LORD NAPIER AND ETTRICKasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether Her Majesty's Government 1907 fully adopt the conclusions stated by Earl Granville in his despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus of the 17th of October, 1872, respecting the territories and boundaries of Afghanistan; and, whether Her Majesty's Government would grant the moral and material support of England to the Ameer of Afghanistan in case of unprovoked aggression upon his dominions? The noble Lord said that the records of India showed that the late Lord Mayo, from the time he undertook the government of India, had turned his attention to every part of our Eastern Empire; and his attention was directed very specially to the condition of the native States which, in India, interpose between the British territory and the territory of Russia. It was Lord Mayo'S opinion—as it was that of every other authority on the subject—that an intermediary zone of native States should be preserved between our territory and that of Russia—he did not mean a zone of neutral States, because Lord Mayo was too sagacious a statesman to believe that such States would not be to some degree under the influence of one or the other of the two great Powers, but States so strong as to be self-supporting, and not liable to be brought under the influence of either the one or the other. Lord Mayo's policy was a policy of demarcation, and he directed his attention specialty to a due distribution of power among those States; and his efforts in that direction having been followed up by his successor, there was every reason to believe that a satisfactory settlement of the question of boundaries had been arrived at. The intervention of Russia in this settlement was necessary only in the case of the northern boundary of Afghanistan; and, with the view of co-operation between the two Governments, a distinguished agent was sent by the Viceroy to confer with the Russian authorities. That agent was received with every courtesy; but after a time it appeared that the Russian Government was not inclined, or was not able, to come to an arrangement with England. Under these circumstances, the Government of India pressed on the Government in this country that the settlement of boundary of Afghanistan should be made as an act on our part singly, and that the conclusions at which we arrived as to that boundary should be communicated to 1908 Russia. After the lapse of a considerable time, there came the despatch of the 17th of October in last year, in which the Government of Russia was informed of the opinion of the English Government as to the just position of the northern boundary of Afghanistan. The despatch further stated that the opinion of the Russian Government had been asked in the first instance, and that, our Government having of itself come to a conclusion on the point, that conclusion had been communicated to the Ameer. Nothing could have been more temperate or more courteous than the terms of the despatch; and the Russian Government met the Government of England in a kind spirit—for, though its opinions on the geographical and political questions were not the same as those of our Government, it gave its assent to the settlement proposed by Great Britain. If the character of that negotiation had not been in some degree impaired by a declaration from other quarters, he should not now be addressing their Lordships on this subject. While the Government at home was advocating in Russia the case of Afghanistan, the Government in India was not idle. The good relations between it and Afghanistan were being drawn closer. The Ameer visited the Viceroy, and was received with the honours due to an independent Power. Taking all the circumstances into consideration, he asked their Lordships to reflect on the responsibilities with respect to Afghanistan which we might fairly be held to have assumed. In the first place, we might seem to have pledged ourselves to defend it, because we had fixed its boundaries. He supposed it would not be contended that in fixing those boundaries we merely fixed a geographical fact—this might have been done by a Committee of the Geographical Society. The fixing of those boundaries was intended to be a political fact, and to have political consequence. Because it was a political fact we told the Ameer that he might defend the boundaries. Could it ever have been intended that our Government could tell a semi-dependent and semi-barbarous power that it might defend boundaries which we had fixed without by implication conveying to it that we would assist in the defence of those boundaries? We were bound to defend them not only by our engage- 1909 ments, but also by motives of general policy in connection with the defence of India. But he would not enter at length into that question. But if we were bound to defend the boundaries of Afghanistan we were also bound to control the Government of that State. The latter position seemed to him to follow from the former. We must see that the Government of Afghanistan conducted itself in such a manner that we should not be called upon frequently or lightly to enter on its defence. We had strengthened the Government of Afghanistan by our alliance; we had given moral and material aid by subsidies and by our arms; and he contended that our obligations to control and regulate the action of the Government of Afghanistan commenced with the first assistance that we gave to that Government. The Government of Russia was not slow to perceive this. There was another reason why we should acknowledge an obligation. If Afghanistan should prove a restless and aggressive neighbour she must be restrained by some one. If we did not restrain the action of Afghanistan she must, in the last resort, be restrained by Russia. Surely it was better that we should exercise that duty than that Russian forces should enter the territory of Afghanistan. There could be little doubt that if Russian forces entered the territories of Afghanistan on one side, English forces would enter the territories of Afghanistan on the other; and in all probability some worse results would arise from the conflict of these forces than could arise from an independent action on the part of England. This obligation, however, was of a distant and speculative kind, and he did not think the Government of Afghanistan would provoke such a conflict. The policy initiated by Lord Mayo had for its object to establish a powerful Government, independent in its internal affairs, but indirectly dependent on this country as regarded its external relations, and if the territory of Afghanistan were split up, the whole of that policy would be frustrated. The noble Earl now intrusted with the administration of Foreign Affairs, in the course of some observations he made in a debate on the Address last year, expressed a hope that no pretext, however plausible—no inducement or temptation—would lead our Govern- 1910 ment, under whatever disguise, to entertain an idea of an extension of our territory to the North or West of India. When the noble Earl gave utterance to those words he did not speak with the responsibility of an official, but he spoke with the responsibility attached to his natural position, and to the fact that he had already been placed at the head of the Foreign Office, and that in case of a change of Government he would undoubtedly be appointed head of one of the great State Departments. Such being the case, he (Lord Napier and Ettrick) confessed that he heard the expressions of the noble Earl with considerable regret and anxiety. If the noble Earl had merely said that he reprobated the notion of an extension of our territory to the North of India, he, for one, would have given his hearty concurrence to the opinion of the noble Earl; but it appeared, from the expressions of the noble Earl, that his views at that moment were absolutely and radically opposed to everything that the Government of India had done, and to the whole of their policy; for it seemed that he viewed friendly relations with anxiety and distrust, because friendly relations might lead to something worse than friendly relations—namely, to alliances—alliances might lead to protectorates, and protectorates to annexation. Now, the whole policy of our Government for the last seven years, originated by his noble Friend on the Bench below him (Lord Lawrence), and continued by the Earl of Mayo and by the present Viceroy, had been to contract with the Government of Afghanistan that friendship and that alliance which the noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) deprecated, and which he seemed to believe might be pregnant with very unhappy consequences. These relations with Afghanistan seemed to him (Lord Napier and Ettrick) not only to have been weakened by the observations of the noble Earl, but also to have been seriously affected by an opinion expressed by the late Prime Minister in a speech delivered in the House of Commons on the 22nd of April, 1873, in reply to a Motion of Mr. Eastwick. In that speech there was a distinct declaration on the part of the late Prime Minister that we were under no obligation whatever to employ material restraint in regulating the conduct of the Government of Afghanistan, and 1911 the general tenor of his remarks vas that our undertaking did not extend beyond the exercise of moral influence. He held the opinions of Mr. Gladstone in the highest respect on every subject except that of Afghanistan, and he could not refrain from expressing deep regret that a statement, so impolitic and unnecessary, had emanated from so distinguished an authority. It was some consolation, however, that the noble Karl who, at the time that speech was delivered, had charge of our foreign relations had never, so far as he was aware, given utterance to the same sentiments, and therefore, perhaps, they need not be regarded as those of the Foreign Office. We knew the impression such a speech made in Europe, but could little imagine the effect it would have throughout Asia. No doubt it had been done into Persian, probably with very doubtful accuracy. There was, in all likelihood a Hindoo version, a Marathi version, a Tamil version. It might be assumed that in every Indian durbar it had been debated, and that in every bazaar it had been a topic of common talk. And what impression could it have had on the Hindoo mind? Probably it had given rise to a feeling that the Government of England was inconsistent and did not abide by its resolutions, or that it had come to no conclusion at all on the subject of Afghanistan. Any reference to the policy of Russia in Central Asia was quite apart from his intention in making these observations. That formed no part of his inquiry of the Government; and it would ill become him to create a bad feeling between this country and Russia, even if he had the power to do so, for he had passed four years of his life in Russia, and had always received the most distinguished consideration; therefore, it would be repugnant both to his personal and political feelings to cause strife between Russia and England. No one could be more deeply persuaded than he of the policy and necessity of maintaining as much as possible a cordial understanding with the Government of Russia. There was much in the character of the Russian nation which deserved our esteem, and it had a mission of civilization in Asia which accorded with our own. But if harmony between the two Governments was to be maintained, it could only be by conduct that would give rise to mutual respect, and 1912 nothing was more important than that this country should make a clear and consistent declaration of its policy, and be ready at all times to support it. He now wanted to know whether the Government would adopt the conclusions of the late Government as set forth in the despatch to which he had referred, and whether they would be prepared with moral and material support to the Ameer of Afghanistan. In case, however, that the Government had not had sufficient time to devote their attention to the subject—it being contained in a long Correspondence with Russia—he hoped that they would seriously consider it, and be able to disclose their views to the House at no very distant date, and that at that time they would be able to set forth a clear, intelligible, and consistent policy in regard to it.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYMy Lords, the Question which the noble Lord (Lord Napier) has addressed to me divides itself into two parts, and probably it will be for the convenience of your Lordships if I deal with the two parts separately. The noble Lord asks me, in the first instance, whether Her Majesty's present Government "fully adopt the conclusions stated by Earl Granville in his despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus of the 17th of October, 1872, respecting the territories and boundaries of Afghanistan." Now, that is a very simple inquiry, and it is one which I have no difficulty in answering. The despatch to which the noble Lord refers, and of which he in part stated the purport, lays down the boundary of the territory which was regarded as belonging to the Ameer of Cabul, and proposes that the boundary so laid down should be recognized by the Russian Government. That boundary was—I will not say unfixed—but undoubtedly uncertain. Differences of opinion might fairly exist as to the line which ought properly to be drawn—at any rate, that line had not been determined by any international engagement. The Russian Government, after some Correspondence on the subject—in which it is but just to say they manifested a very friendly spirit—acquiesced in the proposals made by the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville). The line of boundary submitted by us was accepted, and so far as Afghanistan is concerned, all danger of disputes upon the question of territorial sovereignty has thereby been avoided. Now, my Lords, 1913 I am bound to say that I see no reason for dissenting from the language of the despatch in question, or from the conclusions arrived at by the noble Earl who preceded me in the management of foreign affairs (Earl Granville). In any case I should hold that an incoming Government is bound by an international engagement of that character entered into by its predecessors. The inconvenience and complications that would arise would be extreme if, whenever a change of Administration occurs, questions of this hind were to be considered as re-opened. But, in addition to that, it is only fair to say that, as far as I have formed a judgment on the matter, I think the settlement of the boundary question obtained by the noble Earl opposite was as satisfactory as could be expected. I now come to the larger and much more difficult question to which the greater part of the noble Lord's speech was directed. He asks me whether the Government are prepared to give their moral and material support to the Ameer of Afghanistan in case of any unprovoked aggression upon his dominions. Now, I may observe that to every quarrel there must be two parties, and that every question has two sides. Whether therefore any given case of aggression is unprovoked or not is very likely to be a matter on which different opinions will be entertained, and the pledge for which I am asked is therefore a pledge which involves very little. But passing from that point, I must guard myself from saying that I, accepting as I do the despatch of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville), feel myself in any degree bound by the conclusions which the noble Lord has drawn from that despatch. I do not think I ever knew so extensive a superstructure raised upon so small a foundation. The noble Lord says that we have contracted three distinct obligations towards the Ameer. He tells us that we have fixed the boundaries of his territory, and have thereby pledged ourselves to defend it against all comers. Now, that is to me a totally new theory of international obligations, and if the noble Lord can point to any authority or precedent for the views he has advanced on this subject, I shall be very glad to hear it. Then the noble Lord proceeded to quote some words of mine used last year, from which he drew certain inferences; but I think that if he will care- 1914 fully consider those words and their context he will find that I carefully guarded myself against expressing any definite opinion upon the subject until the Papers with regard to it, which were not at the time before us, were laid on the Table of the House. What I said on that occasion comes to no more than this—and I willingly now repeat it—that in the case of Oriental nations you ought always to watch with great care the engagements which you incur, because such engagements are apt to pass into alliances which bring with them somewhat difficult obligations. I must say that if anything could to my mind furnish an additional confirmation of the views then expressed, and an additional reason for caution in those matters it would be the speech to which we have just listened. If we are bound, as the noble Lord says, to defend the Ameer of Afghanistan against all comers we are, at least, equally bound to warn him beforehand if we think he is placing himself in a wrong position, and eventually we shall be undertaking the obligation of regulating the external affairs of that country. That involves a protectorate, and I venture to say such au arrangement would be one into which it would be most undesirable for this country to enter. It must be borne in mind that the people of a country themselves—whether in Asia or in Europe—will have something to say on the regulation of their own destiny; and to establish English control over Afghanistan against the will of the people—and I do not think we can do it with their consent—would be to engage in an undertaking which would probably result-in reducing Indian finance to a worse position than that which would be brought about by many successive famines. If it is merely meant that, in the event of the Ameer proposing to go to war with any neighbour beyond his own recognized frontier, we are bound to use our influence to prevent such a war—then in that limited theory of our obligations I should concur. That, however, falls very far within the obligations which the noble Lord desires that we should undertake. Then, the noble Lord asks us, what course we should be prepared to adopt under some hypothetical circumstances which do not at present arise? I will not complain of this inquiry, because I remember it has been 1915 said that there is no such thing as an indiscreet question, though there may be an indiscreet answer—but the noble Lord will, perhaps, take it as a compliment to his ingenuity if I tell him that he has put to me a Question which it is very difficult to answer without causing inconvenience to the public service in one direction or another. If I were to say to the noble Lord, "Your questions are vague, and we really cannot tell you what we shall do under circumstances which do not exist," he would probably meet us with the reply, "Well, that is a confession that, so far as the affairs of Afghanistan are concerned, you have no policy." If, on the other hand, I were to inform the noble Lord that I could make a good guess as to what it would be our duty to do, but that I did not think it would be desirable to state what that course was, he might turn round and say, "Then it is clear Her Majesty's Government have a policy, but it is also evident that it is a policy which they dare not venture to announce to Parliament or the country." If, again, I were to tell your Lordships in plain words that I thought it very doubtful whether, under such circumstances as those supposed, the Ameer of Afghanistan would have any reason to expect protection from us, the noble Lord will see—and I am sure your Lordships will see—that a statement of that kind would be a very plain and broad hint to the Ameer that he must not expect much from the alliance of England, and that he had bettor look out for allies in other quarters. Now, I do not think that is an answer which it is desirable to give. On the other hand, if I am to accept the challenge of the noble Lord, and to say that in any such case as has been supposed the Ameer is entitled to claim from us not only moral, but material support, then what I should be doing would be to give, in a casual and informal manner, in answer to a Question put to me from the other side of the House, a guarantee such as the Government of this country has given only in rare cases and under circumstances—as in the case of Belgium—where reasons of policy imperatively called for it. I need not remind your Lordships what and how great a responsibility is thus incurred. To give the guarantee of this country to an independent foreign nation is to take a step involving the gravest responsibility which 1916 can be incurred by an English Government. I hope, therefore, the noble Lord will not think that I am disrespectful to him if I decline to involve the Government or the country in such a responsibility, merely in order to gratify his quite natural and legitimate desire to ascertain the course which we may deem it to be our duty to take under circumstances which have not arisen, which may never arise, and which we are not in a position to foresee. Much will depend on the precise nature of the case, supposing it to occur—much will depend on the feeling of the Afghan population themselves—much must depend on the conduct of the Ameer, both in relation to his own subjects and to other States. All that I should be justified in saying—and it has been repeatedly said by my predecessor in office—is that to maintain the integrity and the territorial independence of Afghanistan in our judgment—and I am quite sure my noble Friend behind me, who is responsible for the administration of Indian affairs (the Marquess of Salisbury) will concur in this expression of opinion—is, and ought to be, a most important object of English policy, and that any interference with the national independence of Afghanistan would be regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a very grave matter, requiring their most serious and careful consideration, and as one which might involve considerable danger to the peace of India. I think, if such an interference occurred, to put the matter mildly, it is highly probable that this country would interpose; but there is a very wide difference between admitting this probability, and acknowledging the right of the Ruler of Afghanistan or any other person to claim from us, under circumstances and conditions which cannot be foreseen, material as well as moral support, not as a matter of policy or of expediency with reference to Indian or English interests, but as a matter of positive international obligation.
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, the noble Earl who has just sat down has left me hardly anything to say on this question—and if I had more to say I should feel reluctant to give utterance to it. But I entirely agree with the noble Earl that, while on the one hand it is the duty of Parliament to view with the most critical observation the conduct of those who administer the foreign 1917 affairs of this country, on the other hand nothing can be more disadvantageous than to require from those persons answers to questions of a perfectly hypothetical character as to occurrences which may never, and which probably will not, happen, and of which in any case, you cannot anticipate the particular circumstances. I wish, however, to thank the noble Earl for the expressions he has used in regard to the policy of the late Government on this subject, and the despatch to which reference has been made. The meaning of that despatch is not to be taken from any commentator, however ingenious and able—and the speech of the noble Lord who brought the matter forward (Lord Napier) was both—but is to be taken from the document itself. It is quite clear that the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will do as we would have done; he will act up to the engagement undertaken in that despatch. As to our influence in Afghanistan, that is considerable; and I think we should be wanting in good faith to the Russian Government if we did not exercise the influence we have in furtherance of that for which we said we would exercise it. Further than that, as to a guarantee, I defy anyone to find in the words of the despatch anything laying us under any such international obligation. We are left perfectly free to adopt whatever measures we may be disposed to take on a most important question affecting our Indian interests, which I am sure will be considered by the noble Earl opposite and his Colleagues in a spirit which befits the Government of this country all the better for their not making any previous declaration defining the course they would take in a case which is purely hypothetical.
§ LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYexpressed his satisfaction at the reply the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary had given to the Question asked by the noble Lord.