LORD STANLEYI have a petition to lay before your Lordships, of which I gave notice upon a former evening, signed by a very large number of persons of all classes in the Colony of British Guiana, praying for an entire alteration in the legislatorial constitution of that colony—(for the Abolition of the Court of Policy and the Combined Court of that Colony, and of all Offices and Institutions necessarily connected with those Courts, and for the adoption of a Representative Constitution in lieu thereof—Minutes of Proceedings, 54). The petition comes before your Lordships in rather an unusual form, but I hope not in such a form as to render its reception inconsistent with the rules of the House, inasmuch as the only departure from the usual form is that the signatures, instead of being appended or tacked together to the petition, are bound together in a book, which I now hold in my hand. The petition is signed by not less than 5,000 of the inhabitants of British Guiana, and amongst them I see the names of many persons holding prominent positions in the colony. The signatures include the names of all classes and all denominations—clergy, barristers, landed proprietors, merchants, shopkeepers, tradespeople of all descriptions, small freeholders, and labourers. I am sorry to see—because it does not give one a very high idea of the progress of education in the colony of late years—that a very large number of these signatures are subscribed by marks and not by name; and this applies not only to the labouring classes of the community, but in many cases to the small freeholders and even persons engaged in trade. But I must say with regard to these 5,000 signatures, that, almost without exception, the profession or 129 trade of almost every person is given, and that the genuineness of the marks is in each case attested by the signature of a respectable witness. It having teen represented that the views expressed in the petition were not the views of the colonists at large, it was thought desirable to procure a larger number of signatures from the lower classes than would otherwise have been the case. Before I proceed to state the circumstances of the petition, and the precise nature of its prayer, I must for a single moment describe the existing constitution of British Guiana, against which the petitioners remonstrate. That constitution is by no means formed upon an English model. It is practically, to all intents and purposes, the same constitution which it possessed at an early period under the old Dutch Government, and which was guaranteed on the cession of the colony to this country. There are in British Guiana two legislative bodies, or rather one consisting of two parts: one, the Court of Policy; the other, the Combined Court. The Court of Policy is constituted in this manner. The colony is divided into five districts; these five districts elect by franchise, which was a very high franchise, but has recently been lowered, seven persons, who form an electoral body or college of choosers. This college, consisting of seven persons elected for life, have power, as vacancies occur in the Legislative Council or Court of Policy, of selecting at their pleasure two persons, who are recommended to the remaining members of the Court of Policy, and the Court of Policy, out of these two persons, selects one who shall fill up the vacant place. Now, the Court of Policy consists of ten members—the Governor and four official members, and five other persons, who are nominated in the manner I have described. Into this portion of the court the principle of representation does certainly enter, but through a system of distillation which leaves exceedingly little of the representative character when the member elected took his seat. There are five persons, undoubtedly, who are selected by a body themselves selected, but elected for life, and upon whose return to the Court of Policy the previously elected members exercise that veto which consists in choosing one of the two returned. But inasmuch as the Court of Policy consists of only ten members, and of these ten five are the Governor and four official members—the four always acting under the authority of, at 130 in conjunction with, the Governor—and the Governor possessing the advantage on an equal division of votes of a casting vote, it is apparent that all the elected, even by the qualified system of representation, are of one way of thinking, and can determine any question in whatever way the Governor may think fit. With regard to the election also of a member caused by a vacancy among the elected members, the Governor has sufficient power without the exercise of a casting vote; for the vacancy having reduced the non-official members to four, the Governor and the four official members form an absolute majority of the remainder. The election, therefore, is in the hands of the Governor. Now, the Court of Policy, constituted as I have described, is, properly speaking, the solo legislative body in the colony. No legislation can originate or be carried on except in that court. There is, certainly, another body, consisting of six representatives, whoso duties are financial, and who are elected by the same constituency, and who sit with the members of the Court of Policy in what is called the Combined Court, and who there take into consideration financial subjects. Of course, although the Governor exercises a great authority in that court, he does not exercise the same absolute authority as in the Court of Policy; but he has not only the authority which he exercises by virtue of the free members which he has at his disposal (including himself), but the court is not permitted to originate anything whatever; it has only the power of dealing with the financial system and with taxation, and that merely for the purpose of checking and controlling systems of taxation originating in the Court of Policy. The Governor, however, has a further control, even over the Combined Court; for at any time in the progress of any measure, by his own single authority, he has the power to put an end to any discussion whatever, by moving and carrying by his own authority an immediate adjournment of the court, not merely to any future period, but sine die, thereby putting an end to the discussion. After the short description I have given of the legislature of the Colony, I think your Lordships will be of opinion that it is not one in which the representative system very largely prevails, or one which conforms very strictly to any British model; and that, if it is at all desirable to introduce the representative principle—if the Colony is fit for the introduction of institutions approaching to British institutions, 131 the remedy is to be sought, not in a slight modification of the existing system, but in an alteration of the system altogether, in accordance with the prayer of the petitioners. I am not aware exactly of the precise nature and extent of the alterations introduced by the noble Earl opposite (Earl Grey) in 1849; but I believe I am correct in saying, that, while the constitution of the Court of Policy and the Combined Court remain entirely unchanged, the alteration was an extension of the franchise of the persons who had to choose the college of electors, and the substitution of a system of open voting for the vote by ballot, which previously prevailed. I am not quite sure, looking at the state of ignorance of a great portion of the population, that the mode adopted of extending, by lowering, the qualification, was the most desirable mode of introducing a change and similarity to liberal and British institutions. The vices of the want of representation still subsisted—the vices of the control of the Governor over the legislature still subsisted; and only the choosers were chosen by a more extensive, but probably inferior, class of persons. The fact is, that great discontent has prevailed in the colony with regard to the existing institutions for a number of years; and in consequence of this discontent, previous to April last a meeting was held, and a petition was sent to the Court of Policy, praying for an alteration of the system, and the introduction of the elective system, and a full and fair representative system. On the 3rd of April, a Motion was made in the Court of Policy, recommending that the present legislative and financial institutions of the Colony should cease to exist; that they should be replaced by a Council and House of Assembly; and that such resolution should be transmitted for the sanction of Her Majesty. The Court of Policy negatived that resolution—that is to say, they decided that the petition should lie on the table, and took no further step. On the 15th April, a largo meeting was held in Georgetown, which was presided over by the mayor; and, on the 6th of May, another meeting was held, at which a committee of sixty persons was appointed to organise operations for the accomplishment of the change which they desired. In consequence of the petition of the 3rd April having remained unnoticed, the demands of the people on the 15th of April became stronger, and they demanded a purely representative Govern- 132 ment, consisting of a Council, not nominated by the Crown, but elective, and a House of Assembly. On the 13th of June, a petition, emanating from the second meeting, was laid before the Court of Policy; and, from what motive I can hardly divine, but that same Court of Policy, which had refused to entertain the petition of the 3rd of April, then came to a resolution to this effect—that it is the opinion of this court that the legislative institutions of British Guiana are unsuited to the existing state of society, and that it is desirable they should be abolished and a House of Assembly and an elective Legislative Council be established in their stead. If anything were wanting to show the almost universal opinion of the Colony, it would be, that, in a body so constituted, such a self-condemnatory vote as that should have been adopted. Many meetings were subsequently held, and great activity prevailed. On the 18th of September, the Governor submitted to the legislative body a scheme not for the purpose of introducing direct representation in either branch of the legislature, but for the purpose of increasing from six to ten the number of financial representatives, and adding to the elective members of the Court of Policy the mayor of Georgetown. Immediately after the promulgation of the proposition, the Governor adjourned the meeting, without discussion, till the 30th of September. In the interval another meeting, very numerously attended, was held, which affirmed most strongly the declaration of the former meetings, stating that they would not be satisfied with such modifications as those proposed by the Governor, but that they claimed the establishment of representative institutions, upon the model of the British constitution. On the 30th of September, a resolution embodying that principle was proposed to the Court of Policy, and that Court did not negative the resolution, but, on the 8th of October, got rid of it by substituting an amendment, to the effect that the Court, recognising the propriety of not altering the constitution for the present without the full consent of all classes of the inhabitants, will abstain from legislation on the subject until sufficient opportunity be afforded to the memorialists for explaining in detail their plan for an Elective Council and a House of Assembly, defining what would, in their opinion, constitute a fair, free, and direct representation. Now, here is the Court of Policy condemning its own con- 133 stitution, and resolving that it ought to be abolished. There is, then, a general assent on the part of the Colony in that resolution, and a general declaration that they desire to substitute for these institutions a House of Representatives upon a principle of general representation, combined with an elective Upper Chamber. Nothing can be more distinct or definitive than these propositions. I do not say whether they are propositions which ought to be adopted, or whether the state of the Colony is such that it would furnish materials for these two Chambers, or that, if they are appointed, that they ought both to be elective; but they go as far as possible in pointing out the views and objects of the people, who are represented by 5,000 petitioners out of a population not exceeding in the whole 100,000 persons. For a body which has condemned itself, to put the petition aside by calling upon the petitioners to furnish a detail of all the circumstances which will give effect to their own wishes, appears to me to be an evasion of a petition, expressing the plain, distinct, and almost unanimous sense of the colony. If anything were required in order to test the feeling of large bodies of the inhabitants, and of those in whom the power of election exists, so far as it exists at all, it may be shown by a single election which has taken place in Georgetown, caused by a vacancy in the College of Electors. The constituency as constituted by the noble Earl opposite, has been called on to pronounce its opinion between the chairman of what is called the Reform Association, which supports the principle of representative institutions, and the supporters of the present system. Of 148 persons who voted, 124 voted in favour of a purely representative system, whilst there were only twenty-four votes in favour of an adherence to the existing constitution of the country, modified as it was proposed to be. I believe I have now laid before your Lordships the facts of the case, and the universal feeling of the colony in favour of a substantial amendment or alteration of the present system. The petitioners state that they would earnestly press upon the consideration of your Lordships, that a spirit of deep discontent has been engendered—that they have a general conviction that the public expenditure is not only extremely onerous on all classes, but, considering the present state of the colony, recklessly extravagant; that the high taxation has enhanced the 134 cost of living to an extent which has been painfully felt by all persons in the colony not in the receipt of Government pay. It is notorious to your Lordships that British Guiana, in common with other colonies, has suffered by recent legislative measures. I am not going to discuss them. But the result has been that the whole revenue of the colony has diminished, whilst the pressure of taxation must fall much more heavily upon diminished incomes than it did in the days of high and remunerative prices; and it is felt by them as a special grievance, that whilst their own produce is subjected to a very serious competition with other produce, and gives a very inadequate remuneration for the labour bestowed upon it, they are obliged, for the purpose of maintaining a high rate of salary for the official servants of the Crown, to impose taxes on the necessaries of life. I call the attention of the noble Earl opposite particularly to this complaint. They complain that while all protection is withdrawn from their own domestic produce, a high tax is put on those articles which it is necessary for them to import for their actual subsistence, and that for the purpose of keeping up the high salaries of officials, which are much more valuable to the holders and more oppressive to the payers than when produce fetched higher prices. I do not say anything with regard to the specific proposition of the petitioners. I do not pretend to such a knowledge of the colony as would enable me to state whether it is in a condition to establish two separate legislative bodies—the one returned by direct representation, the other either by the nomination of the Crown or by election also, as these petitioners propose, by a higher rate of franchise than that required for the Representative Assembly. I do not say that that process ought to be introduced. But this I do say, that if the colony is in a state of advancement and enlightenment—and I have no reason to believe it is not—commensurate with those of Her Majesty's other West Indian possessions—if there are a considerable number of intelligent and well-educated men, and there is a general feeling among them in favour of the introduction of the British representative system, in lieu of the old, obsolete, and badly-working Dutch system—on every principle we are bound to attend to the wishes of these colonists, and not hastily, not injudiciously, not incautiously, approximate as soon as we can to the purely representative system, and pave 135 the way for the introduction of that system, not by modification and tinkering that which is adverse to British views of constitutional representation, but by introducing the principle of direct representation, with regard, at all events, to the upper branch of the assembly, under such safeguards as may be thought necessary. The noble Earl is bound, unless there are strong reasons, which I do not see, to the contrary, to defer to the general, I may almost say the unanimously expressed, wish of the colony, and to grant such modification, with such restrictions as he may think fit to impose, to the principle of direct representation, for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise that control not only over their own financial affairs, but over their legislation generally, which is conceded to every class of British colonists as soon as the condition of the colony is such as to enable them with advantage to themselves to take upon themselves the management of their own affairs. I commend the petition to your Lordships' notice, and the attention of the noble Earl opposite. I do not pretend to dictate, or even to suggest, what precise course should be taken; but I earnestly hope that his attention and that of Her Majesty's Government will be directed to getting rid of the well-founded ground of objection arising out of an obsolete system, and the substitution for the old Dutch system of something like that British freedom which our Colonies ought to possess.
§ EARL GREYI entirely concur with the noble Lord that it is most desirable that British colonists, as fast as they are fitted for it, should enter into the enjoyment of the representative system, founded, as far as it is practicable, upon the model of that existing in this country. But much of what the House has heard from the noble Lord, goes upon the assumption that the demand for direct representation is general in British Guiana. But, in the first place, I cannot admit that this petition expresses the general feeling of the people of the colony—so much the contrary, that on looking over the signatures I believe the noble Lord will find the absence of a very large proportion of names of the greatest weight and authority in the colony. I have here a despatch which has recently been printed, in which the Governor, speaking of a memorial delivered to the Court of Policy, and containing nearly the same signatures as the present petition, says that it fails to convince him of the all but 136 unanimous concurrence of the inhabitants in its object; that although the names of some highly influential persons may be recognised, the names of the great majority of the resident proprietors are certainly absent, and their places are all supplied by the names of their clerks and overseers, and that the great bulk of the respectable resident population is opposed to the plans of those who have put 1,400 marks in lieu of signatures to this petition, and who for the most part are members of the London Missionary Congregations. Now, if you have a representative government, it should be a representation resting on a really wide basis. But so far are they from being agreed upon that point, that although they have been repeatedly asked to do so, they have never been able to agree among themselves what franchise they would have; and it is perfectly notorious to all persons who have a knowledge of parties in British Guiana, that the petition emanates from a coalition between two most opposite parties —one party who want to have the extreme of democratic institutions, another party who wish to re-establish that which formerly prevailed—the complete power of a small oligarchy, consisting of a small number of persons holding in their hands greater power than the Governor. The noble Lord adverted to the changes made in the year 1849; now I can state to the House that antecedently to those changes, six or seven persons could return any one they thought proper to the Court of Policy—in that year, however, the franchise was enlarged. I must confess that when I look at what British Guiana is, I very greatly doubt the expediency of proceeding at once to offer a constitution which will really throw the power into the hands of the great body of the population. I must first consider what that population is. There are, I believe, under 1,000 persons of European descent in a population of somewhere about 130,000. That 130,000 individuals were in great part formerly slaves; Coolies from the East Indies, and Portuguese from Madeira. The population of Guiana is one made up of these various and conflicting elements, consisting mainly of persons—as it appears by the very petition which the noble Lord has presented—so ignorant that they must affix their marks instead of their signatures to the petition. Nor is this all. In Guiana, owing to the high rate of wages and the low value of land, persons of little education are able very rapidly to acquire property; and, as 137 the noble Lord has remarked, out of those who are described as freeholders in the petition, a very large proportion have added their marks, and not their signatures. Therefore, if you adopt any pecuniary qualification whatever—even one which in this country might be considered a high one—practically a large amount of power would be thrown into the hands of people who are perfectly ignorant. On the other hand, if it were sought to throw the whole power into the hands of the planting interest, that would be still more objectionable. Nothing could be more injurious to the real welfare of the people of that colony than that you should create an oligarchical power of that kind. Hence, it appears to me that the really judicious course is gradually to improve upon those institutions which we find existing in that country, and, building upon that existing foundation, gradually, and as the people become prepared for it, to increase the amount of popular authority. This has already been done to a certain extent. But the noble Lord has expressed a doubt as to whether the alteration in the franchise effected in the year 1849 was a wise one. In my opinion, the facts are quite decisive upon that point. The franchise at that time was, as I thought wrongly, confined to an extremely few hands. The absentees were able to act, through their attorneys, to a very preponderating extent; and although I have no objection that property should have its fair influence in the representation of a country, at that time the fact was, that practically a very few people were able to return the Court of Policy. By the alteration which was adopted, a franchise was given by which already there are between 900 and 1,000 electors, and that number is likely rapidly to increase; because there is no doubt that, under the law as it stands at present, a large additional number of electors might he qualified if the parties chose to claim. The Financial Representatives are chosen by direct election; the voters have the power of preventing the imposition of any new taxes, and of regulating all the financial affairs of the colony. In all financial matters the colony does already possesss, to a great extent, the power of self-government. My Lords, I have said that this petition does not represent the opinions of the great majority of the persons in the colony, and still less does it represent that of persons in this country who are deeply interested in the welfare of that colony, and who possess a 138 large proportion of the property there. I hold in my hand a Resolution which I received only a short time before I came here to night, and which was transmitted by the chairman of a meeting of proprietors very largely interested in British Guiana. The opinion they entertain is this—that, under the existing institutions of that colony, the taxpayers possess an effectual control over both the imposition and the expenditure of the taxes; and then they go to point out several reforms and alterations in the existing institutions, which they consider desirable, and which would, in their opinion, be greatly preferable to any sweeping change of the constitution as it now exists. To the alterations which these gentlemen propose, I see no objection whatever. On the contrary, I believe they are sound in principle, calculated to improve the existing institutions of the colony, and gradually to prepare it for the enjoyment of still greater freedom. Accordingly it will be my duty to send out these Resolutions to the Governor, and strongly to recommend to him that a measure founded upon them should be passed by the Court of Policy. I believe that those Resolutions have been adopted by every considerable merchant connected with Guiana, resident in England, Scotland, and Ireland. I cannot help, therefore, thinking that these very intelligent and respectable gentlemen most deeply interested in the welfare of the colony, are quite fit to be trusted with a matter of this kind; and the opinion thus expressed by them is one which ought not to be lightly rejected in favour of that petition which is signed by a small portion of the inhabitants of that colony, and in which, to a large extent, the signatures are not signatures but marks. Then the noble Lord went on to say that, under the existing constitution of the colony, the burden of taxation is very heavy, and that the financial affairs have been very ill-managed. Now, since the last five years, all the changes that have been made have been for the relief of the colony. A large reduction of expenditure has taken place, and a considerable reduction of taxation has taken place also. But the noble Lord said that since that time the Act of 1846 had been passed, an Act which so much affected the property of the colony as to make the necessity of a further reduction of taxation more urgent. Now, I believe, if the noble Lord will look at the actual state of that colony, he will find that it is certainly not less promising in regard to 139 cultivation than it was when the Act of 1846 passed. I will venture to say—and I challenge inquiry into the subject—that the noble Lord will not find, comparing the actual price at which sugar is produced in Guiana, and the price which it realises, that any change for the worse has taken place: in fact, the Governor, in recently opening the Session, congratulated the Court of Policy upon the dawning of better prospects for the future; and I believe he made the statements which he did without being contradicted. Much has been done to reduce the cost of cultivation in the colony, and the fall of wages is equal to the fall of the price of food. I ventured to state upon a previous occasion, that here the effect of protection was to keep up wages. In the case of Guiana, with a limited population, and with an immense demand for labour, there was at that time little inducement to labour; the people would not do more work than was necessary to maintain themselves. Now, the effect of the high prices of sugar inducing the planters to bid against each other was to raise wages, and at the same time to diminish the amount of labour performed. This is what I stated at the time would be the case, and what has been proved by experience. The rate of wages has now fallen to this extent, that the population do more work now for the same wages than they did formerly; and this, in the state of society at Guiana, is an unmixed good, not only to the planters but to the people themselves; because it is most desirable that an adequate motive should be found to labour, and that no desire should exist to encourage the system of idleness which previously prevailed in the colony. The noble Lord stated that the effect of the measure of 1846 has been so to injure the colony as to make a great reduction of taxation necessary. Now, if we look at the facts before us, I find no proof of this. What is the actual state of affairs? At this moment the Governor has been able to propose in the colony a reduction of taxation to the extent of no less than between 150,000 and 200,000 dollars. And how has ho been able to do that? Why, mainly by the increased productiveness of existing taxes. Surely that is no proof of general distress in the colony. It seems to me to be a decided proof of the reverse. I am also happy to say that a great part of this reduction is to be a reduction of the duties upon imported provisions—because I concur with 140 the noble Lord with respect to that colony —and I only wish he concurred with me in the same principle as regards England —that no more suicidal policy could be adopted in Guiana than laying heavy taxes upon the importation of the necessaries of life. But even the existence of self-government could not prevent this, for we do not find that in the West India Islands, for example, any wiser policy has been adopted than that of the Legislature of Guiana. I think, however, that the Combined Court, in its present sittings, will make large reductions in these objectionable duties upon imported provisions, and that will ho followed in future years by their entire removal. I think that is most desirable, because I firmly believe that the effect of those duties upon provisions in the West Indies is most injurious both to the planter and the labourer. It is at all times injurious to the labourer that labour should be artificially restricted; and it is specially injurious to the planters, because in Guiana, by laying a tax upon imported provisions you are virtually giving an encouragement to the negroes rather to keep themselves in their own provision grounds raising provisions, than earning wages from the planter in the sugar mill. It makes the provisions dear; that is, in fact, it makes what the people can purchase with the wages they earn, less than would otherwise be the case; and I therefore think the Government has taken a most judicious course in proposing to reduce the duty upon imported provisions. In fact, the whole of the reductions which the Governor has proposed will really fall, in a great measure, upon those articles. I say, then, that in my opinion, it would be most desirable, if the population was prepared for it, that we should establish more completely representative institutions in Guiana. But as matters now stand, I concur with the gentlemen whose opinions I have now quoted, and who were, I believe, holders of a large proportion of the property in Guiana, that it is far wiser to endeavour cautiously to improve the existing institutions of that colony, than at once to sweep them away, and substitute a scheme altogether new and untried.
LORD STANLEYwould have been inclined to attach much more importance to the statements of the gentlemen cited by Earl Grey if they had not asserted that the colonists were not, in their view, fitted for representative institutions; whilst the noble Earl said, that they had already a 141 highly-intelligent and numerous constituency in Guiana—a constituency of about 1,000 persons—a constituency which would be much larger than it was if persons would come forward and claim the privilege; and that that constituency had now the power of dealing with all financial questions. The noble Earl said, that there was an extended constituency which might he made more extensive still; and that this constituency did in fact at present exercise control over the legislation of the colony. But, if that were so, the authority of the practical men to whom the noble Earl referred was at once destroyed; for the noble Earl did not state that the constituency were unfit, but that they did exercise control. Then why not let them exercise that control by direct representation rather than by a system of which the colonists complained as being so repugnant to them.
§ EARL GREYsaid, that there was a material difference between throwing practically the whole power into the hands of the population of that colony by such an assembly as was asked for, and giving a well-regulated power over the imposition of taxes, which was already possessed by the constituencies, who elected the financial representatives.
§ Petition to lie on the table.