HL Deb 21 May 1901 vol 94 cc726-39
EARL SPENCER

My Lords, I beg to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can give the House any information as to our position and that of the other Powers in China, and as to the progress of the negotiations with the Government in the country. For the second time I rise to ask an important question with regard to foreign affairs on the eve of a holiday. I think I may perhaps congratulate the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the fact that at all events on this occasion his conduct will not be called in question in another place on account of answers being given here instead of there, for I understand that already a question has been asked elsewhere on this subject, and been answered at some length. On this occasion I have not put what my noble friend called a series of conundrums to him, but I have asked him a general question on the subject of our position in China. In particular, I wish to know how far the Powers who are acting in concert in China have advanced towards the settlement of the question of the indemnity—a question which is important as bearing on the future of China. We have seen in the papers, though we hardly know whether those statements are authentic or not, that very large sums indeed have been claimed by various Powers. We have heard that this country has modified its claim, having regard to the future position of China. I venture to say that if the Powers are trying to get from China the utmost that China can give they may be doing a very ill turn to the future good government of that country. If severe or excessive terms are pressed there will be nothing to satisfy any claims that may have to be made in consequence of renewed attacks on property or person which may occur in the future; for I am afraid it can hardly be expected that the settlement will be so satisfactory that in future no claims of that sort can arise. With regard to the sources of revenue on which the indemnity might be secured, I would point out that the amount to be raised from maritime customs is a very important matter in relation to our trade and the trade of other nations. It is important, therefore, that this should be settled on a thoroughly safe and satisfactory basis, without crushing and overwhelming China. The noble Marquess referred to that tax which we know under the name of likin—a very important tax as affecting the interior government of China. He pointed out the difficulties there would be with regard to it, and yet everybody knows that likin, as it is at present levied, is a great impediment to free commerce in that country.

I should like to know whether the Powers have considered what should be done with regard to furnishing proper funds to the provinces, as well as to the Imperial Government, the former being in many points almost independent of the Imperial Government. The governors of the provinces, especially those of the Yang-tzse, have done important work in, supporting law and order. Two of them are reputed to be men of advanced views who have advocated reforms in their provinces. I should like to know whether they have exercised this good influence, and, if so, whether the Powers have given them material support as against the exactions which may have been forced upon them by the Imperial Government. It seems most desirable that such independent Viceroys should be encouraged, and if possible that their revenues should be put upon an independent footing, so that they should not be obliged, in order to find ways and means, to resort to methods which are quite foreign to us in this country.

Then, there is another point. The Powers in China have never been in a condition of actual warfare with China. No war has been declared, but there have been, as we know, serious actions, and from time to time we have read of the probabilities of attacks in distant provinces; by some if not all the Powers, and to that is attributed to a great extent the extreme slowness in getting law and order restored in that country. I should like to know whether there are likely to be many expeditions—which I presume are punitive expeditions—into the distant provinces in the interior, and whether we may hope that in a short time there will be a Government established that shall once more take charge of law and order in the country. Then there is the question of the railways. First of all there was the Tien-tsin incident, where for some time the sentries of Russia and of this country were close to each other, and the greatest anxiety prevailed as to what might occur. Negotia tions have since taken place with St. Petersburg; and I should like to hear whether the Government are still satisfied with the position of affairs there. It has been said that there have been difficulties, that the Russian Government have been very busy in using some of the land claimed by the English company on the opposite side of the Pei-ho, and that they have occupied part of the land opposite the English settlement belonging to the Government. That may be an exaggerated statement, but we would like to know how far the negotiations have been successful.

Next there is the question of the Northern Railway north of the Great Wall. In this case English interests under special agreements were accepted on the general understanding that Russian influence with regard to the railroads should be paramount in that district, while our interest should be paramount in the Yang-tzse Valley. I understand the arrangements were that these railroads should remain as Chinese lines under the control of the Government of China, and there should be no power to mortgage them to any non-Chinese Power. It is known, however, that the Russian Government for military purposes have, as is believed, occupied this line; and I would be glad to know whether there has been any satisfactory conclusion of that occupation, or whether assurances with which the Government are satisfied have been given. There is also the question of Niu-chwang, a place in which we have large interests, larger than any other country. The Russian Government occupied in a civil and military way that city, and I believe they gave assurances that it was of a temporary kind only. I would be glad to know whether any change has taken place, and whether the Government are still satisfied with the position there. The same may be said with reference to Manchuria. Accounts have lately appeared in the press about the occupation by Russia of two islands 100 miles from Port Arthur, or some protest on their part against our ships touching there, and I would like to have some explanation of the situation. Another incident which has caused some anxiety was the German bridge incident, where some guards on a German bridge fired on a tug-boat carrying British colours. I hope to hear that the incident has been exaggerated, and that no serious consequences will arise between us and Germany. I should like to obtain some information with reference to the action of the Korean Government in removing Mr. Brown, an English subject, who for a long time had the management of the Customs in that country.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, I recognise the right of the noble Earl to ask me for a further instalment of the information which I gave him before the Easter holidays with regard to the important matters on which he has touched. I think I can tell him, to begin with, that, although the progress of these negotiations has not been particularly rapid, we are, in my estimation, very considerably nearer than we were to that termination of our entanglement in China which I am sure he desires to arrive at as earnestly as we do. We have remained in that country in order to endeavour to obtain compliance with the terms of the Joint Note which was handed to the Government of China by the representatives of the Powers at Peking. The noble Earl has touched on some of the conditions which were enumerated in that Note. He did not mention in particular one to which I referred when I last addressed your Lordships—the question of punishments. I shall not, therefore, take up the time of the House by referring to the point except for the purpose of saying, with regard to the punishment of the principal offenders, a list of whom I gave to the House, that the matter stands very much where it did when I made my observations, with this difference, that the execution or compulsory suicide of six of these persons has been obtained, and not of five as I then stated. The remainder have been degraded or banished, except in the case of two or three, who are reported to have died. There remains another class of culprits whose punishment we desire very much to secure. I mean the persons who are responsible for some of the worst atrocities committed in the provinces of China. The representatives at Peking lave demanded the punishment of a number of these. The number for whose death, banishment, or degradation we have asked is 107. We have not yet received a reply to the Note containing that demand, but we shall press for reasonable satisfaction in regard to the matter. There is another form of punishment which sounds somewhat grotesque in English ears, but it is one to which I understand very great importance is attached by all those who are familiar with the conditions of life in China. It appears that every young Chinaman aspires to enter the Civil Service of his country in some capacity or other, however humble, and one of the severest punishments which can be inflicted on a district is temporarily to interrupt what I may call the Civil Service examinations, which are held at all the important centres of population. The suspension of these examinations has been demanded for five years in several important towns. I have seen complaints made as to the insufficiency of the retribution which we have been able to obtain. I am bound to confess that in some respects it does seem to me to fall short of what we might have desired. But I should like to put it to your Lordships that the mere exaction of a number of death sentences is not the only form of deterrent punishment which can be inflicted upon the people of China, or upon that part of the Chinese community which was concerned in these events. For really deterrent and exemplary punishment we may look to the protracted occupation of the capital, to the permanent retention of Legation guards and military ports, and to the large indemnities which the Powers are requiring. We, at any rate, are not prepared to keep our troops an indefinite time in China, or to postpone for an indefinite time the moment when something like normal conditions will be restored in that country, merely for the purpose of adding to the tale of heads which will be counted when our demands are complied with.

I come now to the indemnities, which are probably the most important matter dealt with in these negotiations. We have arrived at this stage—that the Powers have now been able to put in a claim in which the total amount of the indemnities demanded by them—demanded, I mean, both for public and for private purposes—is set out. That total has been freely stated in the newspapers, and it is certainly very large. It reaches no less than 450,000,000 taels. The Powers have received from the Chinese Government a reply to that demand, a reply in which, while reference is made to the magnitude of the sum asked for, no positive statement of inability to pay is put forward. On the other hand, offers are characteristically made for a settlement, which would fall considerably short of satisfying so large a demand as that I have described. The discussion of that matter is still in progress. I have said in this House and elsewhere that His Majesty's Government were in favour of moderation in respect of these demands. But at the same time, if the representatives of the other Powers concerned have satisfied themselves, both as to the propriety of these claims and as to the ability of China to meet them, it is not possible for us to take upon ourselves to mitigate the total of the claim. I should like to suggest to your Lordships that it is not only by mere reduction of the total amount that indulgent treatment can be accorded to the Chinese Government. There are other ways of facilitating the payment of the indemnities which are open to us, and of those I will say a word in a moment.

In compliance with the noble Earl's request I may, perhaps, describe briefly the attitude which we desire to take up in regard to this part of the negotiations. We earnestly desire, if possible, to avoid any arrangement under which China might be compelled to contract separate obligations with individual Powers—separate obligations, I mean, secured by special assignments of Chinese revenues or of Chinese territory. I need not dwell on the objections to such a course. We earnestly hope that the Powers will continue to act to get he; and that, as they have dealt with other problems by means of joint action, so in this financial settlement they will be content to base their demands on common principles, to satisfy them from common sources, to accept securities which shall be common to them all, and to arrange that if China should make any default the necessary payment should be enforced by common action.

With regard to the mode in which China might satisfy these claims, I suppose that from our point of view, the ideal arrangement would be that China should herself obtain the money, pay it us, and close the transaction. But it is perfectly clear that the unassisted credit of China would not enable her to go into the market and procure a sum anything like that which the Powers now demand of her. We must therefore dismiss altogether the idea of an unguaranteed Chinese loan. It has been suggested that the case is one in which a Chinese loan might be collectively guaranteed by the Powers concerned. That is not a proposal which at all commends itself to His Majesty's Government. We do not think that we should be justified in coming to Parliament and asking them to pledge the credit of this country for the purpose of facilitating the payment of these vast indemnities upon easy terms—indemnities of which, probably, not more than one-ninth represents the sum to which the country would itself be entitled. We are obliged to regard this matter as one of business; and that does not seem to us at all a business-like proposal. Besides, I am told by those whose acquaintance with these subjects is much greater than any to which I can pretend, that our experience of joint guarantees in the past has shown that they are extremely inconvenient arrangements from a political and international point of view.

The plan which we have ventured to suggest for the consideration of the Powers concerned is this. We propose that China should pay to the Powers concerned bonds representing the share due to each of those Powers, and that those bonds should be extinguished in a term of years by payment of principal and interest; for the service of those bonds we think that it should be possible to ear-mark certain sources of Chinese revenue, the yield of which might be paid at frequent intervals to a board or council whose business it would be to receive the money and distribute it to the creditor-Powers. Such a board would have to be constituted with the consent of the Powers concerned; it would, of course, be merely a receiving and distributing board, and would not be directly concerned in the imposition or collection of Chinese taxes. It seems to us that the advantage of such an arrangement would be this—that if China should happen to make default, she would make default not to any one Power but to the Powers collectively, as represented by the board; and we should hope that the Powers would be induced to agree in that case, if action were necessary in order to compel payment, that the action should be joint and concerted action, and not the action of individual Powers. It is clear that if in pursuance of such a plan as this we were to accept payment from China in bonds at their face value, and also if we were able to make some arrangement, which His Majesty's Government would be prepared to entertain favourably, for not enforcing the full amount of these annual payments at once—it is clear that in that case we should very greatly improve the position of China and render it far easier for her to meet our claims than if she were driven to the expedient of a loan.

As to the sources from which the necessary revenues might be provided, I expressed in March our strong objection to a large increase of the Imperial maritime customs. We remain of that opinion. Your Lordships know how preponderant is our share in the commerce and in the carrying-trade of China; and we feel that, it being our duty to watch over the interests of British trade in that part of the world, we should not be justified in allowing British trade to be made a milch-cow for the purpose of facilitating the payment of these large indemnities. We are ready to agree to a revision of the duties which would bring them up to a full 5 per cent. ad valorem; but we hold that the larger increase which has been suggested in certain quarters could be agreed to by us only as part of an arrangement which would secure to the commerce of this country and of other countries as well countervailing facilities and advantages which would fully compensate it for the additional burdens to which it would become liable. Such an arrangement might conveniently be made when we come to give effect to Article 11 of the Joint Note. That is the article under which the Chinese Government has undertaken to "negotiate regarding Amendments in the Treaties of Commerce and Navigation which are considered useful by the Powers and also regarding other subjects connected with commercial relations with the object of facilitating them." When the time comes for those negotiations, if they progress satisfactorily, we shall be perfectly ready to discuss the question of a further increase of the Imperial maritime customs. But for the present purpose, and while the reforms indicated in Article 11, which will necessarily take a very long time to elaborate, are still remote from us, we cannot agree to anything above the 5 per cent. of which I have spoken.

Then, closely connected with this question of indemnities is the question of the withdrawal of our troops from China. We desire to reduce as soon as we possibly can the large force which, at considerable inconvenience, we have kept in that country for some time past; and we have come to the conclusion, after discussing the matter with the Governments of the other Powers, that the time has come when some reduction may at once be made; 3,300 troops have accordingly been already placed under orders and will leave China immediately. But that is only a beginning. We expect that, as the season progresses, we shall be able gradually to make further reductions, and to leave in China only such a force as would be necessary to ensure good order during what I may call the period of transition—that is, before we are able to reduce our garrison to the bare number required for the legation guards and for the posts which are to hold the country between Peking and the sea.

The noble Earl referred to the question of Tientsin, and the events which have occurred there. I was able to describe to your Lordships the circumstances under which, owing, I think I may say, to the good sense and moderation exhibited on both sides, we were extricated from a situation which had at one moment become extremely acute. How acute it had become your Lordships will understand when I tell you that at a particular moment two Russian sentries and two British sentries actually had their feet on the same sleeper of the railway line. The reasonable settlement of that incident always seemed to me very satisfactory, because it holds out hopes that similar difficulties—and difficulties of that kind are apt to occur in cases of joint occupation—will be dealt with with similar moderation and good sense. What are the facts with regard to the Tientsin concession? It is an area of considerable extent, which I believe covers about a square mile. It stretches along the Pei-ho river, and abuts upon the railway station. This area was claimed by the Russian military authorities at first by the right of military conquest. We subsequently heard that it had been conveyed to them by an instrument signed by Li Hung Chang. Without at all attempting to discuss the history or the validity of the concession as a whole, one thing is, I think, perfectly clear, and I do not think that it is disputed by the Russian Government—and that is that this concession and, indeed, all concessions of the kind, are made subject to any pre-existing rights the existence of which can be satisfactorily proved. We believe that, within this area there are plots which had become the property of the Chinese railway administration prior to the Russian occupation. It was on one of these plots that this dispute with regard to the siding arose; and in reply to the question of the noble Earl, I have to say that within the last few days we have heard that at another point within the concession the Russian troops have been again asserting rights of ownership in a manner which the British military authorities do not consider they are entitled to. We have represented the matter to the Government of Russia, and we have not yet received a reply. But we hold, of course, that if one side is free to resume these exhibitions of activity similar freedom of action may reasonably be demanded by the other side. The case, however, seems to be eminently one for careful local investigation; and I hope that, now that the state of the negotiations appears to hold out some prospect of a diminution of the pressure which has existed, we may be able to obtain an investigation of that kind. Your Lordships will recollect that it was distinctly stated to us by Count Lamsdorff that when the troops were withdrawn from the railway siding, all questions of title and proprietary rights were to be reserved for examination between the two Governments. Such an examination, we think, should take place, and we are perfectly ready to make it in a just and equitable spirit. With regard to the Northern Railway, to which the noble Earl referred, the position remains unchanged. The intramural part was handed by the Russians to Count von Waldersee and by the Count to us. The extramural part is still in the hands of the Russian military authorities, who have from the first stated that they were using it temporarily and for military purposes only. I hope before long to be able to lay Papers on the Table with reference to this question.

Then the noble Earl said something with regard to punitive expeditions. There was a rumour the other day that Count von Waldersee was about to undertake [military operations on a large scale at some distance from Peking, and that the co-operation of the allied forces was desired. We were not informed of the scope of those operations, but we should certainly have been extremely careful, particularly at a moment when we were endeavouring to reduce the strength of our forces in China, how we allowed ourselves to become entangled in any military movement in the remoter parts of the province. But it has turned out, on further inquiry, that no necessity for those operations was found to exist, and therefore, so far as that matter is concerned, there is no question of a punitive expedition in which we would take part. I think I may assure the noble Earl that from the first we have made no secret of our objection to be drawn into any operations remote from Peking and the neighbourhood of that city. I believe that this is not peculiar to ourselves. I believe that that feeling was shared by other Powers, who desired to see the moment arrive when they could withdraw the forces now occupying northern China, or at any rate largely reduce them.

The next point to which the noble Earl referred was the question of the tug which was fired at by some German troops on the Pei-ho River. When inquiry had been made we learnt that the officer in command of the German troops had expressed his regret for what occurred, and had given an undertaking that in a similar case the use of fire-arms would not be again permitted. I hope we may consider that matter at an end. But our information at present is not very full, and we await further particulars.

The noble Earl also asked me what I could tell him with regard to events that happened at the Elliott and Blonde islands. What happened was this. A British man-of-war went to these islands in pursuit of pirates. The Russian admiral on the station—I wish it to be understood that it was a Russian admiral and not the Russian Government—interposed. He made a protest, and attempted to warn off our ship. We were perfectly aware that under our treaty rights we were permitted to repair to these islands for a purpose of this sort, and we therefore instructed the naval authorities in northern China to disregard the protest; that is how the matter stands.

My Lords, in regard to Manchuria, I think the noble Earl has watched the interesting communications which are made from time to time to the press, and he is probably as well aware as I am of the state of things. I will read to him a translation of a passage which appeared in the Messenger Officiel at St. Petersburg, on 6th April, which runs thus— So far as the complete and definite restitution of this region"—that is, Manchuria—"to China is concerned, it is obvious that it can only be carried out after a normal state of things has been re-established in the Chinese Empire, and when a central and independent Government has been established in the capital, sufficiently strong to guarantee Russia against the renewal of the disorders of last year. The Russians remain in possession of Manchuria, and the position has not altered since that publication was made.

The only other point to which the noble Earl referred concerned the two Viceroys of the southern provinces. As to that, I may say that we continue to entertain for those two distinguished men feelings of very high appreciation. We have on more than one occasion been able to obtain an expression of their views on important matters, and we have attached to those expressions of opinion the weight to which they were entitled. I do not think that the noble Earl will expect me to tell him what the advice was or how far it was followed. It is clearly desirable to be a little circumspect in publishing to the world the opinions entertained by high Chinese functionaries, but we certainly shall continue to receive any advice from them gratefully, and we regard them as an important influence for good in that part of China which is under their government. With regard to support, I think I am right in saying that on one occasion material support was offered to them; but we were then assured that at that time they did not incur any personal danger, and it was not thought necessary to take any steps for their protection. I think I have noticed all the topics to which the noble Earl alluded; and I hope I have said enough to show him that something, at all events, has been accomplished in the direction of obtaining a settlement of these different questions; I earnestly trust that when the matter is again brought up in your Lordships' House, as no doubt it will be, your Lordships will find that we have not been unmindful of British interests, and that some further progress has been made in arriving at the end which we all so much desire.