HL Deb 19 February 1844 vol 72 cc1098-103
Lord Brougham

observed that he had stated the other evening that he intended to bring in a Bill for the purpose of meeting the case of a noble Friend of his (the Earl of Dundonald), and extending the duration of his patent for Steam-Engines for a certain time. He had since thought that it would be better to introduce a general measure on the subject. He thought it was advisable to consider the whole law, not as regarded each particular case, but as affecting the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and their power to extend the duration of a Patent in every case, as well as in that of the Earl of Dundonald. He had framed the Bill which he held in his hand with that particular object. By it he proposed that on an applicant presenting a Petition to either House of Parliament for an extension of the term of a Patent, that that House should refer the subject to a Committee for examination, or hear evidence at its Bar on the subject, And if the House thought that a case had been made out, that it should address the Crown on the subject matter, and pray the Crown to take the case into consider- ation. Then, if the party applying for an extension of his Patent presented a Petition to the Crown, the Petition will either be rejected on the advice of some responsible Minister of the Crown, or submitted for consideration to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which body was to be empowered, if the case of the Petitioner was made out, to extend the duration of the Patent for some years. He doubted, however, whether it would not be better to have a joint Address of both Houses to the Crown on the subject, but at any rate he should prefer an examination before a Committee of the House of Lords, for there the witnesses could be examined on oath.

Lord Campbell

said, that he approved of the principle of the Bill, but he wished to suggest to his noble Friend the propriety of making his Bill more general, for the purpose of extending the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. He thought that this was only one subject with respect to which there should be an extension of jurisdiction. He thought, also, that the Judicial Committee should have the power of extending the term of a Patent for a longer period than his noble and learned Friend proposed. He thought that the power of extending the duration of a Patent for fourteen or even twenty-one years might safely be intrusted to this Tribunal, from the nature of its constitution. There was, however, another point of great importance, connected with the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which it would be well to consider whether or not they should introduce into this Bill. The point he alluded to was, whether it would not be advisable to intrust this tribunal with the power of granting divorces a vinculo matrimonii. He had always thought that cases of this kind were not proper matters for Parliament. The business for Parliament should be confined to objects having reference to the affairs of the Empire, and its time should not be taken up in dealing with cases of adultery. It should be left to a court of justice to say whether a marriage should be dissolved at all; and he knew no better tribunal for that purpose than the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. By giving this power to this Judicial Committee, they would render the law accessible to the poor as well as to the rich, and they would enable the poor to obtain a remedy for an injury which was now only to be had by the rich. He, therefore, would suggest, that instead of the present Bill being passed, which had only one object in view, a general Bill for extending the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council should be introduced, and that that tribunal should not only be enabled to extend the duration of a patent, but also should have the power of dissolving a marriage.

The Lord Chancellor

thought it would not be advisable for his noble and learned Friend to mix up two subjects so dissimilar as the law of Patents and the law of Divorce in the Bill now presented to the House. If, however, his noble and learned Friend would bring in a Bill on the subject of Divorce, and its adjudication by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, it should have his best consideration.

The Marquess of Lansdowne

would take that opportunity of stating, that in opposing the grant of large powers to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, when the Bill giving these powers was before the House, he was actuated solely by a prudential motive in going step by step where a new tribunal was being constituted. He should say that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council would be an infinitely better tribunal for this sort of business than that which now existed. It would have also another great recommendation over the present system—that of cheapness, and the law would then be protective, not, as now, to one class alone, but to the whole country. He denied that the impediments thrown in the way of the poor man getting a divorce tended to improve the morality of the country; on the contrary, he was satisfied that it had a directly contrary effect. Before, however, they parted with their own jurisdiction on this subject, it would be well for Parliament to take care and consider whether the proposed tribunal would be a better one than the present.

Lord Brougham

wished only to observe, that the suggestion now thrown out by his noble and learned Friend had not escaped the attention of the framers of the Bill constituting the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. There was in that Bill, as originally introduced, a clause not exactly giving the absolute power to the Committee of the Privy Council to grant divorces, but giving to it power to inquire and report in all cases of application made for bills for divorce in consequence of adultery—making it, in fact, ancillary to the proceedings of that House. His plan would be, never to part with the jurisdiction now possessed by that House, but that the Judicial Committee might report to the House, and under the sanction of the House, give its judgment in these cases; because he was then, as now, very jealous of transferring or narrowing the jurisdiction which belonged to them. The noble Marquess said at that time they were going too far, but now that they found the system work so well, he thought they might go a little further. They then had founded a totally new tribunal, and it was impossible to tell how it might work. He thought that after three years' experience, and finding that in other matters it worked well, they might give it a quasi legislative power in cases of divorce. He thought that in the present instance, they had better go on step by step, and if they adopted his proposal with respect to the extension of the term of Patents, that they might take up the other subject. But with respect to that subject, it was a most delicate subject, and was connected with details of the utmost difficulty; such, for instance, as the making provision for the divorced wife—it required the greatest care and deliberation. In his opinion, the course hinted at by his noble and learned Friend (Lord Lyndhurst) was by far the most judicious. He (Lord Brougham) would frame a special Bill for this object, which he should propose should be referred to a Select Committee, when they would obtain the assistance of the Judges of the Consistorial Court, the right rev. Prelates, the Common-law and Equity Judges; and he trusted that the result would be that they should be able to attain the point aimed at, and make the law as available to the poor as it now was to the rich. Certainly, as the law at present stood, it was a remedy for the rich, and not for the poor, not only to the wrong of the party, but to the great injury of the morals of the poor.

Lord Campbell

said, he should be the last person to transfer the powers of that House or of Parliament to the Privy Council or any other body. The question, however, of a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, he thought ought to be referred to a judicial tribunal; and he could conceive none better for industry and quickness than the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. He could not bring himself to think that the usual proceedings in such cases were conformable with the proper functions of that House of Parliament.

Lord Wharncliffe

said, that, after the divorce was obtained, then came the question of whether the parties should be allowed to marry again? That he apprehended to be a question for Parliament alone. Again, the future provision to be made for the divorced female was always a matter which was narrowly looked to by that House, and there would be great difficulty in transferring this power to another tribunal. Under these circumstances, the expenses of such proceedings would not be diminished, inasmuch as in the first place, a trial must be had, and then a Bill in Parliament.

Lord Redesdale

did not think much expense would be saved by taking questions of this kind before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, except, perhaps, as to the duration of the inquiry. Before the Privy Council, such case would be probably disposed of in one day, whereas before their Lordships' House the inquiry would occupy a longer time. There was a subject connected with this matter, which was worth their Lordships' consideration; namely, the expense of passing divorce Bills through Parliament. This expense arose chiefly from the fees to which the solicitor, agent, and every person who was concerned in passing a Bill through Parliament were entitled. These expenses were not incurred in one stage only, but were repeated in every stage of the Bill, and it was a matter well worthy their Lordships' consideration, whether something could not be done towards reducing these expenses.

Lord Brougham

said, the subject was well worthy the consideration of the House; he knew an instance in point himself. He was one of the trustees to an estate, respecting which a Bill had lately been obtained from Parliament. The trustees had just received a bill of 367l., that being the parliamentary agent's bill alone. Upon this Bill, not a single witness had been examined, and there was not the slightest opposition to it. The whole expenses of this Bill, which was unopposed, and merely obtained for the purpose of granting leases, was 1,200l. He thought that this was a matter in which the House should interfere, as it operated as a denial of justice.

The Lord Chancellor

repeated, that he had no objection to the principle of his noble and learned Friend's proposition, but he thought that it would not be advisable to mix up this question of Divorce with that of Patents. In cases of Divorce, he thought that in any case a Bill would be necessary for the purpose of enabling the parties to marry again.