JURIES DETENTION BILL. (Hansard, 10 May 1897)

§ LORD COLERIDGE
moved the Second Reading of this Bill, which, in his opinion, was a humble but useful Measure. It proposed to do away with the distinction in the treatment of jurors in cases of felony and in cases of misdemeanour. No one could now discern the distinction between those two classes of cases. Whatever history might say, at present some of the gravest crimes were misdemeanours, and some of the most paltry crimes were felonies. But in the case of the trial of felonies, however paltry the crime, when once the jury had been sworn they must be kept together until they discharged themselves by giving a verdict. This was not the case in questions of misdemeanour. The result was inconvenient in the administration of justice, because, as the afternoon approached, it was impossible to take felonies lest they should last over the day. Or, if they were taken, the trial was very often prolonged to such an extent that the jurors became fatigued. He did not understand how justice could be advanced by such a barbarous and old-fashiond method of procedure; and he thought that the ancient distinction should be given up. Probably the language of the Bill required amendment in some particulars; but in point of principle he recommended the Bill to the favourable consideration of the House.

*THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE (Lord RUSSELL of KILLOWEN)
said that there were few men connected with the administration of criminal justice who did not feel the need for this reform. Before, however, this Bill could be effective for real good, it would have to be materially altered from the form in which it had reached the House. It would be within the recollection of many of their Lordships that cases had occurred in which, had it been necessary to arraign a prisoner on the charge of felony, it would have been impossible to try him satisfactorily. The celebrated Tichborne case was an illustration. Fortunately the ends of justice were achieved by indicting the prisoner for misdemeanour, under which he got a very considerable sentence of imprisonment. But had it been necessary to make the experiment of indicting him for the felony of forging the Tichborne bonds, the experiment must have broken down, as it would 87 have been impossible to get a jury secluded from their business and homes for 50 or more days. The restriction of the discretionary power of the Judge to allow a jury to separate simply for the purposes of refreshment or rest was wholly inadequate. Sir H. Poland had pointed out that this limitation would be a most unfortunate one. In the middle of the trial the Judge might be taken ill, or might be compelled to adjourn for the purpose of the attendance of a witness; or other circumstances might make it reasonable that the jury, or some of them, should be allowed a brief interval to go to their homes. None of these cases would be covered by the language of the Bill as it stood. As to the objection against giving this discretionary power to the Judge, he thought the short answer to it was this—that, if there were cases in which it was right that the jury should be allowed to separate, and cases in which it would not be proper, he could not see who was to exercise the discretion unless it were the Judge who had all the circumstances before him. Little as the Judges cared to have increased discretionary power, he did not think this was a case in which they ought to shrink from the exercise of that power. There were some, and he believed the Lord Chancellor was among them, who would exclude murder and treason cases from the purview of the Bill; but those were crimes which, althought serious, infinitely varied in their character; and if it were proper to give the Judge discretion at all, it would be proper to give it in those cases just as in any others.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD HALSBURT)
entirely agreed that some alteration of the law was proper at the present time; and, further, that the limitations which had been alluded to would make the Bill of no use at all. It was quite true that there were some misdemeanours very grave and some felonies very trivial, and therefore he would be disposed to say that the true distinction ought to be between cases which were very grave and those which were very trivial. He could not help thinking that when the time came it would be a serious matter for the House to consider whether or not on trial by jury of a person whose life was at stake, and who was possessed 88 of considerable means, it would be desirable to leave the discretion to the Judge rather than to make it part of the law. It might be worth everything to the person to procure disagreement among the jury; and he might cause the jury to be shadowed in some way or other, in order that by the expenditure of a large sum of money he might bring about such a disagreement. The possibility of such a temptation ought not to be presented. But that was a point which could more properly be discussed in Committee. The reason why he would object to leave it to the discretion of a Judge was, not that he in the least questioned the impartiality of the exercise of the discretion, but that it would be invidious for a Judge to say, "In this case I will allow the jury to separate, and in another, I will not." When the Bill got into Committee, he would move Amendments directed to this and other points. At present the only question was whether the Bill should be read a Second time; and as he entirely agreed with the general object of the Bill, he supported the Second Reading.

§ LORD HERSCHELL
said that he agreed that the Bill should be read a Second time, and that in Committee it would require consideration. The point mainly was whether they should in all cases leave it to the discretion of the Judge, or whether there was a certain class of cases in which the present system should continue. He did not intend to express an opinion about it, although he did not see that there would be serious objection to excluding cases of murder from the scope of the Bill.