HL Deb 11 June 1835 vol 28 cc642-5
Earl Fitzwilliam

presented a Petition from the inhabitants of Auch- termuchty complaining of the present system of Corn-laws. He said that the petitioners considered these laws as opposed to the best interests of the labouring classes of the community. For himself, he considered them to be beneficial to no class whatever. He had not abandoned his intention of pursuing is former course with respect to these laws, and he trusted he should do so with success, for the present system, he was convinced, was one which could not be a permanent part of the system of the commercial law of the country. The time was not far distant—perhaps he should live to see it—when a considerable number of those who took the greatest interest in the welfare of the agricultural classes would be convinced that their interests could not be secured by this system. The price of wheat was now under 40s. a quarter. It must therefore be obvious to their Lordships that no legal enactments could secure to the agricultural interests of this country a price, nor to the landlords a rent dependent upon a price such as they required when that price was determined by the operation of natural causes which no system of laws could alter. Unless the law was assisted by a short supply, all classes would soon find that the idea of maintaining a high price of corn by law was a delusion.

The Earl of Malmesbury

denied that the agriculturists were seeking for high prices. The state of the market proved this fact. If they were monopolizers or jobbers, it was clear that they had failed in their object. But such was not the case, they were neither the one nor the other. A reaction must take place in some way or other, or the ruin of the farmer must inevitably follow. The Corn-laws were not intended to secure high prices, but they were adopted as a shield to protect the country from ruin hereafter. Take away the Corn-laws, and the ruin of the farmer would be confirmed. Let their Lordships look at the manner in which the farmer was burthened, and then say, why he should not receive his share of protection. Relief was granted to others. To the landowner special protection was given for special reasons, and he could not conceive why protection should not be extended to the farmer; so long as those laws remained they would save the country from the greatest possible of evils—the discouragement of the agriculturist. All the farmer desired was a fair remunerating price; he did not seek to have anything to do with monopoly or jobbing.

Lord Brougham

protested against the two doctrines laid down by the noble Earl who had just spoken. One of the noble Earl's positions was, that the object of the Corn-laws was not to raise the price of corn. If it were not, he did not know what raising the price and keeping up the price of corn was. [The Earl of Malmesbury: I spoke of a remunerative price.] A remunerative price! That was a very nice question, upon which there was a great diversify of opinion, just as circumstances operated on different parties. It was, however, clear that the object of the Corn-laws was to keep the prices higher than they otherwise would be. Exorbitant prices, he knew, was out of the question. There was, therefore, no great difference of opinion between him and the noble Lord with reference to the effect of the Corn-laws (and this was often the case) when they came to understand each other's meaning. The other position of the noble Earl was, that it was not the object of the agriculturists by means of the Corn-laws to raise the price of wheat, because the prices were low, and they had failed in producing such an effect. But how stood the fact? Wheat was now at 39s., whereas it was down to 36s. some weeks ago. But if it were said to be the object of the Corn-laws (it was a common argument and a very intelligible one) not to keep up prices at all, not to keep up even remunerative prices, but to establish steady prices and to prevent those fluctuations, how had those laws operated? Why, they had failed to produce any such effect—for under the protection of those laws, corn had fallen from 60s. and 64s. down to its present price. He believed that if the Corn-laws were repealed, or Mr. Ricardo's plan of a fixed duty of 10s. per quarter were adopted, such a proceeding would not reduce the price of corn so low as many individuals imagined.

The Earl of Malmesbury

said, if 1,200,000 quarters of foreign grain, which were now hanging over their heads, were let out of bond, such a supply would ruin the agriculturists both of England and Ireland.

Earl Fitzwilliam

said, this remunerative price varied exceedingly. In 1815, the remunerative price was 84s., but, according to the Corn-law Bill of 1828, it was 62s. or 64s. One of the strongest illustrations of the fact, that the Corn-laws were not beneficial to the agriculturists generally, was to be found in this circumstance—that the poor agriculturist was not enabled to take the benefit of any rise of price which might chance to occur. Owing to the extraordinary abundance of the harvest, and the consequent lowness of the price, larger quantities of corn were at present lying on the hands of the farmer than was usual at this time of the year. It would, however, be uniformly found that the farmers thus situated were amongst the most wealthy of the agricultural class. The poor farmer who rented bad land, and who had but little capital, had been, at a very early period, compelled to part with his stock; so that any rise which might take place between the second week in June, where they now were, and August next, when they might expect that the harvest would be reaped, would benefit the more wealthy class of agriculturists, but not the poor farmer. But those who would derive the greatest advantage from the existing system were the speculators in foreign corn—the persons who owned that large mass of foreign corn which was now in bonded warehouses those were the individuals who would derive the chief benefit from any rise that might take place in the price of grain. For these reasons he would contend, that the Corn-laws did not tell so much in favour of the great body of agriculturists as some noble Lords supposed.

Lord Ashburton

said, that the present Corn-laws gave no protection when wheat was beyond 55s. After that price foreign wheat might come in on a reduced scale of duty. The noble Earl appeared to think that the farmer was not benefitted under the present system of Corn-laws, and would be better off without any protection at all, but he (Lord Ashburton) was at a loss to understand how it could be argued that the agriculturists of England, Ireland, and Scotland, did not derive advantage from keeping to themselves the markets of the country when the price was below a certain sum. If there were no protection, wheat might come in at 30s. a quarter. It could not be fairly contended, therefore, although the agriculturists might not have full protection under the existing Corn-laws, that they enjoyed no protection. Knowing how difficult it was to adopt any artificial system which would be satisfactory to all parties, he thought it would be hard to devise any scheme that would work better than the present, and he hoped, therefore, that Parliament would not be lightly induced to tamper with the Corn-laws.

Petition laid on the Table.