§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, he wished to put a Question to the noble Duke at the head of the Admiralty respecting the loss of Her Majesty's ship Orpheus. In the official despatch on the subject it was stated that the Orpheus, with nearly 200 men, was lost by acting, not against, but in compliance with the directions on her chart. The telegraph flag was flying telling her to take the bar; she obeyed that instruction, and consequently was wrecked. Since the chart was issued, in 1853, the sand at the mouth of the harbour of Manukau had shifted three quarters of a mile, and in consequence the Orpheus, instead of passing safely through the channel, ran directly on the sand itself. He wished to know, What steps the Admiralty were in the habit of taking for the purpose of collecting information on foreign stations respecting those changes which occurred from time to time, affecting the navigation of the waters, and also what means they adopted for disseminating that information among the officers of the Royal Navy? Although it appeared, in this instance, that Her Majesty's officers were unacquainted with the changes which had occurred, the merchant service were not ignorant of them; for he had seen in the newspapers a letter from a gentleman commanding a vessel stating that they were perfectly well known.
§ THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, he was very glad that the noble Earl had put this question to him, as it enabled him to correct an error on the subject which was very generally prevalent, and into which it was not surprising that the noble Earl should have fallen, as it originated from a statement in the despatch of the Governor of New Zealand, Sir George Grey. In that despatch it was stated that the Orpheus
was intending to make the passage across the bar, as laid down in the chart of 1853. Since that time the bar has shifted about three-quarters of a mile to the northward. She was thus rather more than that distance too far to the southward.The loss of this fine vessel and so large a number of her gallant crew was, of course, a most painful calamity; but it would have been an additional source of deep affliction if it had been caused by any neglect on the part of the Admiralty in not communicating to the officers of the ship the changes which were known to have occurred in the harbour. So far, however, 376 was this from being the case that the change fron the chart of 1853 was brought to the notice of the Hydrographer's office in October, 1861, if not before. A notice was then drawn up, of which printed copies were sent to the senior officer on the Australian station to be distributed among the ships in that quarter. That notice contained the following observations:—It appears from the Remark Book of Her Majesty's ship Niger, 1861, by Mr. A. J. Veitch, master, that since the survey by Captain Drury in 1859 the main channel at the entrance of Manukau Harbour has shifted; as also, that the code of signals noticed in the New Zealand Pilot, 2nd edition, 1859, established to assist the navigation of that port has been altered and improved. The following directions will therefore supersede those heretofore in use; but from the shifting nature of the entrance of Manukau Harbour, as also of all the bar harbours on the west coast of the north island, the seaman is cautioned to pay strict attention to directions that may be given from pilot stations; and it has been recommended as a general rule, in the absence of direct information of changes in the channels, that that portion which has the smoothest water between the breakers should be taken, as experience has proved that it will be the deepest part. The north side of the middle banks forming the southern boundary of the main channel to Manukau has extended to the northward since Captain Drury's survey in 1853; vessels, therefore, in crossing the bar of this harbour should bring the Nine Pin rock twice its base open to the southward of Paratutai, N.E. by E. ½ E., which will lead about a cable northward of the breakers.Thus seamen were first cautioned that the bar had shifted, and were also warned to pay attention to local information. When he first heard of the accident to the Orpheus, he was anxious to learn whether the officers had received the notice he had referred to. He therefore sent for the issue book kept in the Hydrographic Office, from which it appeared that the New Zealand notice was sent to Portsmouth on the 13th of November, 1861, and placed in No. 5 Australian chart box. On the 23rd of November the Orpheus drew this No. 5 box from the store at Portsmouth, and the receipt for it was in the Hydrographic Office at the Admiralty. In addition to this, it was probable that in taking the command of the station from Commodore Seymour in July, 1862, other copies, with all spare charts, would have been taken to the senior officer's ship. Moreover, he had seen an officer on Saturday who was saved from the wreck, and he believed he was correct in stating that the master of the Orpheus had a copy of the very notice in question in his hand at the time when the ship was approaching the bar. He 377 mentioned these circumstances only to justify the Admiralty, and to show that they were not chargable with neglect of duty. He would not go any further into the subject. Their Lordships were doubtless aware that the Orpheus, which drew above 20 ft. of water, was larger than most of the ships frequenting that coast, and be might observe that he had sent her out at the pressing instance of the Governor of New Zealand for a large and powerful vessel. The noble Earl had also asked what were the general orders of the Admiralty in regard to correcting charts. Those orders were very complete and peremptory, and appear in the printed instructions for masters. The master was directed to note all inaccuracies in any of the charts supplied to the ship, but especially in those published by the Admiralty, so that the requisite alterations might be presently made. If the position of the dangers was materially altered, or if he should discover any new dangers, or if the inaccuracies he might have detected in the charts were of importance, he was to report them immediately to the Admiralty by the very first opportunity, so that no time should be lost in making the necessary corrections. Again, when a hydrographic notice of a newly-discovered shoal, or rock, or other danger, or a notice to mariners of a new or altered light, buoy, beacon, or land mark was received on board, the master was at once to insert it in red ink in all the charts to which it referred (these being always enumerated at the foot of the notice), and to note the same in the sailing directions, reporting to the captain that he had so done. Further, all masters of Her Majesty's ships were required to report to the Secretary of the Admiralty through their captain the discovery of any new rock or shoal. The Governors of our Colonies and Consuls constantly sent information, and harbour-masters and merchant captains did the same. The Hydrographic Office was in constant correspondence with all parties who could furnish information in all parts of the world. As soon as it was received, if considered of fair authority, it was printed and circulated not only for the benefit of Her Majesty's ships, but of all navigators. He thought he had now shown that every care was taken to let the officers of the unfortunate vessel know the changes which had taken place in the harbour, He had only to add that there would, of course, be an inquiry into all the circumstances connected with 378 the loss of the ship, and then probably it would be ascertained how the vessel came to be lost. He could not omit bearing testimony to the gallant bearing of all on hoard, and of the crew of the vessel, who, seeing death coming upon them in all directions, still remained steadfast in the execution of their duty. Such conduct afforded a fine example of the courage and bravery of British seamen.