THE EARL OF DUNRAVENMy Lords, I beg to ask my noble friend the Secretary of State for War whether he is now in a position to make a statement as to the military measures Her Majesty's Government propose to take.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEMy Lords, I have to thank your Lordships for the consideration you have shown me in allowing me to postpone until this evening what I have to say upon this most important subject. I gather from the observations which have been made in this House upon previous occasions that the points with regard to which your Lordships desire to be informed are these—first, to what extent have we, in sending out of this country large military forces for service in South Africa, denuded the United Kingdom of its proper garrison; next, what steps are we taking, or have we taken, to secure the safety of these islands during the absence of these large forces; and, thirdly, I think your Lordships would like to know what forces are, or will be, at our disposal for the prosecution of those military operations which we all, I am sure, desire to see carried to a decisive and to a satisfactory conclusion. I think I may, perhaps, first state to the House what troops are actually in or under orders for South 1169 Africa. In the two colonies before the war broke out we had a force of about 23,000 men. To those we intended to add, for the purpose of offensive operations against the South African Republics, a field army of, in round figures, 50,000 men—that is, an army corps, a cavalry division, and troops for the lines of communication. We had assumed that that force would have to be concentrated in the Cape Colony and prepared for an advance by a date which I may state as the 23rd of the month of December. We were led to take that date for this reason—that it was the earliest date by which we could look forward to concentrate in the Cape Colony the whole of the supplies and the whole of the land transport necessary for the advance of a considerable army. The 50,000 men did, in point of fact, arrive in South Africa before the appointed date, and as to the transport animals I may say that the whole of the 15,000 mules which were required for the conveyance of the troops were collected in the Cape Colony or in Natal by the middle of the month of December. But, my Lords, before the time came at which we had looked forward to the commencement of the advance important events happened in South Africa. At the beginning of the month of November we became aware that for the original plan of a central operation by way of the Orange Free State there had been substituted other operations for the relief of Ladysmith upon the eastern and of Kimberley upon the western side of the theatre of operations, and there were also subsidiary operations in the Cape Colony. General Clery and Lord Methuen commenced their respective advances on the 18th of the month of November, and before the end of the month Lord Methuen had fought three pitched battles on the line of the railway leading towards Kimberley, followed by a fourth battle in the early days of the month of December. I mention this change in the plan of campaign not with any idea of suggesting that any other dispositions were preferable, but because I wish to impress upon the House how greatly the magnitude and the difficulty of the task was increased by this fundamental alteration. I think it is obvious that, even if all had gone well with the two relieving forces, those operations could not possibly have been carried on by a force of the dimensions which was 1170 considered sufficient for the one great central operation, and, in fact, we all know that things did not go well, and that both the relieving forces encountered checks and obstacles which led to the prolongation of the two relief operations, and retarded for a very long time the commencement of the central advance which had always been regarded as the pivot of the whole campaign. These events led us to recognise at an early stage the necessity of adding largely to the forces in South Africa. All through the autumn and winter a steady stream of troops was poured into the two colonies. During October 28,000 men embarked from this country, during November 26,000, December 24,000, and January 25,000. And, in addition to the troops now in South Africa, there are under orders or on their way at this moment 50,000 further troops. Three divisions had left this country by the middle of November, the fourth division was in South Africa, the fifth division left in the last week of November, the sixth division in the latter part of December, and the seventh division in the beginning of January. These troops were accompanied by those colonial contingents of whose admirable behaviour we have, I am sure, all heard with the liveliest satis faction. They were followed by a certain number of Militia battalions. There were local forces raised upon the spot in both colonies. At a later stage we sent out that force of Imperial Yeomanry which had been raised with the assistance of the officers of the old Yeomanry—a force the whole 8,000 of which has, I am glad to say, now been raised. We are now sending out more Militia battalions up to a total of thirty battalions altogether, and I rejoice to hear that the colonial contingents are still following in considerable numbers. Taking all these troops together, we shall have before long in South Africa, approximately speaking, no less than 200,000 men, of whom three-fourths, roughly speaking, have been sent out from this country. I am, of course, not suggesting that the whole of this great force is one of which Lord Roberts can dispose or which he could at any moment place in the fighting line. We all know what large deductions have to be made from the grand total of a military force in order to arrive at the actual number of sabres and bayonets whom the general in command can make 1171 use of in the field, but I mention these large withdrawals of troops from this country because I think it is right the House should know the extent of the drain to which our resources at home have been subjected by these operations. In these circumstances I do not think I shall be contradicted when I say that our first duty seemed to us to be to make arrangements for supplying what I might describe as the wear and tear of the South African army, and up to the present time I think we have done that not unsuccessfully; 5,600 men were sent out as drafts in the month of December, and 2,700 in January. It may, perhaps, reassure your Lordships to hear that we anticipate no great difficulty in supplying the necessary drafts of what is probably as important as men—I mean of horses. We have found many new sources of supply, and from these sources we are confident of being able to draw a number of horses sufficient to supply the wants of the Army, even making allowance for the terrible inroads of horse sickness which we know is rife in that part of the world. We must, of course, anticipate very large further demands, and we have therefore to take stock of the resources from which those demands can be met. If I may run briefly through what I may describe as our military assets, I may state that of regular troops serving with the colours—the remaining battalions of infantry, the men at the depôts, the soldiers who are left behind by the Line battalions as being of not sufficient age or service to go out, the remaining regiments of cavalry, the remaining horse and field artillery—of these we have 98,000 men at home altogether. In addition we have about 12,000 men of the Reserves, of whom we have not yet made use. That gives us in all 110,000 regular soldiers at home at this moment. It may perhaps interest the House to know that that number is almost exactly the same as the number which was serving with the colours this time last year. Then we have the Yeomanry, which, deducting the men whom it has contributed to the Imperial Yeomanry, numbers 7,000. We have of Militia of all arms, deducting those Militia battalions which have gone or are going to South Africa, 77,000 men. And we have Volunteers, deducting the companies which the Volunteers have contributed to the Line battalions serving at the front, 215,000. That gives a grand 1172 total of 409,000 armed men serving in this country at the present time. I think some of the statements which we sometimes see made with regard to the alleged absolute denudation of this country scarcely, perhaps, take sufficiently into account the large number of men which, in spite of all these demands, are still left to us in the British Islands. My Lords, it is, of course, in a case of this kind not sufficient merely to count heads or to assume that every soldier in the country is available for military purposes at the moment. Our business is to organise and equip what we have got, and to distribute those forces in the most advantageous manner. Now, what are the requirements from these resources which it is our business to meet? I think those requirements are threefold. We have, in the first place, to provide an army for home defence, by which I mean not merely troops stationed at garrisons and defensive positions, but a mobile army, which we would be able to transfer rapidly to any point which may at any moment be threatened. In the next place, we require the necessary garrisons for our forts and for the positions which under our mobilisation schemes have to be defended in case of attack. And, in the third place, we have to be prepared with sufficient reinforcements and with the means of replacing any troops which may be taken for the purpose of these reinforcements from within the limits of the mobile army. Now, my Lords, the first question which arises is—What should be the size of that mobile army? The matter was gone into twelve years ago, and it was then laid down very clearly in the Minute written by the then Secretary of State for War, Mr. Edward Stanhope, that after provision had been made for the defence of India and the colonies it was desirable that we should have a force of three army corps for home defence, two of these army corps being composed of Regulars, and the third partly of Regulars and partly of auxiliary troops, and that, subject to these considerations, two army corps should be available for service abroad. I have no doubt that what was then contemplated was that we should, after establishing our superiority at sea, be able to send in the later stages of a war a moderate-sized army for offensive purposes beyond the limits of these islands. But, my Lords, circumstances 1173 have changed a good deal since Mr. Stanhope's Minute was written. I cannot help thinking that there is something ironical in the present situation, in which we, the greatest maritime Power in the world, find ourselves at war with two little States which do no not own a boat's crew between them, and which are consequently invulnerable by our powerful Navy. We are in the position of a strong man fighting with his right arm tied behind his back; but I hope, again, when we talk of the denudation of these islands, that we shall not forget that that right arm is intact, and unimpaired, and stronger than it has ever been in the history of the Empire. This exceptional combination of circumstances has thrown upon the Army exertions of the most arduous kind. We find ourselves in this position. We have to send out, not two army corps at the end of a war in order to drive home a blow struck in the first instance by the fleet, but we have to send out at the very beginning of the war nearly three army corps, with no assistance from the Navy except that assistance—and I gladly acknowledge its value—which the Naval Brigades and Naval Artillery have been enabled to give to us on shore. Our first duty, I think, is to see that we are provided with a field army of the dimensions laid down in 1888—that is, a field army numbering about 130,000 men. That is the more necessary because a field army must be, as it were, the reservoir upon which we draw should it be necessary to send further reinforcements out of this country. In our opinion that army corps should have at least what I may describe as a backbone of Regular troops; and as I am mentioning Regular troops, I may state to the House that it is our intention to add to the permanent strength of the Army twelve new Line battalions of infantry in addition to the three Line battalions which we are now raising under an augmentation of the Army decided on two years ago. That permanent increase of the Army is necessitated by the growing demands of our Imperial and colonial garrisons. We propose to add these new battalions as third and fourth battalions of existing line regiments. I have before stated in this House the reasons for which it seemed to me that the four-battalion organisation had very great conveniences, and I will not repeat them now. In order to form these battalions we shall draw 1174 upon the surplus men of the first and second battalions—the men whom the first and second battalions have left behind—upon the reservists of the regiment, upon ex-soldiers desiring to reenter the Army and serve on for pension, and, lastly, upon ordinary recruits. I may say, perhaps, with regard to ordinary recruits, that we have every reason to be satisfied with the manner in which recruiting has progressed during the last few months. It is perfectly clear that a war does not tend to make the Army unpopular. I may, perhaps, tell your Lordships that in October we took 4,395 recruits, in November 5,226, in December 3,798, and in January about 6,500 recruits, or a total of about 20,000 recruits in four months—that is, 4,000 more men than in the corresponding four months of last year, which was supposed to be an extremely good recruiting year. I pass from infantry to artillery, and more particularly field artillery. Her Majesty's Government have, ever since they came into power, recognised the very great importance of that branch of the Army. We have already added no less than sixteen batteries to the Field Artillery, but we are convinced that a much larger increase is necessary. The part played by the artillery in the present war shows, I think, how necessary it is that we should be amply provided in this respect. There is also this consideration—that, having to depend for our home Army to a considerable extent, at all events, upon auxiliary forces whose training is necessarily not as perfect as that of the Regular Army, we feel it is absolutely necessary that those auxiliary forces should be, if I may use a colloquial and customary expression, stiffened by the presence of a large force of Regular field artillery. After sending out the artillery of two army corps to South Africa we have the field artillery of one army corps left. Our proposal is to raise horse and field artillery for two more army corps—that is altogether thirty-six batteries of field artillery and seven batteries of horse artillery, or forty-three batteries altogether. When this increase has been effected we shall at any time be able to send our two army corps out of the country with a full complement of artillery, and at the same time to have at home the full horse and field artillery for three army corps. These new batteries will be formed partly by a 1175 small nucleus taken from existing batteries, partly from artillerymen left behind by out-going batteries, partly from artillery reservists, partly from ex-artillerymen desiring to rejoin the Service. We also propose that a certain number of Volunteer artillerymen should be allowed to join the batteries upon a short one year'sterm of engagement. I may say that the guns for these new batteries have been ordered, and that it is our intention to add to the usual armament of 15-pounder guns a certain number of batteries of howitzers. It is intended that in time of peace these batteries should be retained as cadres only, by which I mean that the materiel will be always there, but the number of men would in time of emergency have to be specially expanded. I have only one word to say with regard to the cavalry. We require for the force I have indicated fifteen regiments of cavalry. There are in the country eight regiments, and we propose to form four out of the reserve squadrons left by regiments that have gone abroad, and that the remainder of the cavalry force should be furnished by a brigade of Yeomanry specially trained for this purpose. We also propose an increase in the Royal Engineers, and a considerable increase in that most valuable branch of the service, the Army Service Corps, the numbers of which are certainly insufficient at present. I pass from the Regular forces to the Auxiliary forces. I think that one of the lessons of this war has been to show us what a great and valuable reserve power we possess in our Auxiliary forces. We have already drawn largely on the Militia, and I hear from my military advisers nothing but the warmest commendation both as to the manner in which that call has been responded to and as to the excellence of the Militia battalions themselves. We must, I think, insist upon a nucleus of Regular troops for our home Army, but for the bulk of it we must depend on the Auxiliary forces. I am sometimes told that these forces have been too little taken into account in the past. All I can say is that there is not at this moment a battalion of Militia or Volunteers which has not got a place assigned to it in the defensive system of the country. Some of them are told off for garrisons, some to the defence of the capital, some to columns intended for use at particularly vulner- 1176 able points; and nothing is further from the thoughts of the military authorities than to assign to them an unimportant or inglorious part in the duty of defending this country. If we are to depend largely on the Auxiliary forces it seems to me that we cannot take too great pains, on the one hand to increase their numbers, and on the other hand to add to their efficiency. I will take the Militia first. A noble Earl below the gangway in the debate on the Address expressed his conviction that the time had come for embodying the whole of the Militia. We do not differ from him in principle. We have already embodied seventy-three battalions, and we shall embody the remainder as soon as climatic conditions render it possible to put them under canvas. At this moment our barracks are full, and there are objections, which, I must say, seem to me to have some force, to a large use of billeting for this purpose. In the spring we propose to form large camps at which the whole of the Militia will undergo a course of training. We shall pay particular attention to musketry, and we intend that the battalions shall be provided, at the public expense, of course, with the necessary transport. I have of late had my attention a good deal directed to the great variety in the payments which are made to different classes of militiamen and to the corresponding variety in the liabilities under which they serve. We have the ordinary militiaman receiving a bounty of £1, for which he is liable to serve at home; the Militia reservist, who receives another bounty, and is liable to serve out of the United Kingdom with the Line battalion of his own territorial regiment; and you have the special service militiaman created under the Act of 1898, who also receives a bounty of £1 and is liable to be called out for service with any battalion or regiment. It strikes me, in the first place, that these bounties are not conceived on a very generous scale; and, in the next place, the conditions of service are needlessly complicated and puzzling. This matter is not one which can be dealt with in a hurry; and I only mention it because I should like to convey to the House that we have this matter under our consideration, and that we shall endeavour to deal with it successfully. I hope in particular that we may find it possible to do something 1177 to alter the present position of the Militia Reserve, which, though, perhaps, not unpopular with the men serving in it, is, I know, extremely unpopular with Militia officers. As immediate steps, we intend to give to the Militia, when out for training, that messing allowance which is now given to the Line, but which the Militia have not yet been allowed to receive. We also propose to alter the rule under which a militiaman receives a bounty of forty-two days pay, whatever be the length of the period for which he is embodied. It seems to us clear that the bounty should vary according to the tax on the men's time. Then I hope to obtain an increase in the bounty paid to a militiaman when he re-engages, and, in addition to that, I think we must offer inducements to encourage ex-militiamen to rejoin the force, provided, of course, that they have the proper physical qualification. The Militia is now 30,000 below its establishment. We have every hope that, by making the conditions of service more attractive, we shall be able to fill up that void. With regard to the Yeomanry, we shall encourage them to enrol up to their full establishment, or beyond it, if the men are forthcoming. We propose that they shall have this year a month's training under canvas; that they shall be provided with transport; and that the contingent allowance should be increased. As to the future of the force, I think it will occur to many people that the role played by mounted infantry, and the manner in which the Imperial Yeomanry, which, as your Lordships know, is a force of mounted infantry, has been developed as an offshoot from the old Yeomanry, suggests that there may be room for improvement in the organisation of the Yeomanry force. But that is a matter which requires delicate handling; and I very gladly assure those noble lords in this House who are connected with the Yeomanry that we shall deal with it in a cautious and tactful spirit, and with every desire to carry the force with us and to respect its time-honoured traditions. I come now to the Volunteers. They have an establishment of 265,000 men, and their present strength is 221,000 or 43,000 below the establishment. I stated to the House the other evening that we intended to encourage all Volunteer battalions to recruit up to a strength of 1,000, and that, where still more men were forthcoming, 1178 we should encourage the formation of second battalions, perhaps of a more moderate size. Then we find that there is, in some Volunteer forces, a great desire that a part of the battalion should be equipped and organised as mounted infantry. To that very laudable wish we shall certainly offer no obstacle. We shall encourage the movement, and shall be prepared to pay special rates of capitation wherever a Volunteer battalion is able to provide a mounted company. During the present summer there will be camps at which the Volunteers will undergo special training, and we have every hope that the whole force may be trained at such camps between the months of May and August. Musketry, of course, in the case of the Volunteers, deserves special attention, and connected with this question is that question of ranges about which I have been more than once questioned in this House. Your Lordships are aware of the immense difficulties with which that question is surrounded; but I am not without hopes that we may be able to surmount them. I think ix possible that, with adequate precautions, some of the numerous ranges which have lately been condemned as unsafe for use with the present rifle might be made sufficiently safe, at any rate, at the shorter ranges; and I hope that we shall be able to carry further an arrangement already in force under which the Government pays a subvention to corps whose means are insufficient to enable them to provide themselves at their own expense with suitable range accommodation. Then there is the Volunteer artillery. There are altogether ninety-eight batteries of Volunteer artillery. Of these some are armed with guns of position and others with fieldguns—16-pounders. The whole of these guns are not of a modern type—I am afraid most of them deserve the description obsolete. It is our intention to rearm the Volunteer artillery with modern guns. To those now using guns of position, we propose to give those semimobile 4.7 in guns, which have done such excellent service in South Africa, and which are apparently regarded as the most efficient guns of that description which we can find. In the hands of the rest we shall put modern field-guns. The Volunteer artillery will, like the rest of the Volunteers, be given an opportunity of undergoing a special training during 1179 the present summer. Before I leave this subject, I may tell the noble Lord on the cross benches (the Earl of Wemyss) that we are quite prepared to encourage a proposal in which I know he takes a keen personal interest—the proposal that Volunteers who have served for a certain number of years in a Volunteer corps should be allowed to enrol themselves as Volunteer reservists, and be given a grant of ammunition and facilities for using ranges. There is only one reservation which I must make as to that. We must be careful, in giving effect to a scheme of this kind, to do nothing which would interfere with the existing Volunteer battalions. We have done what I think is a reasonable thing under the circum stances. We have issued a circular to Volunteer officers asking them to give us the benefit of their advice as to the conditions under which this proposal might be carried out. One word with regard to the Militia and Volunteer officers. We think that they should be given further facilities for attending courses of instruction, and that this should be done under financial conditions which will absolutely safeguard them against any inroad on their own private means. I may also say that I am in hopes of being able to make an arrangement under which there will be appointed to the Headquarters Staff of the Army an officer or officers having special and practical familiarity with the administration of the auxiliary forces, who will be able to guide and inform us as to their peculiar wants and requirements. I trust that by measures of this kind we shall be able to add considerably to the popularity of the Yeomanry, Militia, and Volunteers; but there is another source from which I think we may fairly look for a temporary accession to the military strength of this country. There are amongst us in civil life a very large number of men who have completed the full time of service with the colours and the Reserve. A great many of these men are still in the prime of life. A soldier who enlists at eighteen and completes his twelve years service with the colours and the Reserve, is only thirty when he becomes a civilian. We are under the impression that there must be somewhere in the neighbourhood of 170,000 men between the ages of twenty-five and forty-five upon whom we might draw for a special force for service in this country at the present moment. We pro- 1180 pose to open the door to these men. We propose to ask them to come to us for an engagement of one year, and for home service only. We shall, of course, give them a certain bounty for doing so, and if, as we hope, they come forward in considerable numbers, we shall form special reserve battalions of these men. Of course it is impossible for us to predict the number in which these men may be forthcoming, and the success of the experiment will depend a great deal on the extent to which they are influenced by the great wave of patriotic feeling which is now sweeping over this country. We shall do our best to make their short term of service as attractive and as little onerous to them as possible. They are men who have all learnt their business as soldiers; and in their case, therefore, it will be possible to dispense with those initial stages of the soldier's training which are, I imagine, most irksome to them. We shall commence in the most promising centres; and if, as I hope, we succeed in obtaining a considerable number of men, we shall have in this new reserve force a most valuable body from which to fill up in the home battalions any gaps which may be created by the withdrawal of troops for service in South Africa. It will, of course, occur to your Lordships that for these battalions, and also for the new Line battalions and new batteries of artillery which we intend to raise, we shall want a large number of officers, and I frankly confess to the House that the difficulty of obtaining officers in the proper number and of the proper quality seems to me to be one of the most serious, if not the most serious, with which we have to contend. We expect to draw them partly from the Reserve of Officers, of whom there are, I think, now 1,700, and for the rest we must depend upon promotions in the higher ranks, accompanied, of course, by the admission of a very large number of officers of subaltern rank in the lower. With this object we intend to offer commissions to the Militia and Volunteers, to the Universities, and a small number to the public schools. We also intend to offer commissions to the colonies, from whom we have already received many excellent officers, and I am sure any one who knows, as I know, anything about the Military College at Kingston, Canada, will not doubt that officers taken from that source are worthy to take their place 1181 by the side of the very best officers of our Army. My Lords, amongst our other proposals now being carried out is one dealing with the question of the stores and munitions of war of all kinds. As to that, I do not think I need say any more than that we have adopted it for our policy, not only to replace the large inroads which have been made upon our stores of all sorts, but also to build up the Reserves upon a much ampler scale than has hitherto been authorised. We have been struck by the inadequacy of our reserves of many kinds of stores, and we are determined that we shall no longer be open to that reproach. I have omitted to mention one other point, which is that we hope to add to the number of men serving in our Line battalions upon the three years engagement. The number at present of three years men is limited, I think, to 100 men in each battalion. We attach great importance to this variation in the period of service, and for two reasons. In the first place, we believe that in taking men on the three years term we tap a different stratum of recruits, men who will not accept liability for a longer period of service. But that is not all. The three years men contribute much more rapidly to the Reserve than the men who stay longer with the colours, and we all know what an invaluable stand-by the Reserve has been to us during these operations. I think I am right in saying that, whereas 100 three years men contribute about 90 men to the Reserve, 100 men who serve seven years only contribute 25. It is, therefore, quite obvious that as a machine for manufacturing Reservists the three years men are much more valuable than men who serve for a longer term. I have given to your Lordships, as I had promised the noble Earl I would, an outline, and only an outline, of our proposals. I may, perhaps, now be allowed to summarise in half-a-dozen words the more important features of those proposals. They involve a very large increase indeed to our artillery—to the Regular artillery, and an addition to the efficiency of the Volunteer artillery. They also involve a considerable addition to the force of mounted men available in the Army. There is, thirdly, the proposal which I sketched just now for the employment of ex-soldiers in short service battalions to be employed at home for one year only. That seems to me what might be described as an 1182 emergency measure—a change of the very greatest value. Fourthly, we have a number of minor steps, all to be taken in the hope that they will increase the popularity and efficiency of the Reserve forces. The details of these latter proposals, I have no doubt, may strike some of your Lordships as trivial, but I do not think they will so strike those who have been at all familiar with the administration of the Militia and Volunteers. We know that it is these small matters that make a great difference to the contentment of the force. My Lords, I may be asked to state before I sit down what addition to the numbers we expect to get as a result of the changes which I have indicated. The question is not an easy one to answer, because it is quite clear that, relying as we do upon offering certain inducements, we can only conjecture the extent to which these inducements will be successful in achieving the desired purpose. But I may say this, that whereas the deficiency in the Auxiliary forces—where they fall below their establishment—is 76,000, we are hopeful that if we cannot make up the whole of that deficiency we shall at least reduce the deficiency by 50,000 men. From the new line battalions, from the new batteries of artillery, from the forces of Engineers and Army Service Corps, from the additional three-years men, and from the additional cavalry, we hope to draw about 30,000 men, and if it should be the case that we succeed in inducing the ex-soldiers of whom I spoke just now to accept our terms in considerable numbers I do not think it is inconceivable that 20,000 might be persuaded to accept service. If these anticipations—and they are mere conjectures—are realised, we may look forward to 100,000 men as being the gross outcome of the proposed changes. Before I sit down may I say one word on two omissions in my statement which I dare say your Lordships have noticed. I said very little about organic changes. Where I have referred to them I have merely indicated the direction in which our thoughts were moving. I do not think that it can be expected of us that in the midst of a war such as that in which we are engaged we should attempt to carry out great organic changes. Your Lordships may also have noticed that throughout these remarks I have not once referred to the words ballot, or conscription, or compulsion. 1183 I have once or twice had occasion to speak to your Lordships on that subject, and I have always said that it seemed to me that the time might come when we should have to resort to compulsion in some form. I have also said that in my belief it would be profoundly distasteful to the great mass of the people of this country, and that we can only resort to it after all other attempts to obtain the necessary number of men had failed. At this moment, when men are coming forward spontaneously in great numbers, when there is an amount of enthusiasm, a general and widespread desire throughout the Empire to bear a part in its defence, I do not think that this is a time for talking about compulsion in any form. What I venture to think is wanted at the present time is not compulsion but encouragement. That encouragement we propose to give in the most ungrudging spirit, and we believe that we shall be met half-way by the patriotism and resolution of the people of this country.
LORD SALTOUNMy Lords, I do not rise to make a speech, but simply to ask for a word of explanation as to the Artillery. I did not understand whether they were to be armed with the present 15-pounders or with more modern quick-firing guns.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEThey will be armed with 15-pounders of the latest and most modern type.
§ LORD WANTAGEMy Lords, I merely rise to express regret that the noble Marquess, in the course of his excellent and lucid explanation, did not give the House more information on the subject of the mobility of our Army, which, in my opinion, can only be increased by increasing the number of mounted infantry. I feel satisfied, whatever may be done, that the Yeomanry will never be persuaded to become mounted infantry. I think if the experts who are now serving in South Africa could tell us what is the lesson most learned in our campaign against these two Republics it would be the advantage the Boers had obtained from being able to move their troops rapidly from one place to another. The noble Marquess alluded to this subject very shortly, but I should have been glad if he had been able to tell us something more definite and resolute with regard to it. 1184 The statement which has just been made by the Secretary of State for War is to me, and I believe to every Member in the House, most gratifying. The noble Marquess has described the most extraordinary feat which has been achieved in conveying this large force from England to South Africa without, I believe, the loss of a single life, with hardly any loss of stores, and very few losses of transport, cavalry, and other animals. I think the next most interesting thing he told us was that we had still a large force under command at home which might still be used in South Africa. These are facts which give us the greatest confidence. The next point on which I should be glad to hear the noble Marquess's opinion is whether some system—it has been often advocated in this House and in the other House—might be adopted by which all children in schools which are deriving State aid in teaching should be called upon to learn some form of military teaching from men with a perfect knowledge of the matter. That, I believe, would be one of the most useful steps that could be taken. Difficulties have, I understand, arisen between the War Office and the Education Department which have hitherto prevented such a system being adopted. Only yesterday I saw in the newspapers a statement made by the Rev. Dr. Wood, head master of Harrow, in which he says—
During the past year the school had done well in most branches of school life. He did not know whether the people of this country were within measurable distance of conscription, but at Harrow they were going to impose on Harrovians a form of conscription by compelling all boys over fifteen henceforth to join the rifle corps.I do not call that conscription, but I should be very glad to see it extended throughout our educational establishments. The statement of the noble Marquess was very lucid, but it extended over so much ground that it is not possible to discuss it at present in all its bearings. We can consider it at our leisure and see what may be done to amend and improve it.
VISCOUNT GALWAYMy Lords, I think the time to enter into the whole question of the Yeomanry will be when we have the full report of the officers now commanding in South Africa as to the service of this arm in the field. But for 1185 the time being we have to make ourselves as efficient as possible. I understood—I am not quite sure whether rightly or wrongly—from the statement of the noble Marquess that he proposed that the Yeomanry should go out this year for a month. He also said that a special grant was going to be given for mounted infantry in connection with the Volunteers. It costs the Yeomanry a large amount of money to go out even for fourteen days training, and under canvas it will cost more. If the Yeomanry are to go out for a month, and at the same time recruit to increase their numbers, I would urge upon my noble friend the absolute necessity that the question of Yeomanry horses should be taken into consideration, and some allowance given for this purpose. If we are to increase our numbers we shall have men who can ride and shoot, but who are not in a position to keep horses for themselves, which is necessary at the present time. I am sure we are all anxious to do our best to promote the efficiency of the Auxiliary forces. We know thoroughly the feeling of those with whom we have worked for many years, and it might, I think, tend to the smoother and better working of the scheme sketched out by the noble Marquess if we were enabled to make suggestions when it comes to details. If we do recruit up to our maximum strength I hope it will not be a case of recruiting in a hurry, and throwing the men over in six months or a year. If that is done it will do more to discourage than to encourage them.
§ LORD BLYTHSWOODMy Lords, I rise to say a few words with regard to the Volunteer force, and to make a suggestion. It is evident that if you were to call out any large number of Volunteers you would be interfering with a number of trades and businesses, and it has struck me that what we require are service battalions, officered by Regulars, one of which should be provided by each five battalions of Volunteers. Each company might be quartered at some centre, and should have a month's training each year, for which they should be paid. You would then have a service battalion fed by five battalions which would be able to move to any part of the country, and which would be very valuable indeed if the Volunteers were to be called out. As 1186 to the Artillery, I hope that the armaments for the Volunteers, as well as for the Militia, will be of the latest and best pattern, and that the force will be kept efficient in horses and men throughout the year.
THE EARL OF DUNRAVENMy Lords, it is impossible to adequately discuss the interesting statement which has been made to-night by the noble Marquess without having some little time to consider and digest it, and as I have no doubt the House would like to discuss it later on I shall certainly postpone any remarks I might like to make. I will only ask the noble Marquess whether he will consider the advisability of laying the facts and figures he has mentioned on the Table as a Parliamentary Paper, and having them printed and circulated. I was delighted to hear that the Volunteer artillery are to be armed with modern instead of obsolete guns, but the noble Marquess made no mention whatever of the Militia artillery. I do not know exactly the nature of the weapon with which they are armed at present, but if there is any intention of supplying them with more modern guns I shall be glad to hear it.
LORD MONKSWELLMy Lords, I have no intention, even if I were able, of entering into a detailed criticism of the proposals of the noble Marquess. I will confine myself to their practicability. I think the weak point in the Marquess's observations was contained in a very pregnant sentence towards the close of his speech. After giving certain results that he hoped to obtain in the way of recruiting, he said all this was mere conjecture. Then it seems to me that the whole scheme of the noble Marquess, as regards practical results, rests on mere conjecture. The noble Marquess said that recruiting for the last few months had been eminently satisfactory. Naturally, it would be eminently satisfactory, for the country is now in a very hot fit, and I hope it may remain in a hot fit, at any rate until the war is ended. But it is common experience that a hot fit is succeeded by a cold fit, and then recruiting may not be so satisfactory. So recently as July last the noble Marquess stated in this House that the recruiting returns for the last few months had been comparatively dis- 1187 appointing. The noble Marquess said in July—
We are endeavouring to increase the Army by 25,000 men, and of these we had, by the beginning of the year, succeeded in obtaining 12,000; 5,000 of these, it is true, we obtained from the Army Reserve. At this moment we are making little or no progress in bringing about that augmentation of the strength of the Army which we had hoped to effect within three years from the time when it was sanctioned by Parliament.It does not seem to me that the noble Marquess has a great deal to go upon when he suggests that we shall have anything like an addition of 100,000 men of all arms as a result of the scheme now laid before the House. It appears to me that the noble Marquess has grappled very insufficiently with this great question of recruiting. I dare say some of his proposals will result in an increase in the number of recruits. But I notice, for instance, he does not say one single word with regard to increasing the inducements to enlist in the direction I have often suggested to him in this House and out of it—namely, in the direction of giving a man, while he is with the colours, such an education and training as will make him more efficient, and not less efficient, to earn a livelihood in the open market when he has completed his term of service. This is no doubt a very big question, but I hope it will receive the serious consideration of the noble Marquess. There is another matter. If we have the large increase of the Army which is anticipated, how is it proposed to accommodate the men? The noble Marquess has stated that the barracks are now full, but he has not suggested any large scheme, although I suppose there is one in the air, for building new ones. Again, the noble Marquess said it would be very difficult to get officers for the Volunteers and the Militia. I doubt myself whether he will not find it still more difficult to fill up the ranks in those forces when the war is brought, as I hope it will be at no distant time, to a successful conclusion, and when the laudably hot fit is succeeded, as no doubt it will be, by a colder fit. I have not made these remarks in any spirit of hostility to the suggestions of the noble Marquess, which were, perhaps, as good as was possible under the circumstances. I merely say that it does seem to me that there are many practical difficulties in the 1188 way of carrying out a scheme which does not appear to be larger than is necessary for the defence of the country.
§ EARL BROWNLOWMy Lords, I desire to say a word or two with regard to the Volunteers. A great deal has been said about the artillery and increasing the number of Volunteers, but not one word has been uttered as to the transport. I am perfectly aware that it is proposed to try an experiment in this direction, but at the same time that experiment is rather a small one, and, if I may say so, rather a half-hearted one. I trust that in carrying out the proposals he has brought before the House, the noble Marquess will not omit to give his best consideration to the exceedingly important question of transport. I agree with my noble friend Lord Wantage that it is most important that drill and the theory of shooting should be taught in our schools, and the boys might even be allowed to practise shooting with great advantage to themselves and without danger to their neighbours. I do not think, however, that this is a matter in which the War Office can take the initiative, but I hope that when any scheme is laid before them the noble Marquess will see his way to give it his most kindly consideration.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYMy Lords, I have not the slightest intention of going into the details of the scheme which the noble Marquess has so clearly explained, but I wish to say a word upon one or two points. Although I entirely recognise the necessity of having recourse to immediate expedients in order to supply the forces that are necessary for the defence of the country at the present time, and to supply any additional reinforcements that maybe required during the progress of the war in South Africa, I hope that this will be kept in mind—that, as far as possible, subject of course to these two essential considerations, the arrangements made will be such as will facilitate further changes which hereafter we shall come to consider in regard to the general organisation of our forces. Otherwise, some of the temporary arrangements made, instead of facilitating the further changes that may be necessary, might stand in their way. One other observation is this. Although I have never taken any part in the subject of the military organisation of this country, I have always felt 1189 a strong desire that the Militia force should be made thoroughly efficient, and I do not see why at the present moment, even though we have to make various temporary arrangements, we cannot consider it an opportune time for placing the Militia on a thoroughly permanent and efficient footing. It is a force that stands between the Regular forces and the Volunteers, and it is, to my mind, the force upon which you must eventually depend for the defence of this country in those cases—I am afraid that with the extension of our responsibilities they will I happen more often—where you may be obliged to send away a very large part of your Regular forces. You ought to have a thoroughly efficient Militia, both as regards numbers and organisation. I have no desire to enter upon the question of what future changes in our organisation may be found desirable; but at this moment, when the country has a great inclination to support you in any measure for the increase of our military strength, I cannot see any reason why this occasion should not be taken for placing the Militia on that permanent footing of efficiency which I have long desired to see it attain.
EARL NELSONMy Lords, as the noble Lord has drawn our attention to the Militia I am particularly reminded of the fact that I was present in this House, many years ago, when the great Duke of Wellington made a speech in reference to a proposal of the Government of the day to organise and call out the Militia. It was the last speech the Duke of Wellington made in this House, and it was a very short one. He said—
My Lords, the Militia is a constitutional force. The battle of Waterloo, that battle of giants, was fought by Militiamen.Your Lordships will find that speech in Hansard. As the noble Duke sat down he said, in my hearing—It would have been a very different thing if I had had my old army.That is testimony not only to the value of the Militia, as a supplement to the Army, but also to the advantage of having a well-trained army as well.
THE MARQUESS OF GRANBYMy Lords, I am confident that the words which have fallen from the noble 1190 Marquess the Secretary of State for War in regard to the Militia will be heard with extreme pleasure by that force. For some years the Militia have, if I may use the term, been under a cloud, but they have come through the present crisis with success and with satisfaction to the public. The noble Marquess in his statement said that Volunteer artillerymen were to be allowed, under certain circumstances, to undergo a year's training with the batteries of the Regular artillery about to be raised. I do not think he said anything with regard to the possibility of Militia artillerymen being allowed any privileges in that respect. I would venture to hope that the opportunity which is to be given to the Volunteer artillery in this direction should also be given to the Militia artillery. The Volunteer artillery are, quite rightly, going to be supplied with new guns of the best pattern. I venture to think that the Militia are in even greater want of new guns than the Volunteers, and I trust that the Militia artillery will be included in any scheme of rearmament. The noble Marquess's remarks with regard to the simplification and amplification of the Militia bounty and pay will be received with gratification by that force. The subject is a somewhat complicated one at present. The question of ranges is, perhaps, one of the most important of all the subjects raised to-night, and I hope that care will be taken that there shall be no undue extension of overground ranges; otherwise it will be quite as dangerous to move about country districts as it is at the present moment on the veldt in South Africa. I believe that in many cases a very efficient system of shooting might be introduced by the adoption of underground ranges for Morris tube practice.
§ LORD TWEEDMOUTHMy Lords, I should like to say a word with regard to the subject of ranges, which has just been raised by the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Granby). One thing that has been made apparent during the proceedings of the last four months is the strength in defence of a mobile force of men who know the country and who are good shots. I do not believe our opponents, the Boers, are anything more than fairly good shots. The difficulty of providing ranges owing to the new rifle has, in my opinion, been greatly 1191 exaggerated. In the first place a man can learn the best part of rifle shooting by shooting at short ranges. In old days, when you had a rifle with a considerable recoil, there was a great deal to be said in favour of making a man shoot with the full charge he would have on service, so as to accustom him to the recoil; but in these days, when the recoil of the rifle has disappeared, any man who is gifted by providence with good sight can very quickly be taught to aim correctly at the target. What is difficult is to teach men how to let off the rifle. It is not a question of aim, but a question of holding the rifle absolutely still while the trigger is pressed. All the necessary knowledge of letting off a rifle can be taught at 100 yards range just as well as at 1,000 yards. If you will insist that no man shall be allowed to shoot at a long range until he can shoot straight at a short range you will have gone a long way towards the solution of safe rifle ranges; because, if a man really can shoot straight, I do not think he is very likely to miss the butt which protects the targets, even at the most dangerous ranges. If you will insist that your tyro in shooting should fire at small targets at short ranges he will quickly become a very efficient shot. So far as I have been able to judge, from what I have read in the newspapers, all the effective rifle fire in the present war has been rifle fire at shore range. If our soldiers are made good shots at short ranges I do not think there will be any difficulty in supplying the whole country with ranges.
§ THE EARL OF WEMYSSMy Lords, I do not propose to enter into a discussion of the proposals of my noble friend. All I wish to say is that this is the greatest opportunity that has occurred in my lifetime for putting our military resources upon a sound foundation. I venture to think that my noble friend has failed to do this. The noble Marquess has given us really the play of "Hamlet" with Hamlet blotted out. He is building garrets and upper storeys, and putting on the chimneypots, but he is neglecting to look after the foundation of our military system. What is its foundation? I heard with the greatest satisfaction the remarks which fell from the noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition (the Earl of Kimberley). He told us what the foundation of our military system is—namely, a permanent 1192 and full Militia. There is only one way of making that Militia full—I appeal to my noble friend and the illustrious Duke near me (the Duke of Cambridge) to bear me out—and that is by enforcing the existing Militia Law which you annually suspend. I feel so strongly that this is the time when the people are prepared to accept anything which will make the nation permanently secure that I propose, on some convenient day next week, to move the following resolution, and I hope to get the noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition to second it—namely:
"That this House, having heard the proposals of the Government for strengthening our military forces and armaments, is of opinion that, inasmuch as our military system rests on the Militia ballot, it is essential, looking to military efficiency and the permanent safety of our country, that the ancient constitutional law of compulsory service for home defence, and home defence only, be at once put in force in such modified form as will effect its purpose without weighing unduly upon the people."
LORD RAGLANMy Lords, I rise to express the hope that the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, in raising reserve battalions from ex-soldiers now to be found among the civil population, will endeavour not to do anything which might impair the efficiency of the Militia by tempting men out of its ranks.
A NOBLE LORDA great deal has been said about mounted infantry. Mounted infantry, so called, would be of hardly any use if the men were not thorougly well trained and practised in riding. A cavalryman who knows how to ride and groom a horse would be far more useful if he were thoroughly well taught to shoot with the rifle than an infantyman who, as soon as he had fired his rifle, was liable to tumble off his horse. I think this is a matter which should be considered.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEMy Lords, I will not anticipate the debate which the noble Earl on the cross benches proposes to raise on the question of the Militia ballot, but I may, perhaps, say half a dozen words in regard to some of the criticisms, and I have certainly no reason to complain of them, which have been made on my statement. Lord Wantage commented on the absence of a 1193 sufficient reference to mounted infantry. I thought I had certainly on two occasions in my speech mentioned our desire to increase that arm of the service; but I repeat that we have under consideration the expediency of treating the Yeomanry I will not say as mounted infantry, but more as mounted infantry than at present. We desire to encourage Volunteer corps to form mounted companies, and at this moment a considerable portion of the infantry of the Line are trained as mounted infantry; and we shall continue to do that to the same extent and, I hope, even to a greater extent than before. The noble Lord also spoke of the desirability of giving some form of military education in our public schools. I must say that suggestion commends itself very much to me, and I am able to say that the Education Department and the War Office are already in correspondence on the subject. Lord Blythswood made a suggestion which I did not quite catch with regard to service battalions, but I have no doubt he will be kind enough to explain that to me privately. He expressed the hope that the guns with which we propose to arm the Volunteer artillery will be of the best type. I gladly give him that assurance. They will consist partly of semi-mobile guns of the 4.7 calibre and partly of modern field guns. My noble friend Lord Dunraven made a suggestion that the facts and figures which I had mentioned might be printed and circulated. I do not quite know which figures he referred to, but it is possible he may be able to find the information he requires in the reports which the public press may be good enough to give of what I have said this evening. Lord Dunraven also made a suggestion that the Militia artillery ought not to be overlooked in any scheme of rearmament. My impression is that the great bulk of the Militia artillery are employed as fortress artillery with the existing armaments at the fortresses, and that there are not many batteries of Militia artillery guns strictly so speaking. A noble Lord on the front bench opposite took me to task on the ground that my figures were conjectural; but if he can indicate any method by which it is possible to present anything but conjectural figures, I should be very much obliged to him. In point of fact, where you rely on voluntary service the figures must be conjectural, and no one 1194 can tell whether the inducements held out will be sufficient or insufficient.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEAll I can say is that recruiting is going on extremely well. The noble Lord suggested that soldiers while serving with the colours should be put through some course of education to fit them for civil life. That would be very good for the soldier when he left the Army, but I question whether the prospect of spending several hours a week in school is one which would attract a great many recruits to the Army. The Leader of the Opposition expressed a hope that we would not take, any emergency steps which would stand in the way of any well-considered reforms which may seem necessary hereafter. We shall endeavour to do nothing which will stand in the way of any schemes for the improvement of the Army which the experience of this war may lead us to take into consideration later in the year. I quite agree with what fell from the noble Earl as to the position which ought to be assigned to the Militia forces in the military system of this country. We fully recognise that, and we shall do everything in our power to fit the Militia to fill their place as adequately as possible. Some mention was made by the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Granby) and by my noble friend Lord Tweedmouth as to the question of ranges. I think there was a great deal of force in what fell from Lord Tweedmouth. I am under the impression that we may have been rather too pedantic in our inspection of ranges; but it must be considered that if some unfortunate person gets hit by a stray bullet the War Office are likely to be taken very severely to task, and it is therefore not unnatural that the inspection should err on the side of strictness. I believe there is a great deal to be said for the view, and particularly with the new rifle, that it may be sufficient to lay more stress on musketry instruction at short ranges, leaving the long-range shooting for the central ranges we are endeavouring to secure and which we shall make accessible to the Auxiliary forces as well as to the Regulars. Lord Raglan expressed the hope that in raising 1195 Reserve battalions from ex-soldiers now to be found among the civil population we should endeavour not to do anything which might impair the efficiency of the Militia. That is a most reasonable suggestion, and I will see that it is borne in mind. Lord Galway asked what our Intentions are with regard to the payment of the Yeomanry should they be invited to undergo a longer period of training than usual this year. In that case the contingent allowance will certainly be reconsidered.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI will take care that that suggestion is fully considered.
§ House adjourned at twenty-five minutes past Six of the clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten of the clock.