§ Viscount Melbournemoved, that that portion of the King's Speech delivered at the opening of Parliament which related to Portugal should be read; which having been done, the noble Lord rose to introduce the Motion of which he had given notice upon the subject. We regret to say, however, that the noble Lord throughout the whole of his address to the House, spoke in so low a tone, and so frequently dropped his voice, that it was exceedingly difficult to catch what fell from him. He commenced by observing that their Lordships were aware, from that portion of his Majesty's Speech which had been just read, that his Majesty saw very little prospect of the negotiations which were announced at the commencement of the Session in 1825, and were again mentioned in less sanguine terms in his Majesty's Speech at the close of the Session, being brought to any satisfactory conclusion,—that he saw very little prospect of a reconciliation between the Princes of the House of Braganza, and that so much inconvenience had resulted from the present state of affairs—the continued interruptions of the relations between this country and Portugal had been 592 productive of so many inconveniences and embarrassments,—that it was the desire of his Majesty "to effect the termination of so serious an evil." From this latter portion of the Speech it might be pretty clearly and distinctly seen, that the termination which his Majesty had in view was the recognition of the present Government of Portugal; and his (Lord Melbourne's) noble friend, the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had, he believed, already stated on the first night of the Session that the only consideration as to the recognition of that Government was a question of time, and that it was not the intention of his Majesty's Ministers to give any further information to the House before that recognition should take place. Under such circumstances, he conceived it to be his duty, seeing that this was a question affecting the best interests, and replete with the most serious consequences to the good faith and honour of this country, to bring it under the consideration of their Lordships. In doing so it would be necessary for him in the first place to lay before their Lordships a clear and detailed statement of the whole course that had been pursued in regard to Portugal, in order to enable them to judge whether the interests of this country had been properly consulted, and whether proper measures had been taken to maintain our honour, and to preserve our fidelity to the engagements into which we had entered. He should commence his statement with the period when the Emperor of Brazil thought fit to adopt measures for the separation of the Crowns of Portugal and Brazil. Having come to that determination, his Brazilian Majesty chose to accompany the separation of the two Crowns with the establishment of a Constitution in Portugal, and he consulted Sir C. Stuart, our Ambassador then at Brazil, respecting the formation of that Constitution. Of that Constitution also Sir C. Stuart was the bearer to Portugal, and the adoption of it in that country was cautiously and temperately recommended in certain despatches from Mr. Canning, who then filled the office now filled by the noble Lord opposite, and who acted as the Minister of the Government of this country for Foreign Affairs. There was, besides, the direct and active interference of our Ambassador (Sir C. Stuart) to induce the people of Portugal, to accept that Constitution, which was accordingly accepted, which became the Constitution 593 of Portugal, and which Don Miguel, at Vienna, pledged himself to support in the presence of our Ambassador. The result, however, was, that that Constitution was entirely overturned; that in the overturning of it, and in the usurpation of Sovereign authority by Don Miguel, there were manifested on his part a contempt of all promises, a violation of all engagements, and that such of the inhabitants of Portugal as had supported the Constitution were driven from their homes, dispossessed of their properties, and either transported to pestilential climates, or condemned to an ignominious death upon the scaffold. Such was the fate of all those who adhered to the Constitution established by British influence in Portugal, or who were charged with adhering to it. That short and simple statement of the case he was confident would make their Lordships feel that it was their duty to enter upon a full inquiry into this subject. The end and termination of all those proceedings in Portugal their Lordships would see was, that all those suffered in the way he had described who had adhered to the Constitution brought to Portugal from Brazil—a Constitution which had been so recommended by our Government to them, and which had been adopted by them principally through the direct and active interference of his Majesty's representative at Lisbon—a Constitution supported by a British army, and upheld by the continuance of that British army in Portugal long after the occasion for which it had been first sent to that country had ceased to require its presence there. And now, after all such changes and alterations had taken place, and after the destruction of that Constitution in the establishment of which we had been leading and principal agents, his Majesty's Speech deplored the evils arising from the interruption of our relations with Portugal, and expressed a wish for their renewal. But he would ask whether we could by any such renewal ever stand again in the same relations towards Portugal as formerly—whether it were possible we ever could renew the same relations of confidence and friendly feeling that formerly existed between us, and whether there was any party in that country that would not regard us with feelings of distrust and hostility? Could we reckon upon the friendship of the partisans of Don Miguel, whom we had offended by our interference 594 for the establishment of a liberal constitution in Portugal, or could we seek for the friendship and support of that party who had listened to our advice, and had been ruined by its adoption? The fact was, that our conduct towards that party had thrown them into the hands of foreign Powers. It had been stated, either by the noble Duke, or by the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs, upon a former night, that in consequence of what had taken place in Portugal, there was a risk, if our relations continued much longer interrupted, of our throwing the parties into which Portugal was divided into the hands of foreign Powers, and of dissolving that friendly connexion which had so long existed between this country and Portugal. But it was extremely improbable, that by the mere renewal of our commercial relations with Portugal we should renew our ancient amity and mutual feeling of good will; and in regarding this question, he, for his part, did not merely look upon it as one connected solely with our commercial relations, but one which gravely affected the public interests and honour of this country. Our conduct in this instance was of a piece with acts of ours recorded in history, and to which we could not look back with any degree of pride or satisfaction. Our character did not stand high upon the continent, for what had we done there? If we referred to history, we should find that it was filled with the records of a series of abandonments, — the abandonment of the Elector Palatine,— the abandonment of the French Protestants by Charles 1st,—the abandonment of Holland, and the whole Protestant interest of the continent, by Charles 2nd,—the entire abandonment of our continental Allies, by the treaty of Utrecht, which gave rise to the resolution that the noble Duke opposite had termed ridiculous, but which was then rendered necessary by the pusillanimity of the Minister of the day—the abandonment of the Emperor in 1735, in consequence of which Alsace and Lorraine were wrested from him; and, finally, the abandonment of Prussia by the peace of 1763. Such was our history, and it shewed that our conduct upon the continent had been characterized by a series of abandonments and by the violation of good faith and plighted engagements towards our Allies. But it might be said, and it had been said, that it was not the policy of this country to interfere in the 595 affairs of other nations. He (Lord Melbourne) would be the last man in that House to recommend the adoption on our part of a meddling and interfering system, such as that which the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs had upon a former occasion so strongly condemned; but he could not avoid remarking that at the same time that the noble Secretary expressed his disapproval of such a system, he was meddling and negociating with every court in the world; and in truth it was necessary, circumstanced as this country was, to carry on such negotiations. While the noble Secretary expressed so decided a condemnation of the principle of interference, he must be too well acquainted with practical affairs not to know, that with dominions such as we possessed, and with the various relations which appertained to us, as the first commercial and manufacturing country in the world, and which bring us into connexion with every nation in the globe, the strict principle of non-interference was a policy entirely impossible for adoption on the part of this country. It was well known that since the conclusion of the great war with France efforts had been made in almost every part of Europe by the people generally desirous to obtain better institutions, to get rid of their old forms of Government, and procure for themselves some share in the administration of their own affairs. Revolutions for such objects had occurred in Spain, in Naples, in Piedmont, and in Portugal. These struggles had been encouraged by speeches and by public meetings in this country, and hopes had been held out to those engaged in them by the levying of men in this country for their assistance. He had always disapproved of the adoption of such measures on the part of individuals in this country, but whose honourable motives he respected, and whose patriotic principles he admired; and he disapproved of such measures, because that which was only the act of an individual would on the continent be applied to England generally, and persons abroad would be deluded into the notion that they might count on the support of this country in their efforts to obtain independence and good government. The impression had in consequence gone abroad, that the Government of this country was inclined to support those who were not afraid to encounter the evils of civil war, and it was for that reason 596 he (Lord Melbourne) had always disapproved of the species of interference which had been manifested by the people of this country in behalf of the revolutions on the continent. He was of opinion that the honour and interests of this country were so deeply compromised by the measures which had been adopted with respect to Portugal, that it was due to their Lordships to demand from his Majesty's Ministers a full and complete statement of the whole facts of the case, of the course which they had pursued, of the guidance which they had followed, and of the measures which it was intended to adopt in order to bring the negotiations on the subject at length to a termination. A number of papers had been laid upon their Lordships table last Session, which he now held in his hand. They had been laid before them in consequence of a motion made in the other House by an hon. and learned friend of his, and which specifically called for all papers relating to the negotiations carried on between the Crown of Great Britain and his Brazilian Majesty. That motion was shaped in the form in which it had been carried upon a direct understanding with the Minister of the Crown, that all information should be communicated, which did not contain such premature disclosure of negotiations, or matters then pending, as might be injurious to the public interests. In looking over these papers, however, he did not think there had ever been a more meagre unsatisfactory series of documents concerning a series of events presented to Parliament. These papers were divisible into four or five portions. The first related to the embassy of Sir C. Stuart; the second related to the Protocol of Vienna; the third consisted of despatches to and from our Ambassador at Lisbon, after the return of Don Miguel. There were two letters also which passed between the Marquis Barbacena and the noble Lord opposite (the Earl of Aberdeen), respecting a demand made by the Marquis for assistance from our Government for the Queen Donna Maria; and the remainder consisted of a correspondence between the noble Duke (Wellington) and the Marquisses of Barbacena and Palmella, respecting certain Portuguese troops landed in this country. Nothing could be more meagre and unsatisfactory than the first portion of these papers. They were, in many instances, contradic- 597 tory of each other. The second letter of Mr. Canning alluded more to the necessity of interference than the first; and the second letter of Sir William A'Court differred from his first letter, for in the second he expressed himself satisfied that the Constitution would be adopted and sworn to in Portugal. And here the noble Lord said he could not avoid making an observation which had often occurred before to him,—he alluded to the impropriety of individuals employed in his Majesty's service accepting, when in the discharge of such duties, titles and honours from foreign Governments. Let those who did not serve the State in a civil or military capacity, if they pleased, receive such honours, to whatever extent they might be proffered; but let those who were employed in the special service of the King of Great Britain be contented with the honours conferred upon them by their own Sovereign, which were always liberally, and sometimes even prodigally, bestowed upon those who served him faithfully. Above all let not individuals decorated with foreign titles, and upon whom properties had been bestowed by foreign Powers, be accredited to foreign courts as the representatives of the King of Great Britain. The evils which had occurred from employing such individuals in stations of such delicacy and importance, were too obvious and too well known to render it necessary for him more particularly to allude to them. The noble Lord proceeded to complain that there was a gap in the correspondence laid before Parliament, extending from the 4th of August, 1826, to the 5th of November, 1827, and it was principally to fill up that important gap that he had called their Lordships' attention to the subject, and should ask them to concur with him in the Motion with which he meant to conclude. He next came to the Protocol of Vienna, which had been signed by Don Miguel in the presence of our Ambassador. He did not wish to use any strong or violent expressions regarding the public capacity of that individual; enough had appeared of his private character, and upon the face of the papers which had been laid before the House; and enough was known of his conduct in 1824, when he rebelled against his father for the purpose of usurping his authority, to render it needless to say much regarding his conduct in a public point of view. But he 598 conceived that in a great and moral country like this, they should affix the stamp of their reprobation upon the conduct of a man who had violated all his engagements, and proved himself alike indifferent to honour and to faith, to the most sacred promises, and the most solemn contracts. Their Lordships were aware of the engagement to which Don Miguel pledged himself at Vienna in the presence of the British Ambassador. It had been said that the British Ambassador was no party to that, that he was merely a witness on the occasion,—rather an odd situation for a British Ambassador to fill,—but the presence of our Ambassador on that occasion, it could not be disputed, was a sanction on our part to the proceeding that took place, and to the engagement which was then entered into. The fact itself was sufficient to show their Lordships the necessity of having further information laid before them on the subject. But it would appear distinctly from a letter written by the Emperor of Brazil, that Great Britain not. only directly assisted him in procuring the adoption of the new Constitution in Portugal, but also impliedly engaged to maintain it; for his Majesty expressed his thanks in the letter in question for the assistance thus afforded to him, and his hope that since the Constitution had been framed we should enable him to ensure the maintenance of it for the future. Now, if that letter received no answer disavowing any such intention on the part of Great Britain, and if it were, on the contrary, sanctioned by the conduct of the British Government acting and taking the part which it did, he could not see how this country could consistently have departed from the line of policy to which it thus stood pledged. Don Miguel having made every promise required in the presence of the Emperor of Austria and of the Ambassador of Great Britain,—having promised to adhere to the Protocol, to maintain the Constitution, and to put an end to all former differences, by granting a general amnesty on his arrival in Portugal, proceeded to Lisbon; and what were his first steps on arriving there? The moment he arrived, instead of granting an amnesty, he commenced a general persecution. Was it not plain, then, at once that he did not mean to keep one of his promises, and that as he had broken his promise as to the granting of an amnesty, he was also determined to break his pro- 599 mise as to the maintenance of the Constitution which he had pledged himself to uphold, but which, from the outset, it was obvious he intended to overthrow? Either he would keep all his promises or he would not; and as he commenced, on his very landing, by breaking one of them, it was quite obvious that he was determined to break them all. Such being the case, he (Lord Melbourne) would ask, why was our Ambassador allowed to remain so long at Lisbon? Why was not he immediately withdrawn, when Don Miguel commenced by breaking one of the engagements of that Protocol, the making of which our Ambassador at Vienna had witnessed, and the violation of which was witnessed by our Ambassador at Lisbon? But it might be said that the taking of such decided steps might lead to war, which ought to be avoided in the present state of the country. He (Lord Melbourne) could not entertain any apprehensions that such would have been the result of a bold and manly policy; on the contrary, he conceived that a much greater risk of war was incurred by the manifestation of weakness and fear, than by the assumption of a hostile attitude when we were called upon to assume it; and he very much dreaded that the timid policy which we had latterly pursued might eventually, and that at no very distant period, lead to war. What had happened in this case? We allowed Don Miguel to proceed step by step, breaking every promise, and violating every engagement which he had made, until his open usurpation of the Crown left us no decent alternative but to withdraw our Ambassador. Either we should not have interfered at all in the matter from the commencement, or we should have stopped him at first in his proceedings for the destruction of the Constitution. With regard to the Protocol of Vienna, the explanation afforded upon that subject in the papers laid before Parliament appeared to him extremely lame and unsatisfactory. He should like to know what actually took place on the occasion of the signing of the Protocol; he should like to see a copy of the reply to the despatch of our Ambassador at Vienna respecting it, and he should also like to see copies of the despatches of our Ambassador at Lisbon, respecting the conduct of Don Miguel after his arrival there. It was stated in his Majesty's Speech at the, close of the Session of 1828, in reference 600 to the state of Portugal, that "the just expectations of His Majesty have been disappointed; and measures have been adopted in Portugal, in disregard of the earnest advice and repeated remonstrances of his Majesty, which have compelled his Majesty, and the other Powers of; Europe acting in concert with his Majesty, to withdraw their representatives from Lisbon." If such advice and remonstrances had been repeatedly tendered, and if the despatches and documents in proof of that fact were in existence, it was fit they should be laid before the House, for not a word to such an effect appeared on the face of the papers that had been presented to Parliament. It would seem, indeed, that Parliament and the public had been much misled throughout the whole of the transactions connected with Portugal, and it was the duty of their Lordships to call for full and ample information on the subject.
There was one portion of the papers presented to Parliament to which he could not allude without pain and regret—he meant the correspondence between the noble Premier and the Marquisses Barbacena and Palmella, respecting the Portuguese troops that had been landed in this country. It was, in his opinion, one of the greatest blessings of our Constitution, that under it the very highest offices in the State were open to every individual in the country. He could not avoid observing, however, that the present noble Premier should endeavour to give to his administration as much of a civil character as possible, in order not to afford his enemies an opportunity of saying that that act (he meant the conduct adopted towards the unfortunate Portuguese troops) could only have been conceived in the mind of a mere soldier, and that it would not have been tolerated for a moment in the mind of any other individual in such an exalted station. That act he (Lord Melbourne) would say was contrary to the law of nations. We admitted them to land in this country when we might have prevented them: it might be perfectly fair on our part not to allow them to convert our ports into arsenals; but what right had we to follow them upon the high seas, and to stop them within the waters of a friendly Power? Such a proceeding was obviously contrary to the laws of nations. Why not stop them in port, and before they had proceeded on their voyage? 601 But it was replied that they had sailed with false clearances. The fact was, that previous to their sailing the Marquis Palmella had apprized the noble Duke opposite that their destination was Terceira; and the noble Duke could not, therefore, have been misled by any false clearances as to their real destination. This was a subject regarding which he was sure their Lordships would see at least the necessity of having further information laid before them. Altogether he trusted he had made out a case, demonstrating to their Lordships the necessity of having fuller and more complete information laid before them upon all the subjects he had mentioned. He should say no more, further than to add, that the line of conduct pursued by the Government of this country all through these transactions had been characterized by a disingenuousness and a harshness unmitigated by the expressions of any one honourable sentiment or generous feeling. The whole of our policy with respect to Portugal had been disgraceful, and to persist in it would be still more so. The noble Lord concluded by moving, "That an humble address be presented to his Majesty, praying that he would cause to be laid before their Lordships:—1st. Copies of any despatches to and from Sir Henry Wellesley, respecting the conferences held at Vienna in the month of October, 1827.— 2nd. A copy of instructions given to Sir Wm. Clinton, Commander of the British forces sent to Lisbon in the month of December, 1826; and Copies of any subsequent despatches to the same officer, as far as such despatches relate to the object and extent of the employment of the British force in Portugal.— 3rd. Copies of any instructions given, or communications made, to Sir William A'Court upon the same occasion.—4th. Copies of any despatches received from Sir William A'Court between the 4th of August, 1826, and the time of his departure from Lisbon; and also of any despatches addressed to Sir William A'Court by his Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during the same period, as far as such despatches relate to the internal political affairs of Portugal.— 5th. A Copy of the Protocol of the conference held at London on the 12th of January, 1828, between the Ministers of England, Austria, and Portugal.— 6th. A Copy of the instructions given to Sir Frederick Lamb his Majesty's Ambassador to the Regent of Portugal. 602 —7th. Copies of such further despatches, or such further extracts from the despatches, from Sir Frederick Lamb, as relate to the proceedings in violation of the engagements entered into by Don Miguel, and to the steps directed by the British Government to be taken in consequence thereof.—8th. Copies of all despatches addressed to Sir Frederick Lamb by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs subsequent to the 1st of March, 1828.—9th. Copies of all communications between his Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Portuguese Ambassador, the Marquis Palmella, subsequent to December, 1826.— 10th. A copy of the instructions given in 1828 to Lord Strangford, his Majesty's Ambassador to the Court of Rio Janeiro, and Copies of all correspondence upon the objects of his mission.—11th. Copies of any communications made to or received from the Courts of France, Spain, Austria, and Brazil, relating to the settlement of the affairs of Portugal, and to the recognition of Don Miguel as king of that country.— 12th. Copies of the whole correspondence respecting the arrival, residence, and departure of the Queen Maria da Gloria.— 13th. Copies of the correspondence which took place before the arrival of the Portuguese refugees, relating to their reception in this kingdom.—14th. The correspondence between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Marquis Barbacena on the subject of the Portuguese refugees leaving Plymouth, and the subsequent interruption of their landing in Terceira.—15th. The Protest of Count Saldanha, transmitted to Captain Walpole, and referred to in the enclosures D, G, and K, in No. 39 of the papers presented to this House.— 16th Copies of the negotiations and settlement which took place in London with Don Miguel, referred to in the despatch from Sir Frederick Lamb to the Earl of Dudley, of the 1st of March, 1828."
§ The Earl of Aberdeensaid, that if the Motion of his noble friend had been more in accordance with Parliamentary usage and form, and if he had merely called for additional papers to explain the course which his Majesty's Ministers had deemed it right to pursue with regard to Portugal, he should have felt it his duty under such circumstances to oppose it, on the ground that such information was at present unnecessary. He was much more inclined 603 therefore to oppose the Motion, which was clearly made with very different views and for a very different purpose. Indeed, if the noble Viscount had intended to follow up such a Motion by an impeachment of his Majesty's Ministers, the papers which he had just moved for might certainly be necessary, in order to afford him grounds, if possible, of sustaining such a charge; but if it were merely information he desired, the noble Viscount, he must say, had, indeed, the most insatiable appetite he ever knew. The truth was, that if all the papers which he asked for were produced, they would amount to many volumes, and a great portion of them would be found to have no practical relation to the question upon which the noble Lord had addressed the House. Amongst other papers, the noble Lord had moved for copies of all the despatches addressed to Sir F. Lamb from the 2nd of March, 1828 —that was, during all the time of his mission to Lisbon, for he only arrived there at the latter end of February; and the noble Lord had also moved for copies of any despatches from Sir Wm. A'Court between the 4th of August, 1826, and the time of his departure from Lisbon; and also of any despatches addressed to Sir William A'Court by his Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during the same period, as far as such despatches relate to the internal political affairs of Europe. Why, these papers would comprehend a detail of all the transactions that had occurred there during the whole of that period; and did their Lordships conceive it necessary to have such information laid before them? He considered it to be his duty, in the present situation of this country with respect to the kingdom of Portugal, to state that he had not altered the opinion which he expressed when the papers respecting Portugal had been laid upon their Lordships table last Session. That opinion was, that they contained sufficient information on the subject, and he had now only to add, that until the measures which his Majesty's Ministers had advised his Majesty to adopt should be carried into effect, it was not their intention to lay any further information before their Lordships. When the change which was in contemplation should be completed, then further information would be readily laid before their Lordships. If the noble Viscount had read more attentively than he appeared to have done papers already before the 604 House, it was probable he would not have made this motion. Before he adverted to the various topics of the noble Mover's speech, he felt bound to say a few words upon a subject which, though the noble Lord had not himself dwelt much upon it, their Lordships would no doubt hear a good deal about in the course of the evening,—he meant the character of Don Miguel. He was anxious that he should not be misrepresented, as he had been upon a former occasion, in reference to what he thought on that subject, and as he meant to state his opinions regarding it plainly and clearly, any further misrepresentation of them could be only wilful. That Don Miguel was a most heartless and incorrigible person it was not possible to deny; that Don Miguel might be cruel also, he was ready to believe and to admit, as he knew very well that cruelty was too often the offspring of cowardice; but this he would say, that when he saw the absurd exaggerations which were put forth respecting that Prince, he could not avoid confessing, that to him such statements appeared calculated to have, upon fair minds who clearly perceived how gross were the exaggerations, an opposite effect from that which they were intended to produce. Such exaggerated statements were calculated to create a doubt of what was before believed to be true. It was his opinion that it was an unwise course to dwell too much on the personal character of princes, and still more to make their personal character a motive to influence the political conduct of other nations. He thought it was a question of minor importance, whether Don Miguel were a Nero or a Titus. That was a matter of comparatively small importance, considered with respect to the interests of the two countries, England and Portugal, conjointly; or separately, with respect to that course which it was essential for us to pursue, in order to maintain the honour, consistency, and well-understood interests of this country. Don Miguel had been accused by the noble Lord of having usurped the throne of Portugal. Now he did not mean to enter into all the mysteries of the law of jurisprudence in Portugal, but he must say, that whether Don Miguel were a usurper or not, their Lordships must allow the Portuguese nation, after all, to be not only the proper, but also the most competent judge to decide on that matter. There was no denying that by a vast ma- 605 jority of the Portuguese people, Don Miguel had been declared to be no usurper, but possessed of a legitimate right to the throne; and he apprehended, that from that decision there was no valid appeal. When he said that an immense majority of the Portuguese were of that opinion, he could not more satisfactorily support his assertion than by directing their Lordships' attention to the different manner in which the two brothers had presented themselves to the Portuguese nation. When Don Pedro sent that Constitution to Portugal—an ill fated present he feared it was —in its preamble he ordered it to be sworn to by the three estates of the kingdom, and afterwards promulgated. How was that direction complied with? Why, the party in power were afraid to comply with Don Pedro's order, and submit the act of Constitution to the three estates, because they well knew, that if the three estates were assembled, the right of Don Pedro to grant that Constitution would be questioned. Don Miguel, however, acted very differently when he went to Portugal,— whether the Cortes were assembled legally or not was another question,—yet he did in fact assemble them, according to all the ancient, lawful forms prescribed for such assembling, and submitted his claim to their deliberation. A more numerous or respectable assemblage than the one in question, in point of rank, wealth, and character, never met in Portugal. That assemblage affirmed his right to the Crown; and the persons who composed it were, after all, the most competent judges of the question. Then came the question as to the conduct of Don Miguel in respect to the violation of all those pledges which he had entered into at first in Vienna, and afterwards in England, and on this point, indeed, his conduct was utterly indefensible. This was "the head and front of his offending." All the engagements which he had entered into with his brother, with the Emperor of Austria, and with the King of England, he had shamefully violated; and this conduct had led to the present situation of affairs existing between England and Portugal. The noble Viscount had asked, when Don Miguel began to show an inclination to violate his promises, why did not the English Government immediately recall its Ambassador? Did the noble Viscount really think that that would have been the most prudent course to adopt. The Government 606 had in his opinion followed a much more advisable course. On the intimation given by Don Miguel of his intention to violate the promises he had made, the English Ambassador repeatedly remonstrated with him in the strongest manner. The next step he took was to suspend all intercourse with the Portuguese Government, and retire from the court. His last step, when nothing else was left for him to do, was to leave the country. What more could be done short of taking measures to declare war? Every thing in the way of remonstrance or threat that could be used, short of actual hostility, was employed. But if the arguments of the noble Viscount meant any thing,—if there were any consistency, honesty, or common sense in them, they must mean that the English Government ought to have adopted measures of force to compel Don Miguel to fulfil his promises; but their Lordships would hardly be prepared to approve of such a course. Every thing, indeed, short of actual warfare had been tried, and that, he was persuaded, was a result to which their Lordships unquestionably would not come. With respect to one part of the noble Lord's motion, which called for a copy of the negotiations which Lord Strangford carried on at Rio, he might say, that the result of those negotiations were already before their Lordships, in that portion of the papers laid on the Table which related to the transactions between the Marquis Barbacena and the English Government. In fact, Lord Strangford, on arriving at Rio, could hardly be said to have negociated at all; for he was told that a Brazilian Ambassador, with Plenipotentiary powers, was in Europe who was fully empowered to enter into and conclude all negotiations with respect to Portugal. The papers then on the Table, he might say, contained the result of Lord Strangford's mission, which was undertaken in the most amicable manner, and entirely in a spirit of reconciliation and friendship. But the Marquis Barbacena asked the English Government for succours, to assist in making a conquest of Portugal, and founded his claim on ancient treaties which were said to be still in existence. The noble Viscount would of course perceive what answer it was his duty as a Minister of the Crown of Great Britain to give to such an application; especially, when it did not appear that the English Government was bound 607 by any treaty of the kind supposed. The Marquis Barbacena repeated his application to our Government, and said, "If the existing Treaties do not authorize you to lend us assistance, let us make fresh ones." The Government thought that war could not, under any circumstances, be entered upon for such a purpose; and he must say, that it was most fortunate that the English Government did come to such a decision; for if we had entered into a war, the burthen of that war and its expenses would, under any circumstances, principally have fallen on this country. But it so happened that not only the principal burthen would have fallen on this country, but we should have had to wage it singly with a Power which had violated no positive engagements with us, for this country had received no guarantee from Don Miguel, but had only been the depository of pledges to his faith. If, indeed, he had guaranteed the fulfilment of his promises to this country, then he admitted that the country would have been bound in honour to see those promises executed. But nothing approaching to any guaranteed engagement had been entered into, and therefore we were not bound in support of the honour of the country to adopt hostile measures. If we had entered into war on the Marquis Barbacena's representations, he repeated, that this country would actually have had singly to undertake the conquest of Portugal. The Marquis Barbacena addressed his note to the Government, requesting its assistance, in November, 1828. But what said the Brazilian Minister in April, 1829? He derived his information indeed from newspapers, to which the noble Viscount professed to have recourse; but he had every reason to rely on the accuracy of the statement he was about to read to their Lordships. It appeared from the Brazilian newspapers, that one of the Deputies of the Brazilian Chamber reproached the Government for interfering with the affairs of Portugal, because the Brazilian Government was on terms of peace with Portugal, and carrying on all the relations with Portugal as this country did at present. How did the Brazilian Minister reply to that charge? [The Earl of Aberdeen here read a paragraph from a Brazilian newspaper, which stated that the Minister of the Interior of Brazil expressed his surprise at so serious a charge being brought against the Govern- 608 ment, which he declared was far from wishing to interfere with the affairs of Portugal,—reprobated in the most unqualified manner every act performed in Europe by the Brazilian diplomatist, who, he said, had no authority to act; and required that the Brazilian Government might not be considered responsible for what had been done in Europe by unqualified individuals, who had received no instructions to act as they had done. He asked, was the Government to blame because the distance of Brazil from Europe prevented their disapprobation of such conduct speedily reaching that part of the globe? Already, he reminded the Chamber, one Brazilian diplomatist had been dismissed, for conduct similar to what had excited the worthy Member's censure. How then could the Brazilian Government be charged with interfering in the affairs of Portugal?] This party, therefore, (continued the Earl of Aberdeen,) for whose benefit we were asked to assist to conquer Portugal, refused to sanction any such proceeding on the part of its agents, and, consequently, we should have been left to carry on the war alone. The English Government, in declining the proposal made to them, had acted not only justifiably, according to their conception of the interpretation of the treaties and engagements which existed with respect to Portugal, it had also acted most fortunately, inasmuch as the result would have been what he had stated to their Lordships. The principal ground on which the noble Viscount rested his reason for interfering with the present Government of Portugal, was the abandonment, as he conceived, of the Constitution, of which a present had lately been made to that country. What sort of interference the noble Viscount meant, unless by war, he could not understand. By what other method could the English Government force that Constitution on the Portuguese nation? The noble Viscount undertook to give a plain, simple, unvarnished statement of what he called the facts respecting the origin of the Constitution; but a statement more opposed to the facts he had never heard in the whole course of his life. If any one thing were more certain than another, it was the extraordinary anxiety which Mr. Canning showed to disconnect himself and this country from every thing belonging to that Constitution. The noble Viscount had said that Sir Charles Stuart assisted 609 in the formation of that Constitution. Now there was not the least shadow of foundation for any such statement. Sir Charles Stuart was merely the bearer of the Constitution to Europe, and that was all the concern he had in it. The instant it arrived in Europe, Mr. Canning was so much alarmed at the idea that this country might be thought to have had something to do with it, that he immediately wrote despatches to every Court in Europe, staling that the English Government had no concern in the formation of it, and that Sir Charles Stuart, in bringing it to Europe, had acted on his own responsibility, without receiving any instructions from his Majesty's Government. Thus, then, the noble Viscount's plain, simple, unadorned statement was entirely erroneous. No less wrong was he when he said that the general impression in Portugal was, that England would support the Constitution, and that those who had acted on that persuasion had become victims in support of what he at last called a British Constitution. The noble Viscount even went so far as to say that the Constitution was supported by the British army. That the presence of the British army might have operated in securing the existence of the Constitution, he would not deny; but when the army was sent to Portugal, great care was taken to declare that the sole purpose for which it was sent was to resist what was conceived to be a threat of foreign aggression. Six months afterwards, when a vote of credit passed the Parliament before the close of the Session, the same declaration was repeated in both Houses—namely, that the army remained in Portugal exclusively for the purposes for which it was originally sent. He could refer their Lordships to declarations, made in the strongest manner possible, disclaiming any other object in continuing the army in Portugal but to resist foreign aggression. That was acting strictly according to Treaties, but it formed no part of our obligation, implied or expressed, towards Portugal, to enforce any species of Constitution on the people of that country. Therefore, when the noble Viscount said that the Constitution was maintained by the British army, he completely misrepresented the state of the case. Though he should be very unwilling to call that Constitution a British Constitution, inasmuch as it had been concocted in Don Pedro's brain in less than a week's time, and therefore, however well intended, 610 must be imperfect in its parts and in its operation, yet he admitted that those Portuguese who supported it might, have been led to do so from the partiality which they might suppose this country would naturally entertain for it, and from an opinion that they were acting in conformity with the wish, at least, of the British Government. Inasmuch as they had been affected by those considerations, and suffered in consequence, although he felt most unwilling to interfere in the internal affairs of Portugal, or of any other nation, yet, in his opinion, it ought to be with the utmost possible reluctance that any person should think of renewing our relations with Portugal, unless those unhappy persons were placed on a footing of perfect security. The noble Viscount had asserted that he (the Earl of Aberdeen) had stated that England had allowed other Powers in Europe to occupy her place with respect to Portugal. That was not, however, the fact, He had stated, that if England maintained indefinitely her present situation, their Lordships could not expect other Powers to follow her example. She would in such case, be throwing the advantages which her connexion with Portugal had given her into other hands. Hitherto, all Europe had kept back, with a confidence which was highly honourable to this country, and which did not bear out the imputations which had been for some time, uttered respecting the footing of disrespect on which this country stood with other Powers in Europe. They had all acted with a most honourable spirit towards England, but it behoved this country to take the lead in Portuguese affairs, for if she did not, she would lose the commanding influence she had always possessed and deserved in Portugal. He thought, that whoever might be Sovereign of Portugal, if we rightly understood our own interest, we should be on a good footing with him. During the periods when this country had been most closely connected with Portugal, that country had not been blessed with the most amiable monarchs. But it was never necessary to look at the personal character of the kings of Portugal, when forming an intimate connexion with that country; and if it should be necessary to recognize that Government in favour of which the Portuguese people had declared, he had not the least doubt but that our mutual relations would be as cordial as ever they had been. The severities and excesses which had 611 taken place in Portugal in the administration of the Government, he deplored as much as any man. But we were not entirely guiltless ourselves on this subject. We remonstrated with the Portuguese Government, and protested against the course which we call severe and cruel, but the reply was obvious. The Portuguese Government said, "You keep us in a state of alarm and apprehension. You allow plotting to go forward in England against our institutions, and permit great bodies, against which we must protect ourselves, to exert themselves for our overthrow." Now self-protection, whether a government was legitimate or not, was the first of all duties, and we therefore must consider ourselves a little responsible for those severities of which we complained. The noble Viscount had adverted, as it was impossible not to expect he should do, to the event which took place off Terceira, and which he described in terms of unmeasured reprobation. But if that affair were fairly and impartially considered, the English Government would be found to have done nothing but what a strict sense of duty and obligation to preserve a neutral line of conduct compelled it to do. He would give the noble Viscount, in a very few words, the simple narrative of that affair. The noble Viscount had alluded to some correspondence which he supposed to have taken place before the Portuguese who were defeated at Oporto, arrived in England, and by which they were invited to come to this country. That was not the case. The simple facts were these. After the failure of the expedition which had set out to Oporto, and after the leaders of it had returned to this country because they found the sentiments of the whole Portuguese people against them, the troops, who had taken to flight without striking a blow for that Constitution which they were supposed to be so desirous of defending, went into Spain. The Spanish Government allowed them to enter its territory, but ordered them to quit it within one month. This condition was difficult to be complied with; indeed impossible. What then, did the English Government do in behalf of those unfortunate persons? We entreated the Spanish Government to extend the period, which was granted, and means were taken to bring the Portuguese to this country, where, on application, they were assured they would be received and enjoy protection and hospitality. Measures were prepared, 612 and even lodgings taken for their reception. They arrived at Plymouth, and soon amounted to upwards of three thousand. For some time they remained there quietly, until at last an application was made by the Brazilian Minister to his noble friend near him (the Duke of Wellington), requesting a convoy might be given to the Portuguese troops to go to the Azores. His noble friend of course could have no knowledge of foreign troops in England, and he told them they must disperse, or if they left the country, they must leave it as individuals and not as troops. Some time afterwards the Marquis Palmella, on being told that these troops must be dispersed in certain numbers in the neighbouring towns, declared that they preferred being sent to Brazil, and desired a convoy for them. Now, granting a convoy would have been an unjustifiable act, for we had no right to protect them against Portugal any where but in England. The leaders wanted the English Government to give a guarantee for the safety of these troops. That was refused, and after a great deal of difficulty and negotiation their departure (which had been strongly insisted on because it would relieve the apprehensions of the Portuguese government, we knowing that their existence at Plymouth, embodied and ready to depart, did, in fact, create fears in that Government, and consequently led to many of those acts which we deplore on the part of that Government, in order to protect itself against invaders), their departure was at last fixed, and they determined to go to Brazil. In the mean time a revolt took place in Terceira against the Government of Don Miguel, and applications were made for assistance. Now at that time there being no civil war in Terceira, the garrison only being in favour of Don Pedro, and the whole population being friendly to Don Miguel, could the English Government, he would ask, have permitted these troops to have gone in warlike preparation to take the Island, and at the same time have maintained that honest neutrality it professed? Impossible! We might have done so, to be sure, availing ourselves of Don Miguel's breach of engagement, and every thing that was odious in his personal character, or of the weakness of Portugal, which left us nothing to fear in the way of retaliation; but would these have been sufficient reasons for diverging from a course consistent with honesty, and he must say the only course 613 proper for the English Government to pursue, considering what it had declared should be its line of conduct from the first? It was quite monstrous to talk of these troops being helpless unarmed men. Their lordships all knew that soldiers well officered and well disciplined, having arms again provided for them, were as formidable as if they had never been deprived of arms; and it was notorious that such arms had been provided for them. Their remaining in that state at Plymouth was a very flagrant breach of neutrality on the part of England according to all the law of nations, and he would take the liberty of reading a passage from an author, which would show that, according to the general principles of the law of nations, it was incumbent on the English Government to disperse those troops. Vattel, speaking of the duties of neutral States, said, "On the other hand, it is certain that if my neighbour affords a retreat to my enemies, when defeated and too much weakened to escape me, and allows them time to recover and watch a favourable opportunity of making a second attack on my territories, this conduct, so prejudicial to my safety and interests, would be incompatible with neutrality. If, therefore, my enemies, on suffering a discomfiture, retreat into his country, although charity will not allow him to refuse them permission to pass in security, he is bound to make them continue their march beyond his frontiers as soon as possible, and not suffer them to remain on his territories on the watch for a convenient opportunity to attack me anew; otherwise he gives me a right to enter his country in pursuit of them." Their Lordships knew what effect those troops had on Portugal, because the Marquis Palmella had said that their dispersion would relieve that country from fears. Perhaps those apprehensions were unfounded, after what had taken place at Oporto; but when those troops departed they were told that they would be prevented taking part in the civil war raging in Terceira, being, as it were, fitted out from this country, where, if they had not been received, they would either have remained prisoners in Spain, or been captured by the troops of Don Miguel. Therefore it was quite impossible for them to go from this country furnished for an attack on any part of the Portuguese dominions. The noble Viscount had asked "why did we not stop them at our own port?" The reason was, 614 because they went on board with clearances for Brazil, where we were told they were going; but having been deceived before by a Brazilian agent with respect to the destination of some arms, which had been conveyed to Terceira, we told them that having been deceived once, we would not be deceived a second time. If the decision of the English Government had been otherwise, he conceived that its neutrality would have been completely illusive. We knew their intention, for though they had false clearances, we could not shut our eyes to their real destination. Some of those troops did go to Terceira, and the result was, that one person, an Englishman, was unfortunately killed. The masters of the vessels knew nothing of their destination, but were forced to go there. They implored the officers on board to allow them to change their course, but they were compelled to advance to Terceira; and it was only at the very last moment, and after every possible endeavour had been made, in vain, by the naval officer stationed on the spot, to induce the Commander of the troops to alter his course, that a shot was fired. It was then discovered that of these helpless, unarmed, and faithful followers of their lawful Queen, Donna Maria, three hundred out of six hundred were Germans and Danes, exported from Hamburgh and Lubec. These were the lawful and faithful subjects of her Majesty Donna Maria! Was not this open war? Could any thing be more absurd, then, than to say that England interfered with helpless individuals going to the territory of their lawful Sovereign? If we had done otherwise than we had, we should, to all intents and purposes, have been affording means and facilities to those troops to engage in the civil war at Terceira. No impartial man could look at the transaction, from the first to the last, without being struck with the fraud that had been committed. It was not, therefore, surprising that the language of some of the letters which passed on the occasion was stronger than suited the taste of the noble Lord opposite. The character of the whole proceeding was such, that if fairly viewed, would not only justify the measures which were taken, but actually show that they were necessary. There was another part of this transaction which was not a little curious. How were these troops maintained? how were they paid? Their Lordships, perhaps, were not aware 615 that these troops were actually maintained by English money, of which English creditors were actually defrauded! for the expense of the maintenance of those troops was defrayed from the dividends of that loan which had been remitted to England regularly by the Brazilian Government, for the purpose of being paid to British creditors. That money was intercepted in its course, and appropriated to this purpose, all participation in which the Brazilian Government disavowed. [The noble Earl here read an extract from a speech of the Brazilian Minister of Finance, informing the Brazilian Chamber that the dividends had been sent to England, and ought to have been placed in the Bank of that country, but might possibly have got into hands which had diverted the money from its proper course.] Those dividends, his Lordship observed, had never been deposited in the Bank of England, but had fallen into the hands of other parties, who had diverted them from their lawful destination. He repeated it was impossible for this country to have allowed the expedition to proceed against Terceira. The principle of neutrality which we had laid down we had uniformly observed throughout this contest, in spite of all the impressions which might arise from our having used the force of Government against what might appear a feeble party. Most scrupulously had that neutrality been observed towards the opponents of Don Miguel, and he did think that the present Portuguese Government had much more reason to complain of our conduct than its opponents. But in addition to the general law of nations, which obliged us to act as we did with respect to these troops, he was not quite sure that the Portuguese Government, on the strength of commercial Treaties which did exist, might not make a demand on this country, which it would be very difficult to meet under the words of the Treaty. He did assure their Lordships that every step taken in the business had been the result of a sense of duty, and not of any application from the present Government of Portugal; and he thought that when the Portuguese Government learned that persons calling themselves the agents of Don Pedro were allowed to exercise sovereign powers in this country, granting orders and rewards, it would have some reason to question our strict neutrality. It was his opinion that even if the 616 information asked for by the noble Lord were proper to be granted, yet no practical use could be made of it; but believing the information on the Table of the House quite sufficient to explain the actual state of the relations between England and Portugal, and Government having promised, when any change took place to afford ample information to their Lordships, he felt himself obliged to oppose the noble Lord's Motion.
§ Viscount Goderichconcurred in what had fallen from the noble Earl with respect to the bringing of the Portuguese Constitution to Europe. It was deemed indispensable to the tranquillity of Europe that Portugal should separate from Brazil, and Sir Charles Stuart was sent to Portugal to explain the necessity of such a proceeding to Don John, then the King of that Country, who assented to the principle, and directed Sir Charles Stuart to proceed to his son, Don Pedro, at Brazil, with a proposition to separate the countries. Before Sir Charles Stuart arrived there, Don John died, and he was thus placed in the peculiar situation of messenger from the King of Portugal to the King of Portugal; for Don Pedro became, by his father's death, the sovereign of that country. He, however, consented to adopt the measure of separation. There were, it is true, at that time, considerable differences respecting the mode, in case of future successions, how the separation was to be perpetuated. However, in the end, Don Pedro consented to this separation, and also, which was not at first contemplated—granted a Constitution as well. When in the sequel it became known to Mr. Canning that Sir Charles Stuart was to be the bearer of this Constitution to Lisbon, he wrote to that Ambassador, on the 12th of July, in these words:—"Every thing which you bring from Rio de Janeiro to Lisbon will be precisely what the Portuguese nation have a right to expect, except the Constitution;" and Mr. Canning then went on to state, in the same despatch, "but, in order that we should better inculcate on other Governments our disinclination to meddle in their internal affairs, it is expedient, in this respect, to remove all grounds of jealousy of British influence, and it is therefore his Majesty's desire that you should proceed to England as soon as you deliver into the hands of the Infanta Regent, and of the Portuguese 617 authorities, her brother's despatches." In the same spirit he wrote on the 12th of July to Sir William A'Court, that, as a foolish notion prevailed in France of the influence of Great Britain having been used to obtain the Portuguese Constitution, it had been ordered that Sir Charles Stuart should at once return home, to obviate any such impression. It was true, indeed, that, in a subsequent despatch, of the 17th of July, he did convey to Sir Charles Stuart an opinion, which certainly the Government of England had a right to adopt (but it was evidently adopted as the result of a balanced opinion), that the best course for Don Miguel to pursue appeared to be the fulfilment of the Charter. Mr. Canning, had, however, always left it open to the Portuguese nation to take this Constitution as they thought proper, hoping only that their decision would be eventually productive of their own happiness. This was the course which at the time, and under the circumstances, became a British Minister, who was bound to look with a prudent consideration to future events, and to the operation of this Constitution on the relations of Portugal with other States. Undoubtedly Mr. Canning, if he consulted his own feelings, wished for the acceptance of the Constitution; but at the same time he said as a British Minister, "We are no judges of what is fit for the internal arrangements of the people of Portugal; but as the separation of your kingdom has been accomplished by the force of our reasoning with Brazil, we think it reasonable you should adopt the views of Don Pedro at the time when he made that separation." This was the language of Mr. Canning; and so far as the British Government was concerned with this Constitution, he could not coincide in the inferences of the noble Mover, that we were bound on that account to interfere in a stronger manner after the delivery of the documents by the British Ambassador. It was undoubtedly true, as his noble friend had said, that troops were sent out to Portugal by Mr. Canning towards the end of the year 1826; but this step was taken without the slightest reference to the question of the Portuguese Constitution;—in fact, the substance of the orders to these troops was most unequivocally to refrain from all interference whatever in the internal struggles of the people of Portugal, but 618 to protect them, in virtue of the provisions of ancient Treaties, from any attack by foreign force. This was not to protect the Constitution from the opposition of the people for whom it was intended, for Great Britain was bound to do no such thing—such a principle having never in fact been suggested from beginning to end—but simply and exclusively to prevent Spain by force from overrunning Portugal. With reference to the character of the individual who had usurped the Government of that country, he had no objection to adopt it from the words of the noble Earl opposite; these were true and correct, and whatever was the complexion of his vices, the affliction merely concerned the Portuguese, not the British, except, perhaps, so far as they might be supposed to affect the latter in the progress of the external relations of the new kingdom. The effect of Don. Miguel's passions, however, was certainly to exhibit him offering a great insult to the Crown of England, one which the latter could only overlook in pity for the feebleness of the weaker State, and from a sense of magnanimity towards an individual at once mean, perfidious, and imbecile. And here, perhaps, he concurred with the noble Earl in thinking it best not to heap terms of obloquy upon princes, with whom hereafter it might be expedient for us to hold relations, even though such terms were the natural offspring of honest and well-regulated minds. He likewise agreed that England was not bound to have gone to war to repress the treachery of this prince; but he could not see that such a result would have necessarily followed the adoption of the policy so often recommended on this subject. Whether it were likely or not that less measured language had been used towards Don Miguel by the Government during these transactions, than appeared on the face of these papers, was what he could not say, for he could only form a judgment from the papers before him; but in exact proportion as he thought it would have been unwise for the Government to involve themselves in hostilities upon these points, in exactly the same degree was Parliament bound to look with jealousy at the course taken by that Government towards Don Miguel. There was one topic, the last touched upon by both his noble friends, on which he must say something, and, he lamented, in 619 a different lone from that of his preceding obvervations, he meant the affair at Terceira. He well recollected when, last year, the noble Lords opposite (the Ministers) pledged themselves to place on the Table all the Papers concerning it, they expressed their confidence that when this information was perused, it would be found to remove every doubt upon the propriety of what had been done, and compel their Lordships, by the demonstrative force of reasoning, to approve of the course which the Government had taken in the matter. He now begged to assure their Lordships that he had sat down to read these papers with the strongest desire to find that the honour of the Crown— not the particular character of this or that administration—had not been compromised by the affair at Terceira, and with the most conscientious anxiety to come to the same conclusion as the Government. He lamented, however, that the result did not correspond with his wishes, for he was obliged to confess that the Papers did not remove from his mind the unfavourable impressions he had previously imbibed, or suggest to him any train of reasoning to alter their force. In considering how far the conduct of Government was open to approval or disapprobation with reference to this business, they were bound to consider a little the circumstances under which it had occurred; the actual condition of Don Miguel at the time, and that of Donna Maria, relative to their respective connexion with the dominions of Portugal. The Brazilian Minister, Viscount Itabayana, had applied to the British Government to export arms to some foreign place, and his noble friend immediately gave that permission, accompanied with certain conditions; namely, that these arms should not be conveyed for use to any place where civil dissensions raged in the dominions of Portugal. Now this condition was accepted by Viscount Itabayana, but the noble Duke opposite afterwards said, that in conveying the arms to Terceira a breach of faith had been committed with him, for he thought they were intended for Brazil. He (Lord Goderich) confessed that on the face of these Papers he saw nothing to conduct him to that inference; and yet the right interpretation of a few passages in the letters which passed at the time, was of great importance in leading their Lordships to a right 620 view of what had subsequently happened. How could it be necessary for Viscount Itabayana to ask the permission of the British Government to export arms to Brazil? It was supposed, he was aware, that such permission was necessary, but the fact was exactly the reverse, and no licence was necessary. True, the law gave a power to the Crown to prevent, by an order of Council, the export of arms, but no such order existed at that time, and therefore none could have been in force, which required a licence to obviate. In fact, the only order in Council at the time in force was one which prohibited the export of arms to the coast of Africa, without a particular form of licence; and why? Not because of any troubles which were raging in many parts of Europe; not because of the contending relations of the Braganza family, but solely and expressly to prevent the export of arms for carrying on the slave trade on the coast of Africa. [hear] How could it then be contended that any permission was required to export arms to Brazil; none was necessary, nor up to this hour could the Government, as the law stood, prevent an agent of Don Miguel's from exporting arms to Portugal. The evident neutrality, then, was not to interfere at all in the exports of arms; instead of which the people of Terceira were prevented from having them, while the partisans of Don Miguel were not. The Government ought not to have been in ignorance of these distinctions, or to have mistaken the law which applied to them. He was prepared, indeed, to make a distinction between this application of Viscount Itabayana and the one subsequently made for the removal under convoy of the Portuguese troops in depot at Portsmouth, and upon that branch of the inquiry he perfectly agreed they were bound not to permit the assemblage of troops on the coast of England to arrange plans of hostility against a country towards which it professed and meant to be neutral. Indeed, he thought they were justified in putting an end to that depot where it was, and to afford these people a conveyance to the Azores. But he repeated, there were some singular things conveyed through the correspondence in their Lordships' hands, which must be well understood before they hastened to conclusions, and he begged permission to refer to some of them. On the 8th of December the noble Duke opposite, in a 621 letter dated from Goodwood, thus wrote to the Marquis Palmella:—"Some time ago one of the Brazilian Plenipotentiaries now in England, wrote me a letter to desire that convoy might be given to an expedition intended to be sent against the Azores." Now what meaning was to be attached to the word "against" except to convey the intention of hostility. [The Duke of Wellington here said "No."] Did the noble Duke mean to say that he disbelieved the nature of the application of the Marquis Barbacena, to which his phrase alluded? If so, then he (Viscount Goderich) could only remark that there was no evidence upon the face of these documents to justify such an imputation; for what were the words of the Marquis Barbacena when he applied to Ministers? When he wrote to the noble Duke opposite, on the 15th of October, he said, "The Secretary to the Government of the islands of the Azores has just arrived in London, authorized to demand with the greatest urgency, the immediate despatch of a part of the faithful Portuguese troops which are now in England, and whose presence in the above-mentioned islands would ensure their defence as well as their tranquillity, under the Government of the legitimate Sovereign, against the attack with which they are menaced by the illegitimate Government established in Portugal." So that the application was not for leave "to attack" the Azores, but to repel a threatened attack of them by the usurper. The movement of the Marquis Barbacena is, then, entirely defensive, and in answer to an application, in which he says he is bound to concur, he goes on thus—"Determined as I am to grant the succours which faithful subjects of the Queen demand from her, and persuaded that these succours, when once landed at Terceira, will be sufficient to put this island out of danger, I cannot conceal from myself the risks which the transports may run during their voyage, if they be not protected by some ships of war. Such, M. le Duc, is the strong motive which makes me have recourse to your Grace, for the purpose of demanding from his Britannic Majesty, in the name of the Queen, the convoy of a ship of war, to escort from England, to a possession which remains subject to the legitimate authority of her Most Faithful Majesty, a part of the loyal troops which are at Plymouth, the succours in question not to be 622 landed at Terceira, in the unfortunate event of that island having fallen under the aggression with which it is threatened. From what is above stated, you will see, M. le Duc, that there is no question of a hostile undertaking, but simply as a measure of defence, dictated by the feeling of that strict obligation which is imposed upon every sovereign to protect his subjects." This was the tone of the letter of which, when afterwards writing to the Marquis de Palmella, the noble Duke said it conveyed an intention of attacking the Azores—a wrong impression evidently from the words employed on that occasion. The noble Duke, in his answer to the Marquis Barbacena on the 18th of October, says, after describing the Portuguese as not in the quality of troops, but of individuals —"I also announce to your Excellency, that His Majesty's Government cannot permit that England should be made an arsenal or a fortress, from whence any one may make war as he may think proper. If those Portuguese subjects desire to make war at the Azores instead of doing so in Portugal, of which they have the choice, let them go there as individuals if they please. But I must candidly tell you, Monsieur le Marquis, that it cannot be permitted that individuals, of whatever character they may be, should prepare warlike expeditions in the ports and arsenals of this country, in order to make attacks upon others." Well, then, in the end, they did go out as individuals. [The Earl of Aberdeen.—"I must deny that."] They surely went without arms, and in ships exposed to every risk; he could not, therefore, concur in opinion that they had departed in any other character than as individuals. When the noble Duke used the term individuals, he never could have meant that it was necessary they should depart each man in a separate ship. If he meant that six hundred of them should not go out in any single ship, he ought to have told them so in the first instance, and not to have led them into an error, the consequence of which was, their exposure to the reckless consequences of Captain Walpole's attack. He intended to make no complaints against the refusal of the Government to give a guarantee, or convoy, to secure the escort of these Portuguese to the Brazils, and therefore he should come to the letter of the 12th of December, from the noble Duke to the Marquis de Palmella, in which were these 623 words:—"His Majesty's servants have been informed by me of your assurances that these troops are going to the Brazils, and they rely upon them. But I have to inform you, that as your orders may be disobeyed, other authorities may interfere in the disposal of these troops. The King's servants have thought proper to advise his Majesty to give orders that effectual measures may be adopted to prevent any attack upon the Portuguese dominions in Europe by any of these troops." He could not help observing, that the meaning of this passage in the noble Duke's letter was very vague, for geographers had differed, whether the Azores were in Europe or Africa. If not in Europe, then they were not comprehended in the prohibition: if in peace with their lawful Sovereign, then the Portuguese had no right to be opposed in proceeding towards them. And it was on this same day (the 12th of December) that there issued, in the shape of instructions from the Admiralty, Captain Walpole's warrant to burn, sink, and destroy any of the ships bearing these Portuguese to Terceira. They were charged with intending to make an attack on that Island. This was quite contrary to the fact, as conveyed in the applications of the Marquisses Barbacena and Palmella, the latter personage being likewise exposed to an imputation of telling an untruth on the occasion. This imputation was, he thought, an act of great cruelty, when directed against an honourable man, for such he knew he was from his conduct during many years in the discharge of high diplomatic functions in this country;— against a man, too, in the hour of his misfortune, when filing from eminent station, and reduced to exile and beggary because of his fidelity and honour: it was, he repeated, cruel to impute such conduct to a person so placed, and who on the face of these papers, instead of deserving to be accused of having practised delusion, had stated most distinctly that the destination of these troops had been altered from Brazil to Terceira,—it was made voluntarily, and without the least knowledge of the order issued from the Admiralty. It was right to notice that another reason given, during these discussions, why the Portuguese ought not to be permitted to go to Terceira, was, the divided state of parties on that island. Where was the proof of these alleged divisions? The first 624 intimation of them was given in the noble Duke's letter of the 30th December. Although in the Marquis de Palmella's, on the 20th, information of the perfect tranquillity of the island was conveyed, yet the noble Duke writes—"The Azores are part of the dominions of Portugal, and we know that a civil war is now carried on in those Islands, particularly in that of Terceira." Where was, he repeated, the proof of that fact, and of the announcement to these Portuguese that they should not be permitted to land there?—[The Duke of Wellington—"Why in the very sentence you are quoting."—Lord Holland.—"Yes, at the end."]—He had not overlooked the words, "they will not be allowed to land there;" but he meant to ask, why the announcement had not been previously made, and the necessary orders issued to warn these Portuguese of the risk to which they were exposing themselves before they had embarked and incurred it? He admitted that it was possible his reasoning might be overturned by a fresh statement but it could not upon the information then before Parliament, and he spoke from those official documents presented by his Majesty's command, and not from newspaper reports or unauthorized communications. In them there was not the least proof that the Portuguese were early warned to avoid Terceira, or that any dissensions raged on that island. The noble Duke had, indeed, said that the Azores were part of the dominions of Portugal; so they had been for nearly 200 years, but they were at this time perfectly tranquil. Terceira was held for the legitimate sovereign, Donna Maria da Gloria —she had the real actual possession. Don Miguel had de facto seized the Crown of Portugal; and unless it was meant to be contended that he had on that account a right de jure to its distant possessions, there was no pretence for depriving the Queen of Portugal of her legitimate rights of sovereignty where they were duly administered. She had reality of possession and force of law there at least, and what was against her? Not a de facto, but a pretended claim de jure on the part of the usurper. The noble Viscount proceeded to observe, that he thought the Marquis Palmella had been most cruelly treated. He showed nothing like duplicity in any part of his conduct, and he knew that he was a most respectable person, from often having had occasion to see 625 and correspond with him in his diplomatic capacity. The Marquis Palmella was now reduced from a high and affluent situation to a state of exile and poverty, and it was cruel to add to all this the charge of duplicity and deception. It was said that the Commanders of the vessels who carried out the Portuguese troops did not know their destination, and that they were not aware that they had been prohibited from landing at Terceira. If so, the Ministers were so much the more to blame; for these Commanders ought to have been informed of it, more particularly when the order of the Admiralty was issued, commanding our ships of war to burn, sink, or destroy (for such the order was in effect) any vessels that should attempt to land at Terceira. In consequence of this neglect the men and the vessels of this country might have been destroyed by the fire of our own ships of war. If that warning had been given, probably the ships would never have sailed, and the attempt would never have been made.—If, in spite of the warning, the parties had persevered, it might have been possible to have prevented it, by an act of authority. He might be told that Government could not have prevented it, inasmuch as the act was no violation of the municipal law; and perhaps, therefore, an act of authority might have been required; but he (Lord Goderich) should be glad to hear what right was given by the municipal law to treat the King's subjects in a manner not warranted by the law of the land. The law of nations which might apply to the Portuguese could not extend to British subjects, who might all have fallen victims to the rash and unadvised order of the Admiralty. The noble Earl (Aberdeen) had talked of the rashness of Count Saldanha, and of the loss of one life as the consequence of it. Whether his courage ought to be praised, or whether he ought to be blamed for his rashness and obstinacy, was a matter of no consequence—one shot had destroyed one life; but it was to be recollected that instead of a single shot a whole broadside might have been discharged, and not only the six hundred Portuguese but the British crew and the ship might have been sent to the bottom. Providentially that issue had not followed, but the principle was the same, and such might have been the melancholy result of the order of the Admiralty. He was sure that his noble friends would have had their minds wrung with the bitterest 626 affliction if anything of the kind had happened, and then they would have had to exclaim, "Good God! that we had but thought of warning these people before they went on this fatal expedition!" He had thought himself compelled to make these observations, but he would ten thousand times rather have had his judgment convinced by what had fallen from the noble Earl, which would have prevented his arriving at a conclusion so painful. He was sure that his noble friend would do him the justice to admit that he had not described conduct which he disapproved, in terms inconsistent with the courtesy due from one public man to another; or with the consideration due to the dignity of their Lordships and the importance of the question; he had discharged an irksome duty; and he might assert, with deep regret and entire sincerity, that he wished to God the record of the transaction to which he had alluded, could be blotted from our annals.
§ Lord Wharncliffesaid, he could neither concur with the noble Mover, nor with the noble Viscount who had just taken his seat. That noble Viscount, in particular, seemed to have gone over the papers to which he had referred so repeatedly by some system of cross-reading, and had arrived at a conclusion corresponding with that mode of perusal. The House ought to remember the statement of Mr. Canning, when he proposed that troops should be sent to Portugal. In terms stronger than any other man could use, he expressly asserted that they were not to act either for or against the Constitution—they were only to defend the country against invasion by the troops of Spain. What reason, then, could the Portuguese have for thinking that this country had taken what the noble Viscount was pleased to call the British-Portuguese Constitution under its special protection? His noble relative (Lord Stuart of Rothsay) when Sir C. Stuart, had only brought the Constitution to Portugal in his capacity of a Portuguese Plenipotentiary; and when the Emperor of Brazil was anxious to consult him on the subject, he was too prudent to consent to give any advice, so that that circumstance could not be construed into an approval in the face of Mr. Canning's direct disavowal. The simple question, was this:—When Don Miguel reached Portugal, and a party, which seemed the strongest, made its appearance adverse to 627 the Constitution, was Great Britain called upon to interfere, and to force it upon the people? He denied that she was so called upon, and he denied that if any British Minister had attempted to force it on the Portuguese he would have been supported by the British nation. This country was bound to remain strictly neutral; she had remained so, and if the Portuguese were deceived in their expectations, they were alone to blame. He agreed that there was something painful to the feelings in what had occurred at Terceira; but how was this Government in fault? That, and that only was the real point in issue. The island was not solely and absolutely in the possession of the King of Portugal, for a civil war was raging there at the time, and the mere use of the word "attack," in one of the documents, did not merit the importance attached to it by the noble Viscount. His, noble friend (Lord Goderich) had argued that some warning ought to have been given; and this country had been held up, with respect to that transaction, as guilty of a most scandalous breach of good faith towards Portugal. All he could say was, that if the conduct of the British Government towards other Powers was no worse than it had been towards Portugal, there would not be much reason to complain. He denied again that Mr. Canning had ever upheld such a notion, as that we were bound to assist any foreign nation in maintaining or destroying its Constitution. His liberal mind was naturally inclined to the extension of liberal principles; but he always maintained that Great Britain could not interfere to promote that extension. On these grounds he should vote against the Motion.
The Earl of Carnarvoncould not allow the question to come to a vote without offering a few remarks upon the peculiar situation in which this country was placed with regard to Portugal. He did not intend to uphold the policy of one Minister against that of another Minister; but to review the conduct of Great Britain towards Portugal as a whole, and to consider whether the natives of that country had been treated by this country in a manner to inspire affection and confidence, and to lead the rest of the world to believe that Great Britain had acted with becoming consistency and energy. He well understood the doctrine of non-interference; and in nine instances out of 628 ten he should approve it; but he could not understand, in the condition of the relations between this Kingdom and Portugal, between a powerful and a weak State, with the capital of the latter occupied by the armies of the former—how, after the danger of invasion, for which those armies were sent out, was at an end, we could allow our troops, like Ambassadors, to remain mere calm spectators of the transactions before their eyes. Sir C. Stuart had acted, first the part of a witness, and afterwards that of a letter-carrier; at one moment he was a Brazilian, and at another a Portuguese plenipotentiary. That was a matter of comparatively slight importance; but there was another circumstance too much kept out of view in the course of this night's debate; he alluded to the fact, that Great Britain had acknowledged the Queen of Portugal—and in what relation did this country stand therefore with regard to the dynasty of Braganza? It had been said that we ought not to interfere in the affairs of Portugal.—Not interfere with the affairs of Portugal! What had been our conduct towards that State? Let Don Miguel answer the question. As a rebel to his father we conveyed him a prisoner to France, and from France he was sent to Vienna. After an involuntary residence there, after being affianced to the Queen of Portugal, and after the most solemn protestations, he had been allowed to return to his native country by the agency and interposition of Great Britain; and yet with these facts before our eyes we were to remain tame witnesses of the overthrow of that very system we had been endeavouring to support. By some artifice of special pleading it might be attempted to escape from the difficulty arising out of interference at one time and non-interference at another, yet there was not a nation in the civilized world to whom Great Britain had not rendered herself ridiculous by sending a military force to Portugal to do nothing but to keep up a species of mock neutrality, and defeat the very end for the accomplishment of which she had so long laboured. The noble Earl (Aberdeen) had attempted to establish a case on the law of nations; he had made a pompous reference, and had read a learned quotation from Vattel; but the only question to be considered was, whether what had happened at Terceira was an attack, or were the Portuguese 629 conveying themselves to a friendly shore where no attack was necessary? With their ultimate destination we had nothing-to do. A great deal had been said of "a civil war raging in Terceira," but nobody had instanced a single battle; it might have "raged" in the correspondence of the noble Duke and the Marquis Palmella, but assuredly it had not existed, much less "raged," anywhere else. Of this he was quite certain, that all England, that was out of office, had rejoiced in the glorious victory of Count Villaflor over the expedition sent out by Don Miguel, and it was unalloyed by any necessity, on the part of the conqueror, to turn his arms against a single inhabitant of Terceira. When the Portuguese, who had been so inhospitably treated in England, were landed in France, they were allowed to proceed without molestation to Terceira, and Don Miguel himself had never dreamt of complaining of a violation of the law of nations. Although many parts of the speech of the noble Foreign Secretary had given him (Lord Carnarvon) much pain, one portion of it had excited in his mind unmixed satisfaction. The noble Earl had distinctly stated, that Great Britain would never recognise the usurper of Portugal, even as King de facto, until he had done full justice and made complete reparation to the unhappy victims of his tyranny. Englishmen knew little of the degree of suffering to which those victims had been exposed: they were not merely detained for safe custody, they were immured in the most loathsome dungeons, and if they were ever restored to freedom, many of them could never be restored to health. Of Don Miguel himself he would not attempt to speak; he should fail in expressing his sense of disgust and hatred, and after the terms employed by the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs, all he (Lord Carnarvon) could say would appear like apology, if not panegyric. Although the usurper had now gained footing, there was a time when Great Britain might have had the whole army of Portugal on her side, while Miguel would have been left with only his priests, panders, and parasites. He was aware that the Motion of his noble friend would require some modification; but, in the general statement, that further information was required to vindicate the character and honour of this country, he heartily concurred.
The Marquis of Lansdowneobserved that after what had been already said, it was not necessary for him to add anything to justify, and little to explain, the vote he intended to give. If, by supporting the Motion, it could be supposed that he meant at all to sanction the principle, that Great Britain ought to have interfered to guarantee the Constitution of Portugal, he would vote against it, and he trusted the time would never come when Ministers would advise the King to guarantee a Constitution of any kind for any Foreign State. He would also rather oppose the Motion of his noble friend than that his vote in its favour should lead to the slightest implication, that under the circumstances it was fit to recognise the authority of Don Miguel. The rule of that tyrannical usurper was repugnant to the feelings of the whole kingdom, and it was needless for him to add a single touch to the picture drawn by the noble Secretary of State. What he understood to be sought by the Motion was this,—that without interrupting negotiations, for none were pending—without committing Great Britain to any future course of conduct, for no such course had been pointed out— the House and the country ought at least to be furnished with the fullest information before a step was taken that could not be adopted without pain and regret. What, he would ask, had been done to meet this great evil? During the last two years our foreign relations had undergone an alarming change; at one end of Europe a mighty State, the maintenance of which was once considered essential to the balance of power, had been reduced to a state of dependence and vassalage; while at the other end those friendly relations, the preservation of which our wisest Statesmen had held necessary to the welfare of this country, had been torn asunder. Thus circumstanced, was it fitting that Parliament should show indifference to the important events passing before its eyes? If it consented merely to look on with apathy, notwithstanding what had been said on a former night by the noble Duke regarding the inexhaustible wealth and resources of this country, and her capability of meeting a new war should it arise, people would be found on the continent malicious enough to attribute our forbearance to other causes than indifference. With regard to our existing relations with Portugal, he 631 would not fatigue the House by referring to the many great authorities who concurred with Lord Chatham, that it was essential to our interests to maintain a good understanding with that country: he would appeal only to that event which had been too much lost sight of in the course of debate—he meant the manner in which the Ministry of this country-had wisely interfered, in order, for its own sake, to produce a separation between Portugal and the Brazils. To effect this object, not only had Sir C. Stuart been sent to Lisbon, but the Government of Great Britain had otherwise interposed, and had not allowed the inhabitants of Portugal and the Brazils to settle the question for themselves. When the separation was settled we became interested in the terms of that separation, and without meddling with the Constitution, we declared to Portugal that we had a strong interest in the accomplishment of the arrangement; and indirectly and directly too we encouraged those who through all history, from generation to generation, had been known as the British party in Portugal, to declare for the Queen and for that species of government which Don Pedro had annexed as the condition of his abdication. it was because Great Britain attached value to that Constitution that she became a party to the arrangements at Vienna, by which Don Miguel was relieved from the just sentence under which he was then suffering, on condition of giving it his support. It was also to be recollected that these steps were taken in accordance with those who had filled the highest situations of the State in Portugal, and he was not to be told that because there was nothing technically and absolutely binding, there existed no moral obligations towards the people. Those who had zealously acted in accordance with the views of Great Britain, ought not to be cut adrift merely because we were not bound by the specific letter, of a Treaty. He was not disposed to enter into the general affairs of Portugal; but as to the particular transaction at Terceira he must make a few observations, because he agreed with his noble friend (Lord Goderich), that the honour and character of the country were implicated. In the first place he must declare that the conduct of Great Britain was not conformable to any recognized law of nations; and when the noble Secretary of State made a solitary quotation 632 from a solitary author upon the point, he did not seem aware that not a single word of it applied to an attack upon the subjects of a friendly power upon the open seas, on their way to one of the possessions of that friendly power. If Don Miguel had been the very reverse of what proved to be his real character—if he had been faithful instead of treacherous, and mild instead of cruel—and if this country had been anxious, on account of his many virtues, to show him all acts of friendship, he should have contended that Great Britain would not have been justified in thus pursuing his interests across the Atlantic.—He had the acknowledgement of the noble Duke himself on this point. The noble Duke had well and strongly said in that House, that when application was made to Government for a guarantee for the ships in which the Portuguese troops were going to cross the Atlantic, the answer was, that no such guarantee could be given, for that his Majesty was not king of the Atlantic. Why, then, his Majesty not being king of the Atlantic, did his ships of war attack those loyal Portuguese troops, proceeding to the spot to which their sovereign had ordered them to proceed; proceeding to a spot in which uninterrupted loyalty had prevailed? No civil war, nor any appearance of civil war, had occurred in Terceira. Of that fact he had the best possible information. He held in his hand a letter from a distinguished general officer in that island, who declared that during the whole time that he had been there the Government of the Queen had been universally acknowledged in Terceira. Yet that was the place which it was pretended by his Majesty's Government the loyal Portuguese troops from this country were proceeding to attack! Their lordships would also recollect, that in the last Session the noble Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated, as a kind of counterpoise to what had been said on the other side of the House, that the people of Terceira were disloyal, and intended to form themselves into a republic, and that with that view they had prepared a jacobinical coin. He (the Marquis of Lansdowne) had since seen a specimen of this coin; and so far was it from being jacobinical, that it bore the superscription of Queen Maria on one side, and the usual legend of Portugal on the other. The noble Secretary, therefore, was not 633 justified in attributing to any disloyal feeling at Terceira the interference of his Majesty's Government; an interference from which the French Government, though much less bound both by feelings of honour and considerations of interest, had abstained. There could not be a doubt that under the existing circumstances of Europe, the interest of Portugal ought to be dearer to this country than ever. The noble Secretary of State did not appear to have adverted to the; different situation in which we were placed with respect to the Continent by the events of the last two years. In that period we had seen the whole power of; Turkey, "our ancient Ally," reduced, If we calculated on creating any counterbalance to our loss of influence on the Continent by that occurrence, it could only be by creating an independent power in Greece. In the mean time the interests of Portugal ought to be considered as identified with our own. We had permitted France to obtain a preponderating influence in Spain. If it were our interest—as no one could doubt that it was—to exclude the other continental powers from the Peninsula it was more than ever our interest to maintain our ascendancy in Portugal. That ascendancy must depend on the feelings of gratitude and confidence entertained in that part of the Peninsula by those who had looked, who still looked, and who, he hoped, ever would look, to England for friendly cooperation and assistance. He trusted, therefore, that if by any "untoward event," by any inevitable misfortune, the consequences of which might, he hoped, still be averted—that if, from causes which were no longer in our power of control, although they had once been so, we were to be brought to a step humiliating to our own Sovereign and injurious to Portugal, and be compelled to acknowledge a prince who had shown himself faithless to the one, and a curse to the other, we should at least escape from the utter and disgraceful sacrifice of our honour by stipulating for the security of the lives and property of these unfortunate individuals who had been induced by a succession of appearances on our part, to embark their fortunes in a cause which had, unhappily, proved unsuccessful; and who in adhering to that cause, conceived that they were adhering to their British connexion. He would vote for his noble friend's Motion, 634 because it would enable the House to become possessed of the circumstances which had driven the country into the painful situation in which it was placed.
§ The Duke of Wellingtonsaid, he felt himself bound to say a few words in answer to what had fallen from the noble Mover for the papers, and the noble Lords who had followed him in the debate, particularly in relation to the transaction at Terceira. The noble Mover had said, that we were bound to the maintenance of the Constitution in Portugal on account of the part we had taken in its establishment, and the interest we had manifested in its success. It was hardly necessary for him to add a word in proof of the contrary fact, after the observations of his noble friend (the Foreign Secretary), and of the noble Marquis who had just addressed the House. He could assure their Lordships that if there was one point on which Mr. Canning was more anxiously earnest than another, it was in enforcing the opinion that England would not, and had no right, to interfere in upholding the Constitution in Portugal. If there was any subject on which that right hon. Gentleman took more pains than another, and the mass of correspondence on the subject was almost incredible, it was to impress the Powers of Europe with the conviction that the Constitution of Portugal was not the offspring of English influence, and that Sir Charles Stuart's agency in its being brought to Europe was solely in his capacity of Minister to the King of Portugal, and not as Ambassador from the King of England. Mr. Canning repeatedly urged the Powers of Europe to remain tranquil, and to aid the establishment of the Constitution by the countenance extended by their several Ambassadors at Lisbon, on the assurance that England would not at all interfere in its maintenance, and that it did not, as he had said, originate with the British Government. If, therefore, Mr. Canning were to be believed, we had no right to interfere in the matter; and as a consequence no steps to the enforcement of the Constitution should be taken.—But then it was said, by the noble Marquis (Lansdowne) and the noble Viscount (Melbourne) on the second bench, though you are not pledged to guarantee the Constitution, yet you are bound to protect it by the part taken by your Ambassador in the earlier stages of its existence. The question then was, in what capacity was Sir Charles 635 Stuart's name mixed up in the matter? It was not that of Ambassador from the King of England. Sir Charles Stuart went to the Emperor of Brazil as mediator of peace between his Brazilian Majesty, and his father, the King John of Portugal; being thus at the same time Ambassador to the former, and Minister Plenipotentiary to King John. The treaty of peace was signed and ratified, showing that Sir Charles was not, as had been stated, Ambassador from the King of Portugal to the King of Portugal, but to the Emperor of Brazil, to whom he at the same time acted the part of mediator. Dates would show, moreover, even if Mr. Canning's words were not sufficiently in the negative, that it would have been actually impossible for him to be the originator of the Portuguese constitution. King John of Portugal died on the 10th of March; the event of his death was known in this country on the 26th of that month; the intelligence reached Brazil on the 23rd of April; and on the 10th of May (the matter was concluded on the 6th of May so far as Sir Charles Stuart was concerned) the Constitution was promulgated by Don Pedro. Before the intelligence of King John's death had reached Brazil the Emperor had solicited Sir Charles Stuart's advice on the Constitution, and on his abdication of the Crown of Portugal in favour of his daughter; but Sir Charles very prudently abstained from giving any advice, and Don Pedro himself completed the act of abdication and the Charter of the Constitution. This act of abdication, it should be borne in mind, originated entirely with Don Pedro, for it was the object of Don John to secure the succession in his favour; and though the clause of abdication was introduced when the treaty was about to be ratified, King John addressed him afterwards, "My son and successor to the Crown of Portugal." After this he believed an application was made here by the Marquis Palmella, to have the succession of Don Pedro to the Crown of Portugal ratified by the British Government, so completely was the whole transaction not the result of British interference. Don Pedro, as their Lordships knew, had the Constitution so framed as to render it impossible to hold the two governments, so he resigned one in favour of his daughter. He mentioned these facts in order to show that dates alone would prove that we had no hand in the framing 636 of the Constitution which Don Pedro granted to Portugal. It was true that the tenor of Mr. Canning's letters of the 12th and 16th of July expressed a certain qualified approbation of the Constitution but Mr. Canning did no more than express his approval of its principles, telling the Portuguese to make their own unbiased selection, and whatever that should be, the British Government would acknowledge it, with a view to the happiness and security of the Portuguese people. He recommended to them the Constitution of Don Pedro, but he went no further, and never pledged himself or the country to its support. He further took pains, he repeated, to convince the Powers of Europe that the Constitution was not his nor the British Government's measure, but was the free act of the Brazilian Emperor.
The noble Duke proceeded next to contend that Don Miguel's regency was by no means owing to British influence at Vienna. The fact was, he said, that Don Miguel's being appointed had nothing to do with the transactions at Vienna. Don Miguel was first commanded by his brother to go to the Court of Rio Janeiro, but he refused. After that, and without at all consulting us on the subject—he (the Duke of Wellington) was not then in office, but could find no traces of any consultation, and believed there were not any— the Emperor of the Brazils appointed Miguel his Regent. It was true there was a conference between the ambassadors at Vienna on the appointment, and at this conference the British ambassador attended, but solely to induce Don Miguel to observe the terms of the Treaty under which he was appointed Regent, by shewing him that it had received the sanction of the British Government. It also was thought that his visiting England on his way to his regency would ensure his adherence to the oath he had taken, and conduce to preserve alive amicable relations between this country and Portugal. He said, then, that it was not owing to the transactions at Vienna, but to those at Brazil that Don Miguel was appointed Regent. We were no more than the depositories of his promise, that he would faithfully execute the Treaty under which he had been appointed Regent, and so far as he has violated that promise he had offered an indignity to his Majesty. But we had no claim on him whatsoever beyond this promise from any thing that 637 took place at Vienna. There were circumstances certainly which arose out of the Treaty of Vienna; but these had nothing to do with Don Miguel's appointment; and for this simple reason—that Don Pedro had no Ambassador at all at that Court. It was true, we took upon ourselves to request of Don Pedro the execution of the act of abdication; but though many months have elapsed since we made that request, the abdication has not arrived in Portugal, not even at this day. Much had been said about our abandoning what is called the British party in Portugal. Now, if any man had a right to say, that he was better acquainted than any other with the state of that country, it was himself, and he could confidently say, that he knew of no English party in Portugal. He certainly knew good Portuguese, and he knew of others who joined the French at the time of the invasion of Portugal by France, but a distinct English party never came within his knowledge. He believed, indeed, that the whole Portuguese nation, with some individual exceptions,—chiefly among those who had returned after the peace of 1814,—were anxious to preserve the alliance of this country, being sensible of the benefits which it conferred on them. It was a mistake—a gross mistake—one, indeed, which it was cruel to encourage—to assert that the force sent out in 1826 was sent out to enforce the Constitution. It had a very different object; and he defied noble Lords to infer, from the speeches that had been made by Ministers at the time in either House of Parliament, any design from that armament which had such an object. The noble Earl (Carnarvon) blamed the Government because the army was allowed to remain in Portugal after the necessity which occasioned the sending of it thither had ceased to exist—namely, after the cessation of foreign hostility. True, the army was allowed to remain in Portugal, but he believed that those who gave permission that the army should remain there did what was right and acted from the best motives. They were entreated to leave the army in Portugal by the head of the Government of that country. This request was made to Government about the beginning of September, when the army had received directions to withdraw. Don Miguel was expected to proceed to Portugal in December, and it would have been unfair, unkind, and opposed to that 638 spirit of conciliation which he hoped would always exist between this country and her allies, not to have consented to leave the army in Portugal till that period. The vessels which escorted Don Miguel to Portugal were destined to bring the army back to England, and in point of fact the army did embark in those ships. Don Miguel requested of our Ambassador that the army might remain some time longer; but the Ambassador refused, and the whole of the army was embarked, with the exception of a small body of troops which the Ambassador detained till he received further instructions from his Government. The noble Earl had stated that the British army ought to have prevented those acts of which he complained that Don Miguel had been guilty at the very earliest period after his arrival in Portugal. The officer commanding the army had been repeatedly directed not only by the Government which sent out the troops, but by the Government which succeeded it, to keep himself clear of all interference in the internal concerns of Portugal. Indeed, the only case in which he was instructed to interfere was in defence of the royal family, not excluding Don Miguel himself, because when those instructions were given, Don Miguel was not suspected. The noble Viscount (Melbourne) had said that our Ambassador ought to have been recalled. He (the Duke of Wellington), however, felt the highest satisfaction in acknowledging the great services which our Ambassador rendered to his country and to Europe on that occasion, by preserving unanimity in all the diplomatic corps, from the commencement to the latest moment of these proceedings. It should be borne in recollection, that the first acts of Don Miguel were not of so flagrant a character as those which he committed afterwards. If the right hon. Gentleman who represented his Majesty at Lisbon had withdrawn in consequence of Don Miguel's first acts, would his example have been followed by the Ambassadors from Austria and France, or the other principal Courts of Europe? Would not his secession have created division in the councils of the different Sovereigns with respect to this important question? and should we not have been involved in greater difficulties than we were placed in at the present moment? In his opinion great merit was due to the right hon. Gentleman for having waited and pro- 639 ceeded gradually, step by step, carrying with him throughout the proceedings the opinions and acts of his diplomatic colleagues, and thus giving to the united councils of Europe, headed by himself as the representative of this country, that unanimity and vigour which those councils ought always to exhibit. He must do the Ambassador the justice to say, that though he took those steps himself, his noble friend, the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and his noble friend whom he saw just now on the opposite bench (Earl Dudley), gave him directions from time to time in nearly exact conformity with the measures which he had taken, and on the same principle upon which he had acted. He now came to consider the case of Terceira. Before he did so, however, he begged to remind their Lordships of the situation in which this country stood after our army and Ambassador had been withdrawn from Portugal. We still remained, with our Consul-General at Lisbon. —we still remained bound by treaties with Portugal,—we still remained in the enjoyment of all our commercial relations. In this situation we were necessarily bound to observe the strictest neutrality,—first of all, with respect to the civil war which was going on at the moment of the departure of our army; and next, with respect to the contest which might be expected to ensue between Don Miguel and Don Pedro. In adopting this course his Majesty's Government followed the practice which had been observed by this country for many years preceding. He did not mean to say that our treaties with Portugal would not justify us in interfering to any extent in respect of any matters regarding the internal concerns of that country and the family of Braganza; but. for above one hundred and twenty years, and more particularly of late years, we had entirely avoided mixing ourselves up with any of the internal affairs of that kingdom. Since 1820 repeated applications had been made to this country to interfere in the internal affairs of Portugal. An application had been made to this country by King John, which, under the terms of our treaties with Portugal it was extremely difficult to resist, for assistance to enable him to get the better of the rebellion existing in the Brazils; and headed by his then son and heir. Another application was made by the republicans, who at one time had pos- 640 session of Lisbon, and endeavoured to establish a republic in Portugal. This party wanted us to guarantee the constitution and prevent foreign attack. We, however, had kept all these applications at a distance, and resisted them. He therefore could say, that in conformity with the practice of this country, particularly of late years, since 1820 and 1821, we were bound to avoid all interference in the internal concerns of Portugal. With respect to the disputes between King Pedro and Don Miguel, we had distinctly stated that between two branches of the house of Braganza we could not interfere. It was under these circumstances that a body of men were sent to this country who very soon after their arrival were organized at Plymouth on the footing of troops. The first communication which he received on the subject of these troops was from the Marquis Barbacena, who proposed that they should be sent to Terceira under the convoy of his Majesty's fleet. His noble friend opposite (Viscount Goderich) said that in his answer to the Marquis Barbacena's communication, he had misrepresented the object of his application. He was not aware that he had done so. He begged to call the attention of their Lordships to this circumstance, that throughout the correspondence he had never made use of the word Terceira. He considered the Azores as a whole, and that particular fact was a complete answer to most of the observations of his noble friend and the noble Marquis. He had considered the Azores as a whole, and he must say he should not have performed his duty towards this country, which was in the situation of a neutral, if he had allowed a body of troops to assemble here, and be taken to the Azores, in order to carry on war against the Sovereign de facto of those Azores. He would have had nothing to say to troops going to the Azores from France, or the Netherlands, or any other place except this country; but he could not permit them to sail from here without being guilty of a breach of neutrality. His noble friend stated, that in a subsequent part of the correspondence his noble friend the Secretary for Foreign affairs had considered the Azores as part of Africa, whilst he (the Duke of Wellington) considered it as part of Europe. He could assure his noble friend, that when he was speaking of the Azores, he never considered whether 641 they were part of Africa or of Europe. His object was, to prevent a breach of neutrality, and it mattered not to him whether the Azores were situated in Africa or in Europe. His noble friend, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had been supposed to have given permission to the troops to proceed to the Azores, because he considered the Azores to be part of Africa. Whoever read the correspondences would be convinced that that was not the fact. In his (the Duke of Wellington's) letter, he exposed the indecent subterfuge which was attempted to be practised on his noble friend, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, by representing that the persons who were desirous of proceeding to Terceira were unarmed men. He showed that they had arms with them. His noble friend opposite contended that the Government had committed a breach of the law of nations, by preventing those persons from landing at Terceira. He did not intend to argue the question with reference to the law of nations, about which much difference of opinion prevailed. He would, however, mention, that according to the best opinion he could obtain in this country, that act was not a breach of the law of nations. His noble friend said, that the Government ought to have given notice to the captain and seamen of the vessel, that they would not be allowed to proceed to Terceira. The captain and seamen were not exactly ignorant of the determination of Government on that point. They took out bills for Brazil; but they had not sufficient provisions and water on board to last during a third of the voyage to Brazil. Could it be pretended that they did not know what they were about,—that they did not know where they were going V He admitted, however, that this was no excuse for the Government. But what happened? As soon as they appeared off the Azores, they received notice. One of the captains of his Majesty's ships told them that they must not go in. What was their conduct? Did they say that they would not go in? No. They continued their course, notwithstanding the notice they had received on the spot, until they were obliged to turn about by a superior force. Was not a notice at sea as good as a notice in port? If not, the Government certainly was to blame; but he believed the majority of their Lordships would be of opinion one notice was 642 just as good as another. It was clear that notice was given before a shot was fired, and that, notwithstanding the notice, the parties to whom it was given persisted in their course. He must say, that Government proceeded with the utmost caution throughout the whole course of these transactions. The Government entreated that the men might be removed from Plymouth. In a conversation which he had with some individuals who possessed influence over them, at which his right hon. friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs was present, he entreated them to disperse the men, and not have them all collected at Plymouth. A list was made out of the number of men to be received in different towns. This list was made out according to a statement which Government received of their numbers. Government promised to give every assistance in its power in order to make their dispersed situation as convenient as possible. But dispersion did not suit the object which these individuals had in view. It was subsequently avowed that they were kept at Plymouth for the purpose of inspiring the Portuguese Government with terror. It was impossible for us to permit that state of things to exist. At the very moment when discussions were going on here with respect to the Portuguese troops at Plymouth, Government received intelligence from different parts of Europe that other bodies of troops were collecting at Lubeck, Hamburgh, Bremen, and even in Flanders. At that moment, also, an officer was sent, to Plymouth, who gave out a general order, in which he formally took command of the depot at Plymouth. What was the meaning of this? Did depot mean troops or private individuals? No doubt could be entertained that a body of troops was intended to be designated. When he looked back at these transactions, he was really astonished that he had had the coolness to bear with the conduct of the Marquis Barbacena. He was perfectly aware that it was in the power of Government to have dispersed the body of troops at Plymouth in a legal manner; but he begged to tell their Lordships that he could not have adopted that course without exciting more noise, objection, and opposition, than had been occasioned by the measures actually adopted to show that this country was determined to preserve neutrality. He would put a case to 643 their Lordships. Supposing Don Miguel had sent here to say that a body of troops were collected at Plymouth in order to invade his dominions, he would like to know what he must have done under those circumstances. Was he to say "It is no such thing—there are no troops at Plymouth?" Or was he to say "True, the troops are here, but I will not disperse them, or prevent them from invading your dominions?" Were we to go to war to protect those persons who were doing that which was derogatory from his honour? He really must say that his noble friend opposite had not considered either the difficulties of the case, or the difficulties of the position in which the Government was placed. He was sorry to say, that since that time those persons, by means of subterfuge and passing from one country to another, had succeeded in arriving at Terceira. He hoped that this country would feel no inconvenience from their occupation of the Azores. He must tell their Lordships that if the other Governments of Europe had done their duty in the way in which we had performed ours, Europe would have had a better chance of a permanent peace resulting from recent transactions between Portugal and Brazil, than it possessed at the present moment. Not that our Government entertained an apprehension-of war; but he must say, that the state of things at Terceira was not that which ought to have been and would have been, if the other powers of Europe had done their duty as the Government of this country had done. He had made their Lordships acquainted with his objections to the production of the papers called for by the Motion. The question stood at the present moment. in precisely the same state in which it stood when it last came under their Lordships' consideration, and he hoped their Lordships would not insist upon the production of the papers until Ministers should advise his Majesty to lay them before Parliament.
§ Viscount Melbournesaid, he still retained his opinion that this country ought to have taken more energetic measures in support of those individuals who had advocated the constitution in Portugal, and that opinion was strengthened by the declaration of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that he would not look with favour upon any arrangement which did not include an amnesty for those individuals. 644 In consequence of the course which Government had pursued, we had lost the friendship, not only of the English party in Portugal, but of the whole country. He thought he had made out a special ground for the production of information, and therefore he would take the sense of the House upon his Motion.
§ Their Lordships divided,— Content 21; Not Content 52;—Majority 31.