FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HC Deb 09 December 1970 vol 808 cc522-48

8.40 p.m.

Dr. Alan Glyn (Windsor)

I am grateful for this opportunity to address the House after the statement by the Minister, but I am in some fear and trepidation since it is exactly ten years since I have dared to intervene in a foreign affairs debate. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary in his extremely explicit speech made quite clear that this is a very open debate, and I know that the right hon. Member for Stepney (Mr. Shore) will not expect me to follow his argument.

Today the really important issues before the country and the world are the relationships that exist between East and West. This point was brought out by the right hon. Member for Kettering (Sir G. de Freitas). Another new factor entering into the picture is the rôle that China is about to play by virtue of the advanced state of its nuclear plant in Sinkiang. I believe that there are two alternatives—either that the Russians will be genuinely frightened of the developments along their long frontier because of the possession by China of powerful nuclear weapons which could make the Russians more amenable to a rapproachment with the West; or that there could be an agreement between those two powers to divide up the world. It is those factors which eventually must influence the course of history. A third possibility is that the province of Sinkiang, which in fact is not Chinese at all, could be taken by Russia, by force.

Arising out of these factors we must face the fact that any form of disarmament conference cannot be restricted to consideration of nuclear weapons. Both in Hungary and Czechoslovakia the Russions have shown that they have very large conventional forces at their disposal. Any form of alliance must take that matter into consideration. Hon. Members on both sides of the House must be interested in some form of reduction of tension and arms, but I plead with my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to look at this matter in the context of Russian strategic strengths. We have only to look at the extension of Russian naval forces into the Mediterranean and the Far East to realise that Russia is endeavouring to extend its influences throughout the world.

This brings me to an extremely important point. If we are to protect our trade routes, we must perforce have a base somewhere and it so happens—and here I disagree with the right hon. Member for Fulham (Mr. Michael Stewart)—that it is important we should retain a base in South Africa. I will not go into the merits of the régime there; nearly all of us dislike it. I ask the Government to consider only one point in this respect. Is it in the interests of Great Britain, of world peace, and of all those countries east of Suez that we should retain that base? If so, I must ask them to stand firm on their obligations to supply whatever is necessary so that we can fulfil our obligations in that area.

I turn now to the course of events in South-East Asia. As we all know, this is a long-drawn-out struggle in which, thank heaven, we are not involved. But, as co-Chairman of the Geneva Agreement, it is a matter to which we should turn our attention. It may well be—I put this point to the House genuinely—that it could suit Russia to attend a Geneva Conference. We should then take the opportunity if it is afforded, because we have an obligation which we must discharge. But there are difficulties. Three different countries are involved—first, Vietnam; secondly, Cambodia; and, thirdly, Laos.

The right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) mentioned the invasion of Cambodia. This is an extremely important point. I have been to Cambodia within the last three months. When this invasion took place the stores and depôts were largely destroyed. The effect was to drive the North Vietnam troops west towards the hilly country in the northern part of Cambodia where they still are. They continue to represent a grave danger to the peace of Cambodia. General Lon Non is doing everything that he can.

One interesting point which has come out of this tragic event is that, for the first time, the South Vietnamese and the Cambodians are operating together. The security and defence of that stretch of country, The Parrot's Beak, is being run by the South Vietnamese who are not only helping their neghbours, but at the same time are supplying them with what arms they can spare.

As has been rightly said, the fighting has subsided to a considerable extent in South Vietnam. We all welcome this. But there are reasons for it. The first is that the Americans and the South Vietnamese have got a much better control in South Vietnam. They have made a number of reforms which have encouraged confidence. They have every intention of arming every adult South Vietnamese citizen. As a parallel, Switzerland has the only army in the world where every soldier takes his personal Army weapon home with him.

The South Vietnamese president told me that he was intending to carry out this operation in his country because he had no fear whatsoever from his own people.

The second important reason is that the reinforcements which were coming from North Vietnam to South Vietnam have been diverted and are now going either to Cambodia or to Laos. The effect of this is extremely worrying. What has happened is that in both Cambodia and Laos there is a heavy concentration of North Vietnamese troops—I have seen them myself, both dead and alive—which in my view represents a serious threat to the Governments of those countries. I do not deny that there are not some Communist Khmers in Cambodia, just as there are Pathet Lao, but what is important is that there are North Vietnam Army troops operating in those areas. The position in Vietnam is different, because here the North Vietnamese are fighting the South Vietnamese. The situation in the other two countries has to be regarded very much more as an invasion by the North Vietnamese Army.

The solution to the problem is extremely complicated. What worries me is that at the moment there seems to be a division of opinion in Hanoi as to whether it should deploy all its troops in Cambodia and win a victory and topple the Lon Non Government, or continue to attack the three countries. It is my genuine view that if Hanoi went about it in a strategic and tactical way it would be possible, one by one, to topple those régimes.

I put it seriously to the House that if we get an agreement—which is what we all want—Laos and Cambodia will have to get rid of 50,000 and 100,000 troops respectively, all of whom are in jungle areas. This will put a tremendous responsibility on Her Majesty's Government should the Geneva Conference be reconvened, because we shall have a responsibility to see that peace is carried out, and it will be an extremely difficult operation. I hope that there will be some form of political solution, but I must warn the Government that it could be that at the end of the day the co-Chairman would be blamed for any failure which resulted from an agreement.

I see that the right hon. Member for Stepney is about to leave the Chamber. I think that my right hon. Friend will deal with most of the points made by him, but I should like to put one matter to the right hon. Gentleman personally. If we are looking at security in Europe, if we join the E.E.C. and bring with us our E.F.T.A. partners and our Commonwealth friends, this alliance, which will be of a commercial nature, will lend weight to our own N.A.T.O. forces. I am sure that this combination of commercial interests will have an effect and make our N.A.T.O. Alliance very much stronger in the future.

It has always been my view that if we, as taxpayers, are expected to contribute towards the maintenance of our forces in B.A.O.R. we should not be denied any benefits from joining the E.E.C. I do not see any reason why we should not use that as a bargaining counter. I am sure that in replying to the debate my right hon. Friend will assure us that the transitional periods will be satisfactory. I am equally satisfied that if they are not satisfactory we shall not become part of the E.E.C. Although I am not as optimistic as the right hon. Member for Fulham about the possibility of some arrangement being reached, I support what my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford (Mr. Churchill) in his excellent maiden speech, said about our approaching agreements, with a certain amount of scepticism.

I believe that the solution in the Far East involves our remaining there because this gives confidence to the people of the area. We should do more than go forward with our five-Power arrangements. It is essential that the countries of Indo-China join together in some sort of mutual pact—Laos presents a difficulty because of the special arrangements made in 1963, but this could be overcome—because if countries like Laos, Thailand and Cambodia realise the common dangers, they will accept that it is in their interests to have something stronger than S.E.A.T.O. A pact including America and ourselves could have a great stabilising influence in the area.

It will be difficult to convince them of this. I have had long talks with all the Prime Ministers concerned and I appreciate the difficulties. We are reaching the point, however, when they would like to see some sort of mutual agreement. I urge my right hon. Friend to consider the possibility of our extending our treaty obligations to get an agreement to include these countries. I appreciate the difficulties and the need to judge between War and subversion. If we are to secure peace in the Far East, I am sure that it will come only by there being an American and British presence in the area and by there being a proper treaty which guarantees to the people of those countries the security and safety which they rightly deserve.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Robert Grant-Ferris)

Mr. Molloy.

Mr. Peter Archer (Rowley Regis and Tipton)

On a point of order. I am not clear whether the statement which was made a short time ago was an intervention in the debate and thus formed part of the debate or was an intervention which was outwith the debate. Whatever the position, I am not objecting to the statement being made and I accept that it was perfectly proper that it should have been made.

However, this is the first foreign affairs debate that we have had for a long time. Also, only Privy Councillors had caught your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker, or that of Mr. Speaker, up to the point at which the statement was made. Might it not be in the interests of the House if the Foreign Secretary were to consult his right hon. Friend the Leader of the House with a view to suspending the Standing Orders to enable the debate to be extended?

Mr. Deputy Speaker

The last part of the hon. Gentleman's point of order has nothing to do with the Chair. I must inform him—and I am glad of this opportunity to make the position clear—that unfortunately for this debate, the time taken by the statement counts as part of the debate. There can be no addition of time to extend the debate. This is unfortunate, but those are the facts. It means that the hon. Gentleman and probably others who would have expected to be called to speak will not now be called.

Dr. M. S. Miller (Glasgow, Kelvingrove)

Further to that point of order. Is there nothing that can be done to protect the rights of back benchers in this matter? I, too, emphasise that only Privy Councillors have been called to speak from this side of the House. Can you do nothing to protect us, Mr. Deputy Speaker?

Mr. Deputy Speaker

I appreciate and sympathise with the hon. Gentleman, but the traditions and customs of the House dictate that the Chair calls Privy Councillors if they rise. I suggest that he has a talk with his Privy Councillors.

8.59 p.m.

Mr. William Molloy (Ealing, North)

I sympathise with the point of order which has been raised. I only wish that my hon. Friends had raised it when a Privy Councillor had been called to speak. I, of course, am not one of them.

In the short time available to me I shall make a few remarks about South Africa and briefly refer to what I feel is the most remarkable thing that we have seen recently in European affairs. I refer to the initiative that has been shown by Chancellor Willy Brandt, which to some extent at least has been applauded by some hon. Members.

There was an omission from those speeches from both sides of the House which expressed grave apprehension about the policy of selling arms to South Africa. Men of experience from both sides of the House voiced their apprehensions as to what that might cost this country in the perhaps not-too-distant future, both politically and economically. I should like to rectify the omission by congratulating the Archbishop of Canterbury on the manner in which he has tried to make a sensible contribution to the problem by going to South Africa, meeting people and listening to their points of view, but never for one moment giving in to any pressures. Both Front Benches of the House could learn a great deal from what he has said on this subject.

A number of hon. Members over the past six years have been pleading for a European security council. I and one or two of my hon. Friends have pressed for it for many years. Initially we were not given much encouragement, but I am glad that in the last year of the previous Government there was a definite move to see whether this was a feasible, possible and practical move.

I was glad to hear the excellent speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Fulham (Mr. Michael Stewart), who has not only made excellent speeches in the House on this matter but was listened to avidly and congratulated warmly in the Council of Europe and in the Western European Union when he spoke on this theme.

Sometimes we forget that in discussions on foreign affairs we cannot, as did the hon. Member for Stretford (Mr. Churchill), make comparisons with what was happening 50, 60 and 70 years ago. That is an appallingly myopic and not a particularly bright attitude. A new element has arisen in foreign affairs in the past 20 years and that is the hydrogen bomb and the cobalt bomb. We have to consider nuclear weapons today.

When we hear people outside the House, and one or two hon. Members in the House, criticising our students, and making banal criticisms because some of the young men today wear their hair like the founder of the Christian religion or like the knights of the Middle Ages, we should concentrate on the fact that young folk throughout the world are living in the most terrifying age mankind has ever passed through. That is what we have left them. When they perhaps get annoyed because, from childhood, through adolescence and into their early twenties they have lived in the constant shade of threat and terror of a nuclear explosion, with its penumbra of annihilation hanging over everybody, perhaps we should give them some consideration. We should realise that we have some responsibility in this matter when they make protests about the sort of world we have created for them.

With the idea of a European peace and security council we can make a contribution to establishing peace not merely in Europe but throughout the world. It is fair to say that if there had been the equivalent of a Korea or Vietnam in Europe, nuclear weapons would have been used before very long.

When we talk about freedom, democracy and honour, as the hon. Member for Stretford did, we have to realise that, if the final holocaust ever comes, freedom, democracy and honour will cease to have any meaning. The terms imply a design for society and a social code. If society is destroyed, nothing honourable, free or democratic will remain. That is the serious issue which arises in any discussion of foreign affairs in this House.

Over the past six years, there have been various propositions. There was the Bucharest Declaration, supported by the Danes and Norwegians. When my right hon. Friend the Member for Fulham was Foreign Secretary he, too, gave his support and encouragement to the idea. We now have the supreme example set us by the German Chancellor, Herr Willy Brandt, and his negotiations with the Poles and Russians.

If we want to see Europe make its contribution to peace in our continent and throughout the world, we must applaud those endeavours and not try to find faults in what may follow from them. Before the proposed treaties can be ratified, the Russians will have to give way on one or two issues. I hope, for example, that we shall never again see the implementation of the loathsome Brezhnev policy and what happened to Czechoslovakia.

All these considerations must be borne in mind, and we must never lower our guard. But merely to take a negative attitude is to remain in a paralysed and dangerous situation. The German Chancellor has taught us a lesson in practical politics. I hope that this country will applaud his ideas and that, before long, we shall see established a European peace and security council. When it is set up, we must see to it that it is not involved merely in achieving and maintaining peace but moves along economic and social lines.

Through this sort of intercourse between the countries of Europe, the ball will be placed in the court of the ordinary people. I have massive confidence in ordinary people. If they are given the opportunity to meet one another and discuss matters, I believe that a real contribution will be made to the realisation of a lasting peace throughout the world.

9.3 p.m.

Mr. Roy Hattersley (Birmingham, Sparkbrook)

My first task, even in their absence, is to offer the congratulations of this side of the House to the hon. Members for Hornchurch (Mr. Loveridge) and Stretford (Mr. Churchill), who made their maiden speeches today. The hon. Member for Hornchurch made a confident and lucid speech, and I have no doubt that we shall hear him with pleasure on very many occasions in the future. For the time being, he will be remembered as one of the few new Members who managed to include a passage from the Lord's Prayer in their maiden speeches. The hon. Member for Stretford clearly faced an ordeal. At the best of times, a maiden speech is an awe-inspiring occasion. The hon. Gentleman, following very many illustrious ancestors, must have found it a very difficult task. There is no doubt that he came through with flying colours, and we look forward to hearing him in many future debates.

At the beginning of the debate, the Foreign Secretary said that debates of this sort are very often disorganised, unsatisfactory and diffuse. That is a sentiment which I suspect is more readily accepted at the beginning of a debate than at the end of it. I must add to its diffuse nature, and I do so by asking the Minister of State two specific questions. From long experience, I know that it is kinder to have questions asked at the beginning of the penultimate speech than at 9.30 p.m.

My first question is concerned with Anguilla, to which my right hon. Friend referred earlier in the debate. Can the Minister of State tell us when we will hear whether the Government are accepting the recommendations of the Wooding Report? Indeed, can he tell us whether the Government have accepted those recommendations? Perhaps we may also be told whether the Wooding Report's recommendations are to be discussed by the Government with the Governments of other Commonwealth Caribbean nations.

The second specific question that I ask him concerns the cost of our contribution to N.A.T.O. We all know that, at last week's meeting, there were suggestions that all N.A.T.O. members might and should make increased contributions in terms of budgetary subventions The British Government thought it best, or thought it wise, or thought it necessary, to make their contribution in the form of the designation of extra forces, rather than the actual payment of money. However, it is widely believed—it is certainly believed in Germany, from which I returned only this morning—that our partners in N.A.T.O. were at least given hope that there might be other funds available in terms of increased N.A.T.O. contributions

If the Minister of State is to tell us that such a hope has been held out, then for obvious reasons I shall press him no further On the other hand, if he is to tell us that there is not to be an increased contribution, I should be grateful if he would tell us why this decision has been made. Does the Government, for instance, disagree with the N.A.T.O. judgment that the extra funds for infrastructure and other things are not necessary?

Clearly, whatever the reasons which have prompted the Government, they do not include a ceiling on defence expenditure. As we know very well, the Government do not believe in ceilings on defence expenditure.

Mr. John Wilkinson (Bradford, West)

Would the hon. Gentleman agree that the most effective and perhaps least expensive contribution that we could make would be an increase in our reserve capability which is so singularly deficient at present? If one consider the percentage of reserves to regular Armed Forces, one sees that it is lower in Britain than in any other Western country.

Mr. Hattersley

I was asking the hon. Gentleman's right hon. Friend a question and I allowed him to make a supplementary point. His question should be addressed not to me but to the Government. However, since he has addressed it to me, I will tell him frankly the answer. It is that reserves of the sort which my Government organised, volunteers who could be slotted into the regular Army, might make a positive contribution to our N.A.T.O. commitments; territorials of the sort that his Government are about to expand are a nonsense in terms of European defence.

I turn from the two specific questions to other points raised in the debate. I will try at once to deal with the point of my right hon. Friend the Member for Stepney (Mr. Shore), who dealt in some detail with the Werner Report. He treated it as though he had discovered, as a result of that report, for the first time, that there are political implications in the Treaty of Rome.

Of course, membership of the European Economic Community, by its very nature, is bound to involve great Britain in some sort of political union. The Common Market is not a zollverein, it is as it says, an economic community. For it to be a community, there have to be, for instance, some common commercial standards. There have to be, for instance, some common laws on monopoly. There have to be, for instance, some parallel social benefits. Therefore, all of us—those who have had a longstanding enthusiasm for British membership and those who have been more skeptical—have always recognised that there is an element of political commitment in our signing the Treaty.

My right hon. Friend is entitled to ask the Government their view about this specific item of political commitment and whether we genuinely believe that the second and third stage of that report will not be implemented until a time when, if we are ever to be members of the Community, we will be able to influence it. But it is wrong to imply or suggest that the idea of the political union is something new or strange or something which enthusiasts for membership prefer not to talk about. Indeed, it is one of the concrete benefits of membership which we shall enjoy if entry can be secured on the right terms.

I move now to rather more general questions concerning Europe and specifically to the prospects of a European security conference. I want at once to make one point very clear to my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun). He suggested, or at least implied, that the demand of my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) and the Foreign Secretary for a solution—a permanent solution—to the Berlin problem before some substantial movement towards a security conference, could be interpreted as just an excuse for delaying convening such a conference.

The N.A.T.O. partners have been saying far four years that progress on Berlin is an absolute prerequisite to progress in other fields. This was certainly included in the Brussels declaration of a year ago. Their motives then, and our motives now, for saying that a solution to the Berlin situation ought to be the principal obligation and the principal priority on a European agenda are very clear and I believe, very right.

The first is a matter of principle and the obligations that we have as partners with the free people of Berlin. The second is practical—the belief that the best way both of obtaining a settlement of the Berlin problem and of achieving a successful European security conference is to say that the Berlin item must be dealt with before the security conference can proceed.

Willingness to underwrite Berlin's status is an indication of the Soviet Union's genuine enthusiasm for détente, but I think that it is more than that. Nobody should pretend that the sort of solution that the House wants to see to the Berlin problem can be anything other than an embarrassment to East Germany. The fact that we all have the strongest reservations about the regime in East Germany should not blind us to some of the realities of its political position. When it is said that Berlin provides what the regime rather euphemistically describes as an "ideological diversion" in East Germany, it is making a statement of reality—the reality, for instance, that very many East Germans would choose, given the opportunity, to move into Berlin in preference to living in East Germany.

A permanently acceptable solution to the Berlin problem is one which is bound to cause the East Germans some embarrassment. To overcome that embarrassment they need some persuasion by the Soviet Union. Indeed, it may well be that they have already received some persuasion from the Soviet Union. But continual persuasion is necessary. As I believe that the Soviet Union has a strong vested interest in a successful European security conference, I think that it is wise and prudent for us to say that that item must appear on the European agenda only when Berlin's status has been clarified and confirmed permanently.

It is worth reminding ourselves again what that clarification means. It means the acceptance of West Berlin as an integral part of the Federal Republic. It means constant free access from the Federal Republic of Berlin. It also means freer communications between the two halves of the city. It also means ending the vestiges of economic discrimination from Warsaw Pact countries to the city of Berlin. Perhaps most important of all, it means that those four principles must be under-written by the Soviet Union, which must do its best to ensure that they are applied—consciously applied, and genuinely applied.

The East German News Agency gave the West some advice last year about its attitude to Berlin. It said that "the West must not only purse its lips but must begin to whistle". That is advice that the East now needs to take itself. We need some genuine steps. We need some practical steps. We need more than the indication of enthusiasm. We need a demonstration along the lines that I have suggested to the House.

Inevitably the debate has dealt in part with the situation in South-East Asia and the American commitment to Cambodia and Vietnam. I join the Foreign Secretary in re-emphasising the essential, fundamental rôle that Britain can and may well play in bringing that unhappy state of affairs to a conclusion. I welcome the news that the Foreign Secretary told the Russian Foreign Minister that we were available to join in the reconvening of the conference. Like him, and like all reasonable people, I look to Indo-China for signs of hope, and I believe that I see some, not least in President Nixon's statement of 7th October. It contained rather fewer proposals than his first and perhaps principal statement on Indo-China, made on 14th May, 1969. But the more recent statement included a major addition—the offer of an agreed timetable for the withdrawal of all external forces as a part of the overall Indo-Chinese settlement.

Before the statement was made Hanoi had always said that it regarded the offer of an agreed timetable as a crucial contribution towards a solution. I have no doubt that President Nixon included that proposal in the knowledge that it was so regarded in Hanoi. I hope that it may be so regarded in the future. I have no doubt of President Nixon's personal commitment to disengagement in Indo-China. Of course, that means honourable and orderly disengagement, with the assumption of greater responsibilities by the South Vietnamese. But I have no doubt of his determination to see his troop withdrawal programme through, reinforced by the knowledge that it is going ahead of schedule.

I go even further. I think that even if President Nixon were not personally committed to it the national mood in the United States would make it very difficult for him to divert in any major way from his announced programme. The defeat in the Senate by only 55 votes to 39 of the most extraordinary proposal that it should place a limit on the funds available to maintain forces in Vietnam is an indication of the national mood. I believe that the circumstances of the time would force disengagement on President Nixon even if he were not to choose it. However, I believe that he does choose it, and that he gave a sign with the statement of October 7th.

What we need now is a new sign from North Vietnam, a sign that the cynics who said that the peace conference in Paris could not go ahead whilst the North Vietnamese felt that they could get a more acceptable solution by playing for time were wrong. I share the Foreign Secretary's view that no sign could be more appropriate than an improvement in the appalling conditions under which American prisoners are being held. Last week Ambassador Bruce, whom we all regard as the most rational and temperate of men, listed 13 Articles of the Geneva Convention which were being contra- vened. Nothing could say more for the genuine intentions of the North Vietnamese than to make the conditions under which the American prisoners are held a great deal more tolerable.

I now say a final word on Vietnam and the bombing there. In my last speech as a private Member in 1966, made from the back benches opposite, I attempted to justify President Johnson's decision to bomb strategic targets in North Vietnam. I did that because his decision was taken in support of his ground forces, who were then carrying out a task which I regarded as tragic but necessary. Having resumed the status of private Member, I say, with apologies, that I still believe that what I said then was right. But that was about bombing in 1966. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East said this afternoon, more recent bombings have not had the clear-cut objectives of that action 4½ years ago. Their military objective has been at least obscure, and I share with my right hon. Friend regret that they took place.

I finally turn to the Middle East. The Foreign Secretary said at the beginning of his speech that no one can be optimistic about the situation there, and it is difficult to disagree with that judgment. But I am sure he will agree with me that lack of optimism is not an argument for abandonment of an endeavour. At the time of the last initiative, this piece of advice appeared in the Washington Post: it is not necessary to hope in order to act, nor succeed in order to persevere. The origins of that aphorism are obscure. Some people attribute it to William the Silent; others, surprisingly, to Mr. Dean Acheson. Despite the fact that it may come from such diverse origins, we will all agree that there is no doubt about its applicability to the Middle East situation.

Nor can it be said that the prospects in the Middle East improve with the passage of time. Attitudes, hard enough already—indeed, hard enough for many hundreds of years—continue to harden and pressures develop on both sides which make a solution increasingly difficult. I give only two examples. In the Arab States, for instance, there is growing pressure from extremists guerrilla organisations which makes the statesmanlike decisions which some Arab Governments are already prepared to take, and eventually which they all must take, much more difficult for Governments to take and survive. On the other hand, in Israel there becomes an increasing commitment, both in terms of psychology and of institution, to the territories acquired in 1967. The more time passes, the more difficult a solution becomes. None of us clearly knows what the solution is, but all of us, I think, know what the solution's basis must be—and that is United Nations Resolution No. 242 of 22nd November, 1967.

About that resolution's value I think there can be no doubt. Nor can there be any doubt as to the unanimity of both sides of this House both about the value of the resolution and its interpretation. Any student of HANSARD who reads column 1033 of 13th April last will be struck by the resemblance between the paragraph recorded there and paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the present Foreign Secretary's speech in Harrogate six or seven months later. The passages about the resolution are virtually identical: the passages on what is meant in terms of boundaries before 5th June, 1967, are virtually identical; the passages on how those boundaries are best defined are virtually identical. Indeed, the present Foreign Secretary went on to talk about the need to provide Israel with security by guarantee as great as that which she now enjoys as a result of her conquests in exactly the same terms as the point made by his predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Fulham (Mr. Michael Stewart) on 13th April.

I believe that both my right hon. Friend and the right hon. Gentleman are not only identical but—I say this with humility—are also right. I believe that they are right in terms of guaranteeing Israel's security in terms certainly as substantial as the security she now enjoys. That is why I have never been able to understand those inside and outside the House, who criticised the four-Power initiatives in the Middle East as they went on in parallel to Dr. Jarring's patient attempt to find some solution through Resolution No. 242. It is the great Powers which must underwrite and become firmly committed to the security by guarantee which is the only solution in the Middle East situation. It is absolutely essential that their constant co-operation and con- stant commitment are obtained in this way.

That, perhaps, is looking too far to the future. At the moment, there must be, and I believe there will continue to be, patient work in terms of interpreting and applying the principles of Resolution No. 242. I do not believe that that work can be done too quickly or with too great an urgency. I understand that Dr. Jarring is to report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by 5th January. Equally, as I understand it, the present cease-fire lapses a month after that date.

All of us must hope that some progress is made before then, perhaps not progress in substantive matters, and perhaps not even crucial progress on these procedural matters which are themselves fundamental—questions like whether the parties will negotiate direct, or whether Dr. Jarring will somehow collect opinions and count heads without ever bringing the parties face to face across the conference table. Perhaps these fundamental crucial questions (both substantive and procedural) will have to be agreed to enable any real progress to be made. But over the few weeks between now and the ending of the cease fire we all hope that there are signs that the cease-fire will be renewed by the Arab countries, not in the fear that by its constant renewal a new status quo will develop, but renewed by the Arab Governments in the hope that the attempts now being made offer them a genuine solution for reclaiming and having returned to them the lands governed by Resolution 242, and yet living in peace with an established and guaranteed State of Israel.

In many ways this has been a sombre debate, but in many others it has been optimistic. The House has welcomed the initiatives of the Chancellor of the Federal German Republic and it is appropriate that in this final speech from the Opposition benches I should again welcome those initiatives. These are the great hopes for East-West relations, the great hope for the peace of the world. Having seen the steps which he has so successfully taken to solve problems which once we all believced to be permanently beyond solution, we have all been given hope for solutions in other parts of the world to problems which now seem as impossible as those which Willy Brandt has succeeded in solving over the last six months.

9.32 p.m.

The Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Joseph Godber)

It is always difficult to draw together the threads of a foreign affairs debate which has ranged widely. Today's is no exception and the fact that we started in candlelight and had a break at eight o'clock for an important statement has not made it less unusual than some other debates. However, I should like to deal with a number of issues which have been raised during this somewhat truncated debate.

I should like first to echo the opening words of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) in offering my congratulations to the two maiden speakers today. We all listened with interest to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Loveridge). It was delivered in a way which commended him to the House. We had all looked forward to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford (Mr. Churchill). I say this without wishing to make an invidious comparison, but, by reason of my hon. Friend's name, this speech was looked forward to with especial anticipation in all quarters of the House. We all greatly welcome the opportunity to hear this newest member of the Churchill clan come among us, and we all wish him every possible success. I only wish that his illustrious grandfather had been sitting in his corner seat as my hon. Friend made that speech, for I can imagine the approving nod, and the approving grunt which would have gone with it, at the end of the speech.

I do not propose to dwell at length on the Common Market, simply because my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster will be making a statement tomorrow, and there will be an opportunity to question him then. However, I should like briefly to take up one point made by the right hon. Member for Stepney (Mr. Shore), who devoted most of his speech to the Common Market. He talked first about the common agricultural policy and went on to discuss Community finance.

It was my right hon. Friend the present Chancellor of the Exchequer—and the right hon. Gentleman was referring to his Speech—who told his Community colleagues at Luxembourg at the opening negotiations on 30th June that our predecessors had looked forward to Britain's taking part as a full member in the negotiations on financial arrangements for the period after the end of 1969. He pointed out that we were not, however, a party to that agreement and the question of our contribution to Community finance was therefore an absolutely central issue in the present negotiations.

The point I want to make is that the Government did not, as I think the right hon. Gentleman implied, "sell the pass" on this issue. We have made it absolutely clear that unless a fair and sound solution is found, no British Government could contemplate joining. As to the Common Market, it would be better to leave that to my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster who will be answering questions tomorrow on the latest developments.

We have had several interesting contributions on Vietnam and I listened with interest to the speeches made by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) and the hon. Member for Spark-brook. While I would not wish to disagree with anything in particular they had to say on the broad lines of policy, I would not go along with them in their condemnation of the latest bombings. Without knowing more about the military factors it would be wrong to do so.

All I would say is that there was strong criticism by some hon. Members in this House and elsewhere at the time of the Cambodian operation, but there seems little doubt that this has helped enormously to bring down the degree of casualties in Vietnam, and I would have thought that these matters have to be judged in relation to the military situation. More valuable was the reference to President Nixon's new negotiating offer. The governments of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia all endorse the proposals. In America both hawks and doves seem to have been united in accepting this as fair and reasonable.

We for our part believed and said that these proposals could form a good basis for a settlement within which the people of South Vietnam could decide their own future free from outside interference. I hope that the Communists, despite their initial rejection of the offer, will think again and talk seriously on the basis of President Nixon's proposals. My right hon. Friend referred to his recent offer to Mr. Gromyko to join in reactivating the Geneva Conference. I emphasise that offer still stands and that nothing would please the Government more than if the Soviet Government were to accept that suggestion.

The right hon. Member for Leeds, East referred specifically to the question of China and the United Nations. I was glad that he did because I was the first British representative at the United Nations to vote for China's admission, back in 1961 or 1962. Since then representatives of this country have consistently voted for China's admission. This year, for the first time, there was a simple majority for it. I freely acknowledge that this gives a fresh importance to the second vote. This is a matter on which we shall be having close consultations in the coming months. Our object is to see China occupying the Chinese seat in the United Nations.

That has been the view of both sides of the House for many years and I hope that it can be achieved. The position of Formosa or Taiwan has to be resolved, and I should be sorry to see them denied a seat. If they chose to deny themselves a seat because of their feelings that is another matter, but it should be for the United Nations to make the opportunity, not for two Chinas but for China to be there and for there to be a representative of Taiwan or Formosa in some form or another if they so wish. That is the way in which I should like to see it resolved. How it will eventually turn out will depend on the view of many other people including, of course, Chiang Kai-shek.

Turning to the question of N.A.T.O., which has occupied a lot of time in the debate, the series of meetings held in Brussels by the defence and foreign Ministers of N.A.T.O. in the first week of December were very useful indeed. The nature of the problems discussed made this an occasion for taking stock rather than for making new moves. The Ministers had an important report to consider on the defensive problems confronting the Alliance in the coming decade. They reached agreement on the first steps towards removing some of the weaknesses revealed, and the European members agreed to increase their contributions to the common effort. Details of our own decisions to increase the forces we provide for N.A.T.O. were announced in the Defence White Paper. The special European defence improvement programme as the co-operative endeavour by the European members of N.A.T.O. is known will be a continuing process. Different countries will make different contributions, but all will play their part.

The hon. Member for Sparkbrook asked a particular question on this matter. The cost of our extra contribution to N.A.T.O. has been assessed at £45 million over the next five years, but at £140 million over 10 years. This takes account of the Jaguar squadrons coming into force in the latter part of the period.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether further consideration had been given to the budgetary contribution. I understand that the German representative put forward certain proposals which will be looked at, but no decision on them has been made. The important thing to remember is that we are contributing a larger proportion of our gross national product to N.A.T.O. than is any other European member, and, with the additional contribution which we have announced, we are well fulfilling our side of the bargain. I hope that our European colleagues will agree with that.

Mr. Healey

Will the Minister answer the question which I raised earlier, namely, what is the net value of our contribution over the next five years, given the loss to N.A.T.O. of the Nimrods stationed in the Far East, the five frigates stationed in the Far East and the additional battalions?

Mr. Godber

I have no figure for that. If the right hon. Gentleman puts down a Question, we shall try to give the figure, but it will not be easy. I have given the additional contribution which we have proposed.

The right hon. Member for Leeds, East referred at some length to the question of N.A.T.O. defence and the allied matter of balanced mutual force reductions. This is a very important subject, but, as the right hon. Gentleman recognises, it has very great difficulties. For the present, Berlin is, in our view, the key, as was recognised by the N.A.T.O. Foreign Ministers when they met in Rome during the period in office of the previous Government. The same attitude was shown at the Brussels meeting attended by my right hon. Friend last week. Once there has been a satisfactory conclusion to the Berlin talks, and progress made on other relevant matters, the allies will be ready to move forward to wider discussion with the countries of Eastern Europe.

I was glad to hear the right hon. Member for Leeds, East say so firmly that that was prerequisite. We agree. This will show whether there is hope of moving forward in the way in which we and others would like to move, but without some evidence of this kind I hesitate to say what progress could be made in talks on this theme. The question of making progress in regard to Berlin is the essence of all the hopes which have been voiced in the Chamber today.

A conference is not an end in itself; it is a means to an end. On more than one occasion in the past the Russians have pressed for the setting up of conferences which have stimulated a great deal of hope, but the hope has not been justified. I remember from my experience the excitement aroused when there was talk of complete and general disarmament and the setting up of the 18-Power Conference in Geneva. We went wearily on month after month. That conference still exists and continues. It has achieved something; it would be silly to say otherwise. [Interruption.] It has indeed achieved a great deal. I was involved in the first significant development of it—the partial test ban treaty. But it has not achieved what was hoped of it. Such matters as a European security conference were discussed in the earlier stages of that conference. The question of balanced force reductions was an important issue during the early stages.

By all means let us have a conference if there is the prospect of progress. But It us be realistic. In that context, I should like to make a few comments about the position concerning Germany and Berlin. The important initiative taken by Herr Willy Brandt, which has been welcomed on both sides of the House, has led to the negotiation of the Soviet-Ger man Treaty and the Polish-German Treaty which has in the last few days been initialled. These Treaties carry forward the relations between West Germany and the Eastern nations in a way which would not have seemed possible two years ago. We welcome this, but we recognise the limitations and the problems. Even if Willy Brandt and his colleagues are moving forward and the Soviet Union want to come some way to meet them, we must recognise that the Soviet Union has its own problem with the G.D.R. and Herr Ulbricht. We should like to see the G.D.R. moving in the same way, but we cannot avoid noting the difficulties that appear to have been placed in the way of developments and the problems in relation to Berlin. There has been difficulty which has, perhaps, been stimulated by the very success of Willy Brandt's policies.

It is impossible to forecast for how long the Berlin talks will continue. The ratification of the Treaties is a matter for the Federal Government, and they have said that ratification will not take place until progress is made on Berlin. This is where the matter rests, but we would do right to congratulate Herr Brandt on the significant and far-reaching initiative which he has taken.

The hon. Member for Sparkbrook spent a little time discussing the Arab-Israel question. I agree with what has been said about the great difficulty of making progress. All parties directly concerned stand to gain enormously if a solution can be achieved but the fears and doubts of both sides are so great that we continually get bogged down. We all agree that Resolution 242 is the key and that the reactivation of the Jarring talks is the most important thing that could take place. The difficulty is that Resolution 242 means different things to different people, and this is why the Jarring talks are so important.

Our views on the content of the settlement have been set out fairly recently by my right hon. Friend and I will not repeat them. A key factor is the question of the guarantees. Perhaps the best guarantee of a settlement would be that a settlement was concluded. The parties would then have an interest in maintaining it. But that in itself is not enough. One possible contribution, the stationing of forces under United Nations auspices along such frontiers as may have been agreed, has been suggested today. We know of the doubts of the Israeli people about this, after what happened last time, and to ensure against the premature withdrawal of such forces it could be agreed that they should be removed only on an affirmative resolution of the Security Council, which could be vetoed by any one of the four permanent members. When I was in Israel a few weeks ago I talked on these lines to some of the Israeli leaders. Whilst they were not immensely enamoured of the idea of a United Nations presence in this regard, they acknowledged that if it were done in this way it would have some merit.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Mr. Dodds-Parker) in his helpful speech referred to the possibility of a European guarantee. I would support that if it is what the parties wish. However, it is difficult to find precisely what they do wish. But if we had any indication that this would help, Her Majesty's Government would be active in promoting a development of this kind.

Mr. Peter Archer

rose—

Mr. Godber

I am sorry, I am short of time, and I should like to give way, but I have a number of issues which were raised and with which I should like to deal.

The situation in the Gulf was another matter which was mentioned in a number of speeches, particularly in the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford, to which I have already referred. It will be recalled that we entered into a commitment to consult the leaders in the area and other Governments concerned before coming to any conclusions about our policy. Shortly after taking office, my right hon. Friend appointed Sir William Luce as special representative to carry out these consultations. Sir William has had extensive discussions and we are now considering what our policy should be in the light of these consultations and of developments in the area.

The broad aims of our policy have been repeated in this House many times. We shall continue to make a contribution to the stability of the area in a manner which would be appropriate in the conditions of today. It is our firm desire to help to promote the union of the protected States consistent with the wishes of the Rulers, the peoples and their neighbours and to do what we can in settling any outstanding issues which are in dispute. Sir William has also been charged with the supervision of these aspects of policy, and he will do all he can to encourage the rulers to make progress, particularly over the constitution of the union, so that practical progress can be made. It is disappointing that the meeting of the Deputy Rulers so far has led to no firm result, but there is recognition that the smaller States must combine together if they are to have an effective future. This is what we are most anxious to achieve, and I hope we shall be successful.

Mr. Hattersley

The right hon. Gentleman's statement about aims was very much a statement of virtues with which hardly anybody could disagree, but some Members on this side of the House would add another principle. Some of us have reservations about the stationing of British troops in this area on territory which has already expressed disapproval of the presence of British troops there. Do Her Majesty's Government affirm that principle?

Mr. Godber

We would not propose to keep troops where they are not wanted, but we would want to have troops where our friends want us to keep them there. This is a matter to which we attach considerable importance.

These are some of the issues with which we have been concerned during the debate. There is one other subject upon which I should like briefly to touch, which is a matter in which I have been concerned recently, and that is the difficult problem of Anguilla. The right hon. Member for Leeds, East said something to indicate that perhaps I had been over-sure in this matter. I can assure him that I have always recognised the great difficulties in this matter. The last thing I want to do is to score party debating points, though I admit that, had I wished to do so, there is ample opportunity. My interest is to get a satisfactory solution to a problem which should never have arisen.

We have been looking at the conclusions of the Wooding Report, and we invited the Prime Minister of St. Kitts to come here for discussions. I myself had previously been to Anguilla and St. Kitts and had talks there. Mr. Bradshaw has been here. I regret to say that we have been unable to make the progress that I should have liked to see made during these talks. We have not as yet reached a satisfactory solution. I told Mr. Bradshaw and his colleagues that the proposals would remain on the table and I invited them to consider these proposals to see whether they could form the basis for a satisfactory conclusion.

I was sorry this morning to see some rather extravagant headlines in the Press which do not represent the true situation. There are times when violent things are said. But it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to see that no bloodshed takes place; nor do I believe that it is likely to take place while Britain takes an active part. I believe that the wish on both sides of the House is that we should find a means to a satisfactory solution.

We really need time for tempers and feelings to cool. Personal antagonisms between the leadership of both islands do underly many of the troubles. The proposals which I put forward were designed to find more time to enable those concerned to look at the issues. We do not want to create unnecessary fragmentation in the area. We stand by the undertaking first given by the previous Government, and repeated by us, that we will not force on the people of Anguilla a régime which they do not want. I believe that the people of this country will stand by that undertaking. We have to try to find a solution which is acceptable to the Anguillans, because of that undertaking, and which will be tolerable and reasonable to the people of St. Kitts as well. This is what I have been seeking to put forward.

I was asked whether we accepted the Wooding Report. We have consulted those concerned. We sent a senior official to explain the points in that Report to the people of Anguilla, but they rejected it. It is therefore difficult to use it as a basis for negotiation. We are, nevertheless, grateful to Sir Hugh Wooding and his colleagues for the immense trouble to which they went in preparing the Report. We believe that there are elements in the Report on which we might be able to build. That is what we have been trying to do.

We have drawn the attention of the Commonwealth Caribbean Governments to the Report and we shall be glad of any assistance that they may be able to give us. But it is our responsibility to find a solution, and that is our intention. It is a question of finding adequate time for people to look at the issues involved and to enable tempers to cool. Britain will seek to find a solution. We may not have succeeded initially in reaching a solution, but we are faced with problems arising from the 1967 legislation which has limited our freedom of movement. This is one problem. However, I am confident that, given time, and if we can get good will on both sides, we shall be able to bring the issue to a satisfactory conclusion.

Having covered a wide variety of topics, I come back to the essence and centre of the debate, which is the question of East-West relations and achieving a détente. My analysis of the debate, with all the difficulties which have interposed themselves, is that there is a genuine community of feeling in this House about the need to move forward to détente, but there is also a demand from the House—I put it as high as a demand—that if we are to move forward, the Russians and their colleagues have to show the seriousness of their desire to do so by helping us over the Berlin crisis. I believe that the message which should go out tonight is that if the Russians seriously want to make progress—I have indicated that we recognise that they have problems—they have the opportunity of finding a way to meet us in relation to this problem. If they do so, then I think that the initiative taken by Herr Brandt will bring a fruitful result, and the debate today may have played some part in it if we send out this united message from the House tonight.

Mr. Hector Monro (Lord Commissioner to the Treasury)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.