LORD BROUGHAMAfter the lamentable accounts which have reached us during the last two days—lamentable as every one must feel them, whatever be his opinions or his wishes respecting the war, I rise to discharge a duty to this House, to the country, and to humanity. Closing my ears to the shouts of triumph raised by one party, to the murmurs of others complaining that such enormous carnage should have had no result, and to the cries of the defeated, disappointed it is said, 522 perhaps untruly, in their hopes of abating the nuisance of a free Government in their neighbourhood—from these I turn aside, that I may give utterance to the thoughts which should be uppermost in all men's minds towards what party so ever in the contest they may lean. A slaughter has been committed unexampled in the history of our race; and at the time I speak it has not ceased The British Senate has been called the refuge of oppressed nations; whether it deserves that title or not, I know that it is the refuge of suppressed feelings; of right feeling and sound principles; the lacerated feelings of humanity, and the outraged sense of justice. The heartfelt sorrow for what has befallen so large a portion of our fellow creatures—the heavy censures—the deep indignation roused against the perpetrators of that enormous slaughter, can find no vent elsewhere; stifled, or altogether suppressed in some countries by the arbitrary commands of despotic power—drowned in others by the clamour of popular violence. But here those natural feelings are the cherished growth of the soil; and in this high court of justice they charge by a name technically familiar to us, which I abstain from using, the wilful authors of the war, be they who they may, by whatever motives actuated, whether stimulated by the thirst of vain glory, or moved by the cold calculations of selfish interest, or possessed with the jealousy of free institutions, or inflamed with the lust of conquest—whoever they be, and by whatever passions incited, the wilful authors of the most unprovoked and indefensible war ever waged, and their guilty accomplices, have dyed the plains of Italy and made her rivers flow with the blood of innocent men—innocent because the dupes of their arts or compelled as unwilling instruments in their hands. But let us be just to France. Her ruler has disclaimed for her all desire of conquest, or aggrandizement; and so far I verily believe that the French people will be no gainers in any manner of way. They will bear the burthen, will pay the cost without receiving the profit. The crop is raised with their blood, but they will not reap the harvest. Then who is to gain by the horrible carnage of which the Lombard plains are now the scene? Is it the Italian people? No one more earnestly desires than myself to see the oppression cease under which they have so long suffered. In every quarter from north to south that people has been grievously misruled; and no one would rejoice 523 more at their freeing themselves from the Austrian yoke and their other burthens. But when I contemplate the policy which seems now to prevail, I am thrown back in my recollection to the evil times which some of your Lordships, with myself, are old enough to remember, and to remember with he rror—I mean the wholesale dealing in revolt and insurrection of the National Convention. I speak of their celebrated decree of the 19th of November, 1792, which, if it did not begin, extended the war over Europe, and continued it for above twenty years—the decree holding out the hand of fellowship to whatever people should revolt against their rulers, and not only giving them countenance, but offering the assistance of their armies, and instructed their generals wherever an insurrection had happened to protect all engaged in it from the punishment which they had incurred. At the present clay the course is not by decrees, but by acts and deeds, showing the insurgents that they may expect help; and the traffic in revolt is not as in 1792, carried on wholesale but by retail. One day it is the north of Italy against Austria; another it is the Duchies against their rulers; a third day it is Hungary against Austria; a fourth, it is the States of the Church and the Legations against the Pope. All are parts of a system called that of Nationalities in the north of Italy, and everywhere else. It is singular, too, he w in adopting the system of 1792 and 1793, they have also adopted the language of those dismal times. I speak not of France, but one of her allies, an ally in whose dominions every effort was made, every mode resorted to for rousing a warlike spirit and breaking the peace. I have seen with my own eyes the topics used by the Government press in that country, and the excitements to war in daily effusions of the war party,—that is the Ministerial party. The remedies were of various kinds and applied in different ways. But the first I chiefly remember, and remember having seen with no little horror, was this,—"War, it is true, may be an evil; but there are many evils in this world of ours; ills there must be and wars;" and it was added, "National independence, the liberation of oppressed peoples, is a tree that requires a sufficient manuring of human corpses" (un engrais suffisant de cadavres humains). Now, in the days of the Committee of Public Safety, St. Just, the execrable accomplice of Robespierre, employed the same expressions, "Liberty," he 524 said, "must be founded upon mountains of human corpses" (monceaux de cadavres). I had fondly hoped that the last war had been waged in the name of liberty, but unhappily we have lived to see in that desecrated name massacres so horrible in their extent, and attended with such unheard-of cruelty, that the mind recoils from the contemplation. The war, it may be said, has gone too far to be stopped; but I trust that England will interfere at the very earliest moment for the restoration of peace, and that, too, without ever asking who was to blame. Let it be the rule to make bygones, bygones; let us say both parties are equally to blame, or all alike blameless. It is to be hoped that the losing party may perceive that by persisting in an unequal contest she will only lose the more. It is greatly to be dreaded that Germany may be induced to take part in the struggle. There can be no doubt there exists already too much disposition to break the peace in that quarter; and if the sword were once drawn there, no man can tell to what extent the war may go, or when it may end. There is no actual attack threatened against Germany; the danger is only that of a possibility; and it is therefore earnestly to be desired that every effort may be made to keep Prussia from engaging in hostilities, and to prevent that greatest of all calamities, a general war. I have no fear of an invasion of this country, and I think my noble Friend opposite (Lord Howden) has taken a too gloomy view of the feelings of the French people on that subject. I firmly believe that all persons of respectability in France, all educated persons, all persons of property, they who represent public opinion, are he stile to the present war, and lament that it should have broken out. The multitude armed, and unarmed, may indeed have had their heads turned by temporary success, just as they would, on the other hand, be the first to be cast down by any reverse of fortune; but they are not those to whom we must look for sound public opinion. The whole country was averse to this war until it was actually begun, and then the reprobation of it diminished with the excitement of the occurring events. But it is still strongly disliked by the bulk of the community. That dislike is nothing compared to what would be felt and loudly expressed by all classes were the Government to break with this country. I firmly believe that no act of the Government could excite greater indignation than a 525 quarrel with England. But is that any reason why we should not be prepared? Quite the contrary. We say to France, "We don't distrust you, we don't believe that you will do us any wrong; we rely on your professions and your promises. Nevertheless, common prudence requires that we should guard against every possibility, and possible danger may arise from a change in your Government; for no one can tell what might in that event be the disposition of your military classes." Let us therefore be prepared by land and by sea. Above all, lot us be prepared by sea. I hope and trust that I shall have a satisfactory answer to my question from the noble Duke opposite, and that it be authoritatively declared that there is no foundation whatever for the report as to the Navy Estimates being lowered. Instead of the preparations of the late Government being lessened, I would rather that they might be extended, so as to render an attempt upon our shores, happen what may, absolutely impossible. There is the widest difference conceivable between a constitutional Government, with a free Parliament and a free press, and Governments such as those of the two allies, France and Russia, where every expression of public opinion is stifled. My belief is that had there been a free Government in France, this lamentable war in Italy would have been utterly impossible. It arose from there having been no legitimate vent for that public opinion which was at first quite unanimous against war, although when hostilities had been actually declared a certain change took place. Under those circumstances, and having regard to the naval force of France and Russia, it is our bounden duty to make it absolutely impossible that the channel should be commanded even by the united fleets of those two Powers.
§ THE DUKE OF SOMERSET(who was very indistinctly heard) said, he trusted that, in answering the question of the noble and learned Lord, he would excuse his not following him through the various topics touched upon in his speech. He would confine himself simply to giving the information which the noble and learned Lord seemed to require. In doing so he should lay before their Lordships such information as he possessed respecting the progress which had been made in the reconstruction of the navy; and here he felt that he had to represent the late Government rather than the present. He had seen with great surprise a statement in the 526 newspapers that he had commenced the duties of his office by reducing the Navy Estimates, and striking off a large number of men from the dockyards. But the fact was that he had not taken a single step in either of those directions. He would state to their Lordships what had really happened. On the 11th of April last the Board of Admiralty being very properly desirous of expediting the works in progress in the dockyards, ordered that the men should work extra hours. At a later period it was considered that further works wore necessary, and additional men were ordered to be taken on, and on the 5th of May it was ordered that more men should be employed upon the works in the dockyards. It was a perfectly right course on the part of the late Government to put on an additional force of men as soon as they saw it was necessary. In this respect, therefore, he (the Duke of Somerset) was quite ready to defend the course adopted by the late Government. A great deal had been said for many years past about the way in which the Navy Department had been administered. Now, it happened that when he was a Member of the House of Commons an inquiry was directed to be made into the Navy Estimates, and as Chairman of the Committee, he had before him all the leading persons who had been connected with the navy for a long time previous, and he had thus collected a great deal of information on the subject. It appeared that for thirty or forty years great economy was practised in the Navy Estimates, and very little expenditure was incurred. He now rejoiced that such economy had been practised, for had it not been so, the money would have been entirely wasted, the class of vessels built would have been entirely unsuited to the present exigencies, and if a number of vessels had been launched they would have been perfectly useless, and the country would now have to pay just as large a sum for the reconstruction of the navy. That was the course for a long period of time. Then came the period of steamships, but of steamships with paddles, when the Admiralty again set to work and produced a number of vessels of that class. But before many years had elapsed the screw-propeller was introduced, superseding the use of the paddle. If, therefore, they had gone on building steamers fitted with paddles, they would have been found unsuited to modern requirements. From a return which he and in his hand, it appeared that in the year 1847—the year 527 before the inquiry to which he had referred was made—there was not a single ship of the line with a screw. In January, 1853, which was the date of the next return, the Government had got as far as 17 vessels with screws. The next return was one of the 1st of January, 1859, when it appeared that we had 50 line-of-battle-ships with screws. Since this time the Government had gone to work with considerable industry, and whereas in January, 1859, the total number was 50 screw ships, on the 1st of July, 1859, the number was 57. Thus there had been a continual increase; and, meanwhile, the country had been saved the expenses of machinery, dockyards, and of executing the necessary works. The late Board of Admiralty had further resolved upon the construction of a vessel of 6,000 tons—whereas the largest vessels hitherto had not exceeded 4,000 tons in size—which was to be coated with iron. Vessels of this kind could not be built under an expense of less than a quarter of a million, and if we were to go on producing vessels of this class, it would occasion a most enormous expense to the country. But as far as the instructions adopted by former Boards of Admiralty were concerned, in no respect had the Estimates for the naval armaments of the country been diminished by the present Administration. In going into this question, moreover, it was not sufficient that larger Estimates should be taken—it was necessary that the expenditure should be properly adjusted. If he (the Duke of Somerset) wished to produce a number of vessels upon paper, the best course he could take would be to convert existing vessels into screw line-of-battle ships. Thus a fleet would be produced upon paper, but it would consist of vessels of comparative inefficiency. But, after all, the great question with which they had to deal was the question of manning the navy. This was a subject which must also be attended with very considerable expense, of a threefold character; first, that which arose from the immediate loss occasioned by taking men from their usual engagements; secondly, that of bringing up a number of men from boyhood to serve as sailors, which was a very effectual process; and thirdly, the adoption of an extensive system of bounty, which, though there could be no doubt of its necessity, must also entail a great expenditure upon the country. In dealing with all these questions a great degree of careful attention 528 was necessary. On all accounts, however, it was essential to bring our naval force into a state of efficiency. What they had to provide for was not merely a question of attack upon the shores of this land. They had to consider the position of the country as a great maritime power, and they must endeavour to maintain the country in that position at however great an expenditure. No doubt a great outlay would be required for this purpose, much of which would be entirely wasted: but it was both justifiable and necessary as a precautionary measure, because if in the capital or any other seat of commerce any feeling were to prevail that this country was not properly protected, the pecuniary loss sustained by the country would be very much greater than any sums which would be necessary to be expended for its defence. That was the view he had taken with regard to the future position of the navy; and he could assure the House that, both with regard to providing ships and the men for manning them, the present Board of Admiralty were as anxious to do their duty as the late Board, and to pursue a course which would place the maritime defences of the country in a satisfactory condition.
§ THE EARL OF HARDWICKEsaid he felt very much satisfied with the statement, as far as it went, of the noble Duke. He cordially joined in the sentiment expressed by the noble Duke that the great object to be achieved was the raising the maritime defences of the country to a pitch of efficiency which would preclude all apprehensions of invasion. He held that it was the duty of the Government to render the navy of England sufficiently powerful not only to maintain the British Channel as the British Channel, but to enable us to insist that the boundaries of this country in that direction should be the low-water mark on the French shore. They might talk of the militia, rifle corps, and all the rest of it, but if there was a chance of a he stile fleet of men-of-war appearing off the English coast, such would be the feeling which it would produce in the country that far more pecuniary suffering would be occasioned than any that the noble Duke could cause by any measures he might take for placing the naval defences on a satisfactory footing. In former wars our Parliamentary Government had been able to maintain great naval forces; but he might be permitted to refer to the condition of the French navy during the last war, and to the manner in which 529 that navy surmounted the difficulties it had to encounter. In 1794, the year after the commencement of the war, the French had seventy-seven line-of-battle ships, and 176 frigates. In 1812, having suffered defeat at Trafalgar, and having sustained severe blows at various other times, their line-of-battle ships had risen to 113, and their frigates to 272. So that, even then, in the face of such disasters, their power of production was such as to give us ample warning of the achievements in that respect, of which the means and energies of the French people were capable under the most adverse circumstances. The noble Duke had made a statement of what had been the progress of advancement in the British fleet during the years 1853 to 1859. The year 1853 was the year after the retirement of his noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) from office; and in the year 1852 the first screw line-of-battle ship was built, under the naval administration of the Duke of Northumberland. From 1853 to 1859, the rate of progress of the British navy had been very irregular. To the close of 1857, when the late Government took office, there were afloat twenty-five screw-sail of the line. During the 411 days of the late Administration the Government had raised the number to fifty sail of the line. Nothing, he understood, had had so great an effect upon the French people, nothing had created so great astonishment, as this rapid power of production by the Government and the maritime yards of this country; and it had, as he had been assured, formed a subject of consideration on the other side of the Channel. But there was one description of vessel the creation of which would render very great service to the navy if due attention were paid to it. He would venture to suggest to the noble Duke that while he was rapidly augmenting the strength of the naval force he should turn his attention to the condition of our frigates. That class of vessels, being of a light draught of water, it was well known were extremely useful in time of war in enabling a belligerent to know where his enemy was, as well as for purposes of convoy and communication. They might be considered as the eyes of the fleet. In 1815 this country had as many as 314 frigates; and their Lordships would remember that Lord Nelson, who always placed the greatest reliance on that class of vessels, said on one occasion he believed after he was dead the word 530 "frigates" would be found engraven on his heart, for without them he could neither see nor hear. In frigates the French were still superior to us. The question of money was of comparatively little importance, and he trusted the noble Duke would only take into consideration he w he could best use the power of production at his disposal, and he w he could most efficiently obtain men for the ships when built. In the evidence laid before the Commissioners for Manning the Navy, it appeared to be the opinion of the chief authorities that in the event of hostilities it was of the greatest importance that this country should have three fleets—one of 30 sail of the line in the Channel, one of 20 sail of the line in the Mediterranean, and another of 20 sail of the line in the North Sea, with frigates and light vessels in proportion. There could be no safety to the country unless the navy were raised to that extent. Then there were the demands of our foreign and colonial stations to be supplied; so that altogether, according to the best authorities, we ought not to he content with less than 80 sail of the line and a proportionate number of frigates and light vessels. This might seem a large force to be under the necessity of keeping up, but it must be remembered that in 1815 we had 831 vessels afloat, of which 244 were line-of-battle ships and that now we had only fifty sail of the line, which were not all ready for sea. All the points relating to the subject of manning the navy were dealt with in the Report of the Commissioners. It might be objected to that Report that it was somewhat speculative, and no doubt it was open to that objection, because, in the first place, it was not certain that the number of men necessary to form a reserved volunteer corps could be got; nor when they were got and their names entered on the books was it certain that they would always be forthcoming when wanted. A great number of shipping masters had been consulted by the Commissioners on this question, and they were all of opinion that a retaining fee would be likely to induce a number of men to come forward and enter themselves, and they thought that this plan, if limited in a certain way—giving the fee only to men engaged in short voyages—would secure all the advantages required. The late Government had placed the matter on such a footing as would, in a few years, if the present Government carried out their views earnestly, place the country in a 531 most satisfactory position in regard to manning the navy. There would be an absolute certainty of obtaining men when they were needed, and great expense would be saved by doing away with the necessity of keeping up large establishments when there was no use for them.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHMy Lords, I heard with great satisfaction what fell from the noble Duke opposite with respect to the intentions of the present Government on the important subject of the navy; but it was no more than I expected, because I could not but bear in mind what fell from Lord Palmerston two or three years ago, in the course of a discussion on the navy in the other House. The noble Lord said, he thought the navy of this country ought to be equal to contend not only with the navy of France, but also with the navy of any other great maritime Power united with France; and I think it is impossible that under the present circumstances of the country, which are much graver than any which existed at that time, or indeed, in my opinion, at any time during the last half century, Lord Palmerston could in the slightest degree have changed that opinion. If that be the object which we have in view, the noble Duke must feel that he is only in a state of progress, and that he has a great deal to do. I believe I might venture to go as for as my noble and gallant Friend who spoke last, and say that no force of line-of-battle ships less than seventy would be sufficient for the protection of our maritime interests. I would not distribute them as he proposes to do, but that number we ought to have. We ought to have, also, a proportionate number of smaller vessels for the protection of our trade, for it must be recollected that however equal our navy may be with the navies of France and Russia, the detachments we are compelled to send out for the protection of our colonies and our trade, extending all over the world, are so great that the force remaining for the defence of our own country is by no means so great as we ought to have. But I rose principally to endeavour to impress upon your Lordships and the country the truth which I feel most deeply, that no extent of increased efficiency which you can give to your navy can now, under the changed circumstances of navigation, give you an effectual protection against invasion, if an enemy be determined to invade you. The advantage which an enemy determined to take the initiative derives from the posses- 532 sion of forts like Brest and Cherbourg, and from the improvements in steam navigation, are so great that, at least during six months in the year, he may land 60,000 or 80,000 men upon any beach on the south coast of England. But recollect that the great advantage of a powerful and superior fleet is, that though a force may be landed it loses its communications. The late Emperor Napoleon said—and I have no doubt the present Emperor has seen reason to adopt the maxim—that the science of war consists in the science of communication. If that be so, no prudent general would land a force in this country unless he had a reasonable expectation of always being able to preserve a communication with the country from which that force had come. And this leads one to offer a suggestion for the immediate consideration of the noble Duke, which is this—that no time whatever should be lost in protecting all the ports and all the roads in which it would be possible for an enemy to place a fleet with any degree of security, and where he might form tâte de pont that would assist his future operations. I trust he will lose no time in placing at every one of these points—and I particularly recommend to his notice the port of Portland—some one fort at least, capable of sustaining a siege of a week or a fortnight, so that it would be impossible for an enemy to he ld that position with a fleet to assist his operations. I refer to the new port of Portland, that port which the late French Ambassador went down to reconnoitre, and which he took the trouble of visiting at the end of last summer in order to see the particular advantages it possessed. I trust that whenever that respectable gentleman goes to that port again he will find it in a better position than when he saw it last. Now, my Lords, whatever you do with respect to the navy, it is impossible to neglect your army—that military strength by which at last must be defended everything we value. The noble Duke is right to extend the force of the navy. It is a security for our interest and honour, and it may be productive of great advantages in carrying on our defences. But of itself our navy is not sufficient, and unless you determine to establish on a permanent and secure basis the future military defences of this country, I feel confident that, considering the passions that animate persons on the Continent who are he stile to us, considering the vast power at their disposal and the reasons for running the risk 533 of invasion, I can speak with perfect assurance, and to my own mind almost in the language of prophecy, that the attempt will be made, It will not he made during this war. What we have to apprehend is when this war has terminated—when France has broken the military strength of Austria,—when she has terrified the other Powers of the Continent—when there is a close connection and understanding with Russia—and when she has the opportunity of bringing a disciplined and victorious army—for they will consider themselves certain of success—to realize the last project of the Emperor Napoleon I., all whose projects the present Emperor has boasted it is his fate to accomplish. I cannot close these few observations without expressing my conviction that if we do not take advantage of this respite of time —of the advantage given us by the war France is engaged in—we shall imperil everything that every man in this country values—its independence, its honour, and its constitution.