HC Deb 30 January 1963 vol 670 cc912-6
5 and 6. Mr. Eden

asked the Minister of Defence (1) what consideration he has given to the capacity of British industry to manufacture an effective and wholly independent nuclear deterrent;

(2) what wholly British projects he has studied with a view to backing one of them as a replacement for Skybolt.

Mr. Thorneycroft

Various projects for wholly British manufactured deterrent weapon systems have been considered. In the view of Her Majesty's Government the Polaris system is to be preferred on grounds both of time scale and of cost, as well as the fact that it is already in service.

Mr. Eden

Can my right hon. Friend assure the House that the capacity of British industry to provide an alternative weapon to Skybolt was fully taken into account before the Polaris decision was agreed at the Bahamas? Is it not a fact that there have been in existence for some time two teams in British industry who have really got to the stage of producing the fundamentals of an alternative British weapons system?

Mr. Thorneycroft

My answer implied no reflection on British industry. I was concerned only with the time scale and the cost.

7. Mr. Swingler

asked the Minister of Defence what is his estimate of the total expenditure to date on the maintenance of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent.

Mr. Thorneycroft

Taking the whole period since 1948 and including the research and development cost, the capital cost of the V-bombers, the cost of the weapons they carry, their running cost and the costs we have met for Thor, the total is about £1,000 million.

Mr. Swingler

Without anticipating what will be said in today's debate, may I ask whether the right hon. Gentleman, as a former Chancellor of the Exchequer who resigned and protested against Government extravagance, will be prepared—either today or tomorrow—to "come clean" with the British public and tell them the amount of the bill which the Government now propose for carrying on this illusion?

Mr. Thorneycroft

Certainly we will go into the cost question in the debate, but the figure is under 10 per cent. of the defence budget.

Sir G. Nabarro

Would not my right hon. Friend agree that although the aggregation of cost over a period of 16 years or more may be £1,000 million, that figure properly related year by year to the whole defence programme of this country works out at about £50 to £60 million per annum, which is a very reasonable figure for so massive a defence system?

Mr. Thorneycroft

There is no doubt that we have had very good value for money.

Sir G. Nabarro

Hear, hear.

Mr. Mason

Does the estimate of £1,000 million include the development cost of rockets such as Blue Streak, £100 million, Blue Water, £55 million, and other partially-developed rockets which never proved militarily successful?

Mr. Thorneycroft

As I understand it, it covers the research and development costs that have been put into this.

10. Mr. Shinwell

asked the Minister of Defence what nuclear deterrent projects he intends to develop and put into production to fill the gap before the delivery of the Polaris submarine.

Mr. Thorneycroft

I would ask the right hon. Gentleman to await the debate which is about to open.

Mr. Shinwell

Am I understood that in the course of the debate the right hon. Gentleman proposes to develop the case for filling the gap between the strategic air force and our contribution to that air force and the Polaris development and production? Does he intend to do that?

Mr. Thorneycroft

So far as security considerations permit.

Mr. Shinwell

But surely that is not a satisfactory answer? Are we not entitled to some information about the possibilities of filling the nuclear deterrent gap in, say, the course of the next five years?

Mr. Thorneycroft

I hope that we will have an opportunity of debating whether there is a gap, what sort of gap it is and what we might do, but I still say, "so far as security considerations permit".

Mr. Paget

Are we going to hear if the Government have made up their mind whether we can afford both a nuclear deterrent and decently equipped conventional forces? If they have come to that conclusion, how much more is it going to cost and, if not, which course is going to be preferred?

Mr. Thorneycroft

I thought that the Opposition had put down an Amendment designed to do away with our deterrent and I thought that that would be relevant.

Mr. Bellenger

In view of the limitations which are imposed on the right hon. Gentleman in relation to security, would it not be preferable that we should consider some of these matters in the sort of committee which some hon. Members have suggested for some time should be set up?

Mr. Thorneycroft

That raises a different question which the right hon. Member might like to discuss with his own Front Bench.

16. Mr. Wall

asked the Minister of Defence whether, in view of the Bahamas Agreement, he will now direct that the cost of carrying the deterrent shall not be included in the Vote of any of the three defence Services but on a separate Vote or on that of his Department.

Mr. Thorneycroft

No, Sir, I regard the question of which Service Estimates carry the cost of the deterrent as of little practical importance.

Mr. Wall

Is not my right hon. Friend aware that some of the criticism of the Polaris agreement is based on the repercussions it might have on the future of the Royal Air Force and the conventional Navy? Would he not agree that if the cost of the method of carrying the deterrent were borne on a separate Vote it would lead to more flexibility and a better understanding by the public?

Mr. Thorneycroft

That argument carried to its logical conclusion would mean that there would be only one Vote, and that the Vote of the Ministry of Defence. I do not think that one should be influenced by whether the deterrent should be carried on the Royal Air Force Vote or on the Navy Vote. One would use the equipment that is available. One would do it on its merits.

30. Mr. John Hall

asked the Minister of Defence what projects for wholly British-manufactured deterrent weapon systems have been considered; and what were the estimates of the cost, in terms both of money and diversion of scientific and technical manpower.

Mr. Thorneycroft

Consideration was given to the possibility of a wholly British manufactured project but the factors of time and diversion of effort from other parts of the programme made this less advantageous than accepting an American offer to sell a missile which was already in service and a later mark of which was under development.

Mr. Hall

May I press my right hon. Friend on this matter. Was no estimate at all made of the cost?

Mr. Thorneycroft

I was hoping to deal with this question of the home manufacture of missiles in the course of the debate. I would really rather deal with it at greater length than is possible now.