§ Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Mr. Pratt].
§ Commander BELLAIRSFrom time to time hon. Members of this House during the last four years have endeavoured to get information from the Admiralty as to the escape of the "Goeben." We have endeavoured to get the proceedings of the court-martial on Admiral Troubridge. We have failed. I draw a sharp distinction between the position when we were at war and the position since the Armistice. While we were at war the Admiralty were entitled to plead that the interests of the State prevented them from disclosing the information. They can no longer plead that now. I have asked five or six times for these records and failed to obtain them. Briefly, these are the facts. When war broke out, on 4th August, 1914, the "Goeben" was at Messina. A great French fleet was in readiness to defend the French transports, and their admiral offered four of their cruisers to the British admiral, to be used for offensive purposes. Under the British admiral there were three great battle cruisers. There wer four armoured cruisers under Admiral Troubridge and four light cruisers and twelve destroyers capable of attacking the "Goeben" at night. Under. Admiralty orders I submit—the fact has 2864 never been revealed—the three great battle cruisers, each of which was capable of attacking the "Goeben," were placed in line of patrol from Bizenta to Sardinia, 250 to 300 miles away from the "Goeben" at Messina. The distribution could have been changed later but was not. Two of the battle cruisers had chased the "Goeben" into Messina on 4th August and were then ordered away by Admiralty orders.
As far as I understand the matter, on 5th August, at four o'clock, it was known that the "Goeben" was at anchor in Messina, and the "Gloucester" reported her leaving at six o'clock next day. Therefore, in the twenty-six hours it was quite possible for the War staff of the Admiralty, knowing that the French Admiralty did not want these vessels on the line of patrol to protect the French transports, to have rescinded this order so that they could proceed to blockade the "Goeben" in Messina, because they were only 250 miles away, and were capable of 23 or 24 knots. Now I come to the four armoured cruisers under Admiral Troubridge. Their conduct was entirely governed by what transpired at the court-martial, that they were acting under an Admiralty order. The Admiralty order was to this effect:—" It was of importance that the strength of the Mediterranean Fleet should not be reduced in the early stages of the War. You are, therefore, to avoid being brought to battle by a superior force of the enemy." That is an imperative order—not a mere instruction. The question arises whether the "Goeben" was a superior force, within the meaning of those words. Had they met her in narrow waters she would not necessarily be a superior force. If Admiral Troubridge's force had met her at sea she might undoubtedly be considered a superior force. She had a 28-knot speed, as against the 20-knot speed of the four armoured cruisers. Her 11-inch guns had a range of 28,000 yards, while the ships of Admiral Troubridge had a range of 14,000 or 15,000 yards. With her 28-knot speed, so far as I can work it out, she could have steamed round Admiral Troubridge's squadron in 75 minutes, keeping at 16,000yards range, and might conceivably have finished them off one by one. Consequently, if Admiral Troubridge was bound to meet the "Goeben" at sea by daylight in the open sea, carrying out the Admiralty orders, he was entitled to regard the "Goeben" as a superior force.
2865 I now come to the twelve destroyers. They were capable of attacking the "Goeben" at night, but they were suffering from the fatal disability that no colliers had been provided for coaling them and they were short of coal, and therefore unable to attack. That is an act for which the Admiralty were responsible. So we see that in all three cases, the battle-cruisers, Admiral Troubridge's Squadron and the destroyers, the Admiralty were responsible. When I say "the Admiralty," I do not quite know what interpretation is to be put upon "the Admiralty "—whether it was the Board, or whether it was the War Staff, or whether it was the First Lord acting with the First Sea Lord. I know that when the Dardanelles decisions were taken, it transpired before the Dardanelles Committee that three of the Sea Lords had protested that they were never consulted on any single occasion with regard to the Dardanelles operations and, of course, the same thing may have happened in this case, and so I am not saying who exactly was responsible. But this I do say, that, in all War Staff work, orders are not sent to subordinates at distant stations, because the best judge of what has to be done is on the spot. Instructions should be sent as a guide. But in this particular case the British admiral was acting under orders and this fact has never been revealed, although it is of importance that justice should be done to individuals. I attach far greater importance to knowing the correct war doctrines in this country both for the public and the Navy, and that is why I think it necessary that we should get all the facts in regard to this episode of Naval War in order that we should get our war doctrine right both for the Navy and the public. The Navy-has never had revealed to it any of these episodes of the War which have been investigated by courts-martial or courts of inquiry, and therefore all the lessons have been missed by the Navy as well as the public. There is also this in regard to the Admiralty. The late Lord Randolph Churchill, when he sent in his Report in connection with the Hartington Commission in 1886, said with perfect truth:
To a naval or military officer professional reputation is everything next to life itself and the loss of it means professional ruin.If these distinguished Admirals were acting under orders issued from the Admiralty I think it reflects very badly on 2866 the Board of Admiralty that during the last four years they have concealed this fact from the public and therefore injured their reputation. The Admiralty's answer to me as far as I can make out is that they have no intention of revealing the finding of the Troubridge court-martial. I think the Admiralty are acting illegally in that way. Courts-martial derive all their authority from our common law. Their method of procedure is based on our common law. The Admiralty Regulations say they shall be held in public, and the Order in Council, which enabled the Board to hold them in secret, as the Admiralty themselves have acknowledged, was only passed in the year 1916. The court-martial on Admiral Troubridge was in November, 1914. Therefore, a member of the public who gets hold of any of the proceedings of the Troubridge court-martial is fully entitled to reveal them and to use them as he thinks fit, now that the War is over, because you were bound to hold that court-martial in public, and I will not be violating any confidential document if I make use of these proceedings. Courts-martial are subject to revision by this House, and you will find that that was emphatically asserted in Parliamentary Debates in the year 1810, and Adey's work on court-martial says, "It is affirmed that the House of Commons is a Court of last resort." The Admiralty have deprived the House of Commons of an immemorial right by depriving it of all knowledge of this court-martial. It was the only court-martial which we held in the ten months of office of the present Secretary of State for War as First Lord of the Admiralty in regard to any naval miscarriage, and it was only held because Admiral Troubridge insisted on his honour being vindicated by being tried by his peers. He was tried by four Admirals and a number of Captains, the President of the Court being that very distinguished officer, Admiral Sir George Egerton. That Court entirely vindicated Admiral Troubridge. As regards the finding of the Court, that finding has been offered to me from several quarters, but I prefer to use the finding which was sent to me anonymously. I therefore do not involve any naval officer. The charge was failing to pursue the fleeing enemy. There were thirteen different paragraphs, and I will only read those which I consider have an important bearing on the escape of the "Goeben."The accused …'was informed that should we become engaged in war, it will be important 2867 at first to husband the naval force in the Mediterranean and in the earlier stages to avoid being brought to action against superior forces.'He was also informed that '"Goeben" must be shadowed by two battle-cruisers. Approach of the Adriatic must be watched by cruisers and destroyers. It it believed that Italy will remain neutral, but you cannot count absolutely on thus.'(6) That on 5th August, at 0.30 p.m., the accused received news that the Austrian Fleet was cruising outside Pola, and at 4 p.m. that 'Goeben' was at Messina.(7) That at 6 p.m. on 6th August the accused received news that 'Goeben' had left Messina, steering East, shadowed by 'Gloucester.' That after then 'Goeben,' and possibly 'Breslau,' were steaming N. 50 E. towards Adriatic. The accused's action in proposing to arrive at Faro Island at daylight was justified.(8) That at 11 p.m. on 6th August the accused was informed by 'Gloucester' that 'Goeben' was going to S.E.; that at the time his position was N. 86 E. 145' from 'Goeben' approximately. That at that time the battle-cruisers were disposed as follows: 'Inflexible' (flag) and 'Indefatigable' about thirty miles West of Marsala, Sicily, and 'Indomitable' had left for Bizenta at 8 p.m., and after coaling, steering eastward. That destroyers were at Valissa Bay seriously short of coal, and unable … to proceed at high speed to attack 'Goeben' at night.(9) That it … appears the accused would get no support from the First Cruiser Squadron, and that from their position it was impossible for him to attack 'Goeben' before daylight.(10) That in view of the instructions received the accused was justified in considering he must not abandon his watch on the Adriatic, having regard to the transportation of French troops between Algeria and France and the possibility of the Austran Fleet coming out.(11) That in view of the instructions received from the Admiralty by the Commander-in-Chief and repeated by him in his sailing orders to the accused, and also signal made on 4th August, viz., First Cruiser Squadron and 'Gloucester' are not to get seriously engaged with superior force, the Court are of opinion that under the particular circumstances of weather, time and position, the accused was justified in considering the 'Goeben' was a superior force to the First Cruiser Squadron at the time they would have met, viz., 6 a.m. on 7th August in full daylight on the open sea(13) The Court … finds that the charge against the accused is not proved, and fully and honourably acquits him of the same.I cannot conceive what reasons the Admiralty have for not disclosing that finding to the public and the House, except to prevent the public from knowing the bad arrangements they made at the outset of the War. That is the only explanation I can give. When the Prime Minister came into office he said that frankness was the beginning of all wise action. But we have never had frankness from the Admiralty. I do 2868 hope that under my right hon. Friend, who is no way responsible for the past, we will get frankness in regard to all naval episodes of this War. We want it, as I have said, in order to get a correct body of doctrine formed in regard to the War generally, and we cannot hope to get a properly conducted War Staff, with public support for it, unless my hon. Friend will supply all the material for discussion. For four and a half years the Admiralty have used their Orders in Council to keep the secret in regard to the escape of the "Goeben," and the result has been anything but good for the Navy. The escape of the "Goeben" is of immense importance, because it led, I contend, to nearly all our disasters. It brought Turkey into the War, and subsequently Bulgaria, caused Greece to hesitate, and anybody-can tell you how great was the influence which it exercised on the fortunes of this War. With regard to the Secretary of State for War, who was then First Lord of the Admiralty, he seems to have been singularly unfortunate all along in his dealing with Turkey both in word and deed. I remember the day when he referred to Enver Bey as the Garibaldi of the Turkish Revolution. Enver Bey has turned out to be probably one of the biggest scoundrels and cut-throats of this War, but in all the miserable story of failure in this War I contend there was nothing so big with fate as the orders issued by the Admiralty which opened the door wide for the escape of the "Goeben" from Messina to the Golden Horn. I do ask the First Lord of the Admiralty in his reply to take the responsibility on the Admiralty which has been largely shared between the two British Admirals in command on the Mediterranean Station in 1914.
§ The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. Long)I want at once to repudiate quite simply and without heat, and quite as plainly as Parliamentary custom permits, the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Gentleman that the action of my predecessors was due to any desire on their part to save their skins. I suppose there is no member of the present Government, or of the Government in 1914, with whom I personally was more often in conflict in this House or on the paltform than the present Secretary of State for War. The real meaning of the hon. and gallant Gentleman was in the postscript of his speech, when he told us that what he really wanted was to bring home to the 2869 present Secretary for War the responsibility for the action taken by the Board of Admiralty in 1914. I am not going to follow my hon. and gallant Friend into the actual history of the incidents of the "Goeben" and the "Breslau" and the failure to deal with these ships. I only propose to remind the House that the action of Admiral Troubridge was followed by a court-martial, which acquitted him of the charges brought against him. The action of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Berkeley Milne, was inquired into by the Board of Admiralty. The full and satisfactory statement which the Department issued as the result of the inquiry has been reissued since I have represented the Board. My hon. and gallant Friend made two statements which I at once contest. He stated that the Financial Secretary, in answering questions, said the Board of Admiralty had said they had no intention of revealing the proceedings of the court-martial. My right hon. Friend never said anything of the kind, or have the Board of Admiralty, since I have been responsible as First Lord, nor in the time of my predecessor, had said they never intended to publish these documents or some of them.
§ Commander BELLAIRSMay I—
§ Mr. LONGI am afraid I cannot give and gallant Friend has raise this question when only half an hour, and himself occupied twenty Therefore he will forgive me not give way to him. I have investigated the answers given by my right hon. Friend, and he confirms what I say, that the Board of Admiralty have never confined themselves to an absolute refusal to produce this information. Then I contest what he said regarding our action in respect to the Troubridge court-martial. He may have some reasons for his statements, but I contest them. He told us that the House of Commons is the great Court of Inquisition, and has a right to revise courts-martial. Of course everybody turns to the House of Commons as the last Court of Inquisition. Of course we have a right to investigate anything that any Member chooses to raise, and for which he can secure the attention of the House. But my hon. and gallant Friend does not suggest that after a court-martial has been dealt with, all its complicated procedure that this House should review and revise, 2870 the decision. The most intelligent Member of the House has been unable to devise a plan that would enable us to do that and to do our other work. Just think what it would mean? It would mean that thousands of courts-martial could be reviewed by this House, because some Member took exception to their findings. Of course, we have the power, but that does not alter the fact that the action of the Board of Admiralty at that time in regard to the court-martial on Admiral Troubridge was taken in what they believed to be the highest interests of the State. My hon. and gallant Friend said, and said quite truly, that I have no personal responsibility for what was done by the Board of Admiralty in 1914, and, as a matter of fact, there is not to-day on the Board of Admiralty one single member, except the right hon. Gentleman near me (Dr. Macnamara), who was a member of the Board in those days. Therefore, to suggest that we are keeping salient facts back in order to save the reputation of Boards of Admiralty is really a suggestion which I think ought not to be made. I will not put it any higher than that, of course, my hon. and gallant Friend is perfectly entitled to take the lowest view of civilian Members of this House who become members of a Government. I have been long enough a Member of the House to know that if a man has got any character and any reputation and wants to lose them he cannot do better than become a member of the Government. Therefore, I do not make the slightest complaint if my hon. and gal-land Friend suggests that I and my predecessors—I am the fifth First Lord of the Admiralty since the War began—have entered into this conspiracy to protect our own and our friends' characters by concealing these salient facts. He forgot this fact: There are naval members on the Board. Are they included in this charge? My hon. and gallant Friend admitted that I have no personal responsibility, but I am sorry that the time at my disposal does not allow me to go more closely into this case. I will say why I, as the representative of the Board, in agreement with my colleagues, decline to publish the proceedings of this court-martial. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said that the Navy had suffered because this report had been suppressed. I am perfectly certain he does not speak for His Majesty's Navy when he makes that statement. What does my hon. and gallant 2871 Friend want? That the experiences of this War on sea and land shall be used for the benefit of the Navies of the future and for the future strength of this Empire? That is an absolutely just and reasonable contention, and it is an attitude which the Admiralty intend to meet. I have read the proceedings of this court-martial, and I say without fear of hesitation that the reason why information is not published at this moment is not due to any desire on my part or on the part of the present Board of Admiralty to protect anybody, either naval officer or civilian. I will also say, having read it, as I have done, from a detached point of view, and having no responsibility, that to publish this report or anything like it, or to publish in detail statements of this kind, which are historical facts, without publishing a great deal more than is at present available, would be to run the gravest risk of doing injury to gallant men who ought not to be injured and who will not be injured if you can publish the proceedings of this court-martial and other information which is of vital importance if we are to be able to form our conclusions in future.
2872 I have no time to say more. I honestly regret that my hon. and gallant Friend should repeatedly suggest in this House that the non-publication of this court-martial is due to some bad influence in the Board of Admiralty. I can assure him there is nothing of the kind. I am sure he will accept that statement that I am not given to making assertions which are not absolutely true and to be relied upon. I have come to the case with an absolutely open mind. If I thought the production of this report would be advantageous to the country I would assent to its publication immediately. My reason for adhering to the decision already-announced is the one I have given, namely, that it would be impossible to do this without running risk to gallant men through misconception. Until the right time comes for giving these facts I should not be fit for my place if I did not claim the right to decide when publication should be made and what shall be published.
It being half-past Eleven of the clock, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House, without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
§ Adjourned at Half after Eleven o'clock.