which I cannot now dwell, but which I do not like entirely to pass without notice. He took care to defend himself in advance from the imputation that the natural corollary of his view would be that there should be additional expenditure on fortifications, and he was also careful to make it quite clear that 1072 he was untainted with what I may call the heresy, the vicious, abominable heresy, of the localisation of the Fleet. I think the noble Earl went rather far, however, in the matter of coaling stations. Coaling stations are in themselves no source of strength to the Fleet, the Fleet alone is the source of strength; our fortified coaling stations are merely useful accessories; and the amount of money expended on them, and the nature of their fortifications, have all been carefully worked out from the point of view that, if we once lost the command of the sea nothing could save the coaling stations. All that is required of them is that they should be able, in the temporary absence of the Fleet, to resist naval attack, it being understood that such naval attack might vary very greatly according to the different parts of the world in which our stations are. But under no circumstances is the Navy to be considered as a localised Navy. This question has come up in connection with the Australian naval agreement, and I have seen Australian papers that have combated the arguments of the Admiralty by pointing to the fact that in England we have coast-guard and port-guard ships. According to these writers these are vessels which are anchored off Hull, Portsmouth, or wherever it may be, and would remain there in time of war to defend such places; but, as your Lordships know, there is not a word of truth in that. In time of war the only place you may be perfectly certain a coast-guard ship would not be near is the place with which it is connected in time of peace. We have already abolished port-guard ships. I regret that the purely accidental connection should have given rise to such a misunderstanding, because the so-called coast-guard ships in time of war would be just as liable to be sent to China as a China ship would be to be brought home if wanted in the Channel.
After all, the only thing that matters is general sea power, and in that respect the noble Earl was a little cramped in his perspective of the case. You must consider sea power as one from Suez eastwards; and it is not possible for any foreign Power with which we might be in a state of tension to have a force of the despatch of which to those seas we should not be 1073 aware, and foreign ships could no more be in two places at once than could British ships. And if these foreign ships are taken from European waters and sent eastwards, then British ships of corresponding value can be sent after them; and I do not think there is any prospect, or ought to be any prospect, that in time of war, after the period of tension, we should find ourselves in a position of inferiority in the Ear East. And then I would again remind the noble Earl of the extreme unlikelihood of a foreign Power running the risk of scattering and disseminating its forces at the very moment that it was nerving itself for a conflict with us. I hope I have dealt with the points the noble Earl has brought forward, and that he will not press for Papers. I do not think the public interest would be served by the production of those Papers. I certainly would not pledge myself to their production until the matter had been again thoroughly examined by one of the Committees I have mentioned; and I hope that for the present the noble Earl will be satisfied with my assurance that what he has said shall be brought to their notice.
§ THE EARL OF CREWEI need hardly say that I shall fall in with the suggestion of the noble Earl and not press for any Papers on this subject. But there are two points in his speech to which I should like to allude. In the first place, I confess I was not entirely convinced that a coup de main was quite such a remote contingency as he seemed to think. With regard to the question of reciprocity, it is not genuine reciprocity unless the risks involved are equal; and I should have thought that from an Imperial point of view we had a great deal more to lose under certain possible contingencies, by admitting foreign ships to our ports than they could conceivably have by admitting our ships to theirs. However, I am grateful to the noble Earl for the exceedingly kind manner in which he has answered my questions, and I have pleasure in withdrawing my Motion.
§ Motion, by leave of the House, withdrawn.