§ LORD LYNDHURSTI am anxious, my Lords, before we separate, to call your attention to the affairs of Italy. I have from time to time applied to my noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Clarendon), to furnish us with information on that subject, but my applications have been uniformly unsuccessful. I regret to say that we do not very often succeed in obtaining information from my noble Friend, or in procuring papers containing information to be laid upon the table, until such information has ceased to be interesting or important. 711 Happily, however, in this case other sources of information are open to us. Deplorable, indeed, my Lords, is the situation of Italy. Every man of education—every man with any feeling—must deeply sympathise with the situation of that most interesting and unfortunate country. When my noble Friend first furnished the protocol of the 8th of April, the world was taken by surprise, and Italy hoped and expected great and important advantages from that publication. I regret, however, to say that those hopes and expectations have been completely disappointed. I have often questioned within myself the policy of that publication, unless the Governments of France and England intended to follow it up, not by a mere interchange of diplomatic notes, but by some efficient action. For, my Lords, it Is impossible that men should continue to live under a foreign military tyranny without being eager to break their chains; and to raise the hopes and expectations of persons in that situation, and afterwards to disappoint those hopes, is a course that must lead in all probability to a most calamitous state of things. I need hardly add, my Lords, that of all military tyranny the military tyranny of Austria is the most galling and odious. It is not in Italy alone that we have had experience of the military occupation of Austria; we have had more recent evidence with respect to it in the Principalities. The Austrians entered the Principalities as friends and protectors—professedly as friends and protectors, in virtue of a treaty with the Sovereign of that country. It might be supposed that under such circumstances the Austrians would maintain most strict discipline, that they would abstain from all violence and injury to the inhabitants, or that if, by any accident any injury or violence were committed, that it would be speedily redressed. Unfortunately, however, during their occupation they pursued a different course, and I think I am authorised, from the information I have received, in saying that the people of that country lament that Rusian invasion was exchanged for Austrian protection. The Austrian occupation of those countries has been spoken of in favourable terms; but I have seen so much of the evidence from official documents that I feel certain that the representation I have made is perfectly correct. My Lords, by the Treaty of Vienna the limits of Austrian power in Italy was strictly defined. They have passed this 712 boundary; they have stretched themselves along the coast at Ancona, and they are now in the occupation, with an immense military force, of the duchy of Parma and a portion of the State of Modena. They command, indeed, the whole north of Italy. I will not enter upon an inquiry how far their original entry into the Legations was legal, and how far it was justified by the condition of the country and of the Governments. These things I pass over. They are well worthy of consideration and discussion, but they would take me from my present object. What I wish is to bring before your Lordships the present state of that country. From the time the Austrians have passed the boundary seven years have elapsed. For seven years they have had possession of this territory, and they have not only ruled it, but they have placed a greater portion of it in a state of siege, and under martial law during the whole of that period. My Lords, when is this to cease? What termination is to be put to this state of things? I ask this of my noble Friend. He will tell me that the short answer returned by the Austrian Government to this question is, that they will leave this territory when they can do so without danger of insurrection. Now, mark the course of things. Bad Government produces dissatisfaction, disturbance, and possible insurrection. That leads to the invasion of a military force. The possession by a military force continues and increases dissatisfaction, protects bad government, produces disturbances, and renders it impossible to remove the troops; so that, by this argument, to the evils of the possession of such a country by a hostile force there appears to be no reasonable termination. My Lords, that is a sad prospect for Italy. If it be true, is there no remedy? What are we to say of the condition of that unfortunate country? My Lords, I refer to the suggestion which I think proceeded from my noble Friend opposite. I refer also to the suggestion of the Sardinian Government as to the mode in which these evils may be terminated. The plan is this—establish a satisfactory Government—a Government that will satisfy the people; establish a small national force for the purpose of keeping the peace, and then you may withdraw your army. Until that is accomplished it is impossible to do so. Now, it must be allowed that this plan is specious; if it could be carried into effect it would be satisfactory. But, my Lords, it cannot be done without the consent of 713 Austria. Will she consent to do it? Will she consent voluntarily? If she will not consent by her voluntary act, will she consent by the pressure or persuasion of the Western Powers? A man, my Lords, must be credulous indeed who should suppose that Austria will voluntarily quit the possession of these districts. It has been said sometimes that the inconvenience of this possession is such that Austria by her own act will withdraw her troops. I know a little of Austria; and I am sure that the inconvenience must be of a nature much more strong than I can conceive to lead her to withdraw her troops from this part of Italy. I think, therefore, that so far as relates to her voluntary acts, the withdrawal is altogether hopeless. It has been thought that she may possibly yield to the pressure of France and England. I look forward to that state of things with the anticipations of agreeable results. I do hope that the pressure will be such as to accomplish the object which I have in view. I do not mean a pressure by the force of arms, but by the moral effect which would be produced by that pressure. But I may be permitted to say that, although a short time ago I was somewhat sanguine as to the effects of the concurrence of France and England, yet that certain events have since occurred and certain symptoms have appeared, of such a nature and character as to lead me to entertain very serious doubts whether those hopes will be realised. Not that there is any coolness between the two countries or any want of energy on the part of England; but there are circumstances in the situation of France which lead me to doubt whether she is disposed cordially to cooperate on this subject: therefore, my Lords, although I do not absolutely despair of the state of Italy, I confess I feel very great anxiety, mixed with very great distrust and fear, that the object which I have in view may not be accomplished. My Lords, my noble Friend, in the document to which I have referred, speaks of the grievous notoriety of the proceedings of the Government of Naples. It is impossible not to say a word on that subject. I will only say, in general terms, that nothing, in my opinion, can exceed the infamy of those proceedings. I will not attempt to describe the conduct and policy of that Government, because any terms that I could make use of would fail to impress your Lordships' minds with the reality of the evils under which the subjects 714 of that Government suffer. Nothing but a minute detail of circumstances of a most extraordinary kind which have occurred could possibly impress your minds with a distinct and accurate notion of the state of that country. I must leave this to the general impression of what you have read and heard. I will only refer to a publication to which I have before alluded—a publication by a right hon. Friend of mine, the Member for the University of Oxford (Mr. Gladstone). That publication was circulated extensively throughout the Continent of Europe. It went through various editions, and caused a great impression. An official answer was returned to it by the Government of Naples. I do not know how many of your Lordships have read that answer; but, so far from refuting the statements of my right hon. Friend, it only confirmed the accuracy of his details. That publication—I strike out everything but what fell under the observation of the author himself—a man of truthful character and conduct—that publication relates conduct on the part of the Neapolitan Government to mark the infamy of which is beyond my power of expression. But it may possibly be said that these occurrences took place four or five years ago, and that great improvements have taken place since that period. But, so far from any change having taken place, the same system has continued from that time to the present—more secrecy is observed, and there is more disaffection, but there is the same infamous system of tyranny and oppression. If it is suggested that a change has taken place, let me refer to what is passing at this hour in the kingdom of Naples—to the political trials that are going on, the counterparts of those described by my right hon. Friend (Mr. Gladstone), in which there has been a disregard of every principle of justice and a violation of every right. Persons have been suborned to be witnesses against the accused, and men have been threatened with imprisonment and punishment unless they consented to bear false witness. I will not go through the details, but your Lordships must have read them, and must have seen that a greater violation of right and principle never existed in the history of the world. But what makes the case worse—if it can be made worse—that this state of things is founded upon no law, not even upon the law of arbitrary Government. The constitution of Naples was sworn to by the King. After the 715 disturbances he ratified the adoption of that constitution, which has never been revoked, and is now the law of that country. The obligation of that constitution is, therefore, still in force, and everything has been done in open defiance of the law, and in direct violation of the constitution. My noble Friend told us, in the document to which I have referred, that although the general principle should be that one State ought not to interfere in the interior transactions of another, yet that there were exceptions to that rule—that there might be exceptions which not only give the right to interfere, but make it the duty of another Government to interfere—and my noble Friend applied that principle to the State of Naples. Three months and more have elapsed since the treaty of peace was signed, and since my noble Friend assented to that principle, and soon after a note was addressed to the King of Naples. When I asked my noble Friend, about a week ago, if the Government had received any return to that note, what was the explanation? Upon a subject so grave, so important, so interesting to the country, so interesting to mankind, mark! my Lords, what was the answer. The King of Naples had retired to Caserta, and, although the place is only a few miles distant, that was put forward as a reason for delay. Did you ever hear, on so grave a subject, such trifling—such absolute mockery—such insult? But I am told—and my noble Friend will tell me if I am right—that within the last two or three days an answer has been received. [The EARL of CLARENDON assented.] I see an assent on the part of my noble Friend, and I thank him for it, because that will lead me to another question. Is that answer satisfactory? I am told that it is extremely the reverse. I am told that the King of Naples denies the right of this country to interfere in the affairs of his kingdom, and that he not only denies the right, but possitively refuses to give any explanation or reply to the remonstrances addressed to him. I will repeat the question. I ask my noble Friend whether that is the substance of the answer received to the important communication which he addressed to the King of Naples? My noble Friend shows no sign. Then I shall ask him to lay on the table of the House a copy of the answer, that we may have an opportunity of judging whether the information I have received is correct. There is one thing that strikes me as singular. There is no 716 country in the world, I should say, more open to the power of England than the kingdom of Naples. If the King of Naples sets our power and authority at defiance, what is the interpretation which I put upon that conduct? It is this—that the Government of Naples feels that there is some lukewarmness, some backwardness on the part of France to co-operate with us in extreme measures for the purpose of obtaining the object which we have in view; and they think further, that we should not like to adopt measures which might give rise to conflict with Austria. This, then, is the state of things to which we are reduced. We threaten the Government of Naples. We say, "Your conduct is atrocious, is infamous; we require you to change it." They refuse to listen to our remonstrances, and we sit quietly down and take no further steps. What then becomes of the power and préstige of England? There is another subject to which I wish to direct your Lordships' attention—I mean the occupation of a great part of Italy by the Austrian troops. My Lords, seven years have elapsed since Austria entered into possession of the Legations, and established a state of siege and martial law throughout the whole of that country. In an assembly of Englishmen it is not necessary to dilate upon what must be the state of a country occupied by a military force of foreigners establishing such a system as that. Of all instruments of arbitrary power martial law is the most effective and the most fatal. Acts of oppression are exercised without restraint or limit, and upon bare suspicion peaceable citizens are apprehended and thrown into prison. As Englishmen we have a very imperfect idea of what being thrown into an Italian prison means. We have a notion of well-arranged apartments, inspected and visited by magistrates and officials, and placed under most careful and responsible superintendence; but we must not transfer that notion to the loathsome dungeons in which men of education and men of station are imprisoned, on mere suspicion, with the vilest and most atrocious malefactors. Such is the state to which many of the inhabitants of the Legations are now reduced—occasionally, to be sure, there is a show of trial. But what species of trial? Trial by a military tribunal of foreigners, every member of which is subject to the control of the prosecution; a trial without any form, without any rule of law, in which 717 everything is directed, according to the will and discretion of those by whom the proceedings are instituted. And what is the result? The result, I am told from the highest possible authority, is, that since the Austrians have been in possession of the Legations, 200 prisoners have been shot, and between 2,000 and 6,000 sent into exile. I go to another spot—the Duchy of Parma. There has been a great increase in the military force of Austria in that Duchy. Piacenza was originally assigned as the place for the armed occupation of Austria, but that place has long become too small to hold the forces she has sent into the Duchy. A conflict has taken place between the invaders and the Government. The Government insists that the trial of parties accused shall be before the ordinary tribunals. What say the Austrians?—that they shall be tried by courts martial, composed of foreigners. Every man who is attached to the principles of freedom and fair dealing, and to the due administration of justice must wish that accused persons should be tried before the ordinary tribunals of the country. But but this fact has occurred, and it is a melancholy fact—that before the conflict took place the Austrians had seized a great number of persons and transferred them to the dungeons of Mantua, where they lie in a hopeless state; for if brought to trial, they will be tried according to the discretion of the Austrians. It is while this conflict is going on that it is consistent with duty for Her Majesty's Government to do everything to interfere and support the cause of the people; yet, my Lords, although this contest has been going on for a very long period, it is only within a few days that our Ambassador at Florence arrived at Parma. Whether we shall derive any great advantage from his presence, I will not pretend to say; but, if report speaks truly, his inclinations and opinions are opposed to the rights which it should be the duty of Her Majesty's Government to defend. I pass it over, and I come to another part of this subject—I allude to the kingdom of Sardinia. Every Englishman must feel the deepest possible interest in the fate and prosperity of that kingdom. We are related to it now by common institutions and by a brotherhood in the great struggle which has recently terminated. The advocates of foreign occupation say that Italy is not adapted to free institutions. The State of Sardinia is a striking refutation of 718 that opinion. Under the greatest difficulties, in a situation where the most active struggle was going on, Sardinia has succeeded in establishing constitutional Government, and in preserving it by the exercise of great firmness, moderation, and patience; and I am sure every man in this country and every one of your Lordships must feel anxious that nothing shall occur to impair, in any way, the benefits of that constitution. The state of things in that part of the Peninsula is one, however, which must cause the greatest anxiety. That Government is regarded with jealousy, with aversion, I may almost say with hatred, by the neighbouring Government of Austria. That Power regards the Sardinian Government as holding out a most dangerous example, and anything that can be done for the purpose of subverting it will be eagerly adopted by Austria. My Lords, in every constitutional Government there will be parties. In Piedmont there are the Radicals on the one side, and the Ultramontanes on the other; but there is in addition, a third and most dangerous party—the party of the priests—which has shown its sentiments towards the Government by its conduct in the affairs of the property of the Church. These bodies are all combined in a formidable opposition to the Government. Notwithstanding all this the great body of the population of the country is content and happy, and are active in their support of the constitutional Government. But the danger to Piedmont from abroad is not confined to Austrian intrigues, carried on within her—there are other dangers with which she has to contend. Immense armies are concentrated in her neighbourhood, which are being continually augmented. The least accident may create a collision which must bring down destruction upon the territory of Piedmont. But that is not the only danger to which the Sardinian Government is exposed by the formation of vast armies upon her frontier—armies already large, and increasing day by day. Their presence requires Piedmont to maintain a much larger and more expensive military force than her limited means would otherwise justify her in supporting, and therefore she is compelled to withdraw her financial resources from beneficial application in order to employ them in the maintenance of an army to defend her against the multitudinous forces of Austria. My Lords, I wish to impress upon you, as I desire to impress upon 719 the Government, the absolute necessity of giving the strongest moral support to Sardinia; and should an emergency arise—should a necessity occur—to give further the aid of its material support to a country which has deserved so well of Europe as Piedmont has done. We can never desert that country without a violation of duty. Allow me to point out to your Lordships the bitter feeling of Austria towards Sardinia, as exemplified in the case of the sequestrations. There never was an instance of such littleness—if the affair had been one between women, I should say, of such spite. I will just briefly describe the circumstances of that case. By the law of the country every subject can cast off his allegiance—that is, with the consent of the Government, and with that consent he can leave the country and become a foreigner—in every respect a foreigner, and, like every foreigner, he is allowed to hold property in the country. Now, after some disturbances at Milan, a great number of persons who were not at all concerned in these disturbances, but who felt that a further residence in that country would be uncomfortable, availed themselves of the general license to quit the country; but, being warned that particular caution was requisite at that time, every one of them applied for and obtained a special permission. The greater number of those persons established themselves in Piedmont, where they became naturalised, and thereby, according to the laws of that country, became entitled to all the privileges of Sardinian subjects. Many of them have become members of the Assembly in Turin. However, in consequence of some alleged suspicions the property of those persons in Milan was sequestrated by the Austrians. No explanation was given, no grounds assigned, no evidence was stated, no justification offered; but that sequestration has continued, despite the continued and earnest remonstrances of Piedmont, down to the present time—a period of between three and four years. Having stated these facts to your Lordships, let me for a moment ask what is the course recommended by the friends of Italy? They are earnest in advising that there should be no attempt at insurrection; that for the moment the idea of an united Italy should be abandoned; that all hopes and wishes for revolutionary movements should be abandoned. The plan of an united Italy is impracticable. Revolutionary movement would be immediately 720 crushed by the disciplined bands of Austria, and the pressure of her despotism would be increased tenfold. Such, therefore, must be the advice given by all real, genuine friends of Italy. I have taken some pains to inquire, and I understand that the great mass of the intelligent and well-informed men throughout Italy are most moderate in their views. They desire no great changes, they do not wish to alter the existing Governments; but what they desire, and what they are entitled to demand, is an impartial administration of civil justice and a firm, honest, and intelligent administration of affairs. Give them that, and I firmly believe the great majority of the people of Italy will be content. When the French in 1806 entered the Legations they established the French code of laws, and their civil affairs were firmly and honestly administered; the people, before discontented, became satisfied, happy, and wealthy, and that period of its history is regarded in that district as the happiest it has ever known. We know well that, in Tuscany, the laws which the good Duke Leopold introduced were productive of happiness and contentment among his people; and we also know that, at the present time the people of Piedmont are contented, happy, and prosperous. That is what the people of Italy now require—that is what will satisfy them, and I would advise them most strongly not to seek to disturb the boundaries of different States, but to labour with all moral force, by all the means in their power, to gain the objects they so much desired—impartial administration of justice—good and regular administration of civil affairs, My Lords, there is one way in which that object may be attained, and with facility—it is by the cordial union and earnest co-operation of France and England. Whether we may hope for that co-operation for such an object I will not undertake to predict—it may occur—it has occurred—and it has produced great benefit to the people of the country to whom that united action was applied. Such co-operation is the only hope of the Italian people, and I trust I shall have some explanation from my noble Friend which will justify them in cherishing that hope. My Lords, I very much regret that the Austrian Plenipotentiary at the Congress was not content to discuss with my noble Friend and the French Plenipotentiary the question of the affairs of Italy. At the same time I am not at all surprised, because 721 with Austria there is only one rule of government, and that is—force, coercion, direct military repression. It is a principle with Austria, that the people are for the Government, and not that Government is for the people. There is not one liberal idea in their whole system. For such a system to exist in another country, supported by foreign bayonets, must be horrifying; and with what feeling that system is regarded by the Italians we have most abundant evidence to establish. My Lords, I have thought it my duty to bring this most important and most interesting subject before you, and I trust that the very deep interest I take in it will be my excuse for addressing you at such length.
§ THE EARL OF CLARENDONMy Lords, during the course of the last two or three years it has been my disagreeable duty to meet with official reserve Motions which have been submitted to your Lordships by the noble and learned Lord on the foreign policy of this country. The statements of the noble and learned Lord have always been so lucid, and have been accompanied with such powerful appeals to the sympathy of your Lordships—although my noble and learned Friend declares himself to be only responsible, or rather irresponsible, for his own opinion, and that he speaks for no party—yet cannot help thinking that he is in some degree responsible; and although your Lordships have ever been most indulgent to those who speak under responsibility from the Ministerial benches, and especially with regard to the production of papers, yet I never at any time rose to follow my noble and learned Friend without a deep sense of the delicacy and difficulty of the duty I had to perform. I say this, the more particularly now, because I feel that there is so much in what has fallen from my noble and learned Friend that meets with the sympathies of the people of this country; that there is so generous an interest prevailing in this country in favour of Italy, and so great a desire that that country should emerge from the position to which she has been reduced by bad government, and be lifted up to the station which she is entitled to hold, and which she may hold by means of judicious reforms, that I feel an unusual regret that I cannot meet my noble and learned Friend by laying on the table of the House papers which would show what are the opinions of the Government, and what have been the steps taken to procure a better state of things in Italy. 722 But the correspondence on that subject is incomplete; it is still going on, and we have favourable expectations of the result. I can, therefore, conceive that nothing but injury would accrue to the cause my noble and learned Friend has at heart by the production at this moment of that correspondence. It might be the means of putting an end to the friendly and confidential communications with those Powers which are chiefly concerned in the condition and welfare of Italy. My Lords, we cannot improve the condition of Italy by force. We must come to an understanding with those countries from which the movement must proceed. Many of the facts to which my noble and learned Friend has alluded exhibit a state of things of long standing. There are many flagrant abuses of authority to which he has referred which seem to be the necessary consequence, to a certain extent, of the caprices of men in a corrupted and degraded state of society, and which can only be remedied by good Government and by a power which cannot be produced suddenly and by external pressure. I have endeavoured to collect all the information I can with respect to the present state of Italy, and to separate it from all exaggeration and all party spirit; and I admit that in order to establish a really better state of things—not only a state of things adapted to the character and wants of the people, but which must have some reference to the unfortunate circumstances of Italy—I am certain, (and I rejoice to hear the opinion and advice given by my noble and learned Friend on that subject), that revolution, however momentarily successful, will not lay the foundation of any substantial prosperity. It is our earnest hope that the people of Italy are too sagacious and have profited too much by former experience, not to resort to means, the result of which will render their position worse. My Lords, nothing has been done by Her Majesty's Government either to promote or excite revolution. I feel that it would be both unjust and cruel to excite expectations which could not be realised—or rather, I should say, expectations which we are not prepared ourselves to realise; because if we excite expectations on the part of a portion of Italy—if we lead them to expect aid from us, I say that we are bound to render that aid. And though I am prepared to say that there are cases in which intervention in the affairs of other States not only becomes a right but an 723 obligation as strong as any, still I hold, as a general rule, that interference with the internal affairs of other States is not justifiable, and can only be resorted to upon the clearest grounds and as a last resource. It was in this spirit, and without any desire of promoting revolution or exciting false hopes, and with the view of laying the foundation of substantial reforms, and of procuring the speedy evacuation of Italy by foreign troops, that the subject was brought before Congress. In fact the initiative was taken by France; and this I think may be taken as a proof that the Government of France desired the withdrawal of the French troops from Rome. I cannot but regard with satisfaction that the subject was brought forward before the Congress, notwithstanding that it has been most bitterly condemned in some quarters. I was sorry to hear, even from my noble and learned Friend, an expression of regret that the matter should have been brought before Congress unless measures of great vigour were to be taken by the Governments of France and England. We have been told that we had no right to bring the subject forward before the Congress at all; that, by doing so, we were discussing the independence of States not represented at Congress; that it was calculated to defeat the object which we had in view, and that the representatives of the Governments who brought the question forward are responsible for the consequences which may ensue. But I say we were fully entitled to bring that question before the Congress; and when all the great powers of Europe were engaged in the great work of pacification, when they were solemnly binding themselves to evacuate the territory of Russia, when Greece, Turkey, and the Principalities were to be relieved on the earliest occasion from the presence of foreign troops, I say it was impossible not to cast our eyes towards Italy, which for years had been occupied by foreign troops without any sufficient pretext or justification. I shall not enter, any more than my noble and learned Friend, into the causes which led to that occupation; but we felt that it was a measure only to be justified by urgent necessity, and that it ought to cease with the causes which gave rise to it. We felt also, as my noble and learned Friend has said, that that necessity would never arise unless accelerated. We felt that the initiative would not be taken by the Italian Government. It may be convenient for 724 Sovereigns to rely upon the aid of foreign bayonets for temporary support rather than incur the anxiety and trouble of rendering themselves independent by effecting reforms which would secure for them the gratitude and affection of the people. It was with this object that we brought this question before the Congress; and we have good reason to be satisfied with having done so. And here let me take this opportunity of adverting to the conduct of Count Cavour at the Congress. The conduct of Count Cavour, the representative of the State most deeply interested in the result of the discussion, was throughout moderate and dignified, and he well sustained the reputation which he had already earned for himself by the services which he had rendered to his country. To him, more than to any other man, is Sardinia indebted for the establishment of liberal institutions; whereby he has rendered great service to Italy by proving that the Italian people are not unfit to enjoy liberal institutions, and that rational liberty is not inconsistent with devoted loyalty; and that both may be enjoyed in that country without risk of revolution or danger to public order. I feel the most entire reliance on the spirit by which Count Cavour is actuated, and I believe that the Austrian Government itself is not more opposed to insurrections in Italy than he is, or would do more to prevent it. It is true, as my noble and learned Friend has said, that three months have elapsed since this discussion took place; and it is also true that there are no visible results. But my noble and learned Friend must not infer from this that nothing has been done. As much has been done as could be undertaken in the time that has elapsed. I wish I could say that the result of our communications with the King of Naples was satisfactory. I cannot do so, for it is impossible that any two Governments could be more at variance in respect of the facts of the case than Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the King of Naples. Our representations were made to him in the most friendly spirit. We stated our reasons for believing that the existing state of things was dangerous to the stability of his throne, and also injurious to the peace of Europe. We particularly pointed out what were the dangers which threatened His Majesty, and we more especially pointed to that which my noble and learned Friend has suggested as the great difficulty—the necessity of a 725 better administration of justice. We recommended a general amnesty for political offences, and such a system of Government as would rally round it the confidence of the people. We pointed out the inexpediency, not to say the danger, of a policy characterised be systematic mistrust and unjust persecution, and, above all, we showed how essential it was that all subjects of His Majesty, irrespective of their political opinions, should have sufficient security for their persons and their property. I think, my Lords, that a milder representation with respect to the existing state of things could hardly have been addressed to any Government. It is true that at last we have received an answer to this representation, but we have not yet been able to confer with the Emperor of the French on the subject of this answer. I hope I shall not bring the French Government under the censure of my noble and learned Friend by saying that the Emperor is absent, and that, as yet, therefore, there can be no reply given. Until we have communicated with the French Government on the subject, and have determined with them upon the course which it may be necessary to pursue, I think it will be better not to lay that note upon your Lordships' table, and I shall confine myself to saying that it was impossible for any answer to be less satisfactory or less indicative of future improvement. But, my Lords, the questions of reform in the Pontifical States and the withdrawal of foreign troops from those States have also been pressed upon the consideration of the Powers principally interested, and, I must say, have been discussed in a manner and in a spirit very different from that in which the King of Naples has met the suggestions made to him. Although my noble and learned Friend may be incredulous, I believe the Austrian Government itself desires to withdraw its troops from the Pontifical States. I believe that the French Government also wishes to withdraw its troops, and this desire, so far from meeting with any opposition on the part of the Roman Government, is shared and approved by it. If, then, it be true—as I have every reason to think it is—that this desire is sincere on the part of the three Powers principally concerned, I cannot believe that much time will elapse before the withdrawal I have spoken of takes place, and before those precautions are taken which will be undoubtedly necessary after so protracted a foreign occupation 726 in order to prevent the recurrence of disasters which we should all regret. These precautions being taken, however, I can see no reason why the Papal territory should not be evacuated with as little danger or as little mischief as took place in the case of Tuscany. The events of 1848 may have left painful reminiscences in Tuscany, and may have raised the same apprehensions on the part of the Government there; but it is to the credit of the Grand Duke of Tuscany that he determined to rely for support upon his people alone, and to request the withdrawal of the Austrian troops, and your Lordships are aware that the last Austrian soldier has long left the Tuscan territory, without the slightest disturbance having ensued. My Lords, I see no reason why this example should not be followed, in respect to all the other Italian States. But, my Lords, in point of fact, the experiment of confiding in the Italian people has never yet been tried; for those excellent measures which inaugurated the reign of the present Pope, and which were received with gratitude by his people, were, like everything else, swept away by the torrent of revolution in 1848. I say, then, that measures of reform have not had a fair trial. I hold in my hands—it is too long for me to read to your Lordships—the Pope's proclamation, dated in 1849, which preceded his return to Rome, and in which the foundation of a better judicial system was completely laid down. I believe, if the reforms there promised by the Pope were carried into execution, that everything which my noble and learned Friend could require for the better administration of justice there would be carried out. But I repeat that, as yet, the exhibition of confidence in the Italian people has never yet been attempted. Throughout the greater part of the Peninsula, an administration founded upon the policy of securing the affections by promoting the welfare of the people has never been tried. The policy hitherto adopted has always been one of fear, founded upon the expectation of immediate revolution, without analysing the causes of those fears or inquiring whether those apprehensions were or were not justified. Now, this is not a natural state of things. It is not natural on the part of nations to rebel against their Governments. A rebellion against a Government which did all in its power to secure its welfare was never a national feeling on the part of any people; and I am convinced, my Lords, that the Italians are not 727 inaccessible to kindness, that all they wish is to have their wrongs redressed, and that they are not difficult to govern if their rulers will attempt the work of reforming in good faith, in good earnest, and under a greater sense of responsibility than that which they have hitherto exhibited. My Lords, I do not know that any practical utility would ensue from my attempting to follow my noble and learned Friend throughout the speech he has made. He himself has pointed out in his speech some of the great difficulties which must attend the course to be taken by this Government. He has stated in plain terms the difficulty which we should have to encounter in acting alone. He has stated in plain terms why it is necessary that pressure, if applied at all, should come from France and England together; and I believe that until we can supply that joint pressure in all its force we shall not arrive at the results which we all desire. I will only say, in conclusion, that Her Majesty's Government have as much at heart the amelioration of the condition of the Italian people as either the Parliament or the people of this country can have, and that all the efforts they can make and all the influence they can bring to bear will be exerted in the endeavour to ameliorate that condition.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEsaid, he trusted that no attempts would be made to excite insurrection in Italy, because it would lead to bloodshed, would probably end in defeat, and would then only make bad worse. But he could only say that the sooner a Government which continued to tyrannise over a people like that of the King of Naples, and to oppress them in a manner which had been to-night stigmatised as "infamous," the sooner such a Government was put an end to the better, not only for the people governed, but for the whole of Europe. When it was said that there must be no armed intervention in the affairs of Naples, what, in point of fact, kept the King of Naples on the throne? He, as he did not hold an official position, had no hesitation in giving utterance to the general belief upon that subject, and that was, that his position was maintained by the Austrian troops which had been allowed to overrun the Italian peninsula from the Alps to Ancona. It was well known that if any movement took place against the King, the Austrian forces would come in and suppress the movement. Well, then, it was said by 728 the noble Earl that under no circumstances could resort be had to force in order to remedy a state of things which was injurious to Europe at large. [A gesture of dissent from the MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE.] Well, he was delighted that he had misapprehended the meaning of the noble Earl, but the noble Earl had talked of the inexpediency of the foreign armies being withdrawn from Italy until a better government was established. Why, if their departure were delayed until then, their stay would be indefinite, for they had gone into Italy to support and maintain a bad government, and not to support any amelioration of it. He, for one, anxious as he was that the powerful voice of the British Parliament might be of influence in bringing about a better state of things, could not press for the production of a correspondence which the noble Earl stated was not yet complete; but he thought that some information as to acts which had been committed in Parma, such as Italians being carried over the Austrian frontier and immured in Austrian dungeons, might well be laid before the country. With the exception of Sardinia, a country, the independence and integrity of which would always be dear to England, the whole of Italy was in a state of anarchy. It was occupied on the one hand by the brigands, and on the other by foreign troops, and such a state of things could not long be endured, for the condition of Italy might ultimately affect the balance of power in Europe. It was for the country to consider if it were not its duty to employ all its influence, and force even if necessary, to put an end to the occupation by foreign troops of a territory which ought to be independent—an occupation which was continued for the purpose of maintaining a tyranny not only injurious to the persons under its sway, but disgraceful to the present age.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEsaid, he felt great doubts as to the practical utility of continuing the discussion, and felt the greatest reluctance in adding a single word to what had fallen from his noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon), but he wished to refer to one statement which had been made by the noble Marquess. The noble Marquess had understood his noble Friend to say that under no circumstances could force be employed, and he had felt it his duty in the momentary absence of his noble Friend to intimate by a dissenting gesture that such had not 729 been the meaning of his noble Friend. What his noble Friend had stated was, that in the present state of affairs with regard to Italy—that in the present state of negotiations no recourse to force could be expedient; but he by no means laid down the principle that, with regard to that country any more than with regard to any other country, if the interests of Europe required it, no application should, under any circumstance, be had to force. On the contrary, his noble Friend had stated that there were circumstances under which a recourse to force might not only be necessary, but might be a matter of actual duty. They all were ready to admit that every other means of obtaining an object should be exhausted before recourse was had to force, and, above all, that every step should be taken, if interference by force should at any time be justifiable, to convince other Powers of the justice of the interference, so that the general peace of the world might not be disturbed. Let their Lordships also recollect that at that very moment, when they were talking about interference in the internal affairs of Naples, they were also protesting against the interference of other Powers in Italy. The present was not a state of circumstances in which it would be desirable to introduce any new complications, and he trusted that those which now existed would pass away, and that the result would be that interference would be got rid of altogether. He hoped that there existed on the part of the occupying Powers a bonâ fide and deliberate intention, in a greater or less degree, to get rid of interference, and the latest intelligence received by the Government with respect to Parma indicated an actual disposition to withdraw interference there the moment the system of assassination was put an end to. There were now fewer Austrian troops there, and the number would be gradually diminished. Concurring as a matter of feeling in the general sentiments expressed by the noble and learned Lord, he, nevertheless, thought it was equally the duty of Government to resist being led away by such a feeling, and to be firm in abstaining from any measure which might appear to embarrass the question. He only trusted that if ever interference should become necessary, it would be vigorously conducted, so that it might lead speedily to a satisfactory result. He had already said that he entertained some doubts as to the utility of the present discussion, 730 and he therefore would not prolong it, not seeing the way to any immediate or useful effect being produced but by moral force. He was ready, however, to acknowledge that that moral force might be strengthened by the unanimous expression of feeling in that assembly, in which so much variety of opinion existed on other subjects, and that it would not be without its effect even in those fortresses of prejudice and arbitrary power which were undoubtedly the last places likely to be reached by it.