HL Deb 15 July 1845 vol 82 cc496-525
The Earl of Clarendon

In calling the attention of your Lordships to the correspondence which has recently been laid upon the Table, and in asking your Lordships to agree to the Resolution which I shall have the honour to propose, I trust I need not assure the House that I am actuated by no party motive. Indeed, I am sure that my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, will do me the justice to believe that no consideration whatever could induce me to treat of our relations with other countries in the spirit of a partisan; for, with respect to foreign affairs, I hold that our own domestic differences should always be laid aside, because we have all, be our political opinions what they may, a common interest in exhibiting ourselves to the world united, and in an attitude to command respect; and we are all equally concerned in advancing the interests, and, above everything, in upholding the dignity, and maintaining unsullied the honour and good faith of our country. Differences of opinion will of course arise as to the means by which these great national objects may be most effectually secured; but they should always be approached with the caution befitting their importance, and be discussed, not in the spirit of party, but in the spirit of men having a common purpose and a common interest in view. Such being my opinion, and feeling confidence, as I do, in the just and honourable character of my noble Friend, your Lordships will readily believe that a painful sense of duty alone could have induced me to call your attention to the correspondence which has lately taken place between my noble Friend and the Spanish Minister; involving, as I think it does, a question of national faith, and requiring, as I am sure it does, some further explanation, not alone for our own satisfaction, but in order to prove to the world that your Lordships, as well as Her Majesty's Government, are scrupulously mindful of the international duties of the country, and that no interested motives nor apprehended sacrifices could, for one moment, make us hesitate to recognise the solemn obligations of a Treaty; for I need not remind your Lordships, that by a Treaty the honour of a country is deliberately pledged, and that, as the engagements of a Treaty impose on the one hand a perfect obligation, so they produce on the other a perfect right. The breach of a Treaty is, therefore, a violation of the perfect right of the party with whom we have contracted, and is as evidently an act of injustice as to rob a man of his property. Treaties are the only means by which we can provide for international objects, and secure protection for the subjects, and advantages for the commerce of our country; and considering our extended relations in every part of the world, it is evident that no country is equally interested with our own—setting aside the duty which honour imposes—in maintaining inviolate the obligations of a Treaty. It may suit other Governments, whose ways are not always those of justice and integrity—and I could name instances—to evade such obligations when they find them onerous, and to defend themselves by sophistry and casuistical arguments, by which they deceive nobody, and least of all themselves; but such a course is not suited to us—our national character is placed on too high an eminence—our honour is too unsullied—our good faith in all our dealings is too universally acknowledged for us to tolerate the suspicion even, that either because we are dealing with a Power from whom we have nothing to fear, or because the consequences may be injurious to ourselves, we are about to evade the performance of a promise which, with reference either to its letter or its spirit, we are in duty bound to fulfil. I will not affirm that such has been our conduct; but I do say that the answer of my noble Friend is, to my mind, neither satisfactory nor conclusive to a claim which, as I read the Treaties, appears to me perfectly unquestionable. The Duke of Sotomayor, the Spanish Minister, in a decorous and well-argued note, claims, under the existing Treaties between the two countries, that the sugars of Cuba and Puerto Rico should be admitted to the same advantages as the sugars of the United States and Venezuela. The Duke of Sotomayor says— These Treaties have not only always been faithfully observed on the part of Spain, but the most favourable construction has always been put upon English claims, reliance being had on just reciprocity, as the necessary condition of the validity and consistency of those claims. And here I must bear testimony to the perfect correctness of this assertion; for I myself, when at Madrid, had occasion to plead these Treaties in defence of some important British rights, and my claim was unhesitatingly admitted by the Spanish Government. Indeed, as I well considered the Sugar Bill of this year in its relation with foreign countries, and look some part in the debate upon it here, I feel almost ashamed of myself for having neglected to remind your Lordships of these Treaties; but I must say, I think it very little creditable to those by whom a Bill, involving such new and, as I consider, such dangerous principles, was prepared, that they should have been altogether ignorant, as they manifestly were, of the existence even of the numerous Treaties which bore directly upon the subject which it was their duty to investigate. In the early portions of my noble Friend's reply to the Duke of Sotomayor, I entirely agree. I think he is quite justified in saying that the course which her Majesty's Government have adopted in respect of the United States and Venezuela, proves that they have no wish to escape from the obligations of a Treaty, and claim no right to limit the operations of a commercial engagement. I think my noble Friend is quite right in passing over the Duke of Sotomayor's declaration, that his Government is determined to suppress the Slave Trade, not only as irrelevant to the question, but because, notwithstanding the Treaty that has recently been concluded, the Spanish Government cannot be considered to have any sincere desire to suppress the Slave Trade so long as they retain General O'Donnell as Captain General of Cuba. I possess authentic information, with which of course I shall not now trouble your Lordships, proving how largely General O'Donnell not only promotes, but actually participates in the Slave Trade, contrary to the wishes and the interests of the great majority of plantersin that island, but with the full knowledge of the Spanish Government; which is, therefore, indirectly abetting, and not sincerely endeavouring to suppress the Slave Trade. I think also that my noble Friend was quite right in not entertaining the Duke of Sotomayor's argument in support of his claim, founded upon the admission of the produce of the Philippine Islands; for that concession was manifestly made in furtherance of the principle (if principle it can be called) of our Sugar Bill, and, as my noble Friend says, most justly, had no reference whatever to the Treaties in force with Spain; for it is quite clear that Her Majesty's Government never gave them a thought, and were to all appearance ignorant of their existence. From all the rest of my noble Friend's note, I am compelled entirely to dissent; and I regret that his rejection of the Spanish claim should be based upon arguments so untenable, and that his name should be appended to a document which will reflect such discredit upon the country. Now I beg your Lordships' attention to Articles of the Treaties. [Lord Clarendon then read the 38th Article of the Treaty of 1667; the 9th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, signed 13th of July, 1713; and the subsequent Treaty of Utrecht, signed December 9, 1713, by which it is stipulated that— The subjects of the respective Powers shall enjoy at least the same privileges, liberties, and immunities as to all duties, impositions, or customs whatsoever, relating to persons, goods, and merchandises, &c., and shall have the like favour in all things as the subjects of France, or any other foreign nation the most favoured, have, possess, and enjoy, or at any time hereafter may have, possess, or enjoy; and they shall not be bound to pay greater duties, or other imposts whatsoever for their imports or exports, than shall be exacted of, or paid by the subjects of the most favoured nation," &c.] I defy any form of words to be more explicit than this; and yet my noble Friend says in his Note, he is satisfied that they are of no effect whatever in establishing a right on the part of Spain to that which she now claims, because by an Article in a Treaty of 1670, it appears that the West India Colonies of both countries are excepted from these general privileges, and the subjects of the two Powers are respectively forbidden to trade with those Colonies. It is perfectly true, that owing to there having been no new Treaty made between England and Spain since 1796, or rather since 1667, except Treaties ratifying and confirming prior stipulations, the words of the Treaty of 1670 remain unchanged; but it is equally true, that by the altered circumstances of the world, and of the relations between the two countries, they have, as I hope to prove to your Lordships, become entirely obsolete. The non-intercourse with the Spanish and British West Indies, and the granting of licenses to trade there by the respective Kings, are as much fallen into desuetude as the prohibition to the subjects, captains, and mariners of each confederate to sell and trade in the ports and havens which have castles, fortifications, and magazines; and the best proof of that is, that the respective subjects and mariners do sail, and have long sailed into ports having magazines and fortifications, and do trade freely, and have long since traded freely, and without any question of license, in the dominions of the respective Powers in the West Indies. To take our stand, therefore, upon the dead letter of a Treaty, which is so manifestly at variance with its spirit, and is so completely falsified by the everyday practice of many years, is, I must contend, a quibble in its worst form, and an evasion of an obligation so palpable, that I think it would not be listened to in any court of equity; and I am sure it would be utterly scouted by men of honour in their individual transactions with each other. It seems to me that in framing this part of his note, my noble Friend must have totally lost sight of the actual as well as the ancient relations of England with Cuba and Porto Rico. He appears to have forgotten that the prohibition which he refers to has never been at any time strictly maintained; for in this, as in all other instances, the wants and the interests of men have proved more powerful than the laws made to restrain them; and accordingly it will be found on reference to a work of great authority—that of Bryan Edwards—that in the early part of last century, so large a trade was carried on between Jamaica and the Spanish Colonies, that it employed 4,000 tons of British shipping, and furnished a market for 1,500,000l. worth of British goods; and that this commerce has always since been carried on with more or less interruption on the part of the respective Governments. My noble Friend appears not to be aware, that in 1767 the Spanish Government, becoming alarmed at our reaping the exclusive benefit of this trade, permitted English goods to be sent to the West Indian possessions on payment of very moderate duties; that in 1766 the chief ports of Jamaica and Dominica were opened by Act of Parliament to all foreign vessels of a certain description; and that some years later the House of Commons passed a Resolution that the continuance of free ports in Jamaica would be highly beneficial to the trade and manufactures of the kingdom. Sugar and coffee, the produce of foreign Colonies, were then permitted to be imported in British vessels, and to be warehoused in this country, and re-exported free of duty; but if intended for home consumption, they were to pay the duties legally due at the time on the importation of such goods. Sugar and coffee, the produce of foreign plantations, were permitted to be imported in foreign vessels into the Bahama and Bermuda Islands under the Acts 27 and 30 George III.; and such goods, if carried from those islands to any other part of the British dominions, were to pay the duties which at the time were payable on foreign sugar and coffee. Your Lordships will, therefore, see that the intercourse between the Spanish and British West Indies has been clearly legalized by Acts of Parliament, even when our own navigation laws were de jure in full force. But I must also beg the House to bear in mind what are our actual relations with the Spanish West Indies:—That we have Consuls at different places in Cuba and Porto Rico, who have been long established there—that our exports to Cuba exceed 3,000,000 of dollars — that we import from thence to the amount of more than 9,000,000 of dollars, which is nearly double the exports of that island to the United States—that between 400 and 500 British ships trade annually with Cuba—that our commerce with Porto Rico is, in proportion, quite as great as that with Cuba, and that the shipping engaged in it, which, five years ago, amounted to nearly 1,100 tons, is annually increasing—and, lastly, that for upwards of twenty years since the alteration of our navigation laws, it has been legal, not only for an Englishman in English ships, but for a Spaniard in Spanish ships, to import into this country the produce of Cuba and Porto Rico. My noble Friend appears to have forgotten also that we do not hesitate to take annually a vast quantity of the copper of Cuba. Here we levy no differential duties: in this case, the old restriction to trade with Cuba is not thought of, because we want the copper—which is produced in a manner ten times more destructive to the life of the slave than the article, in order to prohibit which, we revive this restriction, and declare that the sugar of Cuba is inadmissible. But inadmissible how? Not for the purposes of exchange, for we take any quantity of it in exchange for our commodities—not for the purposes of manufacturing, for our warehouses are full of it, and our refineries depend upon it — not for the purpose of trade, for we buy the products of Germany and Russia with it; but it is solely inadmissible for the purpose of home consumption; and a dead letter of a restriction is dug up and brought to life, for nothing but the purpose of preventing Her Majesty's subjects from eating this polluted sugar. Yet with all these facts staring us in the face—facts which prove that the letter of the Article quoted by my noble Friend has fallen into complete desuetude, and that, consequently, we should alone be governed by the spirit of the Treaty of 1670, by which all the merchandise of Spanish subjects is placed upon the footing of the most favoured nation; I say, that with all these facts before us, to refer to a Treaty 170 years old, and to argue that under its provisions there is a sort of mare clausum round these islands, which renders them inaccessible to our traders, not as to their general products, but with respect to one commodity only, and one particular use of that commodity—does really exhibit an intrepidity in special pleading, which, as I said before, would be unavailing in any court of equity or honour, and which, I fear, would not have been resorted to in dealing with any Power from whose resentment we had any thing to apprehend; whereas the very weakness of Spain should have been an additional argument in favour of a generous and liberal interpretation of our engagements with her. My noble Friend lays great stress upon the Fourth Article of the Treaty of 1814, by which it is provided that— In the event of the commerce of the Spanish American possessions being opened to foreign nations, His Catholic Majesty promises that Great Britain shall be admitted to trade with those possessions as the most favoured nation. And he argues, first, that it is evident from these words that the Spanish West Indian Colonies were not then open to Great Britain, or to foreign nations, and, consequently, that the general privileges conferred by the ancient Treaties could not apply in reference to the trade of those possessions; and, secondly, that at the negotiation of the Treaty of 1814, the ancient Treaties were not considered by Spain herself to confer the privileges for which she now contends. All this, however, proves nothing beyond the fact, that on both sides certain restrictions had been agreed upon mutually between the two countries, in regard to the trade with their respective Colonies; which restrictions, being applied equally to all nations, had nothing in them the least inconsistent with either the letter or the spirit of the Treaties. There was nothing in them to prevent Spain excluding English ships and commerce altogether from her Colonies; nor any thing to prevent the full exercise of our old navigation laws with respect to Spain, so long as they applied to all foreign countries alike. But the provisions of those Treaties did render it obligatory upon us, if we altered our laws in favour of any other nation, to do so equally towards Spain; and Spain was equally bound to remove her Colonial restrictions in our favour: if she did so for any other country and in 1814, the American Colonies being then in rebellion, and a prospect existing (though the prospect at that time in the eyes of Spain barely amounted to a possibility) of the trade between the other countries being opened, Spain, in perfect good faith, and in order to carry out the spirit of former Treaties, engaged that England should be admitted to trade with those possessions as the most favoured nation. And yet my hon. Friend now turns this concession, as it was then, against the Spanish Government, and says that, if the ancient Treaties revived by that of 1814, had given to the two nations a mutual and general right to the treatment of the most favoured nation, it would have been unnecessary for Spain to promise, that in the event of the American trade being open to foreign countries, Great Britain should be admitted to trade as the most favoured nation. Now, I do not think there can be a doubt in the mind of any rational man, that the provisions of the former Treaties would have amply sufficed to secure to us all the privileges of the most favoured nation in the West Indian Colonies, if the trade with them had been thrown open; but because, on account of the former restriction, we made security more secure, and probably insisted upon this Article in 1814, at a moment when, after the important services we had rendered to Spain, there was no difficulty in obtaining it, it does appear to me most unjust to draw from it the conclusion that Spain would have withheld from Great Britain the privileges she granted to other nations in respect to her American Colonies, which everybody capable of understanding those Treaties must know we should have considered a direct infraction of them, and should not for one single hour have tolerated. But my noble Friend is determined that whatever may have been the course pursued by Spain, whether she concedes her rights, or is forcibly deprived of them, no interpretation favourable to her shall be admitted. The Duke of Sotomayor contends that Spain has a right to be treated by Great Britain as a most favoured nation in regard to Colonial commerce, because Spain, in 1824, conceded to Great Britain, by Royal Decree, the liberty of trading with her South American Colonies; and he speaks of this Decree as the execution of the engagement taken by Spain in the Treaty of 1814. To this my noble Friend objects, and I agree with him, that the Decree makes no allusion to the Treaty. But it would have been improper, indeed, impossible to do so, because the Decree did not confer upon England alone, but upon all nations in alliance with Spain the privilege to trade with her Colonies; it did, however, concede to us every thing we could expect, or had a right to claim under the Treaty; and although my noble Friend speaks slightingly of the Decree, and treats it (as to a certain extent he is justified in doing) as an ex post facto measure, adopted only after the South American Provinces had passed from the authority of Spain, yet he must remember that it applies equally to Cuba and Puerto Rico, which were in a very different position from the South American Provinces. Cuba and Puerto Rico had not passed from the authority of Spain: they were not even in revolt; and the King of Spain might have withheld from Great Britain and all other nations the liberty of trading with those possessions. But he did grant it; and it is the trade with Cuba and Puerto Rico that is now in question, and not that with the South American Colonies; and with regard to those possessions of Spain, therefore, I contend that the Decree does warrant the construction put upon it by the Duke of Sotomayor. But my noble Friend won't hear of that either — and why? Because we had already helped ourselves to what we had agreed should be conceded to us; or, in other words, as my noble Friend more diplomatically expresses it, the British Parliament, in 1822, had passed a law to regulate the trade between Spanish America and the British Colonies; and early in 1824, it was intimated that the recognition of the South American Provinces could not much longer be delayed. I say nothing of the political motives which brought about this recognition, or the new world that was called into existence to redress the balance of the old, and in punishment of the French invasion of Spain; but I do insist upon the fact that we had, long before this period, given a complete go-by to the restriction upon our trade with the Colonies of Spain—that we had embarked a large amount of capital there, and had considered the Treaty of 1670 to be obsolete. And I must beg the particular attention of the House to an extract from a Paper which was laid before Parliament, by command of Her Majesty, in March, 1824. It is the memorandum of a conference between Mr. Canning and the Prince de Polignac, respecting the South American Provinces; and after speaking of the appointment of Consuls in South America, Mr. Canning proceeds to state— That such appointments were absolutely necessary for the protection of British trade in those countries. That the old pretension of Spain to interdict all trade with those countries, was, in the opinion of the British Government, altogether obsolete; but that, even if attempted to be enforced against others, it was, with regard to Great Britain, clearly inapplicable. That permission to trade with the Spanish Colonies had been conceded to Great Britain in the year 1810, when the mediation of Great Britain between Spain and her Colonies was asked by Spain, and granted by Great Britain; that this mediation, indeed, was not afterwards employed, because Spain changed her counsel; but that it was not, therefore, practicable for Great Britain to withdraw commercial capital once embarked in Spanish America, and to desist from commercial intercourse once established. That it had been ever since distinctly understood that the trade was open to British subjects; and that the ancient coast laws of Spain were, so far as regarded them at least, tacitly repealed. That, in virtue of this understanding, redress had been demanded of Spain in 1822, for (among other grievances) seizures of vessels for alleged infringements of those laws; which redress the Spanish Government bound itsel by a Convention (now in course of execution) to afford. Yet, notwithstanding all this—notwithstanding that we first procured the abolition of the restriction in 1810 as the price of our mediation, which mediation we did not carry into effect, though we did not, in consequence, absolve Spain from the conditions upon which we undertook it—notwithstanding that we have taken for ourselves everything we wanted, regulated our own trade, and appointed our own Consuls—that we demanded, and obtained, compensation for the restrictive coast-laws of Spain having been applied for—notwithstanding that the King of Spain confirmed what we had done, as far as circumstances would permit him—for, in the words of his Decree, he confirmed "the state of things which had existed since 1820, and some time before;"—nevertheless, my noble Friend declares that he cannot now, twenty years after all this has taken place, and has been definitively settled, perceive that any obligation whatever, of a reciprocal character, is imposed on the Crown of Great Britain with regard to the trade between either country and the Colonies of the other; and he still claims the benefit of an obsolete restriction imposed 170 years ago. Is this generous? Is it just? Is it wise? Is it the fitting policy for a great and powerful country towards one that is feeble and defenceless? Is it the course which becomes a country that has hitherto justly prided itself upon its unblemished honour, and scrupulous observance of its obligations? Is it a prudent course for a country which is always proclaiming its liberality, and recommending its own example? I feel sure it is not; and upon questions such as these, I do with confidence appeal to the justice and generosity of your Lordships. But my noble Friend next proceeds to strengthen his case by reference to the Order in Council of 1828, which, he says, furnishes another proof, not only that Great Britain held that Spain had no right to be treated as a most-favoured nation in respect of Colonial trade, but that the Government of Her Catholic Majesty acquiesced in that view of the commercial relations of the two countries; and my noble Friend adds, that if Spain had considered that any of her existing Treaties conferred upon her the privileges of the most favoured nation with respect to Colonial trade, she would not have remained satisfied with the limited privileges granted by that Order, but would undoubtedly have demanded that the full privileges granted to other nations should also be accorded to her. But, so far from proving that Spain had no right to favour with respect to Colonial trade, I contend it proves the direct contrary; for upon what other ground than that of Spain's right to claim the privileges granted to foreign ships, were they granted to her, and not only granted, but without Spain having fulfilled the conditions required by the Acts of Parliament, and to which other nations had submitted? I suppose it will not be contended that we went about offering these important privileges to different Governments—a portion to some, and a portion to others—some Governments complying with the Acts of Parliament, others refusing. Of course we did no such thing; but, having granted them to some countries for our own accommodation, we could not refuse them to others who, as in the case of Spain, had a right to claim them. But my noble Friend says, that if Spain had considered that any of her existing Treaties conferred upon her the privileges of the most favoured nation, she would not have remained satisfied with the limited privileges granted by the Order in Council (not that I believe these privileges were limited in any respect), but would undoubtedly have demanded that the full privileges which had been accorded to other nations should be extended to her. Why, I have not the least doubt that the Spanish Government had entirely forgotten, or were wholly ignorant of, the old Treaties, distracted as they were by internal dissensions and the difficulties of administering the country after the French army of occupation had been withdrawn: and this is no improbable assumption, seeing that Her Majesty's Government, who have no such cares on their hands—though they are not altogether free from care—have just shown themselves equally forgetful and ignorant of those Treaties. But is this a reason why we should persist in doing wrong to Spain, and in turning to our own advantage her neglect of her interests? Does this bear out my noble Friend in his present objection, that Spain did not require enough? Before, his complaint was that she demanded too much; and I can only compare his course to that adopted by the big boy in the division of the cake among his little schoolfellows — he who asks, shan't have—he who doesn't ask, don't want; and when my noble Friend asserts that Spain quietly acquiesced in the limitation, it is just what the big boy would say when called to account for his injustice and selfishness—"Why, the little boys all held their tongues; they acquiesced in the principle I laid down, and thereby furnished strong proof that they were conscious they had no right to be placed on the footing of the most favoured boys—that is to say, the big boys, of whom I am afraid—with regard to the cake." But, seriously, are we prepared, upon reasoning such as this, to sully the national honour, and to deprive another country of its just rights? We must have done one of two things: we either, gratuitously and unasked, proffered these Colonial privileges to Spain, or we yielded them, on her demand, as a just right; and in either case, we committed a gross act of injustice, and violated the spirit of our Treaties, in not placing her on the same footing, in every respect, as the most favoured nation; and yet it is upon this very act of injustice, and the ignorance of Spain concerning her rights, or her impotence to enforce them, which we call her acquiescence, that we now found our claim to repeal the Act, and in a precisely way to slip out of our obligations. I now come to a passage in my noble Friend's note, which, desirous as I am to avoid the use of harsh expressions, I hardly know how to designate; but this I must say, that there is no part of the correspondence which I have read with the same regret, or with the same sense of humiliation; for my noble Friend's note will go forth to the world as a manifesto of English faith and English principle; and in every part of the world there can be but one opinion with respect to it. At the same time, however, I felt convinced that my noble Friend must know how weak a cause he was defending, when he stooped to argue it upon the ground that the Treaty of 1713, although it gives to Spanish subjects the rights of most favoured nations, does not extend to their produce. I cannot call this even casuistry or special pleading—I will not call it misrepresentation, because my noble Friend is perfectly incapable of it; but I must consider it a complete misconstruction of the Treaty. My noble Friend says that we are to treat as the subjects of the most favoured nation the subjects of Spain, but that there is no obligation to treat the produce of Spain as Great Britain is used to treat the produce of the most favoured nation; and we find this assertion contained in the same document in which is quoted the Ninth Act of the Treaty of Utrecht, which declares that Spanish subjects shall have the same privileges and immunities as to all duties and customs relating to goods and merchandises, and shall not pay greater duties for their imports or exports in the territory of Great Britain, than shall be exacted of or paid by the subjects of the most favoured nation! But, surely, my noble Friend must perceive that if his argument be good for anything, it is of general application—it is conclusive against Spain, and the produce of Spain, as well as of her Colonies, under every circumstance that we may choose to give this interpretation to the Treaties; for in them there is no limitation to Spanish European produce, and my noble Friend's argument is just as valid against the wines of Spain, as against the sugars of Cuba. This is, however, the first time that such a distinction between persons and produce was ever heard of; and our own practice towards Spain, and that of Spain towards us, would, I should have thought, been sufficient to prevent my noble Friend from establishing a precedent so mischievous and so discreditable. Why, in 1703, when under the Methuen Treaty, we reduced the duties on Portuguese wines, for the purpose of encouraging to the utmost our trade with Portugal, we did not hesitate to place the Spanish wines on the same footing; and not only the Spanish, but the Sicilian wines, as the King of Spain was also at that time King of the Two Sicilics; and to charge those of France, Germany, and all other places at a much higher rate, while English produce of all kinds enjoyed similar privileges in Spain. But now, according to my noble Friend's doctrine, we might reduce the duties on French and German, and all other wines, and refuse to do so on Spanish, but yet plead that we honourably fulfilled the Treaties by permitting Spaniards to bring wine from Bourdeaux or the Rhine to England at the reduced tariff, as their persons are to be protected from paying higher duties than the persons of other nations. And if Spain were now to follow the example we have set her, to adopt the arguments we are using, and henceforward to reduce the duties upon the salt fish of Sweden, the hardwares and cloths of Germany, the silks and cottons of France and Switzerland, as she will be perfectly justified in doing—and so far from blaming her (except as regards her own interests), I shall consider that she only acts with becoming spirit in thus applying our own principle to ourselves, and with perfect fairness reciprocating our policy;—I should like to know whether my noble Friend is prepared to tell British merchants, when they came to remonstrate against the Tariff of Spain, levelled as it would be against the productions of this country, that they had no locus standi, nor cause for complaint, as the subjects of Great Britain were in the full enjoyment of every advantage secured to them by the Treaty of Utrecht? I warn the people of Newfoundland, of Birmingham, of Sheffield and Manchester, to look to this; for they may rely upon it, the question is quite as much one of national interest as it is of national honour; and that the mere adoption of a modern form of words, such as those used in the Treaties with the United States and Venezuela, and referred to by my noble Friend, with respect to goods being the growth, produce, and manufacture of the respective countries, instead of the phraseology in use 150 years ago, but which has precisely the same meaning and intention, will not be sufficient to save us from the charge of deliberately violating our engagements, nor, on the other hand, of protecting us from the measures of retaliation which we shall deservedly bring upon ourselves. And having adverted to the United States, I would take leave to ask my noble Friend upon what principle he proceeded technically to apply to them the provisions of our Treaty, with reference to the Sugar Bill. The United States have only a right to be treated as the most favoured nation; and when they demanded that the sugar of Louisiana should be admitted on the same terms as those of Java, Manilla, and China, my noble Friend ought, if he adheres so rigidly to the letter and the technical meaning of Treaties, to have replied that we admitted the free-labour sugar of those countries, and were prepared to do the same for the United States, if they had any such commodity to send us. But my noble Friend at once acquiesced in the demand of the American Government, and we received the slave-grown sugar of Louisiana at the low duty. Now, may we not draw from this an inference that fear rather than justice guides our policy towards other nations, and that if the United States had been in the same powerless condition as Spain, we should not have received the slave-grown sugar of Louisiana; and that if we had been bound to Spain by vast commercial transactions, and by a territory only separated from our own by a nominal frontier, the Duke of Sotomayor might have found the Treaty of 1670 rather less stubborn and unbending than it has proved to him? It was reserved, in short, for my noble Friend to prove, that, abroad as well as at home, we have one law for the rich and the powerful, and another for the poor and defenceless. My noble Friend must, however, bear in mind, when he draws such nice distinctions between persons and produce—distinctions that may be suited to the theological subtleties of the new Oxford school, but which should find no place in the arrangement of affairs of State—what are the words of the Treaty of 1670 upon which he lays so much stress. He must remember that they have relation only to the trade of the Colonies of the respective countries, but that they have no relation to the trade into the parent countries, carried on by the subjects of either, even though from the respective Colonies. If the Treaty of 1670 had been made last year, or last week, there is nothing in it to affect the present demand of the Spanish Government. True it is that we might not carry the fish of Newfoundland to Cuba, and that the sugar of Cuba could not be imported into Newfoundland; but there would be nothing to prevent the fish of Newfoundland from being sent to Spain, nor the sugar of Cuba to England, now that our old navigation laws have been altered: and at this moment there is nothing except the prohibitory duties imposed upon the sugars of Spain which prevents their being freely brought to this country, either in English or in Spanish ships. But these duties we have lowered in favour of other nations; and the Treaties provide that Spanish subjects shall be entitled to the same privilege as to all duties on their merchandise, as the subjects of the most favoured nations; and that if it shall happen in time to come, that any diminution of duties shall be granted by either side to any foreign nation, the subjects of each shall reciprocally and fully enjoy the same; and that they shall, in all lands and places, subject to the command of their respective Majesties, enjoy the same privileges as to duties which relate to wares and merchandise, as the most favoured nation uses and enjoys, or may use and enjoy for the future. We have granted the reduction of duties to other nations: the Spanish Government claims the same favour; and, I trust your Lordships will be of opinion, that their right to it is clear and unquestionable. Before I conclude, I must once more beg your Lordships to remember, that the Treaty of 1670, upon which my noble Friend mainly relies, is merely a stipulation between the two Powers, that their West Indian Colonies should be closed against each other, as they were against all other countries; or, in other words, it was a suspension, by mutual agreement, of those general rights to which the Colonies would otherwise, under the Treaties, have been entitled; and it is quite clear that the moment each party annulled the particular agreement, by which the general rights were held in suspension, those rights reverted to them by the Treaties. And as we ourselves chose to annul that particular agreement, not only for ourselves but for Spain—as the Spanish Decree of 1824 recognised our acts—as the Order in Council, of 1828, admitted the rights of Spain to Colonial privileges—and as the whole course of events for the last twenty years has entirely obliterated every trace and vestige of the limitation of 1670; yet the general Treaties subsisting in full force, it is clear that the Colonies are entitled to the general rights which had been restricted by the special agreement, just as if it had never existed. I have now, as briefly as I could, passed in review the arguments upon which the unfortunate determination of my noble Friend is founded: I know not whether I shall have induced your Lordships to take the same view of them as I do myself; but if not, I can only attribute it to my own want of ability, and not to any defect in the case which I have endeavoured to substantiate; for to my mind, it seems impossible to maintain those arguments, whether we read the Treaties in their strictest and most technical sense—whether we take them separately, or all in relation to each other; but of this, I am sure, that to strain those Treaties from their obvious and natural meaning, is unjust in itself and most impolitic on our part, at a moment when we are striving by every means in our power to liberalize the commercial policy of the world—when we are everywhere condemning differential duties, and the warfare of custom-houses—when we are endeavouring to establish relations favourable to ourselves by commercial Treaties with other nations, and to satisfy the daily increasing wants of our people, by finding fresh markets for their produce. God knows that in this we have obstacles and rivalries enough to contend against, without adding to them mistrust of our good faith, and the example of quibbles and special pleading, in order to support a law by which we propose to reform the social system of other countries. I have already trespassed too long upon the time of the House, to permit of my now attempting to show how utterly futile and inoperative for its professed object the Sugar Bill of last year must prove; but in support of which, we are now entangled in this unfortunate controversy with Spain. The results that were predicted of that Bill have already taken place: we have raised the price and increased the exportation of slave-grown sugar, in order to supply the place of the free-labour sugar, which we withdraw from neutral markets, where it meets the slave-grown sugar on equal terms; and it must be of course immaterial to the planters of Cuba and Brazil whether we bring their sugar here for home consumption, or for re exportation to Holland and Germany, in exchange for that description of sugar which, under the Bill of last year, we are now compelled to consume. By that Bill we have set an example of exclusive dealing, which we shall have occasion sorely to repent. In Brazil it has already cost us the loss of one of our best markets, and the withdrawal of all those special rights, political and commercial, which British subjects formerly enjoyed. We must now prepare ourselves for similar results, as regards Spain and her Colonies: that, however, will only affect our interests; but I greatly fear, that the example we are now about to give, of how the obligations of a Treaty may be evaded, will affect us irreparably in that—which is far more precious than all our commercial interests together—the honour and good faith of our country; and it is for the purpose of averting this great evil, as far as lies in the power of your Lordships, that I ask your concurrence in the Resolution which I have now the honour to propose:— That in reference not merely to existing Treaties between Great Britain and Spain, but to the Regulations under which, subsequent to those Treaties, Commercial Intercourse has for many years been carried on between Her Majesty's Subjects and the Spanish Colonies, this House is of Opinion, that the Subjects of the Queen of Spain should continue to be permitted to import into the United Kingdom all the Productions of the Territories or Possessions of the Spanish Crown, paying thereupon no higher Duties of Customs than are paid by the Subjects or Citizens of the most favoured Nations upon the Importation of like Articles, being the Productions of the Territories or Possessions of such Nations.

The Earl of Aberdeen

My Lords, my noble Friend has strongly impressed on the House the duty and the necessity of strictly adhering to the faith of our Treaties; he has shown the greatest anxiety lest the honour and good faith of this country should be tarnished by any deviation from its engagements. My Lords, in that respect I entirely agree with my noble Friend. No person can be more deeply sensible than I am of the great importance of scrupulously adhering to such views; and perhaps, in the situation I have the honour to hold, it may be peculiarly incumbent on me to be alive to the obligations of the principles which he has stated. But, my Lords, I suspect that had it not been for the general policy of the Government, as connected with the Sugar Question of last year, we should not have heard much of this Spanish claim; I think, if the claim had been put forward in any other matter, it would not have met with the same support on the part of my noble Friend. I don't wish, nor is this the time, to enter into a discussion of the wisdom and propriety of the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government on the question of Sugar Duties last year. My noble Friend has already denounced that measure as unjust and impolitic. I believe, on the other hand, it was a just and wise measure, with a view to contribute to the repression of the African Slave Trade; that it was fully justified by such motives; and that its result has not been such as has been represented by my noble Friend. On the contrary, it has succeeded in bringing into this country a large and increasing supply of sugar of free growth; and that there is every prospect of that supply being continually augmented, while the price has been kept down as much as could possibly have been anticipated. My noble Friend, if I understood him, does not deny that the trade with the Spanish Colonies was, until a recent period, under the operation of certain Treaties, practically excluded. A contraband trade, no doubt, more or less, existed; but that the trade was prohibited my noble Friend does not deny. He argues, however, that when the restriction was removed, twenty years ago, under the same Treaties, the right accrued to Spain, as a most favoured nation, to enjoy all those advantages which we have granted to any other nation. Now, when he says these ancient Treaties have been always observed by Spain, and that he has appealed to them, and found that the Spanish Government have listened to his representations, I must say I am astonished to hear such a statement; because, in the experience I have had, I have met with nothing but a rejection of the validity of these very ancient Treaties to which he refers, and a denial on the part of Spain that these Treaties were in force, or susceptible of the construction it is now ready to give them. Such has been the conduct of Spain throughout. In the first place, only let me recall to your Lordships' recollection the Family Compact—the Treaty concluded between France and Spain in 1671. Mark the observance that then took place of the Treaties with this country, which placed the two countries, as you say, on the footing of the most favoured nations. Observe the 24th and 25th Articles of the Family Compact. Here is the 24th Article:— The subjects of the high contracting parties shall be treated with respect to commerce and duties in each of the two kingdoms in Europe as the proper subjects of the country in which they live or resort to, so that the Spanish flag shall enjoy in France the same rights and prerogatives as the French flag; and in like manner the French flag shall be received with the same favour in Spain as the Spanish flag. The subjects of the two monarchs, in declaring their merchandise, shall pay the same duties which shall be paid by the natives. The importation shall be equally free to them as to the natural-born subjects; neither shall they pay any duty not paid by the natural-born subjects of the Sovereign; it being well understood that no other Foreign Power shall enjoy in Spain, any more than in France, any privilege more advantageous than that of the two nations. Then, the 25th Article says:— If the high contracting parties shall hereafter conclude a Treaty of commerce with other Powers, and grant them, or have already granted them, in their courts or dominions, the treatment granted to the most favoured nation, notice shall be given to the said Powers that the treatment of Spaniards in France and in the Two Sicilies, and of the Neapolitans and Sicilians in France and in Spain, is excepted in that respect, and ought not to be quoted or cited as an example, their Most Christian and Catholic and Sicilian Majesties being unwilling that any other nation should partake of those privileges which they judge convenient for the reciprocal enjoyment of their several subjects. Now, these are engagements entirely in violation of all the Treaties as interpreted by my noble Friend. And this Family Compact, recollect, was in existence; and, although not supported and readily acquiesced in by this country, it did receive an official recognition by the Parliament of this country; for the Seventh Article of Mr. Pitt's Commercial Treaty with France, in the year 1786, is as follows:— And it being the intention of the two high contracting parties, that their respective subjects should be, in the dominions of each other, upon a footing as advantageous as those of other European nations, they agree that, in case they shall hereafter grant any additional advantages in navigation or trade to any other European nation, they will reciprocally allow their said subjects to participate therein, without prejudice, however, to the advantages which they reserve, viz., France in favour of Spain, in consequence of the 24th Article of the Family Compact, signed the 10th of May, 1761; and England, according to what she has practised in conformity to, and in consequence of the Convention of 1703, between England and Portugal. And, at the time, Mr. Fox bitterly reproached Mr. Pitt for having by this Article sanctioned the Family Compact, which had, to a certain degree, been so invalidated by succeeding Treaties. This country had, by this Treaty, recognised the right of France and Spain—for the conditions are reciprocal — we recognised the right of Spain to place France in a more favourable position than we enjoyed ourselves. So much for the observance of these Treaties by Spain in those days. But I maintain that it is to the course of practice by the two countries that we are to look for the true interpretation of these ancient Treaties. It is in vain to refer to the letter of these Treaties, many provisions of which are inconsistent and contradictory; but it is to the constant practice and conduct pursued in the execution of these Treaties by both parties that we are to look for their true interpretation. Now, my Lords, Spain has always resisted the obligation of these Treaties, even where it would appear their provisions were most clear and specific. For example, British merchants, by the very express terms of one of the Treaties—that of the year 1667—are exempted from certain contributions. The contributions are levied on them; we remonstrate; Spain says that these are old conditions—that the times are changed—that they no longer apply to a constitutional government, and that British subjects cannot expect to be better treated than Spanish subjects, notwithstanding the express provisions of the Treaty. They also maintain, that inasmuch as by one of the Treaties—that of 1783—it was stipulated that commercial arrangements should be entered into between the two Powers on the basis of reciprocity and mutual convenience, that engagement is as much in force now as at any former time; but that as there is no reciprocity they are not bound by the provisions of the Treaties to which my noble Friend refers. And so throughout we are met with a denial of the validity of any of these existing Treaties; and to the extent to which my noble Friend would press interpretation of them, this country has adopted the same right of construing them as Spain had done;—such has been the case on various occasions. For instance, my noble Friend says, that Spain has the same claim to be treated in British ports as the subjects of the most favoured nation. Very well. We make a reciprocity Treaty with France—we admit French ships into British ports as English ships—would Spain think of making such a demand? According to the argument of my noble Friend, Spain would have a right to demand that Spanish ships should be admitted into British ports upon as favourable terms as French ships are admitted.

The Earl of Clarendon

On the same conditions.

The Earl of Aberdeen

No, it is not on the same conditions. Their claim is to stand on the footing of the most favoured nation, without reference to conditions. That is quite a different subject. But they make no such demand; and for a very good reason. Of course, they could not make such a demand, because they impose heavy discriminating duties on our shipping. But, nevertheless, if the argument of my noble Friend were sound, it would entitle Spanish ships to be received in English ports as favourably as French ships. That would, undoubtedly, be the consequence of his argument if it were sound. I think that this is decisive with respect to the large claim put forward by the Spanish Minister, and supported by my noble Friend. I would beg, however, to ask a question of my noble Friend, who, I believe, had some concern in the transaction to which I am about to refer; at all events, it is perfectly well known that Her Majesty's late Government had proceeded very far in negotiating a Commercial Treaty with France; that Commercial Treaty I myself took up and carried also nearly to the point of conclusion. Well, that Commercial Treaty stipulated for a very large reduction in the duty on French wines; but did my noble Friend, did the late Government, or did the present Government ever think that it inferred the necessity of reducing the duty on Spanish wines? Never for one moment. Therefore your Lordships see, that Treaty, which might have been signed, and would have been signed, had it not been for the unfortunate events of the year 1840, which meet us so frequently in our relations with France — that Treaty would have been concluded, the duty on French wines would have been greatly lowered, and the duty on Spanish wines would have been a matter of negotiation with Spain, whether it should be reduced or not. So far advanced was that Treaty, that the late Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in the House of Commons the loss he expected to the Revenue in consequence of the reduction of the duty on French wines from that Treaty. Still more recently a Treaty was under negotiation with Portugal; that Treaty arrived very nearly to completion; unfortunately, at last, circumstances rendered it impossible to conclude it, but it had advanced very nearly to the point of conclusion; a large reduction of duty on Portugal wines was stipulated in that Treaty; but was it ever imagined for a moment that that could necessarily infer a reduction in the duty on Spanish wines? Never. It is very probable that a Commercial Treaty would have been made with Spain; and I well recollect that the Spanish Minister of that day, a very excellent and enlightened person, used to come to me repeatedly, with the greatest anxiety, to know the progress of our Treaty with Portugal; because, he said, if we succeeded in concluding a Treaty with Portugal, he had no doubt we should compel Spain to enter into a Commercial Treaty with us, which he was most anxious to see effected. But it was only as the result of negotiation and a Commercial Treaty, that he looked to any such a result; he never imagined that because we reduced the duty on Portugal wines, therefore Spain would have a right to claim an equal reduction. Such a thought never entered into his imagination. My Lords, there are various other instances in which this country has acted thus in the interpretation of these Treaties, besides those to which I have adverted. My noble Friend relies on the Treaty of 1667 as giving the Spanish Minister (although he does not refer to it by name, yet it is embodied in the Treaty of Utrecht, word for word, and therefore forms part of it — my noble Friend relies on that Treaty of 1667 as placing Spain on the footing of the most favoured nation. Why, only twenty years after the conclusion of that Treaty of 1667, in the first year of the reign of James II., in 1686, when that Treaty must have been supposed to be at least as well understood, so shortly after its conclusion, as it can be now, the Parliament of that day imposed a duty of 8l. a tun on French wine, and 12l. per tun on Spanish and all other wines. Undoubtedly, this country acted in the full exercise of its discretion in the application of these respective duties. But, still later, until a very recent period, the duty on Spanish tobacco was 6s. per pound, while the duty on United States tobacco was only 4s.; and this continued till 1822, when a general equalization of the duties took place. I may just mention another proof, which applies to Spanish wines as compared with Portugal wines. From the time of the Methuen Treaty down to 1787, there was a duty of 1l. per tun on Spanish wine higher than levied on Portugal wine; and the duties on Spanish and Portugal wines were equalized in 1787, and continued equal to the present time, with the exception of the interval between the 5th of July, 1809, and the 1st of January, 1813, during which period an additional duty of 12l. per tun was levied on Spanish red wine, which was repealed by the 53rd George III. Therefore, there is no doubt we have repeatedly, constantly, and in every mode, exercised an entire discretion in the relative proportion of duties imposed on Spanish produce. My noble Friend says that still, after the Colonial trade was opened, we were bound to admit the produce of Spain on the footing of the most favoured nation; and my noble Friend has given a representation of the mode in which the condition for admitting England to trade with the Spanish Colonies, was exacted from the Spanish Government. I am not here to say anything about the liberality or generosity of imposing such a condition; at the same time, I must say, that after the great services rendered to Spain previously, I suppose it may have been considered a not very unreasonable return, to stipulate that if the Spanish Colonial trade were opened at all, this country should enjoy equal advantages with other nations; the truth of the matter being, that Spain, on more than one occasion, had offered to this country to admit England to exclusive privileges in the Colonial trade. More than once, in consideration of assistance rendered to Spain for the recovery of her revolted Colonies, and for other services, the Spanish Government proposed to admit this country to exclusive privileges in that trade; but these proposals were invariably declined; and all that was stipulated for and exacted, was to be admitted to an equal footing with other countries. But this engagement on the part of Spain, it must be observed, is unilateral. There is no corresponding engagement on our part. You may say that is ungenerous and illiberal; but such is the fact; and I do not see that in the circumstances in which we were placed in relation to Spain at that time, there was anything unreasonable in the demand, even although we did make it in reference to that concession. At the same time, we entered into a stipulation with Spain, which I hope they will also observe, although I have seen some indications of a design elsewhere to defeat it. By a separate Article of the Treaty of 1814, we did exact that the Family Compact should never be renewed, nor any Treaty resembling it. The engagement in 1814 was, that when the Spanish Colonial trade was opened, we should stand on the footing of the most favoured nation. In the year 1824, by a decree of the Spanish Government, the trade with the Spanish Colonies was nominally opened. It is perfectly true, as my noble Friend observed, that before this, England had, although not officially, in the last diplomatic form, yet practically, recognised the independence of the Spanish Colonies. Consuls had been appointed: the Spanish Government were informed that the formal recognition could not be long delayed; and then the Decree of 1824 was issued—but not in compliance with the Treaty of 1814—not at all. The Decree was issued when the Spanish Government thought proper; when they thought it would suit their own convenience or the necessity of the case; and when they had done so, as a matter of course, and in consequence of the stipulation, they were admitted to whatever was granted to others on that occasion. But I must say, that so little did it appear that any obligation was imposed upon Great Britain in consequence of this so-called concession, that until the year 1828, no return whatever was made by this country to the concessions so acquired in 1824; and even in the year 1828, when the Order in Council was issued, it did not confer on Spain the full privileges of Colonial trade, but was couched in terms much less favourable than were applied to several other nations. It merely sanctioned a trade between the Colonies of Spain and the Colonial possessions of Great Britain. His noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) said that the Spanish Government did not remonstrate on that occasion, because they were ignorant of their rights. That is a strange reason to allege; it is not very likely to have been the case with Spain. As far as I have always seen, no country is more ready to make large pretensions than the Spanish Government. My noble Friend certainly may call this special pleading; but the question is the correct interpretation of the Treaty; and as this is a compact, of course it must be strictly examined and interpreted. I have shown you how the relations between the two countries have been understood, and the Treaties acted upon by both parties; and I, therefore, see nothing in the present relation of the two countries which can possibly justify Spain in claiming as a right the admission of her produce into British ports, which my noble Friend puts forth. My Lords, I will now say a few words on the last part of my noble Friend's speech, in which he treats with ineffable contempt the distinction which has been drawn between the rights granted to subjects of a State, and the manner in which the produce of that State is regarded. Now, in the first place, I must observe, that the Treaties with Spain to which my noble Friend has referred, and all the Treaties of that day, are framed on a very different basis from what exists at present. These Treaties stipulate in favour of personal privileges, and they have no reference to goods, except as connected with the persons possessing and dealing with those goods. By those Treaties, Spanish subjects were entitled to enjoy all the same privileges as the subjects of any other foreign country; whether in respect of their persons, their ships, or their goods; but with the produce apart from the ownership of it these Treaties have nothing to do. They have no reference to it. For instance, they say that any article whatever owned by a Spaniard, shall pay on coming into this country no more duty than the same article owned by a Frenchman; but they leave it entirely free to us to provide that the wine of Spain, for example, shall pay twice as much as the wine of France, if only it pays no more when in the hands of a Spaniard, than when in the hands of a Frenchman. The modern Treaties show that this distinction is real. Take the Turkish Treaty of 1838, which is one of the most recent. The Sublime Porte grants— All rights, privileges, and immunities which have been conferred on the subjects or ships of Great Britain by the existing Capitulations and Treaties, are confirmed now and for ever, except in as far as they may be specifically altered by the present Convention; and it is moreover expressly stipulated, that all rights, privileges, or immunities which the Sublime Porte now grants, or may hereafter grant, to the ships and subjects of any other Foreign Power, or which it may suffer the ships and subjects of any other Foreign Power to enjoy, shall be equally granted to, and exercised and enjoyed by, the subjects and ships of Great Britain. And there are various passages to the same effect; and after all, there are additional Articles to the Treaty itself, in which it is provided that all articles being the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and its dependencies, and all merchandise brought in British vessels, being the property of British subjects, shall be so admitted. So that there are some large concessions to subjects and their ships and goods; but, they do not include produce without reference to ownership, and that is the reason why, in the Treaty with the United States, there is an Article giving large privileges to subjects and inhabitants of the countries, their ships and goods; yet the Second Article provides that the duties imposed in the ports of Britain in Europe on articles the growth and produce of the United States, shall not be higher than those imposed upon those of other countries, this Article being quite irrespective of the privileges granted to subjects. So with Venezuela: Venezuela at first claimed exemption on the ground of her sugar being free grown; and I hope that in a very short time it will be so; but, upon inquiry, our Government considered that it could not be strictly called free-grown sugar, and the demand of Venezuela was consequently refused. Venezuela then put forward a claim founded upon this particular Article of the Treaty, which provides that no higher duties shall be imposed upon the produce and manufactures of venezuela, than was imposed upon those of the most favoured nations; and their claim was at once conceded; and, I think, if it was not so, it would lead to much confusion and to absurd consequences; because, on what is the claim of my noble Friend founded? It must be founded at least on the relation to the subjects of the King of Spain, who had this right; but this right, under the Treaties, applying to Spanish subjects, has no reference to British subjects; because if Spanish subjects in Cuba were to have this right under the Treaty, it is clear that only Spanish subjects were intended to have it, and not British subjects. So that, suppose you admit, under the Treaty, my noble Friend's right of Spanish subjects, at the same time, under the operation of the same Treaty, you exclude the claim on the part of British subjects. Now, that is reducing it to an absurdity; it is impossible that it could be so intended. Therefore, it is clear, that the right was personal in its character, and did not apply to produce separate from ownership. I can only say that the subject has been carefully considered by Her Majesty's Government with reference to the tenor of the Treaties; and my noble Friend would fall into an error if he should suppose that this has been unadvisedly done, and that the Treaties have been newly discovered by us, and the effect and operation of them. As to the wisdom, or policy, or generosity, or liberality, of the proceeding, that is a matter which may be discussed if necessary, at another time; but, I must say, that according to the strict and authorized interpretation of Treaties, we have done nothing which is not just. I do not lay any claim to a liberal or a generous interpretation of the Treaties; but I say it is a justifiable interpretation with reference to the policy which Her Majesty's Government have adopted, and which has been sanctioned by this House and by Parliament. There is nothing in the interpretation of those Treaties which I do not think perfectly justifiable, and borne out by the letter of the Treaties themselves, and by the conduct of both parties for a long series of years; and this being the case, I do not think that we are at all liable to the imputation of my noble Friend, and I must oppose his Motion.

The Earl of Radnor

said, that the course of the argument of the noble Earl was different from that which he had employed in his correspondence with the Duke of Soto-mayor. With respect to the Treaties, according to the noble Earl's interpretation, the Treaty of 1667 had been set at nought nineteen or twenty years after; and yet he (Lord Radnor) found in the book which had been laid on the Table of the House by command of Her Majesty, that that Treaty had been renewed over and over again till 1783. What was the meaning of Treaties if they were to be held of no avail? It would be better to have no Treaty at all. He would ask any person of common sense who read the Treaty, whether on the face of it Spain was not to be entitled to all the advantages of the most favoured nation? He (Lord Radnor) read as a man of common sense, and he found that the Treaties of 1667 and 1713 had been revived up to 1786. But the noble Earl said—that was not his argument today—that the Treaty of 1670 overturned that of 1667. It did so in a particular point, and in that point only. But if their Lordships looked at the Treaty of 1670, it said nothing of the produce of the Spanish Colonies not being brought to the United Kingdom; and it was a curious fact, that in the book laid by Her Majesty's command before their Lordships, the Treaty of 1670 was given in part only, and those parts referred to by the Duke of Sotomayor did not appear. The Treaty said nothing of the produce of the Spanish West India Colonies not coming to the territories of the King of Great Britain; it prevented the sailing of vessels from the mother country to the Colonies, but it did not prevent the bringing of the produce of the Colonies to the mother country. With respect to the latter part of the noble Lord's argument, it justified what appeared to him a great injustice. Could any one of common sense believe that the Treaty did not intend, in speaking of subjects of a State, "their" produce and "their" trade? No man of common sense, in his opinion, in reading the Treaty, would not put a different interpretation from that put upon it by the noble Earl.

The Earl of Clarendon

, in reply, said, his noble Friend (the Earl of Aberdeen) had stated that Spain had always denied the right which the Treaty gave us; but he (Lord Clarendon) could show the contrary, from his own personal experience. During the civil war, he had been in Spain, and he had, by means of the Treaty, prevented forced loans being exacted from British subjects resident in Spain. He had in his possession a very magnificent piece of plate which had been presented to him by the British merchants for preventing their being subjected to forced loans, solely on the ground of the Treaty. His noble Friend had said that the duties on Spanish wines had been increased at certain times; but these were the wines of places east of Malaga, in order to defray the expense of resisting the Algerian and Mediterranean pirates. He agreed with the noble Earl behind him, that there was a difference between the arguments used by his noble Friend to the Duke of Sotomayor, and in his speech to-night, which was somewhat in the tu quoque style—that the Treaty had been so often set at nought by Spain and by ourselves, that it was no matter how often it was violated. With respect to the fine distinction of his noble Friend about persons and produce, he appealed to their Lordships whether, although his noble Friend had said that the process of reasoning he employed had led his mind to the conclusion, they were not convinced, as he (Lord Clarendon) was, that the conclusion was not his own, by which he had adopted an opinion not very satisfactory in respect to the interpretation of the old Treaties, or to the spirit of the new ones.

Resolved in the Negative.

House adjourned.