HL Deb 25 March 1805 vol 4 cc105-8
Lord Auckland ,

agreeably to the notice he had given, brought forward some farther propositions in reference to the pending case of this magistrate. After some general observations, as to the peculiar importance of the case, the necessity which existed for their lordships deciding upon it with the utmost caution and deliberation, with a view equally to the correctness of their own proceedings, as well as to the importance of the case in the way of precedent, and, adverting to the circumstance of the proceedings in the committee being adjourned till the beginning of May, against which period their lordships might be furnished with the necessary information of advice upon the point, moved to the general effect, that "the case against Mr. Justice Fox, the charges alleged, and steps taken in consequence, be referred to the consideration of the judges for their opinion of the same; and whether the case, as it stood, could, consistently with the relevant acts and usage of parliament, be farther proceeded in that house, and in that manner."

The Lord Chancellor

did not then wish to offer any opinion as to the substance of his noble friend's motion, but he recommended that the consideration of such a proposition should be deferred for a few days. On the first view of it, they should hesitate ere they agreed to put such a proposition to the judges, as containing points upon which he, for one, perhaps, could have no doubt. He should, however, in the interval he meant to propose, pay a most sedulous attention to the precedents, and to the records on the journals. It certainly required some deliberation, as possibly, by taking such a step precipitately, they might advance further in error. After considering the proposition in a variety of legal points of view, in the course of which he deprecated the putting such questions to the learned judges without further inquiry and deliberation; he moved, that the further consideration of the motion be adjourned till this day se'nnight.

Lord Grenville

did not mean to oppose the amendment of the noble and learned lord, but agreed in favour of a great deal of what fell from the noble lord who opened the discussion. He contended, that sooner than persist in error, they should, if found necessary, tread back their steps; and he hoped, that no fear of imputed inconsistency would deter them from doing that which they should find to be right. He thought it would be proper to take the opinion of the judges on the occasion, who, it should be recollected, had, officially, seats in that house. No objection would be urged, he thought, to the noble and learned lord's amending the language of the proposition, as he should deem proper; and, after adverting to what he conceived a difference in the line of argument then adopted by the learned lord, and what he had urged on former occasions, observed, that he should not hesitate to follow that line of conduct adopted by lord chancellor Clarendon, on an occasion nearly similar, who resorted for information and advice to that quarter, which the usage of that house, and the constitution, equally pointed out as the most eligible in such cases.

Lord Hawkesbury

conceived, that the proceedings then before their lordships were not upon an address to his majesty, for the removal of a judge; but the question was, what proceedings should be had previous to such an address? Those proceedings, so far as they had gone, he conceived, must be either substantially right, or formally wrong; and the very learned and elaborate argument of the noble baron (lord Grenville), and the several cases which he had cited in support of that argument, were by no means in point, but were quite distinct and separate from the question before their lordships. With great respect and deference to the noble baron, he considered it rather a quibble upon the question, than an argument grounded upon sound principles and the strict justice of the case. He contended, that the proceedings hitherto had been regularly and formally right. Their lordships could pursue no other course; he, therefore, thought the consideration of the question should be postponed for some days, in order to afford an opportunity of digesting the subject.

Lord Ellenborough

conceived that the question before the house was, not whether their lordships were to address his majesty for the removal of one of the judges, but whether their lordships would take the opinion of the learned judges, as to the manner of their future proceedings? His lordship had no objection to his learned friend's wish to postpone the consideration of the question for some days, as in truth he thought it but right they should take time upon so important a proceeding; but the impression upon his mind was that, before any address should be presented to his majesty, the question should be tried by a court of law, and Mr. justice Fox should be either found guilty, or acquitted, of the charges laid against him, by the verdict of 12 honest, and upright men. The regular proceedings should be had upon that verdict, a writ of error should be brought, and the verdict either affirmed or reversed; if the former, then the matter would come properly before their lordships. His lordship then went into some observations of considerable length, upon proceedings by impeachment, which he considered would be the most preferable mode. He expressed a strong desire that the opinion of the learned judges should be taken upon the question. It was by no means beneath the dignity of that house, or at all derogatory to their lordships' privileges, to take such an opinion. It was for such purposes the learned judges sat in that house, and he trusted their lordships would resort to them, who were so very competent to give their lordships the necessary assistance.

Lord Grenville

then read the case of Bridgman against lord Chief Justice Holt, for the satisfaction of lord Ellenborough, which case his lordship had chiefly relied upon. The cause originated in the refusal of the Chief Justice to receive a bill of exceptions which had been tendered to him.—The question for postponing the further consideration of the matter until this day se'nnight was then put, and carried.—Adjourned.