THE ARMY AND RESERVE AFTER DEMOBILISATION. (Hansard, 4 March 1902)

§ * THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

My Lords, in calling attention to the probable condition of the Army after demobilisation, I am asking your Lordships to consider the matter of men and numbers, by far the most important problem connected with the Army. You may re-organise the War Office. You may re-construct the Army. Your re-organisation and your re-construction may be perfection, but both will be useless if you have not the men in sufficient numbers and of the right sort to fill the ranks of the Army, 313 which we must have if we are to maintain our Empire with its ever increasing.liabilities. The requirements of South Africa have necessitated the mobilisation of 107,000 men of the Army and Militia Reserves, the retention of 50,000 men with the colours who were due for transfer to the Reserves, and the depletion of the Indian garrison by 10,000 men transferred to the seat of war. I ask your Lordships to consider what will be the effect of demobilisation on the regular Army in South Africa, in India, and at home, and also upon the Reserve. It is necessary, for the purposes of calculation, to assume a definite time when the Reserves will be dismissed from the colours. The precise time of demobilisation may alter figures, but does not affect the main issues which I am about to submit for the consideration of your Lordships. I assume, then, that the Reserves will be dismissed in October, 1902, after three years service with the colours. It seems to me that next October is the earliest moment when their dismissal can be expected.

I find by the Army annual Return for 1899 that the strength of the Army Reserve in 1899 was 78,798, and that of the Militia Reserve who joined the line 29,096, a total of 107,894. Allowing 10 per cent. for men unfit for active service, we get, in round numbers, 97,000 mobilised Reservists for service for South Africa. Since 1899 no transfers to the Reserve have taken place. All men due for transfer to the Reserve have been retained with the colours and counted as colour service men. The yearly transfer from the colours to the Reserve, according to the annual Return of the British Army, is more than 15,000, so that three years accumulation may be reckoned as 50,000 men. This number of 50,000 reservists accumulated with the colours added to the total of 97,000 mobilised Reservists sent out in 1899, will give the gross total of the men due to leave the Army on demobilisation, that is, 147,000 men. But that number is subject to two deductions. First, the number of men who have taken their discharge during the war, their period of service being completed—and, in the absence of official figures, I assume that number to be 30,000—secondly, loss by death and 314 permanent invaliding. Under this heading I cannot obtain any correct figures, because the casualties of the Regular Army have not been differentiated from those of all the other forces serving in South Africa. But some deduction must be made for casualties. I will deduct 20,000 men on this account, and allowing 30,000 as the number of men who have taken their discharge, these two numbers subtracted from the gross total of men due to leave the colours on the dismissal of the Reserve will give the net number of men due to leave the colours on demobilisation. The gross total, 147,000, less 50,000, equals 97,000. But these men due to leave the colours are not all in South Africa. In India there are 30,000 Reservists retained with the colours, which will leave 67,000 Reservists in South Africa. The total strength of the Regular Army in South Africa has just been returned as 137,000 men. The release of these 67,000 Reservists will leave 70,000 men with the colours in South Africa. In the Government plan for redistribution of troops, announced last session, twelve Infantry battalions were allotted as the garrison for South Africa, that is, 10,000 men of the line. I submit that, unless disaster is to be invited in South Africa, the garrison must remain at 70,000 men of the Regular Army for several years to come. When the Reserves are allowed to return home, the state of emergency being declared over, the Militia, Yeomanry, Volunteers, and Colonial contingents, other than South African, must also be released from service in South Africa.

I would call your Lordships' attention to the condition of this garrison of 70,000 men after the Reserves have been withdrawn. The Reservists are the older and more experienced soldiers. They are the backbone of the Army in South Africa. On demobilisation not only will you diminish the quantity of the Army in South Africa, but you will seriously impair its quality. Infantry battalions and Cavalry regiments will be greatly decreased in strength. Infantry battalions will vary between 250 and 400 men, and Cavalry regiments will sink below 200 men. In short, many regiments and battalions will cease to be complete units, and there will be no men to 315 return home with the colours. The strength of the Regular Army now at home, is, I believe, about 120,000, including all men invalided home from abroad and boys of less than twenty-one years of age, upon whom the following demands must be made. In India there are some 30,000 Reservists due to leave the colours. Of these 17,000 have accepted bounties to extend their colour service instead of passing to the Reserve, leaving, therefore, 3,000 due to come home on the return of the Reserves. But the garrison of India is already 10,000 men below strength. Therefore, to bring up the garrison of India to its full strength, 23,000 men will at once be wanted. In addition, there are all other foreign garrisons, except India and South Africa, to be replenished. Thus at least 30,000 men will be required for foreign service from the Army at home, leaving a residue of 90,000, composed of invalided men and boys too young for foreign service, instead of the three Army Corps of 155,000 men which, last year, it was assumed would certainly arise from the ashes of demobilisation.

I now come to the Reserves. In the first place the term "Reserve" as applied to the Reserve of our Army is misleading. By the term "Reserve" is meant a certain quantity of men, money, or material kept back from present use for future need. That is not the case with the Reserve of the British Army. The war has shown very clearly that the men of the Reserve proceed abroad in the first instance, and the boys with the colours remain behind. Our Reserve is really our first fighting line, and we have nothing behind it in the way of Regular troops. The whole essence of short service is the creation of a strong Reserve. But the Government now offer bounties to men to stay with the colours and not join the Reserve. In India some 17,000 men have accepted these bounties. There should be a young soldier with the colours and an older soldier in the Reserve. But you have only one man where you ought to have two; that is the fault, and to him you are paying a bounty of £26 to defeat the whole principle of short service. Moreover, bounties create a double exit from 316 the colours. There should be but one exit, namely, transfer to the Reserve, but bounties allow time-expired men and Reservists to leave the colours at the same moment. I submit to your Lordships that the system of bounties is unsound administration. Transfers to the Reserve take place amongst men serving beyond the seas after eight years service with the colours, which is to the disadvantage of the. Reserve. But a certain number of men at home are transferred to the Reserve alter three years service with the colours, and that is favourable to the Reserve. To calculate for these two different periods of transfer to the Reserve would be extremely complicated. I propose, therefore, to allow the advantage and, disadvantage to cancel one another, and to calculate the whole Reserve on the-basis of seven years colour service and. five in the Reserve. Of the whole Reserve mobilised in 1899—that is, 107,894 men — only those men will, remain in October, 1902, who were transferred to the Reserve between October,. 1897, and October, 1899. All who were-transferred previous to October, 1897, will have completed their full term of service, and will be due for discharge by October, 1902. Thus, of the Reserves mobilised in 1899, there will be only two annual transfers left in October, 1902, that is, 30,000 men.

The Reservists who have been retained with the colours since 1899 amount to 50,000 men, and this number, added to the 30,000 who remain from the mobilised Reserve, will give the gross total, of the Reserve in October, 1902, namely, 80,000 men. This number is subject to the following deductions. First, 17,000 men who have accepted bounties to continue with the colours instead of joining the Reserve, and to this number must be added those men who will accept bounties bet weep now and October, 1902, and some who will purchase their discharge from the Reserve on the termination of the war, say 20,000 in all. The second deduction is one-seventh for casualties, that is. 11,000 men. This, with the 20,000 bounty men, makes 31,000 men to be subtracted from the gross total of 80,000, leaving 49,000 as the number of the Reserve on demobilisation in October, 1902. Your Lordships must, however, remember that these. 317 men have either served through the I South African campaign, or, which is worse from the point of view of general health, have been retained for an abnormal period in India. We entered on the war with a Reserve of 107,000 men, which, on demobilisation, will become 49,000 men. We shall end the war with no Field Army with the colours at home, but only a depot of 90,000 soldiers, including invalids and boys, who will have to supply drafts for an Army abroad of 166,000. That is a very grave situation.