THE DUKE OF SOMERSETMy Lords, in rising to move that an humble Address be presented by your Lordships in reply to the gracious Speech from the Throne, I would venture to remind your Lordships that there is one custom which always obtains in this House, whether these benches be occupied by those who support the present Government or by the noble Lords who sit on the other side, and it is that you invariably extend a kind indulgence to anyone placed in the position I at present occupy. The first subject in the gracious Speech which you have just heard read, namely, the war in South Africa, is the only one with which I propose to occupy your attention for any time, it being really the one nearest all our hearts. The causes which led to this war are not of any importance to-day. What the nation has to do is to see this matter through. Whether it takes six months, or six years, this country intends to settle the question of her supre- 6 macy in South Africa once and for all. The flags of the two Boer Republics must disappear for ever, and the English flag fly from the Zambesi to the Cape of Good Hope; and I trust that, when we have crushed out all resistance, we shall know how to deal with the members of the Government of the two Republics, and those who have aided and abetted them in this gigantic conspiracy to drive us out of South Africa. On the other hand, I hope that the Boer farmers and others, who have been for years purposely misled and deceived as to our aims and intentions by Mr. Kruger and the corrupt oligarchy who misgovern the country and oppress the Uitlanders with the sole object of filling their pockets, and without the slightest regard for the welfare of their countrymen, will be encouraged to return to their usual avocations and participate in the prosperity which is sure to follow the establishment of a just and honest Government. I feel, my Lords, that this war, terrible though it is, will, when brought to a successful termination, be for the real and lasting good of South Africa, and also of this country; and for two reasons. In the first place the Boers, who are, as a people, most ignorant as to the resources of this country, have, ever since the termination of the last war, which ended with Majuba Hill and the disastrous peace which was then made, been quite persuaded that it would be a simple matter to drive the English out of Africa; but by the time the present war is ended they will form a truer estimate of the power of this Empire. In the second place, it will open the eyes of the nation, by bitter experience, to the faults in the existing administration of the War Office, and to the real requirements of our Army. In what I am about to say, your Lordships must not think that I impute blame especially to those at present responsible for the conduct of that office—on the contrary, I think it is our duty as patriots to try and strengthen their hands in the present crisis—but I do think, my Lords, that the system which they found existing there is faulty, and that, when we get breathing time in which to do so, the country will require a complete review of that system. In a few words, my Lords, the Army seems to have existed for the benefit of the War Office. In future, the War Office should exist only for the benefit of our Army. The Army has also suffered from the fact that 7 every Chancellor of the Exchequer seems to consider it the first Department on which to practise economies if he wishes to improve the appearance of his Budget, and this without the slightest regard to the disastrous effects these economies may have on its efficiency. My Lords, we have had reverses and misfortunes; but I think that if our neighbours over the water, who are so ready with hostile criticism, had been obliged to move 100,000 men 6,000 miles by sea before they could put a man or gun in the field, and then found an enemy who, being on the spot, could choose his own fighting ground, and who, we must remember, had for years been preparing for this very war, they would not have done any better than we have done. We have been able to move our troops because—and only because—we have undisputed command of the sea. On this our Empire depends, and I trust this country will take care that she retains that command at whatever cost. Of one thing, my Lords, this country may be justly proud. I refer to the splendid loyalty with which our colonies, with Canada at their head, have come to our assistance. I spent many happy years in Canada—in the woods, on the plains, and in the mountains—and know well the class of men she is sending us. The ranchmen and cowboys from the plains and mountains of the North west are fine riders, good shots, as a rule, and tough, resolute men, used to every hardship and well fitted for such a campaign as the present; and we are also receiving a body of well-drilled Volunteers from the towns and surrounding districts. The other colonies have sent us an equally fine body of men. The rulers of the Native States in India have also offered us men and trained artillery horses, which, I should think, would be invaluable at the present juncture. The successes we have so far achieved in South Africa, my Lords, have been owing to the splendid heroism and devotion of our officers and men, which, under novel and often most trying circumstances, has equalled, if it has not excelled, the best traditions of our Army. They have had to meet, generally on disadvantageous terms, a brave and treacherous enemy, more numerous than our forces as a rule, and to take positions carefully prepared for weeks, and almost impregnable. We have been heavily handicapped in this war by the fact that in face of an 8 enemy consisting wholly of mounted men, and therefore very mobile, we were without any quantity of Cavalry, and had only a small body of Mounted Infantry, the authorities neglecting for a long time to take advantage of the splendid offers of irregular Cavalry from our colonists in Natal—men used to the country, hating the Boers, and perfectly suited for the work. This has, I am glad to say, been rectified, but valuable time has been lost. We have also been terribly under-gunned, and unless the Naval Brigade had, with their usual enterprise and ingenuity, mounted some of the heavy guns from their ships, we should have had absolutely nothing with which to reply to the heavy ordnance of the Boers—in fact, Ladysmith was saved by these naval guns. Of those commanding our troops in South Africa, I would only say that they have had a great responsibility on their shoulders—in the case of Sir Redvers Buller, an almost intolerable one. Adverse criticism of their actions at this distance, and with very little knowledge of their surroundings, political and other, seems to me a great injustice. I am certain that with Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener at Cape Town, and Sir Redvers Buller in Natal, everything that is possible will be done for the success of our arms. I hope, my Lords, that, besides hurrying out reinforcements to our generals in South Africa, the Government will consider well the desirability of at once mobilising our Navy, of embodying the Militia not yet called out, and all the Volunteers, so that they may receive a training which will enable them, in case of a national emergency, to take the place of the regular troops of whom the country is partially denuded, and then call for all the trained men who have passed through either force, at the same time organising artillery and transport, of which those forces are entirely deficient at present. My Lords, we have won half our splendid Empire with the sword. We have only to look at the nations around us, armed to the teeth and jealous of our prosperity and freedom, to see that we must be prepared to defend the whole of it by the same means. If our sword is a little dull, my Lords, it is our business to put an edge to it, and then, if we keep it loose in the scabbard, with a strong hand on the hilt, we shall not only ensure peace for ourselves, but go far to ensure it for the whole of Europe. My Lords, I doubt if, 9 since the days of the Indian Mutiny, the Government of this country has had to face such anxieties and difficulties as at the present moment, but I am quite confident that if the country will sink all party differences, and give Her Majesty's Ministers its unanimous support, they will bring the Empire through the present crisis with success and with honour. To turn to other subjects. For the past year we have good cause to rejoice in the prosperity of Egypt, especially in the death-blow dealt to Mahdism by Lord Kitchener and the united English and Egyptian forces at Omdurman, and the taking prisoner of Osman Digna since that time. My Lords, everyone in this country deeply deplores the sufferings of Her Majesty's Indian subjects caused by the plague and one of the most serious famines which have yet occurred in that country. We may, I am sure, depend on the Viceroy and Government of India doing all they can to give relief and assuage suffering, but with an enormous native population, chiefly a very poor one, this is a task of great magnitude, and one which will require all their ability to cope with. I thank your Lordships for the kind manner in which you have listened to me, and I now beg to move—
§ "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty in reply to the Gracious Speech from the Throne."
THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURYMy Lords, it is my privilege to rise and address your Lordships' House, and to second the noble Duke who has moved that an humble address be presented by your Lordships to Her Majesty in reply to the gracious Speech from the Throne. To me this privilege is rendered of double value inasmuch as it comes at a time when Parliament has been summoned together whilst the nation is in the act of carrying on a war of greater magnitude, perhaps, than any war in which we have been engaged since the days of Wellington, and which has already affected us, and will affect us each one from the highest to the lowest. It is a war that is destined to revolutionise in no small degree all tactics of modern warfare, unless, my Lords, it is to prove an exception to every other war of similar magni- 10 tude ensuing on any long periods of peace—those periods of peace during which engines of war, terrible in their death-dealing properties, are of almost daily invention. It is bound to make every nation pause and consider how the lessons to be learnt from it are to be best applied to the perfecting of their national systems for attack and defence, and in like manner it is destined to mark an important epoch in the military history of our Empire. Under these circumstances, therefore, the war must be the all absorbing topic of the hour. It occupies the first position in the gracious Speech from the Throne. Having served until a comparatively recent date in a regiment which is now at the front, under that distinguished, and, I think I may say, very successful leader, General French, you will understand, my Lords, that my interest in this war is of a somewhat special kind. The noble Duke has already enlarged fully upon the magnificent fighting qualities of the British and Colonial soldiers, and on the heroic valour of the officers who lead them, and, indeed, upon every other point of importance in connection with the war. Your Lordships will, I trust, pardon me, however, if I go over the same ground in emphasising the debt of gratitude due by this country to the colonists who have come forward so readily to help her in her hour of need. My Lords, it always seemed to me that Imperial Federation was rather a dream of the future, but what further proof is necessary that it is with us now, if not in substance, at any rate in spirit, when we see sons of Empire going forward shoulder to shoulder to fight for a common cause, and that cause the integrity of the Empire? I would refer, too, to the patriotic spirit shown by the people of this country at this time, whether it be in the ready response of our Reservists, and all those who have volunteered, to the call to arms, or whether it be in the generous financial support given by all classes to any scheme or fund raised for the benefit of those fighting our battles. These few points, my Lords, I think, form a bright side of the picture, if in other ways the situation of affairs in South Africa at this moment gives cause for much anxiety. No country could have done more, no country could wish to do more, to further the efforts of those responsible for the situation to carry what has now become no light an undertaking to a conclusion which shall 11 not only be comprehensive but final. As regards the conduct of the campaign, criticism there has been, perhaps too much. Far be it from me, however, to criticise on such an occasion as this. I would rather content myself with the feeling that during the conduct of this war our generals who are directing the movements of our forces are reaping a golden harvest of experience invaluable to them for further operations in the field at this time, invaluable should they ever again be called upon to take the field, and of greatest value to those who come after them, who may be placed in a similar position. Before leaving the subject of war, I would urge the necessity, which has become so apparent, of establishing national rifle clubs throughout the country. Every man should know how to handle a rifle, every man should know how to shoot. We want no compulsory system of service, but I cannot help thinking that every able-bodied man might give up two years, a year, or six months, to a course of military training either in the Regulars, or in the Militia, or in the Volunteers. On no account do I desire to minimise the gravity of the situation at this moment, but what in a time of real national peril would be the position of an able-bodied man, endowed with all the physical and intellectual qualities necessary, if his services were of no account owing to a want of training during times of peace? It is for us at home to look and see that the magnificent fighting material we possess is backed by a thoroughly sound and strong system of Imperial defence, and if some reorganisation of this system has proved itself necessary at this time I think we may rest assured that it will occupy the attention of Her Majesty's Ministers at an early date. My Lords, the next point in Her Majesty's Speech is the satisfactory adjustment of the Samoan difficulties. The Samoan Islands, I understand, were of no strategic value or importance to Great Britain. The treaty concluded with the German Emperor has apparently settled once and for all a question that gave rise to constant friction between the representatives of three great Powers in those islands, and is, I believe, a treaty thoroughly satisfactory to all parties, and for which Her Majesty's Government has obtained a concession of equal value elsewhere. I should like to 12 dwell for a moment upon the next point in the Speech from the Throne, namely—
A Bill will be introduced at an early date to give effect to the scheme of Federation which has been adopted, after the most careful consideration, by five of my Australian Colonies.My Lords, those five colonies, I feel, deserve the fullest measure of cordial congratulation we can give them. For two years and more I had the honour of serving on the staff of Lord Brassey, Her Majesty's representative in the colony of Victoria. It was my privilege to witness the never-to-be-forgotten outburst of loyalty and affection shown by the people of the colony of Victoria, and, indeed, throughout Australia, on the occasion of Her Most Gracious Majesty's Jubilee of 1897. The invitation issued by the Government to the Premiers of all the colonies to visit this country at the time, so readily accepted by them, did more to help on the work of Federation in Australia than we may well be aware of. It brought the representatives of those Colonial Governments into closer touch with the Imperial Government at home. It did more than that. It brought them into a closer touch with each other. When I left Australia at the beginning of 1898, the Convention was then sitting for the purpose of framing a Commonwealth Bill, which was to be acceptable to all. The difficulties at that time seemed to be insuperable, but by a policy of steady perseverance, and a spirit of give and take from all, in five colonies, at any rate, those difficulties have at last been apparently surmounted. We may hope to see ere long another nation growing up of our own kith and kin, strong in the fact of its unity, strong in its loyalty and affection for Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen and her Empire, of which it forms a part, a more than useful ally in times of trouble to the country to whom it owes its birth. My Lords, I think the remaining points in the gracious Speech from the Throne require no further comment from me. This war must occupy, no doubt, the almost undivided attention of your Lordships' House for some little time to come. I am glad to feel that, whatever may be the issue of this struggle—and, backed by the dogged determination of the Government and people of this country, there can be but one issue—we shall 13 emerge from it with the bonds of a united Empire still more closely and firmly knit together, determined to use to the best of our ability our resources and our strength to carry on the work of civilisation, to uphold all that is just and right, and to further the peaceful development of commerce throughout the world. I thank your Lordships for your kind attention to my remarks, and I beg to second the Address.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYMy Lords, I feel sure your Lordships will have heard with satisfaction the speeches made by the mover and seconder of the Address. My noble friend the noble Duke made many very sensible observations, with not a few of which I entirely concur. As regards the noble Earl, I am sure the whole House will congratulate him, for I think a more graceful and appropriate speech we have never heard. My Lords, the first subject that is touched on in the Speech from the Throne is our relations with foreign Powers, and I see with pleasure that the noble Marquess has been able to advise Her Majesty to say that our relations with other States are friendly. My Lords, the friendship of other States must always be a matter of the highest consequence to any nation, but at the present moment we must all feel how important it is that we should have friendly relations with the Great Powers of Europe and the United States. I believe I am speaking with accuracy when I say that the relations between the different Governments of Europe and that of the United States and our own Government may be justly described as friendly. I wish we could say as much concerning the general attitude of some of the nations of Europe. I do not wish—Heaven forbid that I should—to add anything to the bitter remarks which have been made as to the feeling shown towards this country in almost all parts of Europe. I cannot pass from that without saying that, without attributing too much to newspaper controversies which go on between the press of the different countries, I do think, without speaking of any particular country, that, with regard to our relations with foreign nations, considerable mischief has been done by the way in which ill-natured remarks in every newspaper, however contemptible, are reported to us. There is a general impression produced, I am convinced, that the situa- 14 tion is much more serious than it is—than the situation really deserves; but what is worse than that is that the continual going on of warfare of that kind serves to irritate people generally and make them feel a want of cordiality towards one another. Not that I deprecate in the least the reporting to us the state of feeling in those countries—I think we are deeply indebted to the press for their reports—but what I do deprecate is the undue amount of stress that is laid on the attacks of the press of other countries, and their being responded to by the press of our own country. It is setting up a kind of paper warfare which I am certain is not conducive to good relations with other countries or to peace. There is only one subject which is specially important in regard to foreign affairs, to which I would refer, and I should be sorry to pass it over. I refer to the negotiations with Germany which have enabled the Government to arrive at a settlement with regard to Samoa. I shall not trouble your Lordships by entering into that matter more fully. For my part, I simply congratulate the noble Marquess on the settlement which has been arrived at of a long-standing difficulty. I will add to that that I think the friendly character of our relations with foreign Powers is due in great measure to the prudence, if I may say so, with which the noble Marquess has conducted the foreign affairs of this country. But I must say this—I have no wish to make an attack upon any member of the Government—that I do hope the noble Marquess will prevent such speeches from being made as were made by the Secretary of State for the Colonies during the recess, and which, though I am certain they were not intended to have such an effect, did, to some extent, neutralise the efforts which the noble Marquess himself had made to bring about a perfectly cordial understanding between us and certain other Powers. I have in years past had some experience of diplomacy, and I am sure that any one who has had anything to do with the conduct of foreign affairs, whether employed in this country or abroad, must know that there is a peculiar discretion necessary in speaking of foreign affairs, and that it is well that those who speak upon them should have some special experience on the subject, and know more 15 precisely than anyone who has not been engaged in such transactions can know what will be the effect of the words they use upon other nations. It is very different to our own domestic affairs. The ground is far more delicate, and it is not perhaps always easy to understand precisely what effect words spoken here by persons of importance may have abroad. I will not pursue the subject, but I felt bound to refer to it, without laying too much stress upon it. Naturally, my Lords, I turn now to that which occupies the thoughts of every one, not only in this House, but throughout the country—I mean the war in South Africa. And in regard to that I wish first of all to express, what is the universal opinion, admiration of the conduct of our troops. Upon that there cannot be two opinions. Whatever may have been the result of their efforts, I am perfectly certain that in no war in which we have been engaged have our soldiers, and such of our sailors as have been engaged, shown a more determined bravery or a more gallant spirit in the discharge of the dangerous and difficult duties they have been called upon to perform. That has not been confined by any means to the soldiers of this country. It has also been shown in as marked a degree by the bodies of troops, not large, but in themselves important, which the colonies have sent to our assistance. I would also say that I do not believe that too much praise can be awarded to the Natal Volunteers, who have come forward in circumstances of the most painful nature, and have shown that they are worthy in every respect of fighting by the side of the British soldier. The support we are receiving from the colonies is one of those subjects on which we can warmly congratulate ourselves. The support of our colonies has been given with no stinted hand. It has been given cordially; nay, more, it has been given enthusiastically, and, whatever may be the difficulties in which we are involved and the dangers that may beset us in the future, this much at least we know, which we did not know before so fully—that we have with us completely the heart of our colonial people throughout the world. That will, I believe, in the future lead to such a binding together of the whole Empire as will tend to increase our power to a degree which perhaps now we can hardly calculate. Of course, I include all the colonies—Canada, Australia and 16 the rest—but I must refer specially for a moment to the Australian colonies, because a measure of great importance affecting them is mentioned in the Speech from the Throne—namely, the federation of those colonies. I think I may say that, whilst at any time we should have welcomed such a proposal and have viewed it with the most favourable eye, our relations with our colonies are now of such a warm nature that they may be perfectly certain that that measure will be received with cordial approval both in Parliament and in the country. There is one other subject to which I must allude in this connection, and that is the condition of affairs in India. It is a most melancholy thing that India should again this year be afflicted by a terrible famine and also by a continuance of the plague. We deeply sympathise with the people of India, and we must not forget that, even in the stress which is laid upon them, they have not forgotten their relations to this country and have sent us both help and assurances of help in our present anxiety. I mention this because it marks the excellent relations which prevail between ourselves and our people in that part of the world. I have alluded to those various passages in the Speech in which we are all able to concur. I must turn now to the war itself. It is in vain to conceal from ourselves, determined as we are not to shrink from any sacrifice to bring the war to a fortunate conclusion, that we have no reason to congratulate ourselves upon the progress which thus far has been made. This is a moment of the deepest and gravest anxiety. I am not a soldier, but, for other reasons than my want of knowledge of military matters, I shall abstain entirely from criticising the actions of the generals in the field, who have onerous duties to perform in the conduct of these operations. It is the duty of Her Majesty's Government to select the men who are to undertake these difficult operations; it is our duty to support the Government in giving them all the assistance and all the means that they may need; but it seems to me to be unwise to criticise the generals themselves in the carrying out of their operations. But I do not wish by that to imply that I do not feel certain that our generals themselves, as every man who may be employed in the prose- 17 cution of the war, are doing their very utmost to perform their arduous duties. Reference is made in the gracious Speech to the experience we have gained with regard to the defects in our military administration.
§ THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The MARQUESS of SALISBURY)Those are not precisely the words.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYI will quote the very words—
The experience of a great war must necessarily afford lessons of the greatest importance to the military administrations of the country.That naturally implies what, I think, would under any circumstances be right, that there will probably have to be a revision in many respects of our military administration. I will say more. I think it very possible that it may be found necessary to make careful inquiry into certain particular points. I was going to add that I do not think that this is the occasion or the moment to go into particulars, even if I were capable of going into them, on such a subject. I merely mention it because I think it is a subject which may lead to discussions of great importance in Parliament. I concur with what the noble Duke, I think, said—that the Government will be wise—I am not sure they are not doing it—if they make every effort to be thoroughly prepared for what may occur in the future. We all hope for great success. We may, unfortunately, meet with serious disaster. Nay, more than that. Although our relations with foreign Powers are friendly, it is well to consider what may happen in the future, and it is well the Government should be thoroughly prepared for any event that may occur. I am certain that this country will meet with courage and resolution any eventuality that may arise, but it is not only necessary to be prepared to meet dangers with courage and resolution. You ought to be prepared beforehand with the means which will enable you to surmount those dangers. I agree entirely with the noble Duke opposite, if I rightly understood him, when he said it was highly desirable that the whole of the Militia should be embodied. I confess I have been astonished that the Government have not 18 taken that measure, not merely with reference to the war going on in South Africa, but also for home service, when the country has been denuded of regular troops. If you embody the Militia in time they will become efficient regiments, and it seems to me the whole body should be at the disposal of the Government for home service. That is one point. The other is referred to in this paragraph of the Speech from the Throne—At a time when several other nations are perfecting their naval preparations at the cost of increasing efforts and sacrifices, the solicitude with which you have provided for the efficiency of our Navy and of our coast defences will assuredly not be relaxed.I gather from that that Her Majesty's Government are well aware of the vital importance of seeing that our one great defence is in the highest condition not only of efficiency, which I hope and believe it is, but also in a state of preparation which may make it easy to utilise it at once whenever it is called upon to discharge any duty which may be laid upon it. I lay stress upon that. I am sure that in the present situation of affairs, it is well that our Navy should be quite ready wherever it is called upon to act, and I hope I may say with confidence that the Administration of the present day intend to keep that matter steadily and fully in mind. Circumstances which have come to my knowledge lead me to believe that that is the case, and I shall be glad to have it confirmed from the mouth of those who speak with both knowledge and responsibility. I have said much, I think, on which I may hope for the agreement of all in this House. I must come now to a less pleasant and far less agreeable task, because I do not think I can pass over without criticism certain matters concerning the action of Her Majesty's Government in the past. I entirely deny that it is our duty, when difficulties surround the Government, to abstain entirely from criticism. We are bound not to embarrass the Government, we are bound not to do anything that may diminish their efficiency, but I deny that the efficiency of the Government is seriously impaired by having the mistakes which in our opinion it has made pointed out, even at the present time. At the same time I shall not enlarge at any great length upon them. I may say at once that I have not the slightest intention of going back to the well-worn ques- 19 tion of the negotiations with the Transvaal Republic. If mistakes were made then they cannot be mended now by any words we may use. The remarks I shall make relate entirely to our want of preparation for the war in which we find ourselves engaged. That, I think, is a subject of great and pressing importance. I will trouble your Lordships with one or two quotations from speeches made by responsible Ministers of the Crown, because it is from their mouths alone that I gather, to my astonishment, that they seem not to have been aware, or not aware in sufficient time, of the state of preparation of the Transvaal Government and the danger which might consequently arise to the possessions of the Crown in South Africa. The argument which is sometimes used in defence of the Government—I believe the noble Marquess himself in a speech pointed this out—is something like this: If you were largely to increase our troops in South Africa during the time you were conducting negotiations with the Boer Government, it would be so warlike a proceeding that it would not only necessarily prejudice the negotiations, but it would induce the Boers, whose state of preparation was more advanced, to attack you. But that argument does not hold good when the speeches of the responsible Ministers of the Crown themselves are examined. Speaking at Leicester, in November, the Colonial Secretary said—The policy of President Kruger led us five times to the brink of war"—that was in past years—"and President Kruger only yielded when he looked into the cannon's mouth.The right hon. Gentleman then went on to say that all the time President Kruger was piling up tremendous armaments until he found himself in a position in which he thought he could safely defy one of the Great Powers of the world, and that these immense preparations for war began long before the Jameson raid. The comment I would make upon that is this—in the first place, this information must have been long known to the Government, and, in the second place, if this was the view taken by the Colonial Secretary, I am at a loss to understand how the policy which has recently been described as one of bluff could have been adopted and pursued in the face of such knowledge as the Government possessed. The Colonial Secretary told us that Presi- 20 dent Kruger very wisely, when we put the matter strongly to him and he was not ready for war, did not think it well to I rush into the cannon's mouth. Would not the inference be, inasmuch as he was persevering in piling up his armaments, that when he had his preparations complete he would rush into the cannon's mouth? That seems to me a conclusion it is impossible to avoid. It seems to me also unwise to have gone in for a policy of bluff without well considering what would be the result supposing it failed. Of course it was on the cards that it might fail. There was a fair probability of peace in the opinion of many men on both sides; but a fair probability does not exclude the possibility of the other event. With the knowledge that these armaments had been preparing for years and years, since long before the raid, would not anyone have thought that a policy of bluff would be unsafe, because, as the probability of peace might not be followed by peace, you would be landed in war without being prepared for it, as in point of fact you were? I will trouble your Lordships with one more quotation, which is, in my opinion, of still greater importance, and it is a quotation from a speech made by the First Lord of the Treasury at Manchester on the 8th of January last. The whole speech is one of very great interest, but I am only going to quote the passages which appear to be the most vital. Mr. Balfour said—Perhaps I shall be asked why did the Government, knowing that armaments were being accumulated in the Transvaal, not enter a protest two years ago, and declare that either the armaments should cease which could by the nature of the case be directed against nothing but this country and her colonies, or else that we should regard it as a cause of quarrel between us and the Boer Government? There was a conclusive reason, and a melancholy reason, why that argument should not have been used to the Boer Government. Our hands were tied and our mouths were closed at that time by the raid. How could we say to the Boer Government, 'You must disarm, you have nothing to fear from us; your armaments, if you accumulate them, must be directed, not to self-defence, but to aggression?'—how, I say, could we use that language when three years ago an expedition composed of our countrymen had from British territory made an onslaught—a feeble and ineffective onslaught, it is true, but still an onslaught—on the Boer Government? We were helpless in face of that argument. That argument could never be used in the face of public opinion and in the face of Europe, for it was always open to the Boer Government to say 21 that these arms that were accumulating, these munitions of war which were choking their arsenals, were intended, not for aggression, but simply as a measure of precaution and of selfdefence against a second raid taking place from our territory. Now you will see the point that I am leading up to. The argument I wish to meet is this, that we entered into this war insufficiently prepared on the spot to deal with the military situation we had to face; and I am of opinion, looking back with all the impartiality I can, that the steps we took were, in the state of our knowledge, sufficient steps, and that the policy we pursued is the policy which all impartial judges of the situation will agree to be one which ought to have commended itself to the responsible Government of the country.Now, my Lords, I cannot see that there is in that argument any sufficient excuse for the course pursued by the Government. These armaments had commenced, Mr. Chamberlain tells us, long before the Jameson raid. It was perfectly well known—it must have been known; it was impossible for it not to have been known—that these armaments were accumulating to a point which could not possibly be required for the purpose of dealing either with such a raid as the Jameson raid or with the Uitlander population in the Transvaal. What, in my opinion, the Government ought to have done was this. When they knew that these armaments were growing beyond anything which could possibly be necessary to repel a raid, or to restrain the Uitlanders, the obvious course would have been to have communicated with the Boer Government. But let me say that, in the first place, the Government ought to have punished much more severely the authors of the Raid. I know it may be said that perhaps we on this side share some of the blame; but I think we committed a grievous mistake in not inflicting severer punishment on the authors, great and small, of the raid. Nothing but that would have convinced the Boers of our good intentions. And, having done that, the Government should have said to the Boers: "We willingly and fully recognise your perfect right and the necessity you are under to arm to the point needed for preventing any such raid as the Jameson raid and of keeping order in your own country. But we know that you are accumulating armaments day by day and they are growing to a point far beyond what you can require for those purposes; and it is our duty to point out that unless you desist your action must lead to our 22 sending large forces to South Africa, when there will be a probability of our coming into collision. We do not wish to adopt an unfriendly attitude towards you, but if you persevere in this course we will have no alternative." My opinion is that if the Boers had persevered after that warning in accumulating armaments visibly directed against ourselves it would have been a just and necessary cause for war then and there. The whole matter was, however, allowed to drift until the Government found themselves in such a situation that they were not prepared, in case of the failure of their negotiations, to take the necessary measures to enforce their view. That is the conclusion I draw from that portion of Mr. Balfour's speech. I will ask you to refer in your minds to things which have occurred not very long ago, and affecting Great Powers. Would you have ventured, in your negotiations, to take up the attitude you took up—and took up successfully—if you had not known that you were prepared, if diplomacy failed, to back it up? But there is something much more wonderful than that, because Mr. Balfour actually told us the Government knew no more than the man in the street. Now I should be the last in the world to question the veracity of anything the First Lord of the Treasury said; yet I am free to confess that I cannot believe the possibility that the Government knew no more than the man in the street. I cannot see how that could be. There is no precedent for it that I over heard of. I am a man in the street, knowing in a general way more than the ordinary man in the street, but I never suppose for a moment that I possess information on any particular subject which the Government have to deal with, beyond perhaps domestic matters, at all equal to the information they possess. It is absolutely impossible to conceive that the Government should not have been fully and entirely informed of what was going on in the Transvaal. We had an agent there, and the country was open to any one to go to. Why, it would have only required a very moderate amount of activity to find out—I will not say every detail, but generally what was going on. Cannon and large quantities of ammunition are not brought into a country without its being generally known. I have heard, indeed, that some 23 of the cannon were made in this country; and cannon and ammunition are not conveyed by railway in such a manner that nobody hears of it. Therefore, I cannot believe that the Government knew no more than the man in the street. They must have known generally what was going on in the Transvaal. I have seen them accused of ignorance, but I do not believe that is possible. They appear also to have thought, if I take seriously what Mr. Balfour says, that their policy ought to be guided entirely by the man in the street, because he says—Supposing we had come to Parliament in the middle of August and said 'We want you to vote us immense supplementary estimates for the provision of immediate transport to South Africa' … what would have been said by the great mass of moderate opinion, both on the other side and on our own side of the House, if we had made such a proposition as that?That seems to me entirely apart from the real question. The question which every Government has to consider when grave affairs are at stake is not what their supporters, not what the man in the street, not what the Opposition may say, but what in their mature judgment the safety and interest of the country require. The responsibility is laid on them, having made up their minds, to make a proposal to Parliament and the country. Whether they accept it or not, the Government cannot justify themselves in remaining responsible for affairs of a grave and serious kind if they have made up their minds that a certain course is necessary unless the nation is prepared to back them. It is their duty to announce their policy and press it, and stand or fall by it; and more than that, in my humble judgment that is a course which would ensure the safety generally of the Government, because the nation would know that, if the men to whom it has confided the government of the country come forward and make such a statement as that, there are most grave reasons behind it. Is it to be said that the country has come to that pass, that the Government may not safely appeal to the country to give it the necessary support? That is not the view that is taken here. Mr. Balfour went on to say something even more grave. He said—Our institutions are such that such a determined policy becomes impossible.24 After describing at length what might have happened, he said:If this is true, would not such a policy be insane?In my opinion, there is nothing more insane than not proposing a policy which you believe to be a true one. Mr. Balfour went on to say—Our institutions, our free institutions, have their merits and have their demerits, and their demerits are intimately and inseparably bound up with their merits. Their merit is this—that no Government can act in great affairs unless it has the opinion of the community behind it. But the defect of that system is that, when the opinion of the community lags behind the necessities of the case, there may be occasions when sufficient rapidity of action is denied to the executive Government.Stronger statements than that have been made in irresponsible quarters, where there seems to be a conclusion arrived at that the institutions of the country are such that we cannot, as in the past, carry on a war. I deny it. I say our institutions are such that the Government has the power, if it has the courage, to beget the support of the people. They may ask for supplies, they may call upon the country for support, they may take any steps they think right, and unless the people are persuaded that the Government ought to be changed the institutions are such that the Government will receive the confidence of the nation. I must say that under all the circumstances of the case—with the majority in Parliament which the Government has, and with an Opposition which is not powerful, though I am bound to defend it—I think the Government had nothing to fear, and that the institutions of the country, if worked in the ordinary manner, are abundant to enable them to take any course which they think best. I deprecate in the strongest manner that it should be held out that, if the Government of this country has determined that the welfare of the country requires something to be done, there is anything to hinder them from obtaining all the support necessary except the withdrawal of the confidence of the country. Who can doubt the truth of what I say if he looks round and sees the universal enthusiasm, the way in which men who altogether disapprove of the war are ready—every man practically—to give support to the Government of the day? I am sorry to trouble you with long extracts and sorry to attack the man who 25 made these observations—a man for whom I have the highest respect, but I could not pass over what I believe to be a destructive and dangerous doctrine. There is one point I should like to add, though it is going back a little on what I have said already. It was said that you could not avoid the war after negotiations had been pushed to a certain point, and then you say, on the other hand, that you were not prepared. Why was it, if you were not prepared, that you were about to deliver an ultimatum yourselves?
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYHow do you know that?
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYNo doubt the Transvaal ultimatum made war absolutely unavoidable; but let us see the position in which you were about to place yourselves. You must have known that if your ultimatum were rejected—
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI do not admit that at all.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYOf course, if an ultimatum was not going to be presented my argument, to a certain extent, falls to the ground, but I am sure of this, that more extensive demands were intended to be made. It seems to me that in the circumstances in which you were placed it was the height of imprudence to push the matter still further, knowing that in all probability the result might be that the Boers would anticipate you, and your colony would be overrun. I have spoken of the want of knowledge on certain matters, but I cannot help mentioning a speech made by a gentleman, a very able gentleman, not in the Cabinet and not now connected with the War Office—Mr. Brodrick. He said that at all events the heart was right if the head was wrong. I have no doubt the heart of the Cabinet is in the right place, but if the head is in the wrong place it concedes much for which we have been arguing. Mr. Brodrick also said that the Government had been deceived. By whom were they deceived? Did their Intelligence Department deceive them? Did Mr. Conyngham Green deceive them? How was it they came to be misled? I am well aware there is something much more important than this, and that is the conduct of the war. Whilst I have felt it my duty to make these criticisms, believing as I do that there are strong grounds for finding 26 fault with the Government on certain matters—for want of knowledge apparently and want of foresight—I can assure them that, far from wishing to take the smallest party advantage, if I were capable of it, I desire now nothing so much as to support the Government to the utmost in carrying on this war, and I desire that their efforts should be crowned with the fullest success.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, I must commence by doing what the noble Earl did, and that is by thanking my two noble friends behind me for the speeches with which they opened the debate. They expressed, in eloquent language, sentiments which I am convinced echo the feelings of the country, and much that they have said will be read both with pleasure and with advantage not only in this country, but in distant parts of the world. I have next to say that the noble Earl impressed me with a feeling which he occasionally does impress me with—a despair of knowing what on earth I have got to say, because he began his speech, as he always does begin his speeches, with a series of unimpeachable propositions, to which I can only reply "Amen." In the early part of his speech, expressed with great force and vigour, he said many things for which I heartily thank him. I will not go further into that, because it is an unfortunate fact of human nature that controversy is always much less dull than agreement in sentiment. But I will deal with the latter part of his speech, in which he went upon the question how far we were to blame for the condition in which the ultimatum of the South African Republic found us. I do not think the noble Earl went back quite far enough. I think he must accompany me back to the lengthy negotiations of 1881 and 1884, and he must note that in the stipulations of the Conventions of those years there was not one word to limit, to suspect, or to hinder the unrestricted importation of any amount of munitions of war that the South African Republic might desire. The port of Lorenzo Marques, in the hands of a foreign Power, was open to them, the railway came immediately upon their country, and there was nothing in the treaty to prevent them using that inlet for the utmost armaments they might think it desirable to possess. It is per- 27 fectly true that they were not permitted by the treaty of 1881 to make agreements with foreign Powers without our consent, and therefore, if matters had stood in that position they would not have been in a condition to make the agreement which they did make with Portugal—that all munitions of war should freely enter into the country. But this difficulty has struck me. I looked to the records and found, to my extreme surprise, that permission to make this pernicious engagement which has been the cause of all our sorrows was conceded without a word by a Government of which the noble Earl was a member. That course was a very serious handicap. The noble Lord tells us that we ought to have known what arms and munitions were being introduced. I cannot follow him throughout all his debate, for he adopted a practice which is a little inconvenient—namely, that of attacking in this House not the Members of it who are present, but Members of the other House. The noble Earl quoted extracts from speeches by Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Balfour, and Mr. Brodrick, and he has thought it his business to attack those speeches. If I had known beforehand that the noble Karl was going to do this I would have had those speeches bound and placed on the table before me, but it is impossible for me to charge my memory with what those gentlemen exactly said, and I will not undertake to defend them. I have no doubt they are perfectly competent to defend themselves. But when the noble Earl says that we must have known, that it was impossible we should not have known—he got into a fervour of enthusiasm over the certainty of the knowledge that we must have possessed—about the artillery and munitions of war that the Republics were introducing—I ask, How on earth were we to know it? I believe, as a matter of fact—though I do not give this as official—that the guns were generally introduced in boilers and locomotives, and the munitions of war were introduced in pianos. It was not our territory, we had no power of search, we had no power of knowing what munitions of war were sent in, and we certainly had no power of supervising their importation into the Republics.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYNot so much as we ought to. It is a very remarkable peculiarity of public opinion in this country that people always desire to eat their cake and have it. They rejoice very much in the spiritual complacency which is afforded them by the reflection that they have a very small Secret Service Fund. Information, however, is a mere matter of money and nothing else. If you want much information, you must give much money; if you give little money, you will have little information. And, considering the enormous sums which are spent by other Powers, not least by the Transvaal Republic, which I was told on high diplomatic authority has spent £800,000 in one year in secret service, and comparing these with the ridiculously small sums that have for a great number of years been habitually spent by English Governments, it is impossible to have the omniscience which the noble Earl seems to regard as the necessary attribute of Her Majesty's Government. He has quoted the speeches of Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Balfour to show that we now know that the Boer Republics were accumulating during a long series of years the tremendous armaments from which we are suffering now. We know it now; we have the best reason in the world for knowing it. But that we knew it to the extent to which it existed in June last I, at all events speaking for myself, most entirely deny. The important thing is not whether we knew it or not, but whether we knew it in a form of evidence upon which we could go to Parliament. I daresay many of us, considering the nature of the Boers and the past history and character of Mr. Kruger, may have thought it was very likely that they were making enormous preparations, and that war at no distant period was possible. But what we had to do was to take to the House of Commons some proof that our surmises were real. It was no use our saying we suspect this or we suspect that; the House of Commons would not have voted two or three millions of extra expenditure a year for the defence of the frontier of Natal if we could have shown them nothing more real than empty surmises. In my judgment the original fault lay in the treaties of 1881 and 1884, by which this bitterly hostile population was installed in the midst of you, with every 29 facility for the introduction of all the arms they pleased. This was done without any precautions to prevent it or to supervise it, and it created a situation I of great and continuing danger. No doubt President Kruger, who is a shrewd man, succeeded in accumulating great armaments without, until very recently, any suspicion of their enormous size having reached those who were concerned. But the noble Lord seems to think that that is an elementary matter which we were bound to know. You cannot see through a deal board. We had no means of knowing the extent of the preparations, although everybody knew they existed to a certain extent. Then the noble Lord will say—You are arguing, therefore, that the reverses and difficulties under which we are at present suffering were inevitable. I am not at all prepared to say they were inevitable. That is a matter on which we shall decide later, when we have had an opportunity of hearing all the circumstances of the case. I am not at all prepared to say that it was not within the region of possibility and human strategy to have deferred the more acute phases of the conflict until the necessary reinforcements had been sent out. I do not say it was so, and I do not say it was not so. I will not give any opinion on the subject until we have been enabled to make inquiry. But I heartily concur in the view of the noble Lord that it is not for us now to express any criticism on the military operations, because we cannot hear the opinion of those who are justly entitled to be heard on the point. I entirely deny that the authors of the most lamentable treaties of 1881 and 1884 have a right to reproach us because President Kruger was enabled to introduce an enormous amount of armament without our knowledge—or without our knowledge until the matter had assumed a very serious character. My Lords, I confess this seems to me to be to a certain extent an unprofitable discussion, because it is almost impossible to take any step in the argument without seeming to call in question the actions of some man or set of men who ought not to be judged until they have been heard, and until a full examination has been made into their case. Therefore, I have very unwillingly entered into this point. I only wish to repeat that I cast the responsibility for the introduction of these vast armaments on the persons 30 who signed the treaties of 1881 and 1884. For the rest, my Lords, I am glad that the noble Earl did not propose, as I understood it was likely he would, an immediate inquiry into the action of either the military authorities at home or the generals in the field. Such an inquiry would be in no sense complete. We do not deprecate it, we do not shrink from it, but we should gravely disapprove of an inquiry held before those who could give us most valuable information were in a position to appear before us. Therefore, I think that, though an inquiry would be quite wise, it would be better deferred to a more propitious period. I cannot entirely coincide with the constitutional fervour which the noble Earl displayed in the latter part of his speech. I do not believe in the perfection of the British Constitution as an instrument of war. As an instrument of peace it has not yet met its match, but for purposes of war there is more to be said. If you look back over the present century you will see there have been four occasions on which the British Government has engaged in war. On each occasion the opening of these wars was not prosperous, and on each occasion the Government of the day and the officers in command were assailed with the utmost virulence of popular abuse. These were the Walcheren expedition, the Peninsular War, the Crimean War, and now the South African War. In all those cases at first—in the case of Walcheren not only at first—there were lamentable losses. In all those cases there was the fiercest denunciation of the Government of the day and of the generals who had charge of the operations. Did I hear the noble Earl deny that?
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI do not know whether the noble Earl has read the life of the Duke of Wellington, recently published, written by Sir Herbert Maxwell—a most admirable book.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThen the noble Earl will have noticed that even so dignified, sedate, sober, and far-seeing a body as the Common Council I of the City of London denounced the 31 rashness and inexperience of the Duke of Wellington, and exhorted the Government to recall him. In the case of Walcheren the miscarriage was too great to allow for any mistake that was made, and nobody interfered on behalf of Lord Chatham and Sir Richard Strachan. In the Crimean war, as the noble earl will himself remember, a fierce attack was made on the unfortunate Duke of Newcastle, who was a very able and conscientious man, and not in the least degree guilty of the things laid to his charge, but the fury of popular indignation was so great that he made way before it. I think he made a great mistake in doing so, because before a couple of years had passed away a complete reaction set in. But the moral I wish to draw from this uniformity of experience is that it is not the extraordinary folly or feebleness of particular Ministers or generals with which you have to deal, which is the sole cause of your reverses. There must be something else. We cannot have been so unlucky as to have fought four times and to have lighted upon the most incompetent and worthless Ministers that the world has ever produced. It is evident there is something in your machinery that is wrong, and that leads me to accept with a very doubting mind the glowing eulogism which the noble Earl passed upon the fighting qualities of the British Constitution. I am inclined to doubt these qualities, and I will recommend to the meditation of the noble Lord these considerations. The art of war has been studied on the continent of Europe with a thoroughness and self-devotion that no other science has commanded, and at the end we find ourselves surrounded by live great military Powers, and yet on matters of vital importance we pursue a policy wholly different from those military Powers. Do not understand for a moment that I am guilty of such profanity as to blame the British Constitution. I am not. I am pointing out that in this matter we enjoy splendid isolation. Of course, first and foremost stands conscription, and no one imagines, even among the youngest of us, that he will ever live to see conscription adopted in this country. Then comes the employment as experts of persons sitting in Parliament exercising power over the military administration, who are named by the Government, but who have not to obtain the approval of the electors and the con- 32 stituencies. It is an important and very difficult question. Then there is the big question of promotion by seniority, a delicate subject; but I doubt if you will find that promotion by seniority prevails in any of the great armies of Europe to the extent it prevails here. Then there is that matter of secret service to which I have already referred. There is no other country which is content to protect itself with so slight a supply of funds as our own; and last of all I feel I am laying my hand on the sacred feature of the Constitution when I say there is the Treasury. At the present time I feel assured that the powers of the Treasury have been admininistered with the greatest judgment, and the greatest consideration, and do not imagine for a moment that I support the idiotic attacks which have been made on the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. He is a Minister who has filled the office with the greatest consideration to the powers of the Treasury; but I say that the exercise of its powers in governing every department of the Government is not for the public benefit. The Treasury has obtained a position in regard to the rest of the departments of the Government that the House of Commons obtained in the time of the Stuart dynasty. It has the power of the purse, and by exercising the power of the purse it claims a voice in all decisions of administrative authority and policy. I think that much delay and many doubtful resolutions have been the result of the peculiar position which, through many generations, the Treasury has occupied. Do not imagine for a moment that I say it is in any way due to those with whom I have had the honour of sitting in the Cabinet. Now I notice these things because I was stimulated to it by the enthusiasm—what I call the 1688 enthusiasm—which has animated the mind of the noble Lord. I do not think that the British Constitution as at present worked is a good fighting machine. I have stated that it is unequalled for producing happiness, prosperity, and liberty in time of peace; but now, in time of war, when great Powers with enormous forces are looking at us with no gentle or kindly eye on every side, it becomes us to think whether we must not in some degree modify our arrangements in order to enable ourselves to meet the dangers that 33 at any moment may arise. I have only been induced to make these remarks by what has fallen from the noble Earl, but I confess—and it is a humiliating confession—that both he and I have been wasting a good deal of time of the House this evening. I do not think that this looking back on past history, this examination of the particular blame that may attach to this or that Minister, or the particular force that we may lend to the speech of any Minister—I do not think that these quite come up to the dignity of the present crisis. We have something more to do than to examine into the past action of Ministers or the present reputation they bear. If you are able to come forward and say, "We have a better set of Ministers to propose to the Crown," and if you can persuade the House of Commons to that opinion, of course, you are doing your duty; but if you are not able to do this, I do not think there is much use in discussing it in such a crisis as this. We must all join together to exercise all the powers we can give in order to extricate ourselves from a situation that is full of humiliation, and not free from danger. I do not say that the danger may not be easily exaggerated. Many a country has begun a great war with difficulties of the kind. We have only to look at what the Northern States of America went through at the beginning of the Civil War, to see how easy it would be to draw a mistaken inference from the reverses with which we have been met at the opening of this war. We have every ground to think that if we set ourselves heartily to work, and exert all the undoubted instruments of power we possess, we shall bring this war to a satisfactory conclusion. I think we must defer the pleasing task of quarrelling among ourselves until that result has been obtained. We have a work that now appeals to us as subjects of the Queen—as Englishmen; and it must throw into shadow the ancient claim, the well-known and acknowledged claim, which party expediency has upon the action of all our statesmen. The noble lord has spoken of what men have said in the other House. I confess I saw with some regret that a noble lord of great position is about to bring this great issue into a party conflict. It is much to be regretted. The only place where he will create sympathy, where he will arouse enthusiasm, is at Pretoria. Our object 34 must be to retrieve ourselves as rapidly as possible from the situation into which we have got. We are in this position. It is worse than many we have gone through before, for we are repelling men who have invaded our territory, and the reverses we have suffered are in consequence of our inability to drive them back. That is a position which cannot last. Remember that this Empire which we sustain is a valuable, splendid, but also a very responsible I possession to support. If anything happens to tear asunder the great continental countries, by the mere force of their geographical juxtaposition, they must come together again, and the evil will be repaired. There is not in our Empire any coercing or retaining force which will I answer the same end; and unless we can sink all lesser issues, unless we take all smaller passions into the one great duty of sustaining our country in this crisis, we shall run the danger of convulsions which will certainly tarnish its lustre, and perhaps menace its integrity.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYMy Lords, I can say, with the utmost truth, what many say by way of rhetorical figure, that when I entered this House I had no more idea of addressing your Lordships than the clock I see in the gallery. But I confess that the speech which we have just heard moves me against myself to make one or two remarks which are pertinent to the extreme gravity of the situation in which we stand. May I, in the first place, say what has not been said before—how truly and deeply I am sure I voice the sympathy of this House for once with the noble Marquess in the terrible bereavement which has robbed him since we last met of the noble and gifted lady who shared the triumphs of his career. But when I pass from that reflection to the speech we have just heard, I ask myself, Why is it that the Prime Minister of this country makes it so hard for "the man in the street"—to which august category I belong with others—to support his Government? He said just now that the speech of the noble Earl behind me was unworthy of the dignity of the occasion.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI am afraid that the noble Lord has misunderstood me if he understood me to 35 say that the manner of the noble Earl was in any way unworthy. I meant to say that both of us in examining the past conduct of the Government had been dealing with a matter which was not the most pressing at the present moment.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYThe past conduct of the Government is a matter which some day will come up for investigation and for inquisition, and they will have to meet an indictment not without force or without gravity. But I hope in my heart and conscience that the investigation may not take place till such a time as the Government and all those who are serving the Queen at this moment may be covered with such a blaze of triumph and of glory that the eye of investigation may be somewhat dazzled and dimmed. When I think of where we stand I am appalled by the nature and the style, the manner and the matter, of the speech of the Prime Minister of Great Britain addressing this ancient and hereditary House. How do we stand at this moment? We have 120,000 men in South Africa, and we at this moment have not been able to advance into the enemy's territory at all. Indeed, we have difficulty in holding our own. The attitude of foreign nations is described by the usual language of courtesy as friendly, but that language is considerably mitigated by the observation of the noble Marquess himself. It does not strike me as being as amicable as the word used would imply, and as it is stated to be in the Speech from the Throne. Here I must differ for one moment from the noble Earl behind me. He thinks it a mistake that our newspapers should reproduce so accurately the language of the foreign press when it is hostile to ourselves. He said—I think he made a slip there—that we reproduce all the hostile language of the foreign press which is addressed to ourselves. Our press can undertake no such gigantic task as that of reproducing all the hostile language of the foreign press. It is not a fiftieth or a hundredth part of that hostile language which we are privileged to read in our own papers. But I welcome the enterprise of our journalists in reproducing some of it, because otherwise we should be living in a fool's paradise—an insular paradise—believing that the nations who have long been envious of our prosperity and have recently been alienated by the 36 language of our diplomacy are by no means unfriendly to us. We stand in a parlous position. We have had explanations as to what is the present position in the view of the Government; and I confess I think that my noble friend was fully justified in touching on those explanations, which are the only authoritative ones that we have had. The noble Marquess brushed them contemptuously aside. He said, as he has often said on similar occasions, that it is not fair in this House to criticise speeches delivered by those who do not belong to this House. That is a hard saying; and he did not soften it, I may mention, by adding, as his own view of the British Constitution—on which he dilated at great length and with startling novelty and originality—that it was wrong to criticise a Government if you were not able to turn it out. That is a contention which would reduce the sacred but limited band behind me to silence and exile for the rest of their lives. But if my noble friend was not to criticise the speeches of Mr. Balfour and Mr. Chamberlain, or of any one who is not privileged by creation or succession to a seat in this House, whom was he to criticise? I scan the opposite bench, and I cannot see any one, except my noble friend who is President of the Council and who is also the President of the Defence Committee, which has been such a bulwark for our country—excepting the noble Duke, who made a speech at the Imperial Institute on education, a speech which would not therefore have been pertinent to any part of the argument of my noble friend, I cannot see any Minister who has broken silence since the month of November. We stand, I therefore, in a strange position. The noble Marquess brushes aside all criticism of the only Ministerial utterances which we have had to clear up the position. He says that if he had had the slightest idea that those speeches would have been called in question in this House he would have had them bound and placed on the Table before him for comment. Did ever any one hear such a defence of two of the most important members of the Cabinet delivered by the Prime Minister at such a crisis of his country's history? There is, at any rate, one question which we are anxious to have answer to. That question was pressed home and was not met. We have a right to know, and though we cannot enforce it by any vote—if the 37 men in the street of whom we hear so much had seats in this House it would be carried by an overwhelming majority—we have a right to know from the noble Marquess, or whoever may succeed him in the debate, whether there was adequate information given to the Government before the crisis in the Transvaal appeared; or whether even there was sufficient information to guide them in their diplomacy and negotiations. That is the point which the nation will insist upon knowing, whether in this House or the other. If you had not sufficient information, dismiss your Intelligence Department, dismiss Mr. Conyngham Greene and your Consular Agents wherever they exist and had touch with this matter, at Lorenzo Marques and elsewhere. If you did know of it you have a heavy responsibility to bear. The noble Marquess says, "How can we see through a deal board?" I suppose he meant by that to allude to pianoforte cases in which, with more knowledge than he gave himself credit for, he unofficially states that the ammunition was taken into Pretoria.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI am only told so.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYThe noble Marquess only states it unofficially. He says that he cannot see through a deal plank, and that therefore he has no means of knowing what was smuggled into Pretoria. I should be glad of any official statement to balance the unofficial statement of the noble Marquess. Then he proceeded with a statement which struck me as more startling still. He said, "Give us more secret service money and we will receive and, in our turn, give you more information." My Lords, the Government is in possession of a very commanding majority in this House—I reckon it at 95 per cent.—it may be more or it may be less. They have in the House of Commons a majority which it is impossible to compute, but which I should say would roughly be represented by three-quarters of the House, or, if that is an exaggerated estimate, by two-thirds of the House. If they have the responsibility of Government they are bound to ask for such funds, whether for secret service or any other, as they may think necessary for the safety of the Empire. They cannot devolve that responsibility upon your 38 Lordships by speaking of the working of the British Constitution. I ask you to analyse the speech of the noble Marquess which is still ringing in your ears. It is the speech of a Minister explaining a disastrous position to Parliament; and he practically has only given two explanations of that situation. They are, first, that the Government have not enough secret service money to obtain information; and, secondly, the mysterious working of the British Constitution. I suppose there are foreign representatives in the gallery listening to this debate; and I suppose that the speech of the Prime Minister will be flashed all over Europe to-night to tell Europe what the Prime Minister has to say in this crisis. And Europe, which is watching with a keen and not a benevolent interest the proceedings of our armies in South Africa, will learn that the causes of our disasters are—one avoidable, and the other inevitable. The avoidable cause is the inadequate amount of the secret service vote, and the inevitable one is the secular working of the British Constitution. I pass from that question to ask another which is of much more interest for me. We do not care to know at this moment how it is that the war began and found us unprepared and has left us in a position almost of humiliation ever since. But what we have a right to know now is—What do the Government intend to do? There is a paragraph in the Queen's Speech, a paragraph which I rejoice to see, of a somewhat didactic character in its first sentence, but not without interest in its second—
The experience of a great war must necessarily afford lessons of the greatest importance to the military administrations of the country. You will not, I am convinced, shrink from any outlay that may be required to place out defensive preparations on a level with the responsibilities which the possession of so great an Empire has laid upon us.The noble Marquess made no reference to that paragraph, except to say that he does not think we shall see compulsory service in the life of the youngest Peer present. I do not affirm or question that proposition. But I do not see that it is as immeasurably remote as the noble Marquess considers that some form of compulsory service should have to be introduced to meet the growing exigencies of the Empire; and I am quite sure that neither from that nor from any other 39 sacrifice will the nation recoil to preserve the predominance of this Empire. We have sent from our island a vast mass of the troops which usually garrison it. Situated as we are, as has been more than once said, in the centre of a universe which is by no means friendly to us, that we should not have a hint from the First Minister of the Crown as to what military measures they propose to take in the face of the disasters with which we have met, and as to the sacrifices which we must inevitably be called upon to make to redress them—that is one of the most extraordinary features of the working of the British Constitution on which the noble Marquess has laid such stress. I agree with him in saying that the country will carry this thing through. It will carry it through, in spite of all the impediments, both of men and of methods, which have shackled it in the past. But I venture to say that it will have to be inspired by a loftier tone and by a truer patriotism than we have heard from the Prime Minister to-night.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (the Marquess of LANSDOWNE)My Lords, the noble Earl has asked Her Majesty's Government a question which, no doubt, he had an excellent right to ask. He asked us what were our intentions as to the military measures which the critical circumstances of the present moment seemed to him to require. If I do not give the noble Earl a detailed answer to that question it is not because I dispute his right to ask it, but because I confess that the Debate on the Address scarcely seems to us the proper opportunity for unfolding to Parliament a full statement upon a very technical matter. The noble Earl will believe me when I say that I give this answer not with any idea of putting him oft, but merely because I do not regard the present as the proper moment for answering the question. I can state to him to-night that I shall be ready on a very early date to ex-plain fully to your Lordships what military measures Her Majesty's Government have in contemplation. Both the noble Earls who have spoken opposite have reproached Her Majesty's Government, first, with their ignorance as to the Boer preparations, and, next, with their un-preparedness for war when it broke out. The noble Earl the leader of the Opposition in this House quoted from a speech 40 of Mr. Balfour's a passage in which Mr. Balfour seemed to admit that we were open to the reproach of unpreparedness for war. But I think the statement of Mr. Balfour was that we were unprepared for war on the spot, and that is, after all, a very different thing. That we were not altogether unprepared for war is surely obvious when we consider the statement of the noble Earl below the gangway (the Earl of Rosebery) that we have been able within a few weeks to send 120,000 troops 6,000 miles across the sea, and land them in a full state of efficiency and equipment. That, surely was no proof of unpreparedness at home. Then the noble Earl complained that we were without information as to the military preparations of the South African Republic. I think that he has done us an injustice. There are, no doubt, many cases in which munitions of war have passed through Lorenzo Marques under the various disguises indicated by the Prime Minister, but I am able to tell the House that the Intelligence branch has been able from time to time to supply us with information which I believe to be extremely correct as to the extent and the nature of the Boer preparations. The estimate made by the Intelligence branch of the number of armed men to be found in the two South African Republics is, I believe, a correct estimate, and one which our experience of these military operations has not in any way falsified. I think it extremely likely that the Intelligence branch may have wrongly conjectured the exact number of men whom we were likely to find at any particular point opposing us in the field. It is clearly a matter for conjecture whether the two Republics were likely or not to detach a part, and if so what part of their fighting force, either for the purpose of garrisoning their cities or for the purpose of watching the native tribes at different portions of their borders. It is also fair to the Intelligence Department to add that they had no means of forming a very precise estimate of the additions which the Boer forces have received from various sources—to some extent, I am afraid, from amongst the disloyal Dutch of our own colonies, and also to some extent by the gradual accretion of small bodies of mercenaries of different nations, who, like the munitions of war, found their way more or less surreptitiously 41 through Portuguese territory into the Transvaal; but with these two reservations, I am able to say that in my belief the estimate given to us by the Intelligence branch was, on the whole, a trustworthy estimate. When I come to the question of guns, I believe in the same way that they were able before the war began, or became inevitable, to tell us, at any rate with approximate accuracy, what was the nature of the armaments in the hands of the two Republics. What I think we did possibly underrate—and I do not care how frankly I confess it—was not the numbers or the armaments of the Boers, but their value as fighting men. They have shown an amount of resource, an amount of mobility and of tenacity for which I think most of us were not prepared; and I think it is in that sense that my noble and gallant colleague, the Commander-in-Chief, in a speech he delivered in the autumn, very frankly admitted that the Boers had shown themselves more powerful and more numerous than we had been led to expect. With regard to our unpreparedness for war, the noble Earl told us that if we were not sufficiently informed as to the preparations of the Boers we undertook a great responsibility in making war upon them. My Lords, I believe that every member of Her Majesty's Government in the summer of last year realised perfectly well that war in the end might prove inevitable; but we did not believe that it was inevitable and so long as by any action consistent with our self-respect we could avoid that war we were anxious to avoid it, knowing as we did that it would prove a very serious and a very costly war—costly not only in treasure, but costly, I mean, in the loss of precious lives which cannot be replaced. We were determined, my Lords, that we would take no steps which might have the effect of precipitating a collision with the South African Republic. We believed that it was perfectly possible to draw an intelligible line between those military measures which were necessary for the purpose of securing our colonies in South Africa and those other measures which might be necessary should an invasion of the two Republics be determined upon. My Lords, while negotiations were still in progress we determined to restrict ourselves to those purely protective measures which seemed to us sufficient for the purpose and which, in our belief, 42 were not calculated to provoke a rupture of the negotiations which were proceeding. I believe that at that time the country was with us in this policy. Throughout the summer of last year the negotiations were proceeding, and proceeding, on the whole, hopefully. We received from the South African Republic one proposal after another, each of them apparently mote hopeful and more encouraging as to a satisfactory issue, and I think we are not to blame if, while those negotiations were going on, we shrank from such measures as, for example, the calling out of the Reserves or the sending of a large expeditionary force which could only he intended for aggressive purposes, It may be argued that that policy was too hazardous for us; but I think we are not open to that charge unless it can be shown that there was reason for believing that the precautions which were taken were inadequate to protect the colonies during the time which must necessarily elapse before we were able to send out a field force and to assume the offensive. We were advised that it was possible for us by sending out reinforcements of moderate size to make the two colonies perfectly safe. We took the best military advice obtainable as to the number of the reinforcements which it was necessary to send out for that purpose. We sent out those reinforcements, and they arrived in South Africa before British territory was invaded by the Boer forces. There is another aspect of the matter which deserves your Lordships' attention. That is this. Supposing we had, as the noble Earl opposite suggests, as I understand—supposing we had during the summer, and when negotiations were still pending, made overt preparations for occupying the colonies on a large scale—
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI think such a demand has been made.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI am sorry if I have misunderstood the noble Earl. According to my lights, if 43 a certain demand had been made, accompanied by the preparation of a large and dominating force, that would only have had the effect of precipitating the negotiations, and at the same time, on the presumption that the Boers were preparing for hostilities, of inducing them to make an attack upon us.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI am sorry there is a misunderstanding.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEAt any rate the noble Earl will not dispute that, if at the moment we had chosen to make large overt preparations in this country for war, clearly indicating to the world that we were about to coerce the South African Republic, at that moment it would have been possible for them to strike at us before we could possibly strike at them.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEWe had this matter thoroughly considered by our military advisers, and we were told that it would take us at least thirteen weeks to land and concentrate and prepare a field force consisting of an army corps and a cavalry division in South Africa. During those thirteen weeks it is perfectly clear that it would have been in the power of the South African Republic to have taken the initiative. We knew that nothing we could do would deprive them of that advantage, and we considered that it would be better to limit ourselves to those purely defensive measures to which we actually limited ourselves, and which were thought sufficient for securing the two colonies against attack. I have only to add that if your Lordships should desire these matters to be more thoroughly investigated, I shall be ready to follow the noble Lords opposite into any details as to which they may require information. For the present I hope I have said enough to show your Lordships, in the first place, that we were not, as has been alleged, unprepared, and, in the next place, that we had excellent 44 reasons for not pushing our preparations at first further than we actually did. It remains for me only to repeat what has been said already by more than one noble Lord, and to express my deep acknowledgments, in the first place, to the people of this country for the manner in which they have supported us in all our military preparations, and in the next place to the citizens of our great colonies for the extraordinary loyalty which they have shown, and the extreme generosity with which they have placed the whole of their resources at our disposal: and, finally, I must say one word to those numerous members of the civil population who have by contributions of all kinds, and particularly in the matter of hospitals, done so much to diminish the sufferings of our troops and secure the success of our military operations.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYCould the noble Marquess tell us the day on which he proposes to make his statement?
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI am not in a position to name a date now, but I can assure the noble Earl that it will be a very early date.
§ On question, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty in reply to her gracious speech," agreed to, nemine dissentient, and same ordered to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.