§ * THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTHMy Lords, in calling the attention of your Lordships' House to the publication of the Spion Kop despatches I shall not waste time by any discursive remarks—for so, I think, they must of necessity be—upon the justice or otherwise of the criticisms passed by Lord Roberts in his covering despatch on the military operations. This is not the time, the occasion, or the place to form any opinion on matters upon which military experts are so entirely at variance. For instance, Sir Redvers Buller, in his despatch, says—
It is admitted by all that Colonel Thorneycroft acted with the greatest gallantry throughout the day, and really saved the situation.On the other hand, Lord Roberts says, in his covering despatch—Whatever faults Sir Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be ascribed to the unwarrantable and needless assumption of responsibility by a subordinate officer.I feel that we have no right, we have no claim, to pronounce any opinion upon Lord Roberts's criticisms of distinguished officers acting in the field; but I am anxious this afternoon to ascertain some reasonable motive or object which has induced the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War to publish these criticisms. They have aroused a depth and strength of feeling which I think it is difficult to exaggerate, and which, I fear, will not soon pass away. The personal controversies of a bitter kind which the publication of these despatches has excited are very much to be regretted but in the course of any remarks I may make to your Lordships I shall decline to be drawn into the vortex of personal animosity and recrimination. I look upon this question as a public and not a 709 personal one, and as such, and such alone, I shall endeavour to treat it. My charge against the noble Marquess is that he has transgressed the rules of honourable tradition by publishing in those despatches confidential reports of a privileged character, compiled in the discharge of official duty, intended solely for the information of the superior authority in the public interest, and accepted in that character by the officers reported upon as well as by the officers reporting. Before I proceed any further I must make some allusion to the extraordinary attempt which has been made by the noble Marquess to shuffle the responsibility of the publication of these despatches on to the shoulders of Lord Roberts. The Paper which has been placed in your Lordships' hands this morning appears to me—and I have now been in Parliament for over twenty years—to be the most extraordinary piece of Parliamentary literature that has ever been presented. This Paper, I take it, is the brief of the noble Marquess: and I am bound to say that, having regard to the character of the despatches the noble Marquess felt he could publish, one cannot help feeling some curiosity as to what there is behind which he felt he could not publish. This extraordinary piece of Parliamentary literature, if I may so describe it, very much tells its own tale. All communications from the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State for War are prima facie privileged, but the noble Marquess is very nervous to assume this responsibility. He telegraphs to Lord Roberts, and uses these words —I do not feel justified in thus editing the papers unless you concur, and you may perhaps think well to refer to Buller. I suggest, as an alternative, that we should treat your despatch of 13th February and all its enclosures as confidential, and that Buller should send through you a full narrative of the operations. This you could forward to me with any observations you desire to make for publication.That, my Lords, in my opinion, seems to point to this, that Sir Redvers Buller was invited to re-write his despatch; that inasmuch as the account which he had originally given to Lord Roberts had received from Lord Roberts adverse criticism, an opportunity—a temptation —was offered to him to re-write his despatch and, as it were, to whitewash himself, changing his account so that Lord Roberts might be able to pronounce a different opinion in his covering despatch. It is certainly a 710 serious matter that confidential communications should be published at all, but it is far more serious, to my mind, in the public interest that the Secretary of State for War should, so to speak, invite despatches to be made to order so that they may be palmed oft' upon the public as genuine expressions of opinion by responsible officers. Sir Redvers Buller declined to take part in any such proceeding. He said —I do not at all like the idea of re-writing a despatch for publication. I much prefer to leave it in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, and let him select for publication whatever he thinks proper.We know what followed. The Secretary of State for War telegraphed to Lord Roberts asking him whether he should publish the despatches as they now stand, and Lord Roberts simply replied that he agreed to their publication. Lord Roberts had nothing to be ashamed of in the despatches he had written, and it must not for one moment be supposed that because Lord Roberts acquiesced in their publication it can be urged that he approved of that course. I am certainly surprised that the noble Marquess should have taken the unusual course of endeavouring to shuffle the responsibility for the publication of these despatches on to Lord Roberts. Of course, my Lords, the temptation was a very great one. Lord Roberts has performed great public-services. He is a man who has the confidence of the public. He is trusted by the public. The noble Marquess has vainly endeavoured to obtain some share of either, but having obtained neither, it is obviously a great temptation to him to throw on Lord Roberta's broad shoulders the odium of publishing these despatches. I maintain that Lord Roberts was perfectly within his right in communicating his views with absolute frankness to the Secretary of State for War, but in such a document free speech would not be tolerated and would not be tolerable unless treated confidentially. I should like to ask whether it is not wise to let the Commander-in-Chief feel that he can express himself freely? If he does not feel this, how is it possible for him to write as frankly as he ought to? In fact, he ought to feel that his communications would be considered privileged, not as a matter of argument, but as a matter of course. I do not think that the noble Marquess the Prime Minister can—I do 711 not know that he will attempt to—shuffle off upon any other man's shoulders Ministerial responsibility. I should like to remind your Lordships that the Conservative party turned out the Administration of Lord Rosebery upon the Cordite Vote, and they turned them out in opposition to military advice. That advice was rejected with scorn. A controversy arose in the House of Commons a day or two afterwards as to the precise character of the military advice, and the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury (Mr. Balfour) declined to accept the plea of military advice, and maintained what I think we in this House generally accept to be sound —namely, the doctrine of absolute Cabinet responsibility.* I should not have dwelt on these facts if it had not been that my right hon. friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated not long ago in another place that all that had been done in the war had been "solely dictated by military advice, and military advice alone." I decline, my Lords, to admit that the responsibility for the publication of these despatches can be thrown on anyone but the Secretary of State for War and Her Majesty's Government. Having endeavoured to show that the Secretary of State and Her Majesty's Government are responsible, I must, with the permission of your Lordships, quote that portion of Lord Roberta's despatch which seems to me singularly unfortunate in publication. Lord Roberts says—The attempt to relieve Ladysmith described in these despatches was well devised. That it failed may in some measure be due to the difficulties of the ground, and the commanding positions held by the enemy probably also to errors of judgment and want of administrative capacity on the part of Sir Charles Warren; but whatever fault Sir Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be ascribed to the disinclination of the officer in supreme command to assert his authority and see that what he thought best was done, and also to the unwarrantable and needless assumption of responsibility by a subordinate officer.You published a despatch reflecting on Sir Charles Warren for a want of judgment and administrative capacity, but I have recently seen that you have appointed him Governor of an enormous territory in West Griqualand. It does*Refer to The Parliamentary Debates [Fourth Series], Vol. xxxvi., page 1385. (Speech of Mr. A. J. Balfour, 31st August, 1895.)712 not seem to me that it was necessary to make that appointment ridiculous. You could have appointed Sir Charles Warren to this position without publishing these words in this despatch. Then as to Sir Redvers Buller, upon him you pronounce a sort of public censure. You imply that he has neither the power nor the capacity to assert his own authority. I cannot conceive any language, if published, more detrimental to discipline, and, if you publish it to the world as you have done, more unjustifiable, unless, as you have not done, you recall him from his command. You exercise a severe censorship over press criticism in South Africa. The Durban Review has been suppressed for publishing an article on the Spion Kop operation. In that article nobody was attacked, and the reverse there was only attributed to bad generalship. Yet what the press—the irresponsible press—in South Africa is not permitted to do, and what the respectable press in this country had, acting under a great sense of self-control, refrained in the best interests of the country from doing, the noble Marquess does without any compunction at all. It is very difficult to fathom the mental process by which the Secretary of State decided to publish these despatches, and I trust we shall have some enlightenment in this matter. We know that it took him about six weeks to make up his mind; and I cannot help feeling that it is very much to be regretted, as he devoted so much time to consideration, that he did not find time to review his own merits, his own services to the public. He might have remembered his own past. The noble Marquess has been Viceroy of India, and he might have recollected the extent to which the government of India is carried on by means of informal communications between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. He might have remembered how in cases of difficulty this affords to the Viceroy the most convenient moans of retracing his steps without loss of prestige. The noble Marquess is no doubt conscious—we are all conscious—of the importance of maintaining the authority and the prestige of the Viceroy in the face of our Indian fellow-subjects; but if it is important to maintain the prestige of the Viceroy of India it is equally important, perhaps oven more urgent, to maintain the 713 prestige of commanding officers in the field. But, my Lords, before the noble Marquess assumed this very unusual, and I have no doubt very disgreeable, role of candid and unsparing critic of brave and distinguished men, who, under great difficulties, and, I think I may say, personal hardship, are upholding the interests of the Crown, it might perhaps have been well, it might perhaps have been advisable, if the noble Marquess had considered whether the generosity and forbearance which is due to them is not ten times more needed by him and his Administration. There is no necessity to deal with this subject in any party spirit, for I cannot conceive that any member of any party in this House wishes to do more than to assist the Government to wipe up its own mess; and a sad mess it is! We learned during last autumn that "serious preparation for war" is a repudiated doctrine of the present Government. We were told that they did not dare, with their enormous majority in the House of Commons of between 140 and 150, to take the proper steps to provide against eventualities on account of possible misrepresentation in the constituencies, and we know that the most ordinary precautions were neglected. Not one gun of position nor any garrison artillery or siege artillery were sent out to Natal, and hardly any engineers to complete the entrenchments. On.3rd October you telegraphed to the Australian Governors to refuse mounted men. Then followed that terrible loss of life and waste of bravery, because we could not follow up our victories on account of not having mounted men. Then on 16th December, after the War Office had discovered what competent soldiers like Sir William Butler and Colonel Spence had told them all along, you telegraphed "Mounted men preferred." I now turn to the situation as it exists to-day. The wreck of Lord Roberta's victorious army, that army which relieved Kimberley, which captured Cronje at Paardeburg, and which has occupied the capital of the Orange Free State, has for weeks lain scattered around Bloemfontein paralysed for want of horses and transport, for against the statement, of which my right hon. friend the Under Secretary of State for War was made the mouthpiece in the House of Commons, you have the plain statement of Mr. Prevost Battersby, who 714 telegraphs from Lord Roberta's headquarters—Mr. Wyndham's reply disconnecting delay with lack of horses caused some surprise.And Lord Valentia, who certainly is not supposed to be in any way unfriendly to Her Majesty's Government, in a letter published in The Times of 2nd May, and dated 28th March, says—We are in a quiescent state waiting for the general advance, which, I fear, will not be for some weeks, as the cavalry want remounting. Many of the men want reclothing, and vast stores have to find their way up to Bloemfontein.I have not yet discovered, and I doubt if any other noble Lord has perpetrated the discovery, that any person outside official circles even professes the smallest confidence in the War Office and the noble Marquess. Although the provocation has been far greater than was the case in the Crimean War, when the Duke of Newcastle was driven from office, I am glad to say there has existed in this country a right and proper feeling not to look out for scapegoats. There has existed, despite a very real and very acute provocation, a worthy English feeling— a feeling which I wish the noble Marquess himself would share—of self-respect, that we should control ourselves, our feelings, and our criticisms in the eyes of the world. Because the noble Marquess has thought fit to publish these despatches, I should be the last person to press, as strict justice might demand, that he should also publish all the despatches that tell against himself or against some favoured officers who are responsible for blunders at Magersfontein, Reddersburg, Karee Siding, at Koorn Spruit, and, alas, I fear at many other places. I hope this may never create a precedent, and that it will be the first and the last discreditable incident of this kind. Before I sit down I will quote to your Lordships the words of a great authority in reference to a disregard of orders by General Crauford at Torres Vedras. You will find published in the Supplementary Despatches of the Duke of Wellington a despatch which he then, as Viscount Wellington, addressed to the right hon. W. W. Pole, and in which he made use of those words—Although I shall be hanged for them, you may be very certain that not only I have had nothing to do with, but had positively forbidden the foolish affairs in which Crauford 715 involved his outposts…. You will say, if this be the case, why not accuse Crauford? I answer, because, if I am to be hanged for it, I cannot accuse a man who I believe has meant well, and whose error is one of judgment and not of intention; and indeed I must add that …that is not the way in which any, much less a British army, can be commanded.My Lords, these are the words of a great man, a great commander, a great gentleman; and, coming from the Duke of Wellington, with his simple sense of duty and his hatred of self-advertisement, they speak to us to-day with a peculiar force and a special emphasis. If this miserable war has brought sorrow, distress and death into many homes, both rich and poor, it has at least united all classes of Englishmen in one common bond of sacrifice; it has evoked a noble, a splendid public spirit; but that public spirit, which no Minister and no Ministry can destroy, may be chilled, and may even for a time be suppressed, if those who are in authority fail in courage and in loyalty.
§ * THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (The Marquess of LANSDOWNE)My Lords, when, as in the present instance, I find that many people hold views opposed to my own, I always begin by assuming that there must be a good deal to be said for their side of the case. I own that when I listened to the speech of the noble Lord who has just sat down, I began to think that my case must, after all, be an even stronger one than I had supposed, for before he had occupied the attention of the House for more than a few minutes he left Spion Kop and the publication of the despatches far behind and diverted himself with an attack in force upon the War Office and upon the Minister who is responsible for its affairs. The noble Lord reproduced a number of, I was going to say, venerable charges which have been made and met in and out of this House. He again told your Lordships the old story of how the War Office had refused mounted men when offered to them by the colonies. That statement was fully answered in another place, and, I believe, in a manner entirely satisfactory to those to whom the explanation was addressed. Let me say again that we never laid it down that we did not want mounted men from the colonies. What happened was this. We were offered, in the case of one of the colonies, a choice I am speaking from memory—between artillery, cavalry, and infantry, and an 716 answer was sent, perhaps not worded with that minute care which would have been desirable (but we were working then under very great pressure) in which a preference was expressed for infantry rather than cavalry or artillery. I need not tell your Lordships that that had nothing whatever to do with mounted infantry, which is a very different thing from cavalry. But the strongest proof I can give of the accuracy of my statement is this, that amongst the first offers which we accepted from the colonies, and which we had actually accepted at the time that the telegram was sent, were the offers of mounted infantry from some of the great colonies. It is therefore idle to say that we had set our face against accepting the services of mounted infantry from the colonies. Then the noble Lord went on to speak of what he was pleased to call "the wreck" of Lord Roberts's army at Bloemfontein. I cannot help thinking that that "wreck" is showing, and is likely to show, seaworthy qualities which may rather astonish the enemy. It comes to this, that the noble Lord imagines that after Lord Roberts had marched across country, under immense difficulties, from a point on the line to Kimberley, to Bloemfontein, he was to find at Bloemfontein, the capital of the enemy's country, reserves of stores and supplies of horses sufficient to enable him to proceed at once with his advance. Lord Roberts had to depend, and is depending at this moment, upon a single line of railway—a narrow gauge line of railway—broken in many places and running through a hostile country. The line had to be repaired, and it is a matter of common knowledge that whatever quantities of stores and of remounts might have been collected at the base—and I shall be prepared, if your Lordships choose to interrogate me on the subject, to show that there were immense quantities of stores and large numbers of horses at the base—a considerable time was bound to elapse before it was physically possible for the necessary supplies and the necessary animals to reach their destination at Bloemfontein. I will not pursue these matters | further. If the noble Lord cares to bring them before your Lordships' House, and will put a notice on the Paper, I shall be ready to meet him whenever he pleases. To-night, I take it, our business is to discuss the subject of which he has 717 given notice—namely, the publication of these despatches. In a speech to which the noble Lord could not, I think, expect me to listen with much approval, I did hear one sentence with which I venture to express my entire concurrence. The noble Lord suggested that this was not a proper occasion upon which to discuss the con-duct of the generals engaged in this campaign, and I shall certainly avoid doing so. I must add this observation—that I do not differ from the noble Lord when he tells the House that it should be the object of the military authorities, so far as possible, to avoid any action, any word, and the publication of any document which are likely to impair the authority of generals in responsible positions in the field. It will be my endeavour to show to your Lordships that, if in the present case documents which might be supposed to have such an effect were published, it was because in our opinion no other course was open to us than that which we actually pursued. I wish, in the first place, to state to the House briefly what is so to speak the law with regard to the publication of documents of this kind. It is to be found in the Queen's Regulations, from which I read the following extract—
A despatch containing a concise description of every action or other specific military operation, irrespective of its magnitude, will invariably be written by the senior officer actually present on the occasion. To enable him to do this, reports describing the action taken by their respective commands will be furnished to him by officers commanding divisions or brigades, and by such other officers us he may specially call upon. These reports will not accompany the despatch, the senior officer being alone responsible for rendering to the Secretary of State for War an account of the operations.Then follows a regulation to the effect that, in certain cases, where the senior general is not himself present, the report may be written by the general who has been in actual command. And, finally, it is laid down that—It will rest with the Secretary of State for War, acting upon the advice of the Commander-in-Chief, to determine what reports or despatches are or are not to be made public, and the manner in which those to be published are to be made generally known.Your Lordships will observe that it is laid down that in the case of each operation there is to be a concise descriptive despatch, that save in a very limited number of cases no subsidiary documents 718 are to be sent home with that despatch, and that publication is optional with the Secretary of State in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief. The noble Lord told us that despatches of this kind were prima facie confidential and that they were privileged; and he drew an analogy between these despatches and the private letters which pass between the Viceroy of India and the Secretary of State for India. A more misleading analogy was never laid before your Lordships' House. I have had the honour of corresponding privately with the noble Earl on the Front Opposition bench when he was Secretary of State for India, and I was Viceroy; and we know perfectly well that that correspondence is a private correspondence which is pursued altogether outside official lines, and one that runs, so to speak, parallel with the regular and official correspondence of the Viceroy with the India Office. I therefore put altogether on one side the misleading analogy of the noble Lord. But, if we are to consider whether these military despatches are prima facie privileged and confidential or not, it is desirable that we should have before our minds what has been the usual practice with regard to the publication of such papers. I have made some inquiries into the matter, and, so far as I am able to ascertain, I believe I am right in saying that the general rule is to publish these papers; that prima facie they are regarded as fit for publication, and I think there are good reasons for so regarding them. In the first place, these despatches are the means which are used for calling attention to meritorious services rendered in the field by individual officers. Noble Lords who have been familiar with the Army are perfectly aware that mention in despatches is a very much prized military honour; and I certainly believe that, if we were suddenly to determine that the publication of these despatches was to cease, there would be a well-founded feeling of dissatisfaction in the Army at finding that its officers were shut out from a kind of recognition which has, until now, been generally accorded to them. That is one reason for publicity as a general rule. Another reason is that the public desire intensely to be supplied with authentic information about these engagements. Information, of course, it-obtains in abundance from other sources, but I believe I am right in saying that 719 what is desired is an authoritative and thoroughly trustworthy account of these military operations, which the people of this country watch with such intense interest. I may be asked, if it be true that it is customary to publish despatches of this sort, whether it is usual to publish them when they contain censure upon officers engaged in the operations described. I have found at least three recent cases which occurred during the Afghan War, when despatches containing distinct censures upon the generals in command were published. I will not trouble your Lordships by referring to those cases unless it is desired.
§ * THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEAll the cases occurred in 1880, during the Afghan War. I will not mention the names of the generals who were censured.
§ * THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEYes.
§ * THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEYes; they appear to have been published almost immediately after the operations they described.
§ * THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI was coming to that. In those three cases other employment was found for the generals. But what I am endeavouring to establish is that the practice is to publish these despatches whether they do or not contain censure. Whether the publication of the censure should be followed by the recall of the general censured seems to me to be a matter with regard to which you cannot possibly lay down a rule. It must depend upon the extent and character of the censure. I now come to the present campaign. Since it began we have published with regularity despatches descriptive of each of the engagements and operations which have 720 occurred. We have published eight such despatches. I find that in two of these there was censure of officers in comparatively subordinate positions, and in the case of one—the despatch describing the action at Stormberg—there was a censure of the conduct of the general officer in command, Sir William Gatacre; and, so far as I am aware, the publication of that despatch was not complained of or criticised, although Parliament was sitting at the time. I have endeavoured to show that, so far from these despatches being prima facie not fit for publication, the case is the other way. Prima facie they are fit for publication, and I think the onus lies on those who tell us that, instead of publishing them, we ought to have suppressed them. I now want to say a word as to the form of these despatches. I have explained to your Lordships what is laid down in the Queen's Regulations as to the form these despatches should take. As we receive them they do not always conform to what is laid down in the Queen's Regulations. I do not say that by way of complaint of the generals who write the despatches. I think a general who is called upon in the middle of arduous military operations to sit down and write despatches is very much to be commiserated. I suspect there are many generals who would sooner fight a battle than write a description of it, particularly if they have in their minds that what they write is to be criticised and examined with the minute care and solicitude which has been exhibited in the present case. But the Spion Kop despatches certainly did not reach us in a shape at all corresponding with what is laid down in the Queen's Regulations. They covered altogether some forty-five pages of print, and I think I am right in saying they contained altogether twenty different documents of one sort or another, many of them being clearly of such a kind that their inclusion in a despatch would not be in accordance with the Queen's Regulations—documents the nature of which showed clearly that they ought not properly to be regarded as forming part of the despatch and that they were probably not so regarded by those who had written them or sent them home. That was the position in which we found ourselves, and we had to decide what we should do. The alternatives open to us were limited 721 in number. We might have published nothing at all; and I gather that is a course which would have found favour in many quarters. But if we had done that it would have been a new departure of a very abrupt kind. We should have been affirming a new principle —the principle that we might publish so long as a despatch contained nothing but praise, but that the moment we received a despatch containing blame that despatch was to be held back from publication. I strongly suspect that if we had taken that line the public would have endeavoured to insist upon publication; and I doubt extremely whether we should have been able to offer a successful resistance. Why, my Lords, that action at Spion Kop cost us over 1,600 casualties. I doubt whether there was any engagement in the campaign which aroused a deeper public interest than the battle of Spion Kop, and do your Lordships think that it would have been possible for us, if asked whether there were any despatches about that engagement, to have said that we had such despatches, but that we intended to keep them to ourselves, or that that answer would have been accepted as sufficient and satisfactory by the public? I doubt it extremely. We should have been exposed to a very well known ordeal in public life—the ordeal of question and answer. We should have been asked whether there were despatches, and we should have had to answer "Yes." We should have been asked whether they contained such and such statements. If we said "No," we should next have been asked whether they contained such and such another statement. In that way admissions would have been wormed out of us; and it is my belief that in the end—what with being shelled in Parliament and sniped at by the press —we should have been compelled to make a clean breast of it and to lay the Papers upon the Table of the House of Commons. But, supposing we had resisted successfully the demand for publication, do your Lordships think the result would have been to screen the generals responsible from blame? Why, it was a matter of notoriety that there was mismanagement at Spion Kop. The newspapers were full of it. It was impossible for anyone to read the graphic accounts sent home by the correspondents of the different journals of this city with- 722 out having it brought home to him that there had been blundering at Spion Kop. But there is another thing with which we had to reckon. In these days news comes from the front not only in the messages of the special correspondents, but in private letters—private letters, written and intended, no doubt, by those who write them to be confidential and reserved for the eyes of those to whom they are addressed, but which, we all know, are not always treated as confidential by those who receive them. I say with confidence that there was such an impression in men's minds as to the management of the Spion Kop operations that if we had held back the despatches the impression created would have been more damaging to the generals concerned than the publication of the Papers which we have laid on the Table of the House. Well, we, at any rate, came to the conclusion that it was impossible to altogether hold back these documents. What other course was open to us? There was another alternative, about which a good deal was said by the noble Lord The noble Lord called attention to the telegrams which your Lordships have seen, and he accused me, on the strength of those telegrams, of having desired to shuffle off my responsibility upon Lord Roberts. He accused mo of having encouraged Lord Roberts or Sir Redvers Buller to palm off garbled documents upon the public, and he made many other equally considerate and agreeable charges against me. I have no desire to divest myself of the responsibility which belongs to me in this matter, but I say that if I had taken the step of publishing Lord Roberts's despatch without telling him what I was going to do I would have been guilty of a great want of courtesy and, I think, of a great want of loyalty to Lord Roberts. The suggestion made to Lord Roberts was not that garbled documents should be substituted for the original papers—nothing of the kind. If your Lordships will allow me, I will road the actual words that were used, and you will see how groundless that accusation is. Being aware, as I was, of the objection which would be entertained in many quarters to the publication of some of these papers, I suggested, as an alternative, not that Lord Roberta's despatch of 13th February should be cancelled or made away with, but that it should be treated, with its enclosures, as 723 confidential—a very different thing and I suggested that we should be supplied to publication with that simple, concise descriptive account of the battle of Spion Kop which appears to be contemplated by the Queen's Regulations, which I read to your Lordships at the beginning of this discussion. I claim that that was a legitimate, a perfectly honourable and harmless suggestion to make. I made it, I confess, with a certain amount of hesitation, because I knew that it lent itself to the kind of misrepresentation in which the noble Lord has not scrupled to indulge so liberally to-night: but I thought it due both to Lord Roberts and Sir Redvers Buller that they should have this opportunity of enabling us to do what I understand the noble Lord himself wishes us to do—that is, to reserve from the public gaze those documents which, possibly, wore calculated to injure the reputation of two of the generals in charge of operations in the field. That course was objected to by Sir Redvers Buller, and from the moment I became aware that that was the case I unhesitatingly withdrew the proposal. Well, there remained, so it seems to me, one course, and one course only, open to us—namely, that we should select and publish the essential papers, doing so, as far as possible, in accordance with the spirit of the Queen's Regulations. With regard to that course, and following the Queen's Regulations, I. made it my business to take the advice of the Commander-in-Chief at home, and I found that in his opinion, as in mine, publication to this extent was inevitable. Lord Roberts was aware of what was intended. Sir Redvers Buller had placed himself in Lord Wolseley's hands, and there seemed one course only open to us, the course which we actually adopted. That was our crime—my crime—and I honestly believe that five out of six of those who now so glibly criticise my conduct would have committed the same crime if they had been sitting in my chair. Just one word as to the alleged disastrous results of this publication. As regards the public, the public wanted to know the truth, and the truth was given them. They know how Lord Roberts apportions the blame for the miscarriage which occurred; they know that neither Lord Roberts nor the military authorities in this country desire to hush up the truth. Then as to the effect of the publication on the Army. The doctrine which appears to find favour 724 with the noble Lord is that whenever a general is censured, or, at any rate, whenever the censure of a general is published, that general must necessarily be recalled. I do not in the least accept that doctrine.
§ * THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTHI am very sorry to interrupt the noble Marquess. That is not what I said, nor what would naturally follow from what I did say.
§ * THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEAt any rate, if he did not say it, the writers of many of the articles which have inspired his speech have been using that language. Now, what was the censure passed by Lord Roberts on Sir Redvers Buller? I must say, in the first place, that it is not so much, to my mind, the publication of the censure that obliges you to recall an incompetent general officer; it is the fact that he has been censured for incompetence. Whether you publish the censure or not, if the general is incompetent you ought not to leave him in charge of the lives of the men and the reputation of the Army. But what was the censure upon Sir Redvers Buller? Did Lord Roberts say that he considered him unfit to lead an army, or that he had lost the confidence of his troops? Nothing of the kind. Lord Roberta's censure is contained in a very short and very pregnant sentence at the end of his despatch. He begins by distinctly expressing a favourable opinion of Sir Redvers Buller's plan of operations. He goes out of his way to say that, as far as the conception of the plan goes, Sir Redvers Buller had shown himself not an incompetent, but a competent general, and then he says—
That it [the plan] failed may, in some measure, be due to the difficulties of the ground and the commanding positions held by the enemy—no censure in that—probably also to errors of judgment and want of administrative capacity on the part of Sir Charles Warren. But whatever faults Sir: Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be ascribed—not to Sir Redvers Buller's bad strategy, incompetence, or ignorance of his profession, but—to the disinclination of the officer in supreme command to assert his authority and see that what he thought best was done.That is the whole of the censure upon Sir 725 Redvers Buller. The censure amounts to this: Sir Redvers Buller trusted too much to his subordinates and did not take measures to satisfy himself that his orders were being carried out. That strikes me as a very mild reproof indeed. And, more than that, Lord Roberts himself, by his own conduct, showed conclusively that he had not withdrawn his confidence from Sir Redvers Buller, because Lord Roberts left Sir Redvers Buller in charge of a large army. He entrusted to him the charge of the most critical and difficult operation of the campaign, an operation which Sir Redvers Buller has brought to a successful conclusion, upon which he has been complimented, and for which he has been thanked by Lord Roberts himself. I say, therefore, the censure was not a censure of the kind which rendered it in the least necessary for Lord Roberts or any-body else to remove the officer to whom the censure was addressed. I ought, perhaps, to say one word before I sit down with regard to a part of the case which was only lightly touched upon by the noble Lord who introduced this subject—I mean the action of the military authorities and of Her Majesty's Government in regard to Lord Methuen's despatches. For a considerable time what I may call the great Methuen myth obtained possession of the public mind. Every- one was convinced—I do not know why —that we had, somewhere in our pigeonholes, a despatch from Lord Roberts censuring Lord Methuen, and that we suppressed that despatch. Let me repeat that we suppressed nothing, because there was nothing to suppress. I have heard the question asked, why was it that if Lord Roberts commented, as he did, upon Sir Redvers Buller's Spion Kop despatch there were no comments upon Lord Methuen's Magersfontein despatch. I can only otter to your Lordships a conjecture, but I think it is a plausible one. The Magersfontein despatch was originally sent home by Lord Methuen on 13th December last. It was forwarded under cover of a despatch by Sir Redvers Buller—a mere formal despatch, without any comments at all. Your Lordships have seen from these telegrams that exception was taken, and I think rightly taken, by the Commander- in-Chief to the form of Lord Methuen's despatch, and he was asked to rewrite it. In that case there was a substitution of one document for another. 726 No substitution was proposed by mo in these telegrams in the other case. Lord Roberts arrived in South Africa on 10th January, and he forwarded Lord Methuen's second despatch on 15tl February, also without comment. I presume that as Sir Redvers Buller, then Commander-in-Chief, had not thought it proper to make any comments, in the same way Lord Roberts thought comment superfluous. At any rate, in his case it was merely a formal transmission of documents, and no comments were made. I think I have noticed most of the points to which the noble Lord opposite drew attention. I can only sum up what have to say by telling your Lordships that I certainly realised, perhaps not so strongly as some of your Lordships do, but I certainly did realise, that there were objections to the publishing of these despatches, but I thought there were stronger objections still to suppressing them, and that feeling of mine was greatly strengthened by the advice received from the Commander-in-Chief at the head of the British Army in this country. I hope if other noble Lords are going to address the House that they will be good enough to tell us not only what we have done amiss, but what they would have done if they had been in our shoes. Until someone can show me that there was any other solution of the difficulty than that which we adopted, I shall venture to maintain, and I do maintain, that we were neither thoughtless nor perverse in publishing these Papers, and that we took, under extremely difficult circumstances, a course which we are able not only to defend but to justify.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYMy Lords, I shall carefully observe the rule very properly laid down by the noble Marquess at the commencement of his speech, and shall in no way depart from the actual subject we have to discuss— namely, the publication of the despatches. It seems to me that in all cases of the publication of official documents there is one principle, and one principle only, which must guide those who are responsible for publication, and that is, what is best for the public service. It is no excuse whatever to say that if you refuse to publish documents you may be attacked —it is your duty to meet attack. The Government of the day have upon them the care, the interests, arid the honour of 727 the nation, and they have to take the course which they think is for the best without reference to any attack which may be made upon them. The noble Marquess told us perfectly fairly at the close of his speech that he acted on that principle. In examining this matter by that principle I confess that I feel great regret that certain despatches in this case were published. My reason is this. I quite agree that comment must be made in communications to the Government at home with regard to the conduct of those who have the onerous duty of commanding our Army in the field, but, on the other hand, it is for the Government to judge whether in any given case it is in the interest of the public service, and in the interest of those who have to conduct difficult and important operations, that the publication should be made. In the present case I do not think that publication was justifiable. The noble Marquess referred to the Army regulations—permit me to say that I do not think that touches this question in the smallest degree. He read what the regulation was. Apparently it is a plain, judicious, and proper regulation, but it is a regulation directing in what form and manner the reports of important operations are to be made, and by whom, and it in no way touches the question whether or not such despatches should be published. The responsibility for that rests absolutely and entirely with the Government of the day. The noble Marquess took, as I thought, in one particular, a rather singular view, because he said he did not see that the censure passed by Lord Roberts upon Sir Redvers Buller was a severe one. Well, that is a matter of opinion. I can only speak for myself; I am not a soldier, but I should have felt it very severely if I had been made the subject of that censure. I am disposed to look a little to the opinion of the man in the street. Most people can apprehend what is censure and what is not, and it has been a very widespread opinion indeed, which has nothing whatever to do with party politics, that this censure was severe. I do not like to express an opinion upon any of the military matters which are in question; that is not my duty; but what I feel is this, that it is a very serious thing indeed to continue the services of a general in command of a very important part of the force, in a difficult war, after you have, in 728 the face of the whole public, inflicted upon him a censure. I do not think my opinion is worth much, but still it agrees with the opinion of the noble Marquess, and I am the more ready, therefore, to state it; as far as I can judge, if I can imagine myself responsible for determining whether Sir Redvers Buller should continue in command, my opinion is that he ought to be so continued, notwithstanding the censure. Various reasons would have led me to that conclusion, and I do not wish to say one single word in disparagement of Sir Redvers Buller, or of any other of the gallant officers engaged in this war. It seems to me that when you have a man in the position of Sir Redvers Buller, commanding a large force and occupying a position of great responsibility, you are bound to shelter him from the consequences of publishing such censure, which, say what you will, must diminish his authority and the confidence of those over whom he is placed. It is impossible that it should not be so. It is human nature that your confidence in the man who is to lead you must be diminished when you see him censured by high authority capable, no doubt, of forming a just judgment. What I say is, that it is not in the interests of the public service that that should take place. I have the honour of Sir Redvers Buller's friendship, but I look at this matter simply and solely as a question whether it is or is not in the interests of the public service, and I have not the smallest doubt that it is not. If you are about to recall a general and you wish to inform the public of the grounds upon which the recall is to take place, no doubt it would be a very proper thing to publish the despatches. Then comes the general question. It is said, when you have got a despatch what are you to do? It may contain things which you wish were not there, and which you would rather not publish; but you are afraid, forsooth, that the public would censure you if they did not get all the information they want. The public are perfectly right in desiring to get the utmost possible amount of information, and I think it is both the duty and the interest of the Government to give them all the information they can afford, but that information must be subject to the condition that the public service will not be injured by giving it. The press and the 729 public opinion of this country would have said that the Government must have had good reason for not publishing such and such information, and that it was their duty, in the interests of the nation, and of the war now going on, and of those who have to conduct that war, not to question their responsibility. Those are the grounds on which I regret the publication of these despatches. I do not think the noble Marquess has really given a plain and complete answer to the accusations which have been made. He asks me to say in what way I would have dealt with the despatches. I am not the responsible Minister, nor have I been at the War Office, but I have been a good deal at other offices, and I have always considered that I was not only justified but bound to withhold information if I thought that the public service required that it should not be published. If I had been attacked in Parliament I should have given one answer, and one, answer only. I should have said:—" The very fact that I have withheld the information precludes me from entering into a discussion of it. I stand upon one principle, which I have a right to stand upon as a responsible Minister, to the best of my belief concurred in by my colleagues—the publication of this information would not be for the benefit of the public service, and therefore I decline entirely to discuss the subject, and must entirely rest upon whether those who hear me have confidence in me, and in the Government to which I belong." That is the whole case I have to make against the Government in this particular matter. Being sure, as I am, that the noble Marquess wished to exercise a wise and sound discretion, whatever my opinion may be worth, I lament that I have come to the conclusion that that sound and wise discretion was not exercised on this occasion.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYMy Lords, it appeal's that the discussion is to fall to the ground, and is to be a mere matter of question and answer between the noble Earl, Lord Portsmouth, and the noble Marquess, the Secretary of State for War; and, as no Minister shows any tendency to answer the very mild and the very moderate, but, in my opinion, the absolutely unanswerable comments of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, I step into the gap 730 rather than that the discussion should fall to the ground. And I must honestly I say that I step into the gap with very great reluctance. I feel that reluctance because the thing is done, the dirty linen is washed in public: no amount of discussion in this House can undo that melancholy fact. Much as we deplore it, there is no speaker in this House so eloquent that he can do away with the fact of the publication of those despatches. Before I proceed any further I wish to ask one question of my noble friend the Secretary for War. A statement, more or less authoritative, has appeared in the newspapers to the effect that since the publication of these despatches Sir Redvers Buller has tendered his resignation, and that it has been refused. Would he tell me whether that is true or not?
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEWe have no knowledge of such resignation.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYThat is very satisfactory. But in any case it would have been difficult for Sir Redvers Buller to have tendered his resignation when opposed to the enemy in the field. That is a cruel position in which to put that eminent general. What is the history of this business? The despatches were received some six, seven, or eight weeks ago; in spite of the burning curiosity which my noble friend attributes to the public to know their contents, they were not produced, and I am not aware that in either House of Parliament a single question was asked for their production. Then, after they were written, there came those stirring incidents in the war in South Africa when, owing to the exertions of Lord Roberts and Sir Redvers Buller, we were extricated from a position which the Prime Minister himself declared in this House to be full of peril, and not free from humiliation.
§ THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY)It was the other way about. I said, "Full of humiliation, and not free from danger."*
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYI give the noble Marquess the option of the
* See The Parliamentary Debates [Fourth Series], Vol. lxxviii., page 33.731 very agreeable alternatives he attributes to himself. Then came the glorious campaign in which Lord Roberts and Sir Redvers Buller saved not only the honour of British arms, but almost the security of the Government itself. What was their reward? In a time of profound calm, when no one asked for the publication of the despatches, when the country had given an ungrudging and complete confidence in the Government—not always warranted, but still ungrudging and complete—the War Office sets itself to think how it may reward these eminent services. It begins a telegraphic communication with the Commander-in-Chief to find out what in his opinion should be published. Now let us consider for a moment what this question of suppression, as to which my noble friend took so high a line, absolutely means. We know from the correspondence that the original Magersfontein despatch has been suppressed. We know that no opinion has been expressed on that despatch by the Commander-in-Chief, and I infer also from the remarks of the Secretary for War that his opinion has not been invited on the subject of that despatch. That throws a somewhat lurid light on the proceedings of the War Office with regard to these particular despatches. They looked about for some laurel wreath which they might put on the head of Sir Redvers Buller after he had relieved Ladysmith; but, after a time in which the nation was seized with an absolute delirium of joy at the news of his operations, the War Office began a telegraphic correspondence with the Commander-in-Chief, and asked him what, in his opinion, should be published. They had a high and holy objection to suppress, but they intended to suppress a very considerable portion, in any ease, of what had been sent over. At any rate, after bandying words and telegrams for some weeks they obtained a cold assent from Lord Roberts, who, in effect, could say nothing else, to the publication of his despatches. He could say nothing else, for two reasons. Lord Roberts is not a man to say, "I shrink from the publicity of what I have deliberately written," and there was a still stronger reason why Lord Roberts was unable to take any other line. It is that Sir Redvers Buller had refused to take this line; and, therefore, in these circumstances, Lord Roberts and Sir Redvers Buller, the latter having 732 been invited in the meantime to revise his despatch and send it in a more agreeable form to the War Office authorities——
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNENot to revise the despatch, but to allow us to treat the original despatch as a confidential document, and to give a mere narrative to the public.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYNot to revise the despatch, but to rewrite it; and where is the casuistry, except in the bosoms of Her Majesty's Government, which thinks it preferable to entirely rewrite a despatch than to revise or alter it? These were the desperate straits to which the War Office and the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa were put in order to meet the desire of the War Office to publish these despatches; and, as it were, after suggesting numerous alternatives to the unhappy Lord Roberts and the even less happy Sir Redvers Buller, the War Office at last determined to publish everything that was damaging, everything that was critical, everything that was censorious, to satisfy a public curiosity of which no outward sign existed. Now, there are two results of this policy. One is that you have been compelled to wash some dirty linen in the presence of the world. The conduct of your military operations has not been uniformly successful, and it has not been free from the criticism of Europe; but so far as I can infer from what reaches us of the Continental press, all comment which they have hitherto passed on our operations in the field is low, is dumb, as compared with the stupor of astonishment with which they have received the publication of these despatches. Then there is the second effect, which has a far greater influence on Sir Redvers Buller himself. Some of those generals have been punished, some have not. Sir Charles Warren has been removed; a colonel who was on the top of Spion Kop, and who-sent a telegram depicting, perhaps in too urgent language—but I am not sure even of that—the necessities of the situation, has been suddenly placed on half-pay. The highest of all has been left to bear the stigma you have placed upon him in the presence of his victorious troops. The noble Marquess thinks it is no stigma at all. I have not the despatch before me, and I cannot quote the words except from memory. If the noble Mar- 733 quess will oblige me with the despatch I should greatly like to read them again. [Lord LANSDOWNE handed the noble Earl a copy of the despatches, from which he read the following extract—
But, whatever faults Sir Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also he ascribed to the disinclination of the officer in supreme command to assert his authority and see that what he thought best was done, and also to the unwarrantable and needless assumption of responsibility by a subordinate officer."]I can hardly conceive a greater stigma on a general commanding in the field than to say that he does not care to see that what he thinks right should be carried out, and does not care to exercise his own high authority. I will be frank, and take an instance from our civil life. Very much the same charge has been urged against the noble Marquess as is brought against Sir Redvers Buller — that he does not sufficiently exercise his high authority and see that what ought to be done is done. We have not considered that a light censure, and we have been astonished at the patience with which the noble Marquess has borne it. The noble Marquess, however, is not commanding in the held; he has not behind him thousands of soldiers, hundreds of officers, all reading the judicial condemnation passed on his conduct by Lord Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief. I venture to say you have degraded his authority, you have impaired his position in a way which was not achieved by any of the repulses he met with in the field. And why have you done this? Because you, the strongest Government of modern times, have been unable to face the prospect of a few questions in the House of Commons. Mr. Gladstone once said to mo of a statesman who is now dead, and whom I shall not name, that he was of a composition to which water would add strength. I am afraid that history will write that epitaph on Her Majesty's Government.
THE LORD PEESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (The Duke of DEVONSHIRE)My Lords, the two noble Lords who have addressed the House from the front bench are perfectly justified in sheltering themselves under the irresponsibility of their position in opposition, and in declining to give the House any indication of what they would have done in the circumstances in which my noble friend was placed.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYI thought my argument tended in the same direction. I am quite willing to take the same responsibility.
THE DIKE OF DEVONSHIREIt merely comes to a difference of opinion as to which of the two courses was the more advisable in what I imagine must be admitted by all to be a very difficult position. My noble friend who has just sat down said that the Government refused to take the responsibility of declining to publish these despatches because they were afraid of questions in the House of Commons. Nothing could be further from the fact than that statement. We have entirely accepted the principle laid down by the noble Earl. The sole guide which we have any right to consult in these circumstances is what would be best for the public service: and in our judgment, if any other course had been taken except that which we took it would have tended to still greater disadvantage. Noble Lords opposite seem to think that, except having to face a few questions in the House of Commons, no consequences would have followed the non-publication of those despatches. They have no right to make any such assumption at all. My noble friend behind me has shown that despatches have been published relating to every one of the principal operations of the war. Does the noble Earl suppose that the total omission to publish the despatches on one of the most important operations of all—the failure to effect the relief of Ladysmith by way of Spion Kop — would not have excited comment more injurious to the reputation and character of the generals than the moderate censure which has been published from Lord Roberts? Questions would have been asked—Are there despatches? If so, will they be published? If not, why not? And I defy the ingenuity of any Minister to have devised an answer which, while admitting that the despatches existed, could show that the omission to publish any part of them was due to any other reason than that they contained comments which seriously affected the character and the judgment, and perhaps more than the character and the judgment 735 of the officers concerned. The noble Lord who raised this question made repeated comments—comments which have been made in some of the public newspapers, upon the invitation which was addressed to Sir Redvers Buller to re-write his despatch. I have no hesitation in saying it is much to be regretted that Sir Redvers Buller did not accept that invitation. The Regulations, which have been referred to, and part of which was read. by my noble friend, on the subject of the writing of despatches by general officers commanding Her Majesty's forces in the field, are not, I think, so full, clear, and explicit as they might be; but obviously the most convenient procedure would be that despatches sent home by a general officer commanding in the field should contain, in the first place, a simple narrative of the operations which have taken place, and that any comment or criticism on the conduct of any officer the general officer thought it necessary to make should be contained and sent home in another despatch, which it would be open to the Secretary of State to publish or not to publish. It was simply that course which Sir Redvers Buller was invited to take. He had sent home a despatch not containing his own narrative in accordance with regulations, but containing a great number of enclosures, and embodying the narratives of many other officers with his own comments. That was not the narrative despatch required by the Regulations, and what Sir Redvers Buller was invited to do was to write a simple narrative of what had taken place which might be published, and then there would have been no question of publishing any comments, favourable or unfavourable, which the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa thought it necessary to make. I can scarcely imagine that Sir Redvers Buller thought an invitation was addressed to him to supply something that would be more agreeable either to Lord Roberts or to the Commander-in- Chief at home, and certainly I, for one, on the part of Her Majesty's Government and my noble friend, absolutely repudiate the idea, and deny that it ever crossed the mind of any one of us, that Sir Redvers Buller should be invited to retract a single expression of opinion he had given, but simply it was that he should confine his despatch to a narrative of the events that had occurred. I do not deny, and my noble friend does not deny, that in- 736 convenience attended the necessity for publishing this qualified censure, but I do not agree with the noble Lord who has just spoken that the censure was a severe one. I cannot deny that the publication of a censure upon any officer in Sir Redvers Bullers position is greatly to be regretted; but I conceive, and I believe that on reflection many of your Lordships will be disposed to the same opinion, that any other course we might have taken would have been attended with equal, or perhaps greater inconveniences. Nothing could be more damaging to the reputation of an officer than that after a sufficient interval it should go forth to the world that despatches existed which could not be made public on account of the damaging character of the criticisms which they contained These, my Lords, are the considerations that guided the Government in the course they have taken. It will, of course, remain a matter for difference of opinion whether the course taken was right or not, but your Lordships must admit that the unfortunate circumstances in which we had to act made it very difficult indeed, if not impossible, to take any course that would have been free from inconvenience or mischief.
§ House adjourned at twenty-five minutes past Six of the clock, to Monday next, a quarter past Four of the clock.