HL Deb 21 May 1901 vol 94 cc742-54
LORD LOVAT

rose to call attention to the state of the service maps now in use ay the Army in South Africa, and to the waste of material and public moneys which had occurred by the appointment of not previously trained officers to the remount, railway, and other military departments; and to move to resolve that no scheme of Army reform will be complete which does not train a largely increased number of officers for extra regimental employ without denuding regiments actually on active service. General Hunter had stated in one of his despatches that the maps in use by the Army in South Africa were a danger to the troops serving in that country. When he (Lord Lovat) left South Africa, some four weeks ago, there had been no change for the better, and there seemed to be no prospect of a change for the better. The maps were so bad that it was really impossible to find the position of places on the maps at all; nothing under a range of mountains as big as anything there was in this country received official recognition in the maps. In October it was stated that there was to be a new set of maps. In the northern part of the colony they did get a few new maps with "h's" dotted here and there to signify houses, and with a few springs and dams marked; but that was the only change visible to the ordinary eye. Although inaccurate in every other particular, the old maps gave correctly the position of boundary fences, and the present issue was exactly the same in that respect, the wire fences being marked with great accuracy, but everything that was of military importance was left out as before. The disgraceful way in which the maps had been prepared had caused very bad feeling among the Army in South Africa. Columns were not infrequently asked to do things which were perfectly impossible, and which they would not have been asked to do it the Generals had been in possession of maps showing the exact position of the country. When it was announced that a discussion was to take place it was fully expected that the Army would have the small satisfaction of seeing someone in Pall Mall blamed in connection with the maps. But they had seen nothing but evasions and a complete whitewashing of the Intelligence Department, and were most dissatisfied in consequence. When the Army was still working in brigades there were intelligence officers who made regular road reports, in which everything of military interest was entered. The last man he spoke to on leaving South Africa was an intelligence officer who had been out there for over eighteen months, and who informed him that nothing whatever had been done in the way of collecting these reports so that the Army could be informed as to future marches. He was aware that not one of the twenty or thirty maps of the Orange River Colony was reliable. Why should not the service send out to South Africa members of geographical societies who were accustomed to take observations and to obtain information for the purpose of preparing maps? He understood that men had been sent out at the beginning of the campaign to prepare a map of the whole country, but the number of mapdrawers was not sufficient for the columns, and they were therefore distributed about instead of being set about the work in a proper manner, as originally intended. Confusion also prevailed in that most important branch, the Remount Department. Senior officers, usually from the Militia, with absolutely no previous training, were appointed as figureheads, and Reserve officers were called upon to undertake this work whether they knew anything about it or not. What was the result? He had seen 130 horses sent out which had only 218 shoes between them. They had to trek a number of miles the following day, and they hobbled into camp absolutely worthless. On no less than three occasions he had known horses to be issued that were suffering from strangles and glanders. Things were not so bad now, because these officers, although untrained when they started, had had a year's experience.

With regard to the railways, men were employed upon them who had no knowledge whatever of the work. He would mention two examples. The sole qualification of one man who was employed at a most important junction was that he had been formerly bugler in a Yeomanry regiment. Another man appointed had been connected with the Privy Purse in England. Presumably it was thought that he could count the fares quickly at the station, it being forgotten that soldiers did not pay when travelling up and down the State railway. The shunter ruled absolutely at each station. On him depended entirely whether a train was ready to start in three hours or in eleven hours. Many of the shunters were pro-Boers, or, at least, were friendly disposed towards the Boers, and that, of course, affected the intelligence and despatch with which the work was executed. He thought that Volunteer officers engaged in railway work should be sent out to South Africa to look after the shunting. Many large employers of labour in South Africa had told him that three shillings a day was an absurd wage to pay to the black men, who were in no sense, though they pretended to be, trained drivers; and there was much dissatisfaction because the War Office was so lavish of hand in paying these men, while the soldiers received only the wretched shilling a day. With regard to meat contracts, he was aware that the contractors bought the cattle on foot at 3d. per pound, that the troops had the trouble of driving them in, and even of killing them, and had then to pay from 9d. to 11d. per pound for the meat. The result of putting large numbers of men to jobs which they did not understand was that many regiments were destitute of officers who had any knowledge of warfare, and the efficiency of the troops was lowered. The Seaforth Highlanders some months ago had only two captains, half of the companies being commanded by second lieutenants. The same thing happened in the case of the Cameron Highlanders. For some time the second in command was a man of only four years service, and he also had to do adjutant's work. The first time he (Lord Lovat) was in action, he acted, although a cavalry soldier with no knowledge of infantry drill, as adjutant and second in command of a thousand men. The latter were commanded chiefly by junior subalterns, who made a very bad job of it. In a nation like ours it was particularly necessary that we should have an increased number of officers. There was no doubt, from what we had seen in this war, that the ultimate strength of the nation lay with the untrained millions who were ready to fight for their country. We had splendid fields to draw from in Canada, in Australia, and in South Africa, but it was absolutely essential that we should have the officers necessary to train these men, and officers could not be made in a day.

Moved to resolve, "That no scheme of Army reform will be complete which does not train a largely increased number of officers for extra regimental employ without denuding regiments actually on active service."—(Lord Lovat.)

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Lord RAGLAN)

My Lords, before replying to the speech of the noble Lord, I would venture to compliment him on the very excellent work which his corps of scouts has done in South Africa, and to congratulate him on his safe return. When I first read the notice on the Paper, I thought it was fairly comprehensive. I now find that my original ideas of it were small. The noble Lord's speech ranged over a very large part of the conduct of the war in South Africa, but at this comparatively late hour I am not in a position to discuss the entire conduct of the campaign. I will, however, endeavour, as far as I can, to reply to the strictures of the noble Lord. With regard to the question of maps, at the beginning of the war a special map of the Orange Free State and surrounding country was prepared by the Intelligence Division and sent out for the use of the troops. No government survey existed, either of the Orange Free State or of the Transvaal, and maps, therefore, had to be based on the farm surveys to which the noble Lord takes such objection. There were also some hundreds of special reconnaissances of routes executed by British officers before the commencement of the war. After Lord Roberts assumed command, arrangements were made for the compilation of another map. Much local information was available, and, therefore, the new map was more complete than the original map sent out by the Intelligence Division. This map has been used in the field throughout the war, and we have laboured under the impression that it had proved very satisfactory. In addition, a large number of general maps have been supplied, such as Jeppe's map of the Transvaal, Bartholomew's map of South Africa, Russell's map of Natal, and special maps of Johannesberg and Pretoria. Criticism on the deficiency of the maps rests on a series of misapprehensions. The country is enormous, and there are no Government surveys in existence. I think it is not the primary business of the home Government, nor would it be at all desirable, that we should take upon ourselves the burden of executing surveys of the various colonies; it is equally obvious that it was impossible to survey states in the position of the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal previous to the war. We must naturally be dependent upon information to be collected from one source and another, aided, possibly, to a certain extent by military reconnaissances. The noble Lord complained that there is apparently no work being done with regard to surveys. I would inform him that two completely equipped survey sections were sent out to South Africa, and also two mapping sections, all under the direction of trained survey officers, and they have, I believe, done a large amount of work.

With regard to the question of remounts, the number required in this war has so far exceeded expectations of any possible war that preparations could not have been made on a sufficient scale. It is impossible to imagine that if we are unfortunately drawn into war again, remounts on anything like the same prodigious scale will ever be required. As to the question of the training of officers in remount duties, no doubt it is the case that some officers were sent out who were not fully acquainted with the work, but if we had waited until we had got a complete system of thoroughly trained officers, including training in lassoing horses on the veldt, we should have had to wait an enormous time before it was possible to send out remounts. The same thing applies to a certain extent to the railways. The army was suddenly called upon to take over the administration of enormous distances of railways, and no doubt it is possible that the selection of men was not always the best; but I do not know why the noble Lord objects to the shunter having anything to say with regard to the administration of the station. I should have thought that the shunter was an exceedingly important man, and that his advice would be taken in cases of marshalling or sending trains backwards or forwards. The Volunteer railway officers to whom the noble Lord referred chiefly consist of the managing directors and so forth of the large railway companies in the United Kingdom, and I am afraid the rates of pay which would be necessary to tempt those gentlemen to take over the railways in South Africa would exceed 3s. a day, which the noble Lord says is too much to pay to the black men. The whole question of the requisite number of officers is a difficult one. Either you must have in peace time a very large increase of officers, or you must trust to reserve officers of some sort or other. A large increase in peace time naturally means a vast increase in expense. In the case of reserve officers you have the difficulty, first of all, of training them, and, secondly, of keeping that training up to date. That difficulty is not peculiar to this country, for in every country in Europe there exists the difficulty of providing officers for the troops which may be mobilised in time of war. I can quite understand the noble Lord's anxiety on the question of maps. To him, as a commanding officer of scouts, maps are perhaps more important than to anybody else; but I cannot but think that it is somewhat doubtful how far it is advisable that these questions should be discussed by officers who are now on full pay. I doubt very much whether it is to the best interest of the army that these questions should be discussed in this way.

LORD TWEEDMOUTH

My Lords, I am sure your lordships listened to the speech of the noble Lord who raised this question with the greatest delight. We in this House may congratulate ourselves in having in him, not only a comrade who can hit hard on the veldt, and give a good account of himself there, but one who is also able to dilate upon his experiences in a graphic and at the same time in a moderate and temperate manner. I am sure I shall only be voicing the feelings of your Lordships when I say that we all hope that when he goes back in a fortnight's time with a new set of men, he will render as good an account of himself as he has done in the past, and that he will return to give a more cheerful account of South Africa. At the same time may I be allowed to put in a word for the request he has made to the War Office to be allowed to take three companies of scouts to South Africa instead of two, as originally proposed? It seems to me that we have been able through the corner of the veil that Lord Lovat has raised to-night to see some of the reasons which have led to the great prolongation of the war, and the great cost at which it is being waged. Take this one question of maps. Of course South Africa is a huge country. I admit that; but still it is a country where we have been ourselves for a very long time. The Orange Free State and the Transvaal are practically surrounded by British territory, and, besides that, we have been engaged again and again in campaigns against both the Boers and the natives. It appears to me that during all that time we might have accumulated sufficient knowledge of the country to have been able to provide our troops with maps which would have been of some use to them, and which would have shown them where they could find water and what operations they might safely enter upon.

The lack of proper maps in this war affords one more proof of what I can only call the blind over-confidence of Ministers in the way in which they entered upon hostilities. After all, the war did not come suddenly; it was expected. I suppose that if anybody had been asked during the last four or five years as to the most probable part of the world where the British nation might be involved in arms, he would have said in South Africa. During the first six months of 1899 the Government were engaged in making constant demands upon Mr. Kruger, and it was evident that, if the demands of the Government were refused, the end must be war. Therefore, when you were making these demands, you ought to have been making such preparations as would have enabled you to enter upon the war in the strongest way possible. Amongst other necessaries, we required maps, but the want of maps was just as great in Natal—you will find this mentioned in Sir Redvers Buller's despatch—as in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Again, why could not the Government have massed in Cape Colony sufficient troops to guard that territory from attack by the Boers in the first instance? Why did you not make sufficient arrange- ments for your transport? One of the great difficulties in the war has been the deficiency in the number of horses. The noble and gallant Lord the Under Secretary for War said that the question of remounts was an enormous one. Of course it was. I suppose every sensible person knew from the commencement that this was a war which would have to be carried on by mounted troops. All the more necessary was it, therefore, to see that that particular department was put into the hands of competent men, and not given over to men who hardly knew a horse from a cow. The son of the Archbishop of Canterbury, for instance, was put in charge of the remount department, although he knew nothing whatever about horses. The great question is, How are you going to make the military forces of this country efficient in the future? It seems to me that the only way in which we can secure for this country an army, not very big, but very mobile, very efficient, of the best material, and armed in the best possible manner, is to show to our soldiers, whether they are men in the ranks, or whether they are officers, that we who employ them are going to be first-rate employers.

What is the scheme which the Government have proposed? They are going to establish six army corps. The first will consist almost entirely of Regular soldiers; the second will consist mostly of Regular soldiers and partly of Auxiliaries; and the third will consist mostly of Auxiliaries and partly of Regular soldiers. The other three army corps do not exist very much in any way, except on paper, and it is extremely doubtful whether you will get the men. I do not agree with some of my noble friends that it is possible to do without a sufficient army. I believe you must have an army, but the only way in which you can get the men is by holding out a sufficient attraction to them to join, and the only way to do that is by treating them better than you do now. In the House of Commons the other day a question was asked as to the reductions which are made from the pay of the soldier for different matters, and it was admitted that 1s. 3d. a month is deducted for washing, a penny per month for hair-cutting, twopence per month for library subscription, twopence per month for the rifle club, and two- pence per month for the cricket club The idea of making a deduction from a soldier's pay for a subscription to a rifle club is most monstrous. First of all, you want to make the soldier a good shot and it does seem to me that the Government might at any rate establish rifle clubs in which soldiers can learn that important duty, without having twopence per month deducted from their miserable pay. It is said that if we did not make these deductions it would cost the country £600,000 a year, which would work out at something like twopence a day to each soldier. I should very much like to see the Government begin by adding that amount to the pay of the soldier. When the soldier joins as a raw boy, by all means let his pay be low but as he increases in efficiency you will find that the best possible way to attach him to the service is by increasing his pay. By that means you would more and more attach to the Army old soldiers who could be trusted when the pinch came to give a good account of themselves. I agree that the system is wrong by which the best officers are taken from the regiments in the field at the time when their presence with the regiment is most required. How can you expect young soldiers to do well if they have not officers to lead them in whom they have confidence, and to whom they are accustomed? The reason that the corps which my noble friend commanded was able to do such excellent work was that they had good officers. It was a matter of chaff that some of his subalterns were bald-headed and grizzled, but they were men of experience, and were able to lead the men with success. A better system must be established in time of peace, so that when war comes the officers may be left with their regiments. There is often too much honour and glory given to the staff officer to the exclusion of the regimental officer, on whom the burden of th day falls. One thing has been proved in this war, that we can trust implicitly to our men and our regimental officers, and that whoever else has made mistakes, they have always been trustworthy. It does seem to me a pity that you do not better recognise the value of your regimental officers. The strong point of the new Army scheme is that you will under it, I hope, set up six centres of training for soldiers in this country. In those six centres I hope opportunity will be given to officers to be trained, not merely in taking charge of the one particular arm to which they may be attached, but in handling infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Again and again in this war has it fallen to general officers to undertake this duty without having had previous experience of the work. I hope this is a matter to which the Government will give their attention, and if under this scheme facilities are given, we shall have gained one great advantage. I would suggest to my noble friend that he should not press his motion to a division, but be satisfied with having brought his case so well and so fully before the House.

The MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

I am sure we on this side of the House desire to associate ourselves with the congratulations to the noble and gallant Lord on his safe return, and with the acknowledgments of the valuable services which he has rendered in South Africa. If after he has gone back to that country he should return to this House and occasionally do a little sniping at this Bench, we shall not take his criticisms amiss, but recognise that they come from one who knows what he is talking about. The noble Lord has opened a discussion which has already drifted over a great many subjects, and which would take a very long time to conclude if those subjects were to be at all fully handled. He has dealt with the question of maps, with the question of remounts, with the question of shunters on the railway, with the question of meat contracts, and with the question concerning the supply of regimental officers. The noble Lord who has just sat down went further still, and proceeded to review Mr. Brodrick's Army Scheme, and to tell us what he thought of the six army corps. My noble and gallant colleague spoke just now of the lateness of the hour. I can plead that excuse with perhaps slightly more plausibility than he could, and I feel sure no good purpose would be served by attempting a minute examination of all the points which have been raised. But as to the question of maps, I do not suppose anyone has ever contended that it is the business of the War Department to be prepared with a large-scale and elaborate map of every country in which His Majesty's forces are called upon to serve. We have had an interesting little operation going on lately in Jubaland. I do not suppose the noble Lord opposite wouldhave expected that the Intelligence Department should have had Jubaland surveyed and mapped out with all the dwellings, if such things are to be found there. The theatre of war has been very extensive, and I believe it would have been physically impossible for the Intelligence Branch to survey the greater part of that area before hostilities broke out. The suggestion of the noble Lord, that as soon as a certain amount of contention arose between His Majesty's Government and that of the Transvaal we should have set to work to execute surveys, is one which would have been a little difficult to carry out. I do not think the survey parties would have been particularly well received if they had made their appearance in the neighbourhood of Pretoria. But though we said very little about it at the time, we did take what measures we could to obtain information about the topography of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.

The noble and gallant Lord also suggested that after the war broke out more might have been done by collating the very valuable road reports prepared from time to time by different officers. If there has been any failure to do that he must not lay it to the charge of those unfortunate persons in Pall Mall against whom he directed so much of his eloquence. There, again, I should conceive that in most parts of the country the position of survey authorities would have been extremely hazardous, and that it might not have been very easy to do what the noble and gallant Lord suggested. Most of the shortcomings to which attention has been called are all shortcomings of a kind traceable to one and the same source—to the fact that the magnitude of these operations was far greater than anyone foresaw. That we have always frankly admitted, and it is quite clear that when, comparatively early in the campaign, troops equivalent in numbers to three army corps had to be sent out of the country, a very great strain had to be put on all departments, with the result that the best men available had to be employed, even when they had not been previously trained for their duties. As to the other shortcomings which have been revealed, His Majesty's Government have never attempted to contend that shortcomings had not been disclosed by, or that no lesson was to be learnt from, the war. I believe that the authorities at the War Office are fully determined that those lessons shall be turned to good account, and I feel sure that most of the points mentioned this evening by the noble and gallant Lord are points which have already attracted the attention of the Secretary of State and of Lord Roberts, and that his criticism will receive the attention which it undoubtedly deserves.

Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.