THE EARL OF ROSEBERY,who had the following notice on the Paper:—"To move for a Return of the Commanders-in-Chief during the nineteenth century who, being Members of this House, have refrained from expressing herein their opinions on military subjects,"—said: My Lords, I propose with regard to my motions 593 to take a similar course to that pursued by the noble Earl who has preceded me. I do not propose to press for the Return I ask for, because I do not think it would lead to any fruitful result or to any great expenditure on the part of the Stationery Office. But I had no other means of calling attention to what occurred last Friday when I took part—being, after all, a Member of this House—in a manner which I thought to be not objectionable in a discussion raised by my noble friend. I was answered at once with great spirit, and, perhaps, with some little acerbity, by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State. The answer was quite conclusive in many ways; but it did not happen to deal with the points which I had raised in my speech. That is not an unusual occurrence in debate, but it is disadvantageous when you have no right of reply. My two points were these: firsts that the condition of foreign feeling in respect to this country was not satisfactory, and in that respect I only re-echoed a speech which had been delivered with much greater force and much more chiaroscuro, if I may so express it, by the noble Marquess the Prime Minister some weeks before. It is, I know, not a popular task to call attention in this country to the state of feeling which exists with regard to us abroad. But I do not think that that ought to actuate a Member of your Lordships' House when he conceives it to be his duty to do so. I confess I was somewhat surprised to be told that I had no right to do so. The noble Marquess said that I had no right whatever to address your Lordships on "questions of this kind without suggesting an alternative plan to that which he had proposed. I had never even mentioned his plan. He said, "The noble Lord is always coming down and criticising my plans." I only once criticised his plans. He might have remembered it because he gave on last Friday the same answer that he gave me then—that I had no right to speak on these questions without suggesting an alternative plan. My Lords, I am bound to say, with all goodwill and deference to my noble friend—who is one of the oldest friends that I have in this House— that I do not propose to lie snubbed in the discharge of what I believe to lie a public duty by remarks of that kind. Is it really suggested, will not say by any Minister of the Crown, but by any sane 594 man, that Members of this House are not to be allowed to discuss propositions laid before them by the Government, unless they can suggest an alternative scheme of their own? Is it really to be laid down as an axiom by Her Majesty's Government that a private peer, who is connected with no party, who has no military advisers, is bound, whenever he takes part in a debate which is remotely connected with military affairs, to produce an alternative plan? I have heard a great many extraordinary axioms in the few visits that I have paid to this House this year. I heard the noble Marquess at the head of the Government propound the theory that we had no right to discuss the Address unless we were prepared to move an Amendment to it.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYOn the night of the Address.* I think that was the axiom. He cheered a remark of very much the same tendency in the debate on Friday last. But I will drop that point. I only say that, of all the constitutional maxims which have ever been uttered in this House, that of the noble Marquess the Secretary of State is by far the most extraordinary. But I pass to the point I dealt with last Friday. I pointed out that we were in a grave condition as regards the feeling entertained for us abroad. I said that that required the greatest vigilance of our Ministers. Of course I was told, as I think we are usually told, to reassure those who are not quite satisfied with our means of home defence, that we had 200,000 odd men 7,000 miles away. It is one of the strangest arguments for reassuring those anxious for home defence that ever I heard of; but I proceeded to urge that a few words from an expert would be a great comfort and consolation to the people of this country. In my judgment the opinion of exports in support of the Government would be very reassuring at this juncture. In the first place, the utterances of the Government have not been reassuring. The speech of the
*The reference is probably to the remarks of Lord Salisbury reported in The Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series, Vol. lxxviii., at page 33.—[ED.]595 noble Marquess the Prime Minister, uttered to the Primrose League, in which he painted in the darkest colours the position of this country in regard to foreign opinion, and the still more startling moral which he drew from it— that we should rely for our defence on the use of the rifle by the Primrose League—was one which by no means gave inspiration and courage to any faltering spirit in this country. I will give another reason why expert opinion would be of great value in a discussion of this kind. As far as I can judge of it from what is printed in the public press and in the monthly magazines, which supply us with so much copious and useful information, the great balance of expert opinion—I will not say the unanimity of expert opinion, but the overwhelming balance—is hostile to the proposals and the military policy of Her Majesty's Government. In those circumstances, with the greatest possible confidence in the noble Marquess, and being well aware of the arduous task which he has had to undertake, I did not think it presumptuous to call attention to the fact that we had had no expert testimony in support of the military policy of the Government. The noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War may say that his ipse dixit, his declaration, should be amply sufficient, that those who hear him hear embodied in his words all the expert opinion which lurks at the War Office. Well, perhaps five years ago I might have said that that was a sound constitutional doctrine. But we had a startling object lesson five years ago about the War Office and expert opinion. There was a question of the adequacy of our stores of ammunition under the late Government. The then Secretary of State for War, who is now the respected Leader of the Liberal Opposition in the House of Commons, gave a positive assurance to the House that the stores of ammunition were ample and that they satisfied his military experts. On the doctrine of the noble Marquess, the Opposition of that day were bound to be satisfied with that assurance; but as the debate proceeded, and as it was clear that the Opposition were not satisfied with the assurance, the opinion of his experts was, so to speak, squeezed out of my right hon. friend. His experts all alleged, for good reason shown, that the stock of the particular kind of ammu- 596 nition in question was amply sufficient for all necessary purposes; and yet, in spite of the assurances of the then Secretary of State for War, backed up by all the expert opinion at the War Office, the Opposition, which now sits on the benches opposite, and which is represented by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War, came to a vote and turned out the Government of the day on that precise issue. I do not complain of that process—it may have been salutary—but I cannot conceive now that the party that took up that position in a juncture so critical, and which did not scruple to oust the Government of the day on a question as to which the Secretary for War had uttered his opinion as Secretary of State for War, and had fortified it by experts—I cannot admit that the party which then took that line are justified now in refusing to give us any expert opinion in support of their judgment. Then I proceeded to say that under these circumstances it was pleasant to remember that we had in the House of Lords a distinguished officer, the Commander-in-Chief, whom we should be glad to see oftener amongst us, from whom a word on the subject of the military policy of the Government would be more reassuring than a great many of the civilian statements which we have heard. For that I was taken to task with some causticity by the noble Marquess and with more benignity by my noble friend behind me (the Earl of Kimberley). I was told that my object was to attempt to degrade the Commander-in-Chief into a politician. Nothing was more remote from my idea, but I confess that, if my wish wore to be carried out, I should have more officers non-political and less officers political than is now the case. So far from wishing to make the Commander-in-Chief political, I would gladly see the War Office non-political, and I would gladly see the Admiralty non-political, and if it were possible—I know none of these things are possible, I am only speaking of a Utopia—I would have the Foreign Office also non-political. Therefore, nothing was further from my idea than to say that the Commander-in-Chief should be forced down to a sort of Under Secretary in order to support, at all hazards, the measures proposed by the chief of the War Office. But I do say this, that we have a right to expect that the opinion of the War Office shall be fortified to 597 some extent by expert opinion—not expert opinion lurking in the red box of the Secretary for War, but expert opinion so far as is consistent with the public service, and which can be produced to reassure the minds of men. The noble Marquess seems to think that there is prevalent in this country a blind and venerating confidence in the methods and the policy of the War Office. Now I am bound to say that, if any good is to be done, he must disabuse himself of that idea. There is not that blind and unreasoning confidence in the War Office. There is, I think, some unreasoning criticism. I think the noble Marquess himself has been subjected to much more criticism than is fair for much of what has transpired during this war, and I for one have never criticised him in that spirit or with that desire. But to go to the other extreme and constitute a sort of civilian Pope at the War Office, who shall utter his dictum with a position of infallibility, is, I confess, a much greater transition of things than this country is prepared to adopt. We are told that the Commander-in-Chief is not to come down to this House. We have always piqued ourselves, in our after-dinner speeches in replying to the toast of the House of Lords, on the variety and richness of the elements of which it is composed. We have pointed to the Commander-in-Chief himself, if I mistake not, as one of those rich and composite elements. We have, indeed, endeavoured to strengthen that military element. I remember the noble Marquess proposed a great Bill for the reform of this House. As far as I recollect, that abortive measure included an accession to the strength of this House of a number of military and naval experts, who were to come and give their opinions on matters of this kind. The Bill was lost, and with it we lost the military and naval experts who were to be brought in; but I fail to see that that is any reason for not utilising those that we have. I am not prepared to draw any rash conclusion from the silence of the Commander-in-Chief. I am not prepared to say that he is not in cordial agreement with the Secretary of State for War in all that the Secretary of State has done. I have no information on that point, and if I had any information I certainly should not use it in a public assembly of this kind. But, at the same time, there is the posi- 598 tion of the Secretary of State himself, and I think it would be greatly fortified; if he had the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief to support him when he develops his military policy. If the Commander-in-Chief is unable to attend, I for one, can only regret it. I venture to think that our experience in this House is hostile to the idea that the Commander-in-Chief is not to attend its sittings. I do not suppose many of your Lordships are able to go back beyond the time of the late Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Cambridge, but that illustrious Duke was never chary of giving his opinion on military matters, and we listened to it with that respect which was due to his great service and unrivalled experience. I should be sorry if I saw the Commander-in-Chief become a political officer, but I should be sorry in a minor degree if it was to be held by this House, or by any Government in this House, that the-Commander-in-Chief, the highest authority in military matters, should be entirely excluded from debates in this. House.
§ *THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEMy Lords, I cannot quite accept the description given by the noble Earl of the discussion which took place in your Lordships' House the other evening, The noble Earl has stated that I said he' had no right to speak on a military question unless he had an alternative policy of his own to propose. Now it is not in my power nor in that of anyone else to deny the right enjoyed by every Member of this House of speaking when he pleases to do so. What actually happened was this: there had been a considerable number of military debates during the present session, and I had received from many of your Lordships useful suggestions in regard to the military measures which we had announced; but the noble Earl has made few visits, to the House, and he has taken no part in these discussions. He has, however, come down at least on two occasions, and on those occasions he has expressed himself in the gloomiest and most despondent terms with regard to our state of military preparedness.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYI did not express any opinion about our military preparation, but about the hostility of foreign countries.
§ *THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEBut on neither of these occasions has he ever told your Lordships what there was in our proposals that he objected to, nor has he added any suggestion of his own. If he will look at the report of what I said he will find that I expressed my belief that the noble Earl might at least have given us some indication as to the defects of what we ourselves proposed, and some indication of the measures that he himself would have adopted. I do not think that that was unreasonable. The noble Earl has spoken of himself with great humility as a private Member of this House, but I hope he will forgive me for saying that he cannot claim to address this House without the great responsibility which attaches to the high official position he has filled. I therefore do think I was justified in complaining of him as I did for having made what I think I called rather infructuous criticisms of the policy of Her Majesty's Government. The noble Earl is evidently under the impression that our military proposals are the result of the labours of the civilian members of the War Office, and that they have no support from our military experts. That is a fallacy which seems to have received considerable currency at the present time. It is almost superfluous for me to tell the House that since this war began there has not been a week, there has scarcely been a day, in which the civilian and military members of the War Office have not met at the same table in order to discuss from time to time the arrangements and the military measures that were being taken. I can speak with full knowledge of the discussions which have taken place, and I can say that the measures which have been adopted by Her Majesty's Government and explained to Parliament are regarded both by the soldiers and civilians at the War Office as the best and most effective measures which could have been taken in the time and with the material at our disposal. As to the position of the Commander-in-Chief in this House, the noble Earl is quite right in saying that the Return for which he asks could be supplied without very much difficulty. I am able to give the noble Earl this information. During the present century there have been six commanders-in-chief, predecessors of Lord Wolseley, of whom five have been members of this 600 House, and of whom two have been Princes of the Royal Family; and I believe I am right in saying that none of those who were Members of this House have refrained from making statements in this House and taking part in its debates. The frequency with which they took part in debates varied considerably. The Duke of York spoke only once on Indian military affairs. The Duke of Wellington spoke occasionally. I find that Lord Hill made two complimentary speeches with regard to the conduct of military operations, and also explained why it was that a sentry had stopped the Lord Chancellor's carriage. It is curious the way in which history repeats itself. I believe the noble Earl on the Woolsack was subjected two years ago to a somewhat similar indignity.
§ *THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEBut the noble and learned Lord was content to send a private remonstrance to the War Office rather than call upon the Commander-in-Chief to explain the incident in your Lordships' House. Lord Hardinge spoke occasionally, and the Duke of Cambridge was in the habit of frequently taking part in our debates. But I cannot find in the speeches delivered by those noble and illustrious peers any trace of any such practice age that which I understand the noble Earl desires—namely, that the Commander-in-Chief should be brought down here for the purpose of corroborating the statements made by the representative of the War Office on this bench. That was the proposal to which I took exception, and that was the proposal to which, speaking at much greater length and with more fully reasoned argument, the noble Earl on the Front Opposition Bench also took such exception. But I am bound to say that even if the noble Earl had been able to point to cases in which commanders-in-chief in the first part of the present century, or even during the time the illustrious Duke held office, had been in the habit of coming down to support the representative of the War Office in this House, I should not have been by any means convinced by that reason that the practice is a sound one in present circumstances. The noble Earl must know that the position of the Duke of Cambridge as Commander-in- 601 Chief was entirely different from that of the noble and gallant Viscount who now fills the office. The Duke of Cambridge held the office without limit of time. As a matter' of fact, he held the chief command of the Army for nearly forty years. Under the present arrangement, which was virtually settled while the noble Earl was still in power, the chief command of the Army is held for a term of five years only, and that, to my mind, makes a considerable difference in what I may call the political position of the Commander-in-Chief. But besides that, the Duke of Cambridge, as a member of the Royal Family, was dissociated from party politics in a sense that no one who is not a Prince of the Blood is ever likely to be. We know that members of the Royal Family, are able to take a useful and busy part in public affairs without in any way involving themselves in party ties or connections. Therefore, I put aside altogether any precedent to be drawn from the case of the Duke of Cambridge. I remain very strongly of the opinion that I ventured to express the other evening—that it is most undesirable that we should do anything, not, as the noble Earl said, to degrade the Commander-in-Chief into a political partisan, but, as I said, to turn the Commander-in-Chief into something like a political partisan. I believe that any arrangement under which it would 'come to be understood that the Government case was not established until the Minister was able to produce something ' like a certificate from the Commander-in-Chief would be bad in the interest of the Commander-in-Chief himself, injurious to the interests of the Army, and be at variance with the recognised principles of our Constitution. As the noble Earl on the Front Bench opposite truly said the other evening, if this change were made in the case of the War Office we should also have to make it with regard to the Admiralty. I judge from the speech of the noble Earl who introduced the subject that he would like to carry matters a good deal further still. But I object to any innovation of that kind, in the first place, for the sake of the gallant officers themselves who would be affected by it. We have not all of us that happy fluency of expression which distinguishes the noble Earl below the gangway, and I know many admirable soldiers and sailors, eminently fitted for high official employment, who would be quite 602 incapable of coming to Parliament and assisting in the presentation of a Ministerial defence. I should be sorry to add to their responsibilities, which are already sufficiently numerous, the duty of from time to time taking up the cudgels in Parliament on behalf of the Government of the day. If that were done, I am afraid what would happen would be something of this kind. The gallant officer would either perform his task skilfully or he would not. If he performed it unskilfully he would greatly damage the Government case and damage it unfairly. If, on the other hand, he became a skilful advocate, I am very much afraid it would lead him to put on one side for the time the duties properly belonging to him in his office. We should find the Commander-in-Chief, instead of working out the military problem of the moment, devoting his time to the preparation of eloquent speeches for delivery in this House. I am also inclined to think that any practice of the sort would tend to 'weaken the position of the Commander-in-Chief in the eyes of the Army. I think it is most important that the Commander-in-Chief, as well as the corresponding official at the Admiralty, should have the; full confidence of the service to which he belongs. In my experience the soldier who is also a politician is apt not to be very much trusted in the Army. Whether that is right or wrong I do not say, but it is so undoubtedly. You would have this kind of thing said: "General So-and-So owes his appointment, or the extension of his term of office, or his promotion, not I to his military abilities, but to the fact that he hold the fort so well for the Government in some hard-fought military debate." I think, therefore, the practice would be a bad thing for the Army itself. And last, but certainly not least, I agree with what was said by the noble Earl opposite as to the constitutional aspect of the matter. I take it that the constitutional position is this—the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State alone, is responsible to Parliament, and the Commander-in-Chief is responsible to the Secretary of State as his principal military adviser under the Order in Council. So long as those two officers continue to hold the positions assigned to them, so long it must be assumed that each of them is satisfied with the arrangements made by the Department with which he is connected. Of course 603 these are minor matters in which there must be give and take; but if the Secretary of State is not properly supported by his colleagues, or the Commander-in-Chief is not property supported by the Government of the day, he ought not to remain in a position in which ho is prevented from adequately discharging his duty. These are the views I ventured to express to the House the other evening, and I still adhere to them. While, no doubt, my noble and gallant friend the Commander-in-Chief has a perfect right to appear in this House and address your Lordships when it may please him to do so, I confess I think he is well advised in sticking to his desk in the War Office, and leaving the Parliamentary representatives of the Department to say what is to be said on its behalf in Parliament.
*THE EARL OF NORTHBBOOKMy Lords, the excuse that I have to offer to your Lordships for making a few remarks on this question is that I happen to have been connected with both the Army and the Navy for a longer period than probably any other Member of your Lordships' House. The question raised by Lord Rosebery is one of very great importance—namely, how far it is desirable that the opinion of experts should be called for upon any subject which is being dealt with by Parliament. I have no hesitation in giving an answer. It must rest with the Government of the day to decide whether or not the opinion of experts in the War Office or the Admiralty should be presented to Parliament. It would be impossible, in my opinion, to carry on those great Departments if there was any obligation on the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War to produce, at call, the opinions of their naval and military advisers. But on the question whether it is advisable that the Commander-in-Chief, being a Member of this House, should address your Lordships on military questions, I am not prepared to agree altogether with the view just expressed by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War. When I had the honour of being Under Secretary for War, and having the conduct of Army affairs in your Lordships' House, I found upon many occasions that the opinions expressed by his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, who was then Field 604 Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, were of great value and assistance in the discussion of military matters; and when the noble Marquess tells your Lordships that the discussion of military questions in either House of Parliament by officers serving either in the War Office or in the Admiralty is at variance with the recognised principles of the Constitution I venture entirely to differ from him. Lord Cardwell, when he was Secretary of State for War, thought it was of so great importance that he should have the assistance of experts in the House of Commons that he created the office of Surveyor General of Ordnance and engaged the services of Sir Henry Storks, who for some time filled that position. In both Houses of Parliament Lords of the Admiralty have sat and taken part constantly in Naval debates. The first recollect was the late Lord Fitzhardinge, who not infrequently assisted in the Naval debates in the House of Commons as Sir Maurice Berkeley. There are others. Sir John Hay was in the House of Commons; so was Lord John Hay; Lord Clarence Paget was Secretary to the Admiralty; Lord Charles Beresford was in the House of Commons as a Lord of the Admiralty; and Lords Clanwilliam and Alcester sat in your Lordships' House when they were Members of the Board of Admiralty. Therefore I cannot agree that it is contrary to the constitution that naval and military officers should take part in debates.
§ *THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEWhen I used the constitutional argument, I was referring to what I understood was suggested by the noble Earl (the Earl of Rosebery)—namely, that when a Ministerial statement was made it should be corroborated by expert evidence, and that until it was so corroborated it was not satisfactory to the House.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYI should be glad if the noble Marquess would tell me when and where I said any such thing.
§ *THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEThe noble Earl suggested that it was desirable that the Commander-in-Chief should be present to give the weight of his assurance and support to the schemes that were being suggested, and he complained that there, was not a single word 605 from the noble Viscount the Commander-in-Chief assuring the House that we were amply prepared for all contingencies. I was referring to the suggestion that the Commander-in-Chief should be called to corroborate the Minister.
§ *THE EARL OF NORTHBROOKI am very glad to have heard the explanation of the noble Marquess on that particular point, but still he undoubtedly argued that it was undesirable that the Commander-in-Chief, as a Member of your Lordships' House, should take part in debates. I do not agree with that opinion for the reasons I have already stated; and I differ from the noble Marquess when ho says that if the Commander-in-Chief took part in the debates in your Lordships' House it would weaken his authority in the Army. I am satisfied that the reputation and authority in the Army of His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge was in no way diminished by the part he took in the debates of this House. It is very difficult to say whether the balance of advantage is on one side or the other. Of course, neither your Lordships nor the House of Commons could upon an important question receive any real answer excepting from the Ministers responsible for both services. What I say, shortly, is that if there happens to be in this House a military officer of distinction holding the office of Commander-in-Chief I see no disadvantage; in his taking part in the debates. But the important question is whether or not the views of the military and naval officers who are serving at the War Office and the Admiralty have sufficient weight in the decisions that are come to by the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War. Speaking of the Admiralty, I have no hesitation in saying that the opinions of the Naval members of the Board of Admiralty have sufficient weight in the decision of all Naval matters. Your Lordships know that the power of the Crown over the Navy is delegated by Commission to the Board of Admiralty, and the Naval members of that Board have a constitutional position in respect to the management of the affairs of the Navy. The Naval member's of the Board of Admiralty have not for a great many years been selected in regard to their political opinions. I remember during the Crimean War the Senior Naval Lord 606 of the Admiralty was Sir Richard Dundas, a member of a well-known Tory family, although a Liberal Administration was in office; and the present First Lord of the Admiralty, when he assumed office, took over the whole of the Board that had been serving with Lord Spencer in the preceding government. The opinions of Naval members of the Board of Admiralty have great weight in the decisions upon all Naval affairs. They may be considered as a kind of Cabinet, with the First Lord of the Admiralty as Prime Minister. During the ten years that I was connected with the Admiralty in different capacities I can recollect no instance of anything but the most cordial co-operation between the Naval members of the Board and the First Lord. All questions of importance were discussed, and the Naval Lords had the power of expressing their opinion. I well remember the programme of shipbuilding I had to propose to your Lordships in 1884. We met on eight or nine different days to discuss that programme. But I happen to know there have been differences of opinion. I know that on one occasion the Naval members of the Board, not being satisfied with the condition of affair's in respect to the strength of the Fleet, wrote and signed a Memorial or Memorandum which was given to the then First Lord of the Admiralty and submitted to the Cabinet; and I believe the Naval Lords obtained the addition they desired. I think I have shown to your Lordships that in the case of the Admiralty expert opinion is amply represented, both in the office itself and also, if necessary, before the Cabinet. As regards the Army, I am not so satisfied that the condition of things is equally satisfactory, and for this reason—that in the Memorandum which was issued by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for War in respect to the duties of the principal officers of the Department, I notice that the consultation of the different military experts in the War Office by the Secretary of State depends entirely upon the will and pleasure of the Secretary of State. There is, no doubt, a provision for a Council, but there are no regular meetings of that Council, so far as I am aware. Certainly the Commander-in-Chief and the other military officers at the War Office have no such constitutional position in respect to the Army as the Naval Lords of the Admiralty have in 607 respect to the Navy. I think the whole question is one which one Cabinet might very properly consider in the coming recess. There was one word used by the noble Marquess to which I should like to refer. He indicated, I think, that if a military or naval officer differed from the measures taken by the Parliamentary head of the Department he had the option of resigning. I am sorry that the noble Marquess made that remark. I hold that the position of these officers is, in respect to resignation, one of great delicacy and difficulty. If it is to be understood that whenever they differ on any matter of importance from the First Lord of the Admiralty or the Secretary of State for War they ought to resign, they will be placed in a very invidious position. It is possible, of course, that a case of vital importance may arise in which the military or naval officer may consider it to be his duty to resign rather than be a party to measures of which he does not approve; but that it should be considered in any case except a very extraordinary case to be the duty of one of these officers to resign his appointment if he does not agree with the measures which are carried out by the Government of the day is a doctrine with which I can in no way concur.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYMy Lords, I have no intention of prolonging this discussion; I merely wish to make the precise intention of the allusion I made the other night perfectly clear. There is, I think, a little confusion in the matter. I did not for a moment intend to lay it down as a proposition that no Commander-in-Chief or other military expert, if he happens to be a Member of this House, should ever speak in the House on military matters, but I was directing my remarks entirely to the particular case before the House at the time. The matter originated in a statement by the noble Marquess with reference to a speech he made to the members of the Primrose League. There arose the question whether we were in a state of sufficient military preparation, looking to the conditions of our relations with foreign Powers. I do not mean by that the foreign Governments. It did seem to me that so grave a matter as that was one simply and solely for the Cabinet and the Government. They were bound to get the best advice, and they are the 608 people to tell the nation on their responsibility that they are satisfied with the state of the defence of the country. I do not think that we ought to look at any outside opinion on that matter. That would tend, in my opinion, somewhat to weaken the responsibility of the Government, and in a matter of that kind it seems to me that it is of the highest importance that the responsibility should rest where alone it really belongs. We must suppose the Government have consulted the highest naval and military authorities. Just conceive what would be the effect if, when the First Lord of the Admiralty makes his annual statement as to the position of our Fleet and its position relatively to the fleets of other nations, the naval expert were to come afterwards and say, "I am very glad to be able to confirm what the First Lord has said on that subject." And suppose the naval expert does not come and say that. In that case it would be impossible that the inference should not be drawn that there was some difference between the exports and the Government. It seems to me that, in a matter of great importance like that, it is not at all advisable that you should invite that opinion. With regard to matters of detail, where very useful information can be given by one who is himself a member of the service, I do not suppose anyone would feel any jealousy, but I hold still the opinion, with regard to the subject we had under discussion the other night, that it is not desirable that we should have recourse to the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief and of naval experts to reassure us as to the position in which we are.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMy Lords, as we have launched upon a constitutional discussion, it is inevitable, first, that we should all of us differ in opinion, and, secondly, I am afraid it is inevitable that we should incur the risk of some obscurity in the expression of our language on a subject so abstruse. But I am bound to say that I do not think the last two speakers have adequately represented what Lord Rosebery said. I understood Lord Rosebery's contention to be that the nation would be very much more satisfied if Lord Wolseley were to stand up in his place and say that he approved of the plans of Lord Lansdowne. Now it is obvious that if Lord Wolseley could be called upon to do that, 609 he must do it with the admission that ho was entitled, if ho liked, to say he did not approve of the plans of Lord Lansdowne. I do not see how you possibly could have a perpetually assenting Commander-in-Chief an orator in this House. Lord Northbrook was able to produce from his long experience a most fascinating picture of perpetual agreement, but I doubt whether this is the experience of all heads of Departments either in the Admiralty or in the War Office, and still more do I doubt whether it is possible that a disagreement, when it arises, can be pushed in every case to the ratio ultima of resignation. No Government could be worked for a year on that principle; somebody must give way. I do not mean to say that it must always be the export who gives way, because his chiefs may think it wiser to give way, but if there is a clash of hostile opinions no one can doubt that it must be the expert who gives way. If that is the case, it would be very imprudent to introduce the Commander-in-Chief in support, because if he is entitled to tell us when he does agree he must inevitably be entitled to tell us when ho does not. I think there is a great deal of force in what Lord Rosobery said, but it was force of an abstract speculative kind. In that Utopia which he contemplates I suppose the head of the Army would always be a distinguished military man, and therefore not a partisan, and the head of the Navy also would be a distinguished naval man. It is the fact, I believe, that in every foreign country except our own the Ministry of War is in the hands of a military man, and not a partisan. But that is because the Constitution of this country differs essentially from every other Constitution. In this country the Government is conducted and the Departments are ruled by Parliament. It cannot be so unless those who are appointed are persons approved of by Parliament, and who have authority in Parliament; it cannot be so if you substitute for the ordinary Ministers of a Government distinguished exports either in naval or military science. I am not saying for a moment what in that speculative Utopia to which Lord Rosebery referred would be the best plan. I do not entirely disagree with the opinion which he parenthetically added that in many respects it might be much better if the Foreign Secretary was never a partisan; but those 610 things are quite inconsistent with party Government in the Houses of Parliament.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThe Utopia may come, but until it comes we must be satisfied with such provisions as our ancestors have handed down, and make the best of them, and those provisions absolutely refuse to allow the military head or the naval head of the professions to come here and criticise their chiefs.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYI wish only to say one word with reference to this discussion, which I think has been most interesting and fruitful. I would once more demur to what the Secretary of State for War has said; he appears to be incapable of understanding a plain proposition when it is laid down. He represents me as saying one thing, and the noble Marquess the Prime Minister represents me as saying another.
§ *THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI quoted you.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI will read the whole of it——
THE EARL OF ROSEBERYI think at this hour that would be most fatiguing, but I am willing to enter into correspondence with the noble Marquess—such correspondence as the penny post will allow—as to what my expressions mean. What I did say is this, and I am willing to say it till the day of doom, that in time of a great national crisis, when our armies have met with perpetual reverses —[Cries of "Oh !"]—well, constant reverses—[Renewed cries of "Oh !" and A NOBLE LORD: "Occasional."]—occasional, then; I am always being advised by the Treasury Bench—at a time of grave national danger—and I suppose that no one who passed the months of January and February in this country will easily forget those months—at such a time, I said, I thought it would have been reassuring in the past if we had had a statement from the noble Lord the Commander- 611 in-Chief giving us confidence as regards our resources and as regards the military measures that the Government were introducing. The noble Marquess changes that into a statement which I expressly barred—that I wish to convert the Commander-in-Chief into an Under Secretary, who should come down and applaud the measures of his chief, like a chorus. That is not my meaning, but I do maintain that occasionally, in moments of crisis, it might not be inexpedient if the noble Viscount, who is a Member of this House, took part in the debates of this House to give us his guidance and experience. Of course we have been accustomed to that during the long career in office of the late Commander-in-Chief. The noble Marquess dexterously got rid of the late Commander-in-Chief by saying that he was a Prince of the Blood, and, therefore, was in a position so exceptional that he could form no precedent. But for forty-four years we have no other precedent to quote, and, therefore, if he gets rid of the Duke of Cambridge by that summary and convenient process, it is difficult to argue with him. As regards my Utopia, I agree with the noble Marquess that that is outside the regions of the debate, but I am afraid I disagree with him in thinking that it is ever likely to be realised.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI do not think I ever said it was.