§ Q1. Mr. St. John-Stevasasked the Prime Minister whether he will make a statement on Government policy towards the European Economic Community.
§ The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson)I have nothing to add to the speeches of myself and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary during the debate on the Address last month.
§ Mr. St. John-StevasWill the Prime Minister give a straight answer to the Question—how the recent statements of Ministers other than himself in favour of Britain joining the E.E.C. can be reconciled with his own uncompromising rejection of the Common Market agricultural policy, both in Bristol and in this House?
§ The Prime MinisterThere is no incompatibility between any of these statements. We have always said—and I said it in the House, on the occasion that I referred to—that we are ready and willing to go on, provided we can get adequate satisfaction on essential British and Commonwealth interests. This is exactly what has been said by my right hon. Friends who have made speeches since that date.
§ Mr. BellengerWhat is to be the procedure in the exploratory negotiations that are going on at the present moment? Is it the purpose of these eventually to make a formal application to join the E.E.C. and, if so, will the First Secretary give progress reports to this House from time to time?
§ The Prime MinisterI am sure that my right hon. Friends the First Secretary and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster will be glad to make reports. As I explained in the debate on the Address, the purpose is to use every opportunity, whether during bilateral talks or in meetings with E.F.T.A. or, indeed, in unofficial meetings like the one last week, when there were representatives from the E.F.T.A. and E.E.C. Governments present, to explore the conditions in which Britain can make application for entry.
§ Mr. GrimondDoes the Prime Minister's Answer about agriculture mean that 212 in no circumstances will the Government accept the levy system?
§ The Prime MinisterWhat I said in my speech at Bristol was that the agricultural policy would mean a levy of 65 per cent. or 70 per cent. on our imports of grain—one of the few items for which we have the figures at the moment—from the Commonwealth. It is certainly the view of the Government that this is not an acceptable position for us. If the agricultural policy were altered in some way to make it more acceptable, our approach would be very different.
§ Mr. SandysWhile the right hon. Gentleman will, no doubt, wish to seek transitional safeguards for essential British interests, may I ask whether he can assure us that he accepts the basic principles of the Treaty of Rome and the institutions set up under it?
§ The Prime MinisterWe have said on a number of occasions that the Treaty of Rome presents fewer difficulties for this country—we said it when we were in opposition—than some of the decisions which have been taken since the Treaty of Rome was signed. There are, however, some difficult points about the Treaty of Rome which would require negotiation—the right hon. Gentleman himself was engaged in some of these negotiations—but whereas the Treaty envisages an agricultural policy, it does not necessarily require it to be this one and with these figures.
§ Q5. Mr. Ridleyasked the Prime Minister what assurances he has had from the French Government about their policy towards an attempt by the United Kingdom to join the European Economic Community; and if he will make a statement.
§ The Prime Minister"None" and "no" respectively, Sir.
§ Mr. RidleyDoes the Prime Minister remember saying at Bristol on 18th March that Mr. Macmillan did not tell President de Gaulle about his intended purchase of Polaris missiles? As this has been proved to be entirely false, will the right hon. Gentleman retract it, and will he agree at the same time that there now appears to be no reason why the French should object to our entry into the Common Market?
§ The Prime MinisterWhat I did at Bristol was to refer to the Nassau Agreement because, of course, whereas there was a short reference by Mr. Macmillan in his talks with President de Gaulle to the fact that, if Skybolt fell through, he would have to get some alternative, possibly submarines—at least, he did not say it had been decided at the time—it was the terms of the Nassau Agreement in relation to the putting of these nuclear or Polaris submarines within N.A.T.O. which upset President de Gaulle at that time.
§ Mr. HeathWill the Prime Minister refresh his mind on what he actually said at Bristol? He actually used the words "the duplicity" of the then Prime Minister at the Rambouillet talks, and this, as he has now said, is entirely unjustified. President de Gaulle, as he himself told me, was informed by Mr. Macmillan of the need to go in for another weapon, possibly Polaris, if we could not have Skybolt. President de Gaulle told me that himself. The Prime Minister must not shift his ground. He should make an honourable retraction.
§ The Prime MinisterThere is no question that President de Gaulle, in the course of a very long discussion, was briefly told about the Skybolt difficulties, and, as I have said already, he was told that, if we could not get Skybolt, we should have to ask for something else. He did not say Polaris; he listed a number of things. What he did not tell President de Gaulle—and what President de Gaulle must have since told the right hon. Gentleman really upset him in not being told—was that the Nassau Agreement required him to collectivise it within N.A.T.O.
§ Mr. HeathAs the Nassau Agreement had not been signed when Mr. Macmillan was at Rambouillet, how could he have told President de Gaulle the terms?
§ The Prime MinisterBecause what he told President de Gaulle involved that it would be, as the Conservatives were insisting, a purely independent deterrent, and President de Gaulle felt that it was all tied up with the Americans, which was not acceptable.
§ Mr. RidleyIn view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give 214 notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest possible opportunity.