HL Deb 29 March 1900 vol 81 cc611-8
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN

I rise to ask Her Majesty's Government (1) whether the duty of self-defence is imposed on a self-governing colony: (2) whether, in the event of war between Her Majesty and a Foreign Power, a self-governing colony can declare itself neutral; (3) whether a Colonial Government which declines to call out its forces or otherwise defend the colonial territory against invasion is liable to compensate those who suffer damage within the territory from the enemy. I must ask the indulgence of your Lordships while I say a few words upon these questions. They refer to the relations between the mother country and her colonies which possess responsible government. Although I am referring in a special sense, and, perhaps, almost exclusively, to the British Empire and the colonies of the British Empire, because Great Britain alone has pursued a system of education and of watching her colonies with the view of ultimately conferring upon them the benefits of responsible self-government, I think your Lordships will also see that these questions refer chiefly to the colonies of South Africa, and to the position of affairs there at the present time, as they have been revealed to us by the Papers which have just recently been laid upon the Table. Responsible government, of course, implies certain privileges and also certain obligations, but so far as I have been able to ascertain Great Britain, when conferring the privileges of responsible self-government, has not as a rule laid down in definite words the corresponding obligations which the colony might be expected to assume. The duty of self defence is naturally one of the obligations which a colony receiving self government might be expected to assume: but the first notice of it that appears in Parliament is in a resolution passed in the year 1862* without a division, on the Motion of Mr. Arthur Mills:— Resolved, that this House, while it fully recognises the claim of all portions of the British Empire on Imperial aid against perils arising from the consequences of Imperial policy, is of opinion that colonies exercising the rights of self-government ought to undertake the main responsibility of providing for their own internal order and security, and ought to assist in their own external defence. The next case, and, perhaps, the most important, is that which is to be found in the Confederation of Canada Act, 1867, but there all duties connected with self defence are expressly reserved for treatment by the Colonial Parliament. The clause runs thus:— The exclusive authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to Militia, Military, and Naval service and defence. In this case, the duty, which is more implied than expressed in other instances, is openly and explicitly stated. When we come to the case of the Cape of Good Hope we find that responsible Government was given in a rather peculiar manner. It came into existence there through the medium of an Act of the Colonial Legislature, which enabled Ministers to sit in Parliament, and which thereby conveyed the privileges of self-government without further direct allusion to that fact. That Act was passed in 1872. But in the Colonial Forces Act, 1892, whereby the Governor appears as Commander-in-Chief, it is stated in the interpretation clause that the word "Governor" means, "Governor acting in Council." Therefore, when acting as Commander-in-Chief within the colony the Governor acts by and with the advice of his responsible Ministers. As to a colony declaring itself neutral, I should have thought the position perfectly clear and distinct. The colonies, of course, have no representation abroad, and they have no foreign policy of their own. They are not consulted with regard to war, and if it had not been for the statement which is contained in Papers recently laid upon the Table, I should certainly not have thought it worth while to put the question. But, my Lords, on a recent occasion in the Cape Parliament, when there was a very important debate with reference to the passing of ammu- * See The Parliamentary Debates [Third Series]. Vol. clxv., page 1032. nition through Cape Colony into the Orange Free State, Mr. Schreiner, the Prime Minister, in the course of the debate, used very remarkable and very important words.* He had been saying that he, believed there was very little chance of war; he was thoroughly persuaded that there would be no war. He said If I am still to see, despite my best hopes and my deep convictions, that South Africa is to be the scene of war between whites, that one race is to be set against another race in any part of Africa, I shall still say—and I say this to-day, not merely to this colony, but to South Africa and he world—that I shall do my very best to maintain for this colony the position of standing apart and aloof from the struggle, both with regard to its forces and with regard to its people. Those words are very important words, and, of course, public attention was directed to them. It was some days later, in speaking to the High Commissioner (Sir Alfred Milner), that Mr. Schreiner expressed the feeling that he had been greatly misunderstood. Perhaps your Lordships will allow me to read a short passage from the despatch in which Sir Alfred Milner describes what passed.†

He says— In the course of conversation, Mr. Schreiner expressed the feeling that his explanations on the subject in the House of Assembly had been greatly misunderstood. He protested against his winds being interpreted as a declaration that the Colony should remain neutral in case of hostilities between Her Majesty's (Government and the South African Republic. He had never harboured such an idea. I replied that in my opinion his words were open to this construction, and that I regretted them. In reply, he went on to explain at some length his point of view. The gist of it was that, while he fully admitted that in case of war between Her Majesty's Government and any other State, this Colony could not be neutral, yet he felt that in the interests of the Empire itself the two main objects which Colonial Ministers should, in that case, keep in view, would be to prevent civil war breaking out in the colony and to guard against the dangers of a native rising. Undoubtedly the forces of the colony should be employed to protect the colony, and he would regard any Minister as most culpable who ran any risk of damage being done to the colony, either from the South African Republic or the Orange Free State. In those words the Prime Minister retracted what was the natural impression * See Command Paper No. 43 (1900). "Further Correspondence Relating to Affairs in South Africa." page 29. † Ibid., page 33. obtained from his remarks, and practically undertook that in the event of war he would call out the forces of the colony for its protection. Unhappily, with regard to the war itself, he was wrong. I thoroughly believe, so far as one can judge from reading the Papers, that from the very first Mr. Schreiner was persuaded—and not only was he persuaded but he was assured by President Steyn and others—that there would be no war; but unfortunately those assurances were not fulfilled. But when the war arose, did he call out the forces of the colony? Just before the outbreak of the war considerable irritation existed at Cape Town, because whilst ammunition and guns had been permitted to pass freely into the Free State, requests for ammunition and guns to be sent to Kimberley and other parts of the colony had been refused. Mr. Schreiner was, no doubt, fully persuaded that his reasons were good ones. He said there would be no war, and that there was no reason for sending ammunition, but when the war broke out, if other means had not been taken to arm Kimberley, it would, of necessity, have fallen owing to the action of the Colonial Government. There was also considerable dissatisfaction felt at Cape Town because Volunteers were not called out earlier than they were. However, on October 16, a few days after the war commenced, the Volunteers were called out and were placed under the control of Sir Redvers Buller. But a little later on—November 9—the Prime Minister took occasion to say that he would not call out the burghers for the defence of the colony, and he sent a minute to Sir Alfred Milner embodying that statement. He enclosed a circular which he had sent to the Civil Commissioners and to the resident magistrates of the colony, and which ran as follows*— It has been represented to the Prime Minister that an impression exists that it is the intention of the Government to call out the burgher forces of this colony. The Prime Minister desires me, therefore, to inform you, and to direct you to give all possible publicity to the fact, that it is not intended to call out the burgher forces, that it is considered that the military forces of the Crown are sufficient to preserve, or, in case of a temporary incursion of the enemy, to restore order, and that all that is expected by the Government of the ordinary citizen is that he should remain loyal to Her Majesty, and give no countenance or * See Blue-book last referred to, page 212. assistance to her enemies now invading this colony. Just consider what was the position of the Cape Colony at that particular moment. In Natal, Ladysmith had just been besieged. Kimberley was actually being beseiged. The north-east of the Cape Colony, and, indeed, the north, and I rather think even a portion of the west, were in rebellion, and under these circumstances one would have thought that the state of things was very critical as regarded the colony itself, and such as to justify, and, indeed, require any measure which it was in the power of the Colonial Ministers to take for the defence of the territory. As all events, that measure was not taken, and the result was that the colony suffered damage. The Colonial Ministers had not done all that was in their power to defend their territory. The injury was not confined to English colonists. Loyal Dutchmen have been looted just as much, and the question arises: Who is responsible for the damage which has been done? That is one of many similar questions which will have to be answered at no distant date. In the first instance, no doubt, the persons liable will be the Boers, who have done the damage, so far as it is possible to collect payment from them; but when you have passed from that point, pray who is then to be liable? Is it the British taxpayer, or does the recourse of the burghers who have suffered loss lie against their own Government, which did not do all that was in their power to protect them? This and similar questions must arise within a very short time. It is no good passing them by or attempting to ignore them. It is, usually, our unhappy fate to be too late in the consideration of African affairs, and it is much better that these things should be brought before the public now and be considered before the time for their solution arrives. I beg to ask the questions standing in my name.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

The questions of the noble Lord are certainly very wide ones, and they are not made easier to answer by the fact that they have an abstract form about them which renders specific language rather difficult. I wish to guard myself, in endeavouring to answer these questions, from any attempt to frame new maxims on the complicated constitutional problems that are involved. The first question is, whether the duty of self-defence is imposed on a self-governing colony. I took that question, in the first instance, to mean self-defence in the event of actual invasion. If that had been the question, of course the answer is that a self-governing colony is bound to do all it can in defence of its own territory against invasion, but I should add that there is also an obligation of honour, which we hold to be absolute, on the mother country to do what she can to assist the colony. But I rather gather from the speech of the noble Earl that he referred not to a condition of affairs resulting from actual invasion, but to what I may call the general position as between a self-governing colony and the mother country in normal times of peace. Well, if I am right in supposing that that was the point to which he wished to direct our attention, the answer is not difficult. The relations between the mother country and the self-governing colonies in respect of an attack from the sea are, in general principles, that the land defence lies in the sphere of the self-governing colony and the defence of the coaling stations or from sea attack lies with the mother country. The cases where a self-governing colony is liable to land invasion are so special that no general principles have ever been laid down in connection with them that I am aware of. As regards the second question—whether, in the event of war between Her Majesty and a foreign Power, a self-governing colony can declare itself neutral—it is perfectly obvious that no part of Her Majesty's dominions can claim to be at peace with a Power with which Her Majesty is at war. Now, the third question—whether a Colonial Government which declines to call out its forces or otherwise defend the colonial territory against invasion is liable to compensate those who suffer damage within the territory from the enemy—presents a purely abstract proposition, because there is no case to the point in connection with the war in South Africa. It is a matter of common knowledge that the Government of Natal has done all it can to use the colonial forces to repel the invasion of its territory, and it would be perfectly unjust to say that the Cape Government had declined to call out its forces. It has called out its Volunteers. It has called out its forces to the extent to which it, and I may also say the Government, consider it wise that they should be called out. I do not go into the question of the exact moment at which they were called out, nor into the rather wide points involved in the word "otherwise" in the noble Lord's question. I must not be understood to say that on every point and in every particular the Cape Ministry has held the views of others who are responsible in connection with the war, but it would not be just or accurate to say that the Cape Government declined to call out its forces; and, in connection with the special point the noble Lord brought forward with respect to the burgher forces, I think it must have occurred to him that some of the burgher forces had much better not have been called out, because it is only a matter of common notoriety that we could not rely on the loyalty of all the burgher forces. Then, my Lords, when I am asked whether such a Government, on the hypothesis in question, is under a certain liability, I must decline altogether to lay down the law on a point which, I think, would puzzle even constitutional lawyers to answer—namely, what is liability, and under what conditions would liability intervene. All I can say in answer to the question of the noble Lord—and I would point out that he has only referred in this question to one class of possible damage consequent upon a state of warfare is that the damage arises from other causes than that referred to in the question. What Her Majesty's Government have aimed at from the beginning, and have openly avowed, is to endeavour to exact compensation to those to whom it is due from those who have caused the damage. The questions involved in compensation are very complicated and difficult. They concern the Colonial Government as well as Her Majesty's Government. The first care and anxiety in the question of compensation naturally lie with the Colonial Governments, who are, in the first place, responsible to the parties supposed to be injured, and it is for them to take steps in co-operation with Her Majesty's Government to see that compensation is exacted from those who caused the damage and paid to those who have suffered. All I can say is that this is, and must be, a matter of co-operation and consultation between the Colonial Govern- ments and Her Majesty's Government. The question has not for a moment been lost sight of, but is now under careful consideration.