HL Deb 05 July 1820 vol 2 cc207-12
The Earl of Liverpool

said, that in rising to propose the bill founded on the report of the secret committee, he thought it unnecessary to enter into any statements for the purpose of impressing on their lordships the importance of the measure. The preamble of the bill spoke for itself; and it would undoubtedly be for those who would be employed officially in conducting the prosecution to prove at their lordships' bar the truth of the allegations contained in that bill. Under these circumstances, he should most deeply regret if, in this stage of the proceeding, any thing should take place in that House to create more prejudice in the public mind, or in the minds of their lordships, than must unavoidably arise from the nature of the accusation. With respect to the course of proceeding which had been adopted, he certainly did not feel disposed to revive former discussions; but he must say, after having consulted his noble and learned friend on the woolsack, and after having given the best consideration to the question, that if he had now to retrace the steps he had taken, he knew not how he could move in any other course than that which had been decided on. He knew it had been thrown out that the course of impeachment was open to their lordships. He had then stated what difficulties he conceived to lie in the way of such a proceeding; and, without going over his argument again, it appeared to him to be a matter of grave doubt whether a constitutional impeachment could lie, if he might use the expression, on account of the commission of a crime not recognised by the common law of this country. He thought he said enough to justify government in adopting the course that had been taken, when the propriety of proceeding by impeachment rested only on a doubtful opinion. Some of the highest law authorities in that House entertained the opinion that they could not proceed by impeachment. This doctrine was held by his noble and learned friend on the woolsack, by another noble and learned lord (Erskine) who had filled that situation, and by a third who had borne a distinguished part in the administration of the criminal law of the country. On a question of this kind it was necessary to proceed on safe grounds, no matter what feeling might be attached to it. Here a point of doubt was raised, and it was to be considered, whether, in consequence of that doubt, any proceeding in the nature of impeachment might not have failed, not on account of the substantive merits of the case, but wholly in consequence of pursuing a wrong course in the first instance. Therefore he must contend, that a bill, in the nature of a bill of pains and penalties, was the most proper measure to be tendered to their lordships. Indeed, it was the only measure that was fairly open to parliament on this occasion. Their lordships were all aware, that this was not a subject on which proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts, or the courts of common law, could be taken. If therefore, proceedings could not be instituted there and if they could not institute an impeachment, justice could only be obtained through the means of some legislative proceedings to be pursued in parliament. This had already been stated in the House, and the only question then for consideration was, in which House of parliament the proceedings should most properly commence. He had stated, that by the law and constitution of the country it was competent for either House of parliament to take this step; but he had also stated, at the same time, that it was more particularly fitting that the proceeding should commence in the House of Lords. From the fairness of the mode of trial in that House, and the power their lordships had to examine evidence on oath at their bar, he conceived there was a greater chance that substantial justice would be done between the parties there than in the House of Commons. He might state farther, that though this could not be considered a bill of divorce, in the common and ordinary sense of the word, still its effect would be the same. The king and the queen did not come be- fore them as individuals; it was a question between the accused party, in her capacity of queen, and the state itself. Yet as it must necessarily relate, in some degree, to the marriage contract between the king and the queen, it was on that ground more consistent with the dignity of the parties that it should come there, than be brought in the first instance before the other House of parliament. The only question that remained was, whether this bill should have been brought in originally under the responsibility of the executive government, or whether it was not more proper to submit the documents in the first instance to a secret committee. He had reconsidered this question: he had reconsidered it with reference to principle and to precedent; and he had no hesitation in saying that, with reference to either, he thought the course adopted by their lordships was the just one. He would venture to say, that there could be found no instance where measures of this kind were adopted without previous inquiry. When he said this, let it not be supposed that ministers wished to shrink from responsibility. The precedents which they had followed would not weaken that responsibility; their wish in calling for a committee was, not to bring forward any measure on the mere ipse dixit of the ministers of the day, but to have some intermediate inquiry, which might prove that there was a proper ground for the present proceeding. He had already said, that a thousand reasons might so operate on the minds of a committee as to induce them not to make such a report as had been made, and which could not be considered as judicially sufficient. But, if such were likely to be the case, what would be the danger of a disclosure of the evidence which must, in the first instance, have accompanied a proceeding by ministers? They had carefully abstained from any disclosure of that nature before the measure was actually brought in, because they wished as far as possible to avoid prejudicing the case of the accused party. He was, however, free to say, that the bill on their lordships' table, founded on the allegations contained in the report, did tend to create some degree of prejudice: he was ready to admit that fact: it was an unavoidable consequence; for there was nothing in the form of justice, though it went to protect an individual who was accused, that did not tend to excite some prejudice. Even where a person was taken into custody, and brought before a magistrate on oath, though the administration of the oath was meant to assist the individual accused, still it went, to a certain extent, to raise a prejudice against him: it was a circumstance that arose out of the very nature of justice itself. It was, in such cases, necessary to consider the two branches of the question, and to decide whether the advantage to the individual accused, and for whose protection the law was intended, was not greater than any temporary prejudice to which its administration might expose him. The present question was, however, one of a most extensive nature: it was one in which great state considerations interfered, as well as others of a more private and delicate character. Therefore it was that he conceived the course now about to be pursued was the best: it combined the sound and substantial principles of justice with a proper view of the practical end that was sought to be obtained.—He would now state to their lordships what the nature of the bill was. It was a bill of pains and penalties, and its preamble would point out with as much particularity as was ever displayed in any criminal case, and as much as the nature of the circumstances required, the offences charged against the accused party. Assuming that the allegations in the preamble were proved, it proceeded to deprive her majesty of the title, prerogatives, rights, privileges, and exemptions of queen-consort of this realm, and it also went to dissolve the marriage between his majesty and the queen. This was the nature of the bill, which enacted no penal consequences over and above those he had stated. It had been endeavoured to frame the bill in a manner that should not bear more severely on the illustrious personage accused than the safety of the state and the ends of substantial justice required. With respect to any question relative to a provision for the illustrious personage, their lordships must be aware that it could not originate in that House. The allegations of guilt were to be found in the preamble of the bill, and for the proof of those allegations he would propose that it should go to the second reading. He trusted their lordships would endeavour to discharge this duty, as they had discharged every other judicial duty in which they had been engaged, in such a fair and impartial manner as would entitle them to the respect and confidence of the country—that re- spect and confidence which they had always deserved. As to the more immediate proceedings, he wished a copy of the bill to be forwarded in the most respectful manner to the illustrious individual concerned. The next question would be whether their lordships would fix a period for the second reading now, or postpone the determination on that point for two or three days, in order to learn what the wishes of the illustrious individual on the subject were. If he were called on to name a day, he would propose the second reading for that day fortnight, as a proper and reasonable time for a measure of this description; and during that period their lordships would have an opportunity of considering what their future course of proceeding should be. He trusted that the administration would be found to act on this occasion with the utmost calmness and deliberation. It was a most important question, and called for dispassionate inquiry. It would be his endeavour, and he was sure it would be the endeavour of all their lordships, to discharge their duty firmly, but with all due lenity and mildness towards the illustrious person whose conduct had been brought under consideration. It was most satisfactory to reflect that the country had no precedents of a case similar to the present, during a period of 200 years, except in the instance of one individual, who never came over to this country. There had not been a queen in this country during that time against whom even a whisper of shame had been raised to affect her character or sully her reputation. It was a matter of deep satisfaction to reflect, that for the last sixty years this country had derived the greatest benefits from the example of the illustrious individual who, during that long period, had shared the throne of England, and who bad by that example contributed most essentially to the moral character and moral feeling of the country. The individual to whom he had before referred was unknown to this country as its queen; and he had hoped that their lordships and the country would in this, as in that instance, have been spared the shame and scandal that must arise from an investigation of this nature, whatever its result might be. He felt that he, in common with their lordships, was placed in a situation in which they had no alternative: the question now was, if those allegations were proved to be true, whether impunity should be extend- ed to guilt, or justice should be suffered to triumph? Nothing now remained for their lordships to do, but to pursue a clear and straight-forward course—to perform their duty boldly—determined, whatever public clamours might exist, to take care that public justice was satisfied.

The Bill, of which the following is a Copy, was then read by the Clerk: