HC Deb 18 December 1919 vol 123 cc719-79

4.0 P.M.

Sir DONALD MACLEAN

A very large portion of what I shall have to say to the House will be certainly not additional statements, but in tile form 4.0 P.M which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I in other days would have known it very well as administering interrogatories. I only hope that the reply will not be one of the nature to which we are accustomed—mean of a mere formal nature. The reason for snaking inquiries and gating full and frank answers, which I am sure my right hon. Friend desires to give, if he can consistently with public interest do so, was never snore important than it is today, because there is public uneasiness all the world over, and people are suspicious of all Governments. That is a perfectly natural consequence of the War, which was undoubtedly a shock to the normal authority of every Government throughout the world. If there be anything which has been thoroughly discredited as a result of the War, and of what we now know of what preceded the War, it is what is known as secret diplomacy. I think what the world as well as this country wants is that, as far as possible, the "cards should be put on the table," and that the "blinds should be up." I quite agree that what is known as short-sleeve diplomacy is unattainable in many respects, and, indeed, at certain stages undesirable. But the point I am urging as the basis of the inquiries I am going to press on the Prime Minister is that there has been a fundamental change in the attitude of European. countries with regard to their governors, especially in respect of foreign affairs. We have been accustomed in the past to be ruled very largely by what is known as the governing classes. Neither the Prime Minister nor I belong to that class. The real change that has come is this: that the people of Europe arc subconsciously determined that government shall not be so much from the top down as from the bottom upwards, and that carries with it the necessary consequence of taking the people into the confidence of those who for the time being rule them, and especially so to-clay in relation to our undertakings and treaties with foreign countries. I make this complaint against the Government with regard to that part of it, and it is this: Often they have appealed to us, and not in vain I think my right hon. Friend will admit, that we should observe discretion because a point raised would be contrary to the public interest, and over and over again, when we got the information from, say, the Paris Press or the American Press, we found that those topics which we had been asked to speak about only in hushed whispers, or to ask questions to the point of discretion, or without any point at all, had been discussed in the open Senate in Paris and in Washington.

We had a Conference held in London the other day, and in response to a question which I put to the Prime Minister he gave what I may call a thoroughly old-fashioned answer. He touched all the points, but left us without any real information. I think that was so. I am going to ask the Prime Minister now—I will not say amplify that reply, because there was really no information in it—if he can give us some genuine information about what passed at Downing Street during those fateful days. First of all, with regard to France. This is the first question I want to put to him. Under the Peace Treaty there was a tri-partite agreement, which we endorsed by legislative action here, between ourselves and the United States and France, binding all three parties ft) come to the assistance of our neighbour across the Channel should there be unprovoked attack on the part of Germany. What I should like to know is this: whether, in the event of the possibility—I will not call it probability—of the United States Senate not ratifying the Treaty, and thereby performing their share of the obligation, has the Prime Minister, on behalf of this country, come to any arrangement with France whereby we should undertake the whole of that duty which was, as we understood, to be shared by three? Whether that is good or not I am not arguing at the present moment, and That is a matter for future discussion. All I am asking for is this—that we should know where we stand with regard to this-very important and, indeed, vital matter. I would press this further query arising out of that—whether, supposing His Majesty's Government, in their considered opinion, come to the conclusion that it is the duty of this country to undertake that position, whether the United States comes in or no, will they, before they come to an agreement with France on that point, consult Parliament before they arrive at such a position with regard to it that they present to us nothing more than a fait accompli to accept or reject, and which, if we reject, would involve the downfall of the Government? That is not a position in which any of us who feel any sort of responsibility want to be put in discussing a matter of that kind. I ask, should that eventuality arise—and I hope it will really not arise, and I will say something about the position of the United States later on—that Parliament will have a full and fair opportunity of discussing the proposals of the Government before they come to an agreement with France which would be binding in honour. I feel a certain amount of delicacy in saying another word upon this point.

May I make it clear that none of us can do any thing but emulate each other in admiration and sympathy with France for what she has gone through? There ran be nothing but the profoundest admiration and deepest sympathy with France. The whole world also recognises a man when they see him, and they have nothing but admiration for the patriotic splendour of the conduct of the great Prime Minister of France. We sincerely hope that the accident which befell him on his journey here is one from which he will suffer no ill effects, and that he may speedily recover. I would like to say this to the Prime Minister—that he may not be aware of what I would like to press upon him as to what is the feeling of a large part of the population of this country who follow these questions. It is this: There is a large amount of public nervousness as to how far this country may be drawn into obligations to, and 'close alliance with, France beyond our capacity to bear that burden. We, too, have borne our share in the fight, and there is a limit, and a very well-defined limit, beyond which I do not think it is either our obligation nor, indeed, have we the capacity to go. Whatever may be implicit in what I have said, I leave it at that, and say nothing more on the point. With regard to Italy, which was the next country the Prime Minister adumbrated, shall I say, in his reply, can he tell us any more about the position of the Allies in relation to the great question of the Adriatic—a storm centre of a very dangerous nature? I do not want to say anything more about that, other than that I think we are entitled to know rather more than the Prime Minister thought fit to tell us on Monday last. Now, about the well-worn subject of Russia, I should like to ask the Prime Minister to tell me whether he would regard as final his answer on Monday last to a supplementary question—and sometimes even so admirably skilled a Parliamentarian as the Prime Minister may give an answer on the spur of the moment which he would not give if he had more than a second's notice in which to reply? This was the answer: If the Soviet authorities in Russia want to make peace, they must make it with the people with whom they arc at war—with General Denikin, General Koltchak, and others. They must make peace amongst themselves first." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th December, 1919, col. 24]. Let us see what that means. The logic of that really is that until civil war ceases in Russia—and so far as all the material portents, at any rate, are concerned it looks as if that will end by the defeat of Keltchak and Denikin—until that time arrives, and if and when that time arrives, that is the only time when the Government and the Allies will consider any suggestions, any advances of any kind, for making peace with Russia. 1 think that is a very serious position to take up, and I would remind him of what I ventured to remind him of some weeks ago. Pitt, in the days of the French Revolution, when the Terror was at its height, did not disdain, indeed he sought, opportunities of getting into diplomatic touch with those who were responsible for what government and what authority existed in those terrible days in France. Later on, diplomatic relations were broken off because war broke out; but I want to press this very strongly on the Prime Minister, because it is a matter of very great importance: Are we to leave that vast country absolutely alone, so far as any diplomatic relations are concerned, until, as far as we can practically see, Bolshevism is triumphant over Koltchak and Denikin? If it is wrong for us now to have anything to do with those who are the dominant authority in Russia at present, it must be wrong then. In all these matters we have to recognise facts, and I hope that His Majesty's Government in this matter will not neglect any opportunity which they can honestly and reasonably undertake of doing anything to bring peace to that terrible inferno, with its awful reactions on the whole of the civilised world. How can we look forward with anything but dismay to a Russia chaotic, inimical, indeed actually at enmity with us, when there is no nation in the world to whom a friendly, a peaceful, and a prosperous Russia means so much as it does to us? I would call my right hon. Friend's attention once again to what the Secretary of State for War said in this House, on Monday, I think it was. Whatever course he may be compelled to take, he shows no change of heart. That is very evident to those who listen to him, and while I can imagine my -right hon. Friend the Prime Minister dragging his friend and colleague out of Russia by reluctant coat-tails, I suggest to him that what it really wants is a rope—not in an illegal sense at all! It wants strong measures on his part to see that his right hon. Friend carries out the policy that the Prime Minister has laid down to this House, and which, as I understand by his answer, the Allies have agreed to, a very satisfactory state of affairs if, as I hope it does, it means the policy of nonintervention in Russia on the part of all the Allies.

What about Turkey? A question was asked by the Noble Lord the Member for Hitchin (Lord R. Cecil) to-day, which I could not quite catch, as I was engaged in conversation at the time, but I understood it dealt with the question as to whether this country would see that some of those subject races, who all these centuries long have suffered under Turkish rule, shall be freed once and for all from Turkish domination. There were handed to me a moment before I came into the House some quotations from my right hon. Friend's own speeches on the matter.

The PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Lloyd George)

On Turkey?

Sir D. MACLEAN

Yes. I will not trouble him with them, except to remind him that no one in the whole course of this War has spoken with more eloquence and passionate conviction about the duty of civilisation to rescue these countries from what he has described as the bloody tyranny of the Turk than he has, and that was implemented by Mr. Asquith when he was Prime Minister It is a matter on which not only Christendom but the whole of civilisation is deeply interested, and I sincerely trust that, no matter what temptations may be dangled before the Allies or what material reasons may be urged upon the Government, they will not be deflected from that great, lofty, moral duty, implemented by solemn Parliamentary undertakings, which has been imposed upon the people of this country. Another point I should like to urge upon my right hon. Friend is that every possible step should be taken to bring about the ratification of peace. Unless that is done—although we may have to leave out many whom we should like to have in—you will never get joint efforts banded together to start really clearing up the mess, and I should like, indeed the country would like, some information from the Prime Minister as to when he thinks that will take place. I urge upon him this: to take the risks and get it done, for I am certain it would result in good. At present indecision, hesitation, doubt, fear, all arise, and you will never get an improvement on that until this part of the question resolves itself into certainty.

I pass from these queries to say a few words with regard to the economic and financial situation. That was the second paragraph in the answer which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister gave to me, on Monday. He said that the economic and financial situation had been examined in detail, and that in order to remedy a fall in the exchange, prejudicial to the two nations, it had been arranged that permission should be given to the French Government to apply for a loan in this country. As far as we are concerned, I am sure we wish the French Government good luck in their effort to raise money here, but I want to say a word or two on the European position particularly, and in passing I should like to say this. We had a very interesting discussion yesterday on currency. One listened to the Debate, which was a very useful Debate I thought, but the real question came out again and again. Questions of currency, the inflation of credit, all these are only symptoms of the disease, and the regulation of currency or further creations of credit may be useful, but they are not the radical measures which are necessary to cure the evil. The evil lies much deeper than that, and, as was said by severa,1 speakers yesterday and endorsed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the true remedies consist in increased production, stoppage of borrowing, and, above all, cessation of public and private extravagance. I do not want to hammer away again at the Government on the question of public extravagance; they know my views about that, but I would urge this, in so far as any remarks of mine will go outside this House, and that is the immense importance of the individuals, the citizens of the country, in their own private capacity, recognising their public duty in this matter.

It has been said before—the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, all have said the same thing, and we all say the same thing, but can anybody go about the country and sec any check, any decline, in private extravagance? Not a bit. The whole social Jazz dance of extravagance goes madly on, and I wonder how long the people of this country will be before they realise that they are dancing over an inferno which at any moment, with the collapse of credit, might give, and then they would see the results, which they themselves have so largely contributed to, engulfing themselves and those they love in that disaster. What is the position with regard to the exchange in a few countries in Europe? What is our own position? In pre-war days we stood preeminent amongst the nations of the world as the great financial centre of it, and I do not see any reason why we should not recover that position. We ought to. Our geographical position should help us. If we are worthy of our task, and live up to our honourable traditions in the world and our own duties as private citizens, we shall get back to it in time. So far as our relations with the United States are concerned at present, rather less than four dollars goes to the sterling—a depreciation of 22½ par cent. —and, taking our own depreciated stock, and comparing it with nations east of us, what is the position to-day? On our own depreciated standard to-day there is a drop of about 40 per cent. —38 francs to our own sovereign; 47 to 50 lira in Italy—a drop of about 50 per cent.; and as to Germany, no one really knows what it is, but, so far as the quotation goes, I think to-day it is something between 170 and 180 marks to our sovereign—a depreciation of about 90 per cent. As to Austria and Russia, of course you cannot get any reliable quotation of exchange at all. America is assisting us still, and she is also assisting the nations of Europe, but the real posi- tion is that each day we are getting deeper into debt to the United States, and all the nations of Europe are getting deeper into debt to us.

I am not one of those who cares to cry stinking fish about my own country at all, and I might say, so far as I have been able to look at the figures, that so far as the balance between imports and exports is concerned, our position is incomparably better than any other nation in Europe. Taking the first nine months of this year, we had about £1,167,000,000 worth of imports and about £540,000,000 of exports, with about £98,000,000 of re-exports, leaving a balance, supposing the year had concluded at that rate, of somewhere about £700,000,000. We have, of course, something to set off against that. Our investments abroad bring in about £150,000,000, and for other services—banks, and things of that kind—I think it would be safe to reckon about £50.000,000. But then comes in the great sheet-anchor of this country in peace and war, the Mercantile Marine, and I do not think the estimate would be veryfar off if I said there would be paid to this country very little short of £400,000,000 this year for freight service rendered to other countries. If it is more, so much the better. That leaves us with not very much more than £100,000,000 to make up so far as our foreign trade is concerned. Of course, we all know that imports are material and visible goods for services rendered. That is the way business is done. But the real trouble is this. So far as we are concerned, looking at it, as one is entitled to do, from selfish interests, though our own interests are not always selfish, it is the duty which we owe to ourselves, and, indeed, to those whom we want to help. Of course, it is no use, if you arc trying to rescue a drowning man, to be dragged in with him. It is of the highest importance that you should keep yourself on the bank, if you are going to help him at all. Of course I am assuming that you have got the rope round him.

One thing dominates the situation in Europe, and that is hunger, the greatest cause of all the political ills from which mankind has ever suffered. It is the parent of rebellion, and all social unrest, and of the main troubles in Europe today. There was a very remarkable letter which appeared in the "Times" of yesterday, I think it was, signed by eminent men of every class and grade of society, appealing to this country to do what it could to save the existence of millions of people in Central Europe. If something is not done, when the crash comes a lot of things will go down with it. It is not a sentimental business alone, although, of course, that ought to have its weight, but it is an appeal to duty of the highest importance if we wish to save Europe from the whirlpool in which Russia is swirling to-day. I do not know what can be done, but something on those lines, I am happy to think, has already been started, and I would urge in support of that appeal again what I have already said. It is not merely philanthropy and sentiment; it is the instinct of self-preservation in ourselves and others, and I hope and believe the Government is well aware of the situation, and I would say, for high state reasons of a national and an international character, they ought to take all available steps to support that appeal, backed as it was in the way I have just indicated. For what my opinion may be worth, I have come to the conclusion that it may be necessary in order to get these matters on their true basis, that there should be international co-operation of a financial kind, to provide the necessary credit. We cannot do it ourselves. So far as I am concerned, let that be quite understood. The burden which we are carrying is an enormous one. I do not think we realise how great it is, or it would be crushing. But there are other countries who might bear their fair share or the burden. Where are the Nationals from those countries oppressed by famine, pestilence, and the after-horrors of war? Many millions of them are in the United States; millions of them are in the. Argentine, in countries which, all honour to them for whatever part they played in the War, have not been nearly so hard hit as we have. I think, too, the call of race should meet with some response in these matters. We all know and constantly hear that you cannot destroy nationality. That appeal I think ought to find a very hearty response from those people, in order that they may play their part, not only to save the nations from which they have sprung, but to save a large part of civilisation as well.

I would like to say a word on the question of the United States and the League of Nations. I think it is a great mistake on our part to be too impatient with the United States because of the hesitation. and the delay which has taken place in the signing of the Treaty. We must remember what the traditions of the United States are with regard to interference and intervention in European affairs. There are taught, I believe, in all the primary schools of America selected portions of the last message of Washington, and when you remember that such portions have been taught to generations for the last fifty, sixty, or seventy years, that is the way in which a national tradition is created, and in which a national atmosphere becomes existent, and is extraordinarily difficult to fight against when you wish to create an entirely new situation. One or two of these sentences I have here before me. This is what Washington said to his people: The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote relation. He goes on to say: Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humour, or caprice? Many things have happened since those words were written, but the tradition has remained, and we must bear that in mind when we consider what is happening in the United States to-day. Those who have determined—and I believe they will be successful—to bring America into line with the signatories, at any rate, of all the substantial parts of the Treaty, have that to fight against as well as their own domesticities in their political contest with which we may be sympathetic while not perhaps completely understanding. Those are the difficulties with which those in America who are striving to bring America into line on this great matter are faced. I believe the United States will come clean through in the end. I strongly believe so, but time is going on, and the wheels of her chariot sadly tarry. The League of Nations very largely depends for its enforcement—I would rather say its enthronement—amongst the peoples of the world on that great nation joining with us in the duty which we have undertaken. But I would say this to the Prime Minister: Whether the United States come in or not, we must go on. What is the alternative? Doubt, hesitation, fear, resulting only in a resort to armed force once again for the protection of the public rights of those who are not strong enough to defend themselves. If this thing is allowed to drift—and there is considerable danger of it doing so—the inevitable tendency of all the governing men in Europe will be to slip back again into the terrible days of preparation for war. Let me say this: While we have won a victory over Germany, Germany has won in the methods of war. What is happening? Such fighting as is going on to-day. We have adopted gas, and all the horrors of bombing from the air. Germany is victorious in the methods of warfare. We shall once again plunge into this horror, this nightmare of statesmanship, and of the peoples, unless something better takes its place. There is no half-way house between the League of Nations and a return to militarism. I urge upon the Prime Minister, who in the past has often allied himself with difficult causes, again to gird up his loins, and his courage, and to stand up in this great opportunity, not only for this nation, but for the world, and to work for a better state of things.

Lord ROBERT CECIL

No one who is interested in foreign affairs, and its difficulties, will consider that the present occasion is less difficult than any previous occasion on which we have discussed these matters. But there are certain aspects of the international position which, I think, it is right should be mentioned, and if the Government can give us any information and enlightenment upon them, I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that the country, so far as my experience of it is concerned, will be grateful, for it is deeply interested it the subject. I have been struck, in going about the country—and I have been shout a good deal lately—with the profound and moving interest which all classes of the community feel in the foreign relations of this country at the present time. In that respect, I am quite sure the War has made a most profound difference in the attitude and thought of our people. I agree very much with the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down when he presses very strongly that Peace should be finally ratified as soon as possible. Nothing would do more to relieve the tension in Europe than that we were really done with the War. I do not want to refer to or discuss recent delays which have taken place. We all know they were bound up with the negotiations with Germany. It would be very improper, since those negotiations are not yet complete, to express any opinion upon them. But I, perhaps, may, without indiscretion, be allowed to go so far as this: to point out to my right hon. Friend and the Government that a revolution in Germany cannot possibly be of any service to us and may be destructive in the end. I am glad my right hon. Friend agrees with that. It is quite evident that the destruction of the present German Government would necessarily result in one of three things—either complete anarchy, or a much more extreme Left Government—a Sparticist Government—or a military reaction with a military autocracy. None of these three results can possibly be in our interest, and I am glad that here again my right hon. Friend takes the same view. I am sure, therefore, in all the negotiations and discussions on the subject with our Allies the Government will bear in mind that central cardinal fact.

As to Turkey, I want to say a word or two. There is very considerable anxiety no doubt in considerable classes of the community about Turkey. The feeling is very deep on the Turkish question—and rightly so. The public have been very tremendously stirred by the Armenian massacres, by the cruelties in Syria, and by the terrific hardships and miseries which various parts of the population in Chaldea and Syria have undergone in consequence of the misgovernment of the past, and the disasters of the present War. So many people look with interest at this question that it is quite right to speak freely about it. The campaign winch has apparently been taking place in the French Press can only be described as Turkophile. I do not want to go into details, but if it is a fact that this is in any considerable degree the opinion in France it is only right for someone to say that it has no echo or counterpart in England. I quite recognise there are great difficulties—to which the right hon. Gentleman referred to at Question Time—and I do not desire to dogmatise about Constantinople, which is a very difficult and complicated question. But speaking for myself, I may say that I shall be very profoundly and deeply disappointed to put it very mildly—if Turkish dominion in Constantinople is allowed to remain. I believe it would be a disaster. I believe it would be treated by the worst elements of the Turks as a great and dramatic victory over the Powers of Europe. Constantinople, in some respects, is a most difficult and complicated question. In this and similar matters we do want to be quite thoroughly assured of it that the Government stands perfectly firm by the declaration—the repeated declaration—I have copies of it here, but it is quite unnecessary to remind my right hon. Friend, as I am sure he will not seek to deny it—the repeated declaration that the Turkish government of any sort, or in any form or degree, over subject and alien races must not be allowed to remain. We cannot have in any way the old device of Turkish government for Armenia with certain guarantees, or anything of that kind. That will not meet the present situation. We must get rid of Turkish government over other races once and for all. I trust that that which up to very recently was the policy of the Government is still the policy of the Government. I trust my right hon. Friend will be able to say some reassuring words to the many peoples who look for a declaration upon the subject.

May I ask here why there has been this very prolonged delay in dealing with the matter? Delay does not make it easier to deal with. I cannot help thinking that even the most difficult questions would have been much easier to deal with a year ago, or even nine months ago; that the question of Constantinople itself would have been easier, though it is a complicated question. I do not think it really is a question about which the Government or the Allies should have failed to make up their minds for so long a time. There are other questions which are complicated, too. The future of Syria, the exact form of government for Armenia; which Power is to be entrusted with the trusteeship of this part of the Turkish Empire, and what Power entrusted with that part. Ali these are difficult and complicated questions. But they need not have delayed the Turkish Treaty for one hour. There was nothing to prevent once and for all settling the question of Constantinople and Anatolia; nothing to prevent the signing of a Treaty with Turkey by which Turkey should resign all control over the provinces which it was determined she was no longer fit to be trusted with. The question as to how they were to be dealt with could have been left over as a matter to be discussed between the Allies and Associated Governments. I have never thought that the difficulty as to an American mandate for Armenia should have prevented the Governments, once and for from ejecting Turkey from Armenia; and I shall be very glad if my right hon. Friend can give us some explanation as to why this very prolonged delay has taken place, and give us some hope that the delay is near its termination.

Take the delay in Austria. We cannot help feeling that the delay there has been an unfortunate matter. My right hon. Friend spoke, and quite rightly spoke, of the acute economic position in Austria, and indeed in many other parts of Central Europe. I believe that the Governments are absolutely agreed as to the terrible danger that threatens not only the women and children of Austria, but time peace and good government of the whole of Central Europe in consequence of that situation. The situation has been acute for months past. I myself came over from Paris, I think it was in April, and I made a speech to this House in which I called attention to the very acute economic position in Central Europe. I want to ask my right hon. Friend for an explanation as to what exactly has been done to relieve this situation? What plans have been made? I know food has been put in; but it is merely throwing away money, and it is not of much use merely shovelling food into the country if you do not do more than that. We cannot go on permanently feeding these peoples. You must set them on their legs again, so that they will be able to feed themselves. You must get the economic machine going. That is essential. [An HON. MEMBER: "Hear, hear!"] My hon. and gallant Friend cheers as if I had said something extraordinary—

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY

Germany, too!

5.0 P.M.

Lord R. CECIL

Yes, certainly; set up the whole—and Russia! But you cannot afford to leave any of these countries permanently in their present condition. What are the Government doing in that respect? What are their anticipations, and what do they think will happen? I am bound to say that, as far as I know the terms of the Treaty with Austria, I cannot help feeling that the reparation terms were almost insane in the economic position which Austria occupies. I have never been an admirer of the reparation terms with Germany, but, ns applied to Austria, I think they were utterly indefensible. What sense is there in the case of a people absolutely bankrupt, with no hope or chance of putting itself on its legs again, of placing upon them obligations and financial conditions which are impossible for them to carry out. I have never been able to understand the sense of such a provision as far as Austria is concerned, and some of the other propositions in regard to Austria seem difficult to defend.

I cannot conceive why the Southern Tyrol should have been handed from Austria to Italy. There may have been extreme difficulties in the matter. Consider for a moment What the Southern Tyrol really is. It is almost the most definitely Austro-German part of the whole of Austria. It is the birthplace of Andreas Hofer, who maintained a desperate and heroic struggle against Napoleon to maintain the independence of his country. It has not the slightest connection economically, politically, or racial, and yet you are taking this district and handing it over to Italy. You so diminish the size of Austria as to make it almost impossible for the new Austrian State to remain permanently an independent State. I do not know whether my right hon. Friend will go into those questions now, but I deem it right to snake that statement as an additional reason why we should take up this question of re-establishing the economic position in Europe in come thorough and effective form.

I am not going to say anything about Russia beyond this. My right hon. Friend made a reference to it, and I shall not say anything more upon this point, except that I feel that there are very grave difficulties in opening negotiations with the Soviet Governments. I have always felt that there are difficulties which my hon. Friends feel more strongly than I do, but quite apart from that, the uncertainty of its existence, the difficulty of knowing how far its authority is really established, the impossibility at present of proceeding on any principle upon which we have hitherto gone, all this makes very great difficulties in regard to negotiations. I do not myself see any possibility of a solution of the Russian question unless it can be taken up and dealt with by the League of Nations. It is eminently a matter which ought to be dealt with not by one nation or by one group of nations, but by all the nations as a whole to make whatever settlement they think right, and probably they would precede any such settlement by a really impartial examination into the condition of affairs in that country.

All this makes, in my judgment, not an. argument against the establishment of the League of Nations, as some people seem to think, but a strong argument in its favour. I am bound to say to my right hon. Friend, and I should not be honest and candid if I did not, that I am, I will not say suspicious, but really uneasy as to the attitude of the Government on this question. You cannot get over the fact that there are some members of the Government who are almost openly hostile this question. There is the Secretary for-War, for example, who never refers to it in public except slightingly. Perhaps the Prime Minister is more fortunate than I am in this respect, but I could not say that anything the right hon. Gentleman says in private contradicts what lie sags in public in that respect. When you come to acts, I see very little sign in the policy of the Government of their having accepted, exan imo, the real spirit of the League, and I see very little signs of it in the Estimates.

I have the highest possible respect for Monsieur Clemenceau and we were delighted that he came to visit us, but the atmosphere that surrounded the negotiations between him and the Government were entirely of a war character, and there was nothing of the new spirit about them. It was a private conversation, the details of which have not been given to us, between two Powers settling, we understand, many important considerations without consulting anybody else. Can the right hon. Gentleman say what preparations have been actually made by the Government for taking their part in the League of Nations? I know that in France great preparations have been made. Departmental organisations have been established to make it easier for them to take. their place. I want to know have any such steps been taken here? I want to ask the Government—no one would be more-pleased than I should if the Prime Minister can give me a real hearty reply—are the Government going into the League intending to make it a success? Are they really going to put their last sixpence into the League and push it forward with all the strength and power of this country?

It is said that great difficulties have been caused by the action taken by the United States, and I do not want to say a word about that. It is not for me or for any of us to criticise the action which the United States may think it right to take. If it be true that they are not so much in favour of the League as is represented, and that they are not going to take their part, that does not make it any less the duty and interest of others to take part in the negotiations, but it makes it all the more necessary. We must work harder if we are not to have the assistance of our friends over the sea. It is not a question of whether you will say this or that. It is a matter of absolute necessity for civilisation. I read this morning a speech delivered by Sir Lewis Jackson, describing what is likely to take place in the next war. I should like to see that speech in the hands of every doubter about the League of Nations. As far as my judgment goes, it is in no way exaggerated. The next war, if it takes place on anything like the footing of the last, will be as much more horrible as the War we have just concluded was more horrible than any which preceded it. It means the wholesale destruction of all our city populations and it means an incalculable waste of material and work. I agree with my right hon. Friend that the situation in Europe is very critical. I will put it even higher. I would say that it is so menacing in some respects that in my darker moments I have doubts whether, we shall get through, but I hope I am wrong in this respect. I accept all that my right hon. Friend and others have said about the comparative possibilities of this country, but nevertheless the economic situation is intensely serious. If we had bad luck or a convulsion of nature, or some fresh disturbance of the peace I do not think there is anybody on that Bench who in their heart of hearts would be prepared to answer for the consequences. If that has been the result of the last War, what will be the result of the future war It will not be a question of victory in the future. It will not matter who wins, for everybody will be destroyed. That is the thing we have to realise. Alliances and armaments will be no protection, because even if you win you will have another war on a greater scale than the last which will destroy the whole of civilisation. Under these circumstances I hope my right hon. Friend will really be able to make a reassuring statement on this question, and I trust that the policy of the Government will show that that statement is not merely words.

Mr. R. McNEILL

I intend to confine my remarks to a much less ambitious limit than the Noble Lord who has just spoken. There are only one or two comparatively minor points to which I desire to call the attention of the Prime Minister and the House. Referring to the speech of the Leader of the Opposition, I notice and I entirely agree with it, that he laid great stress upon the complete emancipation of the races that have been hitherto under Turkish rule in Asia Minor. I do not believe there is anyone in the House who does not cordially agree that as a result of this War, and the settlement of it those races should be made comparatively free from the domination of the Turk. I should like my right hon. Friend opposite to have pledged himself and those whom he represents on this matter, and I wish he had given us some indication of his view of what can be done to make that emancipation effective. It is all very well to sign a Treaty, as we shall do with the Turkish Empire, saying that these various races in Asia Minor are no longer to be under Turkish control, but that will not get rid of the fact that there are Turks and Kurds and other savage people scattered about all over the country. One wants to know what. effective safeguard we have to offer to these people when we have effected their emancipation. I remember attending one of the largest demonstrations that I ever saw in Trafalgar Square many years ago when there was a popular demand that we should go to the rescue of the Armenians. A deputation was sent to the illustrious father of my Noble Friend (Lord R. Cecil), urging him to go to the rescue of the Armenians, and, if I remember rightly, Lord Salisbury replied that the British Navy was not prepared to go over the top of the Caucasus. Has the right lion. Gentleman formed any clear idea whether we are to have an Army of Occupation of our own, of America, or of the French, or what means are to be taken for safeguarding these people? My own impression and fear is that if anything of the sort were done we should immediately have protests from various quarters in this House against new commitments. We should have the same things said that are now being said with regard to the support given to our friends in Russia and in Asia Minor, and I am not at all sure that the Government would have any very effective reply. Therefore, it is not less important to have clearly in our minds how the thing is to be done when the paper emancipation has been carried out, than to lay stress in this House upon the mere policy of carrying out the Treaty.

The right hon. Gentleman referred—and quite rightly referred—to the distress of these people in Asia Minor at the present time. I should like to associate myself with the protest that he made as to the way in which some of these subjects are dealt with at Question Time in this House. I must say that in some respects we have not been very well treated by the Foreign Office. I make no sort of complaint against my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary (Mr. Harmsworth). He is always courteous and as helpful as he can possibly be, and we all recognise that as the Secretary of State is in another place he has a very special responsibility which makes it difficult for him, perhaps, to assume as much initiative as he would like to do from time to time. That, however, does not get over the fact, emphasised by the Leader of the Liberal Opposition, that we are put off from time to time with every sort of evasion when we try to get information. I put a question only yesterday in this House with regard to one of these peoples in Asia Minor. I addressed my question to the Foreign Office, because I believed, and I still believe, that the Foreign Office was the Department concerned. It was a question regarding the Chaldean Christians in Asia Minor. How was my question treated? I was told that it was a matter for the India Office. The Secretary of State for India had been in the House a few minutes before, but the question was answered by one of the Junior Whips. It was on the eve of a Debate in this House on foreign affairs, and I should have thought that it was natural to assume, when a Member asked for information on a question of this sort on the eve of a foreign Debate, that it was for the bonâ-fide purpose of informing his mind in order that he might take part in the discussion. The question was handed over to the India Office, which I believe has nothing whatever to do with it, and then it was answered by a Junior Whip, who, of course, was not in a position to give any information whatever in reply to supplementary questions. I asked about the condition of the Chaldean Christians in Asia Minor, and whether the Government had any scheme for assisting them, and, if not, whether they would be prepared to give any facility to a private organisation having the same-aim. The Junior Whip, to whom the question was handed by second hand, told us: I understand that only a minority of the Christian community of Chaldeans live within the area of Mesopotamia under British occupation, and I have no information leading me co think that their condition is such as is suggested by my hon. Friend, but I am making special inquiries."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th December, 1919, 406.] What does that mean? I do not know whether it is the Foreign Office or the India Office, but at all events the Office which thinks it is concerned has no information upon the subject. They have no excuse for having no information, because this very interesting though small people have a representative in this country at the present moment, and I certainly understood that that representative had been in communication with the Government. He was quite prepared, I am certain, to give information to the Government, and I can hardly imagine that there was any justification for the Government, on the day before a Debate on foreign policy, not informing themselves, so that they were actually compelled to say that they understood, though they could not speak with certainty, something or other with regard to one part of the question, and that they had no information, but were making special inquiries, with regard to the other part. If the importance and interest of these matters goes by mere quantity, I quite agree that these people are not worth considering, but that is not the true test of 'whether a people deserve the support arid encouragement of the British Government and the British nation. These Chaldean Christians are a very small people, but they are one of the most ancient Christian populations in the world, and they have this distinction, which gives them a very special claim upon our regard, that they are, I believe, the only people in that part of the country who have actually fought as Allies on our side.

Mr. T. P. O'CONNOR

No.

Mr. McNEILL

My hon. Friend corrects me, but these Chaldeans did supply a contingent which, in the course of one of our expeditions—I think the expedition up to the Caspian Sea—rendered most valuable service. Therefore, when we are talking, as we have been talking, on a large-scale about economic relief—I quite agree with my Noble Friend that it is of the greatest possible importance to relieve the terrible economic distress prevailing every where—when we ate talking in millions of sending relief to our late, and, indeed, our present enemies, I do believe that this small, ancient, interesting Christian people, who have thrown themselves upon our side and are now left to the tender mercies of their economic distress and of their secular enemies, are worthy of some effort being made by our Government and our people to save them from extinction, for it is nothing less than that with which they are faced owing to having no food to meet their present necessities. I turn to another point, and here, again, I must complain of the way in which the Foreign Office—not my hon. Friend, who is only the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office—have dealt with my question and the questions of other hon. Members. I put some questions to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to-day on the subject of Montenegro, and he replied by saying he was sure that I would agree with him that as the matter was now before the Council in Paris he ought not to say anything about it. I will not have the presumption to judge him in that matter. I will not venture either to agree or disagree with him, but I gather from his answer that I am not likely to get much information to-day. I will not complain of that. During the War I asked questions upon this and other subjects, and, while the War lasted, I never on any occasion failed to respond to any request that I should withdraw my question. Therefore, I do not think that the Government will say that I have been trying to make mischief.

The PRIME MINISTER

Hear, hear!

Mr. Mc NEILL

Under present circumstances, when we are well past the War, when the actual fighting is over, although it may be difficult, I agree, for the Government to conduct their operations, as my right hon. Friend opposite suggested, with their cards on the table and the blinds up, I do think that more information might be given upon some of these matters, and that my right. hon. Friend and the Government really exaggerate the embarrassment that they would suffer if they let the world know a little more what they are doing. I want, at all events, to let my right hon. Friend and the House know what some of us think about this question of Montenegro. I must express my surprise that it has not attracted more interest and attention in this House, and I am particularly surprised that my right hon. Friend (Sir D Maclean) and those who arrogate to themselves in a special degree the Liberal traditions have not shown the slightest interest in this little country which won the particular enconiums of Gladstone and Tennyson and people of that sort. Mr. Gladstone once called it "immortal Montenegro." Throughout this War we have seen this country slighted, abused, and I think oppressed, with the connivance, I cannot call it less, of our own Government, and not one word of protest has come from the leaders of those who call themselves Liberals in this House. I want the right hon. Gentleman to realise that there is a mystery of Montenegro. I gather from what he has told us that he is not going to dissolve that mystery to-day, but let him understand that there is a mystery. Everyone will remember the great. Admiration with which we all heard in the very first few days of war that this minute little country had gallantly thrown themselves on the side of the Allies and was valiantly fighting against the Austrian enemy. That was the first thing that we heard, and it called forth our unbounded admiration for this little country. If there had been no mystery and nothing bad happened, one would have expected that in the ordinary course that little country would have been singled out among the Allies for encouragement, support, praise, and congratulation throughout, and that every possible honour out of all proportion to their size and importance would have been done to Montenegro as a token of the admiration we felt for them. The fact is that throughout the War, whether on the anniversary of the commencement of the War, or on the anniversaries of victories, or on occasions when formal ceremonial messages of congratulation have been sent by the heads of Governments to each other, or when our own gracious Sovereign sent a telegram of congratulation to every conceivable ruler—Siam, Argentine, and everywhere that an Ally was to be found—not once has any message been sent to Montenegro. That is a mystery. Let me tell the House a second fact. Throughout the War Montenegro was not allowed to have a formal diplomatic representative in London. She applied for it, and I myself had the assur- ance to ask in this House why she was not allowed to have a formal representative in this country. It could not have done any harm to anybody, and at all events it would have been a mark of respect and encouragement. I was told in one of those evasive answers which have been given by the Foreign Office that His Majesty's Government considered that Montenegro was quite sufficiently represented by an official in the Embassy in Paris.

The PRIME MINISTER

What was the date of that?

Mr. McNEILL

I should think it was certainly two years ago. It may have been even earlier, but I do not think that anyone representing the Foreign Office will claim that they did not know that the Montenegrin Government desired to be represented in this country. Let me take a still more flagrant example. Why has Montenegro not been represented at the Peace Conference? Let me give an illustration of the Foreign Office methods of answering questions. I have put a question over and over again on this subject, and the last time was on 24th November, when I asked why Montenegro was not represented at the Peace Conference. This is the answer given by the Foreign Office: As previously stated in this House, the representation of Montenegro was accepted by the Peace Conference in principle; but, as Montenegro is not adjacent to Austria, it was not necessary for the Treaty of Peace with Austria to be signed by a Montenegro representative. The people of Montenegro are, of course, directly concerned with the settlement of the peninsula, and the decision has been left open as to how their representative should he chosen.—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th November, 1919, col. l435, Vol. 121.] My question was why they were not represented at. the Peace Conference, yet I have been told only within the last week or two that although their representation was accepted in principle it had been held over as to how their representatives should be chosen. The idea that because Montenegro is not. adjacent to Austria, she should not be asked to sign the Treaty of Peace with Austria, it is really difficult to describe in any other way than as a cock-and-bull story. I have two papers in my pocket issued from the Vote Office only yesterday, one of them is an agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers with regard to Italian reparation, and the other is with regard to the cost of the troops used for the liberation of territories composing the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The parties to the latter agreement include the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, China, Cuba, France, Greece, Italy, Nicaragua, Panama, Japan, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, the Croats, Siam, and the Czecho-Slovak States. Why was Montenegro not allowed to come in with Panama? Are Panama and Nicaragua adjacent to Austria? Can my right hon. Friend give any reason whatever to explain the mystery which underlies our whole dealing with Montenegro, and why this injustice has been inflicted upon this gallant little Ally? What is the mystery?

It is this. At the very beginning of the War a story was put about that the Montenegrins, or their Government, had been guilty of treachery to the Allies. It was said that even the King himself had entered into relations with the enemy, and it was suggested that an important military position had been given up by treachery. From first to last that story has been at the bottom of the whole treatment which has been meted out to Montenegro by the Allied and Associated Powers, and by His Majesty's Government. What I say is this. If there is or if there was any truth in that statement with regard to the King of Montenegro and his Government, why has the evidence never been produced to prove it? I do not believe myself there is the slightest truth in it.

From first to last there has been an aggressive, Imperialistic, filibustering policy on the part of Serbia. At an early stage of the War it was given out in this country that the Serbian Army had invaded the territories of Austria and had penetrated as far as Sarajevo. That story emanated from Serbia, but, as a matter of fact, there was not one Serbian soldier in that force. It was a Montenegrin force. The Serbians have got hold of the sources of information. They have spent hundred and thousands of pounds, if not millions, in propaganda work, and they have poisoned, I believe, the springs of information that not merely reach the public throughout Europe, but those which influence the conduct of my right hon. Friend and those associated with him in Paris. That I believe to be the truth of the ease, and I say it is not fair treatment. Either the King and the Government of Montenegro are guilty or they are not guilty. They have been officially recognised. They were recog- nised only the other day, for when the King of Montenegro left Paris all the ordinary formal ceremonial was gone through at his departure. The King having been recognised, as he has been, he should be treated as innocent. If these stories have been put about and thus acted upon why have they not been substantiated I would urgently impress upon my right hon. Friend that it is not fair to act all through as if these stories, which have emanated entirely from interested Serbian sources, were information upon which it was right to proceed.

I was told by my right hon. Friend only the other day that one of the difficulties of the situation was that the Montenegrins are divided amongst themselves. How could they be otherwise? When the enemy retired from their country they were not left free. When the tide of invasion retired from Serbia the Serbian Government was restored and the country set on its feet again. But when the enemy retired from Montenegro what happened was that, if possible, a worse enemy took its place, that worse enemy being her own Ally. Although in the early days of the War the Montenegrins fought so gallantly —and there is no truth in the story that they did not; they lost:50 per cent. of their effectives and their military forces by covering the retreat of the Serbians and saved the remnant of the Serbian Army—yet their country has been devastated not by an enemy as was Belgium, Serbia, or Poland, but by the country they themselves saved and a country to which they have been from the first a gallant and loyal Ally. There, again, I say, having regard to these facts, it becomes perfectly unintelligible how it is that the Great Powers should in this way have played into the hands of those filibustering Serbians.

The Government of Montenegro has been kept in exile. Its King and its Ministers have been detained in Paris. Their country has been occupied by Serbian troops. Is it wonderful, then, that the Montenegrins are divided? If you had restored their King or their Government as soon as possible, the differences in opinion, which are natural enough and the like of which are to be found everywhere else, would have settled themselves. If the minority of the people had wanted a change of government they would have been in a position to get it. In the same way, if the majority had wanted to maintain the present Government they could have done so. But, instead of that, their country has been occupied by a foreign army and there has been no possibility of arriving with any real certainty at the feelings of the people and of the nation. What I have been pressing by these questions from time to-time, and what I desire to press upon the Government now, is simply this: That the Montenegrins should be given the power and the right to decide for themselves their own future. Nobody asks anything more for them than that. The Serbian policy, as we know, is annexation. They have been putting it about through their propaganda that the majority of the Moritenegrin people desire incorporation with Serbia. It may be so. On the other hand, it is said with quite as much assurance that that is not at all the case, and that if a free vote could be taken it would be seen that tile Montenegrin desire to maintain their independence. I can very well imagine, having regard to the splendid history of that little country, the only country in the Balkan Peninsula which has succeeded in maintaining its independence all these years against Turkey—I can imagine that if they desire to go into a large Jugo-Slav State they would prefer to go in under some federal system which would preserve their own independence rather than under a union which would obliterate all their past history.

The right hon. Gentleman has said that this question is extremely difficult because we are practically without information. But the Government have plenty of information. They sent one of their emissaries to Montenegro to examine the facts for himself and to report to them what he believed to be the wish of the people and the impressions which he gathered as to the allegations which have been made. Count de Salis sent his Report to this country, and yet the Government has never consented to produce it, or to let this House or the country know anything about it! What is the reason for that? The only reason which has any plausibility at all is this. I was told by the Under-Secretary that if the Government produced Count de Salis' Report it would be dangerous for some who had given him information. That means, of course, that the Report was an entire exposure of Serbian intrigue and oppression in that country, and, therefore, if names were mentioned and published, it would bring down upon those people the wrath of the Serbian authorities in Montenegro. I imme- diately suggested to my hon. Friend that if that were so it was no reason whatever for not publishing the Report and omitting the names, leaving blanks in their place. There are precedents for that. There is the precedent of the Bryce Report on the German atrocities in Belgium, and there must be many other precedents; there can be no possible reason why, with perfect safety to those who gave information to Count de Salis, that Report should not be issued. The refusal of the Government to make the facts known is continuing the mystery, and I am afraid it will be continued so long that, before the public opinion grasps what is being done, the Serbians will have made a fait accompli of the annexation of Montenegro, and when the Government at long last think it safe to give the information to the House and to the public we shall simply be told "it is very unfortunate, but it is too late now; it is all past history." Therefore, I take this opportunity to strongly protest, first, against the way in which this matter has been treated in questions and answers in this House for the last few years, and, secondly, at the continued refusal of the Government, when even at this time I do not believe it would cause any embarrassment, to make, known the facts communicated by their agent as to the opinion the Montenegrin people on the way they have been treated.

Mr. CLYNES

The closing observations of the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down indicate the growing indignation at what might be termed the sustained secrecy of the Government on matters which certainly ought to be more open. Although he stated his views in very restrained language, his protest is, I think, none the less weighty, and should evoke from the Government sonic frank statement as to why they have acted in the way he has described. I rise to address to the Government a few words in order to indicate the indignation felt by hon. Members with whom I act on this side of the House in regard to the line of policy pursued by the Government in connection with matters which should be the subject of common knowledge. What used to be described as foreign politics are not as foreign to the masses of the people of this country now as they were years ago. Those millions of men who went to foreign lands, largely because the trend of foreign politics in previous years dragged them there, have come back retaining an interest in both home and foreign politics far deeper than they ever had before. For that reason, if for no other, the Government should meet this increasing hunger for information on the real facts of the case. In the earlier stages of the almost daily conferences in France following the conclusion of the War, one could understand the cause for a great deal of secrecy. But the effects of this continued secrecy on what might be called our peace of mind, and on the general condition in Europe, are extremely serious, and might very well be reduced by taking the country more into the confidence of the Government.

We are, by the measures pursued by the Government, kept very largely as yet in the realm of war thought. The sooner we escape from that line of thought into the more wholesome mode of looking in terms of peace at the problems we have to handle, the better, I am sure, will it be for all. The Prime Minister takes the lead in appealing to this country, and to all its parties and classes, for unity. I think the Coalition Government bases its main ease for its continued existence upon the need for unity—unity of classes for a unity of purpose. I say that there can be no unity without confidence, and there can be no confidence without knowledge; that it is essential, in order to create a sense of nation and a unity of purpose, that all classes of the people shall be taken more fully into the confidence of the Government. We on this side of the House are expected to feel some sense of responsibility about what we say, either because of any authority we may have at the moment, or any authority we may think we may hereafter acquire. But how can we do justice to that sense of responsibility if we are kept in ignorance—if all that we know about these foreign relationships has to be gathered from enterprising correspondents, whose statements, when revealed, are usually denied if they are made the subject of question? It is in the national interest, if not in the interest of a man or a party for the time being, that we should at once be ushered into that period of more open and frank dealing which we were told would be established as one result of the War. The meetings which are held in all parts of the country, and organised by all parties, at this time of day, prove to us bow deeply interested the people are in the commitments into which the Government may enter from time to time, because of the bearing of those commitments upon our future life, happiness and destiny. We on this side, as did other Members of this House, towards the close of the negotiations which concluded the Treaty, thought we were not being justly treated as a Parliament in regard to the settlements and many features of the Treaty that were reached in France practically behind closed doors. Reference has been made to the meetings recently held in this country—indeed, held in Downing Street —within the last few days; and here we are appealing for information. We are supposed to live in a democratic age; we are supposed to be the governing factor in the affairs of this country. The power of Parliament is said to be supreme, and yet, behind all those words, there is the fact that a few men are making arrangements in private which no doubt they will require us hereafter submissively to confirm as an active duty. That is not the open diplomacy that was promised to us, and we would like to know really what has happened during these very important conferences. This information ought not to be given, because it is extracted by question and answer, or, in reply to a protest, but readily, and as a right, to Parliament, and as the need of the country. The view of those with whom I act on this side of the House is that it is essential in all these matters that we should know how far we are being carried, and that we should not on any sentimental ground, or for any material reason, be led into partnership in regard to these very great obligations without understanding beforehand the value of them, and the responsibilities which they carry.

I want to avoid saying any one word which would appear to be a reflection upon our great neighbour and Ally, France. We are too near the agony of that country, and her suffering in every form and manner, to indulge in a single word of criticism as to the part which she thinks it still needful to pursue to ensure her future safety against an aggressor. But I do venture to say that, like ourselves, France will be obliged to think as much in terms of the world's needs as in terms of the needs of France alone. Therefore, while recognising the part which she has played in the world's history, and the supreme need which fell upon her to protect herself against the aggressions of a more powerful neighbour, we do say that this War has changed a very great deal, and that men cannot look at these questions of alliances and foreign relationships in the sense in which Frenchmen naturally were obliged to look, and continue to look, at them after the events of 1870. The events which followed August, 1914, are the events which must shape the outlook and attitude of all free peoples, at any rate in regard to these commitments. I think it was the Noble Lord the Member for Hitchin (Lord R. Cecil) who referred to the effect upon the world of any tendency in Germany towards revolution. One might add, to what he has said under that head, a reference to the situation in France itself. It is far from being absolutely calm and secure. The elections there, as here, might lead observers to wrong conclusions. I think it may be said that the representation secured for what might be termed the Socialist-Bolshevik body of opinion in France is far out of proportion to the number of voters. I have not the figures in my mind, but certainly a very considerable number of electors in France voted for the candidates who would be classed as extreme or revolutionary, and those who observe events in that country can see that this tendency towards the development of a Bolshevik - Socialist body of opinion exists to a very considerable degree in Germany as well as in France. In France the Majority Socialists, who stood towards their country in that time of war in the same relation in which we stood towards our country here, found themselves, as the War went on, transformed from a majority to a minority of their party. Therefore, in both those countries we have all the elements of prospective disturbance of the most alarming and serious kind.

6.0 P.M.

Frankly, for myself, I say I am wholly discontented and dissatisfied with the existing social and industrial order, and I believe it must be modified in a very material degree before we can or ought to expect anything like absolute contentment and restfulness on the part of the masses of the people. But I want changes to come as the result of the intellectual acceptance of the doctrines as we propose them, as the result rather of conversion than of coercion. Bolshevists in either of the countries to which I have referred, as in the case of Russia, appear to place their faith in the working class of those countries acquiring sufficient power and authority, based, as it must be, upon the application of military force or of some kind of organised violence, in order that they may dominate the affairs and destiny of their country as a class. Just as assailed and opposed the dominion of class when it has been exercised by a wealthy class in this country, I would equally resist class tyranny or class law when it is proposed to exert it on behalf of the working class of this country. You cannot seek to secure the welfare and prosperity of the nation as a whole by enthroning a class in the seat of government, as a class right and as a privilege, without greatly endangering the prosperity of the whole of the people of every class. The position of the Bolshevik, and of the more extreme form of Socialist, who does not seek the success of his country and its government through constitutional changes, is both in Germany and in France, extremely serious, and that has a bearing upon the conduct of the Government of this country in relation to these arrangements in which it has entered. Knowledge, therefore, can do us no harm. The publication by the Bolshevists in Russia of all those secrets which have been locked for years under the key of the Czar certainly did no harm to the cause of progress. Individuals might have squirmed and suffered, as no doubt they did, but the more the Government, especially in a country deemed to be freely governed, takes the people into its confidence, the better it will be for the true interests of the whole of the nation. I suggest under this head, in regard to Russia, that in spite of, and perhaps even because of, the progress which the Bolshevists are making against the military forces there is an increasing need for the speedy establishment of diplomatic relations and an attitude of official peace towards that country. The fact that they are at war with themselves to a considerable extent internally does not justify the statement made by the Prime Minister the other day, when he said, "Let them make peace among themselves." Russia is a very considerable country, with which we had before the War very extensive trade relations. The fact that we are unable completely to separate ourselves from anything Russia may be doing is proved by the conferences between Litvinoff and my hon. Friend (Mr. O'Grady). Under this head we are entitled to know something of what has been going on. How far, if at all, have these negotiations been successful? Is the Prime Minister to wait until, by the pressure of questions, seine little information is extracted from him as to the conferences of which our Press has been full almost day by day? I do not say that means that all these matters can be set right by the single action of this Government, and I therefore think we might be told more frankly what are the intentions of the Government to effect cooperative action with other willing nations with a view to securing a higher measure of contentment, or it may be with a view to lowering that line of famine at which so large a number of these people are placed at present. The real manufacturer of Bolshevism and discontent of a revolutionary kind is hunger. It is the greatest and the most effective instrument the would-be revolutionists can have, and, incidentally, that condition of internal discontent, for which we cannot altogether escape the responsibility, has its effect in turn upon this country, and the efforts of very many well-meaning men and women, which might well be directed towards redressing wrongs which exist here, are being diverted, naturally, and the energies of some of the best of our philanthrophists and our public men and women arc being exerted to try to lessen the effects of the. poverty existing still in some parts of the Continent.

You will not secure the condition of industrial peace and industrial prosperity in Britain so long as conditions abroad are so disturbed and so uncertain. Mystery usually makes nothing but mischief, and when you ask the workers of this country to settle clown to work, you are almost stunned with the reply, in the form of another question, "What about Russia? What about the condition of the people who may have to remain under the dominion of the Turk? What about the starving people of Austria? What about the manner in which one or the other section of absolutely innocent men and women are suffering in some part of the globe? So that although we ought not to undertake the responsibility for setting right all these grievous wrongs, yet it would be well for our peace of mind and for our higher measure of industrial peace and prosperity at home, if our Government could singly do as much as it can and cooperatively as much as it can arrange with other countries. So I would ask that the Members of the House be told something definitely with regard to the negotiations which have recently been proceeding in Copenhagen and that we should have some amplification of the Prime Minister's statement in the earlier part of this week with regard to the intentions of the Government as to declaring not merely an actual, but an official state of peace between ourselves and Russia in order that diplomatic relations might at the very earliest date be re-established between ourselves and that country.

Mr. T. P. O'CONNOR

Perhaps the House will pardon one of the dwindling remnants of the old Gladstonian band of the later seventies to seize the opportunity given by the Debate of saying something about those populations to whose welfare Mr. Gladstone devoted some of the best years of his life. There is a striking contrast between President Wilson's declaration that secret diplomacy must come to an end and the secret diplomacy to which we have been treated so recently as the last one or two weeks. I want to ask the House what is the remedy for secret diplomacy? I hold that it is just as undemocratic and almost as unsafe to leave the decision of peace and war to a single individual, whether he is called a Kaiser, a Czar, or a Foreign Minister. I remember once discussing, with a very eminent politician, a member of a Cabinet, the question how much one colleague in any organisation ought to feel himself committed by the acts of the others, although in the inception and in the details of this action be was not consulted and was not conversant with them. My friend, a Member of the House of Peers, said, "Of course, the same thing happens in the Cabinet. For instance I am busy with a very difficult Department—Ireland—and therefore I cannot do anything with regard to foreign affairs except more or less leave them to the decision and to the knowledge of my Friend the Foreign Secretary." So whatever way you put it, unless you have a Foreign Secretary and a Prime Minister who are in intimate and daily intercourse, or indeed one and the same person, practically the Foreign Secretary is in almost complete control, up to a certain point, of the foreign policy of the country. But although the ultimate decision may be left with another body of men you can, by a powerful individual and by his acts, he so committed that you either have to repudiate him or repudiate his policy, and with the comradeship of public life it is much more likely that the policy will be accepted than the colleague repudiated. The remedy which I have brought before the House, and shall continue to bring before the House as long as I am a member of it, is that we should follow the example of the French Chamber and have, attached to the Foreign Office, a well chosen Committee of this House consisting of its ablest, most level beaded and most trusted men, and that they should be brought into constant touch with the Foreign Office, should have an opportunity of discussing foreign affairs under a pledge of secrecy, of course, with the Foreign Secretary, and that we should get the decision of these terrible questions on which peace and war may be decided out of the always dangerous atmosphere of a single man with a single judgment and perhaps a single weakness of temperament and character.

I have risen as an old Gladstonian to make one or two appeals to the Prime Minister about two or three of the questions of the moment. The Noble Lord said he would not quote the pledges of the Prime Minister upon the question of Turkey. It may do no harm if I repeat the quotation made by the Archbishop of Canterbury in another place. This is what the Prime Minister said on 20th December, 1917: What will happen to Mesopotamia must be left to the Peace Congress when it meets. But there is one thing that will never happen. It will never be restored to the blasting tyranny of the Turk. At best he was a trustee of this far-famed land on behalf of civilisation. Ah! What a trustee! He has been false to his trust and his trusteeship must be given over to more competent and more equitable hands chosen by the Congress, which will settle the affairs of the world. Another quotation: Outside Europe we believe the same principles should be applied. We do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capit..l as Constantinople. Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are in our judgment entitled to recognition of their separate nationa1 conditions. I have down a question for oral answer to the Prime Minister. I have no doubt his answer will be the same as that given by Lord Curzon, which was in these terms: The most reverend Primate alluded to the different declarations that have been made at various times since we went into the country by responsible spokesmen of His Majesty's Government. He quoted in particular two declarations made in the course of last year, or the year before, by the Prime Minister. By those declarations we stand. That is sufficient for me. These declarations apply mainly to two or three of the Eastern populations. I assume that Armenia will be made entirely independent. There was one passage in the speech of the Noble Lord last night which has given some alarm to the Armenians because it seemed to contemplate shutting out Armenia from the sea. I am sure the Government has no such intention because Armenia without any outlet to the sea would be deprived of a great deal of its power of development.

I want now to say a word about Greece and her claims. I was present the other day at a lecture given by a New Zealand journalist who had been with the Greek Army near Smyrna. He described what he had seen with his own eyes and done with his own hands there. He found the place crowded with the corpses, not merely of men, but of women and children. What was far more eloquent proof of what had taken place there than any statement of his was the production of a little Greek boy, not more than ten or twelve years of age. This boy's father had been butchered, his three brothers had been butchered, and he himself had been left for dead, and one saw on the tiny leg of this poor little child the marks of the wound which had been inflicted upon him bythe bullets of the Turks. Now I appeal to the not far distant eloquence of the Prime Minister that no more Christian populations shall be left under the control of Turkey in the peace that is about to be made. I see an hon. Member opposite, and I am bound to say that I understand his principle, namely, that Turkish nationality has the same right to respect as the nationality of the Greeks. I would not take away from Turkish control those portions of Asia Minor which are distinctly Turkish. Allusion has been made by the. hon. Member for. Canterbury (Mr. R. McNeill), to the case of the Chaldeans. I commend that case to the attention of the Government. The Cbaldeans are only a small people, and partly by their geographical position and for other reasons they have been almost forgotten. Yet they have been subject to the same horrible system of butchery and depredation as the Armenians, the Greeks and the other-races under Turkey. I have been instrumental in getting them a small sum from the Armenian Relief Committee, but except that they seem to have been forgotten by the world. A small committee has been formed, of which I am a member, which is endeavouring to come to their relief, and I hope we shall get assistance from the Government in that work.

With regard to the Greeks, I have heard some astounding remarks within the last two or three months. I heard, for instance, that it was seriously argued that Thrace was required as a hinterland to Constantinople. A more astounding doctrine I have never heard. I do not know whether the Prime Minister has had the same opportunity as I have had of seeing the series of maps that arc in the possession of Monsicur Venizelos, which were drawn up by Bulgaria and published by a German firm before the War. There is no suggestion there of Greek partisanship, and all these maps show that Thrace through all the centuries has been a Greek possession. I tremble to think what would be the political fate of Monsieur Venizelos and of the policy he represents if the rights of Greece to Thrace are not to be accepted. I have seen in the Press, which is really the only source of information we have as a rule in regard to foreign affairs and even our own foreign affairs, that an understanding has been come to between Monsieur Venizelos and the Italian Government. I hope that is so and that it will mean that the Dodecanese will be given to the Greeks, for practically 95 per cent. of the population are Greeks. I understand that the Greek Government have made no claim upon the British Government in regard to the island of Cyprus. It will be a foolish and not a particularly creditable transaction if we withdraw from Greece the offer we made to her during the War, namely, that we would give back to her an island which, with the exception of a small minority, is heart and soul in favour of reattachment to the Mother Country.

The Noble Lord (Lord R. Oecil) has spoken about the League of Nations. He has earned the gratitude of his fellow countrymen by the splendid enthusiasm and the inexhaustible zeal which he has thrown into the advocacy of this policy. I was for many years a close neighbour of the Noble Lord in more stormy times than the present, and he was the last man that I should have thought would have been hailed as one of the great hopes of democracy. I regard the Noble Lord as the greatest hope of national and inter- national democracy so far as the League of Nations is concerned that the world has to-day. I have no sympathy with that kind of talk which we constantly hear in private and in public about the League of Nations. When the Noble Lord said he would ask the Government to put its last sixpence into the League of Nations, an hon. Friend of mine said he would not put a farthing on it, much less sixpence. That spirit of cynicism in regard to the League of Nations is profoundly false. Does anybody doubt that the whole world, after the terrible experiences of the last five years, has had a change of mental attitude and a change of soul in regard to war? I have always held that we were bound to win in the war because of one fact—namely, that 4,000,000 social democratic votes were given in Germany in the election that immediately preceded the War. I placed my reliance on the power of those men from behind breaking up that great and perfect combination of the Kaiser and the soldiers which plunged Germany into war. Today, outside the soldiers and perhaps the bureaucracy, I do not believe there is any war party left in Germany. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh, oh!"] I know certain hon. Gentlemen opposite regard that as too optimistic a statement, but it is my strong conviction.

There is no war party in this country that counts. There are militarists everywhere, and I am sorry to say that we have had some specimens of the spirit of militarism within the last few weeks in countries which I feel myself precluded from specially mentioning on this occasion. I believe with the Noble Lord that the next war must be more horrible than the previous war. I was shocked to-day—I was in America during sonic of the worst raids—by recollections of the number of children that were destroyed here by the bombs of Zeppelins during the War. All the science of war, apparently, is now being concentrated on the air, and there is not a man, woman or child in all the great cities of the world that would be free from the devastation of the next war. I believe the world has appreciated that. I am sorry that America has delayed the ratification of the Treaty of Peace. I think I know some of the reasons. I hope that America will not take up ultimately the attitude of liberating itself from the responsibilities of Europe. Whatever America may do, I believe that Europe for its own protection ought to have some safeguard, and the only safeguard is the League of Nations, against the repetition of the horrors of the last five years. If that be not done, all the precious blood that has been shed will have been shed in vain, and our victory will be as nothing but dead sea fruit.

Major Earl WINTERTON

I in contradistinction to more eminent speakers who have taken part in this Debate, wish to speak about a country very closely affected by the Peace Treaty which is about to be signed by Turkey, a country whose future may have a very considerable effect upon the future of the British Empire. It is a country about v inch I am able to speak from personal knowledge. Those who have been in these countries in the-Near East are best able to judge as to what the conditions are likely to be if the present state of affairs remain. I have this, at least, in common with every previous speaker—that I agree most fully that-the present attitude of the Foreign Office towards information is one that is most disastrous, not only to this country, but to the whole of the British Empire. I would like to say, with all respect, to the right hon. Gentleman who spoke from the Labour Benches (Mr. Clynes) that a great many of us agree with every word he said on this subject. I regret that the Prime Minister was not in the House at the time, because it would have interested him to have heard the loud cheers from all parts of the House which greeted the right hon. Gentleman's remarks on this subject. It is absolutely essential, if we are to avoid catastrophe in this country or in Europe, that we should be treated with far more frankness by the Government and the Foreign Office than we have been hitherto. I am on a somewhat delicate subject, and I say, with no disrespect, that I consider it is a scandal that in most of the Debates on foreign policy only the Under-Secretary has spoken. I hope it will be possible for the Prime Minister to arrange that the right hon. Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour), who has a knowledge of foreign politics unrivalled by any Member in this House, should be available during the forthcoming Session to speak on Foreign Office questions.

The country to which I wish to allude is Arabia. I believe I am the only Member in this House who has actually served in a combatant capacity with the Arabs. I am a personal friend of Prince Feisul, and a very close friend of Colonel Lawrence and other Englishmen and Arabs who were connected with the movement for the combined operations of the English and the Arabs in freeing Arabia from the Turkish yoke. Humble individual as I am, there is considerable responsibility on any Member of this House in speaking on the question of Arabia, owing to the very delicate relationship in which she stands to the Allies generally and especially to France and this country. It is right that it should be made perfectly clear what, in fact, has not been made clear, certainly not in the Allied Press of Europe, and not specially clear in the Press of this country—that the Arabs under their present King were as much Allies of this country during the War as Belgium or Serbia No. one who came into contact with them could ignore the fact that early in the War, in a spirit of independence and with great bravery, they threw off the Turkish yoke and freed their country. I do not want to say anything that is derogatory of the Czechu-Slovaks or of the Jugo-Slays, or of any small nationality who were on our side, but there were no small people who so readily or more bravely asserted their right of independence as did the Arab people. Can anyone point to the Jugo-Slays or the CzechoSlovaks doing what the Arabs managed to do so early in the War? I had the honour of fighting with the Arabs, and I say that the oin1inary Arab private soldier need not be afraid of comparison with any one of our Allies in fighting capacity. I speak on this subject with some difficulty, because I have such strong feelings about it that I am afraid I may be tempted into saying something that might be regarded as unfriendly to our Ally, France. It was with the utmost indignation that I saw the suggestion made in certain Allied papers that the Arab movement was a move organised entirely by us on the quid pro quo principle, and that on that principle we created the movement and we set up the present King of the Arabs. We did no such thing. It is true we gave our aid to the Arabs, and that aid was of very considerable advantage, but we gave our aid to the Arabs because they were fighting the Turks and we were fighting the Turks. Let it never be forgotten that the nations that defeated the Turks were the British and the Arabs. The reason why the Turkish Empire is overthrown to-day is because these two people fighting together on terms of comradeship overthrew a tyranny as great as was that of Germany.

The Arab people pressed for recognition and the right to settle what the future-form of the government shall be. They adhered to proposals put forward by them in Paris at the time of the Conference, and, they are entitled to say that not less justice shall be given to them than to other small nations. It is not for me as a private Member to say how far it is right for the Government to support them, but I do wish to put forward those two facts. The Arabs are as much. Allies of this country and France and Italy as were the Belgians. Serbs, or other small peoples. They fought with the utmost bravery and the utter disregard of consequences to themselves. Two-thirds of the Arab private soldiers had their wives and families in Turkish territory exposed to every massacre by the Turks. In many cases they have not seen, them since the commencement of the War They took just as much risk as any of the small peoples in Europe, and they are entitled to be treated as well. My second point is, that I regard with indignation the suggestion that we as a nation gave our assistance to the Arabs because we wished to get some said pro quo, some assistance in India or among the great Mussulman people. We did it to defeat the Turks, to carry out the policy which we always put in the forefront of our platform. as a nation in the War—that is, to enable small countries to shake off the yoke of a great tyranny. We did it successfully, and it is only right, to-day, when success is achieved, that the Arabs, with other small peoples, should have as much of these victories as is granted to these other small peoples, and that Allies more powerful than themselves should not in public discussion or in the Press or in private attempt to take away from them what they cannot be deprived of—that is, the glory of making a great and gallant fight on behalf of the forces of independence against a brutal tyranny.

The PRIME MINISTER

The discussion during the last two or three hours has covered a great deal of ground, and a great many questions have been addressed to the Government with which I shall do my best to deal before I sit down. I should like, however, before referring to the particular issues which have been raised to say out! word as to what has fallen from my Noble Friend (Earl Winterton). I do not think that he can complain about the effort which has been made by myself, by my right hon. Friend the Member for the City of London (Mr. Balfour), and by the Leader of the House, to enlighten the House as far as we can on the position of foreign policy. Although my hon. Friend who represents the Foreign Office (Mr. Cecil Harmsworth) has done his duty with skill, we are doing our best to support him, and whenever occasion demanded, when there was a great Debate like this, we have always, my right hon. Friend the Member for the City of London, the Leader of the House, or myself, Come down to give as much information as we had at our disposal.

A great deal has been said in the course of this discussion about open and secret diplomacy. My right hon. Friend (Sir D. Maclean) opened on that note. I understand that my right hon. Friend the Member for the Platting Division of Manchester (Mr. Clynes) followed, and, though I had not the pleasure of hearing that speech, a full note was taken -and I was put in possession of what he said. Others have also rather dwelt upon the importance of greater frankness, greater candour, and more information being given to the House of Commons and the public. I am -all for that. But I should like to know exactly what it means. Does open diplomacy, for instance, mean an open discussion between those who represent the nation of the very difficult problems which we are attempting to solve?

Sir D. MACLEAN

No!

The PRIME MINISTER

My right hon. Friend says "No." That is what I expected him to say. But that is how it was interpreted. At the commencement of the Conference it was said, "Why do not you have your debate in public?" It has taken long enough in all conscience to come to some sort of conclusion, but I guarantee that had there been public debates reported in the Press we should not have solved the very first of those problems up to this very hour. Not only that, but it would have been full of danger. We listened to the case presented on one side and the other, and I make free to confess that, after hearing the whole discussion and hearing what was to be said against the point of view which we adopted at the start, we changed our view. And that is perfectly right. One has to hear every side. But it would be very difficult to effect a change of course, which was essential if we were to got anything like agreement, if declarations made in the initial stages had been published and discussed and supported on one side and criticised on the other. Open diplomacy of that sort would have been fatal to anything in the nature of compact or agreement between us.

That was the first consideration in arriving at peace. If what is meant is that the decisions which we arrived at should be published, that was clone. I say without fear of challenge that never in the history of any conference ever held has there been such publicity given to the decisions, not merely the final decisions, but the decisions arrived at from day to day. The communications to the Press were very full, whenever decisions were even provisionally arrived at, and what was not published the Press supplemented themselves. In fact, it told everything and a great deal more. There never has been so much publicity. My right hon. Friend has suggested that we should lay our cards on the table with the blinds up. I am not sure that you could see the cards even with the blinds up if you were outside. But really it went a great deal further than that. You had men standing behind you when you had your cards to see what cards you had and to say, "Why did not you play the other one? You had so much a better card than that." That would be a most hopeless way to try to play, but luckily it was not that way. We were not really playing a game of one nation against the other. We were all trying our very best to arrive at a common decision which would not merely obtain common agreement among those who represented the nations at the Conference, but would on the whole obtain common acceptance among the peoples whom we had the honour to represent at the Conference. Within those limits we published everything, and we published far more than had ever been published before in the history of any Conference ever held in this world.

There is great difficulty in publishing what is going on sometimes. I will take the case mentioned in the very eloquent speech delivered by the hon. Member for St. Augustine's (Mr. McNeill). I would be the last man in the world not to sympathise with a great deal of what he said as to a small nation living among the mountains. But when be demands the publication of the report in reference to Montenegro, I think if I showed him that report he would realise that it would be a mistake to publish it. Naturally the Count de Salis' report comments freely upon everything. The Serbians, Italians, Americans come in, and I do not know how many more. It would be a great mistake to publish that document. The House will, I am sure, remember this. I am constantly being brought face to face with it when difficult problems of this kind are discussed. My right hon. Friend said, "Will you not tell us a little more about the Adriatic difficulty? "There is a great deal of inflammable material spread all over Europe. It is very easy to drop a match into it, and therefore one has sometimes to refrain from making statements—although the Government may have a clear view upon the subject—so as to avoid doing something that may excite passions which are very ready to be aroused in various parts of Europe. My right hon. Friend knows perfectly well how inflammable Italian opinion is upon the question of Fiume. The Government are doing their best to promote a settlement, but there are very great difficulties. One has only to read what appears in the papers on the subject to realise how great are the difficulties of the Italian Prime Minister and Government on that subject. A word said in France, in Britain, or in America without a full appreciation of what the state of opinion may be there would add enormously to the difficulties of the Government in coming to a reasonable settlement. And we want to avoid that if we possibly can.

For that reason I confined to a single sentence the statement which I made about the Adriatic. I need hardly say that we discussed it very fully. We have invited the Italian Prime Minister to meet M. Clemenceau and myself and the American representative in Paris within the next few days, but it is no use coming there unless he has got. full powers to settle. I do not want to say anything that will make it difficult. That is why, when I made the statement the other day, I did not give the whole information. I was anxious not to say anything which might give rise to conflict in Italy or which might suggest any antagonism on the part of this country or which could be distorted in any possible way. That is why I say, with confidence, that this is not secret diplomacy. It is purely the sort of reticence which in every big business you have got to show, I do not care what the business is, whether it is commerce, finance or dealings between nations. The only difference is this, that a mistake once made between the nations is irreparable, producing disasters inconceivable, and, instead of doing harm to probably a firm or some thousands of shareholders, you may wreck the hopes of millions of people. Therefore I claim that the Government are right in these very difficult and delicate matters in exercising more reticence than perhaps many of our Friends would wish to see.

Subject to that, there are many questions upon which I think I can safely enlighten the House, although I am always doing it with the knowledge that, while the answer may be thoroughly understood in this country, it is not always understood in France. A mistake made here can be cleared up in the House of Commons—someone gets up and asks questions about it—but a misunderstanding in France or-Italy, or America, cannot be cleared up so, easily. You are not in the Italian House. of Representatives or the French or American to clear it up. Subject to that, I will. do my best to answer some of the questions put to me.

My right hon. Friend (Sir D. Maclean) began by asking about the French agreement. The agreement to guarantee France against any act of wanton aggression was subject, of course, to, the United States of America ratifying the compact. If there should be such a possibility as the United States not ratifying that compact, undoubtedly we are free to reconsider our decision. No undertaking has been given by the Government on the subject, and rightly so, for the. simple reason that we cannot contemplate that the United States of America would dishonour the signature of its great representative in Paris. Therefore it would be a mistake to discuss the subject on a supposition of that kind.

I have no reason to believe that the, United States will not agree to the Treaty. I will only say this: I agree with my right hon. Friend (Sir D. Maclean) that for Great Britain alone to undertake that charge would be a very serious obligation. It would be in many respects a new departure, certainly since the days when we had a Continental frontier. As far as Belgium was concerned, we were one out of three who guaranteed neutrality. This will be the first time we shall be called upon to guarantee protection standing absolutely alone. All that will be taken into account when we come to consider what our final decision shall be. My right hon. Friend has a perfect right to ask that if the Government are ever brought face to face with a position of that kind, they should inform the House of Commons, and give it an opportunity, if anybody wants to do so, to challenge our decision, before we irretrievably commit this country to that course. I do not think I can now be asked to go beyond that. It would be undesirable to discuss it beyond that at the present stage.

Now I come to the much more difficult problem of Russia—a frightful morass, I agree. There was complete agreement, as I stated on Monday, among the Allies as to the policy to be pursued there. There was complete agreement as to the policy which is known as non-intervention. We had already proposed, as has been stated by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War, to send assistance, valued, I think, at —15,000,000, to the armies that were fighting there against the Bolshevik authorities. But beyond that we could not commit the country, and it was right to let them know that. That was the decision of France. She has already undertaken some liability, but nothing which is comparable to ours. They do not propose to undertake any further responsibility in the matter. That is also, I think, the attitude of Italy. As far as America and Japan are concerned, they were not represented at the Conference by plenipotentiaries, and therefore it would be unfair for me to state what their views were on the subject. They were concerned only with part of the problem—I mean practically concerned. They were concerned with that part of it which deals with Siberia, and there I have no doubt the discussions are going on; in fact, discussions are going on between the American and Japanese Governments with regard to what is to be done there in the event of the Bolshevik army making very much further progress towards the East. I do not understand that any final agreement has been arrived at between them up to now. That is the position in regard to Russia.

My right hon. Friend complained that I said the other day that it seemed to me that the Bolsheviks ought to make peace with the people who are making war with them. That seems to me to be common sense. My right hon. Friend says: Will they not consider any suggestion for peace with Russia until Denikin and Koltchak are destroyed? Who is Russia? The trouble is that there is no Russia. A civil war is going on in Russia to decide that very issue. It may he said that at the moment the Bolsheviks are victorious. That is so—far the moment. They have been victorious before, and have been driven back. At the beginning of this year Denikin's Armies were holding only a very small tract of territory at the back of the Black Sea. They rolled forward, and got within 160 miles of Moscow. They have now been driven back, and have lost a good deal of the territory—not most of the territory, but a good deal,—which they won earlier in the year. Koltchak's Armies have sustained very severe reverses. No man would venture to predict, from what he knows of Russia, that the conflict is at an end.

There is no government at the present time which can speak for the whole of Russia. There are great tracts of Russia that are not represented either by General Denikin or Admiral Koltchak or the Soviet Government. That is one of the facts. There are even great territories nominally under General Denikin's sway which are really not so. I have no doubt at all, if all the facts were known, that there are great tracts of territory behind the Bolshevik lines where the Bolsheviks are not in control. Last time I spoke on this subject I stated to the House, of Commons, and I repeat it with fresh information, that one of the difficulties in Russia is this: The vast majority of the population are indifferent. You cannot divide them into Bolsheviks and supporters of Denikin. That is the fact. The peasants in the main want to be left alone. I do not believe they care very much either for one or the other.

Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY

Why blockade them?

7.0 P.M.

The PRIME MINISTER

There arc plenty of difficulties in this matter without adding to them. There is really no one who can speak for Russia. If the Bolsheviks want to speak for Russia they can do so by summoning a National Assembly, freely elected by the Russian peasants and Russian workmen. That Assembly would speak on behalf of Russia. I do not say it would be Bolshevik; I doubt it. I do not say it would be pro-Denikin. It would possibly be something quite different from either. But, at any rate, it would be Russia, and then you would have something you could make peace with. But now you have only warring factions advancing and receding and receding and advancing, swaying hither and hither, with vast populations outside that are never affected in the least by this terrible conflict. The House has only to look at a map. I had the pleasure the other day of pointing out the map to some friends of mine who were at Downing Street—Members of the House. You have only small Armies there of about 200,000, who have not only to defend 1,300 or 1,500 miles of front, but have to control thousands of square miles behind, with a population which is sometimes indifferent, sometimes hostile.

Under these conditions, there is no Russia you can make peace with. Suppose you pursue the policy which has been suggested. Suppose you say, "We will make peace with Denikin for this; we will make peace with Lenin and Trotsky for that." Not of one of them could guarantee peace fir respect of any of the territories nominally under their sway. Why? Because they do not represent the Russian people. Until there be some means by which the Russian people can speak authoritatively, and declare what their minds are upon this subject—I am afraid it seems a policy of despair—nothing better can be done than to pursue the policy in regard to which the Allies are in complete accord. It is a dismal prospect, but there it is. I agree it is a dismal prospect, but them is nothing more dismal than the realisation that always comes when you do not recognise the facts; and the fact here is that the Soviet Government no more represents the vast multitudes in Russia than any of the other warring factions do. Therefore there is at the present moment no basis for peace. We must keep a vigilant watch on the situation. When Russia will evolve, when she will come out of this darkness, when she will come out Of this terrible conflict, no one knows. When she does emerge, when there is sonic sort. of firm and steady Government with whom you can negotiate, it will be the duty of tine Allies, in their own interests, in the interests of the world and of civilisation, to take. the first real opportunity of making peace. It has not yet arrived, I regret to say. That is the judgment of all the Allied representatives who discussed the matter last week in Downing Street.

I come now to the question of Austria. That offers another difficulty of a very serious character. A very large sum of money was allocated to the relief of distress in Europe. I think our contribution was £12,500,000. I am not sure whether the whole of that fund has been expended Within the last few days we have also sent coal up to Vienna. The Italians are sending quite a substantial contribution in the way of grain from Trieste. I agree with the Noble Lord that this 7.0 P.M. is really only "soup-kitchen relief." It is not adequate, but it is all you can do to mitigate suffering. I agree with him there is only one way, and that is to set them on their feet and let them work their own way through. It is easy to say that, but how is it to be done? This country cannot undertake the whole task of setting the world, which has been shattered, on its feet again. We are asked to help here and help there—to help the Armenians, to help the Chaldean Christians, to help the Poles, because to-day you have the same sort of appeal from Poland. There is no part of the world where there is not that appeal, and they naturally turn to England, which has always shown in the past its readiness to respond to every appeal which is made by suffering humanity in any part of the world. We cannot do it. My hon. Friend made a very good reply when he pointed out that, after all, we are carrying burdens which are equal to our strength. We must, at any rate, see that we do not go beyond our depth. I do riot see for the moment what can be done in Austria and in Central Europe, unless America comes frankly in with us. What does it mean? Every obligation into we enter is an obligation which puts its deeper info the mire. My right hon. Friend quoted the sovereign as worth so much and the franc as worth so much, and the lira worth still less, and the mark gone out of sight, but still every obligation of this kind is in respect of something which has got to be purchased in another country. You have got to get your grain and your raw material and to purchase most of the commodities in some other land, and pay in depreciated currency, which becomes even more depreciated by reason of those obligations. We must bear that in mind.

My Noble Friend gave rather a shuddering picture of what might happen. I will not say it was a nightmare. Russia is in an indescribable condition all over that gigantic territory, which is a continent in itself, Central Europe faced with the pinch of famine; Germany unable so far to lift herself and to stand erect. That is Central Europe, that is Western Europe, that is Eastern Europe, and that is those gigantic tracts of Northern Europe, Poland and the Baltic Provinces. It is vital that this country should be firm. It is vital that this country should be sound. It is vital that this country should recover strength, throw off exhaustion, get over such debility as the great strain of war and blood-letting of five years have inflicted upon us. It is essential that this country should recover strength, not for the 45,000,000 of people who are in it, or even for the whole of the Empire, but because the whole future of civilisation throughout the world depends upon Britain recovering her strength. Therefore, when there are appeals here and appeals there, do not let any hon. and right hon. Gentleman imagine that it is from mere hardness of heart that we hesitate before we accede to them. We do not turn deaf ears to them, but we have got to consider carefully, having regard to the strength we have, how far we can go, what obligations we can incur, remembering the vital importance of keeping Britain from having its strength crushed by too much of a burden upon even its mighty limbs. That is what we want. I wish I could see my way to do something to restore Central Europe. It was discussed yesterday, and it was discussed last week at our Conference. Ways and means were discussed yesterday, but I will not pretend that they were adequate. They cannot be adequate unless America comes in, with France and with Britain, to take her fair share.

I now come to Turkey. My Noble Friend said, "Why all this prolonged delay?" I think I can tell him. It would not have been possible without misconceptions, without misunderstandings between nations where a good understanding is essential, to have a hurried peace. What do I mean by that? It was essential for the settlement of the Turkish problem that we should know what America meant to do. My Noble Friend said, "Why could you not make peace with Turkey, cutting out all the non-Turkish territories and then leaving Constantinople and Anatolia to be solved?" I think on consideration he will see that is not possible. What is to be done with Constantinople? What is to be done with the Straits? Can We leave those gates which were slammed in our face under the same gatekeeper? If those doors had been open and if our Fleet and our merchant ships had been free to go through, I do not like to express a military opinion, but the military opinion of a high authority is that the War would have been shortened by two or three years. We could not get in to support Roumania or to support Russia when she was sagging; we could not get on the Danube. It would have made a difference of two or three years in the War if those gates had been open. They were shut treacherously in our faces. We cannot trust the same porter. As to what will remain, much depends upon whether America comes in. My Noble Frend knows as well as anybody knows that there were suggestions made in connection with America. I do not want to dwell on those further now.

Then there is Anatolia, which was referred to by an hon. Member, and there arc Christian communities in Asia Minor which have to be considered. Would America take any share, and, if so, what share? France has great burdens, Britain has great burdens, Italy has great burdens. Much depended on whether America, which has no great extraneous burdens and which has gigantic resources, was prepared to take her share in this great task of civilisation, in this renowned and historic land. But until America declared 'what she would do, any attempt to precipitate the position might have led to misunderstandings with America, and would have caused a good deal of suspicion. We regard a good understanding with America as something which is so vital that, whatever it cost in the way of increased burdens upon our shoulders, and the possibilities of revolt, we considered it worth while, for the sake of a good understanding with America, not to precipitate the decision which we were prepared at any moment to take. That is the reason why we could not make peace with Turkey.

It may be asked, "Are you in a better position now?" We are in a better position to this extent—we are entitled to say now, "We have waited up to the very limits we promised, and we have waited beyond them." I do not know what the decision of America will be, but it does not look promising. If one felt confident that America would come in, it might be worth while waiting another month or two or three. But those are not, speaking quite frankly, the indications at the present moment. Therefore, we consider now, without any disrespect to our colleagues at the Peace Conference, and without in the least wishing to deprive the United States of America of sharing the honour of guardianship over these Christian communities, that we are entitled to proceed to make peace with Turkey. We propose to do so at the earliest possible moment. We have had some preliminary discussions on the subject. As far as we have had them, they were very promising. They will be renewed partly in this country, partly probably in France, in the course of the next few days, and I hope that it will be possible to submit to Turkey the terms of peace at an early date.

Questions have been put to me on that subject. One is about the Chaldean Christians. The Chaldean Christians, with a body of Armenians, numbering between 50,000 and 53,000, have been placed in refugee camps under British guardianship, and up to the present a sum of £2,500,000 has been expended upon relief for these very interesting people. They are engaged in various forms of work for the Government in that country —military work, gendarmerie, road making, camp making, cultivation, and so on; but the most important duty of all is to get them back to their own districts as soon as you possibly can. That cannot be done until you have established peace in that area, but meanwhile we are undertaking the duty of relieving them of any danger of distress. The other question put—and the answer was supplied last night by the Foreign Secretary in the House of Lords—was whether we adhered to the pledges given by me on behalf of the Government, that in the Treaty of Peace we would see that these Christian communities were not put any longer under the dominion of a Government that had abused its authority in a way which has shocked civilisation. I need hardly say that I emphasise what Lord Curzon said in the House of Lords last night. As far as the Government is concerned, we shall enter into the Conference with a view to doing all in our power to enforce the pledges which we gave to the House of Commons and to the country during the progress of the War.

The other question put to me was in reference to the League of Nations. I regret that my Noble Friend the Member for Hitchin (Lord R. Cecil) has cast doubts upon the sincerity of the Government. I do not think it does any good, it I may say so quite respectfully.

Lord R. CECIL

I did not desire to do that, but there is this impression abroad, and I desire to give the right hon. Gentleman an opportunity of removing it.

The PRIME MINISTER

When it, is repeated, it is like every other slander—it gets more power unless it be accompanied by a very emphatic denial. I know the sincerity of the Noble Lord, but in the main people who are very sincere themselves are the last people in the world to cast suspicions on the sincerity of others, and I regret that my Noble Friend did it. He can believe me, not merely is the eminent sincere on the subject, but they have done everything that a sincere Government could do in order to carry our, every obligation in respect of the League of Nations. For instance, when the Treaty of Peace carne up for discussion, had we not been sincere in this matter, we should have chosen representatives on the Committee which drafted the League of Nations who would have placed difficulties in its way. We chose two representatives who were enthusiastic, who were zealous; we chose the real zealots of the League, and gave them a perfectly free hand. They were my Noble Friend (Lord R. Cecil) and General Smuts. What more could we have done? General Smuts had issued one of the most powerful and able pamphlets on the subject I have ever had the privilege of reading, and he was chosen very largely because he was a strong believer. So was my Noble Friend, who has always been an advocate. They represented us on that body. They had a perfectly free hand, and they placed the League of Nations in the forefront of the Treaty. We agreed to that; we supported the whole of their recommendations. There was a great constitution drafted. There were some of us who believed that that was not the best way of doing it, because, with all our prejudices in favour of unwritten constitutions, we thought you would probably attain the object better had it been done tentatively, rather than by having constitutions, like the constitution of America. and the constitution of South Africa, all written out, tabled, and with all the details. But still, we deferred to the views of our representatives in that respect, and it was incorporated in the Treaty.

We can take no further steps at the present moment. The Secretary is an able official of the Foreign Office; but we cannot have the League of Nations until the Treaty has been ratified. Let me speak quite frankly here. The difficulties have not come from Great Britain. We have talked less about it, it is true, but everything that is needful for action has been done by Great Britain. The difficulties have come from the country which took the leading part in the idea, and it is very unfair to suggest insincerity to the country which has adhered in every particular to this great idea, and has done everything that is needful to carry it into operation. I do not doubt that America will come in, but if she comes in on conditions which will not be applicable to all other countries, it is very difficult to have men sitting at the same board under different conditions—one nation absolutely free and untrammelled, and the other nation with its hands tied behind its back. If we meet at a League of Nations, it must be a League of equal nations.

But without presuming in the least to say anything about what America is doing or is likely to do, the League of Nations is so vital to the peace of troubled Europe that the Government arc convinced that this country, at any rate, must go on with it. I agree with all that was said by my Noble Friend and by my right hon. Friend sitting opposite (Sir D. Maclean). What would happen if you had another war baffles imagination. Discoveries made almost at the end of the War, if they had been used, would have produced horrors indescribable— discoveries by ourselves, discoveries by the French, discoveries by the Germans. Another year or two of war would have produced consequences which could have been described only in works of fiction like the remarkable works of Mr. H. G. Wells; and if, after years of devising and inventing, we still have another war with new terrors that no man ever thought of at the beginning—because there were terrors at the end of this War which no one dreamed of at the beginning of the War—if we are going to have a repetition of that, civilisation might as well be wrecked, and this world be driven to something, not the Middle Ages or the Dark Ages, because they did not produce annihilation, but to something that the world has never conceived of in its most imaginative moments.

It is important—it is vital to the world—that there should be some civilised means of preventing this barbarism. My Noble Friend says there are no indications in our Estimates of the work of the League. He is quite wrong. If he will examine those Estimates, he will see that we have considered carefully the Estimates, with a view to putting in nothing that is provocative, but until the League has been founded—until the League is formally established, until we know that the nations of the world, including America, will work the League—we must make our own country secure. If Britain is insecure, peace is insecure; if Britain is insecure, liberty is insecure; if Britain is insecure, civilisation is insecure. When we enter the League, we must be on a foundation of security, and when we do we can then talk like a country which has throughout the ages always thrown its influence on the side of liberty and civilisation. I quite agree with my Noble Friend that the League must be proceeded with, and that the League must be made a reality. Having said that, I will add only one word in conclusion. My right hon. Friend began to talk about the possibilities of this country, the perils in front of it in trade, in finance, and the perils of an insecure Europe. This country displayed qualities during the War that surprised its own sons —qualities of grit, qualities of endurance, qualities of resource. Those qualities are being displayed now, and, in spite of everything which has been said from week to week, from month to month, I am watching carefully, and I can see this great country recovering strength, recovering power. This year it may have a deficiency, as my right hon. Friend pointed out, in its trade, but even the trade of the last month or two shows that next year it will have a surplus. This is a country where, once it has made up its mind to pursue a certain course, its common sense, its wisdom, its native sagacity, its energy, begin to be reasserted, and I venture to say that never was there a time in the history of the world when its strength was more needed for human progress.

Major-General SEELY

I should like to say one word with regard to the opening remarks of the speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. He referred to the possibility of difficulties with France in the event of the United States being unable to continue the engagement which they had entered into. I am only entitled to speak for myself, but I believe I speak for a great many other Members of this House when I say that, whatever others may do, we shall stand by the side of France, and the fact that others may desert her will make us more than ever determined, in the event of unprovoked attack, to remain her friend. We owe so much to France, we are bound to her now by such sacred ties, that I am quite sure that, atlhough it is right that any fresh obligation shall be submitted to this House, I think we may be certain what the answer will be. It will be that. after all, we have done something together, and France remains for ever our firm friend. The Prime Minister drew us a picture of a troubled Europe, and urgently impressed upon all concerned the necessity for a League of Nations. I heartily agree with what lie said as to the terrible consequences of another war, I need hardly say, for it was owing to what he asked me to do that I learnt something of the possibilities of future war. Words cannot describe the horrors that would follow from the failure of the League of Nations and the plunging of Europe again into war, and I am quite sure the eloquent language the Prime Minister used as to the frightful consequences of further conflict are more than amply justified by the facts. But the Prime Minister said that we must keep our powder dry until the League of Nations is formed, and it is quite true that our national defence must remain our first care, for, unless we are defended, we cannot defend the things we care about—liberty, justice, truth, honour, all the things we fought for and won. But also we are told, and told with truth, that while Europe is troubled and very poor, so are we poor, and we must save money.

I propose to make a practical suggestion —the only one I can see—by which we can both save money and at the same time maintain national security. I believe the only way by which we can do it is really to co-ordinate our national effort. Some of my hon. Friends have urged that there should be a Joint General Staff for land, sea, and air. I am sure that is not enough. There must be more than that. You mast have a Ministry of Defence. If anyone likes to go to Gibraltar, he will see a striking instance of what the failure of coordination can do in the way of waste of money. The people concerned there are the Navy, Army, and civil population. Each of them wanted a water supply, but, because neither the Navy, nor the Army, nor the civil population could agree on a scheme, they each made their own water supply, and each cut their own tunnels through the rock at vast expense. The result is, I was told when I was there last, that hundreds of thousands of public money were wasted by the failure to coordinate efforts. There are many other instances. There is one with which the Prime Minister is very familiar, a much bigger thing. Before the War, the Committee of Defence considered the question of the possibility of invasion of these shores. The then Prime Minister attended and gave great attention to it. The right hon. Gentleman will remember the conclusions to which we came, the substance of which was announced in this House. But the consequences which should have flowed from that decision did not flow from it, because the Departments concerned had not got one head who could think out the results of the decision and formulate the necessary plans for land and sea defence accordingly.

It may be said that the Prime Minister is the man to do that, but I submit that the Prime Minister cannot possibly have time, and that you want a Minister who shall devote his whole time, not to administration, but to see how you can secure the defence of this country and Empire, and maintain our obligations—our precious obligations—to France in ease of unprovoked attack. You must have some man who gives his whole time to it. Of course, this will be all economy, if the office is any guide. With regard to actual salaries people are paid, the cost of management. is so small a part of any business that there would be a real economy there, because, although you would create a new Minister, I can conceive that the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Army Minister, and the Air Minister would each be paid lesser sums than they receive to-day, or which are on the Estimates to-day. Moreover, the staffs of each of these Departments would be very largely reduced, for what we call the general staff would be in the Department of that Ministry. This is no new proposal as, of course, the Prime Minister knows very well. The brilliant father of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War made this proposal in the years gone by. It was advocated by him with eloquence and vigour, and on the same grounds on which I advocate it to-day, namely, the only way by which to get security and at the same time real economy. But if it were needed then, how much more is it needed now, because then the complication was how far to co-ordinate the efforts of the two elements, the land and the sea. But now there is the third element—the air, which everybody agrees has infinite possibilities, some of which were referred to by the Prime Minister in describing the horrors of future war. This introduces an element of complication and a possible saving far greater than in days gone by, whether it be the defence of Malta, Gibraltar, Palestine, the new countries of which we shall have to take control under the League of Nations, Mesopotamia, the frontiers of India, or our national security and its relation to the Fleet. All of these are vitally affected by air. I do not think we can expect to get the heads of existing departments to give their whole attention to this when they are so overwhelmed by Ministerial duties.

There would be a further economy in the suggestion I make, and that would be that you would get rid of the present Ministry of Supply. The present Ministry of Supply or the Ministry of Munitions was a vital necessity when formed. The right hon. Gentleman was the man, I always think, who won the War, and one of the ways he won the War was by making the Ministry of Munitions. But that was to get great bulk production which we do not want now. What we want now is to keep the art and science of defence alive, especially at sea. What we really want is not the vast Estimates now proposed for the sea, but the keeping alive of the art and science of our sea-power, which are more required, it seems to me, than a great quantity of ships at the present moment. That is the kind of thing that this Minister would consider. But you would not require a Ministry of Supply for many years to come to produce a great quantity of things in bulk. What you want is some arrangement by which the two or three Departments do not compete one with the other. You want to avoid the Army and Navy competing with each other for boots, but you do not want to make the Army and Navy wear the same boots.

To sum up, I make this definite proposal —and I hope it may be supported—that there should be set up a Ministry of Defence, with responsible Ministers for Land, Sea, and Air, each charged with his own administration, and not that fatal arrangement by which one man should attempt to do the administration of three offices, but each submitting his Estimates and all proposals for national defence to the Minister of Defence, advising whom would be a real Imperial General Staff, a chief of the Imperial General Staff, representatives of the best brains of the Army, Navy, and Air, and the greater proportion of all the General Staffs in the offices concentrated in that office. It would have this lasting mid great advantage that it would make Imperial co-operation much easier. The Dominions could send to this great. imperial General Staff their representatives, and, instead of having to send first to the War Office, then to the Admiralty, then to the Air Office, they would find in that one building all the knowledge that could be obtained of this most complicated business of national and Imperial defence. I earnestly commend this to the Prime Minister, because I am convinced that only by some such means can we ensure due economy, with real safety to our country and Empire.

Lord H. CAVENDISH - BENTINCK

There is, at all events, one satisfactory feature about the speech of the Prime Minister, inasmuch as we are told that peace is at least in sight with Turkey. But I must confess to a considerable disappointment with his declaration about Russia. He very rightly said that Russia is not represented by any one responsible Government, but that, I submit, is hardly the point. The point is, could not the Allied Powers exercise a mediating influence to such a degree that the warring factions would lay down their arms and come to a satisfactory arrangement one with another? I think it should be possible. It is at all events certain that the Bolshevik Government is anxious for peace, and, after all, we have encouraged warfare for so long in Russia that we have a very great responsibility to see that peace may be secured at the earliest possible moment. That is not the question about which I rose to say a few words. I am deeply concerned and deeply distressed with the horror of the conditions in Central Europe. There is no doubt about it that Central and Eastern Europe are in a state of starvation, and in Austria the condition is worst. No doubt the economic condition of Central Europe is to a very large extent due to the results of five years of war, but I do not agree with the Prime Minister when he says that our responsibility is somewhat limited. Our responsibility cannot be limited. The economic condition of Austria, for instance, to a very large extent is due to the fact that we have stripped Austria to the bone, and that we have the first charge on whatever property is left in Austria. I ask the House to consider how far it is possible for Austria to obtain Credit to set her mills and factories going when the first charge on all her property is with ourselves? Who is going to advance her money on those conditions? I am told by competent people that the condition of Germany is only about six months behind that of Austria. If the present policy is pursued towards Germany economic collapse is inevitable. If we are honest we should ask ourselves: How far are we responsible for the condition of things in Germany? The uncertainty of the indemnity is to a very large extent responsible for the inability of Germany to obtain credit, and the countries which export raw material to her and give her credit do not know from hour to hour or day to day what is Germany's economic condition. The harder Germany works, the more money we propose to take from her. I do not know what the verdict of history will be as to the conduct of the Allied statesmen in Paris. I do not know whether my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will be considered a more liberal-minded statesman than Castlereagh or Wellington, but they did see that their treaty with France secured to us in France a contented and prosperous neighbour. If we are to believe the people who have been in Paris the last thing which the Allied statesmen considered was what the international consequences of their policy would be.

It was very truly said by the right hon. Gentleman that in order to secure the liberty and happiness of the world, Great Britain must be strong and prosperous. I submit that the economic condition of this country is directly affected by the economic conditions of Central and Eastern Europe. Before the War we used to send £300,000,000 of exports out there. What is going to be the fortune of this country if Central and Eastern Europe collapses, and the women and the children are in a starving condition? After all, I. believe the high price of commodities in this country is very largely affected by the condition of mid-Europe. Sir George Paish has pointed out the depreciated, condition of the sovereign and that we cannot pay for what we buy from America because we cannot get paid for the goods we send to Germany. When are we going to get some of these indemnities which we were so lavishly promised at the last election? How is Germany to pay for the Armies of Occupation? How is she to pay these large indemnities on which the whole finance of France is based It cannot be done if we are going to rescue Germany. I should like to see a more liberal-minded policy adopted. After all, Burke said with perfect truth that "magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom." The conclusion of the matter is that if we want to rebuild we must realise that no nation lives to itself and that every nation has a right to live.

Only yesterday we were discussing the question of the erection of a fitting me morial to our glorious dead. I cannot help thinking that the most fitting memorial is to secure peace. The only condition under which permanent peace can be secured is the exercising from our foreign policy of militarism, strong domination, and power. No one values the friendship of France more than I do. No one admires her heroic fortitude or sympathises more deeply with her in her sufferings. I can quite understand her feelings. The late war, after all, was only the sequel to the age-long struggle which she has conducted. I would submit that we also have our traditional policy, which is based on international understanding and international co-operation. However much I admire France, I would wish that our statesmen who are sympathetic to her would tell her that the greatest guarantee of her safety, prosperity, and happiness is reliance on the principles of international co-operation and strength. We not only have our traditional policy. We also have our traditional instincts. We are a magnanimous and a generous people. Not only that, but we are a people who have some considerable political insight. If we pursue a policy based upon pure domination, suspicion, and force, the people of this country know perfectly well there is no vista before us except that of war. I should wish to see a more statesmanlike, a more generous, and a more magnanimous policy adopted ton ands Germany and Austria. Cannot we see that Austria can never recover her strength so long as the present peace conditions hold good?

Neither can I imagine Germany recovering her economic condition so long as the uncertainty of the indemnity is hanging over her head. The only way out of this is by the establishment of the League of Nations. Let that League get to work to reconsider and redraft the Peace Treaty. Let it fix the amount which Germany can pay—and let it be a fixed amount! Let us abandon once and for all this policy, this futile policy—which all history has proved so futile—of trying to keep a large portion of the people of Europe. permanently in economic and political subjection.