§ The Order of the Day, for taking into consideration his Majesty's Message 506 relative to the Convention with Portugal, having been read,
The Marquis Wellesleyrose to move an Address to his Majesty, assuring his Majesty of the cheerful concurrence of that House in promoting the objects of his Majesty's most gracious communication. He really was at a loss to conjecture what could be the nature of the objections that would be raised to the present motion. The arrangement which it recommended, proceeded on the general principles of the policy which has so long and so uniformly guided the conduct of this country towards Portugal. It proceeded not only in those general principles, but also on the principle which now induced us to succour Spain, and on the plan established of making the defence of Portugal auxiliary to the defence of Spain. It also proceeded on the principle of animating and combining the efforts of our allies in the pro-secution of the arduous contest in which they and this country were now engaged, He would ask then, what has of late occurred to make us swerve from that good faith which has hitherto characterized our connection with Portugal, or to depart from those principles which have invariably influenced our alliance with that kingdom, to the present hour?—In the course of what he had briefly to state on the present occasion, he should first advert to the nature of the arrangement recommended in his Majesty's Message. That arrangement would be folly understood by a reference to the papers now on the table. In the early part of those transactions which menaced the independence of Portugal, it was proposed in aid of the cause of that country to take 10,000 Portuguese troops into the pay of England to be commanded by British officers. At a subsequent period it was judged expedient to add 10,000 more to that number, and lastly in the present year, it was thought proper to carry the extent of that force to 30,000 men by a further addition of 10,000 more. The charge for the first 20,000 men was estimated at 600,000l. That for the present 10,000 men, 250,000l. to which was to be added a further sum of 30,000l. for the maintenance of the officers to be employed in disciplining and training these Portuguese levies, and in preparing them adequately to act in conjunction with the British troops. It was proper it should be understood that no specific treaty had been concluded for this purpose; but that the arrangement 507 agreed upon, placed it at the discretion of his Majesty's Government to act according to the nature of the varying circumstances to which the situation of Portugal must now be liable. This was thought the most expedient mode, as from the distance of the Portuguese government, if a specific treaty had been entered into, stipulations might have been provided, which from the fluctuating state of affairs in Portugal, it might be found impossible to execute, and which therefore might prove highly inconvenient from the restrictions which they might have imposed; while by reserving a discretionary power to his Majesty's Government, such measures may be adopted as the course of events may render most adviseable. For these reasons no written treaty has been concluded; but the arrangement entered into was made to rest on the plain, broad principle, that every aid should be given to Portugal to enable her to resist the common enemy; with every degree of assistance which can tend to stimulate her own exertions, and to encourage her to call forth her own resources, for the assertion of her natural independence. Such was the general principle, such the extent, of the present arrangement with Portugal. Now if there should be happily room to observe, that in proportion to the improvement of their discipline, the resistance of the Portuguese should become more successful; if with the improvement of their discipline, their courage and perseverance should be more resolutely displayed; if true to herself, and confident in her own means, Portugal should shew no disposition to crouch to the enemy, or rely entirely for her deliverance on a foreign aid; should we not be prepared on the principles of our old alliance with that country, to afford her every aid and every encouragement that can contribute to animate her exertions and uphold her resolution? Such was in all times the spirit of our policy with respect to Portugal, however it might be differently viewed by some persons; but he should not think it necessary to go far back into the history of that, policy. Occurrences not very remote sufficiently illustrated that policy, and manifested the propriety then felt of acting in strict conformity with its principles. When Buonaparté first issued a declaration threatening the invasion of Portugal, what was the situation of that country and of Spain. In Spain the influence of France was pre- 508 dominant; her government was without energy, system, or principle; Portugal possessed no adequate means of resistance, and it was moreover to be feared that the designs of the enemy against her would be favoured by the secret connivance if not the direct assistance, of the Spanish government. Under these discouraging circumstances what was then the determination of the British government: although they had a great army at their disposal, did they dissuade Portugal from making a vigorous resistance to the enemy? Did they propose to abandon her to her fate? Quite the contrary—not only did they signify to Portugal that she should have every aid from this country; but a powerful army was actually prepared to co-operate in her resistance to the enemy. And here he might appeal to the language and the conduct held on that occasion by two of our ablest statesmen; one a person of transcendaut abilities, now no mere (Mr. Fox); the other a person of abilities, perhaps, little inferior (Mr. Windham):—Was it not the opinion of these distinguished persons, then members of the British government, that every aid should be afforded to Portugal to enable her to resist the progress of the French army? That every means should be employed to stimulate her exertions for her own interests and for the vindication of her own independance. And when did we discontinue our efforts for the security of Portugal? Not while the danger was urgent: but precisely at the moment when it had ceased; and when the enemy was compelled by the state of affairs in other parts of the world, to postpone the execution of his designs against our ally. Such was the conduct of the British government upon that occasion; and he should be ever ready to assert that it was a conduct most justly and wisely pursued. Such was the principle upon which they then acted, a principle the justice and policy of which had afterwards been sanctioned by their lordship's approbation. Now how nearly do the principles acted upon in the present case assimilate with those which the British government adopted on that occasion. They had three objects in view: first to defend the country of Portugal; Secondly, if that were found impracticable, to secure the defence of the Portuguese colonies and to facilitate the emigration thither of the Portuguese government; and lastly, if every other resource failed, to rescue and save the Portuguese fleet in the 509 Tagus. The first object having been found impracticable, their attention was turned to the other two, and the Portuguese government and fleet were conveyed out of danger.
In the present instance their lordships would feel that a question of still greater importance had arisen: Not only had we now to act on the original principles of the alliance with Portugal; but also on the principle of assisting the great cause of Spain. Under that impression it was resolved that an effort should he made for the recovery of Portugal, and Portugal has been delivered not only on the principles of the old alliance but, also with a view to the assistance of the common cause. Had their lordships any reason to regret the efforts that had thus been made, or the adherence to the policy by which they were directed. It was never denied but that the defence of Portugal must be highly advantageous to the cause of Spain. It never was denied that Portugal was the most material military position that could be occupied for that purpose: It must therefore be acknowledged that the occupation of Portugal by British troops, is essential to any aid we can be expected to afford to Spain.
If then their lordships had not abandoned the whole system of that policy upon which this country has hitherto acted towards Portugal, if they were not prepared to desert both Spain and Portugal in this crisis of their fate, what could now induce them to depart from the principle, even of encouraging Portugal to make exertions for her own defence? He must again say that he was wholly at a loss to divine what arguments could be adduced in opposition to the present motion. He heard it intimated indeed, not long since by a friendly voice, (lord Grenville) a voice which he trusted would always prove friendly to him, but which never could prove more friendly than when, as on the present occasion, it afforded him an opportunity of vindicating the good faith and honour of this country: by that voice he had heard it intimated that circumstances had recently occurred, which rendered the whole cause desperate; that it was in vain to continue any further aid to Portugal or Spain, and that consequently it would be useless to concur in the present address. He was ready to admit that great disasters had lately befallen the Spanish cause: he admitted it with pain and regret, and no person could view them 510 with deeper concern than he did; but still they were far from sinking his mind into despair. Still he would contend, that it was neither politic nor just to manifest any intention of abandoning Portugal. And here he would call upon their lordships distinctly to say, whether they were prepared to withdraw the British troops from Portugal, and thus dispirit that country and induce her to relax her efforts for her own defence? What advantage could be derived from thus casting over our own councils, and the hopes of Portugal and Spain the hue and complexion of despair? To tell them that the hour of their fate was arrived, that all attempts to assist them; or even to inspirit their exertions in their own defence, were now of no avail; that they must bow the neck and submit to the yoke of a merciless invader? This indeed would be to strew the conqueror's path with flowers; to prepare the way for his triumphal march to the throne of the two kingdoms. Was it then for this that so much treasure had been expended, that so much blood had been shed (loud cries of hear! hear!) that so much of the blood had been shed of those gallant and loyal nations? Whatever calamities and disasters had befallen them, they were not imputable to the people of Spain. The spirit of the people was excellent, and he still ventured to hope that it would prove unconquerable. All their defeats and disasters were solely to be as cribed to the vices of their government. It was his decided opinion, and he would not hesitate again to repeat it; that it was the imbecility or treachery of that vile and wretched government which first opened the breach through which the enemy entered into the heart of Spain: that delivered into hostile bands all the fortresses of that country; and betrayed her people defenceless and unarmed into the power of a perfidious foe. Let us not contribute to accomplish what they have so inauspiciously begun. Let not their lordships come to any resolution that can justify Portugal in relaxing her exertions, or Spain in considering her cause as hopeless. Yet what other consequence would result from prematurely withdrawing the British troops from Portugal, or retracting the grounds upon which we have hitherto assisted her? He intreated their lordships seriously to weigh all these considerations in their mind, and he was confident that every motive and principle of good faith, justice, honour and policy would concur 511 in persuading thorn to adopt the address which he should now have the honour of proposing. The noble Marquis concluded with moving an address to the effect we have already mentioned.
§ Lord Grenvillefelt it an ungrateful task, a painful duty, to recal their lordships attention to predictions formerly made to them, but then despised and rejected; though now, unfortunately, all of them, too fatally, fulfilled. He knew how little acceptable it was to anticipate, by a referrence to our past experience a continuance of the same disasters; but in discharging that duty, he did it with the more consolation, because it was not a mere barren censure of past errors, that was his object, but rather from the consideration of those errors, to conjure them to rescue the country from similar calamities, to pay some regard to the valuable lives of their fellow-citizens, and to ask their lordships whether they were disposed to sit in that House day after day, and year after year, spectators of wasteful expenditure, and the useless effusion of so much of the best blood of the country in hopeless, calamitous, and disgraceful efforts. Such being his object in rising to address their lordships, he might plead to them the cause of the British army, which might soon be wanted for our own safety, and should, therefore, not be exposed in wild, impracticable, and useless expeditions. What return did their lordships think was due to that army for the eminent skill, and discipline, and valour which it bad displayed? it was a sacred duty imposed upon their lordships, to see that not one more life was wasted, not one more drop of blood shed unprofitably, where no thinking man could say, that by any human possibility, such dreadful sacrifices could be made with any prospect of advantage to the country. Could it be agreeable to their lordships to be fed from day to day with views of unprofitable successes—of imaginary advantages to be gained by our army, for ourselves or for our allies?—Let their lordships ask themselves the question—was there any man that heard him, who, in his conscience, believed, that even the sacrifice of the whole of that brave British army would secure the kingdom of Portugal; and if he received, from any person, an answer in affirmation of that opinion, he should be able to judge by that answer, of the capacity of such a person for the government of this country, or even for the transaction of public business in a delibe- 512 rative assembly. By whatever circumstances, by whatever kind of fate it was, he must say, in point of fact, that, in his opinion, he always thought the object of the enterprize impossible: but now he believed it was known to all the people of this country, that it had become, certainly, impossible. Could any man who looked at our immense exertions for the last seventeen years—at those efforts we were making at the present time, and had still to make, in defence of our best and dearest interests—were this even a mere question of a million of money which the country was now about to expend through this measure, a feature in the business which his noble friend in his statements had very prudently suppressed; could any man say, that the expenditure of such a sum, amounting at least to a tenth of the income-tax, collected under such circumstances of privation, was not a subject of serious consideration and concern to the country?—A sum proposed to be expended, not to save the government of a prince who had abandoned his states, but to support the very vices which had been described as the cause of all the mischiefs of that government which, for two years, our army had been employed in forcing upon that country?—not, he said, to contribute to the advantage of the people of Spain; for the time, he believed, was lost, when our possession of Portugal could be of use to the Spanish cause—not for the advantage of this country, for she could derive from it no advantage whatever. Would it be too much, then, after all this, to ask of their lordships that one other million should not be wasted, where nothing short of a divine miracle could render it effectual to its proposed object?
So much he had observed on the question, as far as it was a financial one. But in other points of view the measure assumed a broader character. And, here, again, he must repeat, that no real advantage was to be gained by these visionary hopes of diversions these schemes for animating the dead, either for the safety of individuals or collective bodies, who had placed their faith and confidence in our assistance. But this, it seemed, was a great political measure, and was so considered by his noble friend opposite, who thought it wisely and happily adopted. Would to God it were so! The great principle of the measure was this, that a Portuguese army, in British pay, combined with a 513 British force, was to be considered sufficient to defend Portugal against the armies of the enemy! It was farther recommended on the score of national honour. On the general principle of national honour he was sure that there was no man with the head or the heart of a real statesman, who did not believe that almost every thing valuable was connected with the observance of national honour. The general conduct of this country to Portugal had been actuated by an attention to the public honour; and when his noble friend praised certain parts of the ancient policy of this country towards Portugal, he thought that the instances he should preferably have selected for his praise were to be found, not so much where we had given our military aid, and promoted plans of fighting France in Portugal, but in our efforts for keeping Portugal secure from the dangers of invasion, and averting from her the necessity of a last and ineffectual appeal to arms.
He could assure their lordships, that though the measures he had thus emphatically alluded to, might not form the brightest pages of our annals, they were still of such a description, that they must be reflected upon with satisfaction hereafter, by those who might feel for the character of the country, so far as it depended upon the wise and politic conduct of persons entrusted with the management of public affairs. As to the case which had been stated by his noble friend, in support and justification of the measures of his Majesty's ministers respecting Portugal, he should be ashamed to waste the time of their lordships by dwelling upon it. He was truly sorry, and more especially for his noble friend's sake, that he had felt it necessary to refer to that case, as if either his noble friend, or any of their lordships, could suppose that there was the least resemblance between the situation of Portugal in 1806 and its situation at the present moment. If such were the impression entertained by his noble friend, he must say that his was a different opinion. But he thought it somewhat singular that a case, which had been uniformly and invariably the object of their unqualified reprobation and censure, should now have been made the subject of praise on the part of his Majesty's present servants. Praise, undoubtedly, he was ready to maintain that case was entitled to in an eminent degree; but the last persons from whom he should have expected to 514 hear it so praised were those who had constantly and unalterably hitherto condemned it. He was glad, however, to find them now applauding what they before thought proper to reprobate; and he congratulated his Majesty's ministers, their lordships and the public, upon this even late return to the principles of truth and justice.
But there was one part of the case to which he had alluded, which had been passed over by his noble friend, and that was, that in the instructions given to the military commanders on that occasion, they were restricted from acting, unless they had a reasonable prospect of success; and here they came to the main gist and matter of the question of the present day. Would any one say, that in the present situation of affairs in Portugal and Spain, there was the least ground of rational expectation of success? In the former instance, France was fully occupied in another quarter; the situation of Europe was far different then from its situation, at the present moment; and there was at that period every reason to hope, that a manifestation of a determination to defend Portugal would have the effect, as it really had at the time, of delaying the attack upon that kingdom. Would any one say, in the present instance, that the British army in Portugal, aided by the native force which it was now proposed to provide for by a subsidy, would be sufficient to retard or finally to resist such an attack? What reliance could any man place on this subsidiary force, unaccustomed to the use of aims, unpractised in the operations of war, and wholly ignorant of military discipline, except the little they might have learned from a few British officers? That Portugal could be defended by such a force, was a thing absolutely impossible; and therefore it was that he perceived with regret, that a measure of such, not only questionable, but defective policy, should have been the first official act, as he might consider it, of his noble friend.
But to return back to the question. He had never denied nor attempred to deny, I that Portugal presented a favourable situation from which to assist and encourage the efforts and the spirit of the people of Spain. His objection to the policy and measures of his Majesty's ministers, had always been, that the system of occupying Portugal with that view had been departed from; and that instead of keeping 515 the British army in a concentrated state, in a commanding situation, and at all times applicable to any operations which might be undertaken with a good prospect of success, the British forces had been divided, and diverted to useless, or worse than useless expeditions. When the noble Secretary stated, that it was impossible for the British army to land at Corunna, he seemed to forget that that army which landed at Lisbon had been afterwards marched to Corunna, under circumstances of great calamity and disaster, in prosecution of an operation under all the circumstances of the case hopeless, which the able officer who had the command, had the candour to declare he disapproved of, and which terminated in the loss to the country of that highly distinguished general and thousands of his brave army.—But it was not his intention on that occasion to enter into the consideration of the proceedings during the campaign in Spain, as an opportunity for the discussion of that subject would afterwards present itself. It might undoubtedly have been a question whether it was desirable to station a British army in Portugal, a country which had at that time been abandoned by its prince, and left without any legitimate authority or regular government. He did not mean, however, to cast any blame upon the conduct of that prince, but imputed the whole of the calamities which followed, to the gross misconduct of his Majesty's present ministers. If the object of his Majesty's government had been to expel the French force from Portugal, it was not necessary for them to land a British army in that country for that purpose. In the situation of affairs at that time in Spain, it was the obvious policy of the French to concentrate as much as possible all their force in that country. It was, consequently, the true interest of this country not to drive the French corps out of Portugal into Spain, but to intercept it if possible, in any attempt it might have made to penetrate into that country. The absurdity, however, of the measures of his Majesty's ministers, in sending out commander after commander, each ignorant of the existing state of affairs, and neither bound to act upon any settled system of operations, led to the disgraceful convention of Cintra, by which, in place of weakening the French force in Spain, the British army was made the instrument of strengthening it: for this force, unfortunately, liberated by that luckless conven- 516 tion, arrived before the British forces in Spain, and took a part in the pursuit of our army in that disastrous retreat which terminated in the fatal victory at Corunna; fatal, he called it, and fatal he must ever consider it, because it was purchased by the loss of the able officer who had the command of the British army. Until that instance, there had never been known a case of three commanders having been sent out in the course of twenty-four hours, from different parts of the globe, and with different instructions to take the command of one and the same army.
It was unnecessary for him to dwell more at length upon the manner, in which the unwise and impolitic measures taken in Portugal had been conducted. But, if those who had the management of public affairs, had possessed any wisdom, any capacity for enlightened policy in the regulation of a nation's interests and constitution, any right or sound feelings with regard to the happiness of their fellow creatures, here most fortunately had been a wide field opened to them. They had got the possession of the kingdom of our ally, with its government dissolved, and no means existing within it, for the establishment of any regular authority or civil administration, but such as the British government alone should suggest. Here had been a glorious opportunity for raising the Portuguese nation from that wretched and degraded condition, to which a lengthened succession of mental ignorance, civil oppression, and political tyranny and prostitution, had reduced it. Was not that an opportunity, which any men capable of enlarged and liberal views of policy, and influenced by any just feelings for the interests of their fellow creatures, would have eagerly availed themselves of? Would not such men have seized with avidity the favourable occasion to rescue the population of that country from that influence of ignorance and political debasement which rendered the inhabitants incapable of any public spirit or national feeling. At that period there occurred a most favourable interval for the adoption of such measures, before the French could have re-entered the Portuguese territory over the bleeding carcasses of the patriots of Spain. Here was a task worthy of the greatest statesmen; here was an object in the accomplishment of which, there were no talents so transcendent, no capacity so enlarged, no ability so comprehensive, that might not have been well and 517 beneficially and gloriously employed. It was a work well suited, to a wise and liberal policy; to an enlarged and generous spirit; to every just feeling, and sound principle of national interests, to impart the blessings of the free institutions of a free government to the inhabitants of a country so long oppressed and disgraced by the greatest tyranny, that had ever existed in any nation of Europe. In adverting to this state of the Portuguese nation, he did not mean to undervalue the services or the character of the Portuguese soldiery, whom he considered as possessing qualities capable of being made useful, though he could never admit that they would form a force competent to the defence of that kingdom.
In the comments, which he felt it his duty to make upon the measures and conduct of his Majesty's ministers respecting Portugal, it was by no means his intention to speak against any particular individual who, not being present, could not have an opportunity of answering for himself. He should, therefore, not mention the name, not make any remark upon the conduct of the person who had been sent out on that occasion, and who still continued his Majesty's minister in Portugal. He had known that individual, and though he entertained a sincere respect for him, he did not think that he was the most proper person to have been selected and sent out on such a mission, He considered it wrong in his Majesty's ministers to have employed that gentleman upon that occasion. But if he disapproved of that appointment in the first instance, he was much more disposed to disapprove of the manner in which the affairs of Portugal had been conducted or influenced since he had gone upon this mission, instead of giving to Portugal the advantage of a free government, instead of employing the British army in giving countenance and protection to such a system of civil liberty and national amelioration, that force had been employed in obliging the Portuguese people to submit to that odious and detestable form of government that was peculiarly and habitually obnoxious to them. Could their lordships, then be surprised that Portugal was at present in a state little better than when it was occupied by the French troops? Was it not the only object of astonishment and indignation, that nothing had been done to improve its condition; that no means had been taken to bestow upon that nation the blessings of a free constitution; 518 that no efficient measures had been devised to promote the object so much desired and so strongly recommended by his noble friend, that of providing adequately for he immediate defence and ultimate security of Portugal?
But, upon this head, he must refer to the papers upon the table: papers, which many of their lordships might possibly not have read, nor consequently be acquainted with, but which it would be necessary to consult, before they could come to any just decision upon the question under consideration. Those papers, he must observe, were few in number. The first was a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Canning to Mr. Villiers, dated November 22, 1808. In this dispatch, that right hon. gent. called the attention of Mr. Villiers to the means of organizing a Portuguese force to co-operate with the British army in the defence of Portugal. He should not occupy their lordships' time by reading the particular words. Their lordships would however recollect, that it was some time in the spring of that year, that the spirit of resistance to the French usurpation had broken out in Spain; they would also recollect the time when the British army landed in Portugal; and they would then, bear in mind that it was not till the 22d of November that the secretary of state called the attention of Mr. Villiers to the means of organizing a native force in Portugal. But after this tardy communication or instruction upon that important subject, it must be supposed that no delay was suffered to take place in following it up with further communications. Yet, no! The next dispatch, for no answer appeared to have been given to the former one, was dated as he found by the papers, on the 28th of February following. In that the right hon. secretary said "that as nothing had been received from Mr. Villiers on the subject of the Portuguese levies, and as no bills had come to this country on that account, it would be premature to say any thing upon that head." Their lordships would observe, that though the instructions had been sent out as early as the 22d of November 1808 no answer had been returned so late as the 28th of Feb. 1809, when the late secretary of state found it. necessary to send out the dispatch from which he quoted the passage he had just read. If it could be urged as matter of charge against a minister employed as Mr. Villiers was, that he had deferred replying to an instruction on so important a 519 point, one should suppose that his language Would be, that such a charge was a gross calumny, and that he had anxiously, from week to week, or from month to month, returned answers to his government at home, upon so interesting a subject. The first dispatch, however, from that gentleman was dated the 16th of December following. The whole of the important interval was suffered to elapse, without any effort having been made to promote a feeling of national honour; to create the means of assisting Spain; to raise the spirit, or re-establish the character of the Portuguese nation. His noble friend having been since called to the councils of his Majesty, had officially written the remaining document. It became the duty of his noble friend, upon entering upon his official functions, to consult the records of his office for such information as would enable him to give sound advice to his Majesty on the general conduct of his affairs. No question he was persuaded could be considered of more importance, than the question whether a British army should be employed in Portugal. His noble friend had stated, that it was not only necessary to employ a British force, and the native force to be maintained by the proposed subsidy, but also a Portuguese force, to be kept up at the expence of the Portuguese government, in that country. But, though a British minister had been nearly two years in Portugal, the noble secretary did not find in his office any information upon this subject. His noble friend, therefore was obliged to send a dispatch to Mr. Villiers, dated January 5, calling upon him for information in the following words: "you will therefore transmit to me, without delay, such information as you can collect, as well with respect to the state of the British army as that of the Portuguese force." So that in fact, the British minister was at this moment in complete ignorance of the state of that army which was to be relied on to defend Portugal. Whether any answer had been received to this dispatch he did not know; and, though sufficient time had elapsed to allow an answer to arrive from a place only four days sail from this country, he could only say, that there appeared no answer to it in the papers upon their lordships' table. If any answer had been returned to that dispatch, it should have been laid before their lordships, because it was essentially necessary that before their lordships agreed to the proposition for subsidizing a Portuguese 520 force, they should be acquainted with the state in which that force existed, and how far it was likely to be efficient for the purpose for which it was to be maintained. He must look upon it as impossible that his Majesty's ministers, after having been solemnly called upon by their lordships for the production of those documents, could have presented them in a garbled state. This he was obliged to conclude, as well injustice to them, as to the constitution, to that House and the country.
The noble secretary had engaged in the discussion under their lordships consideration, as if that House was to be called upon that night to abandon the cause of Spain altogether—to withdraw the British troops from Portugal—and to leave both nations to themselves. It was not his intention, however, to make any such proposition, the declaration of which would be as premature altogether as the voting the Address proposed by his noble friend.—What he had to say upon that subject was, that it would be criminal in their lordships to disguise or conceal what they had a knowledge of, that his Majesty's ministers had gone on too long in the practice of deceiving the public, by expectations which rested upon no solid foundation—by hopes, which there was no prospect of being realised—by reports and rumours, which, so far from resting upon any just ground or valid authority, were proved by subsequent information to have been wholly unsupported in truth or in fact. Their lordships were, by the determination of this question, to decide whether in the present arduous and difficult situation of affairs, they were to place further confidence in such men- They were by the result of that night's discussion, to shew whether the management of public affairs was to be entrusted to the discretion of men who had so conducted themselves, and so systematically deceived the public. They were then fully aware of the determination, that would be formed by his Majesty's ministers upon any great question of national policy or interest. If the subject of their consideration should happen to be of a military description, their lordships might be sure that they would I consult military authorities; but they might also be convinced, that though every such authority should lean against their projected measure, ministers would still persevere. It would be unavailing for military men to say, that an operation was impracticable: his. Majesty's minis- 521 ters would reply, "You may think it impracticable; but don't mind, go and try." It would be criminal in their lordships, therefore, so far as they may have the means of preventing it, to leave the administration of affairs in such incapable hands. For his own part, he did not so much object to the question as connected with political interests, or as a mere financial question of expenditure, but as it was likely to lead lo the. sacrifice, the useless—the unprofitable sacrifice, of the lives of thousands of his fellow-subjects. He had mentioned this point upon a former night, but so strong was his feeling upon it, that he did not think he could too often repeat the observation: It was for their lordships to consider whether, under all the circumstances, they would be disposed again to commit the British army under such guidances in Spain and Portugal. The campaigns in these countries had already cost this nation the lives of twelve thousand of its brave soldiers; and it was now to be considered whether any further sacrifice was to be incurred in the hopeless contest.
His noble friend had earnestly besought their lordships to bear in mind the blood that had already been shed, and the treasure expended, in order to induce them to agree to his proposition for making further sacrifices for the same object. He, too, would conjure their lordships, but for a different object, to call to mind the losses that had been sustained; not that they should go on in the fruitless profusion of lives and treasure, but that they should, whilst there was yet time, arrest the fatal progress of national calamity and disgrace. He should conjure their lordships not to lend themselves to such a system, in order that new millions should be squandered, that fresh thousands should be sacrificed; but to take care that no time should be suffered to elapse, before they obliged the government to pursue such measures as would be best calculated to promote the national interest, by enhancing the national character and honour. He particularly called upon their lordships not to suffer the remnant of our brave army to be exposed to the same disastrous fate which had befallen the armies already sacrificed. He trusted that their lordships would come to that determination which all, who felt for the hardships of our brave army,—who valued the lives of our valiant soldiers,—who were anxious for the honour and true interests of their country—must approve, They had but 522 to bear in mind the useless sacrifices which bad been made without any possibility of any advantageous result:—the destination of sir John Moore's army to the North; when that general was of opinion that it should have been sent to the South of Spain:—the loss of 6,000 men in that calamitous campaign;—the loss of 6,000 more in the late campaign under lord Wellington; and all the fruitless waste of treasure that must have been incurred in both these disastrous campaigns. Were their lordships to be told, after all that had happened, that as his Majesty's ministers alone entertained any hope upon the result, they were still to go on in the indulgence of expectations of future success in Spain, and under that vain, that idle and delusive impression to expose still more of the valuable lives of British troops?
The Portuguese soldiers, upon whom so much dependence was to be placed, might perhaps hereafter become good troops, and be capable of acting in concert with regular armies. But when their lordships looked to the weak and imbecile state of their disorganised government;—when they considered that all the energies of the nation were extinguished by the spirit of that government in which the people could place no confidence, their lordships must be convinced of the total impossibility of obtaining any native force in Portugal, competent to effectual co-operation with a British army. When the British army had first entered Spain, it was to have been supported by a Spanish force of 30,000 men, but throughout the whole of its disastrous progress in that country, the British army experienced no co-operation. To expect, therefore, any effectual cooperation from a Portuguese army, in the case under consideration, would be to set all experience at defiance—to derive no benefit from the lessons they had received during the late operations—and madly to expose the best interests of the army and state to imminent but unprofitable hazard. Yet with such facts in view, the foundation of the proposition before their lordships was the expectation of that co-operation, which had not been experienced in either of the two former expeditions. But though so much was to depend upon the state, the amount and efficiency of this native army, the noble secretary was not yet acquainted with its actual condition. A force of 30,000 men was to be provided for; but it did not appear that more than 16,000 of them were actually in existence. Was it then to be supposed, that this small force 523 could, in the short interval between the present moment and the period when the trial would be to be made, be augmented to 30,000, and the whole advanced to such a state of discipline as to be fit to act in line with the British army? He would not deny that the Portuguese peasantry were well suited to assume the character and habits of soldiers; but as no one, even of the 16,000 already embodied, had ever seen an enemy, or was acquainted with the operations of war, he must be excused for thinking a force of that description not to be depended upon in the regular operations and progress of a campaign. They might be, as they had been, useful in desultory warfare; but must be wholly unfit for co-operation with a regular army. He was not afraid, therefore, of any responsibility that might be incurred, by his stating, that if the safety of the British army was to be committed on the expectation of such co-operation, it would be exposed to most imminent and perhaps inevitable hazard.
But if these 30,000 men were not composed of undisciplined peasants and raw recruits, but consisted of British troops, in addition to the British army already in Portugal, he should consider it nothing but infatuation to think of defending Portugal, even with such a force. He was aware it might be said, that Portugal, considered with respect to its geographical advantages, was capable of being effectually defended. He was not afraid, however, to assert, that against a power possessing the whole means of Spain, as he must suppose the French to do at this moment, Portugal, so far from being the most defensible, was the least defensible of any country in Europe. It had the longest line of frontier, compared with its actual extent, of any other nation; besides, from its narrowness, its line of defence would be more likely to be turned; and an invading enemy would derive great advantages from its local circumstances. As to the means of practical defence afforded by its mountains, he should only ask, whether the experience of the last seventeen years had taught the world nothing—whether its instructive lessons were wholly thrown away? Could it be supposed that a country so circumstanced: with a population without spirit, and a foreign general exercising little short of arbitrary power within it, was capable of any effectual defence? He should desire their lordships not to look at the experience of the last 17 years, but to the melancholy 524 events of the last month, and would then ask them, whether the defence of a mountainous barrier could afford any security against a powerful enemy?—Whether the barrier which had not protected Seville, would be effectual for the security of Portugal? The value of such defences no longer existed, and he was inclined to attribute that alteration to an actual change in the art and practice of war. The Alps, the Pyrenees, the mountains of Germany, and the Sierra Morena in Spain, of which they had heard so much, had all been successfully carried without presenting much difficulty, by the improved operations of modem warfare.
It was not to such defences, therefore, nor, indeed, to any defence, that they should look for the security of Portugal, unless the great mass of its population felt an interest in its preservation, and were resolutely determined to perish or defend it. He was ready however to allow that there might be occasions when it would be proper to make large pecuniary sacrifices, not alone for the support of an ally, but to prove to Europe, that we were ready to afford aid to any nation that was disposed to assert its independence. He would allow, that pressed as this nation was on all sides, it would be desirable to afford Portugal, if the question were only as to pecuniary sacrifices every assistance, provided it could be shewn that there was any rational or probable prospect of success. He would not only assist Portugal, but any particular bodies which may have been formed in Portugal, as far as could reasonably be done without committing the vital interests of this country. But here the question was, whether they should agree to the continuance of the British army in Portugal under hopeless circumstances? Disguise it as his Majesty's ministers may, the question really was, whether the army at that moment in Portugal was to be sacrificed as the army had been in the former instance? In the spring of the year, a force of 16,000 men was wanted; and yet his Majesty's ministers, notwithstanding their strong and unconstitutional measure for breaking up the militia, were unable to make out that number. He would ask their lordships, then, what would be the state of the British army, if the army under lord Wellington were to be exposed to the same fate as that of sir John Moore or of lord Chatham? and that too, in the prosecution of an object, in which, he would 525 venture to say, no man could possibly expect success. His object, as he had before stated, was not to propose any resolution to their lordships against the defence of Portugal. The amendment with which he meant to conclude, was there suit of his own observation, and founded upon the reasons which he had stated to their lordships. When the documents which his Majesty had been graciously pleased to promise should be before them, then their lordships would be able to form a more correct judgment. If the past conduct of his Majesty's present ministers had been such as to justify their lordships in continuing to them a blind confidence;—if they were disposed to approve of the manner in which the military operations in Spain and Walchcren had been planned, then they would vote for the Address proposed by his noble friend; but, if they were influenced by a just sense of their country's interests, and an honest feeling for its character and honour, their lordships would, in duty to themselves, to our brave troops, and to the public, exercise their constitutional privilege of carrying up advice to their sovereign, and endeavour by such seasonable interference to arrest the imprudent and impolitic measures of his Majesty's present government. Upon these grounds he should move, to leave out all the words of the original Address after the word, "That," for the purpose of inserting an Amendment to the following effect:—"This House returns to his Majesty their thanks for his most gracious message, and for the communications which his Majesty has been graciously pleased to direct to be made to them; and beg to assure his Majesty, that they will, without delay, enter upon the consideration of these most important subjects, in the present difficult and alarming state of these realms."
The Earl of Liverpoolconsidered the Amendment as a virtual motion for the removal of his Majesty's ministers. It would, indeed, be more becoming the noble lord as well as a shorter course to his object, to have embodied the substance and gist of his speech in a specific proposition to that effect. The motion of the noble lord went not only to the length of removing ministers, but even to oblige the country to abandon Portugal. What else was the meaning of those arguments their lordships had just heard? What else was the meaning of that appeal, of that dangerous and impolitic appeal to 526 the passions of the people, by displaying to them, in aggravated colours, the losses, the burthens they were called on to support? He would not deny, that in the course of the last 17 years, circumstances had occurred, which rendered an implicit adherence to the generally received and established principles of our national policy, a question of great difficulty. But nothing had arisen which, as far as regarded the ancient connection between this country and Portugal; would, in his apprehension, justify a sudden departure from that line of conduct which we had observed for a centrury and a half towards that power. He considered it impossible, that any noble lord, who impartially considered the circumstances under which the war began in the peninsula, should not cordially approve of the prompt and active assistance that had been given by his Majesty's government, to Spain and Portugal. The circumstances under which the war commenced there, formed a glorious exception to those that pervaded all the other nations of the continent. Spain was the first country that furnished an instance of a general rising of its population against the invasion and usurpation of the ruler of France. The French in orher countries had to contend with great and numerous armies; but the moment these were overwhelmed, the countries were conquered. The people were every where neutral, and uniformly remained tame spectators of the contest that was to decide their fate. But in Spain there was the hope of the support of a whole armed population—a hope which was not deceived in the course of two campaigns, fought under every circumstance of adversity and disadvantage. The state of the country too, was favourable to the expectation of that success, which the noble baron had so confidently pronounced to be unattainable from the first. It contained more strength of military position than any country, in Europe. Besides, the state of manners, society, and morals within the peninsula held forth the most sanguine prospect of a general and obstinate resistance. The noble baron, in the course of his speech, having admitted, for the sake of argument, the policy of assisting the inhabitants of the peninsula in their efforts to shake off the yoke of France, still maintained that there was the grossest misconduct in the mode of affording that assistance. The noble baron particularly condemned the landing in Portugal. Upon 527 this point he could assure their lordships, upon the authority of several officers of rank and experience, and who were perfectly competent to give an opinion on the subject, that the very best point on which a disembarkation could be effected, and a lodgement made, was the Tagus; or somewhere between the Tagus and Cadiz, but in the Tagus in preference.
As to that brilliant and decisive operation, by which the French were expelled in three weeks from Portugal, the noble baron had not ventured to call the merit of it in question, though he pressed as a charge against ministers, and as a proof of their misconduct, that the French army was not brought to England instead of being sent home. But did the noble baron consider that the French had the means of retreat in their power; that they might have retired upon Spain? What would have been the situation of the British army, if, after rejecting the terms offered, we had been unable to reduce them to unconditional submission, and having wasted our force in unavailing efforts, we had at last found ourselves unable to expel them? With respect to the charges made against his Majesty's ministers, for not having animated their allies sufficiently to fight their own battles, he could positively state, that no exertions had been warding on the part of government to rouse them to a sense of their danger, and to stimulate their exertions to avert it. Upon this point he could only say on the part of his Majesty's government, that they had never relaxed in their endeavours to awaken the government of Portugal to a sense of their perilous condition. It was not the fault of ministers, nor was it the fault of the person they had sent there as his Majesty's representative, (who, he would take that opportunity of declaring, had discharged his duty honestly, diligently, and faithfully) if the exertions of the Portuguese government were not correspondent to the danger and magnitude of the crisis. But he must intreat their lordships to recollect the particular state of Portugal at that time. Truly, indeed, might it be said to have been without a government; it was a country deserted, in fact; all the antient and established authorities having disappeared with the Prince Regent. But even under these unpromising circumstances every thing was done that could have been done. There was no time lost; there was no ex- 528 ertion untried; there was no measure neglected. The provisional government at the outset gave consent, at the instance of the British minister, that 20,000 men should be raised in Portugal, which were to be taken into British pay, and within a few months after 16,000 of these were actually in the field, and government had the positive assurance of Mr. Villiers that every man of them would be raised. With regard to that army, he had the satisfaction of knowing and stating to their lordships that every exertion was made by the Portuguese government to render it effective. Never were greater exertions made to provide a sufficient force, and never were they more successful. As to the objection that they had seen no service, every army must have a beginning. The noble baron had the candour to acknowledge, that in that country could be found as good materials as in any other, out of which to form an army, and it was to be hoped, when occasion called for their exertions in a military capacity, they would be found to do their duty. The motion of his noble friend went no further than to concur with his Majesty's Message in recognizing the policy of subsidizing a certain number of Portuguese troops.
If the noble baron was not inclined to concur in the principle of that measure, let him declare it; not by a side wind, not by an indirect attack on ministers, but by an immediate and explicit motion to withdraw the army from Portugal. If the defence of that country was of that hopeless and desperate nature that the noble baron conceived it, the sooner the army was withdrawn the better. The noble baron had talked as if war had not its chances and reverses, as if the risks in military operations, were not always proportioned to the magnitude of the object, and had triumphantly asked, what had they gained in the peninsula? What had they gained! Why they had gained the hearts and affections of the whole population of Spain and Portugal; they had gained that of which no triumphs, no successes of the enemy could deprive them. In Portugal such was the affection of the inhabitants, that there was not a want of a British soldier that was not instantly and cheerfully supplied. Look to Spain. What was the feeling of the people of Spain, even in that awful moment of national convulsion and existing revolution? It was that of the most complete deference to the British minister and government; 529 and so perfect was their confidence in both, that they placed their fleet under the orders of the British admiral. Would a cold, cautious, and phlegmatic system of policy have ever produced such proofs of unbounded confidence? Would indifference have produced those strong and signal proofs of affection? Whatever might be the issue of the contest in Spain, to this country would always remain the proud satisfaction of having done its duty. He trusted they would never abandon Spain, so long as any hope remained of the possibility of ultimate success. Their lordships were bound by every sentiment of honour and good faith to support a people who had given proofs of honour, of good faith, and of bravery, that have not been exceeded by any nation that has ever existed.
The Earl of Moirasaid, that if the question between the adoption of the Address and the Amendment were such as the noble secretary of state had assumed—if no other alternative was left than the abandonment of Portugal, or the rejection of the Amendment, he had no hesitation in stating, that he would be among the first to reject it. But the nature of the Amendment was quite misunderstood, or, if not misunderstood, misrepresented by the noble secretary. It appeared to him to call merely for inquiry, with a view to the adoption and arrangement of a different system of policy for the conduct of the war. If the system pursued by his Majesty's ministers had corresponded with his views, he should have continued to maintain it conformably to the sentiments which he had on a former occasion expressed upon the subject of Spain. Every moment's reflection, indeed, satisfied him of the justice of these sentiments—But yet the noble lord was not entitled to call on him for support, inasmuch as the conduct of his government did not correspond with those sentiments. The propriety of interfering in the concerns of Spain, and the mariner of directing that interference, were quite distinct questions; and sorry he was to find, that much as he approved of the former, he saw nothing but what he must censure in the latter. Instead of encouraging and promoting the cause of Spain, that cause seemed in the measures conducted under the direction of ministers, but a secondary object. Instead of taking such a position in Spain as might afford, not only to the people of that country, but to any of the subjects of the enemy interested 530 in the same cause, a strong rallying point, our army was sent to an extreme point, where, in fact, it had scarcely to calculate upon meeting any formidable enemy.—Was this a course pointed out by wisdom or valour? What, he would put it to their lordships, should we say of the capacity of a Russian general, who, being ordered to invade England should effect a landing, and attempt even to establish himself in Cheshire, instead of approaching the centre of the country, Instead of venturing to the vicinity of the capital? What would the Russian cabinet be likely to think of such an officer? Yet the course which, under our enlightened cabinet, the commander of our army took in the Peninsula, was precisely of a similar nature. He entered Portugal when he ought to have landed in Spain.
When Buonaparté had proceeded to attack Austria there were two lines of policy marked out for our ministers, neither of which, though obvious, did they think proper to follow. They ought to have promptly aided Austria, or availed themselves of the Austrian war to expel the French force from Spain. But instead of vigorously applying their means to either object, they attempted nothing that wisdom could sanction or the country approve. Every thing, indeed, which they did attempt was marked by imprudence and mismanagement; their whole career betrayed, as the universal opinion of the public pronounced, a total want of judgment, foresight and vigour; and, as the climax of error, they now seemed resolved to defend Portugal, according to a plan of defence, too, which was perfectly impracticable. For it was utterly ridiculous to suppose, that the ideas of the count La Lippe, as to the practicability of defending Portugal from invasion, could now be relied upon. In fact, nothing could be gained from the attempt, whilst the danger was certain. We should be allowed to retain Portugal, under our present system, just so long as Buonaparté thought proper. Yet the patrons of that system, the present ministers, still called for confidence; and amidst all the calamities accumulated under their auspices, they had still the hardihood to speak of having gained important advantages for the country. But I would ask, said the noble lord, what have they gained? The noble secretary of state boasts, that our country has obtained a higher character than it ever 531 possessed before in Europe; which, by the way, I deny. But I would ask him, Has he gained his object? Has he reduced the power of the enemy? If I were to ask a chess player whether he had won his game, and he were to answer me that he had got a rook, or that he had got a bishop, what should I think of his answer? Precisely as I do of that of ministers to this House; who, when asked whether they have won their game with the enemy, reply, that they have gained honour, laurels and fame; that still they are beaten—they have lost their game—they have played a desperate game for the last two years, and for the last two years they have gained nothing. Their administration has, in fact, been marked by the annihilation of every foreign hope, and the reduction of every domestic resource—they, who vaunted of their resolution and power to protect and liberate the continent, have only succeeded in bringing danger close to our own shores; and why? because they sacrificed the interests of the nation, and violated every principle of public duty to gratify their personal ambition, and personal cupidity. While they coveted the country with their tax-gatherers and supervisors, who were almost as great nuisances as the plagues of Egypt, they aggravated the insults and injuries they inflicted upon the people, by most wantonly squandering the produce of their exactions: Yet, these were the ministers who called for confidence; while he was certain that he was speaking the language of 99 out of a 100 of the whole population of the country; when he asserted, that such ministers deserved marked reprobation and exemplary punishment.
§ Viscount Sidmouthwas of opinion that government had neglected to avail themselves of the favourable opportunity for striking a decisive blow in the peninsula. He should feel much reluctance, however, at withdrawing our succours from Portugal, if without too great a risk we could assist her with any prospect of success. Her long attachment to this country, the sincerity of which had been so forcibly evinced at different periods, and most particularly in 1762, was such, that we ought to feel it incumbent upon us to afford her every assistance in our power. He was unwilling to accede to the amendment, as he thought it would be unjustifiable to withdraw our troops before such a measure became absolutely necessary. He 532 however thought they ought to be well informed as to the co-operation they were to expect on the part of the Portuguese. Government should be careful not to add to the weight of the burden already borne by the people; and to lighten the present as soon as possible. Though he could not bestow unqualified approbation on the measures of government with respect to the war in the peninsula, yet he would not withhold his assent to the address, and he thought his conduct both parliamentary and constitutional, when he declared that giving it his assent under this qualification, he threw the whole of the responsibility on his majesty's ministers.
The Marquis of Lansdowne,adverting to what had fallen from the noble viscount, who had just spoken, relating to the conduct of Portugal in 1762, wished to God the situation of affairs was as favourable for England as at that period. The government of that day had prudence, wisdom, and energy. The present ministers differed as much from them as the feeble government of Louis the 15th did from the energy of that government which now unfortunately wields the sceptre and resources of France. It was never good policy to copy our own proceedings on a former period, and regulate our conduct by geographical maxims when circumstances were changed. Were they, after the melancholy experience they had already felt, again to expose the army to new disasters, while yet mourning the 12,000 already lost? Were the remaining resources of the country to be entrusted to those who had wasted the former, and who now unblushingly called for renewed confidence? It was always bad policy to become principals in a continental war, and such we should be if the proposed force was to be kept up in Portugal. The army with which we were to co-operate was not to be depended upon. He could by no means agree in the praises that were bestowed en the Portuguese or on their armies. When did they shew themselves worthy of this implicit confidence, or abounding with this exuberance of affections? Was it at Vimiera, where they were not trusted with the conduct of a single operation? Was it at the time that sir John Moore marched into Spain, when he was obliged to weaken his army, and leave 10,000 men behind him at Lisbon, to keep the population in awe, and prevent them from rising on their own government? The noble secretary, who 533 made the original motion, had stated, that the breach by which the French entered Spain, was the vile government by which that country was delivered over to them, bound as it were hands and feet. But did the noble marquis know of no other vile government, and was not the same danger and consequences to be apprehended from it? But it was said, that the occupation of Portugal would delay the subjugation of Spain. How delay it? In the same way he presumed that the occupation of Walcheren retarded the submission of the court of Vienna. Was that occupation to be maintained without loss? No; we should there, as at Walcheren, lose one thousand every month. After our recent and severe losses, it was a question if humanity, policy, safety, and future existence would justify such an appropriation of our army, when not a single minister dared to say he thought the measure would be ultimately crowned with success. After our recent losses at Walcheren we ought not again to expose ourselves to the effect of a system so ruinous, at least without deeply reflecting, and having proper information on the subject, instead of assurances which had been uniformly lavished to deceive.
§ The Earl of Harrowbyconsidered the opposition of the noble marquis as rather levelled against ministers than against the measure under consideration. If he wished ministers out of their places, why did he not call for their dismissal, rather than attempt to tie up their hands while in office. With respect to Portugal, if it was intended to abandon her to her fate, it would be better to give her notice at once of such an intention, that she might know on what she had to depend, and make the best terms she could with the enemy. Our sacrifices, he contended, had at least afforded our allies a better chance than they could otherwise have had in the unequal struggle, and if through want of talent on their part in the cabinet, or valour in the field, the cause was lost, England was not to be blamed. The calumnies that had been uttered, were, he thought, sufficiently refuted. The valour displayed by our troops had raised our national character, as the more recent our victories were, the higher we stood in the estimation of Europe, and the greater was our internal security.
§ Lord Erskinebegged their lordships to reflect, that not merely the conduct of ministers, but that of their lordships them- 534 selves, was upon trial on this occasion; and the probable result of that trial, before an enlightened country, was entitled to the most serious consideration. Ministers, it appeared, pursued the old course upon this occasion. Instead of vindicating, themselves they endeavoured to criminate their predecessors. But if their predecessors were really criminal, why did not these ministers who were in possession of every information and document referring to their official conduct, do their duty, and make that criminality the subject of prosecution? This, however, was not their object. They did not want to vindicate the cause of the public, but to get into our places; and how have they acted in those places? Their conduct, particularly in retaining Walcheren, after the main object of the Expedition was found unattainable, was most criminal. It was, I will say, as a lawyer, a murderous act. And yet they challenge, it seems, a motion for their dismissal. Such a motion is, indeed, suspended over their heads, and God knows it is of little consequence whether they are on or off. But as to the retention of Portugal, it is stated, that a native army is collecting in that country, and our money is to be sent there for its support. What fatality! There really seems to be a sort of predestination which I will leave, to the reverend bench to explain, that whenever the French take any country or any prisoners, they shall have some of our money also. I can hardly account for the infatuation which possesses those men who suppose they can defend Portugal, by sending a supply of British money, there. It might as well, in fact, be expected to accomplish that by sending over the woolsack with my noble and learned friend upon it. The noble lord concluded with stating his intention to vote for the Amendment.
§ The Earl of Buckinghamshirewas of opinion that ministers had a difficult game to play, but that it was indispensable that they should not be impeded in their proceedings. The Portuguese campaign might terminate well or ill, but it was a claim on British honour, that Portugal should not be deserted; we had accepted from the prince the right of its protection, and we could not throw off the responsibility under which we had put ourselves, without proving that we had done our utmost to do our duty.
Lord Hollandcould not understand the spirit in which noble lords were willing to 535 give their confidence to ministers without being assured that their confidence was deserved. We were obliged in honour to do what we could for Porugal without injury to ourselves. In honour—for that was the only motive that ought to interest the feelings or excite the hearts of this or any other people. But if we were to embark in the cause of that sinking people, we were not to load them with our imbecility, in addition to their own weakness. A great plan was necessary: nothing neutral or narrow, nothing minute, nothing temporary, could enter into the principle of such a plan, but for this, qualities were requisite, which no man could hope for in the present ministry. He was averse to harsh language; but where was the address, the ability, the knowledge, the public spirit, that were the soul of success in such a cause? He found them shifting from object to object, and hanging their nope on every weak and bending support, that failed them in the first moment of pleasure. They cheered themselves with little circumstances. They first sustained themselves on the improvement of the Portuguese army, then on the free turn which their Constitution was to receive. He thought, that for defence no government could be too free; by that he meant too democratic; the words might not be synonimous, but it was in such governments that men felt of what they were capable: there was then the full stretch of all the powers. There was a great struggle, a great allay of the baser passions; but there rose from them a spirit vigorous, subtilized, and pure; there was the triumph of all the vehement principles of the nation; the rapid intelligence, the bold decision, the daring courage, the stern love of country. It was in the hoar of struggle that men started up among the ranks of the shrinking people; those bright shapes of valour and virtue that gave a new life to the people; those surpassing forms of dignity and splendour that suddenly rose up as if by miracle, among the host, rushed to the front of the battle, and as in the days of old, by their sole appearance turned the victory. But where was the symptom of a love for free government in the conduct of the ministry? The government of Portugal had been absolutely in their hands, had they disburdened it of its obstructions to freedom—had they pointed its aspect towards democracy? It would be criminal to force a nation to a defence which might draw 536 down ruin on them. But if we were found to withdraw from the contest, it was possible for us to do so without degrading the country by any base avidity for little gains, by seizing upon any of those little pieces of plunder which were already so tempting and apt to overpower our resistance to the temptation. We might leave the country of our ally with the spirit of friendship and the purity of honour. It was of great moment to us, in even that meanest and lowest view in policy, to leave the people of the peninsula our friends, but we must be actuated by a higher principle, and be regretted and revered by those whom we were forced to abandon. He could not expect this from his Majesty's ministers, and, therefore, could not think their hands fit to wield the resources or sustain the character of the British Empire.
Earl Darnleysupported the amendment. The ministers had almost destroyed three armies in the course of twelve months, and had within that period, and to little or no purpose, expended more of the military and pecuniary resources of the country than any of their predecessors had done in the course of ten years. Under these circumstances, their lordships could not give them their confidence in the further prosecution of this line of policy, without inquiry.
The lord Chancellor then put the question on the Amendment, when a division took place, and the numbers stood thus:—Contents 42; Proxies 52: 94.—Non-Contents 59; Proxies 65;—124: Majority against the Amendment 30. The original motion passed without a division.
| List of the Minority. | |
| PRESENT. | |
| Gloucester | Dundas |
| Norfolk | Cassillis |
| Somerset | Holland |
| Stafford | Lauderdale |
| Lansdowne | Grenville |
| Grey | St. John |
| Spencer | Besborough |
| Rosslyn | Moira |
| Lucan | Ponsonby |
| Derby | Frskine |
| Donoughmore | Carysfort |
| Thanet | Lilford |
| Albemarle | Douglas |
| Hardwicke | Darnley |
| Essex | Carrington |
| Ilchester | Keith |
| Cowper | Argyle |
| Grosvenor | Ellenborough |
| Breadalbane | BISHOPS. |
| Headfort | Oxford |
| Bristol | Rochester. |
| Bulkeley |
| PROXIES. | |
| Tankerville | King |
| Duncan | Fortescue |
| Ashburton | Carlisle |
| Devonshire | Cawdor |
| St. Albans | Blandford |
| Grattou | Enliton |
| Bute | St. Vincent |
| Darlington | Cork and Orrery |
| Stawel | Somers |
| Searborough | Ducie |
| Guilford | Hutchinson |
| Berkeley | Waldegrave |
| Bolingbroke | Bedford |
| Charlement | Fitzwilliam |
| Townshend | Yarborough |
| Braybroke | De Clifford |
| Mendip | Jersey |
| Crewe | Southampton |
| Anson | Upper Ossory |
| Carnarvon | Suffolk |
| Montfort | Hillsborough |
| Cholmondeley | Foley |
| Hereford | Auckland |
| Grey de Ruthyn | BISHOPS. |
| Glastonbury | St. Asaph |
| Shaftesbury | Lincoln. |
| Buckingham |