HL Deb 05 July 1820 vol 2 cc195-207
Lord Dacre

said, he held in his hand a petition from her majesty. Her majesty expressed her surprise at the nature of the document on their lordships table. She also stated, that she had a variety of weighty matters to urge for their lordships consideration, and that it was most important that she should be hoard in this stage by counsel. He should merely remark, that when her majesty stated that it was necessary for her defence that she should be heard at this period, he did not think it would be becoming in their lordships to refuse her prayer. He would add, that he had been assured from a quarter, the authority of which he could not doubt, that to allow her majesty to be now heard by counsel, instead of delaying, would greatly tend to expedite the proceedings in this very lamentable case. He moved that the petition be read. It was as follows:—

"CAROLINE R.

"The Queen observing that a most extraordinary report has been presented to the House of Lords by their lordships secret committee, and now lies upon the table of the House, represents to the House that she is prepared at this moment to defend herself against it as far as she can understand its import; and has also Various weighty matters to urge to their lordships touching the same, and which it is absolutely necessary for her future defence to have stated at the present stage of these proceedings;—The Queen therefore desires that she may this day be heard on the subject matter thereof, by her counsel."

The Earl of Liverpool

could see no ground for such an application as that which was now made, merely on a notice for the introduction of a bill. It really appeared to him, that the advice which must in this instance have been given to the illustrious petitioner was of a most extraordinary nature. She applied to be heard in the present stage by counsel; but their lordships were as yet in no stage whatever of the proceeding. A commit- tee, appointed by their lordships, had made a report. On that report an individual member of the House had given notice that he would present a bill. This was all that had been done, and he could not understand on what principle this could be considered an occasion for hearing counsel. If the noble lord waited until the bill was introduced and read a first time, it would be competent to him to renew his application, on the propriety of which their lordships would then decide; but at present it appeared totally irrelevant. If he was permitted to lay the bill on the table, a copy would be sent to her majesty, and then would be the time to state any objection which it might be thought fit to make to the measure.

Lord Dacre

was aware that he was placed in a difficult situation when he offered the petition to their lordships; for, as he was not acquainted with the circumstances on which the application was founded, it was not in his power to state particular grounds for inducing their lordships to grant the prayer of the petition. He was, therefore, obliged to confine himself to general reasons, or to suppositions. The noble earl had made it an objection to the application, that her majesty had no regular means of being acquainted with their lordships' proceedings. Now, though no regular communication had been made, was it not a sufficient ground for presenting a petition, when an individual of high station, like her majesty, heard of such a step being intended as the bill of which the noble earl had given notice? If her majesty thought it necessary to make some statements which she believed it would be important to her interests should now be heard, would their lordships refuse her prayer? He had stated that he was not acquainted with the reasons of her majesty's application; but he would put a case hypothetically. He I would suspose—but he begged to be understood that he had no information whatever on the subject—that her majesty wished to submit to their lordships, by counsel, reasons why the proceeding against her should not be by bill The noble lord had argued that the period for considering her majesty's application would be when the bill was on the table.; but if the ground of the application was what he supposed, the proper time would then be passed. Her majesty might have strong grounds for preferring a judicial to a legislative proceeding. Considering, then, the high station of the illustrious petitioner—considering the delicate situation in which she was placed—and considering also the interest which these proceedings had excited from one end of the country to the other, he trusted their lordships would pause before they excluded her majesty from making any statement important to her honour and character—perhaps even to her life

Lord Ellenborough

could not admit that the situation or rank of the petitioner afforded any reason for their lordships departing from their usual course. Whether a petition came from a princess, or from one of the lowest subjects in the kingdom, their lordships were bound to act according to the principles of equal justice. He therefore thought that the House would best perform its duty by refusing to extend any facility in the present case, which they would not be inclined to grant to another person under similar circumstances. He would vote against the petition for this reason—that it asked that which, if prayed for by any other individual in the country, would not be granted.

Earl Grey

admitted that the question under consideration was one of some difficulty, but he reminded their lordships that that difficulty arose out of the extraordinary course of proceeding which they had thought fit to sanction on this unhappy occasion. In the sentiment expressed by the noble lord who spoke last, that it was the duty of that House to administer impartial. and equal justice to all persons, whether high or low, he most sincerely concurred; but at the same time he must observe, that the present was a case so peculiar in its circumstances, that ordinary rules did not apply to it. Her majesty was arraigned by a committee appointed by their lordships on charges unheard of in modern times. He must ask, then, whether the particular circumstances of such a case did not require particular attention on the part of their lordships? At the same time he was far from proposing that an undue advantage should be extended to her majesty. All that he desired was, that she should not come before them under any disadvantage from the course of proceeding they had adopted. And here let him ask, in what situation her majesty stood? Their lordships were not informed of the particular object of the bill which the noble earl was about to introduce; but he would suppose that it wight be a bill for the dissolution of the marriage of her majesty with the king, Then how different would be the situation of her majesty from that of every other individual against whom a proceeding of divorce is instituted! No case of the kind could ever come before their lordships, unless previous proceedings had been gone through in the ecclesiastical court, and some one of the courts below. The effect of this course was, to give the party accused full possession of all the particulars of the charge, and the details of the evidence to be brought against her. Of that advantage her majesty was deprived; but she was placed under the great disadvantage of their lordships' committee having reported, that evidence, supported by the testimony of various persons, charged her with an adulterous connexion of the worst description, and with a long course of licentious conduct. He would ask, then, whether, under this peculiarity of situation, it was not natural that her majesty should wish to have the opportunity of counteracting the impression which such a report might make on the public, if not on their lordships? The noble lord opposite had observed, that her majesty could have regularly no knowledge of the proceeding which had taken place in the House. This objection had been already answered by his noble friend who presented the petition; but he must take the liberty farther to remind their lordships, that this was nut the first petition which had been presented from her majesty. One had been laid on the table, and counsel heard on it, before the committee proceeded to their inquiry. It was not then stated, that her majesty could have no knowledge of the appointment of the committee, though of that appointment she certainly could have no more regular knowledge than of the report. He confessed that he felt that there was, to say the least, much inconvenience in the proceeding then adopted. He was not satisfied in his own mind of the propriety of allowing counsel to be heard against the appointment of the committee. He was, however, unwilling to object to the proceeding, lest the result should have conveyed the appearance of the House being disposed to prevent a course which was thought necessary to her majesty's defence. On that account he acquiesced in the motion. But as their lordships did not object to hearing counsel on that occasion, he must observe, that on comparison her majesty's claim to be heard at present was much stronger. The noble lord objected to counsel being heard, because this was no stage of the proceeding. He would be glad to know in what stage their lordships were when they heard counsel before? The question was not whether the report could come regularly to her majesty's knowledge or not: it appeared to him that a sufficient ground for her application was laid, when she stated that she had weighty matters to submit which it was important that their lordships should hear at this time. Considering the deep sympathy taken in her majesty's situation—considering the agitation into which the public mind was thrown by the proceedings—though it would be far from his inclination to advise their lordships to yield to any popular clamour, he did think that, when such a claim on their justice as that which now came from her majesty was made, it could not be either for the public interest or the honour of the House to stand too much upon precedents. It had indeed been repeatedly stated, on all sides, that this was a case without precedent. It therefore was one in which their lordships could not be bound by the rules applicable to common cases. Without venturing to give any positive opinion, he had thus stated the grounds on which the inclination of his mind led him to conclude that the prayer of the petition ought to be granted.

The Lord Chancellor

declared, that he entered on this question, as he would on every other connected with the present proceedings, with an impartiality which could not be affected by any thing that might have occurred in the late investigation. He had heard a great deal on that and former occasions of objection to the inquiry by a secret committee. On this subject it was not his intention to say a word more than this—that he did not think their lordships could have acted rightly without adopting that measure, and that ministers would have violated their duty had they not proposed it. With regard to the present question, he would be glad to know where, in the history of parliament, it was to be found that counsel were ever admitted to be heard against a measure of some kind or other not yet submitted to their lordships, but which some noble lord was expected to propose. Would their lordships consider for a moment what would be the consequence of such a practice? He did not go the length of saying that a bill must on every occasion be received on its being offered to their lordships' consideration; but their practice differed thus much from that of the other House of Parliament—that when a noble lord had to present a bill, he did not ask leave to bring it in. Now, let the subject who petitioned be high or low, he would ask their lordships whether they were prepared to hear counsel against the privilege of a peer to present a bill? [No, no, from the opposition side.] He thought, however, that was in effect the object of the petition. He was anxious that, in all their lordships proceedings, impartiality should be observed. He should be ashamed of himself as a peer of parliament, if he did not know, when he came to decide on a case, how to dismiss from his mind every thing that passed in a preliminary inquiry. There were cases in which juries would, in the same manner, have to pay no attention to preceding evidence. Suppose an accessary to a crime admitted an evidence, and, confessing his guilt before a jury, did not tell all he knew, and should therefore be put on trial himself before the same jury that had heard his confession;—that jury, would not be warranted in finding him guilty unless the charge was supported by other evidence. Their lordships ought to take care that rights which they possessed for the benefit of all the community were not infringed on account of a particular case. Was it ever before imagined that counsel could be heard against the right of a noble lord to present a bill? This appeared to him one of the most extraordinary and inadmissible propositions ever made to the House.

The Marquis of Lansdowne

maintained, that all the inconvenience which had been felt, and the threatened injustice which was now complained of, had arisen from the extraordinary course of proceeding proposed by the ministers of the Crown, and acceded to by their lordships. Every word uttered by the noble and learned lord on the woolsack, against the agreeing to the prayer of this petition, applied with much greater force to a proceeding already adopted, namely, the hearing of counsel on a former occasion, in consequence of an application from her majesty. For what was the nature of that application, and what was its tendency? The noble and learned lord had maintained, that the present petition had a tendency to intercept the course of their proceedings. Now, if there ever was an application which tended more than another to intercept their proceedings, it was the queen's former message. The application, then, was intended not directly to oppose the adoption of a measure against her majesty, but to prevent the House from making itself acquainted with the king's message, which it had appointed a committee to investigate. The House alone was the fit judge to decide whether it would make itself acquainted with the contents of the papers submitted to it by the Crown; and yet, on the allegation that the queen might be affected by the result of its inquiry, her majesty's counsel were heard against entertaining that inquiry. How did the case stand now? The proceeding of their lordships at present assumed a distinct character of charge and accusation against the queen. The question was not now, whether the secret committee should meet and examine documents affecting her interest and character. They had examined those papers, and had embodied the charges contained in them in the report on the table. Against that report the application of her majesty was directed; and when it was stated by the noble lord that her majesty had no means of knowing, without a breach of privilege, what was going on in their lordships' House, he would call their lordships' attention to the introductory sentence of the message which they had received from her majesty a few days ago:—"The Queen," it said, "having been informed that proceedings are about to be instituted against her in the House of Lords, feels it necessary to approach your lordships as a petitioner and a fellow-subject." The noble lord then acquiesced in the propriety of her possessing that information, the knowledge of which now was declared irregular, and was to be made the ground for resisting the application which proceeded from it. The noble and learned lord on the woolsack had not only denied that her majesty could be cognizant of the proceedings of the House, but had gone further, and had said the petition could not be complied with, because it was directed against a bill not yet submitted to their lordships, and consequently not known to be in existence. When he heard the noble and learned lord making use of this language, he could scarcely believe his ears. The expression of being heard against a bill was not to be found in the whole of the petition. Her ma- jesty made no mention of a bill, or of any intention to introduce one. She stated, that she had been informed that a report was presented to their lordships from a committee to whom certain papers were submitted, and prayed that she might be heard by her counsel to answer the allegations of that report, on which future proceedings were recommended, and to state certain facts necessary for her future defence. He, in perfect ignorance of the reasons which her majesty might allege by her counsel at the bar—in perfect ignorance of the nature or the importance of the information which she offered to communicate—in perfect ignorance of all that she wished or intended to state, was compelled to admit the possibility of her being able to bring forward sufficient objections against the mode of proceeding in contemplation, to prevent its adoption. Feeling, therefore, that this might be the case—feeling that important explanations might be given—feeling that sufficient reasons might be adduced for abandoning the intended measure, or materially altering its nature—feeling that the rule which their lordships were now urged to enforce had been broken through in an instance much less connected with public justice—and being convinced that, though some inconvenience might result from departing from their accustomed forms, or establishing a new precedent, their course, in complying with the prayer of the petition, would be conformable with that justice which they were anxious to administer, and evince that impartiality which they were desirous to exhibit; he would vote for granting the prayer of the petition.

Lord Redesdale

apprehended that there was a great difference between the circumstances in which the last application had been received, and those which attended the present. In the former case, there was a proceeding before the House which her majesty prayed might be abandoned—in the present, there was none. But what was the prayer of the petition? It was that the queen might be heard by counsel, to state certain facts necessary for her future defence. It was not for her present defence that she was to make these statements, nor did they relate to any proceeding on a specific charge. If, then, their lordships should agree to hear counsel on an application so indefinite, how could their lordships limit their arguments? They might go on to any length—they might talk of every thing or any thing that they might think necessary for her majesty's future defence. The proceeding appeared to him of an extraordinary nature, and, though shown to be analogous to one previously adopted, was not therefore justifiable. Because their lordships might have acted wrong once, that was no reason why they should act wrong a second time.

Lord Holland

said, that the noble and learned lord who had just sat down had quite mistaken the objects of the petition. They were twofold. The petition prayed, first, that her majesty might be heard by counsel against certain allegations in a report before their lordships; and secondly, that she might be allowed to communicate certain weighty matters connected with her future defence. He admitted that this was an extraordinary proceeding, and that a compliance with the petition would be a departure from the usual forms of their lordships' House; but when this was stated was it to be forgotten that their forms had recently, in this case, been violated? The noble earl opposite had said, that the report on the table could not properly be known beyond the walls of the House; but was this an answer to her majesty, who, having been informed of its nature, prayed to be heard by her counsel against its allegations? He knew that, strictly speaking, nothing could be known or taken notice of out of parliament which took place within it; but was this rule always or even generally, observed? When an impeachment was brought against any noble lord before the other House of Parliament, the party was allowed, on application, to be heard in his defence; and it was never pleaded, in bar of his being so heard, that he must necessarily be ignorant of the existence of the charge. There was here a charge against her majesty in the report of a secret committee. If the House were to follow the strict rule in one case, they ought to do it in all; and he would engage to show precedent for granting the prayer of this petition, if the noble lords opposite would show him a charge of criminality on the report of a secret committee. The whole course of proceeding in this case, was of an anomalous and unprecedented nature; and when rules were violated to the prejudice of her majesty, it was not asking too much to require the same indulgence for her defence. A noble lord had said, that justice should be administered with an impartial hand to all ranks; and that he would not grant more to the illustrious petitioner in this case than he would to the meanest subject. But if she could claim no advantage above her fellow-subjects, ought she to be subject to any additional inconvenience? and did the noble lord mean to say that the lowest subject of the land would be exposed to the imputations of a green bag report, without an opportunity of refuting or contradicting them? The whole proceedings were at variance with justice and precedent, and precedent was only pleaded as a bar to justice. From the beginning to the end of them there had been no rule, no form, no precedent, no regularity. Looking at the case, and taking into view the whole of what their lordships had done, he would say, that it was one to which the forms of law could not apply, and therefore their lordships had fallen into so many anomalies; but if there had been a departure from form and precedent in the prosecution, was it right that the illustrious personage affected by these irregularities should, in making her defence, be fettered down to the strict forms of law? It was wrong to attend to forms, when, by adhering to them, substantial injustice would be done. All forms that broke through the laws of substantial justice should be disregarded; and parliament, especially in a case which was confessedly without precedent, should not enforce the observance of forms which would take away from an accused party any means of defence. He could not but observe on one remark that had fallen from the learned lord on the woolsack. The learned lord had said, in speaking of the report on the table, that their lordships who had made it could dismiss from their minds as judges, the impressions which they had received as members of the committee; and he had illustrated his observation by referring to the case of a jury, before whom a person who had been heard, as a witness, confessing his guilt, should afterwards be tried as a criminal denying it. Now, he would say, that the cases might be parallel, if the latter were true; but he apprehended that the same jury could not try the two cases, and that the criminal would bring a valid objection against any juryman in the second case, by saying that he had sat in the box when the first was tried. In saying this he did not mean to assert that all the noble lords who composed the committee must ne- cessarily be prejudiced; but he would maintain, that by the analogies of law, they had disqualified themselves from sitting as judges by reporting as a committee. The whole of the proceedings had, indeed, been most irregular and unprecedented. A report had been made on documentary evidence—evidence not known to be received, legally speaking, under the sanction of an oath. Against that report her majesty prayed to be heard by her counsel. It was perfectly true that the petition was unusual, as it was directed, not against any known act of their lordships, but against a prospective measure, and offering information necessary for a future defence; but if this proceeding was extraordinary, it arose out of a course of extraordinary proceedings, which constituted its justification. A learned lord had said, that though their lordships might have acted wrong formerly, that was no reason why they should act wrong again. But strong objections existed against the former petition which did not now exist If they compared this case to an impeachment, the analogy would be in favour of her majesty's counsel being heard. She would have been heard in such circumstances in the House of Commons. The report against which she prayed to be heard recommended a legislative proceeding. Now the facts which she might communicate, or the defence that she might make in this stage of the business, might tend either to quash proceedings entirely, or show the propriety of adopting a measure different from that contemplated. A crime was alleged—a form of proceeding was in consequence recommended; and her majesty stated, that she had a contradictory statement to make to the charge, and weighty matters to bring forward regarding her future defence. It might not be regular to hear her defence, if the precedents of common bills were followed; but no fixed precedents for bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties existed. They had been often passed, but they were always considered anomalous. There had been many observations made about them lately, but it had never been said that the common rules followed in passing other bills were to be observed. He did feel this petition to be irregular, if common forms were to be adhered to—he did feel it an intrusion—he did think it an extraordinary step; but as their lordships had themselves departed from precedent in the way of bringing accusa- tion, they should now allow a departure in the line of indulgence, and extend that privilege in defence which they had exercised in the charge.

The Marquis of Buckingham

concurred with his noble friend, that the House had placed itself in a situation of some difficulty, by agreeing, in the former instance, to hear counsel at the bar. But there was this difference between the present case, and that in which the petition was assented to; that then there was a proceeding pending, whereas now there was none. In the former instance their lordships had appointed a secret committee, they had suspended the sitting of that committee, and in the interval her majesty had applied to be heard by counsel, against the proceeding. It was possible that their lordships might, after the arguments of counsel, have prevented the meeting of the secret committee, and voted that they should proceed no further. But what was their situation now? The committee had made their report, and the noble earl had given notice of a bill founded on that report: in the interval there was no proceeding. Suppose, then, that the counsel were permitted to plead, on what proceeding could the House divide, after having heard the arguments? They would not determine that the noble lord should not bring in his bill. What then could they do the moment after counsel had withdrawn, which they could not have done without hearing one word of the argument? Her majesty did not pray to be heard against the proceeding. There was none before the House. When the proceeding was instituted, then was the time to make any application connected with her defence, and God forbid that he, or any one, should object to grant any thing, which might be necessary to her defence, or, if possible her justification.

The Earl of Darnley

contended, that the report of the committee was a proceeding of the most serious nature, on which her majesty had a right to present a petition. The situation in which they stood was one in which they had no analogy to guide them, and they were placed in that situation by a series of measures which appeared to him objectionable in many respects. But how did they stand at present? After referring the case of the queen to a secret committee, her majesty had petitioned to be heard by counsel. He knew nothing of the facts; he wished much that it was possible for him to know no more; but if they refused the request of the queen in the present instance, it would seem as if they had not granted her all the advantages which her defence required. He trusted, therefore, that the House would not refuse the application.

Lord Dacre

again stated the two objects of the petition, namely, first, to repel the charge in the report; and, 2dly, to state certain weighty matters necessary for the future defence of her majesty. Thinking that her majesty's counsel ought now to be heard in support of these points, he would move that they be now called in.

The question was put and negatived.