Lord Kingsaid, he wished to call their lordships' attention to a subject which appeared to him to be of great importance. He found that his attendance was required in that House for hearing appeal causes at the bar. Now, he wished to learn, from such of their lordships as were better acquainted with the subject than he could pretend to be, whether he was, in consequence of this order, which required him to hear causes, also bound to vote on them? If he must vote, he was also desirous of knowing whether, in the case of his happening to withdraw himself before the hearing of a cause should be concluded, he would still be obliged to give his vote upon it? If these inquiries should be answered in the affirmative, he would then be glad to be informed, how he should act on a cause which was to come on, he believed, on Monday next. The cause to which he alluded was intituled "Connolly and wife," and had been heard before. For his part, however, he knew nothing of it; and he must therefore beg for instruction from their lordships how he was to vote. He had no idea whatever of the case, and was most anxious to do no injustice either to Connolly or his wife. But, would none of their lordships tell him what he was to do? Was he to take a hint from some one of the big wigs which their lordships occasionally saw rising a few inches above the bar? Or was he to be directed by that equilateral triangular hat which lay there? [looking towards the woolsack.] Or might he vote, as was done in some cases, without hearing any thing on the subject, by proxy? Their lordships had, in their wisdom determined, that each peer was to hear only fractions of causes; but, how was this to be reconciled with the mode of voting by wholesale? Now, if vote he must on the above case, he hoped their lordships would put him in possession of the means of voting rightly. He should doubtless be furnished with 641 the notes which he supposed the peers who had already sat on the case must have taken; for they were the judges, and it was the practice of judges to take notes of the causes which were heard before them. Their lordships well knew the value which was placed on the notes of judges, and he would wish those taken in that House to be printed. If, however, it should unfortunately happen that the peers who had heard this case, had taken no notes, and that he would nevertheless be required to vote on it, then he would most humbly beg of their lordships to amend their order, and direct that all peers sitting on appeals, should keep notes of the cases they heard. Thus their lordships would have before them the wisdom and information of their predecessors, and the labours of the sitting part of the peers would enable those who had to vote, to perform their judicial functions properly. This new mode of hearing causes, he believed, had been invented for the purpose of expediting the business of the House; but it appeared to him to have only the effect of keeping away the noble and learned lord whom he considered the most efficient judge of appeal causes. The noble and learned lord was a very great friend of the church; but, what would the noble and learned lord say to a rector, who, wishing to be relieved from the burthen of his clerical duties, should get a curate to perform them for him, but instead of paying the curate out of his own emoluments should leave him to be paid by the parish? This would doubtless appear to the noble and learned lord a very singular arrangement. Having put one ecclesiastical case, he would, with their lordships' leave, suppose another. What would be thought of a bishop, or a clergyman, who should declare from his pulpit, that a person had stated "an utter falsehood?." What would the noble and learned lord think of the reverend person who should thus express himself respecting the character of another, in a place where what he said could not be answered? He was quite sure that the noble and learned lord would be the last man in the world to give his approbation to such conduct.