The Earl of Darnleyrose and said:
My lords; Under the most favourable circumstances—with public attention perfectly alive to the subject, and with all the charms of novelty to recommend it—I am not vain enough to imagine that any thing brought forward by me can have much claim to the attention of the House; but when I consider the many and unusual disadvantages under which I labour on the present occasion, I am under the necessity 724 of soliciting a more than usual portion of your lordships' indulgence. Nothing, indeed, but a sense of duty, and the desire to appear consistent, would have induced me, at this late period of the session, with, other objects of more immediate interest, and of greater importance than this (however important I may still think it) pressing upon your attention, to attempt to divert it for a moment, to the mass of papers on your table, for which I have moved in order to prove the assertions I have heretofore made, on the conduct of the late War with America, and more especially the Naval Administration of the Country. I certainly could have wished that the task of calling your attention to this subject had originally fallen into other and better hands. I am fully aware of the difficulty of doing justice to so extensive and complicated a subject; and think I have some reason to complain that, among near a thousand members, of which the two Houses of Parliament are collectively composed, there should be found no one, but the humble individual who has now the honour of addressing your lordships, to call for an inquiry into those repeated naval disasters, which more than two years since first impelled me irresistibly to bring forward that most interesting subject.
On that occasion, your lordships, it is true, thought fit to reject my motion for inquiry; but I have the satisfaction to reflect, that your time was not altogether thrown away. I flatter myself that my attempt to direct the attention of Government more particularly to the causes of the disasters of which I complained did not altogether fail. Certain it is, that, from whatever cause, about that time they began to equip and construct a larger description of frigates, of which there are at present, as appears by one of the papers on the table, twelve in commission, whereas at that time there was not one; the Endymion, the only one in existence, not having then been fitted out. The manning, however, of ships, is of far more consequence than their construction. For I will venture to assert that the difference of a few more guns is comparatively of little importance, provided the two ships opposed to each other are upon something like an equality in the number and description of their crew. I believe, if the ships had been tolerably well manned, the three successive disasters of the Guerriere, the Macedonian, and the Java, would not have taken place. The last of these was 725 the immediate cause of my having originally brought the subject before the House; and I cannot but recollect that the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty on that occasion stated, that at least the Java was adequately manned. In point of numbers she certainly was; but injustice to the memory of her gallant and lamented commander, I must now state, what I have lately learnt from the best authority, that the crew of the Java was of the worst possible description, composed, in the first place, of a small and weak crew of a frigate, paid off in the river, and sent to Portsmouth just before the ship sailed, and made up to the number wanted by that of a sloop of war sent home from the West Indies, for having shown symptoms of mutiny, and disinclination to fight against the Americans. Captain Lambert was so well aware of the nature of his ship's complement, that nothing but a sense of duty, paramount to every other consideration, would have induced him to go to sea with them; and he was heard to declare, that in the event of falling in with an American frigate he must inevitably be taken. Yet notwithstanding the disadvantage of such a crew, which he had not any time to discipline or arrange, in the well-fought action, which terminated in the destruction of himself and his ship, by a foe in every respect so much superior, he not only did not decline the contest, but was uniformly the assailant. Since the destruction of the Java, no disaster of the same nature has happened in the case of frigates; but many circumstances have taken place equally disastrous in the capture and destruction of sloops of war. The minutes of the courts-martial in two of these cases are on the table, in consequence of motions made by me; and your lordships will see, by referring to these documents, that in point of size and guns, and still more in the inadequacy of their crews, the British vessels had no chance whatever of success, in these unequal, though well-fought contests. In the case of the Epervier it appears that, in addition to these disadvantages, by some strange and most culpable neglect in fitting her out, the guns of this ship were so badly secured, that at the first broadside, five out of nine became unserviceable; and by referring to the Sentence of the court-martial, you will find the Court agreed, that the cause of the capture of his Majesty's late sloop Epervier, was the very superior force of the 726 enemy, the insecure manner in which the fighting bolts of the Epervier were fitted, and the breeching bolts drawing from being badly clinched, and the inefficiency of the crew." With respect to the last, it consisted of 103 men (proved in the evidence to have been of the worst description) and 15 boys; whereas the crew of her opponent, the Peacock, consisted of 182 picked men, and only 3 boys. The other case of the Wasp and Avon terminated in the destruction of the latter, with the loss of 40 killed and wounded, out of an equally weak crew, while the American lost only 1 killed, and 2 wounded, and was apparently unhurt by the effects of the action.
These, and other disasters of the same nature, we must conclude, at length induced the Admiralty to turn their attention to providing a better and stronger description of sloops of war to cope with, those powerful and well-appointed vessels of that class belonging to the United States, as they had before in the case of the frigates; but in doing so, they appear to have exceeded all the bungling and ignorance which have at all times more or less prevailed in this branch of our naval service. To prove that this has been the case, I will quote an authority to which the noble viscount must pay the greatest deference—I mean the Report of the Commissioners of Naval Revision. In their third Report they state that, "Where we have built exactly after the form of the best French ships that we have taken, thus adding our dexterity in building to their knowledge in theory, the ships, it is generally allowed, have proved the best in our navy: but whenever our builders have been so far misled by their little attainments in the science of naval architecture, as to depart from the model before them in any material degree, and attempt improvements, the true principles upon which ships ought to be constructed being imperfectly known to them, have been mistaken or counteracted, and the alterations, according to the information given to us, have in many cases done harm. From the same cause there has been infinite variety in the alterations made, and in the forms which have been adopted. The alterations being on no certain principles, no similarity in the form of the ships could be expected, and they have the appearance of having been constructed on the chance, that in the multitude of trials made, some one might 727 be found of superior excellence. While, therefore, our rivals in naval power were employing men of the greatest talents and most extensive acquirements to call in the aid of science for improving the construction of ships, we have contented ourselves with groping only in the dark in quest of such discoveries as chance might bring in cur way. Nothing certainly can be more surprising, than that in a nation so enlightened as this is, and whose power, importance, and even safety, depend on its naval superioity, matters so essential to the preservation of that superiority should so long have been neglected."—[Signed, Fordyce, Curtis, Domett, Serle.]
This Report was made, I think, in the year 1806; and, to prove that no amendment has yet taken place, in the construction of the two large ships, the Newcastle and the Leander, the Navy-board having procured a plan for the former ship, which they were themselves unable to furnish, and which by all accounts has perfectly answered in the construction of the latter, have, as usual, made some alteration which has spoilt the symmetry and perfection of the model. But the most curious instance of ignorance and misconduct in the construction of ships of war, that ever appeared, is probably to be found in the papers on the table; and to which I must beg the attention of the House. It seems, that before the war with America, as long ago indeed as the beginning of the year 1810, the Board of Admiralty gave directions for the building of a sloop of war to be called the Hermes, after the model of the Bonne Citoyenne, which had formerly been taken from the French, and was found to possess excellent qualities as a vessel of this class, far superior indeed to any sloops of war originally of British construction. Not having any model of our own to work from, or any men of sufficient science to furnish a plan equally good, I do not blame the adoption of this measure. But how was it carried into execution? The Hermes, when fit for sea, was placed under the command of an officer of great merit and abilities, whose case has lately been brought before your lordships by a noble earl (Egremont); and in consequence the Admiralty have restored him to his rank, of which he appears to have been deprived, without sufficient reason, by the sentence of a court-martial; and are about, I trust, by employing him again, to make him farther amends for the injury he has sustained. It ap- 728 pears by the correspondence between captain Browne and the Admiralty and Navy Boards, that as usual the model was altered and spoilt. The Navy Board at first assert positively, as appears by the Report on the table (see Letters of the 4th of October, 1811,) that the new ship is built by the lines of the old one, and precisely similar; but afterwards, when pressed on the subject, they confess, that they had given her greater width in the after-part, at the wing transom; the consequence of which was, that although when light, the Hermes sailed well (for then the lines of the Bonne Citoyenne took effect), as soon as the increased width touched the water, she could not sad at all; and in other respects her construction was so faulty, that nothing but the skill and exertions of her commander could have rendered her an effective man of war: that, however, she became, notwithstanding her faulty construction, and was one of the very few in the British navy, in any way likely to be capable of contending on equal terms with the American ships of the same class. Another ship was then ordered to be built after the same model, to be called the Myrmidon, whose captain informs us in a letter on the table, of a recent date, that though intended to resemble the Bonne Citoyenne, she is unlike her in every respect. It appears, also, that among the alterations suggested by captain Browne in the Hermes, one was to lower the deck forward, or to raise it abaft. In the Myrmidon the surveyors of the navy did both, and thereby equally spoilt the ship.
We come now to the remaining fourteen ordered to be built on the same lines, but of reduced dimensions. The credit of these precious vessels belongs, as I have been told, rather to the Admiralty than to the Navy Board; but, be that as it may, it appears clearly that they never have been, and never can be, with all the bungling expedients and alterations that have been resorted to, efficient men of war, so that their cost (which, exclusive of alterations, amounts to between two and three hundred thousand pounds) has been absolutely thrown away. But that is not the worst; for the attempt to use these vessels, puts in perpetual danger the lives of our brave officers and men, and the honour of the British flag. If your lordships will take the trouble of reading these papers, you will find that some captains complain of one thing, some of an- 729 other. In general they think them overmasted. One officer is of a contrary opinion, and wants larger masts and yards. But one thing, of which frequent notice is taken, appears quite sufficient to account for their bad qualities. The size of these vessels was considerably reduced, and yet they are fitted with the same guns and weight of metal as the larger vessels. At first, indeed, the Board ordered them to carry two guns more; till one of the officers commanding represented that with only 20 ports he could not mount 22 guns. But it is obvious, that if a certain weight of ordnance was just sufficient for a ship of 500 tons, it would be too much for one of 450; and that, in this case, as in all others, the ignorant attempt of partial alteration had destroyed the symmetry of the machine, and utterly spoilt it. One of these ships, the Lee, was in March last nearly lost, and with difficulty escaped, by throwing over-board her guns in a gale of wind; and after this severe trial her captain earnestly recommends that she should be armed with 24 instead of 32 pound cannonades, which he deems "far too heavy for her;" and although this suggestion of the captain was supported by the recommendation of the Navy Board, the captain is threatened to be superseded if he does not choose to go to sea in the ship—or, in other words, for doing his duty by stating that these wretched craft were unequal to their weight of guns. In short, whoever will take the trouble of looking into the details which the papers furnish on the subject of these vessels, will find that a stronger case of mismanagement and waste of public money never was presented to Parliament. This miserable attempt to provide a number of vessels of adequate qualities to cope with the powerful American sloops of war, has utterly failed; and at this moment, after all the experience and warning we have had, there are not more than two or three vessels of that description in the British navy. For I repeat what I have before asserted, that a very large proportion of the smaller vessels of war, which by the accounts on the table appear to have been in commission at the close of the contest with America, were utterly useless for any purpose except that of patronage. The list of sloops of war amounts to 173. The best of these were, in point of force, and still more from the inefficiency of their crews, unequal to the adversaries they had to encounter, as has 730 been abundantly proved by the minutes of the courts-martial on the table, as welt as by other instances. But 72 of this number being of a small size under 16 guns, could, as ships of war, be of no use whatever; and served only to occupy 4,000 seamen, exclusive of officers; which, if they had been judiciously distributed, to strengthen the more effective ships, would, in all probability, have prevented those disasters of which the country has so much reason to complain.
On the subject of the warfare in the lakes of Canada, I must beg the House to recollect, that, on the first day of the session, the noble viscount boldly asserted, that it would be found on inquiry, that every thing necessary to carry on those naval operations with vigour and effect, was not only supplied, but amply supplied by the Government at home, and generally (I think he added) in a twofold degree. But how does the correspondence on the table substantiate this assertion, imperfect as I believe it to be, and without those earnest and repeated applications which I understand were made by sir James Yeo, for men, and supplies of every description? But this correspondence between the Government in Canada and his Majesty's ministers, abundantly proves that the frequent disasters were occasioned by the want of adequate means. At the commencement of the war (August 26 1812) sir George Prevost informs you, that the British force was decidedly superior on all the lakes. In less than a year (on the 24th of July, 1813) he tells you, "the United States have acquired a decided superiority on Lake Ontario;" and an equally decided superiority on Lake Erie was too fatally proved by the disaster of the gallant and unfortunate captain Barclay. The details of this transaction are in the papers before the House; and every part of them prove most decidedly the total want of every thing necessary to constitute an adequate naval force. The whole squadron had not more than 50 British seamen, while that opposed to it appears to have been perfectly well manned and equipped, and superior in sailing and efficiency of every description.
Amongst the attempts made by Government to remedy the want of an adequate force to cope with the Americans on the lakes, the building of two frigates and two sloops at Chatham,—to be again taken to pieces, sent across the Atlantic, landed 731 at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, and taken up the rapids to Lake Ontario, to be built there a second time,—is not the least curious. It appears by the papers on the table, that on the spot the plan was at once deemed impracticable; and although, by the zeal and exertions of an individual, one of the ships was actually conveyed to its place of destination, and there altered and launched, the three others were disposed of—we are not informed how; nor are we told what the expense of this senseless project has been to the nation.
Just at the close of the war we recovered, it is true, our superiority on Lake Ontario, by the equipment of a three-decker. But how was this effected? Not by any forethought or provision made by the Government at home, but by the accidental arrival of some men of war on the coast of America, with part of the Duke of Wellington's army, after the conclusion of the war with France, which furnished their stores just in time to enable sir James Yeo to fit out the large ship, which, but for this accidental supply, could not have been brought forward before the winter. Some of these ships furnished anchors and cables and other necessary stores, and the Centaur her lower-deck guns; without which the new ship could not have been effective; and her being rendered so, in the opinion of sir James Yeo, as I have been informed, saved the province of Upper Canada.
On the subject of the military operations in the late war with America, I shall say little; and it is but justice to acknowledge that our gallant army, on every occasion, maintained its high reputation; even in that concluding scene, in the ill-judged and ill-fated expedition to New Orleans. On this subject I must observe, that no disaster in the history of this country ever called more loudly for inquiry into the conduct of the authors and projectors of the plan. It seems to have been originally undertaken without, any object but that of plunder; and it is difficult to imagine what national advantage could have arisen, or how the great objects of the war could have been materially promoted by complete success. Its complete failure was calamitous indeed, attended by a heavy loss of the gallant and victorious followers, and of the companion and brother of the illustrious Wellington himself. And yet such was the total absence of all public feeling 732 or attention, even when the intelligence first arrived, that, I am ashamed to say, I really believe, the paltry occurrence of the breaking of my windows, and those of the noble and learned lord on the woolsack, which happened about the same time, occasioned a greater sensation. How then can I, at this distance of time, hope to call the attention of this House and the public to this fatal and disgraceful transaction? But it was impossible altogether to pass over what appears to me to form a most prominent feature in the misconduct of the late war.
But, my lords, to return to the conduct of the Naval Administration, which is my principal, object,—it appears to me, that however you may be disposed to forget the late war with America, and to think all retrospective inquiry inexpedient and unavailing, you cannot shut your eyes to the importance of considering, whether the naval service of the country is well or ill conducted. On the subject of the construction of our men of war, I have endeavoured to call your attention to a very flagrant case of misconduct, detailed in the papers on your table. But this is by no means the only case of a similar nature. In the naval administration of the noble earl now at the head of the ordnance (earl Mulgrave), a great number of 74-gun ships were built, which, as I hear, are familiarly known in the navy by the name of the Forty Thieves. The plan and construction of these ships were faulty in the extreme; and they never could have been good men of war, if they had been composed of good materials; but the execution was, if possible, worse than the plan, and many of them showed immediate symptoms of premature decay, and the necessity of great and expensive repairs before they had been many months at sea. The original cost to the nation of these 40 ships cannot have been so little as four millions; and I fear very few of them would be found at this moment in any respect effective men of war.
The Queen Charlotte, a first rate, is well known to have been found in so defective a state, as soon as she was launched, that it became necessary, before she could be sent to sea, to repair her, or rather, it may be said, to build her over again at an expense (as I have been informed) of 70,000l.
With these and many such facts before us, can it be stated, that the faulty consrtuction and premature decay of our men 733 of war is not a fit object of the most serious inquiry? On the important subject of the preservation of timber for naval purposes, I have heretofore troubled your lordships. In the last session I presented a petition from captain Layman on the subject of a discovery, which he states has been made by him, of a method to increase the strength and duration of timber. Captain Layman is a very intelligent and well-informed man; and as an officer, he has the highest testimony, that of the illustrious Nelson, in his favour. But whatever his personal claims to attention may be, his alleged discovery must be admitted to be of the utmost importance, and well deserving the consideration of Parliament. There are many other topics connected with this subject of the navy, on which neither the patience of the House, nor the present state of my health (which almost incapacitates Die from addressing your lordships at all) will permit me to enlarge. I cannot, however, sit down without briefly adverting to some of them. Perhaps the most injurious consequence of the naval disasters we have experienced in our late contest with the United States, has been the moral effect produced by them on the minds of our seamen. Doomed as they have been, in so many instances, to certain defeat, it is impossible that their minds should not have been alienated from the service, and disgusted by the manner in which their, lives have, been sacrificed in unavailing contests with such superior force. I have, indeed, heard that great disinclination to serve in these inefficient sloops of war has been manifested, and frequent desertions have been the consequence.
Amongst other reforms, which it appears to me the naval service requires, the constitution of courts-martial ought not to be forgotten. It certainly should seem by some late instances that have come before the public, that the sentence, is sometimes at variance with the evidence and the law of the case. That to which I have before alluded, appears to have been unwarrantably severe; and the conduct of the Admiralty, in restoring to his rank the officer condemned, shows they were of the same opinion. But I have seen lately another case of a contrary description, where too much lenity appears to have been shown; where the evidence established proofs of the most deliberate and cruel murder. I forbear to particu- 734 larize; but the noble viscount knows the case to which I allude, and I think it of the utmost importance that British seamen should be well assured that they can never be ill-treated with impunity; but that the most strict and impartial justice should punish every case of cruelty or oppression. These cases, I will admit, are extremely rare. There is perhaps no body of men equally numerous so free, from blame, in this respect, as the officers of the navy. They are, for the most part, as humane as they are brave; but there will be always amongst a great number of human beings, some of a contrary description; and these should be restrained by the strong and impartial arm of the law, and the certainty of punishment.
Although I am ready to admit that Government has not been regardless of the just claims of the navy, and has shown a disposition to improve the condition both, of officers and men, on this head much still remains to be done; and I think the navy have a right to expect that no less favour should be shown to them than to the army, which in several points is not the case. For instance, the widow of a naval officer, when she applies for her pension, is obliged to swear, that she derives no emolument from any other source whatever; whereas the widow of an officer of the army proves only, that she receives no other emolument from Government.
My lords; it appears to me too much the practice of the present, day to strain every nerve to make this country a great military power; which, in my judgment, it can never become, advantageously to any great degree; but must mainly depend for its security and greatness on its naval strength. This is the natural foundation of the power and glory of the British empire; and on this basis our principal security must ultimately rest. It is true, the contest in which we are unfortunately engaged, assumes at present almost exclusively a military character; but if it should be protracted (and even the most sanguine cannot deny the possibility of such an event), we shall have to contend not only with the naval power of France, but, in all probability, with that of America also. A state of war in Europe can scarcely fail to bring forward again those questions of neutral rights and blockade which have not been decided by the peace; and their successes in the late war will tend greatly to encourage the 735 Americans to renew the contest. In this point of view an inquiry into the state of our naval affairs must be deemed an object of the highest importance; but, for the reasons I have before stated, it is not my, intention at present to urge it.
I am fully aware of the very imperfect manner in which I have discharged the duty I had imposed on myself of bringing the subject before your lordships; and nothing but a paramount sense of duty, and a desire not to appear to act with levity or inconsistency, in leaving the documents for which I had moved under more promising circumstances unnoticed on your table, would have induced me at this time to trespass on the patience of the House. The noble earl concluded with moving, That the House do now adjourn.
Viscount Melvillesaid, he should leave it to the House to decide whether the noble lord had made out a grave case against the naval administration of the country, and should content himself with noticing only a few of the most prominent topics of the speech they had just heard. The first charge brought against the Admiralty was, that of neglect in not fitting out a class of vessels able to cope with those of America. With regard to this he would observe, that it had always been the system of the British Admiralty to adapt our ships to the nature of those with which they had to contend; but it could not be supposed that the whole system of our navy could at once be changed in order to meet a few American frigates of a larger size than any vessels that had ever gone under that name. The fact was, that the Admiralty had fitted out two or three vessels of this class, but it was impossible to cover the seas with them, so as to meet the American vessels wherever they were to be found. With regard to the noble lord's statement, as to the deficiency of the Java's complement, it was the first time he had ever heard of it, and he believed it to be totally unfounded. With regard to the capture of that frigate, he thought it no disgrace in a ship of inferior force being obliged to yield to another that was greatly its superior. The same general observation was applicable to the capture of some of our sloops of war. The Americans had three or four heavy vessels of this class, and it so happened that they fell in with some British sloops of inferior size, when the result of the contest was unfortunate. But the noble lord had not adverted to the captures of American 736 merchantmen and men of war by the British navy, by which their commerce had been almost annihilated, and by which the honour of the British flag had been upheld. The noble lord complained, that adequate attention had not been paid to skill in ship-building by the British Admiralty. It might be said, however, that this country had become the first naval power in the world, and that no nation could send to sea and keep at sea the same number of valuable and useful ships. From the number of our distant settlements, it was absolutely necessary that we should have large and roomy ships, capable of great stowage, and of keeping the sea for a long time; we could not, therefore, generally imitate the light American schooners, that were calculated rather for expedition than for those purposes to which our navy must generally be applied. Measures had been adopted to remedy that deficiency in ship-building skill which had been complained of, and he trusted that they would soon remove all ground of complaint. The noble viscount next adverted to the complaints of the inadequate protection of our trade, which he contended to be without foundation. They had heard of American privateers infesting our coasts, and committing depredations even in our creeks and harbours. He would assert, that the complaints on this head were grossly exaggerated; and when the merchants who made them were asked for their authority, they could assign no other but that of newspaper reports. He would repeat what he had stated on a former occasion, that it appeared from the books at Lloyd's, that the number of captures last year in the European seas as far as the Canaries, amounted to 172. Of these the whole number of coasters captured was 13, while of running ships, and those that deserted convoy, the number was 94. The fact was, that many captains of merchantmen, on hearing of the termination of hostilities with France, ventured a run without convoy. This was peculiarly the case with those from the Mediterranean; and off Cape St. Vincent's they were exposed to American privateers. He could add, that the report of several captures, which, appeared in the newspapers, was totally unfounded. Of this description was that of a vessel said to be taken in Dublin bay, and also the reported capture of the Blazer gun-brig off the coast of Ireland.—The next topic to which he should briefly advert, 737 was the conduct of the war on the lakes of America. The noble lord asserted, that our disasters there arose from inadequate supplies: but perhaps there was no one circumstance more surprising than the extent of the naval exertions that were made in that quarter. For every seaman, shipwright, cable, and every article of military equipment, sent out from this country, the Americans could with facility supply double the number; and yet the war ended with an acknowledged superiority on our part on the principal lake—a superiority so decided, that the enemy durst not venture to come out to meet us. The noble lord had insinuated that desertion had latterly increased in the British navy, from the moral effects of American success. He would utterly deny the assertion; for the fact was, that desertion had greatly decreased; and it was a circumstance most honourable to the character of British seamen, that it was almost unknown on the lakes, where they were engaged in a species of service the most laborious and anxious, without hope of prize-money, and where strong encouragements to desertion had been held out by the enemy. If any one circumstance had more than another engaged the attention of the Board of Admiralty for years past, it was that the seamen should have no just ground of complaint as to their treatment; and he would venture to say, that there was not a seaman in the navy that was worth his victuals, who would assert the contrary. The noble viscount next proceeded to make a variety of observations on the state of the dockyards, in the course of which he said, that there was now a constant supply of well-seasoned timber for the purpose of shipbuilding, and that no necessity now existed for resorting to the merchants' yards. He concluded by opposing his negative to the present motion.
Lord Rollerose to express his opinion that a weaker case had never been brought before the House, particularly as contrasted with the voluminous mass of papers that had been moved for in support of it. He could assure the noble mover, that he would never vote for his being made first lord of the Admiralty.
The Earl of Darnley replied; after which his motion was put, and negatived. The Bills on the table were then passed through their various stages, and the House adjourned.